1. Introduction. Summary of previous episodes
This article concludes a series of articles devoted to discussing the reality of the task of building aircraft carriers in the Russian Federation.
The author's proposal on the need to consider an alternative concept of a light and affordable aircraft carrier and assess its capabilities in the Ministry of Defense did not arouse interest. Therefore, this series can only be viewed as a fantasy on the topic:
"What would happen if you were interested?"
In reality, from time to time we pull out the project of the full-size aircraft carrier Storm, shake off the dust from it, then look into the wallet and, making sure that there is no more money, we cross out the line from the GPV.
In the meantime, there are no new proposals, we have to remember Nekrasov:
"Or, obeying the law of fate,
You have already done everything that you could
Created Kuzyu like a moan
And he rested spiritually forever. "
You have already done everything that you could
Created Kuzyu like a moan
And he rested spiritually forever. "
Naturally, all tactical techniques in this article are calculated based on the assumptions that in the 2030s the technical level of weapons will increase on both sides.
In the first article in the series "The effectiveness of the air defense of the naval strike group" Using the example of the US AUG, it is shown that the AUG has a multi-echeloned air defense, which requires huge resources to break through - no less than an air regiment or a squadron with dozens of anti-ship missiles.
No single ship, even armed with supersonic anti-ship missiles (SPKR), will be able to hit an aircraft carrier with one dashing attack. Hopes for a miracle missile "aircraft carrier killer" should be attributed to the realm of non-technical fiction. What the hypersound will give, and whether the overheated GPCR will be able to find the aircraft carrier, diving at it from a height of 40 km, is completely unknown.
Some "experts" say that the age of aircraft carriers is over, and our Navy only needs to control 1000 km along the coast. They do not accept explanations why not only China, but even France are building aircraft carriers. Therefore, we need to decide the question not of whether to "build or not build", but which aircraft carrier to build in the conditions of the Navy financing on a leftover basis?
Article "The concept of an aircraft-carrying cruiser with a sixth generation UAV" it is shown that on the basis of UDC "Priboy" or "Ivan Rogov" with a displacement of 25-30 thousand tons, it is possible to build an aircraft-carrying cruiser (AK) worth 1 billion dollars. The cost of an air wing, consisting of 40 UAVs of subsonic fighter-bombers (IS) and 3 UAVs of AWACS, should be about the same. If inexpensive ammunition is developed for the IS UAV, then the AK will surpass all ships in terms of cost-effectiveness in regional conflicts.
In the same article, it is noted that in the Russian Federation there are no ships with Aegis-class air defense systems, and the AK air defense task must solve itself. To do this, it is necessary to place a powerful radar complex (RLK) on the AK, superior to the Aegis radar system. The article Air defense efficiency of a promising destroyer.
Alternative radar complex the design of such a radar was justified and it was shown that its cost would be less than 10% of the price of the ship. Low-altitude targets are detected by an AWACS UAV, the design of which is described in the article "Concept of shipborne unmanned aircraft AWACS"... With a mass of only 6 tons, it provides significantly better performance than Hawkeye AWACS. In particular, it can provide highly accurate guidance weapons.
In the last (from published) article "Air defense tactics of a promising aircraft-carrying cruiser" it is shown that with the coordinated actions of the radar, AWACS and UAVs of the IS, most of the anti-ship missiles will be destroyed at distant lines, and that the air defense system will only have to repel single attacks. This article substantiates the tactics of conducting operations against the enemy's KUG.
It is necessary to remind once again that the author is not an aircraft designer, and all the given performance characteristics are given roughly.
2. Preparation of AUG actions against destroyers Orly Burke
Immediately, we note that the possibility of a counter battle between our and the American AUGs is not being considered. For such a battle, we need to make up an AUG of 3-4 AK, when the advantages of the AK group defense and the numerical superiority of the IS UAV will make it possible to compensate for their lower strike potential. Therefore, we will consider the task of striking the US CUG, which is feasible for the AK, which includes 1 Orly Burke destroyer and ships of smaller classes.
