Military Review

"Goldfish" of Project 705: a mistake or a breakthrough in the XXI century?

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We will still build the submarine pr. 705 in the XNUMXst century.

Director of State Enterprise "Admiralty Shipyards"
V.L. Aleksandrov at the 50th anniversary of SPMBM "Malachite" (1998)


Nuclear submarine pr. 705 has become a national task,
an attempt to make a dash
to achieve military-technical superiority over the western bloc.

Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee D.F. Ustinov

- Under the pile driver all this ...
- Well why ... The power plant will now be reliable,
we have introduced all insurance measures into it, it will become efficient.
And as for "tightness", then, in extreme cases,
we are one or two spans, and the orders will become quite acceptable.
- Not one or two spacings will save you from being "constrained".
Under the pile driver you need the entire 705th!

Dialogue between Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkova
with the Minister of the Court Industry B.E. Butomoy, 1973

"Goldfish" of project 705 leaves almost no one indifferent. Starting from an exceptionally beautiful and streamlined "exterior" and ending with outstanding technical characteristics and very daring design decisions. At the same time, assessments of this project are often given polarity. And sometimes the same specialists.

Below is an analysis of the appearance and stories project 705. First of all, from the angle of real combat effectiveness, as well as, accordingly, assessing the feasibility and optimality of certain design solutions.

Taking into account the specifics of the topic, citation of large domestic specialists and links to their work on the 705 project is widely used, with appropriate comments by the author. Of course, this significantly increases the volume of the article and makes it difficult to read. But the topic requires it. It will be impossible to deal with the 705 phenomenon (and especially its lessons) in just a few words.

Separately, it should be emphasized that so far the "lessons of 705" remain extremely relevant for our sub-division.


Engineering feat or mistake?


Here is an excerpt from an article in the Military Industrial Courier dated May 24, 2006 "A submarine looking into the future".

“We strongly disagree with the assessment of the Project 705 (705K) nuclear submarine given by I.D. Spassky ...

Project 705 (705K) nuclear submarines proved to be efficient ships and quite reliable in operation.

The entire period of operation the ships were in service in constant readiness for use for their intended purpose (at least 80%) ...

They showed their high efficiency: each of them had from one to several contacts with foreign submarines in combat service.

Project 705 nuclear submarines were quite quiet for their time and, having high maneuverability characteristics, received certain advantages over foreign submarines. ...

We, submariners, evaluate this ship as an outstanding achievement of the domestic submarine building, directed to the future. The minimum crew (only 35 people), without sailors, operated the nuclear submarine with practically the same combat capabilities as the nuclear submarines of projects 671, 671RT, 671RTM (the savings for the state still have to be calculated!).

1nd Commander flotilla Northern Fleet nuclear submarine Vice Admiral V.T. Prusakov,
Deputy Commander of the 6th Division of the Northern Fleet Submarine Rear Admiral A.S. Bogatyrev,
Chief of Staff of the 6th Division of the Northern Fleet Submarine Captain 1st Rank P.M. Margulis,
Chairman of the State Commission for the Acceptance of Submarines K-64, K-316 (project 705)
Hero of Socialist Labor Captain 1st Rank V.P. Rykov,
head of the electromechanical service of the 6th division of the nuclear submarine, captain of the 1st rank V.A. Dolgov,
commander of the nuclear submarine K-316 (project 705) Captain 1st Rank A.F. Zagryadsky,
commander of the nuclear submarine K-493 (project 705K) Captain 1st Rank B.G. Kolyada,
commander of nuclear submarine K-432 (project 705K) Captain 1st Rank G.D. Baranov,
commander of the nuclear submarine K-123 (project 705K) Captain 1st Rank V.D. Haiduk,
Commander of the 537th crew (project 705K) Captain 1st Rank V.T. Bulgakov
».

Comments to this publication will be further in the text.

And here it is worth citing a significantly different opinion of one of the signatories of the article (the head of the EMC of the 6th division of the nuclear submarine, Captain 1st Rank V.A. Dolgov):

“The maneuverability of the nuclear submarine of this project simply admired ... The idea embodied in the nuclear submarine of project 705 (705K) provided for the creation of a submarine with a nuclear installation of small displacement (up to 1600 tons) with an integrated control system and a crew of 15-18 people. Therefore, "Malachite" one of the main tasks for itself set the all-round reduction of the submarine's displacement.

Everything was sacrificed to this, on which it was possible to win in weight and dimensions. All this, both then (30 years ago) and now, is issued for a breakthrough into the future, for the creation of ships ahead of their time.

In fact, the fleet received ships with a full range of design and organizational flaws, with the combat capabilities of nuclear submarines of only the 2nd generation. I will only point out the very best ones that the personnel had to deal with every day, during the entire service life of these submarines, both at sea and in the base [11 points in total - M.K.] ...

All these "features" of ALL pr. 705 appeared as a result of "the daily" battle to the death "of the chief designer and the entire team of the bureau for each kg of weight and dm³ of volume", as noted by B.V. Grigoriev in the article “Decisions that determined the appearance of the ALL project 705”.

Hard? Certainly.

Let me emphasize that this is the personal opinion of a very experienced professional with extensive experience in operating nuclear submarines, including project 705. And the fact that it differs significantly from the view "signed by him in the collective letter above", so - "the team did not press!"

And this despite the fact that the main problems of the 705 project were not at all mechanical (for all the severity and severity of the problems of the "mechanics").

Let us recall the "features" of the 705 project:

- high speed and very high maneuverability;

- a nuclear power plant (NPP) with a liquid-cooled reactor (LMC);

- small displacement;

- a very high level of automation (with comprehensive automation of both technical and combat assets of nuclear submarines) and a small crew.

Initial intent: "It's so easy it can be automated"


The original design of 705 is most clearly described in the memoirs of L.A. Samarkin "There is no prophet in his Fatherland."

A.B. Petrov, "father of the 705 project", in agreement with V.N. Peregudov (at this time only the Chief Designer of the 627A project) in 1955-1956. investigated issues of submarine survivability. The result of these studies:

“The architecture of the nuclear submarine should only meet the conditions for diving, the structure should be as simple as possible, all the main technical means for the movement should be in a single number - 1 gearbox, 1 turbine, 1 shaft.

Their redundancy is only in a straight line: diesel generator and / or battery, auxiliary propulsion unit, all redundancy elements without duplication, etc.

The number of the crew should be minimal.

No surface (and even more so underwater) unsinkability.

A.B. Petrov proposed a constructively simple single-hull nuclear submarine from three functional compartments - weapons, control and energy.

VN Peregudov was very interested in this project.

According to A.B. Petrov, he was immediately attracted by the idea of ​​the possibility of automating control processes ("It's so easy it can be automated").

Of course, all this looked, to put it mildly, "revolutionary" (although the US Navy went exactly this way).

Therefore, not everyone agreed with these proposals.

So, M.G. Rusanov was a fierce opponent of single-hull submarines. And with his usual polemical fervor, he argued with A.B. Petrov and his associates. There were opponents of both single-shaft and single-reactor power plant schemes.

“At the beginning of 1958, according to the results of the studies by A.B. Petrova SPMBM "Malachite" a technical proposal was developed, which remained, however, without consideration by the Main Committee for Shipbuilding (SCS).

The reason for this was that at the end of 1958, the GKS held a competition for the 2nd generation nuclear submarine, which resulted in the project 671 multipurpose torpedo nuclear submarine for Malachite.

It should be noted that this was the time when the satellite just flew, Belka and Strelka, everyone was waiting for a man's flight into space. Aviation, which only recently took the supersonic barrier, immediately reached 2 Mach numbers. Submarines capable of operating at depth for a long time have become a reality. It seemed that there were no impossible tasks. What is still impossible technically today, will become a reality in 5-10 years (“And apple trees will bloom on Mars!”).

And this "flight of engineering thought" was not only for our developers. And in all developed countries of the world. The end of the 50s (and up to the beginning of the 90s) was an era of breakthrough engineering achievements, which were subsequently replaced by stagnation (“managers won over engineers”).

Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the problem of the speed of the new nuclear submarine.

B.V. Grigoriev (from 1960 he participated in the design of the nuclear submarine of project 705, from 1971 to 1974 he was deputy chief designer of project 705D):

"With timely detection of an enemy torpedo attack, the Project 705 nuclear submarine is capable of evading its torpedoes, having previously fired a salvo from its own TA."

And this applied not only to avoiding torpedoes.

The US Navy's submarine was preparing to enter the SABROC anti-submarine guided missile (PLUR), and the high speed and exceptional acceleration data of the 705 made it possible to escape from the SABROC strike (taking into account the zone of destruction of its nuclear warhead of several kilometers).

At the turn of the 60s, a major war was perceived as definitely nuclear. Accordingly, the issues of the quick and accurate use of their nuclear weapons (and evading enemy nuclear weapons).

In the same period of time in the USSR, work began on the PLUR "Blizzard" and high-speed submarine missile (SPR) "Shkval".

At the same time "Shkval" for the 705 project very effectively complemented the "Blizzard", almost completely "closing" its dead zone. And taking into account the real detection ranges, it actually became the main weapon for the nuclear war of the 705 project (in its original design).

"Blizzard" and "Shkval".

Given the very high maneuverability and speed of the new submarine, significant restrictions on the launch conditions for missiles could actually be leveled out in battle.

One more essential point should be noted here.

Nuclear weapons are not "wunderwaffe". And it has serious limitations in terms of effectiveness. Given the limited engagement zone of tactical nuclear warheads (up to several kilometers), the question of the precise use of such weapons (target designation) was very acute.

This task was supposed to be solved by a very developed sonar path of the new sonar complex (GAK) of Project 705. At the same time, the installation of a large-size GAK antenna for the most effective passive search was unconditional.

One of the options for preliminary studies of the 705 project (above) and a pre-sketch project (with a spherical antenna of the SAC and a single-hull aft end).

L.A. Samarkin:

“The defining idea of ​​the project in its original form, as already noted, was the constructive simplicity of the ship, nothing superfluous, except for the clearly expressed functionally necessary: ​​armament compartment, control compartment (“ pilot's cabin ”), energy compartment. It was the constructive simplicity that predetermined the small size of the crew and the possibility and reliability of centralized control ...

It turned out something different, and in this “different” everyone contributed their bit.

The representatives of the Navy insisted on ensuring the conditions of surface unsinkability, and for a 3-compartment short boat, this requirement gave it, so to speak, a completely different look - a structurally complicated 6-compartment two-hull submarine.

Here it is necessary to note something that the participants in the creation of 705 clearly do not want to talk about. These are different (not coinciding) views of its "initiator" A.B. Petrov and appointed chief designer M.G. Rusanova. Moreover, the original plan of Petrov (and Peregudov)

"It's so easy it can be automated"

eventually turned into

"Make it as difficult as possible and automate at any cost".

This is the technique.

However, tactically, it should be noted preservation of the original tactical idea of ​​the project - a fast and "nimble" fighter with high-speed weapons (SPR and PLUR with nuclear warheads), capable of evading enemy weapons with speed and maneuver.

implementation


The technical proposal for the 705 project was prepared in early 1960.

The first chief designer of the 705 project was appointed by V.N. Peregudov. A. B. Petrov was appointed head of the advanced design sector of the SPMBM Malakhit.

On June 23, 1960, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a decree No. 704-290 on the creation of a comprehensively automated nuclear submarine of project 705 with tactical and technical requirements: normal displacement of about 1500 tons, full underwater speed of about 45 knots, immersion depth of at least 450 meters, crew - no more than 15 people, autonomy - 50 days. The decree allowed (if there were sufficient justifications) to deviate from the rules and regulations of military shipbuilding.

The chief designer of the project was M.G. Rusanov (I repeat, not in all agree with A.B. Petrov).

Given the extremely stringent speed requirements, the use of titanium alloys seemed quite logical. B.V. Grigoriev wrote:

“The use of a titanium alloy provided a displacement reduction of 600 tons compared to a ship made of steel.

There was a price against titanium.

At that time, sheet titanium cost 14 rubles, titanium pipes - 30 rubles, profile rolled products - 23 rubles. for 1 kg.

A loaf of white bread then cost 20 kopecks.

The decline in prices for titanium, especially for pipes, occurred later. "

"Goldfish" of Project 705: a mistake or a breakthrough in the XXI century?
Amazingly beautiful, streamlined "exterior" of the Project 705 nuclear submarine.

The subject of fierce controversy over 705 is the choice of its nuclear power plant, with a reactor with a liquid metal coolant.

The use of LMT was regarded by many as a mistake.

Samarkin L.A .:

“So why was construction stopped and the project was not developed further?

This happened due to the erroneous, premature choice of an unused PPU (steam generating unit) with liquid metal coolant (liquid metal coolant) in the 1st circuit and due to the reluctance of the top management to admit this error and immediately correct it, to modify the project with a water-cooled NPP ( nuclear power plant), which, of course, was not easy to accomplish, and even more difficult to decide on it. "

It should be noted that the first nuclear submarine with a nuclear power plant with liquid metal cores entered service as early as April 1, 1962 (nuclear submarine K-27 of project 645 - a modification of project 627A).

The K-27 was successfully operated by the Navy with several combat services (including in 1964, under the command of Captain 1st Rank I.I.Gulyaev, a record duration).

A severe accident of the nuclear power plant with the destruction of the reactor core and strong overexposure of the crew occurred with the K-27 only on May 24, 1968, when the construction of the 705 (K) series of the project was already in full swing.

Samarkin L.A .:

“To say that no one at that time foresaw the tragic outcome is impossible.

So, one of the leading specialists of SKB-143 in power engineering R.I. Simonov asked to withdraw his candidacy at the NTS for nomination for the prize for the PPU on the LMC for project 645, since he considered the use of these installations to be erroneous.

Chief Power Designer SKB-143 P.D. Degtyarev refused to sign technical project 705 for the same reason.

Head of OKBM (designer of PPU for project 705K) I.I. Afrikantov addressed a similar opinion to the Central Committee of the CPSU. "

However, it is necessary to take into account the fact that with a pressurized water reactor (WWR) not only the speed requirements were not met, but the very idea was lost

"Avoiding enemy weapons"

due to the limited capabilities of the VVR of that time for a rapid increase in power.

Thus, at the time of the start of development, there was no real alternative in the form of a pressurized water reactor that met the requirements for the 705 project.

At the same time, the nuclear power plant itself on liquid metal cores, with all the operational problems on the 705 project, confirmed its characteristics.

Against the background of a human figure, the compactness of the Project 705 nuclear submarine is clearly visible.


The small number of the nuclear submarine's crew was provided by complex automation. Starting from nuclear power plants and general ship mechanical systems and ending with means of detecting and processing information and a complex of weapons.

The GAK devices located in the central post are highlighted in red, the CIUS is in green, the torpedo complex control panel is between them.

It is especially necessary to note the creation of the combat information management system (BIUS) "Accord".

The solution of the most difficult task in a given time and with high efficiency was carried out by the SKB of the plant named after Kulakova (then the Polyus Central Design Bureau) - a traditional developer of torpedo fire control devices. Taking into account the complexity of the new task, the IAT of the Academy of Sciences (later the Institute of Applied Mechanics of the Academy of Sciences named after Academician VA Trapeznikov) was involved in the work. At the same time, the director of the IAT of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician V.A. Trapeznikov was appointed scientific supervisor for the entire complex automation of the Project 705 submarine (including the technical means of the nuclear submarine).

From the memoirs of E.Ya. Metter "Accord" worked by "Lefties":

“A difficult task was in terms of organizing the time diagram of the system's operation, taking into account the need to solve many programs in parallel at a speed of 100 thousand short op / sec ...

We managed to organize parallel computations of tasks of different frequency and importance, which made it possible to squeeze the software into 32K plus 8K of constant memory ”.

Taking into account the very serious bench testing (here it is worth noting that the SJSC "Ocean" of project 705 underwent not only bench testing, but also sea, with its placement on a special experimental submarine), a responsible attitude to business and a high level of developers, BIUS earned confidently and immediately ...

Alas, there is something to compare with. BIUS "Omnibus" of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute "Agat" for the 3rd generation nuclear submarines took a very long and painful time (with a number of very acute conflicts between the Navy and the defense industry complex). And the same PLUR learned to shoot only in the early 80s.

Head order


Due to the high complexity and novelty of the Project 705 nuclear submarine, the head order was considered as an experimental one. At the same time, for absolutely illogical reasons, its construction was "entrusted" to the Leningrad "Sudomekh" (future "Admiralty Shipyards"), which had previously built only diesel submarines. The first "automatic machine" of the Severodvinsk plant was considered as the "head" one (the first serial).

By decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1961), the experimental nuclear submarine was supposed to go on tests in 1965. And the real construction began only in 1964 with the planned delivery of the order in 1968.

By 1981, according to the draft shipbuilding plan for 1971-1980. it was planned to build 30 nuclear submarines of project 705. It turned out that, without waiting for the tests of the lead nuclear submarine, the OPK began building a series of nuclear submarines (and in 1971, two of them were 80% ready).

