"Ichthyosaurus" and others. Electric torpedoes - new and old
Torpedoes "Ichthyosaurus". And their loading on the submarine of project 06363 in Sevastopol.
January 25, 2021 in the "Military-Industrial Courier" was released interview of the General Director of the TRV Corporation B.V. Obnosov:
In 2020, we completed state tests of the first Russian electric torpedo.
In the USSR, they were produced, but with less high performance characteristics.
Today, the first serial samples of new electric torpedoes have already entered service with the Russian Navy.
They are significantly superior to Western models in terms of noiselessness, range, immersion depth and target detection range by the homing system.
In the USSR, they were produced, but with less high performance characteristics.
Today, the first serial samples of new electric torpedoes have already entered service with the Russian Navy.
They are significantly superior to Western models in terms of noiselessness, range, immersion depth and target detection range by the homing system.
That is, it is stated:
- tests have been completed, serial deliveries to the fleet are underway;
- allegedly "superiority in low noise" over western torpedoes;
- allegedly the range of our torpedo is "greater";
- our detection range is also supposedly higher.
All this (except that the series of "Ichthyosaurs" has gone) is not true.
It should be understood that Obnosov is not just a top manager of the military-industrial complex, but an experienced missile engineer and leader who really does business and plows at work.
Usually in his speeches in the media, Boris Viktorovich is neat and accurate... And there can be only one explanation for such a public lie about torpedoes: misinformation of himself from his subordinates.
This primarily applies to the leadership of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region", about examples of "public amnesia" which has already been written in the article "AICR" Severodvinsk "surrendered to the Navy with critical deficiencies for combat readiness".
Earlier on the subject of "Ichthyosaurus" the author of the article already wrote:
2012 year. Competition will provide effective weapons.
2015 year. Will the Ichthyosaurus Fleet Receive?
2019 year. Ichthyosaurus at the home stretch.
2020 year. "Ichthyosaur" has passed State tests.
But the "Ichthyosaurus issue" cannot be considered without the general situation in our torpedo industry in general and electric torpedo construction in particular.
Let's start with an interview with the Chief Designer of Ichthyosaurus - Technical Director of Dagdizel JSC S. M. Asaliev ( link):
The Dagdizel plant will present at the International Naval Salon the UET-1E torpedo, created within the framework of the Ichthyosaur R&D Center. The executive director of the enterprise Sultanahmed Asaliev told FlotProm about this.
According to him, the 533-mm torpedo surpasses the development of Gidropribor - TE2-02.
“This is a completely digital product, there are a lot of innovations in it, and not all of them can be talked about openly,” Asaliev said. "The export version of the torpedo is somewhat more modest in terms of characteristics than the one we offer for a domestic customer."
According to him, the 533-mm torpedo surpasses the development of Gidropribor - TE2-02.
“This is a completely digital product, there are a lot of innovations in it, and not all of them can be talked about openly,” Asaliev said. "The export version of the torpedo is somewhat more modest in terms of characteristics than the one we offer for a domestic customer."
In some performance characteristics, the Ichthyosaur really surpasses the Gidropribor torpedo.
We are talking, in particular, about a longer cruising range (the maximum indicator of the Dagdizel torpedo is 25 km versus 18 km for the TE2-02), a higher speed (50 knots versus 48) and a better detection range for underwater targets (up to 3,5 km against 1,5). In addition, the Ichthyosaurus is capable of detecting the wake of surface ships with a lifespan of up to 500 seconds. It also has the ability to stepless speed control - unlike the Gidropribor torpedoes.
Thus, it is declared about the real achievement of the characteristics: a speed of 50 knots per 25 km, a response radius of 3,5 km and ensuring the detection of more than 8 minutes of the target's wake.
The problem is that it looks good only against the background of the wretched and pitiful torpedo of the Gidropribor TE-2, but when compared with other western torpedoes, there is somehow no reason to be overjoyed.
Note. On western heavy torpedoes (submarines), back in 2015, the author (based on some of his own analytical work) wrote an article for the "Arsenal of the Fatherland" "On the appearance of modern submarine torpedoes." In terms of the level and complexity of the consideration of the topic, there are simply no close analogues of this article. Link on it on "VO".
It is also worth mentioning an article in the magazine "Arms Export" "Domestic torpedo weapons on the world market" (she on the site "VO").
The article is not ideal, there are some inaccuracies (very small), but taking into account the specifics of the topic and setting, it is unlikely that deeper work will appear in public in the mid-term.
In short, our torpedoes have the following problems and features.
First. Range (stroke) of torpedoes
Let's use the table of transport characteristics of torpedoes in the article "On the appearance of modern torpedoes of submarines" and add UET-1E:
It is obvious that modern western torpedoes UET-1E not only do not surpass, but at least lose twice (to such models as DM2A4, F21). It should be borne in mind that UET-1E weighs much more than the western 53 cm torpedoes.
Accordingly, if they are “loaded” with batteries up to the weight of UET-1E (de facto this has already been done in the DM2A4ER), the lag in performance characteristics of our “newest” torpedo will be simply devastating. Moreover, the DM2A4 (including the battery and the engine) was developed in the early 2000s.
As for the 22 kilometers range of the Italian Black Shark (at 52 knots), this is provided by a single combat / practical lithium polymer battery (more on it below). When installing the same Al-AgO battery, Black Shark gets the same 50/50 (kilometers per knots) as on the F21.
The reason for such a huge backlog of domestic electric torpedoes is antediluvian batteries, and in fact, a complete lack of work on a real perspective. Even in the publicized "super torpedo of the XXI century" (and in fact - a scam) "Lomonos" "Gidropribor" proposed the use of a battery, the design of which was developed in the United States in the middle of the XX century (but in the maximum configuration - according to the permissible dimensions) and from the use of which on The West was abandoned back in the late 60s.
At the round table on naval underwater weapons ("Army-2015"):
“An extremely acute topic was raised in his report by SV Smolkov, the technical director of ZAO Elektroistochnik, - the complete absence of modern R&D on promising torpedo batteries (both combat and practical).
In fact, today the technical level of the batteries used by the Navy corresponds to the western fifties and sixties of the last century (an open-cycle water-activated battery, the design of which we borrowed from the American Mk44 torpedo of the late 50s).
Moreover, Gidropribor wanted to use such a battery in a promising product of the 21st century!
Torpedo batteries are one of the most critical issues in the domestic torpedo industry.
