Tsushima: fires

175

Tsushima fires became a mysterious phenomenon for the reason that, firstly, nothing similar was observed in other battles of the Russo-Japanese War, and secondly, British and French tests of projectiles equipped with picric acid did not reveal their ability to initiate fires.

Well, let's take a closer look at these issues.



First, let's find out the circumstances of the fires in the Tsushima battle.

As S.I. Lutonin:

"A fire in battle is the most terrible thing, it paralyzes all actions, stops the fire."

Of all the battleships of the 1st Detachment, systematic fire-fighting measures were carried out only on the Orel. The rest of the ships went into battle with flammable decoration and furniture in the living quarters, wood on the rostrum, whole warehouses of various combustible items and materials in the rooms above the armored deck.

"Prince of Suvorov"


"Prince Suvorov" received many more hits in battle than any other Russian ship. About 100 shells with a caliber of 6 "and above, according to V. Yu. Gribovsky.

He came under intense fire from the first minutes of the battle. And the fires were not long in coming.

The bed protection around the conning tower caught fire, the wooden paneling of the signal house, then the boats and wood on the rostrum, cabins and sparklers.

Attempts to fight the fire ended in failure: fragments interrupted the fire hoses, hitting people from the emergency party.

At about 14:30, due to loss of control, "Prince Suvorov" was out of order and received a short respite. It burned like a wooden hut, from the bow bridge to the aft 12 "tower. It was impossible to walk from bow to stern along the upper deck. The time in the wheelhouse became unbearable due to the heat and smoke.

At about 15:00, the battleship approached the Japanese squadron and again came under heavy fire. The foremast and tail tube were shot down. Huge fires did not stop there.

At about 16:00, after the "Prince Suvorov" once again came under Japanese fire from close range, fires broke out with renewed vigor, covering the entire surface of the ship above the armor belt.

The wooden paneling in the premises, paint and putty on board burned, 75-mm shells exploded in the battery. The upper deck was so hot that the metal was deformed. And the deck sank in places.

"Prince Suvorov" lost the front tube and mainmast. Almost the entire side above the armor belt was destroyed. The ship turned into a floating ruin, from which smoke and flames erupted periodically.

And in this form it existed until the moment of its death.

"Emperor Alexander III"


"Emperor Alexander III" was the target for the Japanese for almost the entire battle. And received, according to V. Yu. Gribovsky, about 50 hits with a caliber of 6 ”and above.

The first big fire on the battleship occurred in the area of ​​the aft bridge, when it was still following the flagship.

He received especially many hits at 14: 30-14: 40, when he was in charge of the squadron. And fires raged throughout the ship.

The fire was managed during the pause after the first phase of the battle. But then the Japanese shells turned it into a torch again.

By evening, the "Emperor Alexander III" had completely burnt (to iron) sides and unceasing fires at the conning tower and on the back deck.

Borodino


"Borodino" led the squadron the longest and received (according to V. Yu. Gribovsky) about 60 hits with a caliber of 6 "and above.

While he was following Suvorov and Alexander III, hits were rare. And the team successfully coped with the fires that occurred from time to time.

After "Borodino" became the first, a hail of Japanese shells fell on it, a huge fire broke out in the area of ​​the forward conning tower. However, during a pause in the battle, they managed to cope with the fire.

New large fires broke out in the last phase of the battle, where the battleship had a particularly hard time.

The fire engulfed the entire stern.

In the last minutes of Borodino's life, eyewitnesses observed long tongues of flame bursting into the sky near the stern bridge. Perhaps it was gunpowder burning.

So a version appeared that the ship died from the explosion of the cellars.

"Eagle"


On the Orel, unlike other Borodino residents, extensive measures were taken to prevent fires before the battle: wood reserves were removed from the rostrum, the wooden sheathing of the wheelhouse and living quarters was removed, furniture from the officers' cabins and personal belongings from the battery were removed.

In battle, the battleship, according to N.J.M. Campbell, received 55 hits with a caliber of 6 ”and above.

Despite all measures, up to 30 fires were recorded on the ship.

Most often, fires occurred on the spardeck, the upper deck, as well as on the bridges and rostra. Boats, cutters, bed nets, personal belongings, cabin interiors, deck decking, tarpaulin plasters, coal bags, food supplies, paint and putty on board, ropes, tackle, communication pipes, electrical wiring were burning.

Flames flashed twice in the battery, accompanied by explosions of their own 47-mm and 75-mm shells. Charges ignited in the 6-inch turret.

The last hearths on the Orel were extinguished after the end of the day's battle, in the dark.

According to the recollections of the Eagle's officers, the fires seriously reduced the ship's combat effectiveness.

Heat and smoke interfered with aiming. They made it impossible to be at their posts in the wheelhouse, towers and even in the lower rooms (due to ventilation). Suppressed crew morale.

The fire destroyed communication pipes, electrical wiring, fire hoses, and ammunition elevators.

The emergency parties suffered losses from shells and shrapnel, suffocated from choking smoke.

Water from extinguishing fires accumulated on decks and aggravated the list, increasing the risk of the ship capsizing.

"Oslyabya"


Oslyabya came under intense Japanese fire at the very beginning of the battle.

And received, according to V. Yu. Gribovsky, about 40 hits with a caliber of 6 "and above.

Despite the rapid destruction of the ship, large fires managed to spread on the rostrum and on the forward bridge.

"Sisoy Great"


Sisoi the Great escaped the attention of the Japanese gunners at the start of the battle.

However, later he periodically fell under their fire.

In total, according to the report of the commander of the ship, M.V. Ozerov, 15 shells hit him.

Despite the measures taken (the cabins were removed, materials capable of burning were hidden behind the armor), it was not possible to avoid a huge fire in the battery, which broke out at about 15:15.

A Japanese shell flew into the embrasure and exploded on the deck.

The fire quickly spread over the materials stacked there as if in a safe place: paint, wood, food supplies, charcoal baskets, tarps.

The fire main was broken by shrapnel. Therefore, it was not possible to quickly extinguish the fire.

The fire spread up to the Spardeck. And he even nearly penetrated down into the shell cellars.

To extinguish the fire, Sisoy the Great was even forced to be temporarily out of order. And only by 17:00 did they manage to cope with the fire.

In addition, several smaller fires were noted that were more easily extinguished.

"Navarin"


The Navarin suffered less damage than the other ships of the 2nd detachment in the daytime battle.

According to V. Yu. Gribovsky's estimate, he received about 12 hits with a caliber of 6 ”and above.

Before the battle, an extra tree was removed on the battleship.

Fires were noted in the stern, in the wardroom and in the bow, in the cabins of the conductors.

We managed to deal with them quickly enough.

"Admiral Nakhimov"


"Admiral Nakhimov" (according to the report of midshipman A. Rozhdestvensky) received 18 hits.

Before the battle, the tree was removed: cabins lining, partitions, furniture.

Japanese shells started several fires. The largest one is in the bow on the battery deck.

But in all cases the fire was quickly extinguished.

In battle, the ships of the detachment of Admiral N.I. Nebogatov rarely fell under enemy fire.

Before going on a campaign and immediately before the battle, fire-fighting measures were carried out on them to remove wood from the rostrum and from the interior of the casing, furniture and other combustible materials.

"Emperor Nicholas I"


"Emperor Nicholas I", according to N.J.M. Campbell, received about 10 shells.

The resulting fires were quickly extinguished.

"Admiral Apraksin"


"Admiral Apraksin", according to the testimony of the commander of the ship N. G. Lishin, received 2 hits in battle.

The shrapnel initiated two minor fires.

In the wardroom, paint, a piano and a bookcase caught fire. And in the senior officer's cabin - in a trunk with linen.

"Admiral Ushakov"


"Admiral Ushakov" (according to the testimony of midshipman IA Ditlov) took three Japanese shells in battle on May 14.

One of them caused a fire in the nose, which was quickly extinguished.

Admiral Senyavin


Admiral Senyavin successfully avoided direct hits.

In the battle in the Yellow Sea, not a single large fire was noted on the Russian squadron. All fires that occurred were local and quickly extinguished.

In other words, on July 28, 1904, even on the most damaged ships, the situation with fires was about the same as on ships that received a small number of hits on May 14. In the battle in the Yellow Sea, the Russian battleships did not find themselves under such intense and accurate Japanese fire as in Tsushima, but there was no way to quickly fight the fires. "Sisoy the Great" is an exception caused by an unfavorable coincidence.

Thus, a much larger number of hits from Japanese shells and their high intensity are the most important cause of large fires on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

For comparison: the ship of the 28st Pacific Squadron Peresvet, the most damaged on July 1, received, according to V. N. Cherkasov, 34 shells (excluding fragmentation damage and night hits from destroyers). The situation was aggravated by the huge amount of combustible materials in the squadron of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

Flammable effect


Now let's move on to the second question - the incendiary action of picric acid projectiles.

The experience of the wars preceding the Russo-Japanese war testified that the fires did not take on large proportions and were easily extinguished in the bud if the team quickly took up the extinguishing.

At the Battle of Yalu (1894), numerous fires engulfed the ships of both sides.

They were especially strong and long lasting on Chinese ships.

The flagship battleship Dingyuan received about 220 hits. A fire that broke out at one time engulfed the entire bow and central part of the ship, temporarily silencing almost all of the guns. But it was extinguished.

Armored cruiser Laiyuan received over 200 hits. It burned out the entire surface of the ship, including coal in the bunkers, paint and side putty. The body was deformed from the heat.

Both sides used shells filled with black powder.

Explosives based on picric acid were not used before the Russo-Japanese War. And their flammable properties were known only from tests.

In 1899, the French hit the wooden advice note "Parseval" with 10 shells filled with melinite, but not a single fire broke out.

The British in 1900, on trials, hit the battleship Belile, among others, about 30-40 shells equipped with liddite. But there were no fires either. Although the ship had boats, furniture, wood trim, bedding and other combustible materials.

The prevailing views on the threat of fires in naval combat at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War can be described with the phrase of N.L. Klado:

"The flammable effect of a projectile is highly dependent on its content: if gunpowder easily ignites a fire, then melinite and liddite, if they can do it, then only in exceptional cases."

The experience of naval battles in 1904 generally confirmed this.

Thus, the large fires on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron were a big surprise for contemporaries.

The naval battles of the First World War demonstrated a negligible flammable effect of shells. Serious fires occurred only when gunpowder in the charges caught fire.

Experienced shooting British fleet in 1919 on the battleship "Swiftshur" revealed the absence of incendiary action of shells. Although a large amount of chips and debris was specially left on the ship to simulate Tsushima conditions.

However, Japanese shells have confirmed a strong flammable effect not only in Tsushima, but also in tests.

On October 4, 1915, the battle cruisers Congo and Hiei shot the battleship Iki (formerly Emperor Nicholas I), anchored in Ise Bay, with ammunition filled with shimosa.

Of the 128 shells fired from a distance of 12 km, 24 hit the target. Large fires broke out. The battleship drowned.

So why did British and French picric acid-based explosives have less flammable action than Japanese explosives?

The fact is that both the British and the French did not use pure picric acid, but phlegmatized it.

For example, English liddite consisted of 87% picric acid, 10% dinitrobenzene, and 3% petroleum jelly.

The French in melinite mixed picric acid with collodion. A very wide range of impurities has been used by different countries at different times.

The Japanese, on the other hand, loaded ammunition with pure picric acid., not wanting to reduce the force of its explosion by phlegmatizers.

As a result (due to too much blasting) shimosa in most cases did not fully detonate... This was especially clearly seen in the yellow smoke and yellow traces from the rupture - this is in the case when the shimosa did not burn out.

If the non-detonated remnants of shimosa ignited, then fires appeared. Fragments of Japanese shells had the greatest incendiary effect.

V.P. Kostenko described one such case:

“A fragment of an exploding shell up to seven pounds, weighing up to seven pounds, flew into the left vehicle along the mine, lingering on the indicator platforms.

It still has explosiveWhich continued to burn with a bright yellow flame, spreading suffocating gas».

Hack and predictor Aviator


Now we can summarize.

Tsushima (and any other) fires, in order to take on a large scale, needed three conditions: matches, firewood and inaction (so as not to extinguish).

In the role of "matches" were Japanese shells, which, due to their characteristics, had a flammable effect.

The huge mass of combustible materials that was on board the Russian ships became "wood".

And the hail of shells provided not only a large number of fires, but also, most importantly, made it impossible to effectively fight fire.

Could the Russians oppose something to this?

If it was impossible to influence the device of the Japanese shells, then the combustible materials could well be removed from the warships.

Yes, and the hail of shells could be fought by maneuvering.
175 comments
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  1. +12
    14 February 2021 05: 39
    Good morning everyone and good mood.

    Well, at least something became clear from the eternal Tsushima nightmare. Thanks to the author. smile
    1. +7
      14 February 2021 09: 16
      I served in the tank, so the military (from Afghanistan) officers told us that the tank burns great even outside!
      We asked what to burn then? And in response: paint and all sorts of drips from fuels and lubricants! And it burns well, for a long time ...
      1. +3
        14 February 2021 13: 54
        Quote: Leader of the Redskins
        I served in the tank, so the military (from Afghanistan) officers told us that the tank burns great even outside!
        We asked what to burn then? And in response: paint and all sorts of drips from fuels and lubricants! And it burns well, for a long time ...
        External fuel tanks outside. True, the tank remains mobile in such a fire.
        1. 0
          14 February 2021 14: 58
          I know. But we talked without considering them. Now in Donbass these tanks are often "jammed" and filled with sand.
  2. +9
    14 February 2021 06: 15
    On our side, the ships should have been better prepared for battle.
    Thus, the construction overload of battleships of the "Borodino" type was 635 tons.
    Of these, 135 tons are thermal insulation for swimming in the tropics. Combustible.
    Additionally, it was necessary to remove all the floating craft, get rid of the "boatswain supplies".
    And thoroughly clean the ships from coal dust, of which a lot has accumulated, due to the fact that most of the way to Tsushima the ships were used as "coal miners".
    Well, with regards to the fight against the "hail of shells" by maneuvering, then an increase in speed, and bringing the battle to the classics: wake columns, in which each ship of the line fires at its opponent, would allow avoiding the concentration of fire of several enemy ships on one, lead ship ...
    Japanese ships did not have much superiority in speed based on their technical characteristics. Real, and not shown, once, on acceptance tests.
    In the first Japanese detachment, of four different types of battleships and two low-speed armored "cruisers", the battleship "Fuji" was the slowest, which had a maximum continuous travel of 15 knots. Accordingly, the whole squad had such a maximum move.
    This is ideal. And taking into account the large operational overload with which the Japanese ships entered the battle, the maximum continuous stroke of the first Japanese detachment is a maximum of 14 knots.
    The situation is similar with the "underdogs" of Kamimura, whose detachment consisted of low-speed armored "cruisers". The slowest of them, the Azuma, had a maximum continuous travel of 15 knots. Accordingly, taking into account the significant operational overload, the entire second group had a long stroke of 14 knots.
  3. The comment was deleted.
  4. +4
    14 February 2021 06: 44
    Dear Alexey,
    You have touched on an interesting topic, however, the reference to Gribovsky's figures spoils the impression of sensible work.

