With the clarity of a clockwork. Supply of German troops at the beginning of the war

Railway station Brest-Litovsk, 1939 Content source: https://naukatehnika.com

I considered this topic for a long time, back in the book "Fiasco 1941. Cowardice or treason?", Published in 2015. The book was generally devoted to the polemic with Mark Solonin (and I managed to catch him on the direct falsification of the memoirs of Lieutenant General IV Boldin; pp. 301-306, who is interested). But there I tried to make out a number of points related to the preparation of an attack on the USSR, in particular, rail transportation for the supply of German troops stationed on the Soviet-German border, as well as how much Soviet intelligence knew all this. It turned out that Soviet border intelligence had collected enough information that clearly indicated that an attack was being prepared. In the German literature, some information was found about rail transport in Poland during the preparation for the attack, from the end of 1940 to June 1941. But on the whole, the data were scarce and lackluster. I always wanted to look at the process from the inside: how it was organized and how it happened.

Dreams come true, and I managed to find a file on the transportation and accumulation of military supplies (ammunition, fuel and food) by Army Group B from December 1940 to the end of May 1941.

Well what can I say? All this was arranged with the precision of a clockwork. Now, if on what example and see the importance of a well-organized rear for the German army, then on this.

How was it in its most general form?

In general, the process of transportation and stockpiling proceeded as follows. OKH first, in mid-December 1940, requested data on the storage capacity at the disposal of three armies that were part of Army Group B: 4th, 17th and 18th. After receiving information about the capacity of the warehouses and the amount of goods already delivered, a plan was drawn up on how much more ammunition, fuel and food should be delivered. The plan was expanded across the armies, according to the supply districts created on their territories, up to a specific warehouse, designated by a code name.

The necessary goods were in military warehouses in Germany. OKH was planning their loading and transportation to Poland. An exact train schedule was sent to the headquarters of the army command from the OKH, indicating the nature of the goods and the destination.

The command of the armies accepted the cargo, placed them in warehouses with the help of their rear units, and then reported to the OKH on the number of accepted supplies and the fulfillment of the unloading plan. Such reports were compiled on average once every two weeks. The first report was drawn up at the end of January 1941, and the last one, available in the case, at the very end of April 1941. Staff correspondence quite well reflects the entire large amount of work that was done to accumulate reserves necessary for the military campaign against the USSR.

In the future, links will be provided on the following case - TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12454, d. 98. To illustrate this process, I will give a few examples, as well as general statistics of stock accumulation. This is important for understanding the further course of events.

Start of transport operation

So, on December 12, 1940, the command of Army Group "B" demanded from the armies (at that time: 4th, 12th and 18th) to send by January 1, 1941, data on available stocks and storage capacity with their designation on the map (l. 4). While this issue was being resolved, the 12th Army was allocated for the Balkans, and in its place on December 20, 1940, the 17th Army was formed.

There are no maps in the file, but there are accompanying notes. On December 29, 1940, 4th Army sent a detailed report on the state of the warehouses to Army Group B and the Quartermaster General of the General Staff. The warehouses in the border area were designated by code names, for example, an ammunition depot 10 km northwest of Biala Podlaska was designated Martha. Warehouses in the deep rear were not designated by code names.

The 4th Army had 10 ammunition depots with a total capacity of 110 thousand tons, of which 7 warehouses for 40 thousand tons were located near the border; 8 fuel depots with a total capacity of 48 thousand cubic meters, of which 6 warehouses for 35 thousand cubic meters were near the border; 12 food warehouses with a total capacity of 51 thousand tons, of which 5 warehouses for 18,5 thousand tons were near the border (pp. 7-9).

An interesting picture. 36% of ammunition, 72,9% of fuel and 36% of food were moved to the border and distributed among warehouses with a capacity of 2 to 6 thousand tons each.

Also, the 4th Army reported that as of January 6, 1941, they had 9 thousand people in 205 divisions in the ranks, there were 52 thousand horses. And the current state of stocks (l. 10):

The file contains a document with a general overview of the state of stocks for the entire army group, but without a cover letter. Apparently, the case was drawn up at the headquarters of the army group as a kind of reference book, and the documents were selected there on purpose (there is a German inventory of the contents, and the documents themselves are arranged thematically and sequentially).

This document contains the most important information - coefficients. Ammunition (Ausstattung: A.) - 600 tons, refueling for the division (Betriebstoffsverbrauchsatz; VS) - 30 cubic meters, daily supply (Tagessatz; TS) - 1,5 kg per person. In principle, there is no particular need for us in this, since in further documents all figures are given in weight or in volume for fuel. However, it may be useful for other researchers working with German military documents.

Now the general table of the situation at the beginning of January 1941 (l. 15, l. 17):

On December 18, 1940, the command of Army Group B received an order from the OKH that it was necessary to complete the unloading and placement of all planned cargo by May 1, 1941; the goods should be delivered to the final warehouses as soon as possible or, in any case, without the involvement of railways in intermediate transport. From 20 February 1941, each army will receive 8 trains per day with supplies, which must be unloaded immediately.

In the same order, the OKH reported that in January 1941 it was planned to send 76 trains to the 12th Army, 85 trains to the 4th Army and 74 trains to the 18th Army. A total of 235 trains, including 128 ammunition trains, 30 fuel trains and 77 food trains.

The armies were instructed, starting from January 15, 1941, to report on the 1st and 15th day of each month on the state of unloading (l. 18-20). A sample of such a report was even attached to the order so that the staff officers would do everything in the same way.

German order

From the very first report it is clear that the warehouse network in January 1941 was not yet fully built. For example, for the 4th army out of 10 warehouses - 4 warehouses were under construction, 3 warehouses were in the design stage, and there were 3 warehouses with a total capacity of 13,5 thousand tons, which were filled (p. 27). The process of building warehouses was only slightly ahead of the process of delivering and unloading supplies, and this was reflected in the documents. By the end of January 1941, all the warehouses had already been built and began to fill up (sheet 69).

One of the reports on unloading and delivery to warehouses

The territory of Army Group B was divided into three supply districts, which at the end of January 1941 were renamed North, Center and South districts (previously called A, B, C) and the distribution of warehouses between these districts. The file preserved the distribution of ammunition depots between supply districts (pp. 66-67).

The transportation itself was organized with maximum clarity, and here the whole German order manifested itself in full. For example, on January 4, 15, an order was sent from OKH to the 1941th Army with a timetable for trains with ammunition.

This timetable indicated the serial number of the train with ammunition (obviously, according to the list of the Quartermaster General), the train number according to the schedule of the German railways, the place of departure, the number of wagons and the nature of the cargo, as well as the date when the train was ready for departure. For example, at 18 o'clock on January 29, 1941 in Darmstadt, train No. 528573 was ready for departure, in which there were 30 cars with shells for the 105-mm light howitzer lFH18. Or, on February 11, 1941 in Zenne (north of Paderborn, Nordrein-Westphalia) train No. 533203 was ready for departure, in which there were 30 cars, including 9 cars with 7,92-mm rifle cartridges, 10 cars with hand grenades, 9 cars with jumping anti-personnel mines and 2 cars with anti-tank mines (l. 35).

And so on for each train separately. Such schedules were drawn up for each army and sent to the army command in advance. If you adhere to the procedure for loading and preparing for the departure of trains, it becomes very convenient to receive them and quickly unload them, as well as place ammunition in accordance with the nomenclature and purpose. In subsequent timetables, which were drawn up in March-April 1941, when the railways were switched to maximum traffic, they also began to indicate the destination of the train and the name of the supply district to which it was sent.

Sample timetable for the dispatch of trains with ammunition for March 1941

They brought almost everything

This work required great care and organization, but the result is obvious. The whole picture is easier to display in a summary table (ammunition and food - in tons; fuel - in cubic meters):

The table shows the original plan (*), while the plans for the delivery of goods were repeatedly revised and increased, as well as the final plan indicated in the last reporting document (**). There is no data on the 17th Army for the end of April 1941 in the file.

In addition, there is a report on the 4th Army for May 15, 1941, which says that there were 56125 tons of ammunition, 51833 cubic meters of fuel and 50450 tons of food (pp. 242-244). That is, the plans for the delivery and placement of supply cargoes, significantly increased in January-March 1941, were almost completely fulfilled by mid-May 1941.

For example, the 17th Army, which became part of Army Group South and was advancing in Ukraine, already in mid-April 1941 had 6,2 bq of ammunition, 79,6 refueling, 97,3 days of food supplies. The 4th Army from Army Group Center, advancing on Minsk and Smolensk, in May 1941 had 10,3 bq of ammunition, 191,9 fuel fillings and 164 days of food supplies. The army was very well supplied, and its reserves significantly exceeded the original plans. Probably, the warehouses of this army were also intended as a supply reserve for the entire Army Group Center. Some of the warehouses, about half, were moved to the border and were located at a distance of about 20-30 km from it.

In the Western Special Military District on the eve of the war, 24 infantry, 12 tank, 6 motorized and 2 cavalry divisions (44 divisions in total) had 6700 wagons or 107,2 thousand tons of ammunition, 80 thousand tons or 100 thousand cubic meters of fuel, 80 thousand tons of food and fodder. Average per division: 2436 tons of ammunition, 1818 cubic meters of fuel and 1818 tons of food fodder. For comparison: on average, a division from the 4th German army had 5102 tons of ammunition, 4712 cubic meters of fuel and 4586 tons of food. The German divisions had more than double the supply. In addition, by June 29, 1941, the Western Front had lost 30% of its ammunition stocks and 50% each of its fuel and foodstuffs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the battle in Belarus ended in defeat and retreat for the Western Front.

Comments

[Lech from Android.]

Such documents are very valuable for intelligence agencies around the world, their analysis reveals the intentions and capabilities of the enemy with all the evidence.
Were they on Stalin's desk and in the General Staff of the Red Army before June 22, 1941?
Thank you Dmitry for publishing the documents .

[Far B]

Were they on Stalin's desk and in the General Staff of the Red Army before June 22, 1941?

Most likely they were. Just what did it change? Both Stalin and the General Staff knew for sure that there would be war. So they were well aware of the "intentions and capabilities of the enemy". But it is still impossible to name the exact date of the attack on the basis of these documents. Hitler himself changed this date several times, and the intelligence offered such a choice of options that you can go crazy. Or was it necessary from May 15 to give an order to bring the troops into increased combat? Well, it’s unrealistic - no one will last that long "on the Fox". Try, for example, to accept the peaceful start mode and stand for at least an hour, waiting for the starting shot? Yes, in five minutes it will really become unbearable for you.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Dalny V

Most likely they were. Just what did it change? Both Stalin and the General Staff knew for sure that there would be war. So they were well aware of the "intentions and capabilities of the enemy". But it is still impossible to name the exact date of the attack on the basis of these documents.

1. He certainly did not have this data. But the massive transfer of everything and everyone to the border was clearly recorded, which was even declared publicly in the TASS Statement of June 13.

2. Isn't the above an unconditional reason to immediately bring the troops into combat readiness? Of course is

Quote: Dalny V

Was it necessary from May 15 to give an order to bring the troops into increased combat? Well, it’s unrealistic - no one will last that long "on the Fox".

They lasted not even a month, but 1418 days and not in readiness, but in a state of war ..

[Far B]

They lasted not even a month, but 1418 days and not in readiness, but in a state of war

Don't confuse action with expectation of action. It is unrealistic to maintain high concentration in standby mode for a long time.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Dalny V

It is unrealistic to maintain high concentration in standby mode for a long time.

And when it was necessary to bring the troops to readiness, if not when the enemy was concentrated opposite? WHAT else to wait?
When will all reports for one day indicate?

[Far B]

And when it was necessary to bring the troops to readiness

The feeling that you generally have little idea of ​​what it is about. What readiness should the troops be brought to? Increased? The degree of military danger? Full? A directive on putting the formations of the western military districts on alert to repel a German strike was sent out on 18 June. Quite on time. Directive enforcement is another matter. And to declare full combat readiness from May 15 - this, excuse me, only an inflamed brain can think of.

[sd000016]

Maybe it was necessary at least to equip the troops already on the border according to wartime states, but in 3 days (from June 18) it was already too late to do this, but if we started from May 15, we probably would have had time.

[boris epstein]

"To recruit troops already at the border according to wartime states ..."
The directive of June 18 did not set such a goal. The goal was to transfer aviation to alternate airfields, withdraw ground forces to reserve areas, and apply camouflage measures.
And they began to staff the army a year before June 22. But they didn't have time, it's not so easy all this. Many of the new corps and armies had only headquarters. The transition to new staffs of mechanized corps began. The army began to re-equip with new types of aircraft, guns, and tanks. But with a sharp increase in the number of the Red Army, there was a shortage of command personnel, mainly of the lower and middle levels. Read & Halder's "War Diary". He clearly writes that the Red Army was in an intermediate grouping.

[sd000016]

Now it became obvious (historian Aleksey Isaev, see speeches on the Internet) that the USSR army in the form in which it existed in June 22.06.1941, XNUMX could equally withstand Germany, the only question was what damage it could inflict on the advancing enemy. Analyzing the situation in hindsight, one can find that there were options for causing more damage and a greater delay in the German offensive, in particular, due to a more correct organization of work before the war itself. In particular, it was decided to improve the airfields of the border strip by building hard-surface runways and work began, roughly speaking, at all free airfields at once, so that on the one hand there was simply nowhere to relocate aircraft from the attacked airfields, and on the other, none of the modernized airfields were not ready.