And this problem will not be solved without appropriate state funding and setting a task. "
In fact, today the technical level of the batteries used by the Navy corresponds to the western fifties and sixties of the last century (an open-cycle water-activated battery, the design of which we borrowed from the American Mk44 torpedo of the late 50s).
Moreover, Gidropribor wanted to use such a battery in a promising product of the 21st century!
Torpedo batteries are one of the most critical issues in the domestic torpedo industry.
And this problem will not be solved without appropriate state funding and setting a task. "
I note that the reaction to this speech by the representatives of the Navy at the round table was:
- These are “not our problems,” so let the Ministry of Industry and Trade deal with this.
For Al-AgO batteries, in general, we had only an experimental installation at the Central Research Institute named after V.I. Krylov (moreover, about which, over the years, everyone has already forgotten).
Are these problems recognized by domestic specialists?
Yes and no. More on this below.
But first, a little stories.
"Gidropriborovtsy" Ph.D. THEM. Sobolev, Doctor of Technical Sciences E.L. Kabanets, Ph.D. S.K. Egorov, V.D. Oblyapin, B.A. Kaznakov, N.P. Ostrovsky "Stages and problems of the development of a torpedo weapons":
By the end of the 60s, the VNIAI Institute developed torpedo batteries based on a silver-zinc alkaline electrochemical system.
In terms of specific parameters and performance, batteries with such batteries were twice as high as lead-acid ones.
With sufficiently high specific parameters (60 ... 80 Wh / kg), the batteries of such an electrochemical system still had a significant drawback - the shelf life in the prepared state was 15-30 days, which is clearly not enough when used in combat torpedoes.
In terms of specific parameters and performance, batteries with such batteries were twice as high as lead-acid ones.
With sufficiently high specific parameters (60 ... 80 Wh / kg), the batteries of such an electrochemical system still had a significant drawback - the shelf life in the prepared state was 15-30 days, which is clearly not enough when used in combat torpedoes.
It is worth noting here that such batteries in combat torpedoes were still used in our country, and in large quantities.
Torpedo SET-53M (details "Torpedo SET-53: Soviet" totalitarian ", but real"), with all the problems of its operation on a scale fleetassociated with the need for almost monthly (maximum 3 months) replacement of these torpedoes in ammunition and their re-preparation.
Late 50s - early 60s:
The Central Research Institute "Gidropribor" together with the enterprises VNIAI and VNIIT have developed disposable current sources of a silver-zinc electrochemical system, in which dry-charged cells with separate electrolyte storage were used.
The design ... provided for individual filling of each element from the ampoule located on top.
These are batteries of type A-187M, A-455, A-222U, which were part of the ESU (electrical power plants) of the SET-65, TEST-71M, AT-2, AT-2UM and AT-2M torpedoes.
These batteries have a shelf life of 8 years.
The design ... provided for individual filling of each element from the ampoule located on top.
These are batteries of type A-187M, A-455, A-222U, which were part of the ESU (electrical power plants) of the SET-65, TEST-71M, AT-2, AT-2UM and AT-2M torpedoes.
These batteries have a shelf life of 8 years.
Note. In connection with the apparently insufficient assigned service life of such batteries, serious work was carried out to increase it, up to 13 years. Then serious problems began. On the "electrical part" (for those interested), they were described in sufficient detail in a number of public works of Ukrainian specialists (on the extension of torpedoes of the Ukrainian Navy). However, the problem is deeper and more serious - a real "barrier" for old batteries was laid in the electromechanical control system of torpedoes. Due to the heavy electric motor of our torpedoes, the center of gravity is shifted to the stern, and accordingly, with an increase in the cocking time of the old battery, not only did the "starting bag" sharply increase, but the torpedo began to "fall aft." Further - the gyroscopes "sat on the frame", with the loss of the starting coordinate system by the torpedo. As a result, there were even cases of aiming our own (old) electric torpedoes at our shooting submarines.
Separately, it is necessary to say about the safety problem of electric torpedoes with transported electrolyte (ampoule filling). Writes by the former deputy head of the Anti-submarine weapons department of the Navy R.A. Gusev:
In May 1968, the American nuclear submarine Scorpion was lost ...
American experts then already knew that the reason for the death of the boat was the unauthorized activation of the power battery of the MK-37 electric torpedo, which led to the torpedo heating and the explosion of its combat charging compartment.
All electric torpedoes with single-action batteries were excluded from the ammunition load of American ships ...
The Americans relied on the MK-48 thermal torpedo and did it with some kind of frenzy: modernization after modernization, a lot of control firings, bells and whistles ...
God had mercy on us. We had plenty of "hot" torpedoes on submarines (MGT-1, SAET-60). And not only on submarines. In the mid-seventies, two SET-65 combat torpedoes even caught fire on the Boyky BPK, which were immediately fired. The ship was in the Atlantic under the supervision of the American aircraft carrier "Hermes" ...
The reason was gross violations of the torpedo operating instructions ...
The batteries were burning. It is better not to see how they burn.
American experts then already knew that the reason for the death of the boat was the unauthorized activation of the power battery of the MK-37 electric torpedo, which led to the torpedo heating and the explosion of its combat charging compartment.
All electric torpedoes with single-action batteries were excluded from the ammunition load of American ships ...
The Americans relied on the MK-48 thermal torpedo and did it with some kind of frenzy: modernization after modernization, a lot of control firings, bells and whistles ...
God had mercy on us. We had plenty of "hot" torpedoes on submarines (MGT-1, SAET-60). And not only on submarines. In the mid-seventies, two SET-65 combat torpedoes even caught fire on the Boyky BPK, which were immediately fired. The ship was in the Atlantic under the supervision of the American aircraft carrier "Hermes" ...
The reason was gross violations of the torpedo operating instructions ...
The batteries were burning. It is better not to see how they burn.
We will return to the issue of security below. With an emphasis on today.
The next step in the torpedo power industry (1970–1980) was the creation of a new generation of current sources - water-activated (VHIT).
In such power sources, outboard sea water is used as an electrolyte. The anode material of VHIT is a special magnesium-based alloy, and the cathodic material is silver chloride. Subsequently, the cathode material was replaced by copper chloride.
These works allowed to drastically reduce the use of scarce materials (silver). VHIT have higher, in comparison with disposable power sources of a silver-zinc system, specific parameters (100 ... 120 Wh / kg), simplicity of design and ease of use.
The shelf life of VHIT ... is now 10-15 years.