From the memoirs of the senior engineer of general ship systems (commander of the survivability division) Yu.D. Martyaskin:

"Autumn 1964 ... Obninsk ... We studied first according to a three-compartment project according to some pre-sketch drawings.

An interesting moment. It turns out that in 1964, "Petrov's idea" about the most simple nuclear submarine was still alive.

“It was very interesting, smart and stressful.

For example, during the life tests of automation systems at TsNII-45 at the stand, we offered to give us all the night shifts.

We made it possible, especially for women, not to go to night shifts, and we ourselves got the opportunity to test ourselves in the most extreme emergency modes. "

It is impossible not to quote Yu.D. Martyaskin and the (absent) political officer:

“The chief designer of the ship M.G. Rusanov removed the political officer from the staff list so that there was no bummer who annoyed the crew ...

The zampolita was never brought in, for which all the crews prayed for Rusanov. "

Further, it is quoted verbatim from the book by V. Tokarev "Two Admirals" (2017) (the author's style is preserved):

"Due to the increased secrecy, what rumors were circulating - and that our installation makes candy out of poop, and that our salary is immeasurable."

Does it resemble anything from today?

The commander-in-chief, under strong pressure from the Central Committee and the Government, tried to get it in 1968 instead of 1975-1980, a race began, an assault ...

In connection with the chaos at Sudomekh ... they organized their round-the-clock monitoring of the progress of work. "

The construction of the main order for the K-64 was completed only in 1970 (that is, in the anniversary year, when the Leningrad plant could not “not hand over the order”). And in fact, the unfinished nuclear submarine was taken to Severodvinsk for delivery to the fleet.

Yu.D. Martyaskin:

"As soon as the ship was supposed to be ready to go to sea, there and then an accident happened."

Due to massive malfunctions (including large turbine restrictions and only 30% of the reactor power) and imperfections, the K-64 passed only a reduced amount of tests.

From the book of the first commander of the nuclear submarine 705 of the project A.S. Pushkin's "Submarine Blue Whale":

“All control was carried out from 10 consoles, on alert by the entire crew, on alert number 2–7 operators.

The PPU is characterized by a low power load at a speed of 20-24 knots - 28-35%, for a STU - only 12-24%.

The number of propeller revolutions at 20-24 knots is 170-217 revolutions, while for other nuclear submarines it is not less than 220.

The pre-cavitation depth of immersion is 50–100 meters at a speed of 20–24 knots. The magnetic field at a distance of 0,7 of the hull width was only 2,5 oersteds. "

A.I. Wax, chief designer of the Central Research Institute named after acad. A.N. Krylova in her work "Some strokes to the history of the creation of the project 705 submarine":

“Sea trials of the experimental boat began in 1971.

During the tests, it was possible to confirm, albeit indirectly (taking into account the data obtained during the operation of the NPP at a reduced power), the possibility of achieving the design full speed, measuring the noise, etc.

However, already in preparation for the tests and during their implementation, malfunctions began in the nuclear power plant, which ended in 1972 with a severe accident and the decommissioning of the nuclear submarine. "

Yu.D. Martyaskin (a voluminous quote is worth citing almost in full):

“Finally, all tests were completed. The faults were innumerable. The "skulls" gathered to decide "what to do next.

We came to the general conclusion that we need to stay in Severodvinsk for the winter, fix the malfunctions and move to Litsa closer to summer. With this decision, Admiral Yegorov went to Moscow to report to the Commander-in-Chief.

The commander-in-chief blew him very hard, ordered him to sign the acceptance certificate and sent us to the fleet. The Navy can't wait for such a ship.

Arriving back, Egorov gathered all the "skulls" and announced the decision of the Commander-in-Chief. The Skulls said that they only dreamed about it, and the decision was absolutely correct. We simply did not expect such cowardice and hypocrisy from these academicians.

Cheerful admirals arrived from Moscow. And, despite our squeals, they signed an acceptance certificate and drove off. And we were left alone with iron.

Two of the three power plant loops did not work. In one, alloy flowed out, in the other there was the main circulation pump ...

Power is limited, at best a third could be given.

The turbine was enveloped in restrictions. 14 out of 54 cylinders of the VVD command group were leaking, the VVD pressure limitation was 150 kgf / cm² atm [instead of 400, - MK], two out of three compressors did not work.

Under the influence of the outboard pressure due to hydraulic leaks, the bow rudders themselves moved back into the hull ...

A bunch of faults in other parts ...

The light hull was full of cracks, the main ballast tanks did not hold air, and the boat sat immersed in the wheelhouse.

Somewhere around December 27, as part of a caravan, we set off for Zapadnaya Litsa. "

Remembers Admiral A.P. Mikhailovsky:

“The coming 1972 added new worries to us due to the fact that on the eve of the New Year holidays, the newest K-64 submarine arrived in Zapadnaya Litsa for permanent deployment, after being built and tested in the White Sea ...

Many submariners and shipbuilders revered her as the ancestor of the "third generation" and told miracles about her.

Zapadnaya Litsa is not ready for the deployment of a nuclear submarine with LMT ...

Providing a patrol ship as a steam generator to keep the alloy in a liquid state, as well as a floating dosimetry laboratory, was a dubious half-measure.

The head of the electromechanical service, Zarembovsky, was nervous, and I knew firsthand what the AEU on the LMC was, and the bitter experience of Leonov's crew on the K-27 increased the anxious feeling. "

At the same time, the K-27 (the first with liquid metal fuel) was not only a completely serviceable nuclear submarine, it was successfully operated by the fleet for a long time, including at "extreme" modes. In the case of the K-64, the industry submitted a "disabled" to the fleet ...

Admiral A.P. Mikhailovsky:

“Pushkin’s installation has been screwed up”!

The mechanics called a "goat" a kind of "thrombus" - a solidifying clot of liquid metal in the first loop of the reactor ...

The disease did not appear immediately. First, the first alarming symptoms, then the growing crisis.

Desperate attempts by a council of experts from science and industry to save the situation by using extreme measures (up to the discharge of the radioactive alloy) did not help.

There was a collapse. The remnants of the metal did not succumb to heating, neither external nor their own heat.

The reactor had to be shut down, and this is fatal.

The dead K-64 was towed to Severodvinsk. And we thought for a long time what to do next.

Unfortunately, the ideologist of LMC reactors, academician A.I. Leipunsky passed away. "

And here is an excerpt from the book SPMBM "Malachite":


It turns out that

"The crew (fleet), as always, is to blame for everything."

And here it will be useful to recall the very dubious behavior of the management of SPMBM "Malakhit" after the tragedy at the nuclear submarine "Nerpa" (2008).

It would be doubly appropriate to mention the project 885 "Severodvinsk" agro-industrial complex, "handed over" to the fleet with huge imperfections, shortcomings and forgeries with tests. In fact, in a state of incapacity (for with the current level of anti-submarine weapons, a combat submarine cannot be considered "combat-ready" without effective means of protection).

Let me emphasize that these are not assumptions. Namely, the facts confirmed, among other things, by numerous decisions of arbitration courts. Read more about this in the article AICR "Severodvinsk" was handed over to the Navy with deficiencies critical for combat effectiveness.

In addition, it will be triple useful to take into account the fact that now "Malakhit" and USC are stubbornly trying to "hand over" Project 885M to the Kazan fleet - without anti-torpedoes, with anti-torpedo countermeasures that are obviously outdated and absolutely ineffective against modern torpedoes, without volley fire with remote-controlled torpedoes (and other critical flaws).

The realities of completing the head order were well described by Rear Admiral A.S. Bogatyreva in the material "From the history of the technical crews of the nuclear submarine pr. 705 (705K)" with the following final conclusion:

“Even now it is not clear to me why the construction of the newest boat was entrusted in the first place not to the NSR, but to Sudomekh, which even had no experience in building nuclear-powered ships, let alone“ automatic machines ”.

Is this the result of a struggle between plant directors, leaders of the Leningrad and Arkhangelsk regions, or malicious intent?

And at whose command the K-64 became "the longest ship in the world" (the bow is in Leningrad, the stern is in Severodvinsk).

If the priority of construction was given to Severodvinsk, the series of nuclear submarines of pr. 705 would “go” from 1970, and not from 1977, as it happened, and there would be much more boats ”.

On the fracture


Chief Designer of the Central Research Institute. acad. A.N. Krylova A.I. Wax:

“At the end of the analysis of the causes of malfunctions and accidents at the NPP K-64, which were the subject of the proceedings of a number of commissions, the specialists of the TsNII im. acad. A.N. Krylov, his leadership and the Midsudprom, the question arose about the advisability of continuing the serial construction of the submarine pr. 705 (705K), which had been launched by this time.

Based on the experience gained during the tests of the lead nuclear submarine, and taking into account a number of features of the project, as well as its obsolescence due to the delay in construction (the beginning of the design - the end of the 1950s, the real date of delivery of the first serial submarine - the end of the 1970s. ), TsNII im. acad. A.N. Krylova in 1973, in his report to the industry leadership, proposed to consider the issue of curtailing the serial production of nuclear submarines of project 705 (705K) and completion of one nuclear submarine as an experimental one (serial number 905).

The funds ... were supposed to be used for the construction of an additional number of nuclear submarines, project 671 RT ...

It was argued that (taking into account the lower cost of the nuclear submarine of project 671 RT and its relatively good characteristics), this could lead to an increase in the combat effectiveness of the grouping of torpedo nuclear submarines under construction. "

It is worth making a comparison between the nuclear submarines 705 and 671RT of the project.

At a lower cost, the 671RT project had much more powerful armament (two 65-cm torpedo tubes (TA) and four 53 cm, instead of six 53 cm TA project 705), less noise and a greater range of target noise detection, while losing at maximum speed and overclocking characteristics. Obviously, when preparing proposals as a priority parameter, the TsNII im. Krylov considered low noise and more powerful weapons.

However, there was a certain slyness in these conclusions.

Firstly, the difference in dynamics between the 705 and 671RT was not so much quantitative as qualitative, allowing the 705 with a good probability to get away from the small-sized Mk46 torpedoes (the 671RT had much less chance of this).

Secondly, at least two orders of Project 705 were in very high availability (over 80%). The navy and the defense industry have just "written off" the newest and very expensive nuclear submarine (K-64). And it turns out that after her the Central Research Institute. Krylova suggested “just like that” to write off not only a large unfinished submarine, but also at least one practically finished nuclear submarine (leaving only the head Severodvinsk order).

Thirdly, slightly losing out in the noise direction finding range, Project 705 Okean SJSC was fundamentally superior to Project 67RT Rubin SJSC in terms of the capabilities of active assets (sonar and mine detection paths). And this was a very important factor for real combat conditions.

Fourth, we slipped into a very competent American "information stuffing" that supposedly "low noise is all in submarine warfare." At the same time, the US Navy itself did not think so at all, for example, practicing special tactics for fighting its submarines with our low-noise diesel submarines.

Actually, everything that was happening was an obvious beginning crisis of our both military science and applied in the "naval" defense industry, which turned out to be unable to competently assess the new conditions of submarine warfare and work out well-founded proposals on effective combat models for our submarines and their technical implementation (including in the form of effective modernization of the project 705 nuclear powered submarines).

Midsudprom did not support the Institute's proposals.

It was decided to continue the construction of six ships, project 705 (705K), which had been started at two factories, which was confirmed by the adopted resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which ordered the delivery of the last, 6th serial nuclear submarine in 1978 (in fact, the last boat (serial No. commissioned in 107; it was under construction for almost 1981 years, and in 10 it was withdrawn from the fleet).

So the series 705 went to the Northern Fleet, 1 flotilla, in the future Admiral A.P. Mikhailovsky:

“I went to sea in K-123, taking with me only three officers of the flotilla headquarters: a navigator, a signalman and a mechanical engineer. More I could not take: there is nowhere to place.

Abbasov frankly admired his complex-automated miracle. I shared his admiration for everything related to the hydrodynamic qualities of the ship.

However, much was puzzling.

Why do I need these 40 knots, if by 20 the boat becomes deaf?

Why do I need this over-automation, if there is no opportunity to switch to manual control of many systems and mechanisms, when a blown fuse can bring the boat out of control?

Who and why needed to rename the navigator, calling him “assistant commander for navigation”, miner - “assistant commander in arms”, helmsman - “engineer for ship motion control”?

All this is necessary break.

The names of systems and devices, positions, ship schedules, command words when controlling a boat - urgently bring it into line with diving experience, diving traditions and ship charter.

It is necessary to shoot down the "comprehensively automated arrogance" not only from Abbasov's crew, but also from all subsequent ones. After all, by the end of the year, I will have six such boats in my flotilla.

"Reinforced 705"


Already the initial design studies for 705 included not only a multipurpose (main) version, but also a shock one - both with anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles of the D-5 complex (while, in accordance with the views of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov, 8- missile version with the ability to launch all ballistic missiles in one salvo).

One of the shock versions of the pre-sketch project 705.

From the book on the history of SPMBM "Malachite":

“Analyzing in 1968 the experience of creating a nuclear submarine of Project 705, the probable tactics of its use, the SPMBM formulated an opinion on the timeliness of working out issues related to the modification of this project.

The main focus of the modification was seen in increasing the combat effectiveness of the ship by increasing the number and range of weapons.

It was taken into account that an increase in the range of action of torpedoes and rocket torpedoes is possible only with an increase in their caliber and length. "

We emphasize this conclusion of the SPMBM and return to it in the final evaluation of the project.

Taking into account the development of the direct competitor of Project 705 - the nuclear submarine of Project 671 with the strengthening of its armament with the 65-cm TA, the development of Project 705 with "enhanced" armament (Project 705D) began.

B.V. Grigoriev:

“The nuclear submarine of Project 705D was considered as a natural continuation of Project 705 and was developed on the basis of the basic principles adopted in its creation.

The project was supposed to increase the amount of 533 mm ammunition from 18 to 30 units, re-equip the submarine with four missiles of increased caliber.

The Sverdlovsk design bureau "Novator" performed a special development of a rocket for the nuclear submarine of project 705D, which confirmed the possibility of its storage without access and maintenance for 6 months in unsealed outboard launchers of the cabin fencing and launch under its own rocket engines. "

Note. There are very reasonable doubts about the required level of this “elaboration”. And here it is important to remember both the most serious problems with the outboard torpedoes of our submarines in World War I, and the extremely negative consequences of soaking torpedoes during the Great Patriotic War (according to competent experts, this factor became one of the main factors in the low success rate of firing of our submarines during the war years). Then there was the very negative experience of the Malakhit SPMBM with the outboard countermeasures on the Project 971 nuclear submarine, which eventually forced Malakhit to finally place outboard products in pressurized containers (they were first publicly presented at IMDS-2015).

The "self-exit" start made it possible not only to abandon special power plants for firing, but also to increase the maximum launch depth. The proposed solution made it possible to have 10 units ready to fire at the same time. ammunition of various types.

That is, in theory - "everything is fine, beautiful marquise", but the possibility of practical implementation in the form of normal operation in the fleet of "wonderful designs" of "Malachite", to put it mildly, raises serious concerns.

At the same time, on the 705D project (actually "the same age" as the new 3rd generation nuclear submarines), the noise level continued to remain extremely high.

B.V. Grigoriev:

"The acoustic characteristics of the ship were significantly improved (by 1,5 times)."

Sorry, but "one and a half times" is not "essential" for acoustics (in quotes), but almost nothing. And given the extremely high noise level of the 705 project, it is quite logical that the Navy refused the "gift" of the 705D project.

Speaking about the 705D project, it should be noted that it was supposed to be in two versions of the nuclear power plant: with liquid metal core and the new pressurized water reactor OK-650 (without exaggeration, an ingenious product of our atomic complex, both in design and in characteristics).

B.V. Grigoriev:

"The main fuel and energy elements depended little on the type of PPU, since ... the parameters of the OK 650B-40M reactor in terms of mass, dimensions and maneuverability approached the parameters of the BM-XNUMXA."

In the future, the OK-650 reactor will become standard (with minor modifications) for all our 3rd generation nuclear submarines.

The real combat effectiveness of the project 705


Memoirs of the commander of the K-493 pr. 705K captain of the 1st rank B.G. Kolyada:

“Anyone who commanded the nuclear submarine of project 705 (705K) will say a lot of admiring words about its maneuverability, the ability to pick up speed almost instantly (in a matter of minutes from 6 to 42 knots).

The boat is very beautiful externally - a limousine-type wheelhouse fencing, streamlined hull.

The nuclear submarine of project 705 (705K) sailed to the Arctic, the crews practiced ice navigation, including icing.

In my last BS, while sailing in the Arctic Ocean, part of the trip took place under the ice, part - at the edge of the ice. And I very much remember the ease of icing, as well as surfacing in a hole - high maneuverability greatly simplified the solution of these tasks.

The latter should be especially noted.

US and British Navy submarines routinely operate with much less restrictions than Navy submarines. In this connection, the opinion about the "safety" of most of the Northern Sea Route from enemy submarines raises serious doubts.