We will assume that the opponents are aware of each other's presence long before the actual start of the battle. KUG receives control center from satellites at intervals of 1 hour. The AK receives only a rough command control from the AWACS UAV, but continuously. It will not be possible to obtain the exact control center for the AK because of the operation of the electronic countermeasures (KREP) complexes.
Suppose the distance to the nearest enemy airfield is more than 1200 km. Therefore, it is possible that only small IS groups may appear, arriving with the use of refueling or overhead tanks. We will assume that they will not pose a serious danger.
Therefore, further we will consider only the tactics of the AK-KUG duel. Placement of anti-ship missiles on the AK is not provided. A number of anti-ship missiles are deployed on escort ships. However, it is irrational to use them, having only a rough control system.
The rapid development of KREP technology will lead to the emergence of jamming UAVs (UAVs) flying away from the ship by a few kilometers. Under the influence of interference, anti-ship missiles can be diverted to decoys.
2.1. Air defense capabilities of the destroyer Orly Burke
The air defense of the American destroyer is provided by the Aegis air defense system. The modern version of the air defense system has a radar, consisting of two radars, each of which contains 3 AFAR, providing all-round visibility. Multifunctional (MF) radar operates in the 10-cm wavelength range and produces all-weather target detection and tracking. The missile guidance radar operates in a 3-cm range and provides high-precision tracking and target illumination. The detection range of the MF radar is supposedly 400–500 km according to IS.
For our UAVs, the greatest danger is posed by the long-range missile defense system (MD) SM6. In the public domain (Wikipedia) it is stated that the launch range of this missile is 250 km, and the speed is 3-4 M. However, according to experts, its characteristics are clearly underestimated. Now there are two modifications of missiles, and in 2024 the third, the most powerful, will be adopted.
Since the exact values are unknown, we will take an estimate of the maximum speed of 2-2,5 km / s and the firing range against air targets of 370 km, and against sea targets - 460 km. When launched at such ranges, the altitude of the upper point of the trajectory will exceed 40 km. The radar homing head (GOS) of the SAM is unified with the GOS UR AMRAAM and also provides guidance to the SAM and ships.
At present, almost all destroyers are equipped with Standard-2 air defense missiles with firing ranges of 120-240 km, but the new series will be equipped with SM6. The cost of the SM6 is quite high - $ 4 million. Therefore, it is difficult to expect that the entire maximum available number of launchers (74) will be occupied by SM6. Further, assume that only half of the launchers (36) will be occupied by SM6.
The short-range air defense line is provided by the Sea Sparrow SAM with a launch range of 20 km. The disadvantage of this missile defense system is that it is converted from the old aviation UR medium-range and has a semi-active seeker, requiring illumination from the ship's radar, and a heavy warhead - 45 kg. As a result, the mass of the SAM is 225 kg. The advantage of the SAM is its relative cheapness - apparently about 200 thousand dollars.
KREP SLQ-32, located on the destroyer, has a very high energy potential - up to 1 MW, which is achieved due to the formation of narrow beams directed to the suppressed radar. KREP is designed to suppress IS radar, which traditionally operate in the range of 3-4 cm, as well as the GOS of the anti-ship missile system, operating in the 0,8-3 cm range. Wavelengths over 4 cm are not suppressed. Consequently, the IS and AWACS UAV radars, operating in the 5,5 cm range, will be suppressed only by the UAV jammers (SP), and their energy potential is tens to hundreds of times less than the energy potential of the ship's CREDs.
2.2. Determination of the number of ships in the KUG
To strike, it is necessary to open the composition and configuration of the KUG.
In the absence of interference, the AWACS could determine the coordinates of ships from safe ranges of 400-500 km. And the error of definition would be satisfactory: 100-200 m. However, the taken out PP can mask the marks of targets. For this, the PP must be in the beam of the AWACS radar when the beam is directed to the target. With a distance from the AWACS to the target of 400 km and a radar beam width of 0,7 °, the distance of the PP from the ship should not exceed ± 2 km. Therefore, if the AWACS locates the PP instead of the target, then such a CO will still remain inaccurate.