    In his article "Squadron battleships of the Borodino class in the Battle of Tsushima", published in the collection "Gangut" (issue 2), there is a table, a photograph of which is attached by your humble servant. In this article, there is not even a hint of how the estimated number of hits in one or another Russian battleship was obtained.
    Thus, in the table for three out of four "Borodino residents" not the results of the assessment, but empirical figures without any justification. With "Eagle" - a moot point.
    Noteworthy is the incorrect number of 14 '' shells fired by the Japanese on May 1905, 12. A maximum of 429 (actually even less), while Gribovsky has 445.

    "Prince Suvorov" received many more hits in battle than any other Russian ship. About 100 shells with a caliber of 6 "and above, according to V. Yu. Gribovsky.




    Since, dear colleague, there is not the slightest desire to substitute your comment for the topic of discussion, a few words on the essence of the article.
    A combustible material such as paint, the total weight of which on a squadron battleship by May 14, 1905, could reach many tens of tons, could also be attributed to the sources of fires. I had to read that the British in the First World War, before the battle, chopped it off, as far as circumstances allowed.
    1. +5
      14 February 2021 10: 36
      Valentine, good afternoon!
      Quote: Comrade
      however, the reference to Gribovsky's figures spoils the impression of a sensible work

      Unfortunately, there is currently no "perfect" source for this data. And I can find mistakes in the works of Gribovsky, Krestyaninov, and Campbell. But this does not nullify their value.
      Quote: Comrade
      the table for three out of four "Borodino" is not the results of the assessment, but empirical figures without any justification

      That's right!

      And my opinion is that the number of hits in Borodino is underestimated. The Eagle will be the starting point. The classic number 55 for evaluating hits with a caliber of 6-in. And above does not include hits to armor without consequences. The Japanese simply did not mark them (or in passing, for example, they are on the diagram, but not on the list)!

      "Alexander" and "Borodino" were obviously under fire from the Japanese more than "Eagle" and they should have received more shells too, and not at the same level as that of Gribovsky. And the overall picture of damage on them was steeper than on the "Eagle". Here is another reason to make an upward correction of the estimate.

      "Suvorov" generally twice found itself at "machine-gun" combat distances. In the first case, 2000 m, in the second 2600 m. And according to the damage pattern, the rest of the Borodino residents did not even get close to receiving so many shells.

      I have already written an article about Oslyaba - about 30 hits recorded by eyewitnesses. And the "density" of hits is off scale: 3 shells in the bow turret, 2 in the front upper casemate ... This rather corresponds to the density of hits in the "Eagle".

      Valentine, I perfectly remember your article on accuracy in the plot of "Tsushima", where you start from the data on accuracy in previous battles. But scattered accuracy data at Tsushima suggests that the accuracy was much higher there. This is me about the fight I "Ushakov" on May 15th. Or that in the last phase of the battle, according to Campbell, the Eagle received 20 shells of 6-in. Caliber and higher on the starboard side. Moreover, the main goal of the Japanese then was Borodino. So how much did Borodino receive then? And after all, this was the stage of the battle with the greatest distance, when the Japanese even ceased fire from the UK!

      And this article is also indirectly related to accuracy. Have all battleships of the 2nd TOE, which came under intense fire, there were large fires. And such, which were not none ship 1 TOE. And the conclusion is obvious: the hit rate in Tsushima was much higher.
      1. +3
        14 February 2021 12: 06
        Quote: rytik32
        And the conclusion is obvious: the hit rate in Tsushima was much higher.

        Or the power of the shells has increased.
        Although, as for me, both of these factors have developed.
        But I agree with Valentin, the phrase "according to Gribovsky's assessment" hurts the eye.
      2. +3
        15 February 2021 05: 17
        Hello, Alexey!
        Quote: rytik32
        I can find errors in the works of Gribovsky, Krestyaninov, and Campbell.

        In terms of hits, Gribovsky did not make mistakes, but an unfounded hypothesis.

        Quote: rytik32
        my opinion is that the number of hits in Borodino is underestimated.

        We have been talking on this topic for a long time, at the heart of my reasoning is a logical-analytical approach, you have relied on a sensual-emotional one.

        In your article "Oslyabya" versus "Mikasa" you wrote:
        suppose the accuracy of Japanese fire in the Tsushima tie could not be worse than in the Yellow Sea, that is, 10% for 305 mm, 4% for 203 mm and 1,5% for 152 mm (in the sum for 203 mm and 152 mm will be 1,8%, and the superiority in accuracy of 203 mm guns almost 3 times over 152 mm is confirmed by the statistics of the battle in Chemulpo).
        But we did not take into account the objective factors affecting the accuracy of the Japanese. Can it be assumed that these factors allowed the Japanese to be 1,5 times more accurate than in the Yellow Sea and thus reach at least 30 hits - the minimum of the estimated values? I think you can!


        So let's estimate, taking as a basis Your guesshow many 12 '' shells could hit the Russian ships.
        a) On May 14, the Japanese released about 420 12 '' shells;
        b) Fifteen percent of this number - 63 hits, two of them in "Navarin", three in "Oslyabya", one each in "Sisoy Velikiy" and "Admiral Nakhimov";
        c) A. Danilov indicated nine hits 12 "in" Eagle ", in addition, three more are recorded as 10" - 12 ".
        d) In total, there are theoretically 63 - 2 - 3 - 1 - 1 - 9 = 47 for three "Borodinians". 45 "suitcases" for three battleships of the "Borodino" type.
        e) Distributing 45 hits between three armadillos, keep in mind that the "Tsarevich" got fifteen 12 '' shells.

        Quote: rytik32
        All battleships of the 2nd TOE, which came under intense fire, had large fires.

        Dear colleague, there were fires on the Varyag, for example. We read from Rudnev:
        The fire was serious, since cartridges with smokeless powder were burning, deck and whaleboat No. 1 (wooden). The fire came from a shell that exploded on the deck.
        A shell that passed through the officers' cabins, which were destroyed, pierced the deck and flour lit in the provision compartment above the armored deck.
        wanting to leave the sphere of fire for a while in order to correct, if possible, the steering gear and extinguish emerging in different places fires

        You see, there were enough fires, at the stern it was generally burning, be healthy, and you can't blame an incompetent ZPR on a madman laughing .

        1. 0
          15 February 2021 08: 38
          Quote: Comrade
          So let's estimate, taking your guess as a basis

          My guess relates to the beginning of the fight. At other stages, there were other distances. Both more and less.
          Quote: Comrade
          of them two in "Navarin", three in "Oslyabya", one each in "Sisoy Velikiy" and "Admiral Nakhimov"
          3 in Sisoy, up to 0 ... 2 in Navarin, 1 ... 2 in Nakhimov.
          Quote: Comrade
          Distributing 45 hits between three battleships, we keep in mind that the "Tsarevich" got fifteen 12 '' shells

          Don't forget 8 ... 6 dm shells yet!
          Quote: Comrade
          See, there were enough fires

          Well, from the photo it is not "burned like a wooden hut" at all.
          On "Varyag" the picture is like on a ship with not a very large number of hits. And fires were also celebrated on "Rurik". And even our shells set the Japanese on fire. The question is about the size of these fires.
          Why, as soon as the Japanese focus their fire, everything burns. For me, the conclusion is obvious - the Japanese provided a huge number of hits in a short period of time. Moreover, on a scale not seen in other battles of the RYA.
          1. +1
            16 February 2021 06: 04
            Hello, Alexey!
            Quote: rytik32
            My guess relates to the beginning of the fight. At other stages, there were other distances. Both more and less.

            You can take your 15% as the average for the entire battle.

            Quote: rytik32
            3 in Sisoy, up to 0 ... 2 in Navarin, 1 ... 2 in Nakhimov.

            Different sources on these three ships have different data, all of them are of an estimate nature. But be it your way, let it total 4-7 12 '' shells.

            Quote: rytik32
            Don't forget 8 ... 6 dm shells yet!

            Several of them got into "Tsarevich". Nothing can be neglected.

            Quote: rytik32
            Well, from the photo it is not "burned like a wooden hut" at all.

            Dear colleague, this metaphor is from Novikov-Priboy's Tsushima:
            Until now, "Borodino" held firm. The ship, apparently, had no underwater holes. But now, under the volleys of six enemy ships, his energy was quickly depleted. It seemed that the blows of a thousand-pound hammer fell on him. It blazed like village hut.

            Strong and well-founded doubts that Silych, who was in the Eagle infirmary, personally observed this picture.

            Now we read what Kostenko writes about Borodino, less prone to heartbreaking phrases and theatrical hand-wringing:
            In the last minutes a fire engulfed the entire stern and starboard side. The wardroom, the admiral's quarters, rostras, aft bridges, on which 47-millimeter cartridges were torn, were burning. Flames rose to the marsh of the mainmast. Large fires were on the right edge and in the battery, from where the flame was knocked out through the gun ports.

            Yes, there were fires.
            But after all, on "Good Hope", for example, they also glowed,

            There are German descriptions of these fires, impressive.

            As the case with this British armored cruiser shows, everything is much more complicated, and the nature of the occurrence of fires on warships during the battle goes beyond a simple list of flammable things and liquids, which were not instructed to get rid of.

            Quote: rytik32
            The Good Hope was larger than the Oslyabi and was better armored, but it was kicked without its 12dm cannons. So why no one sees a miracle in this fact, but they don’t believe that the Oslyabyu could have been drowned by Japanese cruisers?

            Because these same cruisers could not cope with either "Russia" or "Thunderbolt". They could not, let alone sink, they could not even disable at least one of them.
            1. 0
              16 February 2021 08: 14
              Quote: Comrade
              Dear colleague, this metaphor is from Novikov-Priboy's Tsushima:

              Reading of the Flag Captain of the Headquarters of the Commander of the 2rd Armored Detachment of the Captain XNUMXnd Rank Cross:
              Forty minutes later, after the start of the battle, "Suvorov" burned, literally, like a wooden hut; the marching cabin was on fire, and then all the superstructures.

              As I understand it, it was a steady figurative expression.

              Quote: Comrade
              As the case with this British armored cruiser shows, everything is much more complicated, and the nature of the occurrence of fires on warships during the battle goes beyond a simple list of flammable things and liquids, which were not instructed to get rid of.

              Did I focus specifically on combustible materials on board? No! In my opinion, the key is a very high hit rate.
              Quote: Comrade
              Because these same cruisers could not cope with either "Russia" or "Thunderbolt". They could not, let alone sink, they could not even disable at least one of them.

              Valentine, the distance!
              In that battle, large distances prevailed, at which it was impossible to ensure the intensity of hits.
              1. 0
                16 February 2021 16: 54
                Hello, Alexey!
                Quote: rytik32
                As I understand it, it was a steady figurative expression

                I'm afraid this expression was not true. The hut is entirely made of wood, so it burns like this.

                And on "Eagle", as it was correctly noted here, despite all the horrors of the fires described by Novikov, these wooden boats did not burn down. Note, even the ropes are intact.

                One photograph overturned all the screams about the indescribable power of the fires on the ship.

                Quote: rytik32
                distance!
                In that battle, large distances prevailed, at which it was impossible to ensure the intensity of hits.

                In total, Kamimura had more time to disable / sink the "Russia" or "Thunderbolt" at the required distances than the Japanese needed to disable the "Oslyabi".

                Dear colleague, in this commentary there are three images, if some of them are not visible, drop a few words, I'll post them separately.
                1. +2
                  16 February 2021 17: 44
                  Quote: Comrade
                  One photograph overturned all the screams about the indescribable power of the fires on the ship.


                  Dear Valentine, this is something else. After the Sino-Japanese War, it was concluded that the fire of several ships on the same target, rapid-fire artillery high-explosive shells would certainly cause a fire and would not give the opportunity to quickly extinguish it. This would leave the ship out of the battle for a while. After this war, W. D. Armstrong actively advocated the creation of a universal (semi-armor-piercing) projectile for rapid-fire artillery and its use in the navy. But you well understand that it is possible to concentrate the fire of several ships on one target only if the enemy is behaving passively.
                  1. +1
                    28 December 2021 16: 43
                    it is possible to concentrate in any situation, the question is in duration and "price" for those who concentrate. The passivity of the enemy begins from the moment when the control of shooting and combat has already been violated. The classic admiral "where the flagship is there and everything" cannot be called full-fledged squadron combat control.

                    To control the battle, you need to be able to see the location of all your ships, and be able to transmit instructions to them. Togo could afford to stand openly. But on our ships, from the moment fire contact began, it was not safe even in armored wheelhouses.
            2. +1
              16 February 2021 13: 56
              Quote: Comrade
              Because these same cruisers could not cope with either "Russia" or "Thunderbolt". They could not, let alone sink, they could not even disable at least one of them.