[boris epstein]

I watch Isaev constantly. He, too, is not completely honest and fair. All the events of 1941 (before the counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow) and the summer-autumn of 1942 (retreat to Stalingrad) are considered to the smallest detail and sharply critical. I am not against criticism, but there is a sense of proportion. But victorious battles for the Red Army are viewed ONLY in close-up.
"In particular, it was decided to improve the airfields of the border strip by building hard-surface runways, and the work has begun,"
Please note that ALL the border strip is land returned in 1939. On these lands, Poland did NOT build railways, highways, communication and power lines, industrial enterprises and services. The USSR began to build all this after the end of the liberation campaign. In addition, it was necessary to build fortifications on the border.
"It has now become obvious (historian Alexei Isaev, see speeches on the Internet) that the USSR army in the form in which it existed in June 22.06.1941, XNUMX could equally withstand Germany,"
I could. And there is confirmation of this. Isaev ignored the first liberated city of the USSR: Przemysl, and this happened, you will not believe, on June 23 (twenty-third), 1941. The city was liberated by a consolidated group under the command of a senior lieutenant of the NKVD (translated into the army rank of lieutenant colonel) Palivoda. Further south, the landing of the Dniester flotilla captured a bridgehead on the Romanian coast and held it for 10 days, until the order to withdraw. Soviet long-range aviation bombed the oil fields in Ploiesti. And in the North, the Germans were never able to cross the border on the Rybachy Peninsula. The garrison of the Brest Fortress fought for a month. And read Halder's "War Diary". He writes that "... the Russians showed steadfastness and GREAT training of the infantry in the Brest Fortress." Polotsk line. Troops held the defense until the order to retreat. If GK Zhukov had not been pulled out from under Rovno, he would have stopped Kleist. But he was pulled out to Belarus, where DG Pavlov failed in full.
And now they are shedding tears over him, he was rehabilitated ... But GK Zhukov back in February 1941 during a command-staff game showed Pavlov how the Wehrmacht would beat him Events after June 22 in Belarus coincided by 90% with Zhukov's actions who played for the blue.
At the end of a week of fighting, the same Halder concluded that the war against the USSR was fundamentally different from the war in the West and that the Wehrmacht's losses were much higher than planned.
Even in the conditions of an undeclared war, the Red Army did its best: it slowed down the Wehrmacht, covered up the evacuation of the industry, inflicted significant losses on it. Now ask yourself: in how many days was Poland defeated? On September 17, 1939, the entire command and leadership of Poland fled through Romania to London. How much were the combined French, Belgian and British troops defeated in 1940? For 40 (forty) days. And the same Wehrmacht approached Moscow only at the end of October-at the beginning of November 1941.

[sd000016]

The Red Army had nothing to oppose to the German tank groups. Where they were not there (in the north) or where there were few of them (in the south), there we can talk about the possibility of more or less equivalent opposition. However, it cannot be denied that the equipment, training, professional qualifications and military experience of the Wehrmacht significantly exceeded the indicated indicators of the Red Army. In addition, the Germans had a constant numerical advantage, meeting in turns with scattered echelons of Soviet troops in the border battle. The individual successes that you mentioned do not change the overall picture. Moreover, in the border battle, the most prepared part of the Red Army troops was lost. All this suggests that at least in 1941 the Red Army was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht in almost all respects. Of course, it is impossible to deny the simply heroic resistance of the Red Army shown to the Germans in the initial period of the war. It was this that ultimately, together with the mistakes made by the Germans, led to the disruption of the blitzkrieg and the defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow. However, in hindsight, it is clear that heroic resistance alone would not have been enough. If the Germans, at least at the end of November 1941, went over to the defense near Moscow, instead of continuing the offensive, then the Red Army would not have had enough forces and military resources available at that time to overcome the German defense.
Well, the fact that even with "himself" A, V. Isaev, one cannot agree on everything, is a fact. For example, Isaev will never convince me that Stalin was a genius commander, no matter how hard he tried. His arguments on this score are not at all convincing.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Dalny V

Feelingthat you generally have little idea what it is about. How ready should the troops be brought up? Increased? The degree of military danger? Full?

"
"When you say, Ivan Vasilievich, it seems that you are br, yes." (C)

Readiness to the extent of Directive 1.

you never bothered to answer a simple question

:A when it was necessary to bring the troops to readiness, if not when the enemy was concentrated opposite? WHAT still wait?

You can not? And why are you shaking the air?

Quote: Dalny V

The directive on bringing the formations of the western military districts on alert to repel a German strike was posted on June 18... Quite on time. Directive enforcement is another matter.

It is impossible to fulfill what did not exist in nature.
Or give the number in, out, screen of the original. Again ... can't you?

Quote: Dalny V

And to declare full combat readiness from May 15 - this, excuse me, only an inflamed brain can think of.

In an inflamed brain, it means staying in a sky-ready state with the fighting Europe's strongest army on the contrary and suffer inconceivable losses because of this.
To avoid this:

: Border bridges across the Bug and other rivers have been captured by our troops everywhere without a fight and in complete safety. The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were captured unawares in the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulins, and the forward units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do.
German offensive caught the enemy by surprise. The enemy's battle formations were not tactically adapted for defense; His troops in the border zone were scattered over a vast territory and tied to the areas of their quartering. The protection of the border itself was generally weak.

Tactical surprise led to the fact that enemy resistance in the border zone was weak and disorganized, as a result of which we everywhere easily managed to capture bridges over water obstacles and break through the border strip of fortifications to the full depth
Halder)

not worth it to alert at least after June 13 (TASS statements)?
WHAT did you save, "save", save, eh?

[Far B]

So you never bothered to answer a simple question

Questions need to be formulated normally. Learn - come, boor.

Or give the number in, out, screen of the original. Again ... can't you?

Eat, do not crap:

I transmit the order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense for immediate execution:
1. During the period of June 22-23, 1941, a sudden German attack is possible on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO. An attack can begin with provocative actions.
2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
Simultaneously to the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa military districts be on full alert, to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies.
I ORDER:
a) during the night on 22 June 1941, secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
b) before dawn on 22 June 1941, disperse all aircraft, including military, across field airfields, carefully disguise it;
c) bring all parts to combat readiness. Troops to keep dispersed and disguised;
d) to bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional lifting the subscription. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
e) do not carry out any other events without special order.
Tymoshenko Zhukov
Pavlov Fominykh
Klimovsky
CA MO RF. Form 208. Op. 2513. D.71. L.69. Typescript. There are marks: “Received on June 22, 1941 at 01-45”, “Sent on June 22, 1941 at 02-25 - 02-35”. Original, autograph

In an inflamed brain is to remain in a sky-ready state

The troops were at least in a state of constant combat readiness. Take the trouble to find out what it is.
In the above quote, what direction did Halder have in mind? Or do you, as always, snatch out the particular and pass it off as general? Well, it’s customary for you not to see the forest for the trees.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Dalny V

Questions need to be formulated normally. Learn - come, boor.

WHAT do you not understand in a simple question? Repeat .... third time?

Quote: Dalny V

Eat, do not crap:
I transmit the order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense for immediate execution:
1. During June 22 - 23, 1941

You are screwed up, as usual: this Directive onJune 22 41 g, and you referred to the Directive 18 June.

So where is she, huh?

Quote: Dalny V

The troops were at least in a state of constant combat readiness. Take the trouble to find out what it is.
In the above quote, what direction did Halder have in mind? Or do you, as always, snatch out the particular and pass it off as general? Well, it’s customary for you not to see the forest for the trees.

Halder writes about the weight of the front: about the West, South, SW, NE: ALL bridges are captured, EVERYWHERE crossed and deepened.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

In an inflamed brain, it means staying in a sky-ready state with the fighting Europe's strongest army on the contrary and suffer inconceivable losses because of this.

That is, the Red Army had to remain mobilized from September 01, 1939?
The main problem with mobilization was that, according to intelligence, the enemy, even in June 1941, did not have enough forces in the border area to attack the USSR. The schedule for the transfer of German forces played a role here (the bulk fell on the month of June), and the overestimation of the number of formations in the Wehrmacht by intelligence, and, as a result, the overestimated "alarm threshold" (120-140 divisions out of 200 and 120-140 divisions out of 300 are two fundamentally different situations).
And the "dark cloud of Hitlerites, which is about to sweep across the border" constantly mentioned in the generals' memoirs, is, excuse me, a traditional memoir attempt "to wave fists after a fight." Who among the pilots, when flying around the border, managed to see enemy tank formations, which in real life were located 80-100 kilometers from the border?

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

Oh, is the Red Army needed to remain mobilized from September 01, 1939?

Ideally, yes: a strong, mobilized army was rapidly moving towards our borders.
See, for example, WWI, where it was not an attack, but simply mobilization that caused the war.

Quote: Alexey RA

The main problem with mobilization was that, according to intelligence, the enemy, even in June 1941, did not have sufficient forces in the border area to attack the USSR. The schedule for the transfer of German forces played a role here (the main part fell on the month of June)

We talked about combat readiness.

And yes, see. The TASS statement, where about the transfer of German troops to the borders of the USSR, is predictably clear and clear.

And what has been done in response? Incommensurably little, compared to the threat: naively, for some reason, they hoped to "delay" the start of the war.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Olgovich

See, for example, WWI, where it was not an attack, but simply mobilization that caused the war.

which is absolutely reasonable - mobilization is war ...
it is necessary to judge the potentials, not the intentions ...

[Olgovich]

Quote: DrEng527

which is absolutely reasonable - mobilization is war ...
...

In no way: for example, no one declared war on Aegria in response to its mobilizations in 1912 and 1914

[DrEng527]

Quote: Olgovich

In no way:

argue with: BMSh?

[deddem]

Quote: Olgovich

Quote: Alexey RA

Oh, is the Red Army needed to remain mobilized from September 01, 1939?

Ideally, yes: a strong, mobilized army was rapidly moving towards our borders.

And they would get their own version of the Strange War.
Closer, rather, to the Belgian: since September 39 the Franco-British had at least low-intensity combat operations, but the Belgians, mobilized in September and remaining neutral, passed the peak of combat readiness in December and then rolled downhill: recalling soldiers to industry and to sowing, the launch of the rotation of officers on leave, a general increase in fatigue and indifference.
The result is absolutely the same as that of the conditionally belligerent Franco-English in May 40 and here in June 41: the unparalleled heroism of the individual against the background of a general titanic mess and inertia.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

Ideally, yes: a strong, mobilized army was rapidly moving towards our borders.

We now know that. And then intelligence reported that forces were slowly being drawn to our borders, but their number is still less than 50% of the known number army of the Reich. And also intelligence stubbornly hammered the Center with reports that until the end of the war with Britain, Hitler would not go to the East, and that before the start of the war with us the Germans would put forward claims through diplomatic channels.
Therefore, it was not mobilization that followed, but the statement of TASS - "and what is actually happening?".

[DrEng527]

Quote: Alexey RA

and that before the start of the war with us, the Germans would make claims through diplomatic channels.

Norway, Denmark nominated? In Poland, claims at 20 pm, such as an attack on a radio station, at 4,30 already hit ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DrEng527

In Poland, claims at 20 pm, such as an attack on a radio station, at 4,30 already hit ...

Really? And how about six months of diplomatic butting for the Danzig corridor?

On March 21, Germany demanded that Lithuania hand over the Klaipeda (Memel) region to it. All Kaunas' hopes for the support of England, France and Poland were in vain. Poland was not going to worsen relations with Germany, although she would not mind moving her borders westward in the future, and England was concerned about rumors of an imminent German strike on Poland and a possible German-Polish rapprochement. As a result, on March 23, German troops entered Klaipeda (Memel).
At the same time, on March 21, Germany again proposed to Poland to resolve the interrogation on the transfer of Danzig and on the “Polish corridor” in exchange for joining the Anti-Comintern Pact with the prospect of anti-Soviet actions.

And after these offers you cannot refuse, the Poles began a hidden mobilization.

The hidden mobilization deployment of the Polish forces, which began on March 23, 1939, affected 4 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry brigade, formations in several districts were strengthened, and the directorates of four armies and one operational group were created. These events were based on the mobilization plan “W” of April 1938, which provided for secret mobilization in peacetime. On August 13-18, a mobilization of another 9 units was announced, and from August 23 a covert mobilization of the main forces began.

© Meltyuhov

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

We now know that. And then intelligence reported that forces were slowly being drawn to our borders, but their number so far is less than 50% of the known size of the Reich army. And also intelligence stubbornly hammered the Center with reports that until the end of the war with Britain, Hitler would not go to the East, and that before the start of the war with us the Germans would put forward claims through diplomatic channels.
Therefore, it was not mobilization that followed, but the statement of TASS - "and what, in fact, is going on?"

Yes, they always knew: if a huge army goes to your border, it's not for tea to visit. And it doesn't matter, that country is at war elsewhere.

Sometimes such invasions could stop retaliatory mobilizations, but never a demonstrative peacefulness

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

Yes, they always knew: if a huge army goes to your border, it's not for tea to visit. And it doesn't matter, that country is at war elsewhere.

And there was no huge army there, according to intelligence reports. According to these reports, the Germans were deploying a grouping that, as a first approximation, corresponded to the "border protection forces" in the event that the Germans carried out DESO to the British Isles.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

And there was no huge army there, according to intelligence reports. According to these reports, the Germans were deploying a grouping that, as a first approximation, corresponded to the "border protection forces" in the event that the Germans carried out DESO to the British Isles.

1. You were talking about September 1, 1939. And then a huge army went to the East.

2. "Cover"?

General Tupikov's report, March 1941: "The grouping of the German army since the fall of 1940 invariably moves east... Now in the east - East Prussia, Poland, Romania - up to 118-120 divisions ", “The qualitative state of the armed forces on the basis of political and moral, training and equipment now is at its zenith... »

General Golikov, May: “the regrouping of German troops in the first half of May is characterized by

the continuing strengthening of the grouping against the USSR along the entire western and southwestern border, including Romania

(spitting at his conclusions is not his business.)

Yeah, "cover" - compare with June 22, 41

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

And what has been done in response? Incommensurably little, compared to the threat: naively, for some reason, they hoped to "delay" the start of the war.

Take it easy. Even if in three weeks the result was announced approximately the same as it was in real life.