In such power sources, outboard sea water is used as an electrolyte. The anode material of VHIT is a special magnesium-based alloy, and the cathodic material is silver chloride. Subsequently, the cathode material was replaced by copper chloride.
These works allowed to drastically reduce the use of scarce materials (silver). VHIT have higher, in comparison with disposable power sources of a silver-zinc system, specific parameters (100 ... 120 Wh / kg), simplicity of design and ease of use.
The shelf life of VHIT ... is now 10-15 years.
The design of the VHIT torpedo TE2 (almost completely borrowed from USET-80)
Domestic VHIT has such a disadvantage as the dependence of the discharge characteristics, and therefore the power of the ESU, on the area of use (salinity and temperature of outboard sea water).
This is primarily due to the fact that when developing the design of the VHIT at the first stage of work, a simple hydraulic scheme with an open flow system was adopted instead of a semi-closed system with an automatic device for maintaining the electrical conductivity of the electrolyte at a given level.
This is primarily due to the fact that when developing the design of the VHIT at the first stage of work, a simple hydraulic scheme with an open flow system was adopted instead of a semi-closed system with an automatic device for maintaining the electrical conductivity of the electrolyte at a given level.
Alas, the sad irony of these words of specialists is that the simplest scheme adopted at the first stage has remained the only one and unrepeatable for us (I remind you that even in Lomonosov XXI Century Gidropribor was going to repeat it).
At the same time, in a number of theaters and regions, the use of torpedoes with our VHIT is impossible. For example, in the Baltic, they simply do not have enough salinity.
Left: semi-closed diagram of the Italian torpedo A-244 (we have nothing of the kind), right: experimental Al-AgO battery at KGNTs (2007)
In fact, the only type of practical batteries for torpedoes in the Navy are silver-zinc, with an electrolyte already filled during preparation. These batteries are well mastered, however, they have a limited shelf life in a flooded state (several months) and a very small number of shots that can be fired by them during this time.
An attempt to enter this topic from lithium-ion batteries became the Ministry of Industry and Trade topic "Lion", which was strictly written in the article "We'll see!" On the importance of the media and publicity of "burning" issues ".
The reader may have a logical question:
"What, in general, is going on with us ?!"
The question is not idle. What was above - "flowers".
And now the "berries".
"Just a document" - Decision of the Arbitration Court dated October 28, 2015 in case No. А40-110983 / 2015... In fact, this is a quote from document No. Yu / 1-29 an. chipboard. from 28.11.2014, the military prosecutor's office of the Northern Fleet:
OJSC "Concern" MPO-Gidropribor "within the framework of the ROC" Kant "tested the DP-31U engine for its operability after the expiration of its service life with its extension for 15 years ...
Replacing the DP-31U engine on old 2503 products with a new EPV-390 engine is impractical, this replacement leads to an unjustified increase in the cost of the contract and additional budgetary costs.
According to the product developer 2503, OJSC "Concern" PMO-Gidropribor "... only needs to lubricate ...
USET-80 torpedoes are equipped with digital assault rifles TsA28-05, TsA28-08, a control unit B-21, steering gears (RM), head compartments with homing equipment modules, and other units in which ERIs with expired service life are used.
Components with electronic components are subject to unambiguous replacement or re-certification exclusively by the manufacturers.
Replacing the DP-31U engine on old 2503 products with a new EPV-390 engine is impractical, this replacement leads to an unjustified increase in the cost of the contract and additional budgetary costs.
According to the product developer 2503, OJSC "Concern" PMO-Gidropribor "... only needs to lubricate ...
USET-80 torpedoes are equipped with digital assault rifles TsA28-05, TsA28-08, a control unit B-21, steering gears (RM), head compartments with homing equipment modules, and other units in which ERIs with expired service life are used.
Components with electronic components are subject to unambiguous replacement or re-certification exclusively by the manufacturers.
So, in 2015, the military prosecutor's office of the Northern Fleet, "twists the arms" of the performer (and knowingly disrupting the state defense order and the provision of torpedoes to the fleet) with the requirement
"Recertification exclusively by the manufacturer."
Here is this plant (according to the product management system):
Public Joint Stock Partnership "Science-Virobniche ob'yednannya" Kiev Automation Plant ".
Post address that misce znakhozhennya: st. Starokiivska, 10, metro Kiev, 04116, Ukraine
Post address that misce znakhozhennya: st. Starokiivska, 10, metro Kiev, 04116, Ukraine
Let me emphasize that this is happening in 2014-2015!
Moreover, the author is sure that the employees of the SF prosecutor's office who participated in this perfectly understood everything. Therefore, the "ДСП" is deliberately put on their document. To make it extremely difficult to appeal against their actions (for "especially vigilant" - the document is in the public domain in the databases of the Arbitration Courts).
And here is the materiel in question (link).
And steering cars ( link).
Yes, it looks like unreal nonsense.
Military Prosecutor's Office of the Northern Fleet in 2014–2015 requires the involvement of enterprises and specialists of Ukraine in the repair of torpedoes ammunition! Moreover, it requires absolutely illegally, because for such cases a standard "fallback" option is provided:
"Head organization by type of activity in the Russian Federation."
And the meaning (or rather intent) in this "game" actually is.
"Interest".
For the preservation of the DP-31U clearly requires the replacement of an extremely expensive disposable battery (which, obviously, was lobbied for).
But the installation of a modern BPPM engine (which was proposed by Dagdizel) allowed not only to extend the service life of the USET-80 torpedo with the old battery, but also opened up the possibility of its subsequent effective modernization (since the old DP-31U engine had just a terrible level of interference, imposing significant restrictions on new equipment, and a huge drop in its efficiency made the use of new powerful batteries meaningless).
And one more "cherry".
Serial production of the ancient (whose chief designer died in 1969) DP-31U "Gidropribor" resumed, technologies "recreated". And, moreover, this "antique item" should be installed on the supposedly new torpedoes "Kant", which "Gidropribor" wants to make the fleet happy with.
It has already been written many times, but it is worth repeating again. Specialists and the ex-general director of Gidropribor stated literally about the SSN "Kant":
"We are completing the work started at the end of the 80s."
The Kant battery is actually an American design of the mid-40s. last century, the chief designer of the engine died in 1969.
Telecontrol? As the saying goes,
"We will not use boatswain speed",
and without them, you cannot say for sure about this.