The submarines of the so-called "partners" can not just go there, but with the solution of combat missions. Including where our large nuclear submarines either have very large restrictions, or in general are practically incapable of combat.

Accordingly, the issue of a "small nuclear submarine" for the Russian Navy is at least worthy of attention (for example, the version with a nuclear power plant of project 677).

“Of course, on the new ships the GAK were better - for example, on the Project 671 RTM boats, the detection range was higher, nevertheless, they did not always win in training fights, their torpedo attacks were not always successful.

The speed of our boat allowed us to get away from the torpedo, as a result of which, in fact, no guidance was made.

Hearing a torpedo shot, you bring it to the aft sector and give full speed - 40 knots, and the torpedo does not catch up with the boat.

And here we come to what really became a "knockout" for the 705 project.

Yes, it confidently "runs away" from the 40-nodal SET-65 torpedo (and even more so from the old American Mk37 torpedoes).

Loading the Mk48 torpedo on the US Navy submarine.

However, in 1971 (that is, simultaneously with the delivery of the lead nuclear submarine of Project 705 to the fleet), the US Navy adopted the Mk48 torpedo, which had a maximum speed of 55 knots and with a cruising time of more than 12 minutes (for the first modifications). Thus, the "theoretical" (without taking into account the time for the turn, acceleration and error on the attacking torpedo) catching speed for the 705 project is about 14 knots (or 7 m / s), or just over 2 cab. in a minute.

12 minutes of full speed for the Mk48 means that it will catch up with the 705 at maximum speed, even when launched into the "stern", when firing from a distance of up to 25 cab. (at the same time, as the distance of "counter-detection" of enemy submarines ("Sturgeons" and old "Losov") for the 705 they usually called "about 10 cab.").

In other words, in the overwhelming majority of tactical situations, the US Navy submarines (even of old types) had a decisive superiority over the Project 705 nuclear submarine due to the presence of Mk48 torpedoes with high performance characteristics.


These harsh realities were "retouched" in every possible way.

For example, Rear Admiral A.S. Bogatyrev, in the past - the commander of the nuclear submarines of projects 705 and 705K considered:

Let's say - the worst case - we are being secretly tracked by the enemy submarine, that is, we do not know that we are “on the hook”. ...

Well, what if a torpedo "ran" from the "stern" towards us, and the acoustics, real professionals, found it?

The commander counterattacks the enemy within a few seconds, and in the same seconds the boat reaches its maximum speed, even with a 180 ° turn, and leaves.

The torpedo cannot catch up with her! "

Alas, the Mk48 can catch up (when launched for torpedoes of the first modifications from a distance of less than 25 cab). And here a completely different tactic was needed than “putting a bucket on your head” (a slang expression for the most complete move of the submarine).

Captain 1st Rank G.D. Baranov, in the past - the commander of the K-432 project 705K:

“The insufficient capabilities of the SAC, which are mainly determined by the high level of its own interference, did not make it possible to achieve a decisive separation from the nuclear submarine in solving anti-submarine problems ...

This did not allow to recognize the nuclear submarines of project 705 (and 705K) as domestic submarines of the third generation.

It was said directly and honestly.

Yes, 705 had tracking of foreign submarines (IPL). For example, the K-463 has more than 20 hours of tracking SSBNs (stopped by order). But the tracking is not hidden, with the active use of sonar means (sonar tract in various modes and mine detection tract), at short distances and literally “on the nerves”. With a high probability, the opinion expressed in our literature that “to stop tracking” the K-463 was a request “through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” is most likely true. For such "dog fights" were too dangerous under water.

The problem is that for the enemy such "behavior" of our nuclear submarine was a problem only in peacetime. In the military (or threatened) - it would have been just a shot from the Mk48 (with fatal consequences for the 705).

A picture from the book of Admiral A.P. Mikhalovsky. 705 project destroys SSBN "Shkval". 1977 year

With all this, the words of G.D. Baranov on the capabilities of the 705 project against surface ships:

“After a year or two of the operation of the nuclear submarine, it became clear that the new ships had unusual and in many ways brilliant capabilities of the power plant, which, if used correctly and successfully and without much effort, could evade anti-submarine forces of a potential enemy and any torpedoes that were in service at that time. US and NATO submarines, as well as, unlike nuclear submarines of other projects, to monitor the detachments of warships (OBK), aircraft carrier strike formations and groups (AUS and AUG) of a potential enemy ...

It should also be recalled that an ineffective torpedo weapon designed only for self-defense against NK (SAET-60A torpedoes) forced us to approach them at extremely short distances to increase the probability of hitting surface targets, which sharply reduced our chances of successfully completing torpedo attacks due to the need to overcome deeply echeloned ASW ”.

Alas, the main drawback of the SAET-60A was not in small salvo ranges, but in the extremely low noise immunity of its homing system (HSS), in fact the direct "successor" of the German TV during the Second World War (the effectiveness of which was extremely low due to the massive use of towed traps by the allies) ...

In fact, a project 705 nuclear submarine with a towed trap "Nixie" in a real battle (for its reliable defeat) would have to be fired at by SAET-60A as straight-forward torpedoes. Such is the "nuclear submarine of the XXI century" (according to a number of experts).

At the same time, a large number of US Navy and NATO ships had the ASROC anti-submarine missile system, which made it possible to repeatedly "beat with a club" at our nuclear submarine even before it entered the salvo position.

The high speed of the 705 project was close to that for the Mk46 torpedoes of ASROC missiles and aviation, which (taking into account the low energy reserve of a 32 cm torpedo) sharply reduced the likelihood of hitting an actively maneuvering nuclear submarine of Project 705. However, the ASROC launcher (the most common) had 8 missiles, plus another 16 to reload in the cellar.


Taking into account the factor of low efficiency of Mk46 torpedoes against actively maneuvering nuclear submarines of Project 705, the experience of its use for "opening" and additional reconnaissance of orders of US Navy and NATO ship formations while ensuring the effective use of strike weapons (ASM) by the forces of the fleet should be considered, of course, positive.

From the memoirs of the former First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1988-1992), Fleet Admiral I.M. Captain's:

"To support the actions of the tactical group, it was necessary to form a reconnaissance and shock curtain in the composition of three nuclear submarines of the project 705 or 671 RTM."

Yes, for our Premier League it was "Russian roulette".

But if, figuratively speaking, for the nuclear submarine of Project 671RTM there were “almost all the cartridges” in the “drum of this revolver”, then for the 705 there were only “one or two”. In other words, in order to reliably defeat the Project 705 nuclear submarine, it was necessary to consistently execute a large number of attacks from the Mk46. And here the 705 project had a chance to "split the order" and give high-quality target designation to the strike forces of the fleet.

Enemy score


Undoubtedly, the new nuclear submarines aroused extreme interest in the US Navy (also because they themselves were developing a program to build high-speed Los Angeles).

Vladimir Shcherbakov in the article "How the Pentagon hunted for the secrets of the Project 705 nuclear submarine" wrote:

"American intelligence was able, on the basis of information obtained by various methods, even at the stage of building the first ships of Project 705, to reveal the main features of the newest Soviet submarine."

With the beginning of the operation of the Project 705 nuclear submarine at sea, the enemy began a targeted collection of data on a new project of the USSR Navy, including specifically letting itself be detected.

Captain 1st Rank G.D. Baranov:

“The crews“ brought ”the first contacts with foreign submarines, but their unbiased analysis suggested that the enemy, intensely interested in the TTE of the new nuclear submarines, was specially approaching them at a“ sword thrust ”distance to take hydroacoustic portraits of our ships.

Moreover, in order to analyze the real combat capabilities of the enemy, they even carried out imitations of torpedo attacks (with the actual firing of torpedoes or simulators with torpedo noises). The issues of such actions were considered in more detail in the article “At the forefront of the underwater confrontation. "Cold War" submarine ".

By Dmitry Amelin and Alexander Ozhigin in the magazine "Soldier of Fortune" No. 3 for 1996:

“With the same commander, our crew, performing a long campaign, in the area of ​​Bear Island was attacked by an unknown enemy. I stood as a hydro-acoustician on watch ...

Suddenly, a mark from the target appeared on the screen of the sonar complex ...

The sound from the target began to grow sharply, and I had no doubts that it was a torpedo. The bearing to the target did not change, and this clearly meant that it was approaching us ...

Reported: "Torpedo on the right 15".

The commander immediately gave the command: "Raise the power of the power plant to one hundred percent."

The inclusion of the sound of the torpedo on the speakerphone instantly sobered everyone ...

The commands poured in: "Left on board, the most complete turbine."

Then we ran away, we could develop crazy speed.

What was there, who attacked, what, there was no time to figure it out. "

In view of the above, the public assessment of American authors Norman Polmer and K. Gee Moore (in the book Cold War of Submarines) is as follows:

“Project Alfa is the most outstanding submarine of the XNUMXth century.

The appearance of the Alfa project caused a shock in the naval circles of the West.

We have upgraded our Mk48 torpedoes with the aim of increasing the speed and depth of immersion to values ​​exceeding those achieved on these exceptional submarines. "

Agree, it smacks of open slyness and an obvious desire not even to "shake" the American taxpayer on new expenses for the US Navy, but rather to "hit the hands" of lobbyists of any "exterminating mafias" of the US Air Force in order to "master the budget pie" (that is, "The USSR Navy Is the enemy, and the enemy is its own air force (USA) ").

conclusions


Rear Admiral L.B. Nikitin in his work "Lessons of operation of nuclear submarines of pr. 705, 705K" noted:

“Thus, by the end of the 1970s. instead of "very, very" the Navy received an "underwater fighter" with very mediocre TTE for its time.

The cost of material, moral and other types of costs associated with the creation of a truly unique ship, did not pay off, hopes were not justified.

What is worse in the world?

And, as we can see, this is by no means connected with the choice of the type of reactor installation, as some authors try to present, who, by the way, had no direct relation to the operation of the nuclear submarines of projects 705 and 705K in the fleet.

The position of these authors is not accidental and understandable.

Fact is that at the stage of development of the TTZ and the design of these ships, the authors of the project, the Ministry of Justice Industry and the Navy did not see, did not guess the trends and prospects for the development of submarine shipbuilding for the next 10-15 years, as a result of which it was not possible to create a submarine with optimal TFC in all respects and with a noise level that meets the requirements of combating submarines of a potential "enemy", the noise levels of which were known by that time, albeit approximately. "

This opinion is widespread.

But it is not entirely true.

The fact is that all nuclear submarines become obsolete over time, they are beginning to be more and more inferior to nuclear submarines of new construction in terms of low noise. And here the key issue is effective modernization and development of a model for its use, which ensures the longest possible maintenance of the combat effectiveness of nuclear submarines. The USSR Navy did not cope with this (further this issue will be analyzed in detail using the example of the development in the Navy of Project 671 in comparison with the Sturgeon project of the US Navy).

Speaking of LMC reactors, one cannot but highlight the words of Rear Admiral Nikitin:

"Recent development work has shown the possibility of painless use in the standard version of the frozen state of the coolant, which, with the right approach, opens up ample opportunities for the use of ship reactor plants with liquid metal fuel, practically negating the drawback that caused so much trouble to the Navy during the operation of nuclear submarines of pr. 705 and 705K" ...

Captain 1st rank retired S.V. Topchiev in the article "Opinion: Why the nuclear submarines of Project 705 were not needed by the Navy" summarizes:

The year 1981 can be considered the apotheosis, when the mass awarding of the participants in the epic took place.

A little more than a hundred awards "fell" on the compound that bore the brunt of the project development.

Then a smooth sunset began.

In the early 1990s, all boats, except for the K-123, were decommissioned. "

In the “dying” of the 705s, not even their shortcomings, but the elementary exhaustion of spare parts, both for AEU (for example, bearings of turbine generators and electric machines), and for SAC and BIUS played a very large role.

For example, in the second half of the 80s, on almost all nuclear submarines 705 of the project, the active paths of the SAC (that is, what was just the strong and especially valuable) were faulty.

It was even more "fun" with weapons.

Due to the unique data entry system for the 705 nuclear submarine of the project, special modifications of the SAET-60A and SET-65A torpedoes were produced. By the beginning of the 90s, all of them had already come out according to the assigned terms of service. As a result, when, in the early 90s, the Navy received from a long-term medium repair (after the reactor accident in 1982) the last running submarine of Project 705 - K-123, the only thing it had in its ammunition load was mines (since they did not data entry required). There was not a single torpedo for this submarine.

To date, all the nuclear submarines of project 705 (K) have already been dismantled, which should be considered a big mistake.

Our fleet really lacks an experimental submarine. And when replacing the nuclear power plant with a diesel-electric version (using serial components), we could get a very effective experimental submarine (development of new weapons, detection equipment, etc.).

One of the last Project 705 nuclear submarines to be dismantled.

Returning to the "features" of the 705 project.

First. High speed and very high maneuverability.

For the 705, this was the "design basis", including combat models. And at the time of making decisions, it made sense.

The irony is that, starting from the 3rd generation, our nuclear submarines began to lose their advantage in speed and acceleration characteristics over the new US Navy submarines. 38 knots, indicated in some reference books, for the "high-speed" modification of the Los Angeles submarine, this is not a "mistake", and not a "fantasy", but a fact. The overclocking characteristics of the American submarine are even more impressive. The author had the opportunity to personally verify this on the basis of data from the guidance of the SET-65 torpedo to the submarine.

The reaction of "military science" to these data is interesting (literally):

"Well, one cannot draw general conclusions from one example."

Yes, there are few examples (not one). However, even here our "military science" habitually "played its favorite game -" I'm in the house. "

Moreover, according to a number of indirect data, there is reason to believe that the speed of the latest Virginia-class submarines is significantly higher than the usually indicated values.

Second. AEU with LMC.

Despite all the problems with operation, the implementation of the concept of the 705th without liquid mechanical equipment in the 60s. was impossible. And it paid off (I repeat, regardless of the problems with use).

The third. Small displacement.

By itself, the small displacement of the nuclear submarine was not news... For example, a significant number of foreign nuclear submarines had a displacement less than Project 705 nuclear submarines, starting with the Skate and Talliby (US Navy) and ending with the modern Rubies of the French Navy. For the 705, displacement was important for speed. However, with this "too clever" and very much, completely forgetting during the development of the creation of reserves for modernization. To a large extent, it was this that had fatal consequences for the 705 project (for which it was quite possible to lose the speed knot).

Fourth. The very high level of automation and the small crew did not justify themselves.

However, on the basis of the 705 project for integrated automation, 3rd generation nuclear submarines were created, where the level of automation and redundancy were optimally linked to the number of crews (and significantly less than on foreign submarines).

And here we are, of course, and really ahead of other countries.

And finally, the last and most important thing is the weapon


The main conclusion and unlearned lesson of the 705 project will be the phrase of Admiral Popov:

"Ships are built for cannons."

Alas, it was an almost complete failure in arms that became a disaster for the 705 project.

Nuclear use?

However, in this case, bases are among the priority targets of the strike. Accordingly, you will have to fight with those that are already loaded. PLUR 81R and "Shkval" were stored in torpedo tubes (TA). And given that the torpedoes on the 705 were non-universal, that is, in the TA it was necessary to hold a two-torpedo salvo SET-65A (against submarines) and a two-torpedo salvo SAET-60A (against ships), under the PLUR and Shkval there were only two TA ( in other words, only 2 weapons in ammunition).

With the adoption of the PLUR "Waterfall" (which had, among other things, a non-nuclear version with a torpedo), the modernization of the Project 705 nuclear submarine for them turned out to be impossible. There were not even scanty reserves in terms of displacement and power supply. The team of CIUS developers was dispersed.

According to the initial plans of the Project 705 nuclear submarine, they were to receive high-speed anti-ship peroxide torpedoes 53-65MA with wake guidance and a special modification of the "promising" universal torpedo of the Navy - UST.

With a high probability, the 53-65MA for the 705th was personally "hacked" by Admiral Yegorov, who was very critical of peroxide torpedoes. And it was the right decision. The small crew of the nuclear submarine did not provide constant monitoring of the torpedoes "visually and tactilely" by the torpedo operator on duty. And the stake on automation (the SADCO system - automatic remote control of the oxidizer), developed for the 705 project, was a frank "game with matches".

A variant of the UST torpedo (which became UST-A USET-80) for the 705 project "died without being born." As a result, the "machine guns" were left with the second-generation torpedoes SET-65A (anti-submarine) and SAET-60A (anti-ship). Both of these torpedoes can be watched live in the museum of the Gidropribor concern.

Torpedoes SAET-65A and SAET-60A at the KMPO Gidropribor Museum.

SET-65A had an old (the very first version of SET-65) active-passive homing system (SSN) Podrazhanskiy ("eared equipment") with a real response radius and a search area of ​​less than 800 meters and a speed of 40 knots per 15 km.

Comparing it with the Mk48 (with its 55 knots and 18,5 km of range at high speed, with a radius of more than 2,5 km of SSN and telecontrol) is simply devastating.