To combat PP, it is best to use a second AWACS. The distance between the two AWACS should be large - about 100 km. Then you can use the second AWACS in semi-active mode. That is, he himself does not emit, but uses the illumination of targets from the first AWACS. Consequently, the SP will irradiate only the active AWACS, and the second will either remain completely unirradiated, or the interference power will be an order of magnitude less. In addition, if the interference signals received by both AWACS are retransmitted to the AC, then the signal of the first AWACS can be used to compensate for the interference in the second. The coordinate determination error can increase up to 200–400 m.
3. The tactics of using anti-ship missiles
When the AUG and the KUG come closer to a distance of 600 km, the AUG, in principle, can already start a battle. But this is unprofitable, since the launch range of supersonic anti-ship missiles (SPKR) of the Onyx type and an IS UAV is close to the limit.
To start the battle, the KUG also needs to have a SPKR, since the launch range of the Harpoon subsonic anti-ship missiles (DPKR) is less than 300 km. Our DPKR Kh-35u has the same range. The 3M14 Caliber could have been used as a DPKR BD, but no such use was announced.
The advantage of the proposed AWACS UAV is its high flight altitude - 17 km. Accordingly, the range of the horizon for detecting ships by him reaches 500 km. The detection range of AWACS flying at an altitude of 10 km is 400 km.
Therefore, the presence in the AUG of the BD 40N6E missile defense system with a launch range of 400 km almost excludes the use of AWACS, since it has no information security at such distances. And it is dangerous to hope for the protection of the Aegis air defense system.
3.1. Possibilities of targeting anti-ship missiles to a target in jamming conditions (special point for those interested)
The basic principle of operation of the radar is that the antenna beam is exposed in the next specified direction. And then a short pulse of the selected length is emitted there. The entire distance along which the pulse is rolled is divided into elements, the length of which is equal to the pulse length.
If there is a target at a distance, then the echo signal reflected from it returns to the radar after a while. Knowing the signal delay and pulse velocity, you can determine the distance to the element where the target is. On the radar display, this element is highlighted by a mark, the brightness of which is proportional to the power of the echo signal.
The enemy, seeking to suppress the radar, can emit two types of interference.
Noise interference operates continuously and illuminates all range elements on the indicator, so it requires a high average interference power.
Simulation interference is a rare pulse that copies radar pulses. Accordingly, they simulate target marks only in a small number of range elements. And this requires tens of times less power than a noise interference.
The second method for increasing the efficiency of interference is the use of rather large antennas in the CRED, forming a narrow beam. As a result, the power flux density of the jammer in the direction of the jammed radar increases. Since PP UAVs are small in size, they, in contrast to KREP ships, more often increase efficiency through the use of imitation noise.
Next, we will consider the dynamics of guidance of the SPKR in the presence of a PP UAV.
Let the Onyx-type SPKR fly up to the target at a low altitude of 10 m. At a distance of 15–25 km, the seeker is switched on and the target search begins. The specific range of inclusion and the width of the search zone are determined by the accuracy of the control center and the accuracy of the SPKR entering the search zone. If the output of the SPKR to the target is made by the same AWACS that detected the target, then using the transponder of the radio correction line of the SPKR, the output error can be reduced to 100 m.
At the moment of turning on the seeker, it is desirable for the UAV PP to take a position to the side of the protected ship by 0,5-1 km and 1-2 km forward in the direction of the SPKR.
Suppose that in response to turning on the GOS, the PS will emit several simulation pulses. One of the pulses must be emitted so as to coincide in time with the echo reflected from the ship. The power of this simulation pulse should be several times the power of the echo.
Then the GOS will perceive the sum of the echo and the pulse as a single echo signal reflected from the target, but the direction to this false target will coincide with the direction to the more powerful PP pulse. The typical beam width of the seeker is 5–7 °, so at a distance of 5–8 km, the true target will come out of the seeker beam, since the beam is directed at the decoy target.
As a result, guidance will continue on the PP, and there will be no target in the beam. The control of the delay time of the PP pulses is performed by the ship's radar, which measures the exact trajectory of the SPKR and, knowing the exact position of the PP, calculates the required pulse delay.