We add that there is reason to believe that the "Kant" (which is "very persistently offered" to the fleet) did not have a single shot at all in combat configuration (with a combat battery). The developer stubbornly drove torpedoes with two practical batteries (separately for the equipment and the engine. The reason was the “interference” from the engine to the equipment, which they could not “defeat”). Only now a combat torpedo has one battery (like all normal practical torpedoes, except for the "Kant") with a separate outlet for the instrument circuit.
Read more - "Will the fleet get Ichthyosaurus?"
There are more banal examples:
10.08.2015/XNUMX/XNUMX The Chelyabinsk plant "Uralelement" will produce torpedo batteries for ships and submarines of the Russian Navy.
Previously, these components were supplied by the Ukrainian company Luhansk accumulators ...
By mid-autumn, the plant intends to increase production to 11–12 batteries per year in accordance with the contract, TASS reports.
The exact amount of the contract and the delivery time are unknown, but the director of the plant mentioned that more than 200 million rubles were invested in the production.
Previously, these components were supplied by the Ukrainian company Luhansk accumulators ...
By mid-autumn, the plant intends to increase production to 11–12 batteries per year in accordance with the contract, TASS reports.
The exact amount of the contract and the delivery time are unknown, but the director of the plant mentioned that more than 200 million rubles were invested in the production.
Formally, this is "import substitution" (money is given for it!).
But why "import substitute" for long-outdated products developed in the late 50s - early 60s, if there are already new and modern ones? That is, instead of carrying out a quick modernization of ships for the "Package", "the development of budgetary funds" was arranged on ancient and long-lost combat capability of torpedoes and their batteries.
In this case, unambiguously on unsafe batteries. The design and production technology of such batteries at their manufacturer in the USSR - the Lugansk accumulator plant - was developed for a very long time, with a number of serious accidents in the fleet with these batteries. Therefore, the presence of SET-65 torpedoes with new batteries, for example, in the BOD project 1155 torpedo tubes in the hot conditions of the southern seas, is, to put it mildly, annoying (as is their proximity to the ancient 53-65K).
I repeat - this is all in the presence of a more or less complete, safe "Package", which has a very high combat effectiveness (in contrast to the incapacitated "torpedo firewood" SET-65).
And all this is not the fault of the director of Uralelement. Reviews of honest and responsible specialists about him are quite positive. He just
"Acted within the framework of the existing system"
(although it would be more correct to call all this "torpedo trash" "anti-system").
And what about the so-called partners?
The main type of combat batteries is Al-AgO, with which modern western electric torpedoes have surpassed thermal (unitary fuel) in terms of transport characteristics, VHIT with a semi-closed cycle (A-244 and Stingray). For old types of torpedoes, jellied SDSABs are still used (for example, for the Mk37 torpedo, since replacing the ESU with a thermal one for submarines with self-exiting torpedoes is impossible due to the fact that poisonous gases will remain in the torpedo tube).
Recently, there has been a tendency to create universal (single combat and practical) lithium polymer batteries (for example, the Black Shark torpedo). Despite the fact that the loss in range (from Al-AgO batteries) is actually twofold, the meaning of such batteries is to provide a large number of practical torpedo firing (Black Shark more than 100) at a minimum cost for the most effective development of torpedo weapons by personnel.
Black Shark universal lithium polymer torpedo battery.
Second. Low noise
First, just a quote ( link):
The reasons for the development of electric torpedoes in European countries (Mk-24, DM2, SUT, F-17, etc.) are less noise (in comparison with heat ones), the possibility of a covert attack, "silent assassination".
However, low noise in no way related to our electric torpedoes.
Moreover, they thundered significantly louder than the western heat ones.
However, low noise in no way related to our electric torpedoes.
Moreover, they thundered significantly louder than the western heat ones.
Yes, the noise level of UET-1 is much lower than that of USET-80. And here is the possibility of a smooth change in stroke (up to low-noise small, - with reliable preservation of controllability of a heavily overweight product), and low vibration activity of the new BPMM engine, and increased accuracy of parts manufacturing.
Among other things, this makes it possible to significantly increase the detection range at low-noise travel (up to "values close to record").
Only here is "one but".
The statements about "superiority in low noise" over western torpedoes, to put it mildly, have no basis. Yes, in terms of broadband noise, we will most likely be close at low speeds.
The problem is that for many decades the decisive factor has been the level of narrowband rather than broadband noise.
And in our torpedo building, the attitude to this problem is like in "kindergarten" ("I'm in the house"): they, as a rule, are simply do not measure! Or they measure ("for themselves"), but they write broadband in the documents.
At the same time, at the same time in special open literature (publicly available) such exclusive issues of narrow-band noise noise of torpedoes as "current diagnostics of the operation of torpedo mechanisms" in a mode close to real-time based on its narrow-band noise are discussed.
Thus, the fact that we have “the forest is going” (with “peaks” of large excess of “emissions” of discrete over broadband noise) is known to all specialists. However, they pretend that "they are in the house."
Below are photographs of the tails of the torpedoes "Ichthyosaur" (RF), DM2A4 (FRG), Black Shark (Italy):
Obviously, the Ichthyosaur has largely retained the design solutions for the USET-80 torpedo tail, with which there can be no question of achieving the stealth levels of new western torpedoes.
I would like to emphasize that it is impossible to blame the Ichthyosaurus developers for this "flaw".
They already did 102% of the possible to reduce noise in conditions of extremely poor funding and the most difficult overall organization of ROC. But it is also wrong and wrong to declare an alleged "superiority" over western torpedoes (also because recognizing one's own shortcomings is the first step towards correcting them).
Third. Homing and telecontrol systems
An extremely scandalous fact for our torpedo construction took place in December 2018. Vietnamese fishermen caught a practical Chinese-made torpedo (most likely a Yu-9).
From an article in "NVO" "Torpedoes of the Great Neighbor" :
The creation of the Yu-2004 torpedo by 6 was the undisputed success of the Chinese developers and brought them to the level of the most modern requirements for this weapon ... Data on the subsequent Chinese heavy torpedoes Yu-8 (2006), Yu-9 (2012) and Yu-10 (2014) ) differ and do not have reliable reference to specific samples.
At the same time, there is reliable information about the creation of an electric low-noise torpedo (outwardly close to the Black Shark and F21 torpedoes).
For the first time, a new torpedo "hit the shot" when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited a nuclear submarine in 2018. Obviously, the same torpedo was caught by a Vietnamese fisherman at the end of 2018.