The war was already on. There was a second operational echelon, a second strategic one. So what.
The reason is not the directive, but something else. Well, we lost the border battles (out of surprise), and then what. A bunch of weapons and troops. Well turn on your brains.

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

A bunch of weapons and troops.

2,5 months before September, they lost a career army in the West with all weapons ... If they at least gave the Germans 1: 3 losses, the Germans would not have reached Moscow ...

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

2,5 months before September, they lost a career army in the West with all weapons

Reason for failure- correct conclusion about Germany's unpreparedness for war with the USSR in 1941. We took a number of decisions of a reorganization nature. which sharply weakened the combat capability of the formations (primarily armored vehicles), taking into account that there will be no war. And by 1942, these measures (and not yet in full) would have given a greater effect (well, with the exception of the formation of 30 MKs, this is a mistake). And when they understood. that something is ripening (by May), it was already too late (they tried not to provoke, to hold out until August). Did not work out.

The Fuhrer's adventurism was not taken into account. And the Germans caught us at the moment of "dressing".

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

And by 1942, these measures (and not yet in full) would have given a greater effect

if not a secret - who promised that the Germans would not attack?

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

who promised that the Germans would not attack?

They promise to marry.

And the competent authorities, taking into account the information received, do ---

Quote: chenia

correct conclusion about Germany's unpreparedness for war with the USSR

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

And the competent authorities, taking into account the information received, do ---

and end up in a puddle and bloody ...

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

and find themselves in a bloody puddle ...

Yes, it happens!
But!
Subtotal Battle of Moscow
And the final one is the burning Reichstag.
Hence the conclusion - the Germans, after all, in 1941 were not ready for a war with the USSR. (which is in line with the original conclusion)

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

But!

by December 1, the Red Army lost 3,5 million irrecoverable, the Wehrmacht 200t

Quote: chenia

And the final one is the burning Reichstag.

this is good, but the loss of 27 million does not bother? Can you finally name who allowed it?

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

Can you finally name who allowed it?

I can not.
The highest generals of the Red Army, more specifically Timoshenko (formerly Voroshilov), Meretskov and Zhukov.
Stalin satisfied all their "wishes", severely straining the entire industry.
But their caste egoism is insatiable. Creation of 30 MK - etozh how many general positions, etozh how your importance increases. Therefore, they demanded everything and more, created formations with an untested structure (and replicated them).
There would have been a time, having polished, received the strongest army - unambiguously. Our military theory, if not superior to the German one, was not inferior (but it was in dialectical development, that by the middle of the war operational art and operational-tactical techniques surpassed the German ones, it was tactically that they always surpassed us).

As an excuse, I say, they thought they would slip through.
We didn’t slip by.

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

As an excuse, I say, they thought they would slip through.

it's not an excuse - it's an accusation ...

Quote: chenia

But their caste egoism is insatiable.

Yes, what a caste they are - illiterate punishers who climbed the GV ..

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

it's not an excuse - it's an accusation.

I already said, the German in 1941 was not ready for war with the USSR. And this is reality.

Quote: DrEng527

what a caste they are - illiterate punishers who rose to

at PMV

You mean the British and the French - it is accepted.

And our military leaders in the middle of the war in operational and operational-tactical terms outplayed the German. Nemchura finished the war with better training at the tactical level (from the regiment and below).

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

I already said, the German in 1941 was not ready for a war with the USSR.

But he reached Moscow and Stalingrad ... Be Hitler a little smarter in politics in the occupied territories ...

Quote: chenia

And our military leaders in the middle of the war in operational and operational-tactical terms outplayed the German

always having a significant numerical superiority, and the last year and 2 fronts ...

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

But he reached Moscow and Stalingrad ...

Yes, it happens. The measures carried out in the future would have given a greater effect (1942-1943), but in 1941 there was a personnel confusion, a breakdown of the BP.

Before Stalingrad. this is the result of losses in 1941 (I have already indicated the reason). In 1942 we had more strength. But first, it was decided to rush to attack in different directions (excitement after Moscow). and then the fear of the Germans attacking Moscow. And they could not do it - from October 1941 they could only attack in one strategic direction, and they had to "butt near Rzhev to drive them away. And if Nemchura were 300 km from Moscow, they would have slapped the flank of Group A weakly We already had more weapons and reserves, which the end of the year showed.

Quote: DrEng527

always having a significant numerical superiority,

Ha, the preponderance is created - the principle (at the right time, in the right place). This is art.

The ridge of the Wehrmacht was broken in 1943 (Kursk Bulge). And the allies came to finish off (until May 1943, they fought with 4, 5 (four and a half) German divisions.
IN, how!

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

In the future, the measures taken would give a greater effect (1942-1943),

are you sure? or do you think that the Wehrmacht would not develop? and his speed was higher ... by 43g there would be tigers, jet planes, etc.

Quote: chenia

we already had more weapons and reserves

the devastations in 42g were also terrible - both in the Crimea and near Kharkov ...

Quote: chenia

This is art.

see the balance of power in Crimea in 42g ...

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

are you sure? or do you think that the Wehrmacht would not develop?

In 1942, the developing Wehrmacht (and the starting conditions at the beginning of 1942 were much worse if there was no war). finished very badly. And until March we near Kharkov (even took it), the Germans left Rzhev, they broke through the blockade near Leningrad (and this is already in conditions of total war).

At the beginning of the war, it was not the technology that let us down (although there are also a lot of shortcomings), but the organizational mess (repairs in the house, in all the rooms in which you continue to live).

Quote: DrEng527

see the balance of power in Crimea in 42g ...

It happens. Although it's hard to explain.
But for example, the Germans near Moscow flew 300 -150 km. despite the fact that ours did not have superiority in more than one component.
And defending in winter conditions is much easier than attacking.

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

if there was no war)

you don't know much about history - I recommend looking at the dynamics of the development of the Wehrmacht 5 years before the war and the Red Army ... And the growth of its technical equipment ... in the absence of war in 41, they would have invested more in the development of technologies ... They did not have enough years to create air defense missiles, etc., the Red Army had nothing like this ...

Quote: chenia

And defending in winter conditions is much easier than attacking.

and it was here that the experience of the Red Army in Finland also affected the general depletion of the forces of the Germans. Well, frosts.

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

you don't know much about history - I recommend looking at the dynamics of the development of the Wehrmacht 5 years before the war and the Red Army.

Well, where do we go, (formerly an officer with two higher ones).
In 1942-1943, the Wehrmacht, nothing shone, unambiguously.
And since 1944 you may be right. And the main thing is the FAU 2 with a possible nuclear warhead (the Germans in this regard, should be the first, without spending on war) and a perfect guidance system.

Even before the war, Lyulka had a project for a jet engine and implemented it a year after the war (well, as soon as they gave the opportunity to engage in this project). Although, like the Germans, he was imperfect. And then they ripped off from the British.
And one more important factor is the generation of 26 and later. This generation is entirely with at least 7 years of education. This is a different level of production, the beginning of the massive saturation of engineers in industry. Dash in the late 40s and early 50s
- jet aviation, space rocketry, nuclear project (and energy plan too), construction of nuclear submarines, radio electronics, computing (well, at that time) equipment. and in terms of mechanical engineering - this is all the victory of the school teacher.
We, without any Lend-Leases, achieved this by the mid-50s (1956 only restored the pre-war population). So, the technology race is a double-edged sword. How else would it be who knows.


I want to explain to you that it is precisely the reorganization collapse of 1941 that is the cause of the catastrophe.

Quote: DrEng527

general exhaustion of the forces of the Germans.

As I say, we had more forces and resources even at the beginning of 1942. And all the failures of 1942 are the result of our unsuccessful attempts offensive... caused by losses in 1941

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

formerly an officer with two higher degrees).

I will not frighten you with diplomas ...

Quote: chenia

In 1942-1943, the Wehrmacht, nothing shone, unambiguously.

in fact, the Tiger was supposed to appear, against its background the T-34 and KV would have no effect, as in 41g ...

Quote: chenia

And then they ripped off from the British.

Bought

Quote: chenia

We achieved this without any Lend Lease by the mid-50s

they used trophies and German specialists ... FAU was a revelation for the Queen ...

Quote: chenia

I want to explain to you that it is precisely the reorganization collapse of 1941 that is the cause of the catastrophe.

This is a particular and a consequence, a problem in the SV itself

Quote: chenia

caused by losses in 1941

no, the top command personnel ... on the Kerch Isthmus there were all the conditions for the defeat of Manstein, but as a result the opposite ...

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

actually the Tiger should have appeared,

1945 Balaton at 3 UV there are two TA and two PA (one of them is Hungarian).
Tanks in armies are quite often modernized T-4, as well as panthers and tigers.
breakthrough in 10 days 30 km and the loss of all materiel (especially in 6 TA SS). 3 UV, a mediocre front like this was inferior to the enemy in all components. I’ll say right away that normal anti-tank guns were never created in our country during the entire war (the beautiful D-44 began to be tested in May 1945). Basically, they pulled out the ZIS-2, diluted with 85 mm anti-aircraft guns and ZIS_3, and slightly BS-3, and in a large number of M-42.
Essentially a new generation enemy tanks were met by the same PT artillery as 1941 (F-22 (albeit not PT) of which there were thousands, pierced the sides and foreheads of all German tanks.) Yes, sappers (barrage detachments) acted more harmoniously in 1945. And so the materiel is almost like in 1941.
But in 1941 T-1, T-2, T-3 and T-38 diluted T-4 tore our defenses all the time.
A blow by such forces as in Hungary destroyed not the fronts, but the whole strategic direction.
And in 1945 - zhik! And this is with the materiel of the Germans of another generation.
And why not?

Quote: DrEng527

FAU was a revelation for the Queen ...

Yes, the whole GIRD was just sitting down to saw the dough, spending a lot of money. Only by creating a projectile for "Katyusha" with fucking dispersion.

Quote: DrEng527

on the Kerch isthmus there were all the conditions for the defeat of Manstein,

And there was no need to attack. To dig in "head over heels" (for this, even a third of the strength would be enough) and put 11 Manstein's PA "on a stretch" (Kerch-Sevastopol) and would not appear near Leningrad. And so they put it in the back of the division's head (almost in squares), and upon impact everything was confused.
Effect after winter 1941-42 - "hats on one side"

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

And why not?

officers at the head of the troops

Quote: chenia

Yes, the whole GIRD ka

already RNII

Quote: chenia

Only by creating a projectile for "Katyusha" with fucking dispersion.

it didn't matter - for the OV strike ...

Quote: chenia

And there was no need to attack.

On the contrary, the Crimea could have been liberated!

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

already RNII

Yes, that's right, they didn't work for nothing

Quote: DrEng527

for blowing OF ...

I don't understand here
Blow? OV?

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

OV?

Poisonous substances. Katyushas were created for this - infecting large areas ...

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

Poisonous substances.

Ah, got it. And then I inadvertently thought about the barrage that it was certainly not for MLRS.
But the BM-13 system is more versatile, and the use of special power supplies is only part of the functions.

Well, and - Strike aviation, Rocket, troops. In artillery, fire.

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

But the BM-13 system is more versatile,

Quote: chenia

shell for "Katyusha" with fucking dispersion.

I answered your thesis ... for the OFC it was more important, but due to the massaging of the fire it was stopped ...

Quote: chenia

In artillery, fire.

There is a term fire defeat, fire strike ...

Quote: DrEng527

for blowing OF ...

Quote: chenia

In artillery, fire.

Somehow fire OV cuts the ear ...

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

Somehow the fire OV cuts the ear.

Yes, in principle, you can. the guys from Khimdim strike with "sunshine".
I just thought OB like a barrage of fire - well, the stratification of consciousness is understandable.

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

I just considered OV as a barrage of fire - well, the stratification of consciousness is understandable.

we were taught by NZO and PZO ...

[chenia]

Quote: DrEng527

we were taught by NZO and PZO.

This is a curtain of fire in the defense or in the offensive is placed when the enemy counterattacks.

In the offensive (the period of artillery support and escort - OV, double OV, (Triple OV and more, this is already a POGZ-mobile fire zone.) Well, the PSO is a sequential concentration of fire.

[paul3390]

The Fuhrer's adventurism was not taken into account. And the Germans caught us at the moment of "dressing".

And I think - adventurism has nothing to do with it .. Pay attention - the entire deployment of Barbarossa is sharpened exclusively for the border battle and access to the Dvina-Dnepr line .. Further - there are no studies, not even rudimentary ones. Sorry - wars are not planned this way. The plan must have some clear goal, the achievement of which would allow the war to be considered won. Well - where is she in Barbarossa ???

What happened then? Alternatively, Germany was supposed to crush the Red Army and reach a certain line. Help in this from the Soviet side was promised. After that, she was guaranteed peace with all the necessary concessions and preferences. And it is understandable - this peace was not guaranteed by the Stalinist leadership. Hitler honestly fulfilled his part of the agreement - but the other side did not. Because it did not work to eliminate Comrade Stalin and carry out a coup in the USSR.

Total - as a result, Aloizievich would have been in profit, having received territories, raw materials and eliminating the threat in the east. His unknown partners from our side - also, under the guise of military defeat of the USSR, they came to power. Everyone is happy. Tell me - nonsense? But didn't almost the same thing happen just 20 years ago, during the Brest Peace? When, in exchange for territory and supplies, the Bolsheviks received peace, a way out of the war and managed to stay in power? But many of the participants in those events were still alive .. Do you remember the strange Stalinist question after the news of the beginning of the war - why? But why .. It becomes clear and the behavior of the IVS in the first weeks of the war ..

But the coup failed, and the Soviet Union continued to fight stubbornly. And Hitler, having done his part, froze in bewilderment, not really understanding what to do next and what to achieve. Well, do not count as his serious idea to enter the Arkhangelsk-Volga line? Hence all the throwing of the Wehrmacht, and the incomprehensible two-week pause after Smolensk, and the strange desire to necessarily capture Moscow as soon as possible .. And all subsequent events ..