The AWACS could deal with the diversion of the seeker to a false target, since the AWACS and the seeker operate in different wavelengths. If the coordinates of the target, determined by the AWACS and the GOS, differ significantly, then the AWACS can issue a command to search for a target in the zone that the AWACS considers correct. However, it should be taken into account that in the presence of several UAVs, the submarine AWACS may also not understand the situation.
3.2. Long-range anti-ship missile attack tactics
Let's assume that the AUG is at a safe distance of 500 km from the KUG. The launch range of the Onyx SPKR equipped with a ramjet engine was announced to be 650 km. For such SPKR, the maximum range is achieved when flying along a trajectory at altitudes of more than 12 km.
If the SPKR flies the entire distance at low altitude, then the flight range will be reduced by 4–5 times. Therefore, when the SPKR is launched from a range of 500 km, it will be possible to fly no more than 40 km at low altitude. Taking into account the fact that the SPKR at low-altitude flight leaves the horizon at a distance of 30 km, we find that the covert flight section (10 km) is negligible. The only gain will be that at low altitudes the probability of being hit by missiles decreases.
When flying at high altitudes, the Aegis MF radar will be able to detect SPKR at a range of up to 300-400 km. If a decision is made to destroy the SPKR with the help of the SM6 missile defense system, then the meeting point will be assigned at a short range of about 100 km, where the probability of defeat is very high, since the SPKR at such ranges does not yet maneuver, and the missile guidance accuracy is high.
In the event of a miss SM6, the second attempt to defeat the SPKR will already be provided by a pair of MD missiles. The point of the second meeting (15 km) will allow (in case of a miss) to perform a third attempt at defeat.
It is possible to increase the probability of survival of the SPKR if you perform intensive maneuvering at the time of the approach of the missile defense system. The SPKR cannot constantly maneuver due to the loss of speed. To detect an attacking missile defense system, a standard seeker could be used, which would require the introduction of new operating modes of the seeker and the development of appropriate algorithms. The power of the seeker is small, and independently detect missiles with an RCS of 0,1–0,3 sq. m it will be able to at a distance of 2-4 km, which is not enough to determine the trajectory of the missile defense system and select the optimal anti-aircraft maneuver.
On the cruise phase of the flight, when the SPKR flies at an altitude of more than 20 km, the missile defense radar of the AK will be able to detect the missile defense system and transmit the control center to the SPKR. Then the detection range of the seeker will increase to 6–8 km. Even if the GOS did not detect the missile defense system, the maneuver can be started according to the missile defense radar data, albeit suboptimal.
On the descent site, when the height of the SPKR becomes less than 10 km, the SPKR will be below the horizon of the missile defense radar, and the issuance of the control center will become impossible. The detection of missiles during flight at low altitudes could provide an AWACS, but for this it needs to approach the destroyer at least 150-200 km, which is extremely dangerous. The number of SPKR in AUG is small, and the number of air defense missile systems and MD Kuga exceeds 100.
The cost of the US destroyer is estimated at $ 2 billion, so the placement of 36 SM6 missiles on them seems to be quite justified. Ammunition anti-ship missiles of the Navy and the US Air Force is 7 thousand units. Comparing the military budgets of the Russian Federation and the United States, you quickly realize that you need to look for an asymmetric answer. The reality of the possibility of building an AK, which (together with the air wing) should cost about the same as Orly Burke, causes disbelief among VO readers.
Meanwhile, the IB UAVs allow the use of much cheaper ammunition than the SPKR or SAM BD. Of course, we would also like to have a universal missile defense system that successfully fulfills the role of the SPKR. What is the shape of our 40N6E SAM is still unknown. If it turns out to be no worse than the SM6 SAM, then the question arises - how many such SAMs will we have and when? What radars will be capable of directing such a missile defense system at a range of 400 km and for what purposes? So far, frigates of the Admiral Gorshkov type, capable of at least somehow use the data of the missile defense system, we have 4 fleet all 2.
As a result, we come to the conclusion that even without taking into account the effect of the interference, the probability of a destroyer being hit by regular SPKR is very small. Therefore, further we will consider an alternative method of striking.