              Not a single one !? None at all ?? And Rurik, as usual, did not you remember? Here we read, here we do not read, here the fish was wrapped .. Greetings to your unfortunate owl! wassat
        2. 0
          15 February 2021 13: 42
          Quote: Comrade
          You see, there were enough fires, at the stern it was generally burning, be healthy, and you can't blame an incompetent ZPR on a madman

          You have already been reminded that the fire on the Varyag was almost invisible upon returning from the battle. You persistently slip a photograph of the cruiser abandoned by the crew before death. Yes, in four hours the fire broke out and the bank increased. However, this is not at all
          Quote: Comrade
          my reasoning is based on a logical-analytical approach,

          Forgive the banal pulling of an owl on a globe.
        3. 0
          15 February 2021 17: 50
          A very good commentary from a "comrade" with opinions and opinions, but logic and statistics only add power to conclusions (or take away) the percentage of hits that grows to incredible indicators, which was not there in either one or other wars undoubtedly spoils a good article
          1. +1
            15 February 2021 18: 07
            And to be honest: counting hits: "from 6 and above" for 1903 is just right, for 1906 it is nothing, in 2021 it is simply not correct (this is after so many studies, tests, facts, conclusions, etc.) that the effect of 6 inch shells on ARMORED SHIPS is negligible (if it is not a golden bullet). And at least in comparison with 12 "(which is easy to calculate)
            1. +3
              15 February 2021 18: 53
              The Good Hope was larger than the Oslyabi and was better armored, but it was kicked without its 12dm cannons. So why no one sees a miracle in this fact, but they don’t believe that the Oslyabyu could have been drowned by Japanese cruisers?
              1. +2
                15 February 2021 19: 02
                "The fact that Oslyabya could satisfy the cruiser ..." Why don't they believe? We believe, but with great difficulty, and not to a small extent because there are Facts. For example: In the 1st squadron, the battleships did not cope with Oslyabi's classmates. And then a good version that was discussed here on the site a couple of years ago (it seems) about the fact that the key role in his death was played by the "quality" of the construction and ONE (maximum two) 12 "shell
                1. +1
                  16 February 2021 23: 21
                  Quote: Niko
                  and then emerges from under the sinking Oslyabi a good version discussed here on the site a couple of years ago (it seems) that the "quality" of the construction and ONE (maximum two) 12 "shell played a key role in his death

                  This version does not explain why the Oslyabya drowned on May 14, but the Sisoy did not. The Sisoy also had a 12-inch projectile hole in the nose, through which water entered. The same poor quality of construction. Bulkheads were also not kept. But "Oslyabya" sank in half an hour, and "Sisoy" lasted until morning, and even then the torpedo "helped" him.
              2. +1
                15 February 2021 19: 20
                And the worst thing about the Tsushima "hail of shells", in my opinion: it ("hail") prevents us from identifying 1-2 real serious hits (in 90 percent of cases 12 ") which decide the fate of the ship
            2. +1
              16 February 2021 10: 31
              Quote: Niko
              this is after so much research, tests, facts, conclusions, etc. that the effect of 6-inch shells on ARMORED SHIPS is negligible (unless it is a golden bullet). And at least in comparison with 12 "(which is easy to calculate)

              Just the facts show that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau received 30-40 12 dm of shells for their deaths.
              Moreover, they were, in comparison with Borodino:
              worse armored;
              less displacement;
              received more powerful British shells

              So it turns out that the dead Borodino residents either should have received at least 30-40 12 dm of shells in Tsushima, which is unrealistic from the point of view of accuracy.
              Or you should recognize the significant contribution of 8 and 6 in shells.
              1. +1
                16 February 2021 11: 00
                I'm afraid I could not clearly explain my attitude to the article. The article is good, the best recently on the site (for example, the fact that you paid attention to the differences between the centuries in English and Japanese shells, despite their similarity, which they talk about regularly) It just seems to me that just such material can be discussed, even argued a little (without the evil throwing poop so characteristic of our colleagues lately, unfortunately), there is no point in writing about most of the materials lately - the level is extremely low
              2. 0
                16 February 2021 12: 38
                And yet, if you want to cite the battle of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as a WEIGHTNESS argument, conduct an analysis of the damage inflicted by THEM, it would fit 100 percent (in terms of the effect of medium caliber), but naturally it (this analysis) does not fit into your vision.
                1. 0
                  16 February 2021 13: 51
                  Are you talking about Coronel? Or about the Falklands?
                  Or were there different Scharnhorst and Gneisenau? :)
                  1. 0
                    16 February 2021 18: 11
                    About the Falklands, of course. Did you take from there the number of 12 hits needed to sink them?
                    1. 0
                      16 February 2021 18: 12
                      Under the coronel, as I remember, the Canopus did not have time.
                    2. 0
                      16 February 2021 18: 38
                      All the same faces: Campbell, Gribovsky ...
                      1. 0
                        16 February 2021 20: 34
                        You do not understand. I am talking about what then you need to talk about the return fire in THAT battle. (22 hits-1 ONE killed)
                      2. +1
                        16 February 2021 20: 37
                        Does anything surprise you?
                        Most of the shells hit the armor without a chance to penetrate. We achieved an underwater hole with flooding and heel. Not so bad. And if the team, as expected, sat at the armor, then what should be the losses?
                      3. 0
                        16 February 2021 20: 40
                        Then what did you write about in the article?
                      4. 0
                        17 February 2021 12: 43
                        I do not see much difference in the percentage of hits 1.5-2-3% you yourself agree that 22 hits on a battle cruiser could not lead to any results. If 22 hits-result = 0 then at 44,88, etc. the result would not be very different. And if any of the same ships had received 1 (ONE) 12 "shell, and it is quite possible that Spee would have lived to old age and in honor of him it would not have been necessary to name SHIPS. So answer your own question" how many 6 "out shells can replace one 12" the answer is obvious: In most cases, this is generally impossible
                      5. +1
                        17 February 2021 14: 09
                        I beg your pardon, I'll post a little.
                        According to your logic, if the Japanese squadron against the lagging "Poltava" could not do anything in the ZhM, then there could not be Tsushima, right?
                        Or in another way: if from fifteen12 dm shells "Poltava" did not sink, from 12 dm give 0 effect?
                        But "Oslyabyu" got only 2..4 12 dm shells, but a lot of 8 ... 6 dm shells and he drowned - so the force is not in 12 dm shells?
                      6. 0
                        17 February 2021 14: 36
                        In terms of logic: once again I draw your attention to the fact that I'm not talking about the absolute uselessness or, on the contrary, the omnipotence of ammunition, but about the comparative characteristics depending on the caliber. And in relation to Poltava, it looks something like this: if instead of 12 "we got 6" it would not even be remembered because of the insignificance of the damage COMPARED to 12 "In general, how nice the Strugatskys once wrote:" There is nothing more pleasant than explaining well-known things to someone. "I’m sure you yourself understand this as well as 99 % of those interested in this issue. (as proof: ABSOLUTELY ALL shipbuilding programs after the Russian-Japanese)
                      7. 0
                        17 February 2021 16: 46
                        I bring to your attention that the reason for the appearance of the "Dreadnought" and the transition to the all-big-gun concept is the report of Packinham on the results of the battle in the GM, in which he reported that at the increased modern combat distances, bursts from SC shells interfere with the observation of bursts from main battery shells ... And it is not at all the "uselessness" of the SC when it hits the enemy.
                        On the contrary, from the experience of the RYA, several ships with a powerful spacecraft appeared.
                      8. 0
                        17 February 2021 17: 32
                        "With a powerful medium caliber" and found their grave as a dead-end armadillo branch with two medium calibers, armored cruisers whose apex was the same Scharnhorst with Gneisenau, you can add the Blucher ships that had no chance to motivate owners of large caliber (although in R. the war could still be in line with the battleships) There are general TRENDS that are ABSOLUTELY clear and proven by time, and the report of one person can certainly influence these tendencies to one degree or another, but it is unlikely to set a vector for them. By the way, do you associate the increased distance of action with the caliber, its effect and the greater accuracy of large calibers?
                      9. 0
                        17 February 2021 17: 36
                        I associate the increased distance with
                        1) the advantage of the Japanese in speed - they imposed distance;
                        2) with the fact that with Japanese shells there was nothing to catch at close distances
                      10. 0
                        17 February 2021 18: 01
                        And in all other fleets of the world too? We talked about the conclusions that served as the basis for the shipbuilding programs with all Big Gun
                      11. 0
                        17 February 2021 18: 18
                        Which also? I did not understand you.
                      12. 0
                        17 February 2021 18: 28
                        Either just read 3-4 previous comments, or just say that further conversation is not of interest (tip: Your thought: Packingham, Dreadnought, etc.)
                  2. 0
                    16 February 2021 18: 23
                    I understand your irony. But I do not agree, I am not saying that a medium caliber is not capable of inflicting damage at all, and even more so since SHIPS with excellent personnel, commanders, who shoot much better and have an advantage in the caliber of guns (Coronel) cannot sink much more weak, losing in all respects to the SHIPS of the enemy. Quite the opposite. This only confirms my thoughts ...
                    1. 0
                      16 February 2021 18: 25
                      Just the damage done by 12 "and 6" (If a miracle accident does not intervene) are simply incomparable
                      1. 0
                        16 February 2021 18: 42
                        So I do not argue with the fact that 1 on 1 consequences are not comparable.
                        And how many hits should 6 dm shells be in order to equal the effect of one 12 dm? Assessment in the context of Tsushima: Japanese Oslab projectile? according to Borodino?
                      2. 0
                        28 December 2021 16: 52
                        and they are incomparable. The result is different. 100 6 "shells can turn the battleship into a flaming wreck, while not having holes in the citadel and destruction of the towers of the main battalion. But incapable of combat (temporarily). And one 12" - send the enemy to the bottom with a varnish shot. But in a squadron battle, a sunken ship and a "stuttered" ship are one and the same. Torpedoes will finish the job.
              3. +1
                16 February 2021 17: 03
                Quote: rytik32
                facts show that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau received 30-40 12 dm of shells for their deaths.
                Moreover, they were, in comparison with Borodino:
                worse armored;
                less displacement;
                received more powerful British shells

                So it turns out that the dead Borodino residents either should have received at least 30-40 12 dm of shells in Tsushima

                Sorry to interfere, dear colleague, but practice shows that distribution hits are more important quantities hits.
                Let me explain the idea with a specific example.
                On Armored Defense ", after being hit nine armor-piercing 305 mm shells, the cordite detonated in the cellar of the aft tower of the main caliber, and the cruiser was torn to pieces by the explosion. Armored cruiser Warrior "received fifteen armor-piercing 305 mm shells, however, lasted 13 hours and 9 minutes, eventually slowly sinking under the water.
                1. +1
                  16 February 2021 18: 16
                  Thanks. Great remark and good example
                2. +3
                  16 February 2021 18: 30
                  Dear Valentine, your remark is certainly true, but rather for a different time. German 305-mm PMV shells belonged to a completely different generation than the Japanese RYAV shells, and the guns became much more powerful. The key difference is the ability to give "varnishes shot" - to pierce the armor and explode behind it, causing a fire of gunpowder and the death of the ship. Thus, even a single hit could become fatal. Japanese RYAV shells could not do that. Therefore, in the days of the ROE, there was no such great dependence on where the projectile would hit. "Lucky shots" of the RYAV era meant to kill the admiral, damage the steering, disable the tower ... In fact, not a single hit caused the ship to die.
                  1. +1
                    16 February 2021 19: 04
                    Dear Alexey!

                    "Lucky shots" of the RYAV era meant to kill the admiral, damage the steering, disable the tower ... In fact, not a single hit caused the ship to die.

                    And Gribovsky writes that "Fuji" destroyed "Borodino" with the last salvo. This version is widespread.
                    In addition, several cases are described when in the Battle of Tsushima, after a successful hit, there was a threat of explosion of the cellar, and only courage and heroism saved the ship from death.
                    What about Fuji? There is a version that the battleship was on the verge of death.
                    1. +1
                      16 February 2021 19: 17
                      Quote: Comrade
                      And Gribovsky writes that "Fuji" destroyed "Borodino" with the last salvo.

                      This is a tale invented by Packinham. This does not follow even from the Japanese reports. And our testimonies completely refute the version with the death of "Borodino" from the explosion.
                      Quote: Comrade
                      What about Fuji? There is a version that the battleship was on the verge of death.

                      We're talking about Japanese shells, right?
                      1. 0
                        16 February 2021 19: 26
                        Quote: rytik32
                        We're talking about Japanese shells, right?

                        Without making a reservation about the nationality of the shells, you wrote the following:
                        in the days of the RYAV, there was no such great dependence on where the projectile would hit. "Lucky shots" of the RYAV era is to kill the admiral, damage the steering, disable the tower

                        As for Gribovsky, who allegedly spreads other people's tales, here is another argument for you that this author should not be taken seriously, and even more so refer to his "assessments".
                        Yes, your humble servant there answered your comment above, I am interested in your opinion, why in the sea of ​​fire, vividly described by the storyteller Novikov, the boats on the Orel survived, and the ropes were not even charred?
                        Here on the "Varyag" the boats were burning, Rudnev is a witness.
                      2. +1
                        16 February 2021 19: 29
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Without specifying the nationality of the shells, you wrote the following

                        And you still take the previous sentence in the quote)))
                        There and about nationality
                      3. +1
                        16 February 2021 20: 15
                        Quote: rytik32
                        And you still take the previous sentence in the quote)))
                        There and about nationality

                        Then yes, the Japanese shells, of course, did not penetrate the cellars.
              4. +1
                16 February 2021 18: 28
                Quote: rytik32
                Just the facts show that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau received 30-40 12 dm of shells for their deaths.

