Military Review

And in the open field "Field-21M" is raging

50
Yes, we can say that so much. Many media outlets have paid attention to this new complex, but we should also add our ruble, since we have something to say.




So, "Pole-21M", already a somewhat more modernized and sophisticated system than in the year of its debut (2016), is being tested and tried out in all military districts of the country. Last year, Pole received units located in the Far East; the complex is in service with the troops of the Central Military District located in the Urals and in the Samara region. Plus, the "field" has at its disposal the 201st military base in Tajikistan.

The reports are more than cheerful: they were found, successfully suppressed, knocked off the route, and so on. It's fine.

Indeed, the "Pole-21M" has ample opportunities for searching, detecting and disorienting enemy unmanned vehicles.

The station operates not by the UAVs themselves, but by communication channels with satellites, thanks to which the drones are oriented in space.

In general, despite this name, "Field" is absolutely not intended for field use. No, of course, the complex can also cover military facilities, but first of all its task is to protect important strategic objects from drones and cruise missiles by suppressing the equipment for binding to global satellite and radio navigation systems.

Yes, the main task of the Pole-21M is to disrupt the reception of signals by cruise missiles and UAVs from satellites of various navigation systems. The US satellites of the GPS system, the Chinese "Beidou" and the European Galileo can also be hit.

And in the open field "Field-21M" is raging


The complex consists of a stationary and mobile station control complex and directly the radio jamming posts themselves. Jamming posts are fully automated and controlled remotely. Each post can include up to three suppression modules.

And here a very interesting innovation begins. Posts can be placed anywhere, as long as two conditions are met: the presence of power supply and elevation above the earth's surface.

A very good method is on cell towers.



It is clear that if these emitters start to interfere, and GLONASS will feel in complete prostration. On the other hand, the presence of Russian cruise missiles or drones in the area near the strategic facility is highly doubtful.

And in general, having removed their head, they do not cry for their hair. If it is necessary to defend the same "Omsktransmash", the Nizhniy Tagil "Uralvagonzavod" and something from this topic, then it is probably easier not to launch anything in the area where the enemy's vehicles can arrive.

The jamming range of receivers of satellite radio navigation systems is 25 km, the size of the jamming area is 150 km by 150 km.

In general, it is more than enough to cover any strategic facility, be it a nuclear power plant, a large plant, a railway junction, and so on.

And here interesting prospects arise.

An impenetrable (according to the Ministry of Defense) dome that can reliably cover any object from an air attack is very serious. Especially when for this it is not necessary to involve the calculations of mobile complexes and control centers on permanent duty.

One crew of 2-3 people and 25 remotely controlled posts significantly save manpower.


Management of the "Pole-21M" complex


Now let's look at the other side. From the point of view of the enemy.

If you take an object, the destruction of which can cause significant damage, and remove the possibility of destruction from the air, you get an interesting picture.

As an example, I took the Novovoronezh NPP complex (there are two of them now), the disabling of which will hit the whole region very hard on the one hand, and on the other, because I have a great idea of ​​the area in which the power units are located and how they are protected.

In the event that the dome of the "Field" reliably covers from missiles, disabling the nuclear power plant in general becomes a problem. An attack by conventional bombers is doubtful, since there is a whole anti-aircraft missile regiment that covers the area, plus there is something to work on at close range. Difficult option. Plus more aviation shelves are located in the border areas.

Plus, you have to fly from the border. And we have "two palms on the map" result in a very decent distance.

Many will now say that the dashing guys from the DRG have not been canceled. Yes, it seems that the border with Ukraine is 150 km in a straight line, but firstly, this is not the Bryansk region with its forests, and secondly, to pick the nuclear power plant with dynamite ...



The nuclear land mine that the special forces will carry through the fields is somehow more a plot for a not very scientific and very fantastic film. And the weight is over 300 kg ... On the one hand, the border is not exactly locked, but somehow it all does not look very serious. I would like to wish you luck from the bottom of my heart, because I really would feel sorry for the specialist who would be strained by such a difficult task. This is 150 km in a straight line, and we cannot always move in a straight line even on tank... However, this is already known.

It's a good idea to just blow up the towers where the equipment is mounted. And then send Axes. Not bad, yes, dropping the cell tower - you don't need a lot of roofing stuff. However, there is a problem here. There are a lot of towers.