At the same time, the Chinese media mentioned that "the electric torpedo entered service in 2012", and also indicated the introduction of fiber-optic telecontrol in torpedoes since 2010.
It can be assumed that the Yu-8, taking into account the year of its creation (2006), is a turbine, high-speed version of the Yu-6 torpedo, the Yu-9 is an electric torpedo, and the Yu-10 is a deep modernization of the Yu-6.
At the same time, there is reliable information about the creation of an electric low-noise torpedo (outwardly close to the Black Shark and F21 torpedoes).
For the first time, a new torpedo "hit the shot" when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited a nuclear submarine in 2018. Obviously, the same torpedo was caught by a Vietnamese fisherman at the end of 2018.
At the same time, the Chinese media mentioned that "the electric torpedo entered service in 2012", and also indicated the introduction of fiber-optic telecontrol in torpedoes since 2010.
It can be assumed that the Yu-8, taking into account the year of its creation (2006), is a turbine, high-speed version of the Yu-6 torpedo, the Yu-9 is an electric torpedo, and the Yu-10 is a deep modernization of the Yu-6.
Taking into account the simply antique level of our TE2 (previously supplied by the Russian Federation to Vietnam in the ammunition load of the Project 6363 submarine), the foreign customer had very serious questions about what kind of "torpedo firewood" was "sold" to him ...
The situation is really very scandalous, with potential extremely bad consequences for our military exports. And initially there were chances that measures for urgent revision and elimination of critical shortcomings of our export torpedoes would be taken.
However, the scandal was "extinguished". And we (because tough questions immediately arose about the officials who participated in the scam for the supply of "torpedo firewood" to Vietnam).
Foreign customer? And he was left with very bad questions about us. First of all, due to the extremely low level of the homing system (HSS) and telecontrol (TU) of the TE2 torpedoes.
Of course, the very fact that the main SSN of naval torpedoes (and in fact the only export one - TE2) is still equipment copied from the American torpedo of 1961 (caught at sea in 1965) looks just like unreal nonsense. Alas, these are facts, and the "game" is that some of our developers also manage to be proud of this.
From their anniversary edition ("60 years of the Central Research Institute" Gidropribor "), literally:
“We were gladdened by their successes… homing agents… completing their cycle of full-scale tests of the Kolibri torpedo (product 294, caliber 324 mm, 1973) with SSN, reproduced on the domestic element base…
This SSN "Keramika" has broken all records of longevity.
There is practically no torpedo left where this SSN was not installed as an anti-submarine SSN during modernization. "
This SSN "Keramika" has broken all records of longevity.
There is practically no torpedo left where this SSN was not installed as an anti-submarine SSN during modernization. "
At the same time, Gidropribor was unable to carry out even any serious modernization of Keramika.
This was done by TNK Dastan (Kyrgyzstan). In fact, our developers, with normal digitalization of the CLS, the introduction of new signals and ensuring confident operation in the shallow sea. The real radius of the CLN response has practically doubled. Moreover, based on the results of this work, solutions were found that ensured the massive modernization of all torpedoes with "Ceramics" in the Navy by replacing cassettes (and in the conditions of fleets). 8 successful torpedo shots were fired from this CLO, and the topic was buried.
If the pilots had someone proposed to arm the Su-57 with a missile "reproduced at a domestic base" from the "Phantom" shot down in Vietnam, he would definitely be advised to go through the military medical commission again. With a psychiatrist. However, on the "valiant Navy" the ancient "torpedo firewood" USET-80 with "Ceramics" (and the older SSN "Waterfall") on the "newest" AICR project 955 "Borey" are considered "in the order of things."
The above words of the developer on "Ceramics" were published almost fifteen years ago. Recently there was another anniversary (75 years). In the book they did not write happily about "Keramika". However, at the IMDS-2019 naval show, "Ceramics" was presented (on the TE2 torpedo). Moreover, when looking at the photos of IMDS-2019, several interesting pictures were found (from the portal "Bastion VPK").
The photo shows an active discussion between Obnosov B.N., Krylov I.V. ("Region") and Tikhonov G.B. ("Gidropribor") is just the "problematic issues of the Ichthyosaurus." “By materiel” - in the pictures are our heavy torpedoes UGST and TE-2 (with comments on their specifications in the sidebars).
G.B. Tikhonov is an old and experienced torpedo operator, a very strong professional. Not long ago he was gone ... And, having remembered him, it would be honest and correct to say about this person “as is”.
The author has been personally familiar with him since 2003. There were different things. For example, article "An example of unfounded criticism", one of the signatories of which was Gleb Borisovich. Given that my article "Marine underwater weapons: problems and opportunities" in two parts - Part 1 и Part 2 he had read it before it was published. And he had no serious objections.
When I read it, it was not. And then:
"I didn't think you'd decide to print it!"
The specified articles are 2010. As well as my "response shot" to the "Hydraulic device response" - "Marine underwater weapon-2: arguments and facts"... However, they are still relevant (including to compare the situation “today and ten years ago”).
Remembering G.B. Tikhonov, one cannot but say that he was a participant in the work on the "Kursk". And it was he (signed "torpedo operator Ivanov") who gave the media information about the presence of traces of local high-temperature impact on the wreckage of the 65-76A practical torpedo. Conscience did not allow him to remain silent.
After talking with Obnosov and Krylov, I spoke with Gleb Borisovich:
- The Ichthyosaurus has problems ...!
- Of course, this is a complex technical system, which, despite significant positive statistics of successful application, did not pass the required volume of tests. Accordingly, there are flaws there. Simply because in these conditions they cannot but exist. By the way, it would be very useful to carry out comparative tests with "Kant". I even sketched their program and methodology. Everything is fair. Including with the closest possible to real and "hard" use of the AGPD.
- “Kant” and “Ichthyosaurus” cannot be simply compared with each other!
- Well, Gleb Borisovich, you yourself said everything ... Some are ready and eager for comparative shooting, while others are like hares, trying to avoid them.
- Of course, this is a complex technical system, which, despite significant positive statistics of successful application, did not pass the required volume of tests. Accordingly, there are flaws there. Simply because in these conditions they cannot but exist. By the way, it would be very useful to carry out comparative tests with "Kant". I even sketched their program and methodology. Everything is fair. Including with the closest possible to real and "hard" use of the AGPD.
- “Kant” and “Ichthyosaurus” cannot be simply compared with each other!