                "Ibla" in the Falklands, EMNIP, fired old shells, equipped with black powder.
                1. +2
                  16 February 2021 18: 37
                  They fired all three types: NOT with liddit, and common with black powder, and AR with liddit.
                  Invincible fired 513 305-mm shells - 128 armor-piercing, 259 semi-armor-piercing and 126 high-explosive. Inflexible fired 661 shells - 157 armor-piercing, 343 semi-armor-piercing and 161 high-explosive
              5. 0
                17 February 2021 18: 11
                If my memory does not fail me, then I read in one of the books of A. Patients that the English 12 inch shells were equipped with black powder, that is, the English 12 inch shells were significantly weaker than the Japanese 12 inch shells, close to the blanks, which explains a large number of hits that were able to withstand the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau".
              6. 0
                28 December 2021 16: 58
                from a certain moment there was already a beating at the Focklands. Therefore, it is somewhat difficult to determine the number of shells "for death" there. Suvorov, too, did not immediately after the drowning fell out of action.
                Possibly sinking on German ships completed the matter and after the first 15-20 hits of 12 "shells ... over time.
            3. 0
              28 December 2021 16: 49
              In a one-on-one shootout, yes. When massaging and watering a ship from several dozen 6 "high-explosives, questions will already arise in the case of unprotected rangefinders and communication equipment (pipes, telephones). Drowning is difficult. Stumbling to a state of" non-combat capability "is possible. Especially with unarmored limbs.
          2. +2
            15 February 2021 18: 33
            Quote: Niko
            opinions-opinions but logic and statistics only add power to conclusions (or take away) the percentage of hits that grows to incredible indicators, which was not there in either one or other wars undoubtedly spoils a good article



            This is a photograph of a high-explosive shell hitting Saito Tsunetaro's Eagle.
            1. 0
              15 February 2021 19: 03
              By the way, even the boats are safe in the photo.
              1. 0
                28 December 2021 17: 14
                it is not surprising that to kill a person, one centimeter-sized fragment is enough, and so that the boat is not "intact" in the photo, and hundreds of fragments are not enough. According to the rules, in the event of any fires, emergency parties extinguish them. At the same time, a huge consumption of l / s, and damage to fire hoses. Masses of water for extinguishing are pointlessly poured on the upper decks, reducing the margin of stability. Also, the smoke is drawn into the engine compartment by fans.
                Therefore, it is incorrect to consider the uselessness of 6 "high-explosive shells from a photograph with surviving boats.
            2. 0
              15 February 2021 19: 17
              The degree of impact on armored ships of shells, depending on the caliber, has been well studied, discussed and accepted as a fact by all who found it interesting not even to study, but simply to familiarize themselves with the materials of which there are plenty. To pound water again does not give me desire
          3. +3
            15 February 2021 22: 43
            Quote: Niko
            the percentage of hits growing to incredible rates, which was not there in either one or other wars

            Can I ask you what% of hits the Japanese were:
            1. In the battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904?
            2. In the battle "Iwate" and "Yakumo" against "Ushakov" on May 15, 1904?
            1. +1
              16 February 2021 18: 42
              If Eustathius would stop shooting at Goeben after the first volley, the percentage would be fantastic. The problem is that the longer any "average" battle lasts (especially with the participation of more than 2 ships on any of which the best gunner may just have a good day) (without finishing off point blanks, etc.), the percentage confidently fly to average values ​​+ or - percent.
              1. +1
                16 February 2021 18: 46
                Please do not go away from the question.
                I cite as an example two battles in which more than a hundred shells were fired in each - already a sufficient number for statistics.
                1. 0
                  16 February 2021 19: 51
                  Dear Alexey, with your permission, I will answer two questions:

                  what% of Japanese hits were:
                  1. In the battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904?
                  2. In the battle "Iwate" and "Yakumo" against "Ushakov" on May 15, 1904?


                  Quote: rytik32
                  I cite as an example two battles in which more than a hundred shells were fired in each - already a sufficient number for statistics

                  1) The total accuracy of the Japanese, who fired 419 shells of 8 "-3" at Russian ships, was 2,62 %.
                  2) The number of hits in "Admiral Ushakov" is not known exactly, so it is not easy to determine the percentage of hits.
                  According to a Japanese observer, the battleship's hull was hit by three 8 '' and three 6 '' shells, in addition, both pipes received five or six hits from shells of unknown caliber or fragments from shells that exploded into the water.
                  Two Japanese cruisers fired 367 shells of 6``-8 '' caliber, therefore, the total accuracy was 1,63 %. If we assume that only shells fell into the pipes of the battleship, the accuracy increases to 2,45 %.
                  1. +1
                    16 February 2021 20: 26
                    With your permission, I will add a little.
                    If we "check" 3,6% of Gribovsky, then from the battle at Chemulpo we will leave only "Asama", because of the participants, only this ship was in line in Tsushima, and we also exclude 76-mm shells. And you get 10 hits for 130 shots, i.e. accuracy 7,7%. If we leave only 152-mm and more shells of all Japanese ships, then we have 11 hits for 209 shots, an accuracy of 5,3%.
                    Now the fight with Ushakov.
                    The 367 projectiles fired with caliber 203 and 152 mm are absolutely correct.

                    According to this scheme, 12 hits. I see no reason to consider hitting the pipes as fragmentation - they look different in Japanese drawings:

                    Total accuracy is 3,3%.

                    So 3,6% of Gribovsky does not look fantastic - these are quite "working" values ​​of the accuracy of Japanese fire in RYAV.
                    1. 0
                      16 February 2021 21: 38
                      Hello again, Alexey.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      from the battle at Chemulpo we will leave only "Asama", because of those who participated, only this ship was in Tsushima in line

                      Did not expect from You such manipulations, you are not a troll.
                      Formal question, if I may.
                      Why did you decide to ignore 120mm shells and only count 6``-8 '' in the statistics?

                      You asked a question,
                      what% of Japanese hits were in the battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904?

                      and when it was presented to you, you left only one out of six cruisers under a ridiculous pretext.
                      In this case, your question was formulated incorrectly, since the "Japanese", as it turned out, meant only the cruiser "Asama". This makes the statistics look better.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      I see no reason to consider hitting the pipes as fragmentation - they look different in Japanese drawings

                      Dear colleague, this is not serious. We have already discussed similar situations with the reliability of Japanese schemes - from damage to the Fuji barbette installation, which was not in the photograph of this very installation, to hits in the Eagle's bow turret, which are also not in the photograph.
                      Different Japanese schemes have different image quality, and you know this as well as I do. There are highly detailed images, there are images that are primitive.

                      And most importantly, you not take into account the following fact - the fragments are different to the fragments, there are small ones that have left many points on the surfaces of the "Eagle" pipes, and there are large ones that left holes, comparable to those made by shells. If you do not believe me what happened, write, rummage in the sources, we will also talk about this.


                      Quote: rytik32
                      Suvorov "drowned in 19:30, and the photo is too light for this time

                      First, the photo was edited.
                      Secondly, on May 27, the sun sets in 19:22, and then dusk comes, when you can still see it perfectly, although the sun is no longer visible.
                      You can see this for yourself when you go out into the street eight minutes after sunset.
                      1. +1
                        16 February 2021 21: 53
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Why did you decide to ignore 120mm shells and only count 6``-8 '' in the statistics?

                        Because Gribovsky ignores 120 mm shells. My message is to prove that Gribovsky's score is not abnormally high. Follow the chain of quotes.

                        Quote: Comrade
                        there are small ones that left many points on the surfaces of the Eagle's pipes, and there are large ones that left holes comparable to those made by shells. If you do not believe me that this happened, write, rummage in the sources, we will also talk about this

                        Let me remind you, according to your version, these are fragments from shells that exploded in the water, which, for some strange reason, did not fly anywhere into the side, but only into the pipes)))
                      2. 0
                        17 February 2021 01: 04
                        Hello, Alexey!
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Because Gribovsky ignores 120 mm shells.

                        What kind of 120 mm shells is he ignores, may I ask you, from which specific ships? Please clarify.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Let me remind you, according to your version, these are fragments from shells exploding in the water

                        Let me remind you that I have said the following
                        both pipes received five or six hits from shells of unknown caliber or fragments from shells that exploded into the water

                        The key word here is or.
                      3. +1
                        17 February 2021 08: 37
                        Quote: Comrade
                        What kind of 120 mm shells does he ignore, let me ask you, from which specific ships? Please clarify.

                        The accuracy of 3,2% (I apologize, yesterday I mistakenly indicated a different value) is indicated by Gribovsky for the daytime battle of ships of the combat line on May 14, guns with a caliber of 152 mm and above are taken into account. And for both parties.
                        If you have Gribovsky's figures for all ships or taking into account 120 mm - bring them!
                        Quote: Comrade
                        The key word here is or.

                        The Japanese shells had thin walls and were equipped with very high-blasting explosives. The fragments were very small. Only secondary fragments could be large. Thus, when hitting the water, many large fragments could not form that damaged the pipe.

                        The reason for the small marks on the pipes is trivial - the author drew the pipes disproportionately narrow, so the marks could not be wider than the pipes.
                      4. 0
                        18 February 2021 04: 56
                        Hello, Alexey!
                        Quote: rytik32
                        whether you have Gribovsky's figures for all ships or taking into account 120 mm - bring them!

                        Dear colleague, I just cannot understand what is the connection between
                        Quote: rytik32
                        % of Japanese hits in the battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904?

                        and the "estimates" of Gribovsky?

                        Quote: rytik32
                        The reason for the small marks on the pipes is trivial - the author drew the pipes disproportionately narrow, so the marks could not be wider than the pipes.

                        The eye did not disappoint the Japanese observer, in order to be convinced of this, it is enough to compare the diameter of the pipes on the sketch and drawing of "Admiral Ushakov" (opens with a "click").
                      5. 0
                        18 February 2021 09: 34
                        Hello Valentine!
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Dear colleague, I just can't figure out what connection

                        I was building an answer to Nikolai's post
                        the percentage of hits growing to incredible rates, which was not there in either one or other wars

                        in the sense that in at least one battle the accuracy was noticeably higher, and in another episode of Tsushima - comparable. Moreover, in the battle with "Ushakov" the distances were greater than in many other stages of the battle. Therefore, according to my estimate, the average accuracy in Tsushima for 152mm + shells is even slightly higher than Gribovsky's estimate.

                        There are not many evaluations in the literature now: Gribovsky and Campbell. Campbell clearly does not hold water. Therefore, I took Gribovsky.

                        Valentin, can you hear your estimate of the number of hits on Russian ships: for 12 dm shells? for 152mm + shells? Justification of these figures is not required.
                      6. 0
                        19 February 2021 04: 13
                        Hello, Alexey!

                        Quote: rytik32
                        in at least one battle the accuracy was noticeably higher


                        In the "battle" of the cruiser "Asama" with the cruiser "Varyag", the Japanese cruiser fired 27 8 "shells, having achieved three hits. Accordingly, the accuracy of fire is 8" in this private case was 11,11%. There is no reason to extrapolate the accuracy of fire achieved in this battle to other battles, otherwise, in the battle in the Korean Strait, one hundred and six 8 "shells should have hit the Russian cruisers, which obviously did not happen.


                        Quote: rytik32
                        Moreover, in the battle with "Ushakov", the distances were greater than in many other stages of the battle..


                        This is not entirely true.
                        The Japanese opened fire on the coastal defense battleship from a distance of about fifty cables, and ceased fire when the distance was 32 cables.
                        It is not known exactly when the shells hit, so we cannot say that three 8 '' shells hit at distances, noticeably exceeding those that were the day before, in the Battle of Tsushima.
                        In the battle with the "Admiral Ushakov", the two Japanese cruisers demonstrated noticeably worse firing accuracy compared to the cruiser "Asama". Of the 89 8 '' shells they fired, three hit the target. Accordingly, the total accuracy was 3,37%.
                        As we remember, the maximum distance at which "Asama" fired was almost 38 cables, the minimum - 26.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Campbell clearly does not hold water. Therefore, I took Gribovsky ..

                        And Gribovsky does not stand up to criticism, if you dig, it will be revealed that his "assessments" are not worth a dime. You can just as well get similar "estimates" using a random number generator.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Can I hear your estimate of the number of hits on Russian ships: for 12 dm shells? for 152mm + shells? Justification of these figures is not required.

                        I don’t have such estimates ready-made, here I need to model, take into account a number of nuances, compare and think. Naturally, it will still turn out not what it actually was, but the result will be closer to reality than the empirical figures discussed above.
                      7. 0
                        19 February 2021 08: 42
                        Good day, Valentine!
                        Quote: Comrade
                        There is no reason to extrapolate the accuracy of fire achieved in this battle to other battles, otherwise, in the battle in the Korean Strait, one hundred and six 8 "shells should have hit the Russian cruisers, which obviously did not happen.

                        So how can you explain that these two battles have such a range of accuracy?
                        By the way, in the Korean Strait, we can only assume the number of hits in "Rurik".
                        And hitting "Russia" and "Thunderbolt" is difficult to divide by caliber.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        It is not known exactly when the shells hit, so we cannot say that three 8 '' shells hit at distances significantly exceeding those that were the day before, in the Battle of Tsushima.

                        Distances of the battle with Ushakov 50-32 cab, typical distances of the first phase of the daytime battle on May 14, 35-25 cab. I can see the difference.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        I don’t have such estimates ready-made, here I need to model, take into account a number of nuances, compare and think.

                        Do you agree that "Alexander" received more shells than "Oryol", "Borodino" - much more, and "Suvorov" - at least 2 times more?
                      8. 0
                        20 February 2021 05: 12
                        Hello, Alexey!
                        Quote: rytik32
                        So how can you explain that these two battles have such a range of accuracy?

                        Single ships tend to shoot more accurately than formation. Let us recall with what accuracy the "Goeben" fired in the battle at Cape Sarych, and with what accuracy the German battlecruisers fired in the battles with the British.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        By the way, in the Korean Strait, we can only assume the number of hits in "Rurik".

                        IMHO, the Kamimura cruisers hit him with fewer shells than the "Russia" or "Thunderbolt".
                        Quote: rytik32
                        And hitting "Russia" and "Thunderbolt" is difficult to divide by caliber.

                        I've tried several times.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Distances of the battle with Ushakov 50-32 cab, typical distances of the first phase of the daytime battle on May 14, 35-25 cab. I can see the difference.

                        So what ? We do not know the firing accuracy of 8 '' guns in the first phase, so we cannot compare.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Do you agree that "Alexander" received more shells than "Oryol", "Borodino" - much more, and "Suvorov" - at least 2 times more?

                        The question is not easy, I am not ready to give an answer to it straight away.
        4. +1
          16 February 2021 18: 51
          Compare with the photo "Suvorov"
          1. +1
            16 February 2021 19: 52
            Quote: rytik32
            Compare with the photo "Suvorov"

            This is not a photo of "Suvorov", this is a photo of a column of smoke that rose after leaving the battleship under water. There are photos of "Suvorov", but you have to pay for them like an adult. Naturally, they are not in the public domain.
            1. +1
              16 February 2021 20: 34
              "Suvorov" sank at 19:30, and the photo is too light for this time.
  5. +9
    14 February 2021 08: 24
    Good morning. At the first moment I thought that Andrey from Chelyabinsk decided to continue his Tsushima series.
    The author, I liked it: written in an accessible language
    1. +5
      14 February 2021 12: 07
      Quote: Astra wild2
      Andrey from Chelyabinsk decided to continue his Tsushima series.