But the situation with the SEAT-60A anti-ship torpedoes was even sadder, due to the extremely low jamming immunity of their CLS (and the massive proliferation of towed traps on NATO ships).

The tragedy of the 705 project is that, which was conceived as an "almost space breakthrough" in the 48st century, the "gold" in cost "atomic fish" was armed with almost a "rezinostrel", with which there was practically no chance against even the old US Navy submarines with the MkXNUMX torpedo.

With the Mk48 torpedo, the US Navy knocked out the Project 705 concept. Of course, the costs of these programs were disproportionate. Competently spending limited funds, the enemy effectively neutralized our colossal investment of resources in a series of Project 705 nuclear submarines.


Everything turned out even harder today with the "newest" project 885 "Ash" of the same "Malachite".

The scam with the creation of a "promising" complex of counteraction for the nuclear submarine of the Navy "Module-D", of course, requires a public opening.

Earlier, given the closed nature of the topic, there were great restrictions on what you can write in the media. Now, after the publication of a number of articles (for those who are "especially vigilant" - freely available and with the permission of the "first departments" for publication), this scam needs to be described in detail and in detail.

If a new torpedo was needed to reliably counteract the 705 project of the US Navy, then in order to neutralize the protection concept of our "newest" 885 project of the US Navy, it was enough to replace the cassettes and hardware models in the previously released torpedoes (Mk48 mod.6 and Mk48 mod.7 ).

At the same time, "Malachite" is the head organization of the Russian Federation for weapons and self-defense systems for submarines.

Fleet?

And the admirals are "in anticipation" of well-fed positions in the defense industry. So the fleet “cheerfully accepts” both Boreas with ancient USETs, and defenseless (with obviously ineffective countermeasures and without anti-torpedoes) “Prince Vladimir”, “Severodvinsk”, new diesel submarines.

There will be no war? Maybe it won't.

Was it possible to do something effective with the project 705 nuclear submarine?

Certainly.

And the main thing here is an effective application model and its technical implementation. Since our 705 had no chances to compete with the latest US Navy submarines in low noise (plus effective torpedoes from the enemy), the solution was to use active search means. Fortunately, the Ocean State Joint-Stock Company had the potential for this. And modernization in this direction was quite possible.

Moreover, the modernization of the SAC (new element base) made it possible to provide such necessary reserves of weights, volumes and energy consumption.

The main weapon should have become PLUR. That is, it turns out a kind of "large underwater anti-submarine ship." Moreover, this "underwater BOD" would significantly exceed the same BOD of project 1155 in speed (including search), the ability to work in stormy conditions, and the potential for the most efficient use of hydrological conditions.

A division of such nuclear submarines could become a "broom" for submarines and submarines of the NATO Navy in the Barents Sea, reliably ensuring the deployment of our forces (including NSNF).

It would be extremely effective to use such a nuclear submarine - "submarine BOD" for the anti-submarine defense of a ship formation.

"Long arm" PLUR (in combination with effective means of active search) allowed to shoot the US Navy submarines from a safe distance from torpedoes Mk48. And the American submariners knew this very well, respected and feared the "Waterfalls".

So there were opportunities.

But no one even tried to work out and implement them.

And today again with our current problems the situation is exactly the same.
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  1. Vladimir_2U
    Vladimir_2U 10 February 2021 06: 36
    +15
    At one time, the "Goldfish" impressed with the degree of automation, that's where there was a real breakthrough! You can easily compare with the early books of the Strugatskys!
    1. Mister X
      Mister X 10 February 2021 08: 50
      +8
      strong retraining crew ...
      Author: Maxim Klimov

      hi
      Apparently, the author wanted to say "overexposure"

      1. 2534M
        2534M 10 February 2021 12: 18
        +1
        Quote: Mister X
        Apparently, the author wanted to say "re-exposure"

        thanks for noticing
        1. Lexus
          Lexus 10 February 2021 17: 04
          -14%
          Colleague hi,
          Thank you too! "Lyra" is only a small, but bright, fraction destroyed by "ebnoputinism".
          1. TermNachTer
            TermNachTer 10 February 2021 19: 05
            +14
            Actually, 705 ave. Was taken out of service long before Putin, so he is definitely out of business.
            1. Lexus
              Lexus 11 February 2021 00: 30
              -2
              It always has nothing to do with it - it's usual. Only now the last boats of the project were disposed of in 2008 and 2009. And so, yes, after the "hollow on the stumps" with the result there is no demand.
              1. TermNachTer
                TermNachTer 11 February 2021 13: 19
                -3
                They were disposed of in those years. And when was the last time they went to sea?
                1. 2534M
                  2534M 11 February 2021 17: 46
                  +3
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  And when did they last go to sea?

                  K-129 in the year 1996-1997
                  1. TermNachTer
                    TermNachTer 11 February 2021 18: 39
                    -1
                    And when did Putin become Prime Minister?
                    1. Lexus
                      Lexus 11 February 2021 19: 38
                      +6
                      K-123 and K-373 until 2008 and 2009 accordingly, they stood idle with a loaded nuclear fuel, if that. If desired, it was possible to carry out repairs with modernization and leave at least one boat for research work. LMC nuclear reactors are still considered a very promising topic. But, as it turned out, Honduras is not at all in Latin America.
                      1. TermNachTer
                        TermNachTer 11 February 2021 23: 05
                        +2
                        The fact that the fuel is not unloaded from the reactors does not mean that the boat is "on the move". There are many other units on which the boat depends or not.
                      2. bugagich
                        bugagich 13 February 2021 04: 27
                        +1
                        you are either grossly mistaken, or not in the subject. LMT is a very big problem (not just about Poseidon - not an analogy or a criterion at all). such a boat for research purposes cannot be waved with any desire for any price.
                        and the boat gave (+) actually in politics and in the push of technology in the country, but not a combat unit. and could not. really helped in the formation of a number of engineers. but whether it is justified or not is debatable, and not something else.
                  2. Nemchinov Vl
                    Nemchinov Vl 13 February 2021 02: 35
                    +1
                    What do you think, Maxim, what prevents the fleet from ordering the optimal (on those assignments and performance characteristics) project MCSAPL (perhaps something medium in size between 705, "Barracuda", "Cedar" or RTMK) ? !!
                    why stopped at "Ash M" ? !! It's all about lobbying or the Navy really doesn't know what it needs and at what price ? !!
                    1. 2534M
                      2534M 13 February 2021 18: 21
                      +3
                      Quote: Vl Nemchinov
                      What do you think, Maxim, what prevents the fleet from ordering the optimal

                      waiting for "soft chairs" in the USC firms
                      1. S. Viktorovich
                        S. Viktorovich 13 February 2021 18: 28
                        -1
                        Not enough for everyone?
                      2. 2534M
                        2534M 14 February 2021 14: 04
                        0
                        Quote: S. Viktorovich
                        Not enough for everyone?

                        Monsieur, pick up your long tongue and if you please do not "assume" your "soft-pop-cleslous reflexes" on normal people
            2. fuffi
              fuffi April 27 2021 18: 27
              0
              Someone just to get drunk, but the fact that by the end of the 90s they were scrap metal, and expensive, of course.
        2. datura23
          datura23 14 February 2021 17: 35
          0
          this project is a successful sabotage against the alliance, justification for its continuation of this sabotage
  2. timokhin-aa
    10 February 2021 10: 43
    +11
    No sense from him in the end ...
    1. Vladimir_2U
      Vladimir_2U 10 February 2021 10: 57
      +5
      Quote: timokhin-aa
      No sense from him in the end ...

      Yes, as much as from the Union, if you drain everything ...
      1. timokhin-aa
        10 February 2021 11: 11
        +10
        It's not about the drain, but about the fact that this boat was neutralized simply with a new torpedo and that's it.
        1. DrEng527
          DrEng527 10 February 2021 15: 34
          +5
          The story with these nuclear submarines confirms the banal - it is impossible to optimize weapons in one parameter - as in this case - maneuverability!
          1. Akuzenka
            Akuzenka 11 February 2021 12: 00
            +7
            The new Tsushima awaits our fleet. But the pockets of the admirals are not empty.
            1. Doliva63
              Doliva63 11 February 2021 17: 11
              0
              Quote: AKuzenka
              The new Tsushima awaits our fleet. But the pockets of the admirals are not empty.

              Well, not so bad: Tsushima will be followed by a world revolution, then 2 revolutions, and the country will finally return to a "healthy lifestyle". laughing
      2. antivirus
        antivirus 10 February 2021 15: 39
        -11%
        it's not about the drain - to achieve the level of electronics, you need physics teachers, chemistry, etc. + children perceiving those teachers + time (20-30 years) + chain (?) in industry and R&D + admirals-generals in alliance with "effective managers" + imperio-criticism (who needs it?) - and got it.
        AND TO GET THE BEST BOAT OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND NOT TO Fight ON IT - FOR 12 YEARS AND FOR PENSION - HAHA YOU MOREMAN. we must suffer with all the people. live in the same ranks with the workers and collective farmers. any weapon is part of the country's system of values ​​... there was no "best" goal in everything - that they could at a specific period of time - they gave it to the fleet. torment and now further with your country and people. is it necessary to protect such a people? - everyone decides for himself. can fit better for the Americans?
        1. Boa kaa
          Boa kaa 10 February 2021 17: 29
          +3
          Quote: antivirus
          suffer now further with your country and people. is it necessary to protect such a people? - everyone decides for himself. can it's better to fit in for the Americans?

          Bandera! I’ll see it’s not an ANTI-VIRUS !!!
          You are BACILLA! worse than coronavirus am
          From him, at the very least, they found a remedy, but from betrayal - only execution on the spot! To prevent others from infecting the bacilli of unbelief in the people and the country! So that people like you, Banderlog, strangle at the root! He doesn't like the people, you know! negative
          1. antivirus
            antivirus 11 February 2021 10: 26
            -4
            choke on the vine!
            is it a call to violence? there were a lot of well-fed patriots - everyone sat down.
            - I'm just about the unavailability of the industry and ROC (and other systems in the torpedo tubes. SAC) - the commissioning was delayed for 10 years. and the operation was the same experimental .. the admirals themselves were not ready and right now they can only press the buttons. They scold the zamvolt a lot. What did they want to squeeze out of him? - a serial ship or new ideas to check? and to cram into the series in the SLKD generation?
            and the subconscious "crawls out - I'm talking about" So that others do not infect with the bacilli of disbelief in the people and the country! "
            live a dreamer with your people and "on its wave." If Ry'ka turned out to be too tough for the fleet, then questions to teachers in secondary schools and teachers in schools. And I will modestly add - to teachers of designers.
            reptiles - sit in the aquarium.

            I have no questions to the admins - about calls for violence - everything was clear before.
    2. 2534M
      2534M 10 February 2021 12: 18
      +1
      Quote: timokhin-aa
      No sense from him in the end ...

      sense would be
      it was necessary to modernize correctly
      1. your1970
        your1970 April 3 2021 12: 01
        0
        Quote: 2534M
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        No sense from him in the end ...

        sense would be
        it was necessary to modernize correctly
        - alas, this is not always possible
  3. Alien From
    Alien From 12 February 2021 03: 52
    0
    Not the first time I mastered Maxim's article, in many respects I agree, and with you too, somewhere the thread leading to the future was lost hi
  4. dauria
    dauria 12 February 2021 14: 16
    +1
    At one time, "Goldfish" impressed with the degree of automation

    It seems that Project 222 was nicknamed "Goldfish" for its high cost. A 705 code "Lear", NATO classification "Alfa"
    1. bugagich
      bugagich 13 February 2021 06: 03
      +4
      did you mean not Project 222, Project 661, code "Anchar"...
      boat K-222
      yes, it is she who is the "goldfish", you are right.
      1. dauria
        dauria 13 February 2021 10: 56
        +1
        you did not mean Project 222, but Project 661

        Yes, you are right ... Well, as an excuse - I climbed into the sea once in my life, and that Okhotskoye on Sakhalin. And the film about a boat that managed to drive an aircraft carrier along with a bunch of destroyers across the Atlantic on one reactor was remembered.
  • mark1
    mark1 10 February 2021 06: 39
    +4
    Interestingly, I liked the details. + But here's an assessment of complex automation
    The very high level of automation and the small crew did not justify themselves.
    not unambiguous
    ... complex automation, by and large, has fully justified itself, and the AEU with liquid metal rolling stock has not yet said its last word (Kuzin V.P. Nikolsky V.I. "The Navy of the USSR 1945-1991
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 February 2021 10: 39
      +5
      This is mistake. Small crew = no one to fight for damage, etc.
      1. aars
        aars 10 February 2021 11: 12
        +11
        Rather, the fight was not supposed to be. in the original draft: "No surface (and even more so underwater) unsinkability."
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 February 2021 11: 13
          +1
          Well, that's in the original draft.
        2. Boa kaa
          Boa kaa 10 February 2021 17: 39
          +7
          Quote: aars
          "No surface (and even more so underwater) unsinkability."
          And at the same time have a 33,4% buoyancy margin? BZZ is possible in this case until AZ falls, and then? Blown out and ... to the bottom? If there is no underwater unsinkability .... Yes, and in the middle of the ocean, you can't get aground, as Mina suggests ... Therefore, ours were against the three-compartment structure, because the submarine must remain afloat when at least one compartment is flooded. And now there are 2 adjacent ones. From this, as far as I know, our 'Mechs did not leave and did not allow others to take liberties. School is still underway from Krylov's grandfather.
          Somehow, however.
          1. 2534M
            2534M 10 February 2021 18: 09
            -4
            Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
            against a three-compartment structure, the submarine must remain afloat when at least one compartment is flooded

            these are outdated and unnecessary requirements
            1. Alexander Lysenko
              Alexander Lysenko 10 February 2021 21: 50
              +1
              Detect-strike-retreat? Strike first? No need for a hrenolliard bays. Killed-survived for a while
          2. bugagich
            bugagich 13 February 2021 05: 53
            +1
            you forget that in such conditions pl is already a corpse, more often than not. however, in this case, the decrease in buoyancy played a role in increasing maneuverability - see Project 667. yes, a very controversial project. yes, in terms of ... execution or something. yes, in many respects not very much (although, I myself, personally, think etc. very interesting, but only the other itself, the very idea, we just lack something for now). but those who went to the head say that the maneuverability good
            and this is not only contours, namely the constructive type, if I may put it this way - single-body (although, in full measure, it is not such - but this is already a polemic). in general, the design type also affects maneuverability and noise (there are disputes here, but we will note).
            1. 2534M
              2534M 13 February 2021 18: 19
              -1
              Quote: bugagich
              see Project 667. yes, a very controversial project.

              no, the project is very successful
              and according to it the article is being prepared
              1. bugagich
                bugagich 14 February 2021 16: 23
                0
                the project itself is interesting, yes. I meant his execution.
      2. 2534M
        2534M 10 February 2021 11: 58
        +4
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Small crew = no one to fight for damage, etc.

        in fact it is incorrect
        because the "sliding stop" at the real depths of the submarine "you can't do much" (and this is to put it mildly)
        in general, the topic is interesting, and it is worth writing an article on it - for example, on the experience of the Second World War - when sometimes they did simply outrageous things

        but with the CPU, the OKS BZZh is fully foreseen, and the dynamics of the boat allowed, with a "hole" (small), to quickly jump out to a shallow depth and pump out
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 February 2021 14: 35
          +5
          in fact it is incorrect


          The American principle, they departed from it only on littoral and more than once regretted it.
          There should be ENOUGH people.
          BZZh is conducted not only during combat damage, do you know?
          1. 2534M
            2534M 10 February 2021 14: 41
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            The American principle, they departed from it only on littoral and more than once regretted it.
            There should be ENOUGH people.
            BZZh is conducted not only during combat damage, do you know?

            this topic is a good reason for a separate article
            + just about amers (survivability divisions on AB) there was a very good article in the old "Sea Collection" (and with a comparison like we did on "Kuznetsov")
          2. Shopping Mall
            Shopping Mall 11 February 2021 08: 58
            +3
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            in fact it is incorrect

            The American principle, they departed from it only on littoral and more than once regretted it.
            There should be ENOUGH people.


            "Sufficiency" may vary depending on the applied technical solutions. For example, one unit is not reliable, complex and requires 10 people to maintain its performance. The other requires only two, since its design is more perfect.

            It's the same with automation. For example, look how many people were in the crews of old bombers - 5-7 people, and now there are 2-3, since automation ...

            The main problem in the PMSM is how to define this "sufficiency". Those. from the point of view of automation, it seems to be "enough", and when the low reliability of this automation emerges, it turns out that it is not.