4. Use of UAV IS for strike
4.1. KUG ammunition depletion concept. Prospects for the use of light anti-ship missiles
The lightest SPKR X-31 have a launch range of not much more than 100 km and do not provide an opportunity for IS launch from safe areas. The next DPKR X-35 has a launch range of 300 km. But, like other DPKR, it has a low survival rate, and its weight increases to 700 kg.
The rest of the anti-ship missiles are even more expensive and heavier. In many ways, such a mass of anti-ship missiles is explained by the requirement to have a heavy warhead of 200-400 kg in order to hit the ship with a single hit. It is also required to ensure the principle of "let and forget". And an independent search for a goal in a wide sector. As a result, the dimensions and mass of the anti-ship missile system increase. And the likelihood of their defeat by missiles or ZAKs increases. The increase in the mass and cost of the SPKR leads to a decrease in ammunition. SPKR DB are so heavy that a typical IS cannot lift them.
Bombers Tu-22m3, Tu-95, Tu-160 are capable of carrying 2-4 SPKR, but they themselves have such a high visibility that they cannot enter the zone of destruction of the ship's air defense. The safe distance from these aircraft to the Aegis air defense system with the SM6 SAM will be 450 km. The conventional radar of these aircraft is many times inferior to the radar of the AWACS both in range, and in accuracy, and in noise protection. Therefore, if the SPKR is launched, it will not be by target marks, but by the patch of interference seen by the radar in place of the KUG. After the launch of the seeker, the PRK will have to independently deal with the interference and evade the missile defense system.
The essence of the alternative concept of anti-ship missiles is that in conditions of a powerful enemy air defense, it is better to have several simple, light and cheap anti-ship missiles than one excellent, heavy and expensive one.
It is important to create a "zugzwang" situation for the enemy, when he cannot not spend missiles by firing at our anti-ship missiles, and the number of anti-ship missiles we have is obviously greater than his anti-missile defense systems. When the KUG uses all the SAM ammunition, it will remain virtually defenseless.
As a light anti-ship missile, it is proposed to use a modification of a gliding bomb (PB) with IR seeker, described in the article "Concept of an aircraft-carrying cruiser". The disadvantage of the PB is the short flight range of 100–150 km. The range can be increased by installing a starting booster.
Suppose that with a PB weight of 120–130 kg, an accelerator weighing 90–100 kg can accelerate the PB to a speed of 1200 m / s and undock. A PB with an accelerator will be called a planning anti-ship missile (PPKR).
The PPKR trajectory consists of several stages:
- UAV IS rises to an altitude of 16-18 km at a speed of 270 m / s.
- Then the PPKR accelerator is launched, and the PPKR along a trajectory close to ballistic, rises to an altitude of about 40 km at a speed at the highest point of 750 m / s.
- Next, planning towards the goal is carried out. It is assumed that the maximum gliding range will be achieved when it is possible to ensure the minimum speed at the end of the section of 150 m / s. At this moment, the PPKR should be almost at the target at an altitude of 3 km.
- To avoid being hit by the ZAK Vulcan-Fallanx, after the end of the planning section, the PPKR switches to the dive mode, for which the wing is dropped. The speed at the end of the dive increases to 270 m / s.
As a result, due to the fact that most of the trajectory passes in the stratosphere, the flight range of the PPKR with a mass of 220 kg reaches approximately 300 km. This is despite the fact that the PPKR uses a simple solid-fuel accelerator. The advantage of light PPKR is that the UAV IB can carry 4 such PPKR. With a heavier booster, by increasing the mass of the PPKR to 350 kg, the launch range can be increased to 400 km. But such PPKR UAVs can only carry two. As a result, the enemy will use up half the missiles, which is unprofitable.
Starting from high altitudes allows you to gain altitude up to 40 km with low energy losses and fly the supersonic gliding section at altitudes of more than 20 km, which provides a slow loss of speed. An additional advantage of the PPKR is its low visibility (EPR less than 0,01 sq. M) and small dimensions - 1,7 m long, 0,19 m in diameter, making PPKR a difficult target for missiles.