There is one vulnerable moment in this whole theory - we still do not know who was a participant in the collusion on the Soviet side .. And it is not a fact that Comrade Stalin managed to find out about this. And without that, it's just a theory .. Alas ..

[chenia]

Quote: paul3390

And without that, it's just a theory .. Alas ..

Famously twisted.
But according to me, the version is that the English agent Canaris deliberately belittled the capabilities of the Red Army. And this pushed Adolf to action, in anticipation of an easy victory.
Although everything was much more complicated.

[Olgovich]

Quote: chenia

Take it easy. Even,if in three weeks announced the result was approximately the same as it was in real life.

Do not talk nonsense: thousands of aircraft, tank guns, valuable personnel of pilots, tankmen, infantrymen would remain in the ranks, they would gain a little time and manage to save at least part of the huge warehouses that were actually captured by the Germans.
And the losses of the Germans would have been higher.

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

Don't talk nonsense:

Well this is your habit. It is impossible to surpass you in this. In the first week, we lost 1/10 of all our strength and resources.
WELL? There are still a lot of weapons of technology and people. But there is no surprise for a long time. WELL?
So the reason is something else.
Although with your convictions - how to discuss painting with a blind person.

[Olgovich]

Quote: chenia

Well this is your habit. It is impossible to surpass you in this. In the first week, we lost 1/10 of all our strength and resources.
WELL?

WELL-military disasternever seen before in the world in its entire history.

Got it, no?

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

Got it, no?

It doesn't reach you.
The causes of the disaster are different. And the fact that you are puffed up is a third-rate reason. And do not poke your nose into the topic where you are absolute zero.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Alexey RA

That is, the Red Army had to remain mobilized from September 01, 1939?

we note that the mobilization was completed by the end of October 39 ...
and in 1941, the readiness of the army in the West was supposed to be by mid-June under the guise of US - just to check the troops and deployment plans and persist until mid-August - due to weather conditions, it is not realistic to advance in Russia later ...

[Fat]

Really, Mikhail. For the USSR, this was the first Great War, no one knew how to prepare for it ... In the 1980s, at least in our part, the "mobilization games" were held twice a month. So that everyone knows "their own maneuver", where to run as a messenger, who to call and "brutal" standards at the same time. If not for this, it would not have been possible to clearly and quickly move production inland. The country was really ready, but the army in many ways was not up to the mark

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

... Both Stalin and the General Staff knew for sure that there would be war.

Well

... Just what did it change?

[yehat2]

not so simple. Well, they brought a stock of shells to the warehouses - how do you know if they are going to use it tomorrow or use it within 10 years? Only cross-sectional analysis gives results.
And the Germans were not very bad at confusing the intelligence of the USSR, so that we did not receive unambiguous conclusions in time.
in fact, the USSR could prepare for an attack by Germany and successfully repel it, if at the end of winter everything would have been clearly understood. But Germany, using good logistics, actually determined its intentions only by the end of April. And in 2 months the Red Army would not have had time to reorganize physically in any way, although it is not clear to me why at least personnel divisions were not deployed, supply was not debugged. I am sure that the effect of the first strike could be reduced several times, although it is unlikely to stop the offensive.
Most of all I am amazed by the actions of the USSR aviation in the last 7-8 months before the war. I did not expect such carelessness and indifference at all. Something can be attributed to the illiteracy of the infantry or tankmen who came from the villages. But in aviation, average qualifications were much higher, as was social security, which contributed to the growth of combat effectiveness.
Meanwhile, the aviation entered the war with an absolutely miserable charter, archaic tactics, poorly prepared airfields and the work of the headquarters, with a mass of undeveloped equipment, a bunch of border airfields were completely unprotected - no sane antiaircraft cover (2 cannons and 4 machine guns are not about than), no intelligence service, no camouflage, no heaps of other measures, etc. - just an endless list of unsolved problems.
But the basis of the materiel was made up of cars produced from 35-36 years. To organize their work of time was just dofiga, there was combat experience in the east, in finca and Spain.
The speed of new prototypes and equipment relocation was also terrible, to put it mildly.
If the air regiment did not fly over on its own, but was formed from reserves, this could drag on for half a year.
There were many scandals related to the fact that the equipment was not taken from the factories for several months, and during the acceptance a strange litigation began.
And the last thing, about the technique. There was absolutely no problem buying normal radio equipment abroad. Instead, they stubbornly either did not put it at all, or their frankly unsuccessful samples, which stood a dead weight. Similar questions were related to scopes for fighters and a number of other elements.

[Crowe]

Another panegyric Verkhoturov of great Germany. And the German soldiers helped the peasants to collect bread, and paid for it generously, and they built roads, and the vile partisans who interfered with these good and glorious deeds, so these bad robbers were chased through the forests mercilessly and without loss , the commissars are all lying, they did not cause any harm to the German army, poor ones, but now look what order they had with the supply. In every article, admiration for some sort of fascists runs like a red thread.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: Crowe

In every article, admiration for the fascists runs like a red thread.

And in the end, my fellow countryman Yegorov and Kantaria hoisted the Victory Banner over the Reichstag. The Third Reich ceased to exist.

[Crowe]

Only, as we can see, there have grown up a lot of such "kol s urengoy" who are not happy about this at all. It is not clear where they come from in our country, where every family was famously touched in that war.

[apro]

Quote: Crowe

.Where do they come from in our country,

And what is wrong ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

[Lech from Android.]

rf completely renounced the legacy of the USSR.

You are lying comrade from the Amur region.
The question of Russia's international status was actually resolved on December 21, 1991 in Alma-Ata, where the CIS member states documented their desire to see the Russian Federation as the successor of the USSR, and themselves as full members of the UN. Given this position, the International Court of Justice decided to leave the settlement of the issue to the conscience of the Organization, and the leading countries of the world decided it in Russia's favor.
https://russian.rt.com/ussr/article/344585-rossiya-pravopreemnitsa-sssr

[apro]

Quote: Lech from Android.

Lying

Lyokha ... no words ...

[Lech from Android.]

Lyokha ... no words ...

A real guy always has something to say ... I said you heard. no need to throw mud at Russia and the USSR, then it will not be offensive to you or me for the state.

[apro]

Lyokha. What flag over the country? What coat of arms? What constitution? Basic form of ownership? Goal of the country? Goal of society? And all this is anti-Soviet.

[Lech from Android.]

Lyokha. What flag over the country? What coat of arms? What constitution? Basic form of ownership? Goal of the country? Goal of society? And all this is anti-Soviet.

And what? Then what? Head on the wall or something to knock regretting the past.
I was born, raised, lived under the USSR, now I live in Russia ... then what?

[apro]

Quote: Lech from Android.

what's next?

Live ... who is in the way. If everything suits you. Do not try on someone else's.

[Lech from Android.]

Live ... who is in the way. If everything suits you. Do not try on someone else's.

I live ... I don’t need someone else’s, I’ve earned all mine by honest labor and I’m not ashamed to tell the truth to people in the eyes ... I can, of course, be mistaken, so correct me I will not be offended.

[apro]

Quote: Lech from Android.

I don't need someone else

Soviet ...

[Fat]

Yes, Oleg, I personally do not need everything from Soviet. I still bread, the entire Soviet bureaucracy, with my entire pro-Soviet face. School, God forgive me ...

[apro]

Quote: Thick

I personally do not need everything from the Soviet.

So ... nothing is needed. Russian is much better.

[Fat]

Oleg! no matter how offensive it was. The Soviet (read soviet) bureaucracy did not sprout from scratch. Yes, I was personally rescued from my quirks in my youth by "telephone law". This is not very beautiful, of course, I have no extra convictions for that. No! I really do not want to return to THAT USSR. But I very much wish a just society in Russia. I dream of my country, where everyone will determine their destiny, where the freedom of some does not break the freedom of others ... Much more because of what I am offended for my fatherland ...
ABOUT! Oh wei bro! I will not go to the rally of the Navlnikovites. I strongly dislike this direction. It's too foreign.

[apro]

Quote: Thick

But I really want a just society in Russia.

Who will prohibit. Wish.

[Fat]

Thank you allowed Can you take it as a guide to action? My head is bad. I can hit anyone with a crutch ...

[apro]

Quote: Thick

Can you take it as a guide to action?

No, you are Russian. I am Soviet. The goal does not coincide. Come up with your own plan of action and the plan itself.

[Fat]

Oleg, yes I am a Russian person. But not a leader (at the moment).
I have no plan! I don’t smoke this stuff. I will think over your proposal and come to the polls with a clear program. I've been thinking for a long time. I do not know who to take to help. All candidates need ... at least - verification

[apro]

Quote: Thick

I will think over your proposal and go to the polls with a clear program. I've been thinking for a long time.

Well, God forbid. Good luck.

[Fat]

People are not eternal, unlike the leaders in the Sid-Meer civic. Alas. I still have a "lock" in contrast to "freedom" rules permanently. What is the purpose? Leave for permanent residence in another universe? Or to make the largest possible number of people feel happy?
I trade in kulturtragerstvo. It turns out that I never even reached the final point.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: Lech from Android.

I was born, raised, lived under the USSR, now I live in Russia ... then what?

Live until the near future, nothing is foreseen.

[Far B]

The question of Russia's international status was actually resolved on December 21, 1991 in Alma-Ata, where the CIS member states documented their desire to see the Russian Federation as the successor of the USSR, and themselves as full members of the UN

At least ten times in a row. On 21.12.1991/XNUMX/XNUMX, the USSR still existed. Consequently, all the Alma-Ata decisions are from the same series as the conspiracy in Viskuli. That is, completely outside the law. Had a normal man in power in the Union at that time been in power, he would have closed all these "solvers" ... Not for long ... Before the execution of the sentence on the highest measure of social protection. But, unfortunately, Marked was the "president of the USSR".

[Lech from Android.]

If at that moment a normal man was in power in the Union, he would have closed all these "solvers" ...

Well, there was no normal man then ... it is now easy to talk on this topic, but then there was complete uncertainty and leapfrog in the highest echelons of power in the USSR due to the actions of one abnormal person ... Gorbachev ... The CPSU lost power over the minds of all Soviet people and this power has passed to the bourgeoisie, that now then cry for the past ... the past cannot be returned.

[Far B]

There were enough abnormal figures there and besides this - Shevardnadze, Yakovlev ... Gorbachev would not have pulled such nonsense into one funnel.

what now is crying over the past

And no one calls to cry over the past. And no one calls to return it either, because that water has already flowed away. But to return the country to the previous vector of development is a very possible and feasible task.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Dalny V

But to return the country to the previous vector of development

which one? How do you propose to return it outside the Soviet paradigm?

[Yuri Tverdokhleb]

Guys, what's going on? Some minusers dominate VO. How should ethno understand?

[tihonmarine]

Quote: Yuri Tverdokhleb

Guys, what's going on? Some minusers dominate VO. How should ethno understand?

Liberal adepts have become much more, it is necessary to fight back.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: tihonmarine

Liberal adepts have become much more, it is necessary to fight back.

their fingers, fingers.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: Crowe

Where do they come from in our country, where every family was famously touched in that war, it is not clear

Yes, everything comes from where the children get the information that it is necessary to go to rallies on January 23 in defense of Navalny. The propaganda from the “other side” is obscuring all the media.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Why is this grumbling? Are you dissatisfied that the author gives credit to the organizational and logistical competence of the Germans?

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Crowe

Only, as we can see, a lot of such "kol s urengoy"

and don't say yes. And also in TsAMO a whole cubicle of these "kol" dug in - the hell do they keep such documents there, where

Quote: Crowe

what order they had with the supply.

We ought to classify all this natsYss scribbling back!

[Lech from Android.]

In every article, admiration for the fascists runs like a red thread.

I don't see any admiration here ... I see here the amount of ammunition, foodstuffs, weapons, equipment supplied to the Wehrmacht before the attack on the USSR ... there is no need to put what you want on the article. To ignore such documents under the guise of false accusations of admiration for the Nazis in comparison with betrayal .. .a for betrayal under the laws of wartime, a military tribunal and capital punishment are imposed ... this is a veiled complicity to the enemy.

[apro]

Quote: Crowe

Another panegyric Verkhoturov of great Germany

As VILENIN said, learning Russian Oblomovism from a German. Yes, they know how to organize a business. Yes, they are technically equipped. Organized. This is not dismissed. And if we compare the provision of material reserves. And the organization of logistics support. Then the Germans won. The Soviet side did not have those capabilities. due to the scarcity of the material base.

[Lech from Android.]

the Soviet side did not have those capabilities due to the scarcity of the material base.

Admire the Germans, Soviet you are our comrade from the Amur region ... ... I doubt that you are Soviet.
With the material base of the USSR, everything was in order at that time, the organization was terrifying ... to concentrate thousands of aircraft on the border of the USSR and expose them to the Luftwaffe's blow, it must be a complete layman in the organization ... such mistakes bordering on treason were made quite a few that time.

[apro]

Quote: Lech from Android.

Everything was in order with the material base of the USSR

Not a fact. The main problem of equipping with a normal 3 5 ton truck was solved by the supply of Lend-Lease, and the not very dense network of railways did not contribute to the timely replenishment of material support.

[Lech from Android.]

Not a fact. The main problem of equipping with a normal 3 5 ton truck was solved by the supply of Lend Lease.

This is natural, after the sudden destruction and capture by the Germans of warehouses with equipment on the border with the USSR on June 22, 1941 ... the lack of mobile equipment began to be felt very acutely after that ... many trucks, tractors, tractors and much more were abandoned ... such is the price of laxity and betrayal in the first days of the war, there was simply not enough fuel.

[apro]

Quote: Lech from Android.