- Well, Gleb Borisovich, you yourself said everything ... Some are ready and eager for comparative shooting, while others are like hares, trying to avoid them.
Speaking about the deliberately insufficient statistics of tests (firing), it is worth recalling the words of an experienced naval torpedo operator, ex-head of the torpedo operation department of the Institute of Weapons of the Navy L.M. Bozina “The price of a torpedo crew. To ensure the combat capability of the Navy, the cost of testing and shooting is important ":
A serious drawback in the development of torpedoes in the USSR is the small volume of tests, as a result of which this type of weapon was produced with serious flaws.
The massive use of torpedoes during combat training was in fact a continuation of state tests.
In the first five to six years of the development of this weapon by the Navy, serious shortcomings are discovered and various modifications are made, including to achieve the technical characteristics declared during the development. There are many examples of this.
When the Americans were developing the Mk-48, they fired more than a thousand shots during the tests, thanks to which they discovered and eliminated all the shortcomings, and launched it into series.
Our analogue of this torpedo, USET-80, had just over a hundred test shots. Therefore, perhaps, despite the 15-year development period, he was born prematurely with six acute problems.
The massive use of torpedoes during combat training was in fact a continuation of state tests.
In the first five to six years of the development of this weapon by the Navy, serious shortcomings are discovered and various modifications are made, including to achieve the technical characteristics declared during the development. There are many examples of this.
When the Americans were developing the Mk-48, they fired more than a thousand shots during the tests, thanks to which they discovered and eliminated all the shortcomings, and launched it into series.
Our analogue of this torpedo, USET-80, had just over a hundred test shots. Therefore, perhaps, despite the 15-year development period, he was born prematurely with six acute problems.
In the case of "Ichthyosaurus" everything was even more complicated by intrigues, "setups" and not always fair competition.
In the statement of B.V. Obnosov sounded supposedly
"Superiority in detection range"
at our new torpedo. However, everything is much more complicated.
Speaking about the homing range, it is necessary to "clarify the terminology."
Firstly, specialists use the term "response radius" of the homing system (Rssn). And secondly, (and this is the main thing) today Rssn is not the defining tactical parameter of the CLS (in fact, this is a technical requirement for ensuring the detection of a given target under certain standard conditions), because its noise immunity (and the classification range ( Dl) goals).
From the article "Destroy the attacking torpedo":
The issue of introducing anti-torpedoes is especially important today, given the significant backlog of passive means of protection - hydroacoustic countermeasures (SGPD) - from the capabilities of modern torpedoes and their homing systems.
Taking into account the unconditional secrecy of these issues, it is advisable to outline only the fundamental points.
The noise immunity of the homing system of a torpedo is determined by three key parameters: noise immunity from barrage interference from powerful jammers or jammers according to the western classification; distance classification of real goals and simulators (decoy - according to the Western classification); the number of accompanied (analyzed) goals.
Before the advent of digital CCHs, the noise immunity of all CCHs of autonomous torpedoes was insufficient.
The timely use of even such ineffective means of PTZ, such as gas curtains and mechanical noise emitters, provided good evasion probabilities for the attacked submarine. Under these conditions, telecontrol became the main factor in ensuring the immunity of the salvo in the West. The surface ships of the US Navy and NATO, in the overwhelming majority did not have remote-controlled torpedoes, received a very large ammunition load of torpedoes and anti-submarine missiles to carry out multiple submarine attacks ...
Digital CLOs, which appeared in the 1990s, made it possible to significantly increase the protection of CLOs against obstacle interference, but this had little effect on the actual classification distances of targets.
In fact, at this stage of development, the response radii of heavy torpedo launchers reached 3–5 km, however, a set of classification features of a narrow-band SSV worked steadily at distances of less than 1 km.
Thus, a huge "window" was formed between the detection distance and the classification distance (about 25–30% of the detection distance), in which submarine simulators could be used very effectively. "
Taking into account the unconditional secrecy of these issues, it is advisable to outline only the fundamental points.
The noise immunity of the homing system of a torpedo is determined by three key parameters: noise immunity from barrage interference from powerful jammers or jammers according to the western classification; distance classification of real goals and simulators (decoy - according to the Western classification); the number of accompanied (analyzed) goals.
Before the advent of digital CCHs, the noise immunity of all CCHs of autonomous torpedoes was insufficient.
The timely use of even such ineffective means of PTZ, such as gas curtains and mechanical noise emitters, provided good evasion probabilities for the attacked submarine. Under these conditions, telecontrol became the main factor in ensuring the immunity of the salvo in the West. The surface ships of the US Navy and NATO, in the overwhelming majority did not have remote-controlled torpedoes, received a very large ammunition load of torpedoes and anti-submarine missiles to carry out multiple submarine attacks ...
Digital CLOs, which appeared in the 1990s, made it possible to significantly increase the protection of CLOs against obstacle interference, but this had little effect on the actual classification distances of targets.
In fact, at this stage of development, the response radii of heavy torpedo launchers reached 3–5 km, however, a set of classification features of a narrow-band SSV worked steadily at distances of less than 1 km.
Thus, a huge "window" was formed between the detection distance and the classification distance (about 25–30% of the detection distance), in which submarine simulators could be used very effectively. "
The transition on western torpedoes to broadband SSNs began in the early 2000s, for example, the report of the UDT-2001 conference (20 years ago):
“Specialists of BAE Systems and the Defense Research Directorate of the British Ministry of Defense carried out ... in relation to the Spearflsh torpedo:
- processing of a broadband signal (in active and passive modes);
- use of a more complex waveform envelope;
- the hidden mode of the active location;
- adaptive beamforming;
- classification using neural networks.
On tests it was revealed that using a wide band (about an octave) allows you to increase the efficiency of separating the useful signal against the background noise
A complex randomly filled signal envelope and a wide frequency bandwidth are used to detect targets using low-power radiation.
In this case, the radiation of the torpedo is not detected by the target.
- processing of a broadband signal (in active and passive modes);
- use of a more complex waveform envelope;
- the hidden mode of the active location;
- adaptive beamforming;
- classification using neural networks.
On tests it was revealed that using a wide band (about an octave) allows you to increase the efficiency of separating the useful signal against the background noise
A complex randomly filled signal envelope and a wide frequency bandwidth are used to detect targets using low-power radiation.
In this case, the radiation of the torpedo is not detected by the target.