4.2. Anti-missile defense tactics (special point for those interested)
This paragraph deals with the preliminary stage of the attack, when the enemy is provoked to launch the maximum number of missile defense systems. The greatest difficulty in overcoming the air defense of the KUG is the problem of combating the hypersonic SAM SM6. UAV IB (in the presence of ammunition on the external sling) cannot have low visibility. Therefore, when flying at an altitude of more than 15 km, UAVs can be detected by Aegis radar at a distance to the horizon of 500 km. Consequently, already at a distance of 350-400 km, an IS UAV can be hit.
Manned IS use flight at altitudes below the horizon, and only after approaching the launch line, completing a "slide" and finding a target, they launch anti-ship missiles. On the contrary, the launch of PPKR can only occur from high altitudes. Realizing the inevitability of an encounter with SM6, consider the tactics that make this encounter as easy as possible.
It is necessary to force the air defense missile system to launch the SM6 at maximum ranges, when the speed of the missile defense system drops to 2-3 M. For this, the enemy must know that the UAV can carry up to 4 PPKR, and it is better to destroy it before reaching the launch line.
The flight altitude of the UAV should be 13-14 km, so that the operator of the air defense missile system was afraid that the UAV could rise another 3 km and launch the PPKR, and did not doubt the reality of the possibility of hitting the UAV.
- It is necessary that the AK missile defense radar detects the SM6 already during the acceleration of this missile defense system.
- Having received data on the launch of the missile defense system, the UAV quickly descends below the horizon and, having completed the descent, moves aside by 20-30 km.
- GOS SAM, having lost the support of the MF radar, will not be able to detect the UAV and will miss.
- If the missile defense system accidentally or according to third-party sources turns in the direction of the UAV maneuver, then the missile defense radar must issue a command for the UAV to use PR against the missile defense system.
It is desirable to use 2 UAVs at the same time, separated from each other by 100–120 km. Then the operator of the air defense missile system will be forced to launch a pair of missiles at once. Only by detecting the launch of the second missile defense system, it is possible to allow both UAVs to descend below the horizon, otherwise the launch of the second missile defense system may be canceled. After both missiles miss, UAVs can rise above the horizon in new places and repeat the whole scenario again. It is impossible only to approach the KUG at a distance of less than 300 km, so as not to reduce the balance of time for UAV maneuvers. If, after several SM6 misses, the operator stops further launches, then it will be possible to push the UAV to the next line - 250 km, from which it is possible to launch the PPKR, having a certain margin of launch range.
4.3. Preparation of the launch of the PPKR. Exploration of coordinates KUG
The launch of the PPKR will be carried out from two positions located at the turn of 250-280 km and spaced 100-120 km along the front. UAVs AWACS are critical assets for the entire operation. Therefore, the AWACS should be behind the UAV, in this case, at the turn of 300-330 km at an altitude of 6-8 km.
Having taken this line, the AWACS begins to irradiate the KUG. In response, PP KUGa begin to suppress the AWACS radar. From such a range, it is impossible to provide accurate command guidance of the PPKR. Of course, in favorable conditions, even with inaccurate guidance, the IR GOS PPKR would provide guidance to a given compartment of the ship.
But in reality, the enemy, knowing that the ICGS is installed on the PPKR, will interfere. For example, in the form of aerosol clouds, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to strive to reduce the error of command guidance by 3-4 times. For this, it is necessary to create a reconnaissance group consisting of an AWACS UAV and an IS UAV equipped with PR.
The group in stealth mode moves forward and takes a position for AWACS at the turn of 150 km, and for IS at the turn of 100 km. Further, the group checks the intention of the air defense missile system operator to fire the approaching IS. For this, the IS rises to an altitude of 1 km and begins to defiantly patrol at this range, imitating an AWACS UAV.
The AWACS of the group, while continuing to remain below the horizon, begins to irradiate the space above the KUG in order to record the fact of the launch of the anti-aircraft missile defense system. If the launch took place, then the IB, having dropped below the horizon, goes to the side. AWACS continues to control the flight of missiles. And, if it is found that the missile defense system has guessed the location of the IS, it issues a command to use a pair of PR against the missile defense system. Since the ranges to the missile defense system are small, high accuracy of the PR guidance will be ensured.