      Your words, but to God’s ears. good
      1. -4
        14 February 2021 19: 14
        God forbid.. wassat
        1. +2
          15 February 2021 11: 58
          Well, your articles are generally not a single one on this topic. So we could have kept silent
          1. -2
            15 February 2021 12: 23
            "Better nothing, instead of somehow" (c)
  6. +3
    14 February 2021 08: 34
    The situation was aggravated by the huge amount of combustible materials on the squadron of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.
    The main reason.
    Not some wonderful shells.
  7. -5
    14 February 2021 09: 19
    And this author, like all the others, did not understand the true factors that acted during the Tsushima battle. First, there are fundamentally different Japanese shells. Although they were exactly the same as in all previous periods of the Russo-Japanese War, in reality they are completely different. The fact is that at the beginning and in the middle of the RYA, Japanese shells often did not explode due to tight fuses, just as Russian shells did not explode either. For example, during the shelling of Vladivostok, not a single Japanese shell exploded and only one of them killed 10 people at once with its hit. All amateurs of course think it exploded. But in fact, this shell just hit a residential building, and acting like an ordinary blank destroyed the house and thus killed several Russian people. Thus, not a single Japanese shell exploded during the shelling of Vladivostok - that is, the percentage of non-explosion = 100%. Likewise, Japanese shells often did not explode during the shelling of Port Arthur - the soldiers and residents of the city collected about 2 thousands unexploded Japanese shells. And all the Russian Far East newspapers mocked the Japanese with their non-explosive shells. Although the Russian shells from the ship's guns did not explode in the same way, the Japanese newspapers did not write anything about this. And the Japanese spies reported to the command that the Russian newspapers were writing. Therefore, the Japanese command ordered secretly change the design of the fuses - to make them much more sensitive to impact. And by the Battle of Tsushima, most of the large-caliber Japanese shells had very sensitive fuses. True, from this, Japanese shells began to explode, often directly in the barrels of their own guns. According to one source, 110 Japanese guns exploded in the Battle of Tsushima (don’t think that this is only a large caliber - in fact, they were mostly medium caliber guns). Thus, the action of the Japanese shells in the battle in the Yellow Sea and in Tsushima was fundamentally different from each other. And the famous captain of the second rank Semenov said directly about this - that in Tsushima, Japanese shells exploded in a completely different way - as if they were mines. And the fact that the author of the article cites as an example Chinese, French and English ships that did not have fires is your general delusion, because all those shells had tight fuses and exploded mainly on impact on armor. But nobody still knows about this.
    1. +1
      15 February 2021 12: 55
      Quote: geniy
      Therefore, the Japanese command ordered secretly change the design of the fuses - to make them much more sensitive to impact.

      Secretly? Have a very large number of shells, including those in warehouses? The shells on the ships? And even those on a hike?
      1. -1
        15 February 2021 15: 30
        Secretly? Have a very large number of shells, including those in warehouses? Shells on ships?

        The word "Secret" I have used must be understood correctly. Because, of course, there could be no question of any secret for hundreds of Japanese officers to change the design of fuses and transfer new fuses to ships - of course, all this was accompanied by orders printed on typewriters. Thus, there must be thousands of documents about it. However, you should understand that the Japanese officers, having received such documents, did not immediately run to the offices of Japanese newspapers and did not publish these orders in the Japanese press. And not only that - the Japanese officers did not tell anything about this even to the captured Russian sailors. And in general, the entire history of the RYAV written by the Japanese, although it was published, was only for Japanese officers and absolutely nothing of it was open to the world community until the Second World War. And then Japan was defeated and, in my opinion, the Americans simply robbed Japan and took all copies of books about the RYAV to the USA. And already the Americans, in turn, blatantly classified all this. And if you were attentive, you would have noticed how hotly local experts argue about the true composition of Japanese explosives! And if all of you and the rest of the readers would deign to think: why are they arguing so hotly - no, you would simply take published documents from the Japanese archives. But no - here they brought up all sorts of guesses and speculations - but there is not a single real Japanese document! Therefore, I suppose that until now - for more than a hundred years, Japanese documents remain a mystery to historians because they are classified!
        1. +3
          15 February 2021 22: 46
          Quote: geniy
          there is not a single real Japanese document!

          Here are the documents
          https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/default
  8. -5
    14 February 2021 09: 26
    The main culprit behind the fires on Russian ships is Rozhestvensky himself. He created two factors for fires - coal and boats. Firstly, because of the stupidity of Rozhdestvensky, the Russian squadron - basically only the first combat detachment - very often loaded coal into overload without any need. When sailing in the Indian Ocean, they were loaded with coal every 5-7 days, although the coal was far from being used up, and it would have been enough for a whole month. But Rozhestvensky was afraid of an attack by the Japanese in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, coal was everywhere - even in some boiler rooms like on Aurora and in the wardroom. And in contrast to this - other Russian ships passed the Suez Canal - this is Sisoy the Great, and Nebogatov's 3rd squadron, and these ships did not have such an overload with coal.
    1. -5
      15 February 2021 15: 25
      Quote: geniy
      The main culprit behind the fires on Russian ships is Rozhestvensky himself.

      The main culprit of both the fires and the general defeat of the squadron was the extra 60 Japanese destroyers along the edges of the strait, Rozhdestvensky did not dare to attack them at first, but they hampered the actions of the squadron, and forced them to move in a wake column ... which was a gross mistake that destroyed the entire fleet. Also, the concept of an EBR with two towers in different directions, and an abundance of small and medium artillery, was not optimal for combat, this follows from the stupid idea of ​​a universal ship suitable for long-distance campaigns and all-round defense ... but it was necessary to do as Makarov advised, specialized ships for 3000 tons with one large-caliber turret intended for collective art duels, instead of EBRs and small gunboats 2000 tons with small and medium artillery for cruising raids to destroy destroyers, etc. instead of cruisers.
  9. -2
    14 February 2021 09: 43
    But another major cause of the giant fires was the fires of boats and boats. And this is again the direct fault of Rozhdestvensky. The fact is that during the passage by the Cape of Good Hope - the southern tip of Africa, the Russian squadron was caught by a gigantic hurricane. The waves reached a height of 12 meters. And these waves even reached the Spardek, where even the 12th rowboat from the battleship "Prince of Suvorov" was washed into the ocean. And so, in order to avoid repetition of disruptions of boats in Rozhestvensky's squadron, they were placed as much as three floors above each other, but in the squadron of Felkersam and Nebogatov they did not do that. And before the Tsushima battle, Rozhdestvensky refused to take off the boats and hand them over to transport ships - even Oryol, despite all their fire-fighting training, did not surrender the boats.
    As you know, sailors around the world always fill boats with water before a battle so that they do not burn. And in the same way, before the Tsushima battle, Russian sailors filled the boats with water. But this did not help the four newest Russian battleships in which the boats were 3 stories above each other. In essence, Rozhdestvensky ordered giant bonfires to be laid on the deck of his battleships. And during the battle, fragments of Japanese shells riddled the Russian boats - the water quickly drained out of them and all the boats caught fire with huge bonfires. This is precisely what was the main cause of the fires on the four newest battleships. And the main culprit is Admiral Rozhdestvensky.
  10. The comment was deleted.
  11. +6
    14 February 2021 11: 35
    Once again, rereading the reports and testimonies of our Tsushima residents, I was amazed at the amount of combustible materials on board, and indeed just the list of "extra" cargo. Well that's why "Sisoy" carried paint and wood for destroyers into battle ??? But if it hadn't been for them, there wouldn't have been a big fire in the battery.
    In general, I made a conclusion for myself: if flammable materials and simply excess cargo were removed from the ships (one of the reasons for overloading), then all Borodino residents would have lived until nightfall.
  12. +4
    14 February 2021 11: 57
    So why did British and French picric acid-based explosives have less flammable action than Japanese explosives?
    The fact is that both the British and the French did not use pure picric acid, but phlegmatized it.
    For example, English liddite consisted of 87% picric acid, 10% dinitrobenzene, and 3% petroleum jelly.
    The French in melinite mixed picric acid with collodion. A very wide range of impurities has been used by different countries at different times.
    The Japanese, on the other hand, filled ammunition with pure picric acid, not wanting to reduce the force of its explosion with phlegmatizers.
    As a result (due to too much blasting), the shimosa in most cases did not detonate completely. This was especially clearly seen in the yellow smoke and yellow traces from the rupture - this is the case when the shimosa did not burn out.
    If the non-detonated remnants of shimosa ignited, then fires appeared. Fragments of Japanese shells had the greatest incendiary effect.

    The author is misleading the audience.
    Nobody phlegmatized picric acid. Phlegmatization - of explosives - a decrease in the sensitivity of explosives to mechanical influences (impact, friction, heating, shock-wave action) by introducing special substances (phlegmatizers) into their composition.
    As for picric acid, its main disadvantage as an explosive is the ability to form salts on contact with metals (except for tin) in the presence of at least a small amount of water. This results in the formation of salts - picrates, which are similar in properties to the initiating explosives.
    The French and British fought this process by introducing additives and to equipping shells and used pressed powdered melinite and liddite.
    The Japanese used case equipment - checkers cast into appropriate shapes are then wrapped in tin foil and waxed paper, and sometimes also in silk cloth.
    Further, such a nuance. Pressed and powdered trinitrophenol detonates reliably from the detonator cap, but the sensitivity of the cast is much lower, up to 12 percent of projectiles equipped with cast trinitrophenol may not explode at all. Hence the non-detonating Japanese shells.
    Blasting does not affect detonation.
    Brisance is the ability of an explosive to crush, destroy objects in contact with it (metal, rocks, etc.). The amount of brisance indicates how quickly gases are formed during an explosion.
    Brisance of trinitrophenol is the same as trinitrotoluene - 16 mm. RDX has, for comparison, 24 mm.
    1. +3
      14 February 2021 12: 32
      Let's share the proof
      Hermann Sprengel. The Discovery of Picric Acid (Melinite, Lyddite) As a Powerful Explosive

      Quote: Undecim
      Brisance is the ability of an explosive to crush, destroy objects in contact with it (metal, rocks, etc.). The amount of brisance indicates how quickly gases are formed during an explosion.

      Quite right, these gases can scatter explosives faster than it can detonate.
      Quote: Undecim
      Brisance of trinitrophenol is the same as trinitrotoluene - 16 mm. RDX has, for comparison, 24 mm.

      Therefore, TNT and RDX also often phlegmatized.
      1. +3
        14 February 2021 13: 19
        Quite right, these gases can scatter explosives faster than it can detonate.
        In view of the large amount of material, in order not to waste time, read the issue of the origin and propagation of detonation at least in this book, section one, chapter VI. But it's better to read it in full.

        Then it will become clear to you that you are mistaken about both detonation and phlegmatization, simultaneously misinforming the audience. Phlegmatization is not used to reduce blasting, it is used to reduce the sensitivity of explosives to a safe value, and at the same time, mixtures of explosives with phlegmatizers are used to improve compressibility. Reducing the energy of phlegmatized explosives is a by-product of phlegmatization, and not its goal.
        1. +2
          14 February 2021 13: 45
          Quote: Undecim
          Phlegmatization is not used to reduce blasting, it is used to reduce the sensitivity of explosives to a safe value, and at the same time, mixtures of explosives with phlegmatizers are used to improve compressibility. Reducing the energy of phlegmatized explosives is a by-product of phlegmatization, and not its goal.

          I do not argue with the fact that phlegmatization is primarily used to reduce sensitivity to impact.
          Let's see what my statements, in your opinion, are disinformation.
          1. 0
            14 February 2021 13: 53
            Let's see what my statements, in your opinion, are disinformation
            Strange, I wrote everything in my first commentary about the fact that liddite and melinite are not phlegmatized, and blasting does not affect detonation.
            1. +2
              14 February 2021 14: 16
              Quote: Undecim
              lidditis and melinitis are not phlegmatized

              I refuted this with reference to the source.
              Quote: Undecim
              and blasting does not affect detonation

              If this is understood from the phrase
              As a result (due to too much blasting), the shimosa in most cases did not fully detonate.
              .
              Then I'll decode.
              According to eyewitnesses' descriptions, Japanese shells detonated from touching the slightest obstacles, up to stretched cables, bridge fences, etc. The reason is that, upon impact, vibrations occurred in the Japanese projectile, in the explosive from these vibrations - air bubbles, in which the temperature rose and detonation began. This detonation did not start in the place where it was projected, so often the detonation was not complete. Part of the explosives simply flew apart.
              Here is a causal relationship.
              1. -1
                14 February 2021 18: 06
                Then I'll decode.
                According to eyewitnesses' descriptions, Japanese shells detonated from touching the slightest obstacles, up to stretched cables, bridge fences, etc. The reason is that, upon impact, vibrations occurred in the Japanese projectile, in the explosive from these vibrations - air bubbles, in which the temperature rose and detonation began. This detonation did not start in the place where it was projected, so often the detonation was not complete. Part of the explosives simply flew apart.
                Here is a causal relationship.

                Stop making your audience laugh. It is better to read the literature if your age and basic knowledge allow you to read this way and do not write nonsense about air bubbles.
                1. +5
                  14 February 2021 18: 35
                  Quote: Undecim
                  Stop making your audience laugh. It is better to read the literature if your age and basic knowledge allow you to read this way and do not write nonsense about air bubbles.

                  Here Gorst writes specifically about air bubbles:

                  Or haven't you read Horst yourself ???
                  In general, now I see from your side the absence of any systemic knowledge, obvious errors
                  Quote: Undecim
                  Nobody phlegmatized picric acid
                  , lack of proofs and generally destructive conversation in the style of "go read, but I'm too lazy to bring proofs."
                  1. +1
                    14 February 2021 21: 53
                    lack of proofs and generally destructive conversation in the style of "go read, and I'm too lazy to bring proofs."
                    Yes, I'm not too lazy to bring "proofs", from a smartphone it was inconvenient.
                    Thermal theory is a little more complicated than you described. As for air bubbles, subsequent studies have shown that this theory does not apply to solid explosives.
                    I was mistaken about the phlegmatization of preprinic acid. The clean one was used only for equipping three-inch shells, for large calibers it was phlegmatized.
                    I can be harsh and categorical in a dispute, but this does not apply to the opponent, only to the subject of the dispute.
                    And it is rarely possible to discuss interesting topics on the site today.
                    1. 0
                      14 February 2021 22: 42
                      For some reason, the picture was not inserted.
    2. +1
      14 February 2021 19: 27
      Quote: Undecim
      The author is misleading the audience.
      Nobody phlegmatized picric acid.

      The commentator is clearly misleading the audience. Mellinite was adopted by the French only after the development of the phlegmatizer. In its pure form, picric acid (like nitroglycerin, for example) was not used. It is possible to recall several painful incidents in Russian laboratories, connected precisely with the selection of phlegmatizers. And you don't seem to have read Horst yourself.
      1. 0
        14 February 2021 21: 10
        In its pure form, picric acid (like nitroglycerin, for example) was not used.