            Again, the PMSM, now actively developing unmanned NKs and submarines, will make a huge contribution to reducing the number of crews not by themselves, but by developing technologies that make it possible to produce long-term unattended components and assemblies, which in turn will lead to a decrease in the crews of manned ships by several times, or even an order of magnitude.
    2. 2534M
      2534M 10 February 2021 15: 16
      +2
      Quote: mark1
      (Kuzin V.P. Nikolsky V.I. "The Navy of the USSR 1945-1991

      KiN is bad manners
      cm
      https://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2015-01-16/1_myths.html
      Once again about the myths of post-war shipbuilding
  • svp67
    svp67 10 February 2021 07: 02
    +27
    I can't even imagine how much such a project will cost now ... Even "liquid sodium" for the Beloyarsk NPP reactor was now purchased in France ... And the computer stuffing ... But damn it, without such projects there are no "breakthroughs" in development both the technology itself and the industry of the state.
    It is worth remembering how many new industries appeared in the USSR only when copying the American B-29 bomber
    1. loft79
      loft79 10 February 2021 22: 29
      +6
      A lead-bismuth alloy was used on the nuclear submarine, which is still disgusting (melting temperature about 130C). I worked with him at the IPPE Obninsk (in the 2000s), just in one of those laboratories that participated in experiments on coolant for submarines. There were also experiments with a sodium-potassium alloy, also disgusting (it burns in the air, it bangs when interacting with water). But whatever they were in short supply did not hear. hi
      1. svp67
        svp67 11 February 2021 04: 02
        +3
        Quote: loft79
        But whatever they were in short supply did not hear.

        Alas, a French coolant is used in the fast neutron reactor of the Beloyarsk NPP.
        1. PSih2097
          PSih2097 11 February 2021 18: 29
          +1
          Quote: svp67
          Quote: loft79
          But whatever they were in short supply did not hear.

          Alas, a French coolant is used in the fast neutron reactor of the Beloyarsk NPP.

          it means that someone earned on a rollback, because
          Quote: loft79
          But whatever they were in short supply did not hear. hi
          1. svp67
            svp67 12 February 2021 06: 26
            +1
            Quote: PSih2097
            it means that someone earned on a rollback, because

            Maybe so, in any case, the official version is that we do not have a production facility capable of producing heat of the required quantity and quality of this product
            1. PSih2097
              PSih2097 12 February 2021 19: 58
              +1
              Sergei, today I phoned a friend from the Urals, he said that it is not profitable to work with the locals, moreover, at the management level, and custodians can return up to 20% to the accounts of those interested (remember "Mistral") ...
  • NDR-791
    NDR-791 10 February 2021 07: 06
    +18
    Expanded. It's contradictory. And it is not always correct, given the author's well-known attitude to the methods of adopting a particular model. However, from a purely engineering point of view, creating an "ideal system" is simply not possible. We cannot wait until they create an ideal GAC, an ideal torpedo, an ideal reactor, etc. to someday (when?) collect all this ideal in one complex. And again, from an engineering point of view, ideals collected in one complex cease to be them. That is, the ideal is not achievable in principle. Yes, the boat was revolutionary, even if we omit the voluntaristic decisions with the use of "heavy artillery" represented by the Central Committee of the CPSU. But the design decisions had their say. And don't tell me that all the experience was scrapped along with the boats. The only thing that seriously "annoys" me in such publications is attacks in the direction of competitors - it is very reminiscent of undercover fuss. The first time I encountered this was back in the 90s when analyzing the death of Komsomolets. How many buckets of "substance" Ruby and Malachite poured on each other then cannot be described in words. And so the material is informative, not like translated reprints from "sources"
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 February 2021 10: 43
      +9
      That is, the ideal is not achievable in principle.


      This is not the point, but the fact that the enemy neutralized huge investments in this project "in one move"
      1. NDR-791
        NDR-791 10 February 2021 11: 00
        +10
        And this too, but Project 705 and not our fastest boat. Project 661 Anchar was somewhat earlier (at 80% of the reactor power, the speed is 42 knots). And in it, apart from howling like on an airplane, they also heard nothing. Now from the article: ... Why do I need these 40 knots, if by 20 the boat becomes deaf? ... There are still problems with torpedoes. And the fact that the enemy "in one move" is a question to the former KGB and to decision making system we have. When the desired stumbles upon reality and decisions are made with a blow of a fist on the table, and even for the anniversary. So it turns out that successful decisions are canceled by such a simple method. Now only the number of players in the system has increased, but the system itself has not changed. Remember how Shoigu barked about OCD and frigates.
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 February 2021 11: 12
          +8
          Intellect is not held in high esteem, and no matter what the KGB reported, decisions would be made as they were.
          Ignoring professional judgment is our long-standing political tradition.
          1. NDR-791
            NDR-791 10 February 2021 11: 33
            +8
            Ignoring professional judgment is our long-standing political tradition.
            Unfortunately yes. The time of loners has passed, when the engineer got up under the bridge he built, he won't return. And no one will allow the entire Military-Industrial Commission to be sent on combat duty in the new masterpiece of the military-industrial complex. Where can we get so many admirals? "It is necessary to feel sorry for them, take care of them" (c).
            1. Intruder
              Intruder 10 February 2021 16: 27
              +2
              Where can we get so many admirals? "It is necessary to feel sorry for them, to protect them" (c).
              and then also feed and broadcast the anniversary broadcast ...
          2. DrEng527
            DrEng527 10 February 2021 15: 36
            +4
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Ignoring professional judgment is our long-standing political tradition.

            all the fleets of the world sin this hi The question is how to create a countermeasure mechanism - to be honest, I don't know request
        2. 2534M
          2534M 10 February 2021 11: 52
          -2
          Quote: NDR-791
          but Project 705 and not our fastest boat. Project 661 Anchar was somewhat earlier (at 80% of the reactor power, the speed is 42 knots).

          in fact the fastest
          for the LOCATED speed is greater
          VVR 661 needed a long time to "heat up"
          Quote: NDR-791
          And the fact that the enemy "in one move" is a question for the former KGB

          understandable ... now kEdzhibI is "finovat", ... and "Malachite", as always, "in Belom"
          Quote: NDR-791
          Remember how Shoigu barked about OCD and frigates.

          YOU remember it for what? Just "for furniture"?
          1. NDR-791
            NDR-791 10 February 2021 12: 18
            +10
            I see ... now kEDzhIBI "finovat"
            In 2007, in a deep mountain taiga in the Eastern Sayan, in a hunting hut, there was a cardboard box with kindling for the stove. And in the box ... almost 80 sheets of drawings from the Irkutsk aircraft plant with purple stamps "Secret, not for transferring to a foreign customer" !!! Did they get there by divine providence?
            And yours:
            , ... and "Malachite", as always, "in Belom"
            only once again confirms the very undercover fuss
            1. 2534M
              2534M 10 February 2021 12: 44
              +1
              Quote: NDR-791
              And in the box ... almost 80 sheets

              I hope you did correctly
              1. Local from the Volga
                Local from the Volga 10 February 2021 23: 30
                -2
                he brought it there too!
      2. garri-lin
        garri-lin 10 February 2021 17: 34
        +4
        Nn neutralized. The modernization of the SAC and new torpedoes could well return the 705's efficiency to the project. An ordinary fight. Each step of the opponent must be answered with his own step. Moreover, the problem of torpedoes at that time was already acute and it was necessary to deal with this problem with no less enthusiasm.
    2. 2534M
      2534M 10 February 2021 11: 49
      -7
      Quote: NDR-791
      It's contradictory. And it is not always correct, given the author's well-known attitude to the methods of adopting one or another model

      arguments will be, or YOU just blah blah blah?
      Quote: NDR-791
      But the design solutions said their word

      WHAT?!?!? MOTHER?!?!?
      Quote: NDR-791
      I am seriously "annoyed" in such publications is attacks towards competitors - it is very reminiscent of undercover fuss.

      Monsieur, try AT LEAST ONCE IN YOUR LIFE TO ANSWER YOUR WAVING IN A LONG LANGUAGE
      Quote: NDR-791
      The first time I encountered this was back in the 90s when analyzing the death of Komsomolets. How many buckets of "substance" Ruby and Malachite poured on each other then cannot be described in words.

      and YOU try - AT LEAST ONE PROOF for this YOUR nonsense to find
      1. NDR-791
        NDR-791 10 February 2021 12: 07
        +8
        Monsieur, try AT LEAST ONCE IN YOUR LIFE TO ANSWER YOUR WAVING IN A LONG LANGUAGE
        Here's right from the same article:
        Let me emphasize that this is the personal opinion of a very experienced professional with extensive experience in operating nuclear submarines, including project 705. And the fact that it differs significantly from the view "signed by him in the collective letter above", so - "the team did not press!" The answer is clear ????
        and YOU try - AT LEAST ONE PROOF for this YOUR nonsense to find
        Yes, at least read Mormul with letters and links to correspondence
        1. 2534M
          2534M 10 February 2021 12: 31
          +1
          Quote: NDR-791
          Let me emphasize that this is the personal opinion of a very experienced professional with extensive experience in operating nuclear submarines, including project 705. And the fact that it differs significantly from the view "signed by him in the collective letter above" is so - "the team did not press!" The answer is clear ????

          maybe I was mistaken, and considered it a "run over" on my account - then I'm sorry
          As for the problem raised, it really exists, it is acute and SHAME - "big and respected uncles" when problems arise, begin to behave "like in a garden - and Vovochka farted", to the extent that their unofficial motto can be hung on the facade of some defense industry companies "we will never be extreme"
          Quote: NDR-791
          Yes, at least read Mormul with letters and links to correspondence

          Mormul is a very "crooked" source
          there was no serious conflict between "Rubin" and "Malakhit" on "Komsomolets"
          1. NDR-791
            NDR-791 10 February 2021 12: 50
            +6
            maybe I was mistaken and considered it a "run over" on my account
            In no case!!!
            Mormul is a very "crooked" source
            The fact that Mormul, Cherkashin, Shigin sources are not quite what would be completely wassat this is understandable and well-known, but here's the thing - to discard the mess between developers and say that this does not exist and would not exist, I would be careful. Remember from the history of aviation - at first Yakovlev, being the People's Commissar of the aviation industry, bent everyone under his design bureau, then Tupolev bent all the design bureaus under his production. Do you think the others were very happy ??? And here are the same graters. If something did not work out for a competitor or turned out badly, then the cry that "we said, we can do better" will always be enough. Here I am talking about the echoes of such tales.
            1. The comment was deleted.
    3. ccsr
      ccsr 14 February 2021 17: 15
      0
      Quote: NDR-791
      It's contradictory. And it is not always correct, given the author's well-known attitude to the methods of adopting a particular model.

      You have correctly noted that the author has suffered from this for a long time, and therefore only naive people can believe in his objectivity.
      Quote: NDR-791
      We cannot wait until they create an ideal GAC, an ideal torpedo, an ideal reactor, etc. to someday (when?) collect all this ideal in one complex.

      Moreover, even if we create all this, then in any case we must take into account how it will fit into the modern strategy of nuclear war. And what place will it take in the structure of the flotilla or the fleet, so that we can understand what type of weapons for the command of the Navy is the main one, and what is the secondary one, in order to understand what we should improve first of all.
      Quote: NDR-791
      Yes, the boat was revolutionary, even if we omit the voluntaristic decisions with the use of "heavy artillery" represented by the Central Committee of the CPSU.

      Unfortunately, we do not know at what stage this decision was made, because it is possible that the initiative came from the naval forces themselves, who simply did not have enough funds for these submarines, especially considering that the money was probably required to create the Typhoon - this is purely my suggestion.
      Quote: NDR-791
      The only thing that seriously "annoys" me in such publications is attacks in the direction of competitors - it is very reminiscent of undercover fuss.

      It is obvious. The trouble is that Klimov writes here with little experience in service, and I have not seen comments from more mature officers from the operational and ordering structures of the flotillas, the fleet or the General Staff of the Navy. But they could give a more accurate assessment of the situation, why it was necessary to abandon this or that project, because this could be due to a change in the entire concept of using the fleet in a future war. So, only naive people who are too far from the problem of creating new weapons can believe everything that Klimov or Timokhin writes here.
      1. 2534M
        2534M 15 February 2021 12: 43
        0
        Quote: ccsr
        the author has suffered from this for a long time, and therefore only naive people can believe in his objectivity.

        bunny, you just have your "fillet" by me and Timokhin blazes lol
        hence all your screeching and "discharge"
        Quote: ccsr
        how it fits into a modern nuclear war strategy.

        those. warrant officer Ssyk (ccsr) drunken warrant under vodka "did not tell anything" about non-nuclear war lol
        as well as about limited nuclear
        Quote: ccsr
        who simply did not have enough funds for these submarines, especially given the fact that it was possible that money was needed to create the Typhoon wassat "

        you need to use a lot of tinctures on fly agarics to RAD about "Typhoon" in 1961 wassat lol
        Quote: ccsr
        what does Klimov write here with little service experience

        ensign Ssyk (ccsr), and who are you to talk about "service experience"?!?!
        In your case, this is only a food warehouse and bukhalovo with ensigns.
        Quote: ccsr
        and I have not seen comments from more mature officers from the operational and ordering structures of the flotillas, the fleet or the General Staff of the Navy.

        ensign, and you wipe off the monitor from the secretions and see (IN THE ARTICLE) for example:
        So episode 705 went to Northern Fleet, 1 flotilla, in the future Admiral A.P. Mikhailovsky:
        “I went to sea in K-123, taking with me only three officers of the flotilla headquarters: a navigator, a signalman and a mechanical engineer. More I could not take: there is nowhere to place.
        Abbasov frankly admired his complex-automated miracle. I shared his admiration for everything related to the hydrodynamic qualities of the ship.
        However, much was puzzling.
        Why do I need these 40 knots, if by 20 the boat becomes deaf?
        Why do I need this over-automation, if there is no opportunity to switch to manual control of many systems and mechanisms, when a blown fuse can bring the boat out of control?
        Who and why needed to rename the navigator, calling him “assistant commander for navigation”, miner - “assistant commander in arms”, helmsman - “engineer for ship motion control”?
        All this must be broken.
        The names of systems and devices, positions, ship schedules, command words when navigating a boat should be urgently brought into line with experience, diving traditions and the Ship's charter.
        It is necessary to shoot down the "comprehensively automated arrogance" not only from Abbasov's crew, but also from all subsequent ones. After all, by the end of the year, I will have six such boats in my flotilla.

        Quote: ccsr
        So, only naive people who are too far from the problem of creating new weapons can believe everything that Klimov or Timokhin writes here.

        warrant officer from the food warehouse, you scream wassat here just because you are WHIPPED and stuck into your own fairy tales and nonsense
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 15 February 2021 12: 57
          -2
          Quote: 2534M
          you need to use a lot of tinctures on fly agarics to RAD about "Typhoon" in 1961

          You see, an illiterate torpedo operator, there was a committee in the structure of the Navy that you don't even know about:
          In 1960, by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Naval Scientific Committee (MNC) of the General Staff of the Navy was created, which united the scientific department of the General Staff and the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Navy.
          In 1966, the Naval Scientific Committee of the Main Staff of the Navy was transformed into The Scientific and Technical Committee of the Navy and is directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
          Unlike the STC of other services of the Armed Forces and the STC of the General Staff of the Armed Forces it created an operational-tactical section on the basis of the MNK General Staff of the Navy.
          With 1985 year The Scientific and Technical Committee of the Navy was headed by Academician, Vice-Admiral A.A. Sarkisov - the largest specialist in the field of nuclear energy.