This is natural, after the sudden destruction and capture by the Germans of warehouses with equipment for

In addition, the low power of the Soviet car factories could not at that moment satisfy the needs of the Allies in vehicles, and this is key in a motorized war.

[Lech from Android.]

With proper organization, what was available would have been enough, but everyone wasted in the first days of the war.

https://waralbum.ru/153673/
This is only in Karelia.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: Lech from Android.

This is only in Karelia.

And this is already at Stalingrad, but German.

[Unknown]

Quote: apro

In addition, the low power of the Soviet car factories could not at that moment satisfy the needs of the Allies in vehicles, and this is key in a motorized war.

You want a lot from the Soviet regime, which at that time was only a little over 20 years old. And what she was able to do from scratch is impressive in such a short time. In addition to cars, it was necessary to produce a lot of all kinds of equipment, not only for the needs of the army, but also for the national economy. It is necessary to train millions of people to work on that technique, as well as to produce it. When did the first car appear in Germany? 1888. And it went all over the world. The decade from 1905 to 1910 was the rapid development of the automotive industry in Europe and the USA, but not R.I. Russo-Balt, produced individually, does not count with foreign engines. There were no industrial power plants in R.I., there was no ball-bearing plant, or anything. So we met the Second World War with what they themselves were able to do in a short time, but a lot was done, and they could fight and win. This should be taken into account.

[apro]

Quote: Unknown

You want a lot from Soviet power,

Only a cold statement of the fact. No more. Yes there were problems, but they were solved. By various methods. Even guzhbats. And were worn on their hands.

Quote: Unknown

... This should be taken into account.

I take into account, but many, in a leavened frenzy, completely sweep aside objective circumstances.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: Unknown

So we met the Second World War with what they themselves were able to do in a short time, but a lot was done, and they could fight and win. This should be taken into account.

Thanks for this to our grandfathers, fathers and mothers.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

And what she was able to do from scratch is impressive in such a short time.

those. before 1917 there was nothing in Russia?

Quote: Unknown

There were no industrial power plants in R.I.

bullshit ... recommend:
https://statehistory.ru/3973/Elektrifikatsiya-v-dorevolyutsionnoy-Rossii/
or "In 1899-1900, MHES-1 supplied electricity to the lines of the first Moscow trams. On February 15, 1907, another Moscow station was put into operation: MHES-2 Tramvaynaya with a capacity of 6 MW, built by the Moscow City Administration. In November 1907, completed construction of a new turbine hall and boiler room - the second stage of the Raush station "
It is a pity that you do not know the history of Russia, but live with propaganda scoops ...

Quote: Unknown

and could fight and win.

one might think that Russia did not fight before the USSR! Let me note that in WW1, RIA suffered significantly less losses than the Red Army in WW2 ...

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

bullshit ... recommend:
https://statehistory.ru/3973/Elektrifikatsiya-v-dorevolyutsionnoy-Rossii/
or "In 1899-1900, MHES-1 supplied electricity to the lines of the first Moscow trams. On February 15, 1907, another Moscow station was put into operation: MHES-2 Tramvaynaya with a capacity of 6 MW, built by the Moscow City Administration. In November 1907, completed construction of a new turbine hall and boiler room - the second stage of the Raush station "
It is a pity that you do not know the history of Russia, but live by scoop propaganda.

When the obvious things do not reach, it is difficult to explain them. As in a proverb for children, .... What does it cost us to build a house, let's draw a life ... And then they are talking about Moscow trams. Take today's time for example. The largest aluminum producer is the Bratsk Aluminum Plant, which was the first in the world to produce more than 1 million tons of aluminum per year. The plant produces 30% of Russian aluminum and 4% of the world. The plant consumes 75% of the electricity generated by the Bratsk Hydroelectric Power Plant. One must at least understand how much electricity is needed for all enterprises put into operation, only heavy engineering, and not babble about trams in Moscow. The Romanov family simply did not understand what role electricity began to play at the end of the 19th century and until now. The world's first hydroelectric power station started operating in 1878 in Britain, and in Russia three tsars were replaced, while until one, it became something to reach.

Quote: DrEng527

one might think that Russia did not fight before the USSR! Etmechu that in WW1 RIA suffered significantly less losses than the Red Army in WW2.

Before the USSR, R.I. lost the Crimean War, with difficulty won the Balkan one, having profited at the Berlin Congress, all the results of the victory, allowed the creation of Bulgaria hostile to Russia, was dragged into the Russo-Japanese War, which she began ineptly, ditching tens of thousands of soldiers in Manchuria, sinking the entire fleet, and finished shamefully. Then she harnessed herself to WWI, not having a developed industry, and immediately died along with the tsarism, without pulling such a load. Here is the final result of R.I.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

when obvious things don't reach, it's hard to explain them

Quote: Unknown

There were no industrial power plants in R.I.

lied, you were caught in a lie and now slipped into demagoguery?

Quote: Unknown

The world's first hydroelectric power station started operating in 1878 in Britain, and in Russia three tsars were replaced, while until one, it became something to reach.

teach history: "The first hydroelectric power station in the Russian Empire was built in 1892 in the Altai Territory on the Berezovka River, a tributary of Bukhtarma, not far from the city of Zyryanovsk." - this is at IA3!

Quote: Unknown

not having a developed industry,

4th-5th place in the world ...

Quote: Unknown

R.I. lost

In all its losses and victories, the Republic of Ingushetia suffered losses several times less than the USSR in 1941 ... And even after losing RYAV, RIA lost fewer soldiers on land than the Japanese ...

[Unknown]

[quote = DrEng527] lied, you were caught in a lie and now slipped into a demagogue Are you by nature like that, or are you pretending? You have to understand what you are talking about. Bukhtarmy, not far from the town of Zyryanovsk. "- this is with IA527! [/ quote]
What N.N. Koksharov, it's difficult to call that a station ...

.... What industrial scale can we talk about. For the development of industry, it is necessary to build such ...

........ [quote = DrEng527] in all its losses and victories RI suffered several times less losses than the USSR in 1941 ... And even after losing RYAV RIA lost fewer soldiers on land than the Japanese [/ quote]
There was already an article about the losses of R.I. on V.O. , everything is laid out on the shelves. There.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

What N.N. Koksharov, it's difficult to call that a station ...

you can compare it with the S-Sh hydroelectric power station ... let me remind you:
"The first hydroelectric power plant was built in the USA in Appleton (Wisconsin). Its capacity was only 1 hp "

Quote: Unknown

there was already an article on V.O.

VO articles on this issue suffer from an ideological rather than a scientific approach ...

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

you can compare it with the S-Sh hydroelectric power station ... let me remind you:
"The first hydroelectric power station was built in the USA in Appleton (Wisconsin). Its capacity was only 1 hp.

Don't pretend to be sad. Or maybe not Russian. The language is not clear does not reach? Or a victim of the exam? Don't understand what industrial capacity is? The hike does not matter how much electricity it consumes. or for example a lathe. Here, even the words that are suitable, it cannot be found, will not understand correctly. The first truly industrial hydroelectric power station in the world started working in the USA on the Niagara River in 1882. It is necessary to delve into what it is about.

Quote: DrEng527

VO articles on this issue suffer from an ideological rather than a scientific approach ...

“The scientific approach is in full swing with you, you don't just need to express it.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

Don't pretend to be sad. Or maybe not Russian. The language is not clear does not reach? Or a victim of the exam?

Quote: DrEng527

lied, you were caught in a lie and now slipped into demagoguery?

you can jump further

Quote: Unknown

Don't understand what industrial capacity is?

I'll tell you the truth - this concept at different times meant different things ...

Quote: Unknown

Scientific approach, you are just in full swing

Namely, and against my background, you are an illiterate ideologist prone to banal lies, which I showed you above ... I see no point in persuading and enlightening you further!

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

I'll tell you the truth - this concept at different times meant different things ...

This concept means only one Industry (from the Russian. To hunt, trade) - a set of enterprises (factories, combines, factories, mines, mines, power plants) engaged in the production of tools of labor (both for other sectors of the national economy, and for the industry itself), extraction of raw materials, materials, fuel, energy production and further processing of products obtained in industry or produced in agriculture - the production of consumer goods, so literate.

Quote: DrEng527

Namely, and against my background, you are an illiterate ideologist inclined to banal lies, which I showed you above ... I see no point in persuading and enlightening you further

What lie have I been caught on? Don't turn everything upside down. Your background is mixed on a poor knowledge of history, and on anti-Sovietism. For all that, simple truths still do not reach. First you need to learn to read and understand what is written and only then try to prove something. If only to blurt out the uttermost, and then with foam to lag behind their nonsense.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

The first, really nindustrial hydroelectric power station in the world

Quote: Unknown

This concept means only one thing Industry

running away from yourself by chattering?
read below and realize your wretchedness:
"In 1879 was built first power plant in the USA in San Francisco at 30 кВт.
The first central stations appeared already in the 80s of the XIX century.
They were more expedient and more economical, since they supplied many enterprises with electricity at once. At that time, light sources - arc lamps and incandescent lamps were the main consumers of electricity. Central Station was put into operation in 1882 in New York, it had the capacity 500 кВт."

Quote: Unknown

What lie have I been caught on?

see above - message from Yesterday, 07:25

Quote: Unknown

There were no industrial power plants in R.I.

I kindly brought you a 6MW station in RI ...
I will add:
"In 1913, the installed capacity of Russian power plants amounted to about 1,1 million kW. By 1917, there were several hydroelectric power plants in Russia with an installed capacity of 19 MW. The most powerful at that time was the Hindu Kush hydroelectric power station - 1,35 MW. "

Quote: Unknown

Your background is mixed on a poor knowledge of history, and on anti-Sovietism

do you have a self-prop

Quote: Unknown

If only to blurt out the uttermost, and then with foam to lag behind their nonsense.

see above - you said about yourself, liar!

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

read below and realize your wretchedness:
“In 1879, the first 30 kW power plant in the USA was built in San Francisco.

We'll have to call things by their proper names. You are an illiterate dumbass who does not understand the essence of the matter. How much electricity is needed, for example MTLZ ... I am citing the book: "Electrical equipment of the main shops of metallurgical plants" V.K. Poltev, L.P. Smolnikov. Moscow 1963.

"A modern metallurgical plant with a full metallurgical cycle is a large consumer of electricity, the total electrical load of which reaches 80-100 MW.
The ratio of loads and energy consumption for individual shops of the plant is characterized by the following figures,%:
Loads Power consumption
Blast furnace shop _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ 12 7-10
Open-hearth furnace _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 6,5 6-8
Rolling shops _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 42 34-45
Coke-chemical shop _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 10 7-10
Own needs of PVS and CHPP _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7,5 7-8,5
Water supply _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ 6,5 5,8
Auxiliary shops _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4,0 12-15
Compressor units _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3,0 3-10
Ventilation and lighting _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4,5 3-8
Sinter plant _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4,0 8-12

In connection with the widespread use of oxygen for intensifying the process in blast-furnace and open-hearth furnaces and converters at metallurgical plants, shops that produce oxygen for technological purposes are currently being commissioned.
Oxygen shops consume up to 15% of the electricity consumed by a metallurgical plant. It does not reach that PMW is primarily a war of industry. Iron, manganese, chromium, oil, rubber, aluminum, lead, nickel, cobalt, antimony, arsenic, mercury, molybdenum, tungsten, diamonds, sulfur, sulfuric acid, graphite and phosphates are included into the composition of irreplaceable raw materials, on which the strategic success of the battles in the First World War depended. These elements play a special role in mechanical engineering. For example, in 1914, the offensive of the German army fell through, according to the historian McNeill, precisely because of the acute shortage of copper, which is part of the alloy for the casings. It is noteworthy that tsarist Russia, already in 1916, actually developed all its explored deposits of non-ferrous metals in Siberia, the Urals and the Caucasus. And by 1917, another problem arose - an acute shortage of rolling stock, which paralyzed the transit of ore to smelters in Moscow and St. Petersburg. It is necessary at least to understand that the Hindu Kush hydroelectric power station with a capacity of 1.2 MW does not use the main supplier of electricity for the military-industrial complex to supply electricity to the soap-making, oil-processing and cotton-ginning industries that belonged to the imperial estate. So learn, learn to expand your narrow horizons.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

We'll have to call things by their proper names. You are an illiterate dumbass who does not understand the essence of the matter.

You are a banal illiterate marginal and a liar, which I have successfully proved with facts!

Quote: Unknown

How much electricity is needed, for example MTLZ ... I am citing a book

it says even worse about you than you think! So, for example - steel was smelted at the Obukhovsky plant in the 19th century and made of it tools without electricity at all! You are a banal layman ...

Quote: Unknown

So learn, learn to expand your narrow horizons.

see in the mirror, liar!

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

You are a banal illiterate marginal and a liar, which I have successfully proved with facts!

Judging by the manner of speech that I have already encountered, it is the same as that of famous people with T.V. You are one of these, chosen by God from the promised land. And why is there so much hatred for Soviet power? Okay, digress. It has not been successfully proved by some facts. Took out from there, from here, and most importantly blah blah.

Quote: DrEng527

it says even worse about you than you think! So, for example - steel was smelted at the Obukhovsky plant in the 19th century and made of it tools without electricity at all! You are a banal layman

So in the Middle Ages, they made muskets, bombards without electricity, but everything flows, everything changes, progress does not stand still. You can try it at home, smelt iron ore, maybe it will work out.

Quote: DrEng527

see in the mirror, liar!

When you look in the mirror, what will you notice? Immediately catches the eye.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

Judging by the manner of speech, which I have already encountered, it is the same as that of famous persons with T.V.

you, as usual, with your finger to the sky ...

Quote: Unknown

You are one of these, chosen by God from the promised land.

so you are also an anti-Semite? I will disappoint you, I am Russian and I live in Russia!

Quote: Unknown

And where does so much hatred for Soviet power come from?

This is not hatred, this is an accurate understanding of the essence of this power in the history of Russia!
By the way, why do you hate Russia so much? Are you ready to slander her?