Yes, this is the case when quantity determines some quality. They set up towers here ... They do it, in short. Each operator himself, there are, of course, cases of cooperation, but basically the operators provide themselves with a network of repeaters themselves.

Maps, of course, exist, but even to estimate the number of towers and masts within a radius of 25 km from a nuclear power plant will not be easy. And it is only visually to determine which "Fields" emitters are on.

In general, that is still a task.

In addition, as soon as the first tower "falls", it becomes clear that something went wrong. It will be calculated instantly, and then the DRG will not so much blow up the towers as take part in an exciting show called "roundup". With a very vague prospect, since it is very difficult with partisan forests in our area.

So the situation is funny, but quite interesting. If the modules at the posts (up to three in one) will regularly jam, disconnecting cruise missiles from satellite tracking, then it will be very difficult to withdraw objects on Russian territory. And given that the power consumption of the modules is very low, from 300 to 1000 W, they can work for a very, very long time without straining the power grid.

Remote control with due reliability is generally a song.

Considering that the complex can be used in conjunction with other complexes, for example, "Zhitel" and "Silok", which only expands the possibilities of using the system.

Many experts say that modern mobile electronic warfare systems are used only when it is necessary to repel an attack of objects previously detected in the airspace. With regard to the "Field", the equipment of which is connected to a stationary power supply, here we are not talking about point and target application. You can put the dome of the barrier for as long as the resource of the equipment will allow.

In general, despite the fact that electronic warfare is not uniquely 100% a means of combating UAVs and cruise missiles, the use of such protective domes over strategically important objects can, if not protect, then at least minimize the possibility of striking such objects.

In this perspective, the Pole-21M is a very promising, and most importantly, a difficult-to-disable protection system.

Hence, we can conclude that, in accordance with the prevailing opinion, Russia has a very impressive scientific groundwork and a high level of development in the field of electronic warfare. And it's great that there is confirmation of this.



Materials used:
http://www.ntc-reb.ru/pole.html
Author:
50 comments
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  1. Emil mamedoff
    Emil mamedoff 8 February 2021 03: 30
    +15
    "Former Chief of the General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces Movses Hakobyan said that with the help of the latest Pole-21 electronic warfare system, the military managed to disrupt the work of the Azerbaijani Bayraktar TB2 drone, but only for 4 days. Then the adjacent side managed to bypass the system."

    I also think you can add to the words of the chief of staff - "EW Repellent", the same thing happened with the repellent, but these complexes were also destroyed.

    So. Thank you for the article. I would like to see the next one about how the enemy bypasses electronic warfare. What "antidote" could he have against electronic warfare? (some can reconfigure the operation of their UAVs, or constant frequency changes right during the flight, or maybe something else is applied?)
    Thank you in advance, I think everything will be very interesting.
    1. Ross xnumx
      Ross xnumx 8 February 2021 04: 42
      -14%
      Novel! Sorry for the senile curiosity, between:
      The reports are more than cheerful: they were found, successfully suppressed, knocked off the route, and so on. It's fine.

      And this:
      Russia has a very impressive scientific background and a high level of development in the field of electronic warfare. And it's great that there is confirmation of this.

      There is a specific episode known as for example:
      According to Russian means of objective control, 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from two US destroyers that are drifting off the island of Crete at the Syrian airbase Al-Shayrat in the province of Homs. A massive blow was struck at night, at about 3.42 to 3.56 Moscow time. Of the 59 missiles, only 23 missiles reached the airbase. This was announced on Friday by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

      So that we can enjoy the real characteristics of the complex, and not "cheerful reports from places of permanent deployment." yes
      1. Artyom Karagodin
        Artyom Karagodin 8 February 2021 09: 23
        +2
        Even if the archisceptic-minded Roman spoke out approvingly about this EW complex, then it really should be VERY, VERY effective! good soldier
        1. Sckepsis
          Sckepsis 12 February 2021 07: 46
          0

          archisceptic Roman

          He was never a skeptic of electronic warfare, rather, on the contrary, its educator.
      2. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 8 February 2021 14: 42
        0
        "Out of 59 missiles, only 23 missiles flew to the airbase. This was announced on Friday by the Russian Ministry of Defense" ///
        ----
        According to satellite imagery, about 50 fresh craters were counted at the base.
        1. Intruder
          Intruder 8 February 2021 16: 38
          0
          According to satellite imagery, about 50 fresh craters were counted at the base.
          bastards, in Hollywood they painted ... recourse
          1. 3danimal
            3danimal 9 February 2021 04: 09
            -1
            It was dug by the gophers smile
        2. neri73-r
          neri73-r 8 February 2021 16: 51
          0
          Quote: voyaka uh
          fresh funnels.