          Officers with at least a Ph.D. degree serve there, and their task is to look into the future of the fleet, in terms of building promising missile submarines. And given that it had an operational-tactical section, I would not be surprised that the basics of using Typhoons were born in the sixties. But because of your illiteracy, you will never understand this, because you have never seen the documents of the NTC in your eyes, and you have no idea what they were planning in the sixties.
          1. 2534M
            2534M 15 February 2021 13: 04
            0
            Quote: ccsr
            You see an illiterate torpedo operator, there was a committee in the structure of the Navy that you don't even know about

            ensign Ssyk (ccsr), you are very funny and stupid
            the answer of the Chief of the Naval Operations Directorate, which I posted, was on my documents sent incl. and in OLS

            So turn your WILDLIFE to where you blaze
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 15 February 2021 13: 07
              -1
              Quote: 2534M
              was on my documents sent incl. and in OLS

              So you wrote to the president, you will not lose anything. What did the naval specialists get from your compositions and what did the MNC say to you?
              1. 2534M
                2534M 15 February 2021 13: 19
                -1
                Quote: ccsr
                what did the MNC tell you?

                why do you need to know this ensign!?!?
                who are you anyway!?!?
                from what CAN be said - I WILL REPEAT that just following the results of the conversation on these documents in OLS, on the advice PERSONALLY

                began to print publicly
                The answer of the Head of the Operational Management of the Navy is given
                1. ccsr
                  ccsr 15 February 2021 17: 44
                  -1
                  Quote: 2534M
                  from what you CAN say - I WILL REPEAT,

                  Yes, I realized a long time ago - you really wanted to snatch a position in Moscow in 2006, but your attempts turned out to be useless due to your professional incompetence, so they kicked you off. Well, since then you have decided to take revenge on your former superiors, constantly spreading myths about the state of the Navy, which even former naval officers in the military do not take seriously, who more competently assess the whole situation. And the answer was given to your boss in order to get rid of you - there is not a single instruction that he is obliged to fulfill in relation to you and your report.
                  1. 2534M
                    2534M 15 February 2021 18: 15
                    -2
                    Quote: ccsr
                    you really wanted to snatch a position in Moscow in 2006,

                    warrant officer Ssyk (ccsr), YOU please drag your DRUNKY nonsense to a psychiatrist or a narcologist, and not to a forum
                    Quote: ccsr
                    Well, since then you have decided to take revenge on your former bosses

                    lol
                    RYAL AKI HORSE
                    given that I still have a very good relationship with them
                    Quote: ccsr
                    who assess the situation as a whole more competently

                    warrant officer Ssyk (ccsr), YOU please drag your DRUNKY nonsense to a psychiatrist or a narcologist, and not to a forum
                    Quote: ccsr
                    former naval officers in the military

                    who "for some reason" SUPPORT ME
                    Quote: ccsr
                    there is not a single instruction that he is obliged to fulfill in relation to you and your report.

                    warrant officer, are you a warrant officer at all? did you even serve in the army? do you even realize what kind of Achina you are talking about? HOW IT IS POSSIBLE TO APPOINT A PERSON TO A HONORING (much more) POSITION WITHOUT HIS CONSENT (report)!?!?
                    Corresponding your "instructions for my bosses" - NOT MORE THAN THE DRUNKED RUNNING OF A drunken ensign Ssyk (ccsr)
  • Titsen
    Titsen 10 February 2021 07: 09
    +5
    As usual in those already distant times - to be in time for the next, but the nearest anniversary of October!
  • sergo1914
    sergo1914 10 February 2021 08: 00
    +4
    Sevmash is proud of these boats. It's a pity, most of the builders of this miracle have already left. Well, traditionally, if you give a good thing to the naval hands, they will either lose it or break it. All this about 705.
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 February 2021 10: 41
      +3
      Have you read what you are commenting on? The boats served well to the end. The problem is that they demanded huge expenses and the enemy neutralized them with just a new torpedo.
      1. sergo1914
        sergo1914 10 February 2021 11: 17
        -2
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Have you read what you are commenting on? The boats served well to the end. The problem is that they demanded huge expenses and the enemy neutralized them with just a new torpedo.


        Was reading. Therefore, I comment.
      2. Elturisto
        Elturisto 10 February 2021 12: 44
        0
        And that the replacement of several thousand torpedoes in the US Navy and NATO did not cost anything? They cost, moreover, from 0,9 to 3,5 million dollars per piece, which means that if we estimate the total safety net, taking into account the reserve of 5000 pieces , then the total costs will be from 4,5 to 17,5 billion dollars. And this is not counting the costs of replacing security, personnel training, salary and disposal of old ammunition. So the total cost of a new type of weapon amounted to 15-20 billion dollars. To this must be added a significant decrease in the effectiveness of US naval and aviation small torpedoes NATO. It is difficult to estimate the potential financial losses of the enemy, but I think it is also in the tens of billions. Thus, the additional costs of the US Navy and its allies to counter the 705 PLA project could be up to $ 30 billion. As for the prices for the PLA 705 of the project, the pricing process in the USSR was different from the capitalist one and served primarily for accounting purposes, therefore, to estimate the cost of the PLA 705 in loaves of bread is stupidity. Timokhin, when you start to write on your own, you are talking nonsense.
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        2. timokhin-aa
          10 February 2021 22: 48
          0
          And that replacing several thousand torpedoes in the US Navy and NATO did not cost anything?


          They would have to spend money to replace old torpedoes with new ones anyway. They would have spent the money anyway.

          They cost, and even unmeasured - from 0,9 to 3,5 million dollars per piece, which means that if we estimate the total safety, taking into account the reserve of 5000 pieces,


          900000 apiece. And now they only have 1000+. Stop talking nonsense

          Thus, the additional costs of the US Navy and its allies for parrying the 705 PLA project could be up to $ 30 billion.


          Apply ice to your head before going online.

          Timokhin, when you start to write on your own, you are talking nonsense.


          Usually, such statements are the first sign that the patient is urgently needed for an appointment.
          1. Elturisto
            Elturisto 11 February 2021 08: 40
            -2
            In the USSR, too, it would still have to change old submarines for new projects.
            Read carefully -900 thousand dollars. it was in 1977, in 1990 - 3,8 million dollars. If they have 1000 of them, then with and for some moose you need 1620, not counting Ohio SSBNs and US allies. So everything is correct. That is, with this type of weapon-Mk48, the United States could provide only part of its boats, or limit the ammunition, in any case, for 1000 Mk48- it was necessary to spend 2,3 billion dollars, while the arguments regarding the small-sized Mk-46 and A-244 are logical and justified.
            1. 2534M
              2534M 11 February 2021 09: 50
              -5
              Quote: ElTuristo
              In the USSR, too, it would still have to change old submarines for new projects.
              Read carefully -900 thousand dollars. it was in 1977, in 1990 -3,8 million dollars. If they have 1000 of them, then with and for some moose you need 1620, not counting Ohio SSBNs and US allies. So everything is correct.

              fool
              Monsieur, and YOU are not tired of GIVING BOTH?
              acc. the numbers of the US Navy have long been known, and I will return to them (in the article on MK48)
              Quote: ElTuristo
              it was to spend 2,3 billion dollars, while the arguments regarding the small-sized Mk-46 and A-244 are logical and justified.

              fool
              THAN? SUCKING A DIRTY FINGER?
              just because you wanted to "hang up the price tags" from the lantern?
              1. Elturisto
                Elturisto 11 February 2021 16: 40
                -2
                There is no need to go back anywhere, and where does such a love for sucking fingers come from ... yes, it's strange ... and is it only to sucking?
                1. 2534M
                  2534M 11 February 2021 17: 45
                  -1
                  Quote: ElTuristo
                  and where does such a love for sucking fingers come from ... yes, it's strange ... and is it only to sucking?

                  with this YOUR please to the doctor
        3. 2534M
          2534M 11 February 2021 09: 46
          -3
          Quote: ElTuristo
          if we estimate the total safety, taking into account the reserve of 5000 pieces,

          and what is not 50000? or 500000?
          Quote: ElTuristo
          They cost, and even unmeasured, from 0,9 to 3,5 million dollars per piece.

          YOUR data is incorrect
          Quote: ElTuristo
          So the total cost of a new type of weapon was 15-20 billion dollars

          RAVE
          Quote: ElTuristo
          Thus, the additional costs of the US Navy and its allies for parrying the 705 PLA project could be up to $ 30 billion

          fool
          BRED in a cube
        4. SovAr238A
          SovAr238A 12 February 2021 15: 26
          +1
          Quote: ElTuristo
          And that the replacement of several thousand torpedoes in the US Navy and NATO did not cost anything? They cost, and even immensely, from 0,9 to 3,5 million dollars per piece.


          Another Wikipedian.

          Why do you consider the cost of new torpedoes?

          Torpedo production in the United States practically ceased with the end of the Mod3 version.
          Then 2500 torpedoes of this modification were built, and already modifications 4,5,6, 7 series were almost all the result of the modernization of existing torpedoes.

          On average, once every 4-5 years, batches of 100-200 new torpedoes were produced.
          not more. and only until 1993
          For 15 years, from 1993 to 2006, not a single torpedo was produced in the United States in principle.
          The entire stock was maintained by upgrading old ones.
          Including the most recent, most modern versions of MK 48 Mod 7 CBASS.
          And then, the latest versions of MK 48 Mod 7 CBASS were purchased under a contract for 95 million in the amount of 110 pieces. Which is not at all equal to 3,5 million (as written on Wikipedia) ...
          3,5 is the price in the contract for Turkey and Germany.

          And this is not at all the purchase of 5000 torpedoes, which for some reason you think.
          And there was no utilization, and there was no salary for the personnel, and there was no replacement, which you here without knowing the real material - just hooked up because you wanted to somehow infringe upon the authors of the article and you just carry a gag.
          The modernization of mod 3 into mod 4 was then estimated at about 25-40 thousand dollars. because the money then cost differently.
          1. Elturisto
            Elturisto 12 February 2021 17: 19
            -3
            What's wrong with math?
            1.What's the difference new or upgraded? They cost 0.9 million dollars. and began to cost 3,8 million dollars - the difference is 2,7 million dollars.
            2.All torpedoes for modernization had to be removed from the carriers and sent for an upgrade and then back - is that everything is free?
            3. The amount of the contract you specified can only mean the cost of the last upgrade, excluding the previous ones and does not take into account the initial cost of the product.
            4. Modernizations are different and therefore are not equivalent in terms of the amount of work performed, from that and the price may differ - for example, replacing an engine or replacing software are different things.
            5.Turkey and Germany are NATO countries and opponents of the USSR, project 705 could be in the Mediterranean and North Sea, they were also discussed in my post.
            6. I did not criticize the author (Klimov), but only Timokhin's decree on the erroneousness of his opinion, which in itself is superficial and useless, just like any anti-Soviet.
            1. 2534M
              2534M 13 February 2021 18: 18
              0
              Quote: ElTuristo
              What's the difference new or upgraded? They cost 0.9 million dollars. and began to cost 3,8 million dollars - the difference is 2,7 million dollars.

              and the fact that part of ADCAP was a rework "do not count"?
              or for example the fact that modern "5" in "6" cost 128 thousand dollars for a "tail"?!?!
              Quote: ElTuristo
              All torpedoes for modernization had to be removed from the carriers and sent for an upgrade and then back - is that everything is free?

              WHAT KIND?!?!? LINEAR MK18 (WWII)?!?!
              1. The comment was deleted.
    2. 2534M
      2534M 10 February 2021 11: 53
      -5
      Quote: sergo1914
      if you give a good thing to the naval hands

      tell YOU when your MAIN body wassat wave, don't stumble about him for an hour? lol
      1. sergo1914
        sergo1914 10 February 2021 17: 12
        +3
        Quote: 2534M
        Quote: sergo1914
        if you give a good thing to the naval hands

        tell YOU when your MAIN body wassat wave, don't stumble about him for an hour? lol


        Whoa! Send jokes for 100.
    3. vostok68
      vostok68 10 February 2021 13: 38
      +6
      I heard such words, but from a different angle: everything that disappears into the hands of the sailors breaks down! When my friend and I repaired 2 out of 3 megohm meters that were out of order before our arrival on military service, the commander of the DD even announced gratitude to us in the morning before the formation, it happens differently!
      1. 2534M
        2534M 10 February 2021 13: 41
        +3
        Quote: vostok68
        but from a different angle: everything that disappears into the hands of the sailors breaks down!

        when I heard this, I asked the speakers "a very simple question":
        - AND YOU DIDN'T TRY THEM PREPARE?
        in 90% such "snot" on the "term" is the actual "assessment" of their superiors
        1. vostok68
          vostok68 10 February 2021 13: 49
          +5
          They were in the factory, and it is not so easy to make a crew out of schoolchildren! But I was lucky, the officers (chiefs) were good, as I said above. Although at first yes, they did not believe
    4. Motorist
      Motorist 11 February 2021 00: 33
      +2
      Quote: sergo1914
      if you give a good thing to the naval hands, they will either lose it or break it

      Neighing (never seen such an expression before), appreciated the comment, thank you - vital! good You voiced my thoughts when reading an article, for example, about the "goat" of the coolant.
  • Mister X
    Mister X 10 February 2021 09: 04
    +1
    Nuclear submarine K-27 project 645 - modification of project 627A
    Author: Maxim Klimov

    The Project 645 nuclear submarine was close not only to the serial Project 627A nuclear submarines, but also to the US Seawolf class nuclear submarine.
    In terms of speed, immersion depth and survivability, the 645 even surpassed the American submarine.

    1. timokhin-aa
      10 February 2021 10: 41
      +8
      But in secrecy it did not surpass, to put it mildly. And this is the main thing. The main tactical property of a submarine is stealth.
      1. Mister X
        Mister X 10 February 2021 13: 50
        +3
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        sn.tact.property of submarine - stealth.

        I agree that the Americans paid a lot of attention to reducing the noise of the Seawolf class boats, using:
        - a new soundproofing coating,
        - a water jet instead of a propeller,
        - the mass of noise sensors (about 600).
        1. Boa kaa
          Boa kaa 10 February 2021 19: 32
          +4
          Quote: Mister X
          the Americans paid a lot of attention to reducing the noise of Seawolf class boats,

          You are confusing the first Wolf with LMT and its namesake from the 90s.
          And the problem of noisiness rests on the culture of production and know-how, the type of electric propulsion (minus GTZA) and natural circulation of the heat pump (minus the ETSVN of the primary circuit) plus a system of noise suppression, shock absorption, insulation, piezo rubber on the antiacoustic coating of the case, a single-body design (minus a resonator-drum ) etc.
          But the Yankees will come to this later ...
          1. Mister X
            Mister X 10 February 2021 22: 11
            +2
            Quote: BoA KAA
            You are confusing the first Wolf with LMT and its namesake from the 90s.

            I'm talking about the USS Seawolf SSN-21 during the Cold War.

            Quote: BoA KAA
            And the problem of noise rests on ...
            ... antiacoustic coating ...

            The US Navy website says:
            - These submarines are exceptionally quiet
            Also mentioned is low-noise pump-jet


            The Naval Technology website notes:
            The full acoustic cladding was installed


            The sources do not say about the culture of production, depreciation of units and isolation.
            You understand that the materials are meek, you can't describe everything.

            Quote: BoA KAA
            piezo rubber ...
            ... But the Yankees will come to this later ...

            I agree, and not only them.
            The development of anti-hydrolocation coating for submarines was carried out in St. Petersburg.
            Back in the Third Reich, the principles of protection were proposed, but stealth technologies are being improved all the time.
  • Bez 310
    Bez 310 10 February 2021 09: 09
    +8
    Very interesting, but bitter ...
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 February 2021 11: 18
      +7
      Well, your aviation business is no sweeter. There, too, they buried a lot of money on dubious things.
      1. Bez 310
        Bez 310 10 February 2021 11: 25
        +5
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        aviation matters are no sweeter. There, too, they buried a lot of money on dubious things.

        Maybe...
      2. 2534M
        2534M 10 February 2021 12: 02
        +7
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Well, your aviation business is no sweeter.

        there was no such game
        for example, what happened with the head is simply impossible in aviation, it is banal because "man-made birds will fall from the sky", but here - "if cho" - the ballast is blown, and "behind the nostril" by tug into the base
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 February 2021 14: 29
          +4
          There was no such game, but the fleet is more complicated in principle. There the shoals are larger.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 10 February 2021 17: 05
          +1
          Quote: 2534M
          there was no such game

          The aviators just had a different kind of game. For example, hundreds of aircraft were built, accepted and went to the units, which were not officially adopted for service. smile
          1. Elturisto
            Elturisto 11 February 2021 09: 09
            0
            Yeah, for example Tu-22M1, M2
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 11 February 2021 11: 03
              0
              Quote: ElTuristo
              Yeah, for example Tu-22M1, M2

              Plus Yakovlev's Yak-28L and Yak-28P.
              1. Elturisto
                Elturisto 11 February 2021 16: 35
                -2
                I cannot agree, although certainly not the best models from Yakovlev. Besides, they were all the same actively exploited, and they did not cost as much as the Tu-22M.
      3. Local from the Volga
        Local from the Volga 10 February 2021 23: 36
        -1
        I agree! For once ...
  • Old tanker
    Old tanker 10 February 2021 09: 25
    +9
    An excellent detailed and informative article. And most importantly, an honest straight line without shapkozakidatelstva and vice versa thickening.
    But the fact that our newest boats do not have modern torpedo weapons and protection equipment is not just sad, it is a crime.
  • kig
    kig 10 February 2021 10: 06
    +12
    During my work in the merchant fleet I had to deal with domestic production automation systems of the 70s Shipka, Izhora, Naroch, etc. All this was cumbersome, heavy and made on an ancient element base, but it worked quite well. Failures of 90% were due to all kinds of sensors, actuators and other peripherals. In this regard, I just imagine with horror (or rather, I have no idea at all) how they fought this on the submarine with its limited space ...
    1. Motorist
      Motorist 11 February 2021 00: 42
      +3
      Quote: kig
      All this was cumbersome, heavy and made on an ancient element base, but it worked quite well.

      My experience tells me that the reliability of automation is directly proportional to the bulkiness ...
  • Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 10 February 2021 10: 30
    +8
    Bold plus. The article, albeit voluminous, is interesting and easy to read.
    good hi
  • S. Smirnov
    S. Smirnov 10 February 2021 11: 40
    +8
    Thanks to Maxim for the article. Now the idea of ​​Project 705 has developed somewhat differently than before.
  • rudolff
    rudolff 10 February 2021 12: 03
    +5
    A controversial project, but certainly very interesting. The potential of the ships was never fully realized. And the emphasis was not at all on speed. It's a damn shame we didn't keep a couple of hulls as experimental.
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 February 2021 14: 31
      +3
      Well then, there were considerations in favor of speed, and before the Mk48 these were justified considerations. But the fact that the enemy can change torpedoes had to be taken into account.