        And you don't seem to have read Horst yourself.
        1. +2
          14 February 2021 21: 57
          Well, that is, from 20 to 49% of the phlegmatizer you see, but do not consider it necessary to notice?
          1. +1
            14 February 2021 22: 25
            Well, that is, from 20 to 49% of the phlegmatizer you see, but do not consider it necessary to notice?
            I wrote above.
            1. 0
              15 February 2021 14: 48
              Above you went into a discussion of the physics of detonation. However, another point is more interesting in this article.
              I was mistaken about the phlegmatization of preprinic acid. The clean one was used only for equipping three-inch shells, for large calibers it was phlegmatized.

              Can you understand how you divided the 3 "shells and shells of a larger caliber? From other documents, and even from a Japanese article, you can see that melinite, for example, was adopted by the French army only after the appearance of mixtures. Where and why should it be that small shells can be used without phlegmatization?
    3. +2
      14 February 2021 23: 29
      Quote: Undecim
      As for picric acid, its main disadvantage as an explosive is the ability to form salts on contact with metals (except for tin) in the presence of at least a small amount of water. This results in the formation of salts - picrates, which are similar in properties to the initiating explosives.
      The French and British fought this process by introducing additives and to equipping shells and used pressed powdered melinite and liddite.

      Picric acid is a yellow substance which can be melted at a
      temperature of 250 ° P. When confined or melted into a compact mass
      it can be detonated. It can be fired by percussion. With bases it
      forms picrates, most of which are more sensitive to percussion or
      friction than picric acid. Lead picrate is particularly sensitive.
      Picrates are capable of acting as detonators to any picric acid
      within reach of their explosive influence. On this account
      greatest care must be taken to prevent picric acid coming in contact
      with metallic oxides, lime, rust, ve-digris, etc., as picrates may be
      formed. It is packed in powder barrels with waterproof bags, or
      100 lb. powder cases with calico bags substituted for the linings

      Source: Treatise on ammunition. London, 1905
      1. 0
        14 February 2021 23: 33
        I wrote above that I was wrong with the phlegmatizer.
        1. 0
          14 February 2021 23: 43
          I wrote here not about phlegmatizers, but about how the British prevented the appearance of picrtas. In short, liddite was equipped in special cases or cases.
          1. +1
            14 February 2021 23: 51
            I meant that I was mistaken when I called the phlegmatizer a means to prevent the interaction of picric acid with the shell of the shell.
  13. -2
    14 February 2021 12: 32
    Rozhestvensky is the direct culprit of the explosion of the battleship Borodino, although he personally was never present on this ship at all. The fact is that the explosion of the ammunition cellars at Borodino did not occur at all from the hit of a Japanese projectile from the battleship Fuji, although both of these events happened at the same time, which caused the eyewitnesses to have an erroneous opinion that it was Fuji that sunk Borodino, but Rozhdestvensky ruined him. The fact is that all explosives, when heated in a fire flame, spontaneously detonate without any impact. I remember when I was a child I put a 9mm blank pistol cartridge in a weak fire and waited for a long time - 10 minutes until it exploded with a roar. And the peculiarity of the design of the Borodino battleships is that they did not supply 152-mm ammunition up to the towers like all other ships - by separate projectile lifters or medium-caliber ammunition in boxes - but the so-called noria - that is, an endless chain in which the shells and casings were placed horizontally ... So: the elevator of the right stern 152-mm turret passed just next to the admiral's cabin. And this cabin was full of combustible junk - and wooden furniture, and wardrobes with clothes, and curtains and carpets, and tables and chairs, not counting the wooden lining of the walls of this cabin under expensive wood. It was all this that burned terribly, heating the ammunition in the bucket elevator until it warmed up to about 165 degrees - the point of self-explosion. Moreover, the battleship "Eagle had exactly the same picture: the armor of the noria of its right tower was red-hot - that is, up to about 800-900 degrees. And as soon as the battle ended, the sailors were able to pour water on it, and the Eagle did not explode, although undoubtedly if the battle had spilled for a few more minutes, then the Eagle would have exploded in the same way as Borodino.
    But why didn't the battleships Prince Suvorov and Alexander III explode? Because these first two battleships fought mainly on the left side, and the battleships Borodino and Orel fought from the starboard in the last phase of the battle. And on the left side in the area of ​​the left stern 152 mm turret was the ship's commander's cabin. As Kostenko noted in his book on page 133, "But most of the senior specialists' cabins look Spartan - nothing superfluous. That is why there were no big fires in the cabins of the commanders of all four battleships of the Borodino class. But as soon as at the end of the battle, the battle began from the starboard side. then the admiral's cabins on both ships immediately caught fire because, despite the removal of the maximum amount of fire-hazardous materials, the admiral's cabins did not dare to touch. And the battleships Suvorov and Alexander did not explode because at the end of the battle both of them no longer participated. Thus, Rozhdestvensky - direct culprit of the explosion and death of the battleship "Borodino".
    1. 0
      14 February 2021 14: 49
      Quote: geniy
      Moreover, the battleship "Eagle had exactly the same picture: the armor of the noria of its right tower was red-hot - that is, to about 800-900 degrees. And as soon as the battle was over, the sailors were able to douse it with water, and the Eagle did not explode, although undoubtedly if the battle had spilled for a few more minutes, then the Eagle would have exploded in the same way as Borodino.

      And where can you read about it?
      1. -1
        14 February 2021 15: 45
        The best source on the Tsushima battle is Kostenko's book "On the Eagle in Tsushima". detailed description from page 423. Specifically, about the 152 mm aft turret on the starboard side p. 454 Two 6-inch shells hit the base of the right aft 12-inch turret at the same time, the tower was completely jammed by two moving armor plates protecting the supply pipe ... The turret is not suitable for action ...
        When the big fires began in the admiral's and commander's premises ...
        page 456: The last hits on the "Eagle" volleys of 12-inch guns occurred after the death of "Borodino" ... The doors were deformed from explosions and flames to the admiral's room, which was the main hearth of the flame... The closed doors did not even succumb to the blows of crowbars and therefore it was impossible to enter the area.
        The right aft 6-inch tower was surrounded by a fire on all sides. The armor of her feed pipe glowed DOCRASNA.
        This means that the shells and powder charges were heated inside the noriya before the explosion, and soon the battleship "Eagle" would explode just like the "Borodino" exploded.
        When the battle ended and the falling of the Japanese shells stopped, the sailors of the Eagle went to the upper deck: "Finding holes in the upper deck, they entered the admiral's office ... Through the holes we managed to stretch hoses and give people pipiki, and only then began the fight against the raging flames.
        1. +4
          14 February 2021 16: 24
          Quote: geniy
          The best source on the Tsushima battle is the book by Kostenko "On the Eagle in Tsushima".

          And I forgot about the elephant ... :)
          But it seems to me that Kostenko is lying as an eyewitness, at least because he was not there, and fear has big eyes.
          Do you know HOW it should burn for a 127mm stove to glow red hot?
          1. -1
            14 February 2021 20: 17
            But it seems to me that Kostenko is lying as an eyewitness

            The opinion Widespread among stupid "experts" that Kostenko is allegedly lying is based mainly on the fact that his figure for the number of hits of Japanese 12-inch shells 42 is extremely high, while Japanese engineers called the figure 12, and Campbell is only 5. But in fact, they are lying. these two are the last, and Kostenko is probably a little mistaken and his figure is closer to the truth. The fact is that the hits of many shells (especially under the waterline) do not leave any traces at all, so neither the Japanese nor Campbell, in principle, could determine the exact figure, And only those people who were on the battleship by the shaking of the ship could determine that the ship got into large-caliber projectile. And although Kostenko spent the whole battle in the infirmary, but then he conscientiously interrogated the entire crew, and if the sailors lied to him, it was not his fault. Therefore, it is a very stupid statement that Kostenko was not there - but where was he then? And if you find fault with it - then in general not a single person saw the complete Tsushima battle - and each eyewitness saw only a particle. And thus absolutely everyone is lying, for example, the same cap2 Semenov.
            And as for combustion, if you understood the design of the ship, then in fact the armor covers thin steel sheets - usually only 6 mm thick at the surface. And when the armor plates of the feed pipe were pushed aside by the impacts of 12-inch shells, the fire opened a way for heating these thin 6 mm sheets and a huge fire heated them for an hour. Probably the battleship Borodino exploded from this heating. Do you still disagree with something?
            1. +5
              14 February 2021 20: 32
              Quote: geniy
              Opinion Widespread among stupid "experts" that Kostenko is allegedly lying

              You, as I understand it, are a major expert on the Russo-Japanese War in general and on Tsushima in particular? ;)

              Quote: geniy
              and if the sailors lied to him, it was not his fault.

              :)

              Quote: geniy
              As for the combustion, if you understood the design of the ship, then in fact the armor covers thin steel sheets - usually only 6 mm thick at the surface.

              Have you tried to compare the drawings of the Borodino-class battleship in the area of ​​the 74th frame with the sketch of damage to the feed pipe made by Kostenko?
              1. -4
                14 February 2021 22: 37
                You, as I understand it, are a major specialist in the Russo-Japanese War

                I am not just a major specialist, I am generally the only person in the world who knows how ship gunners aimed in all wars, and how their shells actually fell - which they do not even know about. Therefore, Kostenko's picture is largely mistaken.
                But if you want to blame him for this, then I will say that all people are a little mistaken.
                If you do not agree with my version, then please present your version of the reason for the explosion of the battleship Borodino. In principle, I am not interested in it, I already know that you, like everyone else, are mistaken, you just need to point out your own mistakes to you before criticizing Kostenko.
                1. +1
                  15 February 2021 18: 16
                  Quote: geniy
                  I am not just a major specialist, I am generally the only person in the world who knows how ship gunners aimed in all wars, and how their shells actually fell - which they do not even know about. Therefore, Kostenko's picture is largely mistaken.

                  And what is the right one then?
                  Enlighten, be so kind.

                  Quote: geniy
                  But if you want to blame him for this, then I will say that all people are a little mistaken.

                  I want to say that a memoir is not a report, a report, etc., that is, an official document with a signature and the author is not fully responsible for what he writes.

                  Quote: geniy
                  If you do not agree with my version, then please present your version of the reason for the explosion of the battleship Borodino.

                  I stick to the official version until proven otherwise.

                  Quote: geniy
                  She is basically not interesting to me, I already know that you, like everyone else, are mistaken,

                  Do not judge and you will not be judged ... (c)
                  1. 0
                    15 February 2021 21: 11
                    And what is the right one then?
                    Enlighten, be so kind.

                    Well, I already wrote my version. It happened like this: Japanese 12-inch shells hit the area of ​​the right aft 6-inch tower and created a big fire around it. Because of the smoke and fire, the servants of this tower left for it, and shells and powder charges remained in the noria. The fire lasted a long time - about an hour, during which time the shells and gunpowder heated up and detonated spontaneously. Moreover, not one ammunition detonated at all, but a lot at once, about twenty. And from this powder explosion, the force of fire and smoke hit not only up, but also down - into the ammunition cellar. And the servant of this cellar immediately died instantly, suffocating in the fire and smoke, and therefore did not extinguish the fire in the cellar. and the explosion of the cellar did not occur immediately, but after some time - about ten minutes.And these are not at all my baseless fantasies of how everything happened - there is documentary evidence of this, although only one person was saved from the battleship Borodino - the sailor Yushchin, who was very far from stern - in the bow casemate. But you and people like you are more fond of throwing mud at Kostenko and Novikov Surf, and it is in their works that there is true documentary evidence. And if you and lovers like you CAREFULLY read the works of Novikov Priboy and Kostenko, you could reveal a lot of truth. The fact is that about 10 minutes before their death, the sailors in the bow casemate suddenly greeted and were about to jump overboard. There is no doubt that they saw from afar the first explosion in the aft tower. And from this first explosion a fire broke out in the cellar - for about ten minutes the entire ammunition cellar exploded and Borodino overturned.
                    I was studying a book about the effects of various physical and chemical factors on explosives. So - preheating them in a fire flame greatly increases the sensitivity and causes a spontaneous explosion. And some cold explosives do not explode at all. So wet pyroxylin 30% of the water in Russian shells is generally insensitive to impact. Thus, the general version that Borodino allegedly exploded from being hit by a projectile from Fuji is a version for fools. Because if you reject the version of fire and preheating x, then cold Russian ammunition could not explode at all. And if you carefully read Novikov Priboy and Kostenko, you might find out that Japanese fragments got inside the bow and middle 6-inch turrets on the starboard side and caused a gunpowder fire. But the general explosion of the cellars did not occur, because the ammunition in these towers was cold. Thus, the explosion of the cellar at Borodino could occur only due to heating of ammunition in a fire.
                    And you and the rest of the "experts" do not even need to ask which version you and the rest of the "experts" adhere to - it is clear that you all mistakenly think that this projectile hit from Fuji destroyed the battleship Borodino.
                    1. +2
                      15 February 2021 21: 27
                      Quote: geniy
                      But you and people like you are more fond of throwing mud at Kostenko and Novikov Surf, and it is in their works that there is true documentary evidence.

                      Memoirs will never be documentary evidence.
                      This is a narrative source at best, nothing more.
                      Proofs can only be documents: reports, reports, etc., that is, such media under which the author signs and is ready to bear responsibility for what was written.
                      However, I already wrote this, but you probably did not notice.

                      Quote: geniy
                      The fact is that about 10 minutes before their death, the sailors in the bow casemate suddenly greeted and were about to jump overboard. There is no doubt that they saw from afar the first explosion in the aft tower.

                      Have you ever seen the drawings of the Borodino-class battleship?
                      From the bow casemate you can see only the middle pair of 6 "towers, and then if you stick out very much from the port ...

                      Quote: geniy
                      I was studying a book about the effects of various physical and chemical factors on explosives.

                      What's that book? I want, you know, to join ...

                      Quote: geniy
                      And if you carefully read Novikov Priboy and Kostenko, you might find out that Japanese fragments got inside the bow and middle 6-inch turrets on the starboard side and caused a gunpowder fire.

                      You are probably selective about reading comments. :)
                      I already wrote about this ...
                      But what is the connection?

                      Quote: geniy
                      But the general explosion of the cellars did not occur, because the ammunition in these towers was cold.