However, the work on them did not go very well (because the broadband CCH "collects a shovel" to the running hindrance). But "this is not about us." For the topic of broadband CLOs requires a very large amount of complex R&D and expensive experimental work (the US Navy fired more than 3 shots only for testing version 48 of the Mk7 mod300 torpedo software. I emphasize, this is not for the entire modification, but only for revision of 3 software versions). And all serious research and development work on "torpedo heads" were "stabbed" in our country back in the late 2000s.
And here it is worth quoting “Our Pentagon Wars. The realities of our military R&D "
“The positive shifts in the system of arms and military equipment orders did not affect science, which in Soviet times played an important role in substantiating the necessary nomenclature of arms and military equipment and their performance characteristics (tactical and technical characteristics).
Military science has moved to the stage of loss of functionality. At least, this is what V. Burenok, President of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, claims.
We do not know exactly what our Armed Forces need and with what parameters.
Often, TTZ (tactical and technical assignment) for the creation of new samples contains requirements that are beyond the laws of physics and common sense.
Meanwhile, the "reforms" of the military-scientific complex (VNK) continue.
In the course of their implementation, military science became "like a patient who is continuously operated on, and he no longer thinks about productive life, his task is to recover from endless pain and simply survive."
Military science has moved to the stage of loss of functionality. At least, this is what V. Burenok, President of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, claims.
We do not know exactly what our Armed Forces need and with what parameters.
Often, TTZ (tactical and technical assignment) for the creation of new samples contains requirements that are beyond the laws of physics and common sense.
Meanwhile, the "reforms" of the military-scientific complex (VNK) continue.
In the course of their implementation, military science became "like a patient who is continuously operated on, and he no longer thinks about productive life, his task is to recover from endless pain and simply survive."
It should be emphasized that since the last generation of domestic SSNs ("Physicist", "Packet", "Ichthyosaur") has a very high noise immunity to barrage (which was just the "Achilles heel" of our previous torpedoes - SGPD (means of hydroacoustic counteraction) and all our torpedoes practically lost their combat effectiveness).
That is, TU is needed not just "for long-range torpedoes" (as we mistakenly believe). The main value of the TU is to ensure a very high (almost absolute) noise immunity of a torpedo salvo. For even a "blind" torpedo to the target (up to DKL) will be brought according to a powerful anti-jamming hydroacoustic complex (GAK) of the submarine.
Screen from the advertisement of the French complex PTZ SGPD, while high-frequency SGPD have no effect on the low-frequency GAK PL. That is, a torpedo with a TU can be confidently aimed at a target submarine according to the SAC.
The Ichthyosaurus has no telecontrol.
Absolutely not. For a number of reasons, including the simple reluctance of its chief designer to put TU on the Ichthyosaur.
Fleet and its TTZ (tactical and technical assignment) for the development of "Ichthyosaurus"?
If there is no TR in Ichthyosaur, then it was not in TTZ either.
Alas, they were in a hurry. They hoped that the Ichthyosaurus would go to the fleet “yesterday” (and therefore “as quickly as possible”).
TU?
And THAT "later" ...
Alas, the factor that TU is not an “additional problem” was not fully appreciated, but an effective solution to a large set of problems even at the development stage, which allows to have the entire data flow from the torpedo under test in “real time” right during testing.
I do not write "nothing new", and we already had it. At the first UGST "Tapir" in the early 80s of the last century. However, it turned out to be "firmly forgotten."
Good telecontrol could not only sharply increase the combat effectiveness of the Ichthyosaurus, its export attractiveness (an export heavy torpedo without a TU is nonsense). But also to significantly increase the capabilities of even a limited series of tests (and simplify improvements based on their results). And it was.
The head of this topic passed away a year and a half ago.
Yes, now we have begun to "stir" in terms of fiber-optic telecontrol.
However, this "stirring" is very sentimental. Requirements for the "new TU" were formed by some so-called "specialists" (only "by the grace of the payroll", because all the real torpedo work of these persons ended only in a tough and shameful fiasco). However, they turned out to be much lower than what had already been implemented (in the "lettered materiel"!) In the ROC "Shturval" fifteen years ago. But "for some reason" exactly coincided with the characteristics of the Western system twenty years ago.
The fact that our near-war science has long become a "corrupt girl" is far from news... But not to the same extent ...
Fourth. Arctic torpedo firing
Despite the fact that our "so-called partners" - "probable enemies" of the US and British navies are systematically preparing to destroy our submarines (including strategic missile carriers), including under the ice, with regular massive torpedo firing, our "valiant Navy" until now I have not been able to conduct even one such shooting.
I repeat - the Russian Navy does not have a single torpedo shot with the SSN turned on (just as the USSR Navy did not have them). The enemy has many, many hundreds of such shots.
Photo from the exercises ICEX-2018 of the US and UK Navy.
This problem has already been raised in articles in "NVO" "ICEX - Arctic Threat for Russia" и "Arctic torpedo scandal" which caused a great resonance.
Moreover, some bosses were "jerking" to carry them out. So far, experts have not explained how all this will end (with what we have today).
The only positive consequence was that Gidropribor finally remembered about the bathyspheric tests (with proposals to carry out them before shooting under the ice). From the article (2006) “Bathysphere Chronicles” by N.Kh. Boychenkova, Yu.N. Bukhalova, Ph.D. V.N. Shekhina:
2006 marked the 10th anniversary of the imperceptible withdrawal from the structure of the institute of the sector of bathyspheric sea trials.
And for almost 15 years the boxes have not been packed, and the tough guys from the bathysphere team do not go on business trips to the training grounds.
Perhaps, this is partly the reason for the difficulties experienced by the 165th department in the process of creating and working out new technology (CHN). Models - models, but the experiment has not been canceled.
And it should be borne in mind that obtaining experimental information, for example, about the characteristics of the hydroacoustic channel, the levels of reverberation, the expected range of the CCH, the reflecting ability of various objects when using bathyspheres, requires an order of magnitude lower costs compared to torpedo firing.
The potentialities of bathyspheric research have not been exhausted - they are enormous.
Of course, the current technical level strongly dictates the need to create a new, constructively revised, taking into account the accumulated experience and using modern systemic and technical solutions and information technologies, a device for stop acoustic underwater research - a third generation bathysphere.
Ideas for creating a 3rd generation bathysphere have already been formed at the institute.
And for almost 15 years the boxes have not been packed, and the tough guys from the bathysphere team do not go on business trips to the training grounds.