Quote: Unknown

It has not been successfully proved by some facts.

Why, you lied about the lack of industrial production of electricity in the Republic of Ingushetia, I kindly provided you with a source that refutes this ...

Quote: Unknown

progress does not stand still.

Do you have a self-fuse again? it was you who applied the 1963 book to the technologies of the early 20th century

Quote: Unknown

When you look in the mirror, what will you notice? Immediately catches the eye.

your complexes are not clear to me - how do I know, I only know that you are a liar and a Russophobe ...

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

you, as usual, a finger to the sky ..

Really? Ah ah ah.

Quote: DrEng527

so you are also an anti-Semite? I will disappoint you, I am Russian and live in Russia

What doubts can there be, of course you live in Pskov, and there is nowhere, for example Haifa. And necessarily Russian, but how else.

Quote: DrEng527

This is not hatred, this is an accurate understanding of the essence of this power in the history of Russia!
By the way, why do you hate Russia so much? Are you ready to slander her?

Already an accurate understanding of the essence of power, you like it is in your blood, so to speak at the genetic level, to the point. The main thing is to understand in time where the winds are blowing. I hate tsarism and the nobility, also true from genetic memory, since the parents are from the peasantry, and by no means Russia, as you would like to imagine.

Quote: DrEng527

Why, you lied about the lack of industrial production of electricity in the Republic of Ingushetia, I kindly provided you with a source that refutes this.

I proved to you the absence of industrial production in RI, gave examples, but with your natural resourcefulness, they began to give examples of private power plants, like the Hindu Kush hydroelectric power station, which was in the possession of the tsar's estate manager, so that you understand not to get dirty with physical labor. Give as an example the station in the Kshesinskaya palace, which also generated electricity so that V.K in the palace bedroom could see the charms of Matilda.

Quote: DrEng527

Do you have a self-fuse again? it was you who applied the 1963 book to the technologies of the early 20th century

That at the beginning of the 20th century and 1963, the basis does not change. At first I thought it didn’t come to a fool, and then I see that it’s a different matter. Manners, a style such as a brazen showman, with a touch of intellectual superiority, inherent in only one nation. He understands and knows everything, but all the same, he dodges, a typical Solovyov or Svanidze slips out, but they are.

Quote: DrEng527

I am not clear about your complexes - how do I know, I only know that you are a liar and Russophobe.

It is a sin, there are complexes of what to do. Didn't you see anything in your mirror after all?

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

Of course you live in Pskov, and there is nowhere, for example Haifa. And necessarily Russian, but how else.

By no means, I live in the glorious city of Eburg! It's ridiculous to prove your nationality to a Russophobe and an anti-Semite ...

Quote: Unknown

I hate tsarism and the nobility, also true from genetic memory, since the parents are from the peasantry, and by no means Russia, as you would like to imagine.

The whipped asses of the ancestors haunt you? Well, they dispersed the nobles and what did the peasants get from the SV? New serfdom, dispossession, hunger ...

Quote: Unknown

I proved to you the absence of industrial production in R.I.,

Lying again - I showed you that in 1913, almost 2 yards of kWh were produced in the Republic of Ingushetia, this is industrial power generation!

Quote: Unknown

That at the beginning of the 20th century and 1963, the basis does not change.

how stupid and uneducated you are ...

Quote: Unknown

A manner, a style like that of an impudent showman, with a touch of intellectual superiority, inherent in only one nation. He understands and knows everything, but all the same, he dodges, a typical Solovyov or Svanidze slips out, but they are.

you are definitely one of the notorious and downtrodden villagers

Quote: Unknown

resolved, there are complexes of what to do.

you - nothing, useless ...

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

By no means, I live in the glorious city of Eburg! It's ridiculous to prove your nationality to a Russophobe and an anti-Semite ...

Burst, well, of course in the burg, and the surname Ivanov. I've already heard this, as well as about a hereditary proletarian, and drunken workers from the depot. I am not surprised by the style alone. Do you know I treat Jews neutrally, there are good lads among them. During his service in S.A. had to stay in the OVG mountains. Podolsk, this one came to our ward from the Chisinau Institute, when Andropov closed the military departments, he was a funny guy, he managed to rub his heel before infection, serving as a clerk in the headquarters .. The correct one, the executive will always help, with a smile, but the truth to the harsh soldier's life was not adapted, well, it's fixable. Something pulled into memories, let's get back to the topic.

Quote: DrEng527

The whipped asses of the ancestors haunt you? Well, they dispersed the nobles and what did the peasants get from the SV? New serfdom, dispossession, hunger.

Flogged in the stables, the nobility was swaggering, it was a matter of death. So then it was asked for everything, in twins of 17-year. From old memory. But it is not clear why you have gloating from this? The Russian nobility also did not favor the chosen ones. On the contrary, they blamed them for all their troubles. Like, Trotsky, Sverlov and others have powdered the brains of the Russian peasant ...

Quote: DrEng527

Lying again - I showed you that in 1913, almost 2 yards of kWh were produced in the Republic of Ingushetia, this is industrial power generation!

You try to drag me in one more circle, it won't work. How many, when, everything has already been laid out. You are pursuing completely different goals, the tsarist power is like two drops, similar to the current one, extolling the successes of that one, bring the idea that today's power is not worse than the tsarist, and the achievements of Soviet power, this is what tsarism left, and themselves ,, sivolapye ,, nothing can, only to eat vodka. So, citizens, bear with it, there was and will be such a power, and you don't need another one, forget all the achievements of the USSR, all the lies, and in general you dreamed about it.

Quote: DrEng527

how stupid and uneducated you are

Well, how much to you.

Quote: DrEng527

you are definitely one of the notorious and downtrodden villagers

We don't like you, oh, how we don't like it, but okay we will survive ..

Quote: DrEng527

you - nothing, useless.

As well as you.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

and surname Ivanov

no, I have a different, ancient and glorious surname! It's humiliating to prove something to you ...

Quote: Unknown

Do you know I am neutral towards Jews?

anti-Semite is the stigma of a failure ... Sorry for you, I see no point in discussing further - the topic of the article is different ...

Quote: Unknown

Flogged in the stables, the nobility was swaggering, there was a case

usually for business - don't steal, don't drink, work well ... You Little Russians don't know how to work and don't want to ...

Quote: Unknown

The Russian nobility also did not favor the chosen ones.

you have already decided everything for the nobles ... oh, those balls ...

Quote: Unknown

and the achievements of Soviet power, this is what tsarism left behind, and the sivolapes themselves cannot do anything, just eat vodka

that you are stupid it is noticeable ... and also Ivan, who does not remember kinship ...

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

no, I have a different, ancient and glorious surname! to prove something to you humiliating.

Sounds good, ancient and glorious, well, let it be your way. Why are you trying to prove?

Quote: DrEng527

anti-Semite is the stigma of a loser ... sorry for you, I see no point in discussing further - the topic of the article is different ..

Why did you suddenly feel pity? Said to the Jews is neutral. The topic was different but moved to the one that is currently underway.

Quote: DrEng527

usually for the cause - don't steal, don't drink, work well ... you Little Russians don't know how to work and don't want to.

When, how, but in the majority, in order to show their power, but then I remembered, they also took their souls away.

Quote: DrEng527

you have already decided everything for the nobles ... oh, those balls.

And why decide for them, a lot of honor. They themselves speak about Jews in their memoirs. Or maybe the Cossacks Shkuro fraternized with them?

Quote: DrEng527

that you are stupid it is noticeable ... and also Ivan, who does not remember kinship ..

Why I don't remember, Bryansk roots on my father's side, the village of Rubcha, Zhiryatinsky district, my grandfather's name was Nikolai Yegorych, my grandma's name was Marina. I remember.

[DrEng527]

we will continue your education:
"A hundred years ago, in 1913, the undisputed leaders in the production of electricity were the United States and Germany. This is illustrated by the data given in BN Mironov's book" History in Figures ":
• Japan - 1,5 billion kWh;
• France - 1,8 billion kWh;
• Italy - 2,2 billion kWh;
• England - 2,5 billion kWh;
• Germany - 8,0 billion kWh;
• USA - 26,3 billion kWh.
For the first time in pre-revolutionary literature, data for 1913
year on the number of Russian power plants and released by them
electricity is mentioned in the journal "Electricity" (1917
year). It reports 9537 stations and 1.875.337.930
kW * hours of electricity. "N.S. Simonov // Energeticheskaya, V. 14. No. 4. 2017 Statistics of pre-revolutionary Russia / Economic statistics, pp. 22-32. http://dx.doi.org/10.21686/2500-3925 -2017-4-22-32.
in translation for those brought up on Soviet propaganda - they produced more than in France and Japan!
But that's not all: "Before the revolution, the capacity of all Russian power plants was only 1192 MW. In 1916, they produced 2575 million kW * hours of electricity."

[Unknown]

So we will continue yours. Electricity production per year per capita was: in the USA - 185 kWh; in Germany - 100 kWh; in Russia - 4 kWh ". [2] ... To understand more ... By the beginning of World War I in 1914, foreign capital had ... 100% of the electrical industry ", The most important thing ........" It is characteristic that before Revolution in Russia there was not a single large electrical engineering plant - all of them were entirely of foreign origin, predominantly German, and in the pre-war period their production activities were inextricably intertwined with foreign strongholds. Not surprisingly, most of the largest stations of the time were also in the hands of foreigners. " [1] Here is a table ... ELECTRIFICATION

year
Power plant capacity (in million kw)
How many times has the capacity of power plants increased in comparison with 1913?
Electricity generation (in billion kWh)
How many times has the generation of electricity increased in comparison with 1913?
Power utilization of district stations (percentage)
1913
1,1
-
1,9
-
28,1
1928
1,9
1,7
5,0
2,6
35,7
1936
7,5
6,8
32,8
17,3
61,4

In the USSR, thanks to the better utilization of capacities per kilowatt of power, power plants generate 1,5-2,5 times more electricity than in capitalist countries.
In the USSR, the utilization of the capacity of regional stations in 1936 was 61,4%.
The utilization of the capacity of power plants in the USA in 1936 was 35,6%, in Germany in 1935 — 28,0%, in England in 1934 — 22,8%.
In the USSR, only due to better use of power without additional capital expenditures, the generation of electricity at regional stations increased in 1936 in relation to 1935 by 3 million kWh, which is equal to the production of almost two Dnieproges.
The GOELRO plan, designed for 10-15 years, was overfulfilled almost 2,5 times by 4.8 years. For example, NKAZ needs XNUMX billion kW per year! What power is needed, that's what you cannot understand. The companion doesn't work.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

So we will continue yours.

you have no qualifications for this, only demagoguery and lies ...

Quote: Unknown

Electricity production per year per capita was: in the USA - 185 kWh; in Germany - 100 kWh; in Russia - 4kWh "

Have you already changed your shoes in the air? Not from Ukraine for nothing?
you previously declared that

Quote: Unknown

There were no industrial power plants in R.I.

and now you consider per capita?

Quote: Unknown

To understand more ... By the beginning of World War I in 1914, foreign capital had ... 100% of the electrical industry ",

you are funny in your beliefs - what difference does it make to the workers what capital? For the country's leadership, there is also no difference - the main thing is to pay salaries / taxes ... For example, the Russian artillery of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was largely created by the Krupp company

Quote: Unknown

GOELRO plan for 10-15

was created back in RI

Quote: Unknown

In the USSR, thanks to the better use of power

your agitprop fairy tales are tired ...

Quote: Unknown

The companion doesn't work.

I have no understanding, I have knowledge and intelligence ...

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

you have no qualifications for this, only demagoguery and lies ...

Are you qualified as a metallurgical engineer? Very big doubts.

Quote: DrEng527

Have you already changed your shoes in the air? Not from Ukraine for nothing?
you previously declared that

So it never happened. I know where you are from.

Quote: DrEng527

and now you consider per capita?

You know what the per capita means, but again they turned, twirled. That gives!

Quote: DrEng527

was created back in RI

Dreamers and theorists, but made by practitioners.

Quote: DrEng527

I have no understanding, I have knowledge and intelligence.

You are inherent, resourcefulness, cunning, which is given by nature.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Unknown

You are qualified as a metallurgical engineer

Not an engineer-physicist ...

Quote: Unknown

So it never happened. I know where you are from.

Doubt, though try ...

Quote: Unknown

You know what the per capita means, but again they turned, twirled. That gives!

do you have a continuation of self-punching

Quote: Unknown

Dreamers and theorists, but made by practitioners.

They were electrical engineers! Read the history of Russia, not agitprop fairy tales ... although it is closer to a peasant from Little Russia to remove a shed ...

Quote: Unknown

You are inherent, resourcefulness, cunning, which is given by nature.

what inferiority complexes you have, even you feel sorry for ...

[Unknown]

Quote: DrEng527

Far from being a physics engineer

Well, of course, Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky and others, also electronics engineers, chemists, but only for some reason they climb into politics, and put their hand to the collapse, not to promote science.

Quote: DrEng527

Doubt, try it though.

The city is certainly difficult, but the country is definitely Israel.

Quote: DrEng527

They were electrical engineers! Read the history of Russia, not agitprop fairy tales ... although it is closer to a peasant from Little Russia to remove a shed ..

We can also have a stable, we are not used to it in the village or in the city. Without you so good, we will definitely manage.

Quote: DrEng527

what inferiority complexes you have, even you feel sorry for

And I don't have you. You don't need her.

[icant007]

Quote: DrEng527

not having a developed industry,

4th-5th place in the world ...

In terms of volume, but not in terms of technology.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Lech from Android.

This is natural, after the sudden destruction and capture by the Germans of warehouses with equipment on the border with the USSR on June 22, 1941 ... the lack of mobile equipment began to be felt very sharply after that

Not after, but before.
"The report of the head of the GABTU GVS of the spacecraft on the state of provision of armored vehicles and property of the spacecraft" describes well the shortage in the Red Army of trucks over 1,5 tons, even in peacetime states.