                      The conclusion is simply enchanting ... :)

                      Quote: geniy
                      and other "experts" do not even need to ask

                      Excuse me, the crown does not shake the skull? ;)
                      1. -1
                        15 February 2021 22: 11
                        I want to say that a memoir is not a report, a report, etc., that is, an official document with a signature and the author is not fully responsible for what he writes.

                        And no one bears any responsibility for the words in the report. Even for specific deeds and inaction during the ROE no one bore serious responsibility - neither for the task of Port Arthur, nor for the defeat of the squadron, nor for the loss of the entire war. And if I could remind you what nonsense was in some of the reports! I hope you remember that Dobrotvorsky reported that the Russian squadron was sunk by Japanese submarines?
                        Memoirs will never be documentary evidence.

                        And Kostenko did not actually write his memoirs. If you read his book, then he kept a diary. That is, he wrote everything down every day, and not from memory ten years later. And immediately after the battle, he drew up a technical sketch of the hits of Japanese shells and damage to his battleship - which no other Russian officer did.
                      2. +2
                        15 February 2021 22: 23
                        Quote: geniy
                        And no one bears any responsibility for the words in the report.

                        It seems so to you ...

                        Quote: geniy
                        Even for specific deeds and inaction during the ROE no one bore serious responsibility - neither for the task of Port Arthur, nor for the defeat of the squadron, nor for the loss of the entire war.

                        Three ships are not enough for you?

                        Quote: geniy
                        I hope you remember that Dobrotvorsky reported that the Russian squadron was sunk by Japanese submarines?

                        Have you yourself read Dobrotvorsky's report or only in the retelling of Novikov-Pryboy?

                        Quote: geniy
                        And Kostenko did not actually write his memoirs. If you read his book, he kept a diary.

                        And what do you think is "On the" Eagle "in Tsushima"?

                        Quote: geniy
                        And immediately after the battle, he drew up a technical sketch of the hits of Japanese shells and damage to his battleship - which no other Russian officer did.

                        Are there many officers left in the ranks?
                      3. 0
                        15 February 2021 22: 16
                        You are probably selective about reading comments. :)
                        I already wrote about this ...
                        You wrote that the Japanese fragments penetrated the armor - I did not even comment on this - well, everyone can make a mistake. In fact, the Japanese debris entered the towers through the embrasures.
                        But the general explosion of the cellars did not occur, because the ammunition in these towers was cold.
                        The conclusion is simply enchanting ... :)

                        Do you disagree with something? So clarify your position. And by the way, write your own "official" version of the explosion of the battleship Borodino, otherwise I don’t know anything except the shell hits from Fuji.
                      4. +3
                        15 February 2021 22: 58
                        Quote: geniy
                        You wrote that the Japanese fragments penetrated the armor - I did not even comment on this - well, everyone can make a mistake.

                        I advise you to read the report to the Swede, not "Tsushima".

                        Quote: geniy
                        Do you disagree with something?

                        Remember the ignition temperature of pyroxylinic powders.

                        Quote: geniy
                        And by the way, write your own "official" version of the explosion of the battleship Borodino, otherwise I don’t know anything except the shell hits from Fuji.

                        How hard it is to communicate with a non-reader ... :)
                        Again, I already wrote that in the absence of other data I agree with the version of Shvede stated in his report: a shell hit from "Fuji".
                      5. -2
                        15 February 2021 22: 20
                        Excuse me, the crown does not shake the skull? ;)

                        No, not at all. Because I created such a gigantic version of the course of the entire Russian-Japanese war and investigated in detail the deaths of almost all Russian and Japanese ships, without exception, as well as the ballistics of the falls of Japanese and Russian shells, which even neither Russian nor Japanese officers knew about and until now besides me only one partly guessed about it - the second person on earth.
                      6. +3
                        15 February 2021 22: 58
                        Quote: geniy
                        Because I created such a gigantic version of the course of the entire Russo-Japanese war

                        Where can I read?
                      7. -1
                        16 February 2021 10: 19
                        Where can I read?

                        And nowhere ... The point is that I could not publish anything. I sent my articles and books to different publishers, but as a rule, there was no response from anyone. Because I have a very radical view of RYAV. And now I have accumulated hundreds of started but not finished articles, probably millions of lines. However, this is a common heap for all wars and types of technology, as well as for peaceful use.
                        Although I dream in the near future to publish something, but it is in the form of paper books and for money. BUT time is sorely lacking ...
                      8. +1
                        16 February 2021 08: 31
                        I hope you will please us with your detailed version.
                      9. -1
                        16 February 2021 10: 49
                        I hope you will please us with your detailed version.

                        No, I will not. Firstly: I briefly presented my version in huge comments to the article The Russo-Japanese War as a confirmation of the old rule (I have not even been able to insert a link now - the new computer is not used to it yet ...). So - my views are so radical and probably the only correct one that none of the so-called "experts" dared to challenge my conclusions. And secondly, my version is scattered in hundreds of started and unfinished articles in my archives. But their volume is enormous - probably like all volumes of Leo Tolstoy, because I write much faster than maybe I will publish something someday. But I would like to receive money for my gigantic work.
                      10. -1
                        15 February 2021 22: 33
                        Have you ever seen the drawings of the Borodino-class battleship?
                        From the bow casemate you can see only the middle pair of 6 "towers, and then if you stick out very much from the port ...

                        That's right - the aft tower itself cannot be seen from the bow, but the fact is that at the moment of the first explosion it was apparently turned perpendicular to the side - aimed at the Japanese squadron and when the first explosion occurred, a large force of fire was thrown out of its embrasures almost horizontally. It was this force of fire that the gunners of the bow casemate saw and correctly understood that an explosion of ammunition occurred in this tower. But Borodino did not immediately turn over and these gunmen calmed down for 10 minutes. And then there was the second - the main explosion.
                        So what's your version? And what is wrong with Kostenko's sketch?
                      11. +3
                        15 February 2021 23: 01
                        Quote: geniy
                        This force of fire was seen by the gunners of the bow casemate

                        Can you show on the drawing how they would see it?

                        Quote: geniy
                        And what is wrong with Kostenko's sketch?

                        There are Japanese schemes on the net ... search, compare.
                      12. -2
                        16 February 2021 11: 36
                        Can you show on the drawing how they would see it?

                        And my picture did not load. Although only 200 kilobytes of png.
                        But I consider further discussion with you extremely useless for myself - this is a huge waste of my precious time, which is sorely lacking for extremely useful things.
                        And from you all the same, there is no evidence other than words: look there, look here ... Yes, my computer is terribly slow - it loads one page in five minutes and I have to look for something?
                        I advise you to read the report to the Swede
                        Would bother to give a specific quote, as I do!
                        There are Japanese schemes on the net ... search, compare
                      13. +1
                        16 February 2021 18: 32
                        Quote: geniy
                        Yes, my computer is terribly slow - it loads one page in five minutes and I have to look for something?

                        ... that this is also my fault? :)

                        Quote: geniy
                        Would bother to give a specific quote, as I do!

                        Are you talking about the only quote from Kostenko?
                      14. 0
                        15 February 2021 22: 52
                        What's that book? I want, you know, to join ...

                        G. Brunswig "Theory of explosives" 1932
                      15. 0
                        16 February 2021 18: 33
                        Quote: geniy
                        G. Brunswig "Theory of explosives" 1932

                        Thank you.
            2. +1
              15 February 2021 13: 16
              Quote: geniy
              fire opened the way for heating these thin 6 mm sheets and гromantic the fire heated them up whole hour.

              An ordinary wooden log house burns down to ash in about 15 minutes. No more...
              In the admiral's cabin, wooden upholstery + wardrobes + clothes + furniture could burn for no more than the same 10 minutes. Moreover, if there is a thrust, it would burn with more force, but less long, if there were no thrust, it would smolder longer, but with less force.
              And in either case, there can be no talk of any "huge fire in an hour".
              And even more so to heat 6 mm steel and at least warm up the main armor - such a trifle cannot
              1. -2
                15 February 2021 15: 44
                I think you are wrong. That is, 15 - this is a possible violation of the integrity of a wooden structure and the collapse of a burning house, but not at all its complete combustion to ash. Because wood and, in general, combustible things that have fallen on the ground or on the deck begin to burn less intensely, but many times longer and they emit a lot of heat. In addition, the projectile hit one cabin and it starts to burn and with its heat through the holes in the walls objects in the adjacent rooms ignite and this fire continues for a long time. There were numerous cases of fires on ships - at least the well-known Morro Castle.
                1. +1
                  15 February 2021 17: 57
                  Quote: geniy
                  I think you are wrong. That is, 15 - this is a possible violation of the integrity of a wooden structure and the collapse of a burning house, but not at all its complete combustion to ash.

                  Just believe in the words .. Being a conscript in 1988 in the Gorky region, I participated in extinguishing several times. In the summer, locals took everything valuable from their homes to the cellars - televisions, carpets, etc.
                  We didn't even always have time to run. The fire brigade began to extinguish from neighboring houses - the burning was not even extinguished. To no use, still burned out
                  YouTube is full of videos, you can watch it, everything literally burns for minutes
                  1. -2
                    15 February 2021 21: 29
                    Just believe in the words ..

                    First, you are wrong, because a steel ship is not a wooden house at all. Because the steel walls greatly impede the access of fresh air and oxygen to the hearth of fire inside the ship, and therefore, although there is a large fire inside the hearth, it burns much longer. You might know that tourists split a tree trunk in a special way and the fire burns there not for 15 minutes - but all night.
                    1. +2
                      15 February 2021 23: 02
                      Quote: geniy
                      Because the steel walls greatly impede the access of fresh air and oxygen to the hearth of fire inside the ship, and therefore, although there is a large fire inside the hearth, it burns much longer.

                      Some kind of oxymoron ... :)
                    2. +1
                      16 February 2021 08: 33
                      Quote: geniy
                      First, you are wrong
                      sure?!
                      And I know for sure - that you are mistaken ...
                      With this phrase
                      Quote: geniy
                      Because the steel walls are strong obstruct the access of fresh air and oxygen to the hearth of fire inside the ship, and therefore, although inside the hearth large fire, but it burns much longer.
                      - if oxygen is not available, then there is no big fire. Tourist so-called Finnish candles - chipped logs burn all night, but they smolder.
                      Such a fire will warm up the armor for several hours. What I wrote above
                      Quote: your1970
                      Moreover, if there is a thrust, it would burn with greater force, but for a shorter time, if there were no traction, it would smolder longer, but with less force.

                      I remind you once again that the admiral's cabin is not a timber yard or a wood storage facility. These are not three-girth logs - these are elegant furniture, a little wood on the walls and clothes. This volume, for any combustion options, even with traction without, physically cannot burn for a long time.
                      If in doubt, look at how long it takes to warm up the forgings in a small coal smithy with furs. And then it multiplies this time by the thickness and area of ​​the metal / armor.
                      Or ask the gas cutter - how quickly the steel heats up
                      1. 0
                        16 February 2021 15: 21
                        I will give a short quote:
                        In the last minutes a fire engulfed the entire stern and starboard side. The wardroom, the admiral's quarters, rostras, aft bridges, on which 47-millimeter cartridges were torn, were burning. Flames rose to the marsh of the mainmast.

                        Now are you still sure that this fire lasted no more than 15 minutes?
                        I remember well the words of two sailors from a story in the magazine "Marine Fleet" of the eighties:
                        "Our superstructure was burning ...
                        - Why burn there - it's made of iron!
                        - Here the iron and burned ...
                        There are many thousands of cases of fires on ships. But I just came across this case and I did not bother to look for other thousands of cases of fires on ships and ships:
                        January 12, 1938 at 6 o'clock On the Sakhalin farm in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, on the way from Vladivostok to Moskalvo (on the north-western coast of Sakhalin), a fire broke out in the driver's cabin, which was located in the left corridor under the spardek, opposite the entrance to the engine room.
                        The fire quickly spread down the hallway and smoke. filled the engine room and stoker room. ... Half an hour later, the superstructures on the boat deck were engulfed in fire: the navigator's cabin, the captain's cabin and the radio room .... On January 13 and 14, the fight against fire continued. Only by 4 o'clock on January 15, they managed to cope with the fire, which destroyed all the superstructures and living quarters in the middle of the ship, including the command bridge, the steering and navigational rooms, a radio room, one lifeboat and two kungas.
                        And if you know how to count, the fire on the Sakhalin farm lasted almost 3 days, and if this time is expressed in minutes, it turns out that this fire lasted 4200 minutes. Don't you find that four thousand two hundred minutes is three hundred times longer than your designated time of 15 minutes?
  14. 0
    14 February 2021 14: 37
    Charges ignited in the 6-inch turret.

    IMHO, this is a little off topic ...
    Ignition of the charges took place, but the reason was a splinter that broke through the roof of the tower, that is, an event inherent not only to Tsushima.

    In general, regarding the "Eagle", or rather its damage, in the Battle of Tsushima there is a good article by A. Danilov "Damage to the battleship" Eagle "in the Battle of Tsushima" in "MorVoine" №1 / 2008.
  15. +2
    14 February 2021 15: 09
    The British in 1900, on trials, hit the battleship Belile, among others, about 30-40 shells equipped with liddite. But there were no fires either. Although the ship had boats, furniture, wood trim, bedding and other combustible materials.


    During these trials, there was one episode that drew attention to Fred T. Jane, this is what he writes;

    "Another part of the experiment was devoted to the anti-torpedo network. The shells tore it to pieces and scattered all over the ship, completely destroying it. The explosions burned everything that could burn in its location. It is not at all clear. Liddith has a reputation as an explosive that is difficult to cause a fire. and the only explanation I can offer is that some new form of it or some other new explosive was used. "
  16. +6
    14 February 2021 18: 01
    Damn it, gentlemen.
    As a person who took part in the cutting of several submarines and several "surface watermen" ... And civil / military ...
    They are burning - everything is absolutely the same.
    I have already reported once, any fire on a ship / ship is extinguished in the bud. In the first minutes and a half. Otherwise, later ... you won't catch up with the fire ...
    1. +3
      14 February 2021 19: 13
      Thank you very much for your opinion!
      Then it turns out that the key is a very high hit rate (quantity per unit time). Because of this, there are many hearths - they do not have time for everyone, and there is no way to extinguish fires under the fragments.
      1. +1
        15 February 2021 20: 47
        I agree. There is absolutely no reason to disagree.
        We were on fire in non-combat conditions. And there, then, in general, tin! ..
        Here, at worst, you see that things are not taking a joke, even though you jump out onto the shore. And there, there is not much to jump out of.
      2. 0
        28 December 2021 18: 31
        exactly. And it was the use of high-explosive shells and the massing of fire that decided the matter. If the collision was short-lived (for example, we had an advantage in speed and we got out of the battle) it would be a failure for Togo - no significant damage, repair of communications equipment, rangefinders (replacement), pipes, and Borodino residents are ready to fight again. But as the beating continued, the battleships became more and more defenseless and deprived of the opportunity to fight in emergency parties.
  17. 0
    14 February 2021 19: 38
    The Japanese, on the other hand, filled ammunition with pure picric acid, not wanting to reduce the force of its explosion with phlegmatizers.