      In general, the emphasis should be on secrecy.
      1. rudolff
        rudolff 10 February 2021 15: 23
        +7
        It was necessary to take into account that the enemy's torpedoes would become more jovial, all the more so they themselves worked on both the Squall and the Waterfall, and that the enemy may not be banal alone, but in conjunction with NK or PLO aircraft. And situations are different. Shallow areas, narrows, minefields. I was skeptical about using speed to avoid a torpedo attack even at school. High speed, as well as extreme maneuverability, will not interfere with any warship, but this is not a panacea for all occasions and the price of each added node turned out to be too high. But this ship has other advantages as well.
        It would be interesting to work on the project at this time. New reactors with the possibility of heating the liquid metal of the coolant from the solid state and the possibility of a working "shutdown" of the reactor. Maximum full electric propulsion. New avionics, armament, GAC ... There is room for creativity. Here you can refuse titanium, it is not at all necessary to chase every ton In any case, the boat will remain miniature. ”And then Malachite pulled to the other extreme, Ash - this is already a frank overkill for a multipurpose.
        1. 2534M
          2534M 10 February 2021 15: 45
          +1
          Quote: rudolff
          New reactors with the possibility of heating the liquid metal coolant from the solid state

          there was no need to kill the last corps - K-123
          said that experiments with freezing on it and carried out
          1. rudolff
            rudolff 10 February 2021 16: 03
            +9
            What they did with the K-123 and the entire series as a whole, it is difficult to call anything other than an outrage against common sense. However, this applies not only to this project. They say that the God of stupidity lives in the Russian fleet.
            1. 2534M
              2534M 10 February 2021 16: 10
              +2
              Quote: rudolff
              What they did with the K-123 and the entire series as a whole, it is difficult to call anything other than an outrage against common sense. However, this applies not only to this project. They say that the God of stupidity lives in the Russian fleet.

              in this case it is not stupidity, but greed
              the same "Piranhas" of the 865 project, although they were not a fountain in terms of performance characteristics, in any case the ones were necessary and useful, but they killed them because of titanium
        2. timokhin-aa
          10 February 2021 17: 50
          +2
          I have a different opinion - you need full electric propulsion with booster batteries in order to overlap while the reactor is brought to full power. Taking into account to what% of the total power the same OK-650 can work without TsNPK (we will do without specific numbers), the scheme turns out to be more or less working even on a water reactor. ...

          Maxim enlightened me somehow about titanium - for a long stay at great depths, a titanium case is much better than a steel one.

          Malachite pulled to the extreme that Ash was originally going to replace 949 (A) projects, and not 971 and 671. And the submarine was supposed to be a submarine pr. 957. As a result, its washes were not pulled out even under the USSR, and the Navy announced the SSGN pr .885 multipurpose boat.
          And so it is less than a loaf and much.
          1. 2534M
            2534M 10 February 2021 18: 01
            +1
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            OK-650 can work without TsNPK (we will do without specific numbers)

            this is quite open information
            check the link - write here
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            to shut off for the duration of the reactor at full power

            no sense, OK-650 is VERY playful
            1. timokhin-aa
              10 February 2021 18: 06
              0
              No numbers or links needed. Let it be so, no numbers.
            2. 2534M
              2534M 10 February 2021 18: 29
              -1
              Quote: 2534M
              OK-650 VERY Frisky

              I emphasize - this is not a "theory" but quite an ordinary practice
          2. rudolff
            rudolff 10 February 2021 18: 40
            +4
            I don't know what about booster batteries, after all, this is additional weight and volume, and I agree with Maxim - OK-650 does not slow down with a rise in power, but full electric propulsion and abandonment of GTZA should have become mandatory attributes of the current generation of submarines. In any case, this was predicted in the 80s. Not ripe. Although the maximum low noise and has grown significantly. We need new powerful main EMs, and so far we even managed to sit in a puddle with this on Lada.
            A water cannon is advisable at sufficiently high maximum low-noise strokes or at full electromotion. When moving at several nodes, it will probably lose to a conventional propeller in all respects.
            It is too early to write off LMC reactors. Perhaps the future belongs to them.
            Speaking about which projects were replaced by whom, do not forget about the undercover intrigues of our design monsters. Malachite made Ash to replace the 971s, but at the same time climbed into Rubin's clearing, making an insert of the missile compartment with a claim to replace the 949A. Fortunately, Rubin got stuck with Borey then. And CDB Lazurit simply fought for its survival and developed its 957th (Cedar?) To replace the 945 / 945A and for its production facilities at Krasny Sormovo. As a result, Malachite ate whom he bit, but with Ash was too clever in all respects.
            1. timokhin-aa
              10 February 2021 22: 38
              0
              A water cannon is advisable at sufficiently high maximum low-noise strokes or at full electromotion. When moving at several nodes, it will probably lose to a conventional propeller in all respects.


              So the question now stands precisely in increasing the speed of the low-noise stroke. And in electric motion. Accordingly, both electric propulsion and water cannons are needed.
          3. Shopping Mall
            Shopping Mall 11 February 2021 09: 11
            +1
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            I have a different opinion - you need full electric propulsion with booster batteries in order to overlap while the reactor is brought to full power. Taking into account to what% of the total power the same OK-650 can work without TsNPK (we will do without specific numbers), the scheme turns out to be more or less working even on a water reactor. ...


            Electric movement is always a plus. But with regard to the reactor with liquid metal fuel, there was information that MHD pumps could be used on them, almost noiseless, isn't this a weighty argument in their favor, even without taking into account the compactness and quick access to the maximum mode?

            Yes, and compactness, given that active search is becoming predominant, does the physical size of the submarine matter for stealth? And speaking of converting non-nuclear submarines projects into small-sized inexpensive submarines, a small-sized reactor with liquid metal core is not the best candidate (OK-650 cannot fit into submarines)?

            Of course, if the reliability and ease of operation of the LMC reactor are brought to acceptable values.
            1. timokhin-aa
              11 February 2021 14: 49
              0
              Electric movement is always a plus. But about the reactor with liquid metal fuel, information slipped through that they could use MHD pumps, which are almost noiseless,


              The discussion of the noiselessness of the pumps will bring us close to the issues of state secrecy, at least for the reactors in service.
              Although Klimov says that it seems like infa has appeared on the internet and is already possible, but I don't want to touch this topic anyway.
              1. 2534M
                2534M 11 February 2021 15: 04
                +1
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Although Klimov says that it seems like infa has appeared on the internet and is already possible, but I don't want to touch this topic anyway.

                I wrote about the EC OK-650
                these data were published repeatedly by the developers themselves
                1. timokhin-aa
                  11 February 2021 20: 34
                  -1
                  Well, if by themselves, then okay.
  • xomaNN
    xomaNN 10 February 2021 12: 17
    +6
    On business trips in the Arctic, in Zaozernoye, I saw the nuclear submarine 80 of the project in the early 705s. In private conversations with the officers of the nuclear submarine 671 of the project (there was our equipment in TRK 1 ot.), They spoke negatively about the operation of the 705. It is understandable, on "Avos" with such a cunning and capricious reactor and "automation" it was difficult for the military men to control. Yes, and "awl" relaxes hi

    And for me, the nuclear submarine as a carrier was in the 60-70s a breakthrough of the Soviet submarine shipbuilding. (IMHO)

    Chief designer of the ship M.G. Rusanov removed the political officer from the staff list so that there was no bummer who annoyed the crew ...

    But this detail is Gorgeous!
    1. Silhouette
      Silhouette 10 February 2021 15: 25
      +5
      This is just nonsense. The zampolit was appointed with a crew of more than 75 people. In principle, it shouldn't have been there.
      1. 2534M
        2534M 10 February 2021 15: 44
        0
        Quote: Silhouette
        This is just nonsense. The zampolit was appointed with a crew of more than 75 people. In principle, it shouldn't have been there.

        you have incorrect information
        a good example of this is "Swedish Komspomolets" belay
        1. Silhouette
          Silhouette 10 February 2021 17: 51
          +4
          Do you know of cases of appointment of political officers for 15 crew members?
          1. 2534M
            2534M 10 February 2021 18: 00
            -1
            Quote: Silhouette
            You are aware of the cases of appointment of political officers for 15 people crew?

            I do not comment on the topic of organizing the ACS service
            however, I am aware of mass cases of appointment of deputies in crews of less than the number indicated by you
            1. Silhouette
              Silhouette 10 February 2021 18: 19
              +2
              I admit that up to 50 crew members were made an exception for submarines. But 15 is beyond common sense.
              1. 2534M
                2534M 10 February 2021 18: 20
                0
                Quote: Silhouette
                I admit that up to 50 crew members were made an exception for submarines. But 15 is beyond common sense.

                the fact is that for 705 (with the initial number of 15 people) it was very, very difficult to "remove the political officer"
                1. Silhouette
                  Silhouette 10 February 2021 19: 30
                  +2
                  It is necessary to distinguish facts from stories. Then there would have been political officers on the Tu-16, Tu-95 and the like.
                  1. 2534M
                    2534M 10 February 2021 22: 00
                    -2
                    Quote: Silhouette
                    It is necessary to distinguish facts from stories.

                    bikes you have
                    1. yaglon
                      yaglon 11 February 2021 20: 48
                      0
                      People ask me - is it true that the political officer removed the chief designer from the staff? Nobody believes that this is so.
                      1. 2534M
                        2534M 11 February 2021 22: 42
                        +1
                        Quote: yaglon
                        People ask me - is it true that the political officer removed the chief designer from the staff? Nobody believes that this is so.

                        I believe that this was "supported by the authority" of Aleksandrov
                        those. GK prepared proposals for a solution "above" (which personally with VIP) was made by Aleksandrov
                  2. K298rtm
                    K298rtm 14 February 2021 01: 07
                    0
                    In the days of the USSR (80s), there was a position in aviation - the political officer of the squadron. So this was a combat pilot (somehow he was traveling from Murmansk in the same compartment with that).
    2. Non-fighter
      Non-fighter 10 February 2021 21: 07
      -1
      Well, of course, while you're at home on the couch. And if (God forbid !!!) you receive a bad letter from home and serve you like a copper pot, what will you do to whom will you go?
  • Elturisto
    Elturisto 10 February 2021 12: 47
    -10%
    Thanks to the author and Timokhin for the interesting material. Very interesting article. Again, with an unkind word I remember ok Gorshok. What cretin names ships in honor of this degenerate?
    1. 2534M
      2534M 10 February 2021 13: 03
      +8
      Quote: ElTuristo
      . Again, an unkind word is recalled ok Gorshok. What cretin names the ships in honor of this degenerate?

      until the mid-70s, Gorshkov was not just absolutely adequate, he was a real breakthrough for our Navy
      1. Elturisto
        Elturisto 10 February 2021 19: 16
        -7
        Yes, and before that, he was an immaculate baby in a cradle. Breakthrough where? The USSR ocean fleet. Khrushchev bent America without the beloved brainchild of this Ka-ocean nuclear missile, you have to invent such a slag ...
    2. Local from the Volga
      Local from the Volga 10 February 2021 23: 41
      0
      In honor of you, an inflatable banana on the beach will not be named!
      1. Elturisto
        Elturisto 11 February 2021 09: 16
        -4
        Looks like they already named after you, be proud.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • g1v2
    g1v2 10 February 2021 14: 45
    +4
    Well, if you skip all the poop thrown in the direction of the military-industrial complex and the naval authorities, with whom Klimov is at knives, there is a healthy link in the article. 705 was extremely interesting as an experienced sub, but extremely controversial in the field of real combat capability. Most likely, she was much ahead of her time and turned out to be unsuitable for real service. In fact, liquid metal products are being developed normally only now, when Rosatom began to build Brest reactors on a lead coolant. For the 60s, this was an extremely controversial option. Weak armament also made this plane extremely controversial. Speed ​​is certainly good, but not enough.
    In my opinion, this project could become a starting point for the creation of underwater attack drones or miniapla. Technology in terms of automation is now noticeably advanced. ROSATOM has made a serious step forward in terms of reactors with oil pressure tube. If we take it as a mother ship for several such drones or a miniapl Khabarovsk, for example, it can turn out to be interesting. request
  • Aleksandr1971
    Aleksandr1971 10 February 2021 15: 08
    +3
    Quote: Vladimir_2U
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    No sense from him in the end ...

    Yes, as much as from the Union, if you drain everything ...


    And the point is that it was a crude layout of breakthrough technologies. Advanced technologies are not possible in practice without children's flaws. And we need breakthroughs so as not to lag behind. And in this sense, Project 705 "Lira" was a heroic feat of Soviet industry.
    Another thing is that the GEM on liquid metals at that time turned out to be of little practical use. But in the future, I hope this technology will still show its advantages.
    1. 2534M
      2534M 10 February 2021 15: 18
      +1
      Quote: Aleksandr1971
      And in this sense, Project 705 "Lyra" was a heroic feat of Soviet industry.

      alas meaningless
      all the steam went to the "whistle"
      Quote: Aleksandr1971
      Another thing is that the GEM on liquid metals at that time turned out to be of little practical use.

      in fact, with all the troubles with operation, it paid off - both technically and tactically
  • Aleksandr1971
    Aleksandr1971 10 February 2021 15: 11
    +2
    Quote: demiurg
    How nice to read that Klimov, that Timoshkina when they just tell something about the submarine.
    A breath of fresh air after the copy-paste of Wikipedia by Skomorokhov and others.
    But as soon as they begin to carry the abject truth, it begins to seem that the authors have been replaced.


    It is very pleasant to read not only the articles, but also the comments of Klimov and Timoshkin. Even if they contain criticism of another member of the forum, neither Klimov nor Timoshkin become personal, unlike many other authors and readers of articles.
    1. 2534M
      2534M 10 February 2021 15: 18
      +2
      Quote: Aleksandr1971
      then neither Klimov, nor Timoshkin become personal

      go over angry
      BUT - only in response laughing
    2. Local from the Volga
      Local from the Volga 10 February 2021 23: 44
      -2
      read carefully - that's the only way they do it! but, we write off the real experience for the fleet and the country!
      1. 2534M
        2534M 11 February 2021 09: 38
        -3
        Quote: Local from the Volga
        Read attentively-

        WHAT YOU are nervous ... can YOU drink some water, or change diaper? lol
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Professor
    Professor 10 February 2021 16: 17
    +6
    Respect to the author for a competent article. Such a rarity today.
  • Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 10 February 2021 17: 27
    +4
    American intelligence was able, on the basis of information obtained by various methods, even at the stage of building the first ships of Project 705, to reveal the main features of the newest Soviet submarine
    And the Soviet people did not know anything about this at all - not about this boat, not about boats in general, not about airplanes, about anything - until the collapse of the USSR.
    1. yaglon
      yaglon 11 February 2021 21: 16
      +1
      Much has already been written about the fact that the "probable enemy" knew about the state of the USSR Navy better than the leadership of the USSR Navy itself. I think many facts are fair, especially in a tactical manner. Soviet and American boats often "rubbed" each other very closely, knowing a lot between themselves - down to the smallest signatures. This, one might say, was such a game, without war (well, on the brink of war in some cases). Elements of this game were not advertised on both sides.
      1. Falcon5555
        Falcon5555 12 February 2021 00: 27
        0
        Much has already been written about the fact that the "probable enemy" knew about the state of the USSR Navy better than the leadership of the USSR Navy itself.
        Quite possible. But I regret that not the leadership, and the people (in my humblest face) did not know anything. Apparently, the then propagandists believed that the people should listen to how the CPSU fights for "world peace", and not how the military-industrial complex builds submarines and so on. This would probably give rise to doubts as to whether the CPSU is fighting for peace. In the 90s, when the CPSU (and the USSR) people said "dosvidos", it gradually became available, it became uninteresting and irrelevant.
        1. yaglon
          yaglon 12 February 2021 19: 42
          -1
          Secrecy is, of course, a necessary thing, and the fact that "the people knew nothing", I think, is not the greatest tragedy. I personally consider it a great tragedy that the people, officers, because of this atmosphere of terrible secrecy (and unnecessary, because the "probable enemy" almost always knew everything) did not receive the national recognition they deserved for their heroism. Read the memoirs of Soviet submariners of the 60s-80s, they are full of bitterness for the fact that their real heroism was not interesting to anyone in the USSR. They buried them secretly, took a nondisclosure agreement, all information was kept secret. People died often very heroically, but no one noticed it precisely because of this atmosphere of terrible secrecy (often completely optional).
          1. Falcon5555
            Falcon5555 12 February 2021 20: 06
            +1
            and the fact that "the people knew nothing," I think, is not the greatest tragedy. I personally consider it a great tragedy that people, officers ... did not receive the national recognition they deserved for their heroism.
            That is, according to your opinion, the people - what they know and what they think - it doesn't matter, but when you have to pray for the officers - where are the people? Why is no one bowing to the floor? .. By the way, officers were respected in the USSR, but as ordinary people of other professions.
            Personally, I think that it is just important that the people did not know anything. Communism was overthrown, of course, not only because of this and far from immediately, but these processes are inertial. So it is very important that the people were treated like lackeys. He has not forgotten it.
            1. yaglon
              yaglon 12 February 2021 21: 32
              0
              The people kept thinking and thinking, and destroyed the USSR, specifically the USSR, and not the mythical "communism", which is "like the horizon." Hardly anyone will argue with this. Someone thinks that the USSR was destroyed by some mythical creatures, "traitors" or "agents of the State Department." The State Department itself was very surprised by the destruction of the USSR, it is enough to read the memories of those who ruled the State Department then. Americans were even more shocked by the sudden collapse of the Soviet system than were former Soviet citizens themselves. And the Soviet system collapsed due to a number of factors, "building blocks". One of these "building blocks" was the bestial attitude of the Soviet leadership towards the ship's crew, ie. to those people who stood behind the system and ensured its safety. Time, of course, does not teach anyone. However, this is all offtopic.
              1. Falcon5555
                Falcon5555 12 February 2021 22: 43
                0
                The people kept thinking and thinking, and destroyed the USSR, specifically the USSR, and not the mythical "communism", which is "like the horizon." Hardly anyone will argue with this.
                I will argue. Which one is mythical? .. There was a Communist Party in the USSR, and not at all mythical. Whoever disagreed with her, went to felling, and also not mythical. My expression "Communism overthrown" means "overthrew the power of the CPSU", and not some kind of "horizon line".
                The complete collapse of the USSR is a more complex phenomenon. On the one hand, the leadership of the CPSU and the USSR was one and the same. The USSR was associated with the CPSU, and the compromise of the CPSU meant the compromise of the USSR. But to say that he was not contacted by anything else is probably impossible. There were different historical and ethnic nuances. For example, the withdrawal of the Baltic states from the USSR was predetermined by the end of the 80s, and the "withdrawal" of Ukraine from the USSR was a big surprise and, probably, a historical accident involving the activities of one person - Kravchuk, i.e. with his desire to avoid the shameful resignation after the failure of the putsch he actually supported in 91.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Non-fighter
    Non-fighter 10 February 2021 21: 01
    0
    Excuse me, but how on submarines with a crew of 15 people were resolved issues of formation of emergency parties in which case? At least in case of smoke in the compartment?