          Did you smell or take samples? wassat
          1. 3danimal
            3danimal 9 February 2021 04: 09
            0
            We looked at the satellite photo request
            1. neri73-r
              neri73-r 9 February 2021 08: 57
              +2
              Quote: 3danimal
              We looked at the satellite photo request

              Through the prism of American censorship! laughing You see a gopher, no, but he is! wassat tongue
              1. 3danimal
                3danimal 9 February 2021 10: 21
                +1
                That's right, oh, this American censorship smile
                Domestic TV, of course, are always objective and honest. The military too: you can remember that video in the film by Oliver Stone, where the alleged Russian helicopter "works" in Syria (in fact - an American one in the United States).
                Or, for example, they said that cluster munitions were not used in Syria, and after that domestic TVs show a video from an airbase where a videoconferencing aircraft with KMGU is under its wing.
                1. neri73-r
                  neri73-r 9 February 2021 10: 23
                  -1
                  Quote: 3danimal
                  (in fact - American in the USA)

                  am IN USA? Directly across the capitol? Horror?
                  Quote: 3danimal
                  for example, they said

                  Who and when?
              2. Intruder
                Intruder 9 February 2021 10: 41
                -1
                You see a gopher, no, but he is!
                caliber 152 mm.!? wink
    2. carstorm 11
      carstorm 11 8 February 2021 05: 08
      +13
      I think they were not bypassed but dragged the control posts closer so that they would not be able to control them via satellites. Because the Armenians did nothing to find and destroy them. From the word at all. There, in my opinion, they did nothing at all that they should have been at least minimal. And if they had them, then they were not modifications of M. Again, just one electronic warfare system is not a panacea. Everything should be comprehensive
      1. Avior
        Avior 8 February 2021 08: 38
        +13
        The author has a peculiar style, it is misleading. The system is designed to jam navigation, not to suppress the UAV control channel
        1. carstorm 11
          carstorm 11 8 February 2021 08: 42
          +2
          Actually, that's what he writes) The station works not through the UAVs themselves, but through communication channels with satellites, thanks to which the drones are oriented in space.
          1. Avior
            Avior 8 February 2021 17: 35
            +7
            ... dragged the control posts closer so as not to control via satellites.

            The station does not disrupt the operation of such channels, if they are provided in the UAV, of course
            through communication channels with satellites, thanks to which the drones are oriented in space.

            Navigation is carried out through the receivers of satellite signals in the UAV, it does not have two-way communication channels with the satellite
        2. Intruder
          Intruder 8 February 2021 16: 46
          +3
          The system is designed to jam navigation, not to suppress the UAV control channel
          and in this peculiar style, the author somehow forgot about autonomous inertial systems (in the UAV sphere ...) and about systems for correcting the trajectory of cruise missiles (which he wrote about in the article ...), during their guidance and their set , in finished goods: USA (TERCOM): AGM-86/129 / BGM-109 Tomahawk; Norway: Naval Strike Missile; Russia: X-55/101/555; China: C-602/802; Turkey: SOM; Pakistan: Hatf-VII Babur !!!
        3. 3danimal
          3danimal 9 February 2021 04: 13
          +4
          We have a legend that EW “burns out all the electronics,” a kind of Russian national imba weapon, for a long time.
          When the legend is not confirmed, heavily indoctrinated people try to come up with explanations for the inconsistencies with reality.
          1. psiho117
            psiho117 9 February 2021 13: 32
            +2
            Quote: 3danimal
            a kind of Russian national imba weapon

            Oh yes ... On any "sneeze" - five people are sure to answer: "But we have electronic warfare."
            Moreover, people, in the majority, have no idea what Electronic Suppression and Countermeasures are, how it works, what it can (and not maybe), what powers are required for this and how the enemy counteracts it.
            But we have an airplane suspended container suppressing two Cooks per minute.
            Already infuriates negative
    3. Starover_Z
      Starover_Z 8 February 2021 05: 26
      0
      Cheerful such an article, optimistic. So let everything be true and even more serious for the enemy! To test the system in Syria!
    4. OgnennyiKotik
      OgnennyiKotik 8 February 2021 09: 22
      +5
      Quote: Emil Mamedoff
      What "antidote" could he have against electronic warfare?