Perhaps, this is partly the reason for the difficulties experienced by the 165th department in the process of creating and working out new technology (CHN). Models - models, but the experiment has not been canceled.
And it should be borne in mind that obtaining experimental information, for example, about the characteristics of the hydroacoustic channel, the levels of reverberation, the expected range of the CCH, the reflecting ability of various objects when using bathyspheres, requires an order of magnitude lower costs compared to torpedo firing.
The potentialities of bathyspheric research have not been exhausted - they are enormous.
Of course, the current technical level strongly dictates the need to create a new, constructively revised, taking into account the accumulated experience and using modern systemic and technical solutions and information technologies, a device for stop acoustic underwater research - a third generation bathysphere.
Ideas for creating a 3rd generation bathysphere have already been formed at the institute.
There is another problem here.
Our very overweight electric torpedoes float on "inflatable cushions" after firing, which in ice conditions can lead to their damage on ice and to the sinking of the product.
Moreover, a number of "experts" (in quotation marks) justified the failure to conduct ice firing.
However, this "problem" (quoted) has a simple solution. After operation of the product, bring it by means of telecontrol to ice-free water (if necessary, shoot near the ice edge). There would be a desire.
In addition, this is another factor that torpedoes under the ice have extremely limited capabilities without telecontrol. (The main one is a huge number of "false trails" of reflection from ice, which is difficult for an autonomous SSN to deal with).
Fifth. Perspectives and conclusions
Are there any prospects for electric torpedoes?
With new batteries, of course.
When working on the OHR-2013 issues in 2030, the author proposed a number of research activities and special tests within the framework of the conditional "small leap" (with the opening and elimination of the most acute problems of our torpedoes) and "big leap" (with the creation of the necessary scientific and technical groundwork for the development of really "breakthrough" samples of naval underwater weapons (MPS)).
Within the framework of these events, it was proposed to solve the problems of the optimal energy of promising torpedoes and their caliber (because the "optimality" of the 53 cm caliber raises great doubts among many experts). It was especially emphasized that advanced research on weapons must necessarily anticipate the corresponding work on delivery vehicles.
How it happened in the end, everyone could see in the photo from the Navy event in Sevastopol a year ago, when the "promising" (in quotes) nuclear submarine of the 5th generation, according to the results of the research work "Malachite" ended up with the ancient torpedoes USET-80 and "Physicist-1 ".
From a draft of materials by the author of ОНР-2030.
For reference. Link and quote:
The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation carried out a set of measures to substantiate the prospective appearance of the RF Armed Forces and their weapons system as part of the development of the main directions for the development of AME for the period until 2030 (ONR-2030).
It should be noted that this is a document of long-term (15-year period) planning for the development of AME, defining possible directions for the development of AME in the interests of solving the tasks of the RF Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies, the predicted technical level of samples (complexes, systems), cost and time assessing their creation, as well as directions for conducting research in the interests of solving the most important scientific and technical problems in the development of AME.
On the basis of ОНР-2030, proposals are being developed for setting new and clarifying ongoing research and development projects that go beyond the timeframe of the state armament program, and decisions are made on problems arising in the course of research and development work in various areas and subject areas of AME development, including development basic and critical military technologies.
It should be noted that this is a document of long-term (15-year period) planning for the development of AME, defining possible directions for the development of AME in the interests of solving the tasks of the RF Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies, the predicted technical level of samples (complexes, systems), cost and time assessing their creation, as well as directions for conducting research in the interests of solving the most important scientific and technical problems in the development of AME.
On the basis of ОНР-2030, proposals are being developed for setting new and clarifying ongoing research and development projects that go beyond the timeframe of the state armament program, and decisions are made on problems arising in the course of research and development work in various areas and subject areas of AME development, including development basic and critical military technologies.
I would like to emphasize that what the author put into the proposed version of OHR-2030 on IGO was not the author's "private opinion". This was a reflection of the opinions and suggestions of many specialists (including Gidropribor).
Especially for this, the author deliberately moved away from the emphasis on "closed numbers" (in order to do without the classification of this document), with an emphasis on the principles of development and the issues under study.
We have exits from the "torpedo pit".
And our problems have not technical, but purely organizational reasons.
One of the consequences of this is that many professionals have their mouths gagged. And the management receives "cheap reports" (not related to reality).
The real reason for the lie told by B.V. Obnosov is
"Cheap reports of chiefs".
In terms of the prospects and capabilities of electric torpedoes, I will give only one example of extremely interesting and promising proposals from specialists:
Accordingly, question number 1 now is for high-ranking leaders to hear real specialists, and not "cheap managers" (those from the category
"They lied, they lie and will lie - otherwise they will not know how").
Question No. 2 - the critical need for a wide scope of research (including on new batteries of different types) and special research and shooting.
There is simply nowhere to go further without it.
From the article "Our" Pentagon Wars "-2. Development chaos ":
And one more very important point.
Despite all these difficulties, we have real successes and achievements in the creation of weapons and military equipment. And they need to be appreciated and respected.
This is not just work at the computer or at the machine until the end of the working day (and there is "the sea to the castle"). These are constant nerves, “breaking walls”, “running with obstacles” - to do the impossible, and “even yesterday”. Because "the document is under control," but they just sent it, and so on.
And those who make (and participate in this work, including on the part of the customer) really worthy domestic weapons (and not "golden guns on the wall") deserve every respect from society.
Despite all these difficulties, we have real successes and achievements in the creation of weapons and military equipment. And they need to be appreciated and respected.
This is not just work at the computer or at the machine until the end of the working day (and there is "the sea to the castle"). These are constant nerves, “breaking walls”, “running with obstacles” - to do the impossible, and “even yesterday”. Because "the document is under control," but they just sent it, and so on.
And those who make (and participate in this work, including on the part of the customer) really worthy domestic weapons (and not "golden guns on the wall") deserve every respect from society.
Speaking about the new torpedo (UET-1 "Ichthyosaur"), it should be emphasized that, on the one hand, this is a serious step forward, on the other, there are a number of serious shortcomings and shortcomings (first of all, the absence of technical specifications).
However (given the extremely limited funding and tough opposition to this development) the result is simply exceptional.
This is really a feat.
And those who have done this are certainly worthy of state awards and prizes.
For our naval underwater weapons, the Ichthyosaurus, in general, has unprecedentedly successful test statistics.
However, the existing shortcomings must be eliminated as soon as possible.
OCD is gone.
And now you have to eliminate everything already in the series.
Information