    "I do not believe!" (c) Stanislavsky laughing

    This issue has already been discussed, but I dare to remind you again, the Japanese knew about big problems with pure picric acid, detonation right in the barrel is guaranteed almost as surely as in the case of nitroglycerin. I want to remind you that the Japanese had samples of not only pure picric acid but also a phlegmatized composition provided by the inventor of melinite, which later served as the basis for a lawsuit from the author. Moreover, a lost claim.

    I would like to remind you of the version voiced repeatedly: the Japanese decided to make a feint with their ears and use aluminum as a phlegmatizer. It was this composition that was called shimosa. On the one hand, aluminum reduced the amount of active substance in the projectile, but on the other hand, it sharply increased the flash point, which in turn increased the power of the explosion. Combined with the cases, it was hoped to reduce the probability of detonation to zero. As we know today, the hopes were only partially justified. The reliability of shimosa turned out to be much less than that of melinitis or liddite.

    On the other hand, the addition of aluminum well explains the increased likelihood of ignition from the bursting of such shells. In combination, of course, with a huge number of hits.
    1. -1
      14 February 2021 20: 03
      That is, in fact, you are claiming that the Japanese at some point in time suddenly, for no reason at all, decided that the filling of their shells was bad, and on this conclusion they decided to create a new explosive. Then they either made new shells, or unscrewed the bottoms of the old shells and inserted new explosives into them. Can you confirm your assumptions or fabrications with documents - that is, with quotations from translated Japanese documents?
    2. +1
      14 February 2021 22: 47
      Colleague, good afternoon!
      Yes, the discussion is really old.
      For a "practically clean" picnic article by Koike Shigeki. The Russo-Japanese War and the system of SHIMOSE gunpowder http://www1.tcue.ac.jp/home1/k-gakkai/ronsyuu/ronsyuukeisai/49_1/koike.pdf
      Where are the requirements for impurities and research data by A.V. Sapozhnikov, who have come down to us through Rdultovsky and an article in the encyclopedia.
      What is the aluminum version?
      1. +1
        14 February 2021 23: 44
        What is the aluminum version?
        https://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/ruwiki/702499#cite_ref-12
        The source of this information is unknown. There is no serious source about the fact that shimosa is an aluminized explosive.
      2. 0
        14 February 2021 23: 56
        An article in Japanese will help very few people, with good translators in the comments of the topvar is not good.
        Quote: rytik32
        Where are the requirements for impurities and research data by A.V. Sapozhnikov, who have come down to us through Rdultovsky and an article in the encyclopedia.

        As far as I remember, this was also discussed. The research came down to the fact that no naphthalene was found in shimose, and it is not known whether shimose was tested for the presence of aluminum. Most likely not, because Sapozhnikov himself is a specialist in organic chemistry.

        For the version with aluminum, you know an article with a long-closed link to the explosives manual and a certain dose of common sense. By the time shimose was adopted, the Japanese could not help but be aware of the big problems with pure picric acid. And they didn't just refuse to buy a patent for melinite, they were sure that shimosa was better and more powerful. Aluminum can explain this position. But to consider the Japanese military at the beginning of the 20th century as naive and self-confident, in my opinion, is not constructive.
        1. +2
          15 February 2021 00: 10
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Japanese article

          I posted it in Russian




          1. +2
            15 February 2021 00: 11
            Extension




            1. 0
              15 February 2021 11: 27
              I remember this article. She does not answer unambiguously the question of the composition of shimosa. Only indicates that both melinite and shimosa are based on pure picric acid. However, it also unequivocally states that the same melinite is adopted only in the form of mixtures. The French had to start from scratch the production of dinitronaphthalene for this mixture. Sapozhnikov confirmed that shimose does not contain naphthalene. Those. the composition is different.

              Any unusual phenomenon needs an explanation. The French, Russians and Americans could not use pure picric acid, although they tried. But the Japanese, according to you, used it exactly. The question arises, how did they do it?
              1. +1
                15 February 2021 18: 31
                Quote: Saxahorse
                She does not answer unequivocally the question of the composition of shimosa.

                There is also an unambiguous phrase
                collodion was not added to "gunpowder Simos", it is just pure picric acid

                Quote: Saxahorse
                Sapozhnikov confirmed that shimose does not contain naphthalene. Those. the composition is different.

                I will not believe that Sapozhnikov did not make a spectral analysis of shimosa
                Quote: Saxahorse
                The question arises, how did they do it?

                Judging by the explosions of shells upon impact on the slightest obstacle, in the barrels of our own guns and even, perhaps, in the cellar of "Mikasa" - it did not work out very well)))
                Although the Japanese tried: they varnished the shells from the inside, poured the picrink, and did not press ...
                1. +1
                  16 February 2021 14: 59
                  Quote: rytik32
                  There is also an unambiguous phrase

                  There is also an equally unambiguous phrase from Shimose himself that shimosa is a mixture.

                  Quote: rytik32
                  I will not believe that Sapozhnikov did not make a spectral analysis of shimosa

                  Well, you have completely bent it. wink
                  "In 1910, the first non-electromagnetic spectra were obtained: J.J. Thomson obtained the first mass spectra, and then in 1919 Aston built the first mass spectrometer


                  a serious step forward was the work of A. Lomakin (1930), in which the relationship between the intensity of a spectral line and the concentration of an element in a sample was first established. The well-known Lomakin - Scheibe formula underlies all methods of quantitative emission spectral analysis

                  Sapozhnikov might not mind doing a spectral analysis, but he didn't have such an opportunity yet. hi


                  Quote: rytik32
                  Judging by the explosions of shells upon impact on the slightest obstacle, in the barrels of our own guns and even, perhaps, in the cellar of "Mikasa" - it did not work out very well)))
                  Although the Japanese tried: they varnished the shells from the inside, poured the picrink, and did not press ...

                  Above we talked a lot about the sensitivity of the explosive itself and which made the phlegmatization of picric acid urgently necessary. Cases made of tin foil and all kinds of varnishes were also widely used in Europe, which did not eliminate the need for a phlegmatizer. By the way, did you notice an interesting moment in the lineup? The lower the technological level of the country and the quality of the picric acid itself, the more ballast has to be pushed into the projectile. Therefore, in the French mixture there is 20% dinitronaphthalene and in the "Russian mixture" - 48%.

                  Let us recall again nitroglycerin, the most powerful explosive at that time could not be adapted for use in shells. We even tried pneumatic guns :)
                  The problem is the same with trinitrophenol. In Russia, there were deaths even during the tests of mortar shells, and this at a scanty initial speed of mortars. This indicates the extremely low sensitivity of picric acid to overloads, including when fired, and not only when hitting the armor. And how did the Japanese shoot with "pure picric acid" from the ship's guns?

                  Actually, this is the main reason for my distrust of the simplest answer about the composition of shimosa - there is no explanation of how the Japanese overcame the main disease of the new IV, extreme sensitivity. Of course, journalists will write anything, but shooting with pure trinitrophenol is questionable. Otherwise, the Europeans would not have immediately rested on the need for a phlegmatizer, everything was not so bad for the Japanese, only statistics over the years of use and tens of thousands of shells showed that shimosa still needs to be changed.
                  1. +1
                    16 February 2021 19: 22
                    Quote: Saxahorse
                    Sapozhnikov might not mind doing a spectral analysis, but he didn't have such an opportunity yet.

                    In 1859, G. Kirchhoff and R. Bunsen, after a series of experiments, concluded: each chemical element has its own unique line spectrum, and from the spectrum of celestial bodies, conclusions can be drawn about the composition of their matter. From that moment on, spectral analysis appeared in science, a powerful method for remote determination of chemical composition.
                    1. 0
                      17 February 2021 15: 14
                      Yeah, but the idea itself was expressed by Newton. However, real equipment and techniques appeared only in the 30s.

                      In general, the widespread use of phlegmatizers by the French, Russians and Americans suggests that it is impossible to shoot "pure picric acid". In wooden boxes for anti-tank mines, that's okay, but trinitrophenol has a problem with shells.
                      1. 0
                        17 February 2021 15: 32
                        In the Japanese article there is a reference to the shimose standard, where it is indicated incl. composition and tolerances of impurities.
                        Would you like to reach it via Jacar?
                        That would be the point in this matter.
                      2. 0
                        17 February 2021 16: 52
                        Didn't find which link you meant. By the way, what did you mean by "get through Jacar?" ?
                      3. 0
                        17 February 2021 17: 30

                        That's an example. The word 下 瀬 火 薬 searches for 29 pages
                      4. 0
                        17 February 2021 17: 50
                        Ai? If you find a reliable document, tell me the result.
                        I get the result in Japanese, which is useless.
                      5. 0
                        17 February 2021 18: 19
                        I don't know Japanese either. And I have no result.
                        But, they say, you can recognize the hieroglyphs and translate them into English. And it will turn out quite readable.
                      6. 0
                        17 February 2021 20: 07
                        There are scans of handwritten hieroglyphs inside, quite voluminous come across. It is probably possible to scan all this again and translate it, but in terms of volume .. the work will quite pull on the feat of Hercules, however. wassat
        2. 0
          2 March 2021 09: 58
          Quote: Saxahorse
          For the version with aluminum, you know an article with a long-closed link to the explosives manual and a certain dose of common sense. By the time shimose was adopted, the Japanese could not help but be aware of the big problems with pure picric acid. And they didn't just refuse to buy a patent for melinite, they were sure that shimosa was better and more powerful. Aluminum can explain this position. But to consider the Japanese military at the beginning of the 20th century as naive and self-confident, in my opinion, is not constructive.

          I highly doubt the aluminum version. Because he cannot be a phlegmatizer and forms picrates himself:
          Aluminum picrate
          Chemical formula 3Al, molecular weight 711,31 a. e. m. The nitrogen content is 17,73%. Melts above 100 ° C, explodes upon further heating. It can be obtained by prolonged heating from its hydrates at temperatures below 100 ° C. Impact sensitivity when tested according to the Arsenal Picattini method with a load of 2 kg - 16 inches.
          1. 0
            2 March 2021 21: 35
            Quote: Barb
            I highly doubt the aluminum version. Because he cannot be a phlegmatizer and forms picrates himself:

            The picrates themselves have different sensitivities. For comparison:
            Impact sensitivity when tested according to the Arsenal Picattini method with a load of 2 kg - 16 "(for TNT - 14").

            You can see that aluminum picrate itself is less sensitive than TNT. And the next in the line of picrates, ammonium picrate is used as explosives for armor-piercing shells (Explosive D).
            In the series of picrates with different cations, the sensitivity decreases in the series: Pb> Fe> Co> Ni> Ba> Cu> Mn> Zn> Ca, Na, NH4


            The version with aluminum itself is poorly documented and difficult to insist on. However, the version with "pure picric acid" is even worse, we see from historical examples that it is absolutely impossible to shoot with pure trinitrophenol. This is clearly a simplified journalistic cliché. Perhaps the Japanese had some other solution to this issue, different from the solution of the Europeans.
  18. +4
    15 February 2021 20: 23
    Hi Aleksey!
    The correct article.
    Note that the biggest firefighting problems were on the new ships. This once again confirms the problem with crew training. Maximum attention was paid to getting there. However, we had nothing at all like the Japanese daily gunnery training with barrel firing, weekly practice firing. You have covered another aspect - the lack of regular training on fire fighting and damage control on our ships.
    With this approach to training the team, she had one thing to do - to die heroically ... And the fault in the absence of high-quality training was on the ship commanders and the squadron commander
    1. 0
      16 February 2021 08: 41
      Quote: Andrey152
      However, we had nothing at all like the Japanese daily gunnery training with barrel firing, weekly practice shooting.

      They couldn't have been. On a hike daily shooting rather difficult to organize. And if you organize it, it would take two years)
      But nevertheless, the training of gunners was. And quite intense. As previously published here, the total consumption of cartridges for barrel firing, the consumption in the Russian squadron was even higher than in the Japanese fleet.
      Quote: Andrey152
      the lack of regular training on fire fighting and damage control on our ships.

      This is undoubtedly a big omission on the part of the command. But if you take it impartially and objectively, then before Tsushima, no such fires were observed in a single battle.
      1. +1
        16 February 2021 14: 42
        Quote: Trapper7
        They couldn't have been. On a hike, daily shooting is difficult to organize. And if you organize, then it would take two years)
        But nevertheless, the training of gunners was. And quite intense.

        Where was it intense? Three shooting at a parking lot outside Madagascar. And those on the usual 2-5 cable .. And that's all.

        Nebogatov, who tripled a couple of firing at a distance of 30 kbl near Djibouti, prepared his squad for battle much better, at least identified problems with rangefinders. But the ZPR, although he came out of the chiefs of the artillery school, did not lift a finger for enhanced training of gunners. Three shooting per year is the minimum according to the charter! You can simply recall that the 20% of training shells taken in excess of the stock reached almost all of them to Tsushima. This is directly written in the reports of the commander of the Pearl, for example.
  19. +1
    20 February 2021 01: 50
    Quote: Undecim
    Nobody phlegmatized picric acid. Phlegmatization - of explosives - a decrease in the sensitivity of explosives to mechanical influences (impact, friction, heating, shock-wave action) by introducing special substances (phlegmatizers) into their composition.


    https://chem21.info/info/276704/

    "Explosive properties of picric acid. Sensitivity to impact of picric acid - about 32% of explosions with a load weight of 10 kg and a drop height of 25 cm (under the same conditions TNT gives 4-8% of explosions). Sensitivity to impact of picric acid is limiting for explosives." During the imperialist war in Russia and France, only 76-mm (3-inch) artillery shells were filled with pure picric acid, while shells of a larger caliber were filled with a phlegmatized composition (with dinitronaphthalene or dinitrophenol), much less sensitive to shock. [c.263] "