      Let's start with the definition of electronic warfare - a set of coordinated measures and actions of troops for electronic suppression (defeat) of electronic objects, enemy troops and weapons control systems, and electronic protection of electronic objects of their troops and weapons control systems.


      Simplified 3 main (all in the diagram) components of electronic warfare: Electronic intelligence (RER), Electronic protection (REZ), Electronic suppression (REP)
      I use the term electronic warfare to mean one or more components.
      If we talk about UAVs, you need to perform 2 main tasks:
      1. Stealth
      2. Communication stability

      To do this, it is necessary to minimize the time for sending data packets, use directional antennas, and use various signal (frequency) parameters. And if we talk about frequencies, the higher the better. With increasing frequency (roughly speaking), the transmission range of the direct signal decreases and the power for its transmission increases. Those. the signal is attenuated and harder to detect at a distance and harder to provide the necessary interference power at a distance. The quality of communication means, the ability to select the desired signal from interference, also plays an important role.
      In order to block the communication channel, the power (density) of the interference must be sufficient. Sufficiency is determined by the quality of the communication equipment and the properties of the interference. It is also impossible to create the same 360-degree interference and equally powerful at all frequencies. There are sighting and barrage interference.
      Against the sighting, first, the electronic warfare systems must detect the UAV (RER), determine the operating frequencies and direct the interference to the desired place in space (RER). The UAV should minimize its detection, with the appearance of interference, which completely muffles the desired signal, try to find its own, changing the parameters according to a pre-agreed algorithm and changing its position in space. Simplified by changing frequency, pitch and range. Accordingly, if two or more UAVs come from different directions.
      Defensive interference, electronic warfare UAVs determine the parameters of the obstacle, the coordinates of the sources, the propagation of interference in space. Those. find weak areas and further penetrate them.
      The most relatively simple electronic warfare UAVs determine the coordinates of jamming sources and are destroyed by artillery, MLRS, OTRK, aircraft, etc., etc.
      In general, this is a struggle, technically difficult and highly dependent on the development of the means used. Where the attacker, proactive, mobile has more options. Electronic warfare cannot be guaranteed to protect against UAVs, it is only a part of the air defense system, important but no more.
      Regarding takeover of control, this is in reality impossible. Only if there is a traitor in the ranks of the enemy who leaked all the technical information or the enemy has committed an incredible stupidity.
  2. aars
    aars 8 February 2021 06: 28
    +8
    disabling cruise missiles from satellite tracking, it will be very difficult to withdraw objects on Russian territory.
    No, not so.
    As easy as two and two.
    Because even before satellite, inertial systems with absolute noise immunity appeared.
    The use of satellite is associated primarily with their low price.
    But even American long-range howitzer shells have inerts.
    And if the satellite coordinates are lost, the missile will switch to the inertial system.
    For 25 km, a big mistake will not come.
    1. Dart2027
      Dart2027 8 February 2021 06: 55
      +1
      Quote: aars
      For 25 km, a big mistake will not come.

      This is 25 km at one station, but what if there are more?
      One crew of 2-3 people and 25 remotely controlled posts

      Here it turns out already 100 kilometers, and that's another matter.
    2. Mountain shooter
      Mountain shooter 8 February 2021 07: 48
      +2
      Quote: aars
      A big mistake will not come over 25 km

      Will come running! Big ... otherwise they wouldn't have put satellite on top ...
      1. aars
        aars 8 February 2021 08: 20
        +5
        Your objection is meaningless without specific numbers.
        Conventional widely available (non-military) Russian-made inerts have an error of ~ 0,2% of the distance traveled, i.e. at 25km - 50m.
        1. Mountain shooter
          Mountain shooter 8 February 2021 08: 27
          0
          Quote: aars
          Conventional widely available (non-military) Russian-made inerts have an error of ~ 0,02% of the distance traveled, i.e. at 25km - 50m.