Peacetime Lack:
Passenger cars and PIKAP - 8721
Trucks GAZ - +22184
Trucks ZIS - 40886
Workshops type "A" - 2694
Workshops type "B" - 2092
Gas tank trucks - 8431
CCD - 1135
Other special vehicles - 35860
Total vehicles: 77635

The wartime states are even worse. Moreover, in the event of war, mobilization of vehicles does not cover this shortage:

Lack of income taking into account from the Nar. farms:
Passenger cars and PIKAP - 8161
Trucks GAZ and ZIS - 67729
Workshops type "A" - 5243
Workshops type "B" - 2822
Gas tank trucks - 49662
CCD - 1846
Other special vehicles - 108531
Total vehicles: 243994

[BAI]

This is not for the actually existing army, but for the one being created, which they did not have time to create, including taking into account the program for the creation of mechanized corps. The states were already there, of course there was no filling. Therefore, all the military leaders said that they did not have time to prepare for the war. Of course, if it were possible to carry out the entire program of reorganizing the army, the picture would be completely different.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Lech from Android.

The material base of the USSR was all right at the time

Really? That is, when all attempts to increase the caliber of divisional artillery run up against the simplest "no copper" - this is ok with material base? When does the situation with a shortage of gasoline (not high-octane - automobile fuel) reach Beria? When the army as planned gets less than half of its peacetime diesel fuel? When GABTU is forced to replace 3-ton cars with 1,5-ton ones - because there are too few Zakharovs, and there are not enough three-tonne cars even for super-valuable PARMs and other special vehicles? When the mechanized corps lacks not only tanks. and ordinary fuel barrels?

[DrEng527]

Quote: Alexey RA

When the mechanized corps lacks not only tanks. and ordinary fuel barrels?

can temper formation plans?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DrEng527

can temper formation plans?

At a time when intelligence frightens thousands and even tens of thousands of German tanks?

[DrEng527]

Intelligence was recently cleared of Trotskyists - there were neophytes the problem is that the balance of production capacities of the German tank industry was not kept, the specifics of training tankers in Germany - proceeded from our realities - bullshit and on the knee ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DrEng527

the problem is that the balance of production capacities of the German tank industry was not kept, the specifics of training tankers in Germany - proceeded from our realities - bullshit and on the knee ...

Everything is simpler - the intelligence data corresponded to the productivity of German factories in the event of a full mobilization for military needs. And the Germans in real life issued the figures reported by intelligence - in 1944.
No one could have imagined that in Germany the war with the USSR was not initially planned as total, with the maximum effort of forces and means.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: apro

the Soviet side did not have those capabilities due to the scarcity of the material base.

All of Europe worked for the Third Reich - 400 million people. Well, we all know our capabilities at the end of 1941. It was the most difficult time for the country, for the people, but they survived and won, these organized, technically equipped invaders.

[apro]

Only I didn’t hear. That would be the IVS, Stalin said that the king of the Bonbu planted. He didn’t build car factories. He didn’t teach the engineers. He did not organize the workers. The Reds did everything themselves. And they overfulfilled the plan.

[Fat]

Oleg! Sorry, I could not resist, put a minus.
1. You underestimated the Soviet railways.
2. You attributed to the Soviet railways the scarcity of the material base - it was no longer there at all!
3. The USSR Armed Forces were in the transition period. Rearmed.
4. Supply and logistics work for the headquarters.
We had this young service in the USSR - the General Staff "Ain Columns Marshiren".... It is not surprising that the Enemy beat us in many ways. But why did he be ashamed of everything in the first year ...

[Far B]

Yes, Verkhoturov is such a Verkhoturov ... A great achievement - in peacetime conditions (the Balkans do not count - they did not influence the process in any way) to adjust the supply, yeah.

Dreams come true, and I managed to find a file on the transportation and accumulation of military supplies (ammunition, fuel and food) by Army Group B from December 1940 to the end of May 1941. Well what can I say? All this was arranged with the clarity of a clockwork

And then the war began, and the German "watch" dreamed of a polar fox. And the savages from the USSR managed to organize and carry out the evacuation of industry, unprecedented in history, under the bombing, amid panic among the civilian population. Well, barbarians, what can you take from them

[apro]

Quote: Dalny V

And the savages from the USSR contrived under the bombing,

Not savages. The plan for the relocation of Soviet industry existed before the war. There were responsible executors and controllers. They did everything according to the plan, and not from the bay of flounder.

[Far B]

a plan to relocate Soviet industry existed before the war

A plan is a plan. It is good that it existed, it is good that it was succeeded. But no plan will be able to foresee attacks by dive bombers on the railway echelons going to the rear, panic in cities, roads clogged with refugees, and so on. The fact that ours managed to overcome all this completely kills the myth about "German watches" that worked without failures. In peacetime conditions, it is possible. During the war, the Union demonstrated much better organization.

[apro]

Quote: Dalny V

But no plan will be able to foresee attacks by dive bombers on the railway echelons going to the rear,

Minor misunderstandings. It happens. But was done in the proper volume.

Quote: Dalny V

completely kills the myth of the "German clock", which worked without failures.

Does not kill the Germans throughout the war demonstrated their ability at the right time and place to concentrate material resources for active operations. Remember the strike at Balaton. the enemy has demonstrated skills worthy of learning.

Quote: Dalny V

During the war, the Union demonstrated much better organization.

And organization and great material opportunities.

[Far B]

Minor misunderstandings

Dive bombers attack - minor misunderstandings ??? torn tracks, derailed wagons with equipment, perished production specialists - this is, of course, nonsense, trifles, with whom it does not happen ... Well, you fucking give! (from)

the Germans throughout the war demonstrated the ability at the right time and place to concentrate material resources for active operations

that is why they received a counterattack near Moscow, Stalingrad, "Bagration", the Yassy-Kishinev offensive operation and a number of other blows against the mustals. That is why in the first two winters they froze and died from frostbite. This is how the material resources were concentrated. No, well, cho. Concentrated competently.
It is a huge mistake to underestimate the enemy. But you shouldn't overestimate it either.

and great material opportunities

By the time of the publication of Order No. 227, they were not that big. The victory was nevertheless achieved precisely thanks to the superiority in organization. Not only at the front, but also in the rear - all the people have invested in it. With rare exceptions.
PySy. In general, I do not understand what you are trying to prove to me. That the actions of the Germans are worthy of being studied? I agree, you need to study. But it is not worth extolling them - the result of the war showed that the "supermen" were not a bit "over". It turned out according to Suvorov: "The Russians always beat the Prussians."

[apro]

Quote: Dalny V

Dive bombers attack - minor misunderstandings ???

They greatly influenced ??? no ??? means the losses are within acceptable limits.

Quote: Dalny V

that is why they received a counterattack near Moscow, Stalingrad, "Bagration",

You gave examples for what? To show what? Near Moscow after the typhoon. Having exhausted the means of conducting offensive operations. The Germans went on the defensive. Near Stalingrad. The strike was delivered in the zone of the Romanian and Hungarian troops. Essentially on secondary directions. In Belarus, the Germans did not prepare active actions. Why did you not mention the battles for the Kursk salient. On this axis, the Germans were able to both create and conduct. But the strength of the Soviet group turned out to be greater. and after that they did not take active offensive actions.

Quote: Dalny V

By the time of the publication of Order No. 227, they were not that big.

In the production of tanks, artillery aircraft have already surpassed, and since 1943 they have also raised the quality level, and this is the merit of the Soviet system.

Quote: Dalny V

But it is not worth extolling them - the result of the war showed that the "supermen" were not a bit "over". It turned out according to Suvorov: "The Russians always beat the Prussians."

The Russians fought two wars with the Germans, and in both cases lost, for various reasons, the Soviet-German war, which ended in victory for the USSR. showed the advantage of the Soviet system.

[Far B]

They greatly influenced ??? no ??? means the loss is within acceptable limits

Strong. Losses are much higher than acceptable values. I had to catch up.

the blow was struck in the strip of the Romanian and Hungarian troops

So what? The orchestra was in charge, the Germans were "engaged in the concentration of material resources." So your argument is past the checkout.

for some reason you did not mention the battles for the Kursk ledge

Precisely because this is the case when the Germans could... But this is exactly case, but not "throughout the war"as you say so.

The Russians fought two wars with the Germans

The Russians have fought a little more than two wars with the Germans, if we take into account the thousand-year history.
Once again: what are you trying to prove to me? The superiority of the Soviet system? so, if I'm not mistaken, in the very first post of the branch, I pointed out this:

The USSR managed to organize and carry out an unprecedented evacuation of industry under the bombing, amid panic among the civilian population.

Can you read?

[chenia]

Quote: apro

remember the strike at Balaton. how they were able to create advantages. in the most difficult conditions. organized routes of movement. without air. and in conditions of stealth.

AND? A blow to the enemy with 2 TA (of which 6 TA SS-which drove allies in the Ardennes, almost three times more powerful, and two PA), which was practically inferior to the Germans (2 UV) in all respects.
And ... 30 km breakthrough, losing all tanks (about 400). And when the TA was planted on Tolbukhin, he took Vienna two weeks later.

[Fat]

No need to mow on Tolbukhin. More than just a literate man was. Completed the task! And having received reinforcements ... Tolbukhin in 2 weeks at 41 Iran spud ...

[chenia]

Quote: Thick

No need to mow on Tolbukhin

??
You read carefully, and then comment (although maybe you didn't want to stick it to me, but to my opponent you made a mistake).
I just showed how the second UV, inferior in all parameters, rolled out the grouping into two tank and two field armies (he helped him slightly and 2 UV) and subsequently took Vienna.

[Fat]

Bro, gunman. I KNOW many actions of F. I. Tolbukhin. And even your words, I will support these.
What are you asking? I know clearly only one thing ... 5 TA = 1 battleship. Do you even represent the Soviet TA of the Second World War? Sometimes, it's no more than a hundred armored monsters. I do not understand what you are talking about. I will not sprinkle anything, I need to figure it out
I do not fully understand you. MB.

[Fat]

Pushkar, I just misunderstood. Sometimes the German regiment of heavy vehicles killed our armored army already in numbers, if we count by vehicles. You have to be careful here. I've heard such things ... I don't know, Bro, but my "favorite" dean, just one of the "tankers" .... was wounded in the trash, but his brains were not knocked off.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: apro

Not savages.

Not savages, savages do not win. It was one Soviet people.

[Fat]

Hmm-mm. They were not savages - Russia and the best representatives of the allied peoples? And what were all ours wild? Mnemosyne gave us a lot! We remember everything
From Edita to Better not ...

[Fat]

There was no single Soviet people! Therefore, I will say in Finno Ugric "Uy-nunalez valatam murt" - (a person who is not versed in day and night). Finish already. There were many different things.
Resume, Vlad?
Our truth! We defended Our country. And they did it.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Dalny V

Yes, Verkhoturov is such a Verkhoturov ... A great achievement - in peacetime conditions (the Balkans do not count - they did not influence the process in any way) to adjust the supply, yeah.

On the territory, only a year as passed under the control of the Reich? The task is not ordinary.
At least GA "Center" did not have a situation "2/3 of the fuel is actually stored in Ploiesti".

[hohol95]

Railroad tracks and highways were badly damaged in Poland? Or were the AK fighters "naughty" on the German supply routes?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: hohol95

Railroad tracks and highways were badly damaged in Poland? Or were the AK fighters "naughty" on the German supply routes?

In Poland, the entire military infrastructure was tailored to the Polish army and Polish plans.
In the same ex-Polish borderland, the USSR had a lot of problems related to the fact that damn lord regime did not create conditions for basing the Red Army - well, the Poles did not plan to defend the eastern part of the country against the western one.

[hohol95]

It would be surprising to "sharpen" the Polish infrastructure under the Red Army or the Wehrmacht. Only there was probably a difference in the quality of this infrastructure in the west and east of Poland.

[Catfish]

Good morning, Lord of the Prairie.
Leader, in my opinion, you too harshly walked over the author. For example, apart from dry numbers, I did not notice any panegyric of "Greater Germany". And the Germans always knew how to count and plan. In this case, it did not help them, the more significant our victory.
And you, colleague, do not look like an ordinary jingoist.

[Korsar4]

He presented how those who are here are divided by parties and worldviews.
Picture from "12 Chairs".

[Phil77]

Quote from Korsar4

worldviews

Something, Sergei, do not understand the sense of humor. It's a pity.

[Phil77]

Quote: Phil77

a sense of humor, sorry.
Reply

Yes ... I also ... hit, huh? Laughing together.

[Catfish]

That's right, Sergey. Here only with a condescending smile, otherwise you can not relate to "these".

[Korsar4]

And okay. It's okay that people are different. You can't please everyone. And we will not try.

[Catfish]

Hello, Sergey.
Those minuSERS hardly understood what you meant, even if they once read the book. This company reminds me more of "pike vests" from the second immortal work of the same authors.
Look how they gave the Epitaph the disadvantages, but the man writes perfectly adequate comments, without any "eulogy" to anyone.

[Korsar4]

Hi Constantine!
Even if you start playing "collecting plus signs", it makes sense, according to Kozma Prutkov, to look at circles from pebbles that are thrown into the water.

[Phil77]

Quote from Korsar4

circles from pebbles that are thrown into the water.

Hi Sergey! * Pebbles *? Unpleasant * pebbles *.

[Korsar4]

Hello Seryozha!

They pass by. You can hurt if you get into a sore spot.
And this will have to try hard.

[Phil77]

So, damn it, it's a shame! Bam-bam! And I'm stupid? An argument?

[Korsar4]

See:

1. Taking offense is not constructive.
(Can I bring my old thoughts into the light? -

https://stihi.ru/2001/10/03-225).