    On the NK at the combat posts of the BZZh are those who are assigned to them. In free spaces such as corridors, vestibules. cockpits, cabins, etc. BZZh leads emergency parties, where they drive all the "extra" Moremans: services, gangs, and teams other than doctors and cooks, plus JJ.
    1. agond
      agond 10 February 2021 21: 48
      +2
      As for morality, the obsessive desire of reinsurers to supposedly unsinkability still produces double-hull water carrier boats with many compartments, and a kind of duplication,
      A.A. Petrov was right
      “The architecture of the nuclear submarine should only meet the conditions for diving, the design should be as simple as possible, all the main technical means that ensure the movement should be in a single number -
      1 building,
      1 reducer,
      1 turbine,
      1 shaft,
      3 compartments
      reliability in simplicity, not in complexity
      on these principles they build boats all over the miter, except for us, our theorists believe that if something happens to a boat, it floats up and somehow gets to its own, because it has a buoyancy reserve, two hulls, two reactors and so on, all two ., the compartments are countless, not otherwise the designer in childhood was fond of playing in sea battle, and when they got up, they draw the bottom-ends, or maybe they get paid extra for every extra bottom-hole and for every line a ton of underwater displacement
      1. Falcon5555
        Falcon5555 11 February 2021 09: 36
        -3
        the obsessive desire of reinsurers to seemingly unsinkable still breeds double-hull water carrier boats with many compartments, and with a kind of duplication,
        Controversial! On boats such as Kursk, the hatch between the torpedo and command compartments would not have been opened when fired, Kursk would probably not have been left without control after a torpedo explosion, would not have crashed into the bottom at speed, the rest of the torpedoes would not have exploded, and, possibly, most of the crew would have survived.
        1. 2534M
          2534M 11 February 2021 09: 39
          -1
          Quote: Falcon5555
          On boats like Kursk, the hatch between the torpedo and command compartments would not have been opened when fired, Kursk probably would not have remained

          no need to drag Ryazantsev's illiterate AKHINA here ...
          1. Falcon5555
            Falcon5555 11 February 2021 09: 49
            -1
            And who is Ryazantsev?
    2. 2534M
      2534M 11 February 2021 03: 25
      0
      Quote: Not the fighter
      Excuse me, but how on submarines with a crew of 15 people were resolved issues of formation of emergency parties in which case? At least in case of smoke in the compartment?

      Are you talking about 705?
      there were options, for example, there is only one shift left at the consoles, the rest - "hand-to-hand"
  • iouris
    iouris 10 February 2021 21: 34
    0
    This project is still striking in its boldness. That was the state!
    1. Marine engineer
      Marine engineer 10 February 2021 22: 11
      +1
      "This project is still striking in its audacity ...."

      These were the people.
      "... heroes, not us" (C)
  • exo
    exo 10 February 2021 22: 02
    +2
    Interesting article. There was also a good special issue of the Typhoon magazine on this boat.
  • Pavel57
    Pavel57 10 February 2021 23: 55
    +3
    The project fully confirmed the desire to satisfy the scientific and personal results at the expense of the state. The project is interesting, but it had too many risky components. Almost all of them were realized with a minus.
  • Yuri V.A
    Yuri V.A 11 February 2021 05: 47
    +2
    It looks like the Seventeen Fifth reincarnated in Zamwolta.
    1. Shopping Mall
      Shopping Mall 11 February 2021 09: 30
      +3
      Quote: Yuri V.A.
      It looks like the Seventeen Fifth reincarnated in Zamwolta.


      And Zamvolt and PLA, etc. 705 are often condemned as ineffective use of funds, but the problem is that without the implementation of such projects, a fundamentally new and breakthrough cannot be created. If you do not risk it, then you can improve horse harness for a thousand years - like the Japanese have their swords.

      The United States made the right decision to limit itself to a small batch of 3 ships, almost like the USSR with project 705 stopped at 6 units. After all, they did not build 30-50 units?

      Technologies, concepts of application will be rolled back on them, and then a new large-scale successor of "Arleigh Burke" will appear. It is possible that the USSR did not collapse, and project 705 would have given a continuation, which would have become reliable, breakthrough and massive at the same time.
      1. 2534M
        2534M 11 February 2021 09: 41
        -2
        Quote: AVM
        Technologies, application concepts will be rolled back on them, and then a new one will appear

        Quote: AVM
        It is possible that the USSR did not collapse, and project 705 gave would

        if would my grandmother had ...
        she would grandfather
      2. Yuri V.A
        Yuri V.A 11 February 2021 13: 23
        +3
        I agree with you, only by implementing breakthrough technologies, it was possible to avoid obvious mistakes that cast doubt on the essence of the project.
    2. yaglon
      yaglon 11 February 2021 20: 47
      0
      There is something
  • Eug
    Eug 11 February 2021 15: 04
    +3
    If revived, then conceptually - a simple nuclear submarine of minimum displacement. The key word should be the term rationality. Technically, I don't see any problems; on all issues critical to Lear, the equipment has stepped forward. With the change in the principle of manning the fleet to contract liability and
    the professionalism of the personnel also increased (however, as far as I read in other sources - this issue is bypassed in the article - there were no conscripts on the Lira). So boats (simple, efficient, relatively inexpensive) 12-14 at the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet would be very appropriate. And the number of Boreys should be somewhat increased by placing Onyx and Caliber in their mines and thereby unifying them to the maximum with SLBMs ... three types of nuclear submarines - anti-ship cruisers and strategists based on Boreyev and anti-submarine based on the updated Lyra ... all have the same power plants.
  • certero
    certero 11 February 2021 15: 49
    0
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    There should be ENOUGH people.
    BZZh is conducted not only during combat damage, do you know?

    This is probably why the worldwide trend is unmanned boats.
  • SID
    SID 11 February 2021 17: 58
    +2
    Yes. So, of course, there was no need to do these boats into series. However, this R&D definitely had to be done and brought to experimental improvements. On the basis of the results of R&D, a new boat should be made. Not to mention the parallel development of the weapons complex.

    However, I was interested in the following in the article ... In it, on the example of pr. 705, curious processes are highlighted, how from the mid-50s the processes of degradation of the management of NT by progress and high-tech production began to develop. The process of decay started exactly from the top of the government. Also in the article there are interesting moments alluding to point external destructive influences in the process of making critical decisions in NT work and in production. Impacts aimed at preventing the USSR from breaking ahead of the United States in the submarine.

    This moment is curious in connection with the fact that the United States could not or did not begin to develop its topic with heavy anti-ship missiles. Here the thoughts are the same - about the external (outside the US government system) regulatory impact on NT progress and on the ratio of total military power. It is absolutely implausible to incline to the conclusion that "they could not" (no matter how pleasant it was for our ear), at least on the following example: October 1967, the death of the Israeli destroyer "Elat" by 3 anti-ship missiles P-15 "Termit from the Egyptian boat pr.183-R "Komar" [https://ucrazy.ru/other/1430391788-kak-egiptyane-v-1967-godu-potopili-samyy-slavnyy-izrailskiy-esminec.html]. hysteria about the vulnerability of the communists to the new missiles. After that, the development of super-high-speed submachine guns for missile defense of the near zone began. But they did not become anti-ship missiles. But Israel ... Israelis,

    "The death of "Eilat" was extremely painful in Israel"


    having lost one of the best ships, urgent measures were taken.

    "Already in 1970, the Israeli Navy adopted the Gabriel anti-ship cruise missile"


    She was much inferior to "termite", but this was offset by the development of effective means of countering and suppressing anti-ship missile guidance systems.

    In October 1973 (6 years after the death of EM Elat), 5 Israeli missile boats in the battle of Latakia sank 3 missile boats (2 Komara, 1 Osa), 1 torpedo boat and 1 minesweeper - without loss.

    Soon, six rapidly approaching points appeared on the screens of Israeli radars - six Termit P-15 missiles were launched from Syrian missile-carrying ships. Israeli sailors used an electronic suppression system to counter Soviet missiles, which caused chaos on the radars of Syrian boats and missile guidance systems. All P-15 missiles exploded behind the Israeli boats.


    To the Israelis' credit, in 6 years they have effectively eliminated the imbalance that threatened them in their theater of operations. We, after the adoption of the MK48 in 1972, are still under water in a pitiful position.

    Studying the history of the struggle between scientific and technological developments of the USSR and the USA in the field of weapons, the thought constantly turns to mysterious coincidences, illogical coincidences of circumstances, which together add up to a picture of the influence of a certain regulatory force on NT processes in the USSR and the USA. You don't want to ...

    The author of the article regularly explains such "things" only as nonsense of commanders, narrow-minded greed, betrayal. I see a certain force regulating parity relations so that in the end neither yours nor ours, so that there is no unambiguous dominant.

    Well, today ...? Since this force so powerfully influenced the USSR and the USA in the 20th century, today this pointing and regulating finger, as it seems to me, is already in all clarity, without any modesty.
    1. agond
      agond 11 February 2021 19: 59
      +1
      Ensuring the reliability and safety of the submarine by duplicating its main components and by increasing the number of compartments only leads to cluttering the already cramped internal volume, which greatly complicates access to the most important units, their repair or replacement, modernization is a very harsh business and at the same time duplication is not reduces noise, but rather increases. If the 705 project remained as conceived, that is, everything is as simple as possible, one hull and three compartments, then the boat would be even smaller and even faster
  • yaglon
    yaglon 11 February 2021 20: 42
    +1
    A very interesting article, there would be more of them. It was very interesting to know that Los Angeles imrpoved can reach 38 knots and accelerates very quickly. Looked at other sources - something similar. They say something similar. These are the ones on, and I thought our boats are the fastest ... It would be interesting if the author compared the 971 latest modifications with the aircraft (885 is not an example).
    1. 2534M
      2534M 13 February 2021 18: 14
      0
      Quote: yaglon
      Los Angeles imrpoved can give 38 knots

      yes, but without ZPU GPD (on pylons in the stern) and without a "looped" propeller
  • Vadim Ananyin
    Vadim Ananyin 12 February 2021 00: 14
    +1
    I do not presume to evaluate the article, but the boat was beautiful.
    But now, could it be revived at a different technological level?
    1. yaglon
      yaglon 12 February 2021 19: 43
      +1
      If there had been a "beauty contest" between the submarines, I would have put the 705 in first place. And among the surface watermen, the 1th project, of course.
  • S. Viktorovich
    S. Viktorovich 13 February 2021 18: 43
    -1
    This project is an unconditional breakthrough.
    If you look at its development in time, then its fate is not the worst possible.
    Now it is being discussed by those who did nothing themselves, at best copied something foreign.
    1. 2534M
      2534M 14 February 2021 14: 02
      -1
      Quote: S. Viktorovich
      Now it is being discussed by those who have not done anything themselves

      Monsieur, is the bottom of YOU still burning? - call the fire truck!
      And learn to be at least slightly and sometimes responsible for your long tongue
  • K298rtm
    K298rtm 14 February 2021 01: 18
    +1
    1. Thanks to the author (Maxim) for the interesting article.
    2. In my humble opinion, the engineering and design thought (for all its shortcomings), etc. 705, has outstripped production technologies by a couple of generations.
    3. In those distant times, the main emphasis was placed on speed, diving depth, etc., paying very little attention to low noise (in my opinion).
  • nikant
    nikant 16 February 2021 00: 58
    0
    When you even slightly analyze the situation in the modern sub-fleet, you will see an oil painting: there are no normal torpedoes, no anti-torpedoes either; there is no rocket firing in the required volumes either ... There is no normal infrastructure (provision when leaving bases, during deployment, during patrolling, etc., etc.). There are practically no modern anti-submarine ships; anti-submarine aircraft at the level of the 19th century. One gets the impression that everyone is busy cutting funds and expanding the admiral's area, which, given the link with production workers, has no interest in the fleet ... Isn't it time to transfer money to "land" nuclear deterrence? Everything and everyone is "grazing" under water by potential opponents .. There is not even any game of cat and mouse, because for each simple or rocket-carrying mouse, at least two modern cats are allocated! Will we intimidate everyone with different drones with thousands of miles of raids?
  • Piligrim
    Piligrim 17 February 2021 23: 08
    0
    Thanks to the author!
    Let the specialists in the fleet discuss prof. details I'm not good at this, but what can I see ...
    The situation of systemic decay (destruction) of a structure called the USSR is perfectly shown, albeit on the example of a separate "block". With the abolition of the approaches of L.P. Beria and the introduction of "slush" NS. Khrushchev in the management of the military-industrial complex, the collapse, as it is now seen, was inevitable. Anyone who touched the Soviet Union in their right mind and firm memory should know what fraud is. And therefore, the answer to all the questions that are asked in the comments, maybe - look in the history of your country.
    As I understand it, sooner or later we will have to rehabilitate L.P. Beria as an outstanding manager, and at the same time approaches to work on such complex systems as nuclear submarines and simply modern submarines.
    We will have to restore the system of education - upbringing, motivation - responsibility.
    It won't work in another way, otherwise ... the all-powerful MBA (Master of Business Administration) will strangle us.
  • Red Alert
    Red Alert 21 February 2021 19: 50
    0
    Quote: Falcon5555
    Much has already been written about the fact that the "probable enemy" knew about the state of the USSR Navy better than the leadership of the USSR Navy itself.
    Quite possible. But I regret that not the leadership, and the people (in my humblest face) did not know anything. Apparently, the then propagandists believed that the people should listen to how the CPSU fights for "world peace", and not how the military-industrial complex builds submarines and so on. This would probably give rise to doubts as to whether the CPSU is fighting for peace. In the 90s, when the CPSU (and the USSR) people said "dosvidos", it gradually became available, it became uninteresting and irrelevant.

    The CPSU fought for a communist world without capitalism. And in this struggle we were ready to use weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, very little is said about this.
  • polk26l
    polk26l 23 March 2021 10: 53
    0
    Well, why did it come up? It is necessary to improve this project, with the maximum modernization of the entire boat, at the level of the 21st century and launch it into series!
  • Zum
    Zum April 15 2021 19: 38
    0
    Legend ..... "Lyra" ..... made of titanium .....
  • Compasure
    Compasure April 20 2021 02: 02
    0
    An article by the classic liberal analyst "Everything is bad in Russia."
    Hero of Russia, retired Rear Admiral Vsevolod Khmyrov, commented on the words of military expert Maxim Klimov about the vulnerability of Russian nuclear submarines. According to him, submarines during the campaigns are inaccessible to foreign warships.
    Such statements are the usual populism of an ignorant person who does not know anything about ensuring the combat stability of single and group actions of our nuclear submarines, RIA Novosti quotes the admiral. It is reported by Rambler.
    https://news.rambler.ru/army/46194823-admiral-nazval-populizmom-vyskazyvaniya-ob-uyazvimosti-rossiyskih-apl/