          This is an inertial mounted on the projectile ... Any "widely available" acceleration when fired is unlikely to survive. Plus the rotation ... of the projectile. I do not know the parameters of inertial systems on projectiles, but the presence of satellite navigation on them suggests that the accuracy of the inertial is insufficient!
          Yes, and a deviation of 50 meters - for a 155 mm projectile - count as a miss.
          1. aars
            aars 8 February 2021 08: 37
            +2
            Above it was sealed - 50m by 25km correctly, at 0,02 an extra 0.
            Whether or not to miss depends on the goal.
            And it was primarily about the CD, the projectile is purely for example, even there is ...
            Electronic warfare can somewhat complicate guidance and only - except for inertial motion, the rocket can go along the terrain, and no one has canceled the GOS.
            1. Mountain shooter
              Mountain shooter 8 February 2021 09: 56
              -1
              Quote: aars
              And it was primarily about the CD, the projectile is purely for example, even there is

              A cruise missile cannot fly 25 km ...
              1. aars
                aars 8 February 2021 10: 34
                0
                The jamming range of receivers of satellite radio navigation systems is 25 km
  3. rocket757
    rocket757 8 February 2021 07: 41
    +3
    Russia has a very impressive scientific background and a high level of development in the field of electronic warfare.
    Everything should work in a complex, complementing each other, insuring !!! Electronic warfare + air defense.
  4. Ros 56
    Ros 56 8 February 2021 07: 52
    +2
    The thing, of course, seems to be good, but it should be thoroughly tested in reality, otherwise it's just an advertisement.
  5. viktor_ui
    viktor_ui 8 February 2021 08: 05
    0
    Roman, there is a question - and if several redundant control layers are used in the guidance system of attack weapons from the air (GPS + an electronic route embedded in the head to the point of destruction of the attack weapon + route illumination by AWACS or their derivatives such as an air repeater ...) suppression of the system has not been canceled. The curators of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are clearly not stupid. drinks
    1. aars
      aars 8 February 2021 13: 23
      0
      Quote: viktor_ui
      And no one canceled the reciprocal suppression of the system.
      Absolutely impossible.
      1. viktor_ui
        viktor_ui 9 February 2021 13: 11
        -1
        there is nothing ABSOLUTE except the ABSOLUTE itself, that is, absolutus "unconditional", "perfect" from the Latin alphabet = the whole universe with its VOIDS + Vodyara "Absolute" to a heap apparently fellow - I do not believe MINHERC wassat
  6. Eug
    Eug 8 February 2021 08: 09
    +1
    According to the given scenario, it turns out that you need to have a lot of agents in companies serving cell towers. Then you can try to massively "fill up" (or de-energize) the towers just before the approach of the Axes. But the air defense will still remain.
    1. AUL
      AUL 8 February 2021 08: 52
      +4
      Quote: Eug
      According to the given scenario, it turns out that you need to have a lot of agents in companies serving cell towers.

      Well, this is just not a problem - to adopt an appropriate resolution, and the equipment will hang at least on every tower. But one must understand that the system suppresses only the control / orientation radio channel, and there are other guidance methods - inertial, laser, electronic maps and their combinations. So that system is just one element of the overall complex of object protection.
      1. Eug
        Eug 8 February 2021 21: 00
        0
        Multichannel system with fundamentally different correction channels. But only the inertial is autonomous, and that (as far as I know) can be "corrected".
  7. Avior
    Avior 8 February 2021 08: 48
    +10
    ... And to determine on which "Fields" emitters are - only visually.