Only in the event of the termination of the launches of the missile defense system, a command is issued to start the launches of the first pair of UAVs from the line of 250 km. At this time, the AWACS of the group in a covert mode flies up to the 100-120 km line. 30 seconds before the first PPKR approaches the target, the AWACS rises above the horizon and in semi-active mode for 10-15 seconds receives the coordinates of the ships. Further, the AWACS drops below the horizon, continuing to direct the PPKR. Pointing error will be less than 30 m.
4.4. Striking tactics
Having detected a PPKR raid, the enemy will not use SM6 on them, since for subsonic targets it is better to use MD missiles, which are launched in pairs. However, the stock of MD missiles is also small. And destroyer will not be able to destroy more than 20-30 PPKR. After the end of the stock of the MD SAM, it remains only to continue the launches of the SM6, but already only on the UAVs located closer than 300 km.
If missile launches occur, then the next approaching UAVs are at an altitude of 13-14 km, which allows them to quickly descend to a safe altitude in the event of a threat. Nevertheless, approaching the 250 km line, the UAVs must rise to an altitude of 16-18 km.
After detecting the launch of the SM6, the UAV turns around and leaves, while simultaneously descending at a maximum speed to an altitude of 4 km. Before the turn, the first pair of missiles is launched in a gliding mode towards the missile defense system. When SM6 descends to an altitude of 20-25 km, PR start engines and start towards. The meeting of the first pair with SM6 occurs at a distance of 35–40 km from the UAV. After evaluating the results of the first start, the second pair is started, which starts in a gliding mode and starts the engines immediately after the completion of the turn. Their meeting with the SAM should take place at a distance of 5-7 km from the UAV.
Let us briefly mention that it is possible to propose a variant of disrupting the SM6 attack with the help of KREP, the role of which should be played by the UAV radar. AFAR radar should operate in the same 3 cm range as the seeker SM6. Then a pair of UAVs, separated by 500-700 m, can organize flickering interference, when the interference is switched on alternately from one UAV or another. Switching rate 2–3 s. When, at a distance of 4-5 km, the missile defense system finally aims at one of the interference, this interference is turned off. And the second turns on and suppresses the seeker along the side lobes of its antenna. At this moment, the first UAV makes an intense maneuver and moves away.
If SM6 starts stopped. And there is reason to believe that there are only a few of them left, then both AWACS (accompanied by UAVs with PR) can fly up to the KUG at a distance of 100-120 km at an altitude of 1-1,5 km. At such ranges, PPs will no longer be able to hide targets. From the line of 120 km, IS UAVs can launch already conventional PBs, carrying 6 of them.
5. Conclusions. Final assessment of the effectiveness of the aircraft carrier
- The estimated cost of a serial AK, along with an air wing and ammunition, is comparable to the cost of a US destroyer with ammunition.
- The long range of the air wing's action against ground and sea targets is 600 km, and the air defense border is 200 km.
- The joint work of the AK radar and the AWACS radar allows the UAV to successfully detect attacking missiles and evade the attack. In critical situations, PR can successfully solve missile defense missions.
- UAV AWACS is capable of targeting weapons, which makes it possible to simplify the seeker and reduce the cost of ammunition.
- The cheapness of gliding ammunition makes it possible to use the concept of an "attacking swarm" and force the enemy to use up a set of missiles of any air defense system.
- The use of PB from a height of 16-18 km along the way allows the UAV to fly safely over the affected area of any air defense missile system MD.
- The combat effectiveness of the AK significantly exceeds the effectiveness of its "classmates" - Peter the Great and the modernized admiral Nakhimov. And in the "smaller class" Orly Burke, AK wins for a clear advantage.
- AK is intended for use in regional conflicts. And should not engage in direct combat with the US AUG. But the amalgamation of 3-4 AK will be able to solve this problem due to the multiple advantages in the rate of aircraft sorties, especially repeated ones.