    It's just not difficult.
    They constantly radiate at the frequencies of satellite systems.
    As for navigation interference, for a UAV with an operator, this is not very critical - the operator, if ready for such a situation, can guide the UAV along the picture of the terrain, guided by satellite photos, even if from Google maps. This is more relevant for purely automatic systems.
    To work effectively against military navigation receivers, the jamming emitters must be higher than the receiver - the military uses directional antennas operating on the upper hemisphere, so the signal from below will be weakened and the radius of the area covered by navigation interference will be significantly reduced.
    1. Gust
      Gust 8 February 2021 11: 03
      +2
      The attenuation of the signal is compensated by the stupidly higher power of the emitters operating at a much shorter distance. When operating at satellite navigation frequencies, various refractions / re-reflections from the structural elements of the airframe occur, which also facilitates the work of electronic warfare. But in general, there are other ways of control, so this is not a panacea.
      1. Avior
        Avior 8 February 2021 17: 25
        +2
        It is more correct to say that the antenna, among other things, is shielded from below by the elements of the glider.
  8. SovAr238A
    SovAr238A 8 February 2021 11: 05
    +5
    In the event that the dome of the "Field" reliably covers from missiles, disabling the nuclear power plant in general becomes a problem.


    It is strange that Mr. Skomorokhov forgot about the TERCOM guidance system, which no one canceled or removed from the Tomahawk CD control systems.
    And to which all these "Fields" are like a stop-signal to hares ...



    I would like to wish you luck from the bottom of my heart, because I really would feel sorry for the specialist who would be strained by such a difficult task. This is 150 km in a straight line, and in our country it is not always possible to move in a straight line even on a tank. However, this is already known.


    Once I read about the original purpose for which the Vympel detachment was created ...
    So they were that secret force in the system of exercises on the topic of "penetration into specially protected storage facilities, basing nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants."
    1. Undecim
      Undecim 8 February 2021 11: 49
      +11
      It is strange that Mr. Skomorokhov forgot about the TERCOM guidance system, which no one canceled or removed from the Tomahawk CD control systems.
      The Turkish SOM has an INS system just in case the enemy attempts to interfere with GPS signals.
      Pakistani Hatf-VII Babur has a guidance system similar to TERCOM for the same cases.
  9. Maikcg
    Maikcg 8 February 2021 21: 14
    +3
    Axes and without GPS flew on the map, the whole question is in the preparation time, before the flight task for the rocket for the inertial machine was a day or so, now enter the coordinates a couple of clicks. But for a nuclear power plant, they will try and the charge will not be TNT, so +/- 100 meters for such a large purpose as a nuclear power plant does not matter.
    1. Intruder
      Intruder 9 February 2021 10: 52
      0
      They will try the nuclear power plant and the charge will not be TNT
      Duc, in almost any universal cruise there can be variants with the "TGA", but there only: from 19 to 21% TNT (semi-armor-piercing (high-explosive-penetrating) warhead weighing 584-750 kg.,) and almost any power unit will be deep "kirdyk", with emergency shutdown, followed by long-term repairs or decommissioning ... and all within the framework of conventional ...
      1. Maikcg
        Maikcg 9 February 2021 12: 19
        0
        Within the framework of the convection and raging Field, the ax on the inertial axis is unsatisfactory, the photo of the target will certainly help, but it will not get into the open window. But it is not exactly. And the block has protection from the crashed plane.
        1. Intruder
          Intruder 9 February 2021 14: 46
          0
          And the block has protection from the crashed plane.
          that's exactly protection from a crashed aircraft, and not from the impact of warheads with
          semi-armor-piercing (high-explosive-penetrating) warhead weighing 584-750 kg.
          Somehow the difference is big, only damage to the second cooling circuit and emergency protection of the reactor will work and start to emergency shutdown, plus damage to TP-shak of different (and there are many of them, on the high and low sides) and other ground around the power unit, power equipment. ..
        2. Intruder
          Intruder 9 February 2021 14: 50
          0
          ax quo on inertial drive is unsatisfactory
          orbital optical reconnaissance, with remote sensing of the Earth's surface, there are maps, both in optics - and in radar, with a resolution - less than 10 m, in the surface survey, and this is already in the 00s !!!
  10. Niko
    Niko 9 February 2021 16: 32
    +2
    With all due respect to the system itself, article: another comparison of a snake and a hedgehog in a spherical vacuum. If the question with drones is logical and more or less clear, then the impossibility of disabling such objects about which the "author" writes, in my amateurish opinion, is solved with the help of ballistic missiles (since such a booze has already started)
  11. Bogatyrev
    Bogatyrev 10 February 2021 00: 13
    0
    I am very much interested in why this Pole-21M complex in Karabakh provided protection against Turkish UAVs for only 4 days? How did they get around it then?