2. For example, the opinion of a respected person can worry.
How can you seriously react to letters on the screen?

3. And, oddly enough, benefit can be derived from any dialogue.
(Although it does not occur to me at all to try to convince the disputants of something, for example, on the "Ukrainian question".

[Phil77]

Quote from Korsar4

For example, the opinion of a respected person can worry.
How can you seriously react to letters on the screen?

Yes, you can react normally. When not a dull hit!

[Korsar4]

Imagine yourself as a bullfighter.
If the tram goes on the rails, you're not trying to stop it.

[Phil77]

Quote: Sea Cat

Those minus

Hello Konstantin! Good evening! Some * Fromkin * hurried up to these guys. Extremely impolite ... people. Error! * Fomkin *., * Gennady *, oh!

[Catfish]

And to hell with him, Seryozha. Fomkin ... also me "Newton binomial". Forget it and nafig.

[Phil77]

Quote: Sea Cat

Forget it and nafig.

Just ... why?

[Catfish]

And you ask the neighbor's dog, is he a pillar about --- sal? Animals, they are ...

[Phil77]

Quote: Sea Cat

Animals, they are like that ..

Well, we seem to be about a person, no?

[Catfish]

Someone is worse than a mad dog. I'm not talking about someone specifically, but in general for the human race.

[Korsar4]

Usually the territory is marked.
And sometimes - because you can't bite.

And everyone can remember such stories.

[Moskovit]

The phrase "Dreams Come True" immediately sets you up for such thoughts. And joy for the German army permeates this article like grandma's condensed milk waffles.

[sd000016]

Well, the Germans had more order, well, they had their planes and the training of pilots was better than ours. All this is just a statement of facts. Do you want to keep them quiet? From the article we see what the level of organization of all supply services in the army can and should be. I don't see any praise, but I see the need to master the "advanced experience" of the enemy army.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: sd000016

I don't see any praise, but I see the need to master the "advanced experience" of the enemy army.

The experience of the Red Army is not worse, but better. Just imagine how hundreds of factories beyond the Urals were evacuated in the shortest possible time, and literally in a month or two they began to produce military products. The Germans never even dreamed of this.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: tihonmarine

The Germans never even dreamed of this.

Probably because they didn’t need to fucking drag the factories from Stuttgart or Leipzig somewhere over 2 thousand km. And somewhere in France, on bare ground, in the open air, in 20 ° C frost to rubberize the rollers for the "khanomag" ...

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

... The experience of the Red Army is not worse, but better. Just imagine how hundreds of factories beyond the Urals were evacuated in the shortest possible time.

And what does the 'Red Aria experience' have to do with it ??
Was the task of the Red Army, it turns out, to evacuate the factories?

[Blacksmith 55]

I do not see any agitation in the article; one must learn from the enemy too. If everything was organized in the same way in the USSR, then the war would not last so long.
I have been living in Germany for almost 30 years. At the end of December I received a plan for garbage disposal ..... for a whole year.
And I must say it is executed, as the author said, like a clockwork. For all the years, as far as I remember, I was thwarted once due to a strike.
I was applying for a pension, I spent half an hour in the pension fund, and everything was done. It took a friend from Russia several months. See the difference?
In describing this, I do not want to praise Germany and criticize Russia. There is enough bureaucracy here, but in any organization they take the needs of people (regardless of the thickness of the wallet) quite seriously.
I was in 2015 in my small homeland with my granddaughter, to put a mark in my passport, I had to run for several days.
Let everyone make their own conclusions.
I know that now, as an "enemy", minuses will fall on me.
I just want to say that I would like to wish Russia such officials as here, punctual, conscientious, educated, conscientious about their duties.
Good day .

[ccsr]

Quote: Blacksmith 55

I was applying for a pension, I spent half an hour in the pension fund, and everything was done. It took a friend from Russia several months. See the difference?

Of course we see, because if you and your employer did not deduct money to your pension fund, then you would have to run around collecting various papers in order for you to be credited at least something.
And here, due to the well-known events associated with the collapse of the USSR and the mess of the 90s, many citizens simply cannot confirm their experience and earnings during the Soviet period, so they have to run through different funds and archives, requesting different information for calculating pensions ... Speaking of order here, my wife had to go to the archives of one of the departments that served the Moscow region, but was in Moscow during Soviet times. So she was sent all the data for the appointment of a pension by mail, and she did not have to go anywhere, it was enough to make a written request. We are now more advanced in these matters - you have an idea of ​​Russia thirty years ago, and you hardly know what the EIRTS is, and what can be arranged there upon your request. Even a driver's license, passport or hunting ticket - all of this can now be ordered through the portal of state services.

[BAI]

Another panegyric Verkhoturov of great Germany.

Something new must be said about the war, otherwise it is not interesting. All Russian-language documents have been discussed for a long time. The person knows German. So he rummages in German documents, which, naturally, reflect the German view of what is happening. If I knew English or French, I would write about Anglo-Americans or French.

[wehr]

Alas, I didn’t have a chance to fight NATO, why there are no captured American, British or French documents in the Moscow archives.

[hohol95]

Perhaps there is. Only they refer to the Intervention at the latest.
You also did not indicate the track gauge in the eastern regions of Poland. If it was a European "narrow" track, then whether it was altered for the needs of the Red Army, or the NKPS tried to adapt the Polish and Baltic "trophy" locomotives and wagons without changing the track. That could greatly affect the confusion of the first days of the war.

[smaug78]

Quote: Olgovich

Isn't the above an unconditional reason to immediately bring the troops into combat readiness? Of course is

After the TASS statement, measures began to "immediately bring the troops into combat readiness." The problem is that, due to the peculiarities of mobilization in the USSR, measures to "immediately bring the troops into combat readiness" had to start in early June, when there was still no clarity about Germany's actions and there was a great chance to provoke her to retaliate.
PS Moreover, the Soviet leadership in limited quantities began to carry out measures to "immediately bring the troops into combat readiness" in early spring.

[smaug78]

Quote: Lech from Android.

With proper organization, what was available would have been enough, but everyone wasted in the first days of the war.

It would not be enough, because the state of staffing with vehicles did not exceed 20-25%. The rest was supposed to be withdrawn from the national economy, moreover, together with the drivers ... But they did not have time to pick up what they planned, with the ensuing consequences ...

[Glory1974]

The transportation itself was organized with maximum clarity, and here the whole German order manifested itself in full. For example, on January 4, 15, an order was sent from OKH to the 1941th Army with a timetable for trains with ammunition.

What the author admires is not clear. We made a timetable for the movement of trains, brought to the interested persons who, when and what cargo is receiving. Elementary things. What is the vaunted German order here? Some kind of nonsense.
Moreover, it is not the order of organizing the delivery of goods, but the quantity that comes with the RKKA.

The German divisions had more than double the supply.

Those have more, these have less. It's like comparing warm with salty. Thus, by the end of the article, the logic of the narrative is lost. Grade 3 second birthday. Who scribbled this?

[Cartalon]

The public did not like the article based on documents of any ideology, the history as it is does not interest anyone.
We need agitation about conspiracies.

[hohol95]

The usual work of supply services.
In the complete absence of opposition from the "bandit elements" on the territory of occupied Polish land.
The rear services had no problems with automobile and animal-drawn transport.
Warehouses were also built without hindrances and sabotage. Without interruptions with materials.
That's all. The usual German routine.

[Vlad world]

Actually, the title of the article does not correspond to the content. Pretty decent. If the author changes a little in the title - at the beginning of the war - to - before the war - then it will correspond to the content.

Here in the comments there was regret about the supply of Soviet troops before the war and at the beginning. The General Staff and its leader personally are responsible for this. Who was it --- I think they know here.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vlad-world

Here in the comments there was regret about the supply of Soviet troops before the war and at the beginning. The General Staff and its leader personally are responsible for this. Who was it --- I think they know here.

Is the NSGS responsible for this too?

The mobilization plan of the national economy for the 1941 war year provided for the supply of NPOs to 174,5 thousand tons of B-78 aviation gasoline. In the presence of 56,9 thousand tons of this type of gasoline in the untouchable reserves of NPOs, the security of annual demand was less than 22,5%. For other types of gasolines, the need for NPOs was planned to meet (taking into account the use of cash emergency reserves) for B-74 by 28,6%, for B-70 and RB-70 - by 98,8%. But the B-70 and RB-70 were used mainly on outdated types of aircraft, and the main share of the needs for them fell on training units and refresher courses.
For the ground forces, the fuel supply requirements were satisfied by KB-70 and B-59 by 82,5%, by motor gasoline by 62%, by diesel fuel by 45,3%.

© Melia
Or for the fact that the NKBP disrupted the release of armor-piercing shells for 76-mm guns, including because of the ugly organization of production - also the NGSH was responsible?
The army does not supply itself.

[hohol95]

Did the NKPS have any problems with rolling stock and wagons?

[Vlad world]

In general, these are different departments of the NKBP and the NGSH. The General Staff is responsible for deliveries and plans. Both defense plans and defense supply plans.
It seems that in those days they were punished for disrupting production. And if the General Staff did not achieve at least punishment for those who disrupted the supply, then either the plans are unrealistic or the General Staff's unwillingness to fulfill them. Somewhere like that

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vlad-world

The General Staff is responsible for deliveries and plans. Both defense plans and defense supply plans.

Well, the NGSh issued the BBS supply plan. And the factories either drove the marriage, or failed to work for organizational reasons. And what - will the General Staff of the Red Army be to blame?

Quote: Vlad-world

It seems that in those days they were punished for disrupting production.

Uh-huh ... in the aviation industry, for example, the director who did not cope with the plan was removed - and transferred to manage another plant. And that director - in his place.

Quote: Vlad-world

And if the General Staff did not achieve at least punishment for those who disrupted the supply, then either the plans are unrealistic or the General Staff's unwillingness to fulfill them. Somewhere like that

You have very idealistic ideas about order in the USSR. I know at least one director of a defense industry enterprise, whom even Mehlis himself could not cope with. Moreover, after the surrender of the unfit tanks to the army, after the refusal to correct the design flaws of the manufactured products, after the official discovery of the forgery of financial documents at the plant - after all this, the aforementioned director became the people's commissar.
The second plant refused to make any modifications to its products for six months, although the tank was also ineffective without them. And only under the threat of stopping acceptance, the plant reluctantly agreed - but from the 1001st machine.

[Vlad world]

I do NOT have an idealistic view of the USSR. I believe that the USSR would have collapsed anyway without Gorbachev. So to speak, sooner or later.
Well, your data only shows that the Party and its member are above all else. Party ties and stuff, that is, Blat. And all the same, there is a certain amount of blame - in the supply disruptions and in quality - the General Staff also has. Not finished, not finished. Let's not forget some amount of sabotage. And His Majesty is the Plan. For failure to comply with which the Party punished so that the fear of the military was minimal. All together we get the well-known result. Well, in the development of military plans that led to the catastrophe at the beginning of the Second World War, only the General Staff and its leader are to blame.

[DrEng527]

Thanks to the author - interesting figures ...

[ccsr]

Author:
Dmitry Verkhoturov

In German literature, some information was found about rail transport in Poland during the preparation for the attack, from late 1940 to June 1941. But on the whole, the data were scarce and lackluster. I always wanted to look at the process from the inside: how it was organized and how it happened.
Dreams come true, and I managed to find a case with documents on the transportation and accumulation of military cargo (ammunition, fuel and food) by Army Group B from December 1940 to the end of May 1941.

The author is slightly mistaken in these paragraphs, because they contradict each other. Nothing has been delivered to Poland since the end of June 1940, because only in July, as some historians testify, Hitler's idea of ​​starting a war against the USSR was first voiced in one of his conversations with Halder and other military leaders. Moreover, already at the end of summer - beginning of autumn 1940, demobilization began in parts of the Wehrmacht, because the country bore a heavy burden of military expenditures and a rationing system for a number of goods had already been introduced in Germany. That is why, until the Barbarossa directive was APPROVED, there were no serious cargo transfers to our border. And they really began in December 1940, which was revealed by us not only by border reconnaissance, but also by the RC General Staff of the KA.
In general, I do not undertake to discuss the author's approach to the topic, but I will note that we, too, successfully transferred troops to the western districts in May-June 1941, and there were articles about this on VO. Well, the fact that the German railways were the best in Europe then, and even now, hardly any of the experts will deny - this is really so, and I know this from the experience of the withdrawal of our troops from the Western Group of Forces.

[smaug78]

Quote: DrEng527

and in 1941, the readiness of the army in the West was supposed to be by mid-June under the guise of US - just to check the troops and deployment plans and remain until mid-August

Very nice, with the massive withdrawal of equipment and personnel from the national economy ... A direct gift to Hitler. And the US is a little different:



[ To the main ]



PRO (B) US-1941

In the already distant 2009, on June 11, Dmitry Shein, also known by the nickname "Kid" and "litl_bro", in his LiveJournal posted an article "About the training camp of 1941 ... (... which is no place" big ")". It was reprinted on several sites, for example, on this one. (But under the heading: "Dmitry Shein. LARGE TRAINING FEES of the 41st - WAS MOBILIZATION?"
The article shows the document of the 1st volume of "Robins", pp. 731-732:
=========

N: 306. EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

N: 28
8 March 1941 city

155. On the conduct of training camps for military reserves in 1941 and the attraction of horses and motor vehicles for training from the national economy.

To approve the following draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: "The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:

1. Allow non-profit organizations to call for military training in 1941 in the military reserve in the amount of 975.870 people, of which:

for a period of 90 days 192.869 people
for 60 days - 25.000 people
for 45 days - 754.896 people
for 30 days - 3.105 people

2. Allow NPOs to attract 45 horses and 57.500 vehicles for training camps from the national economy for 1.680 days, distributed according to the appendix to the republics, territories and regions.

3. Fees to spend:

a) in reserve rifle divisions in three stages:

first stage - from May 15 to July 1
the second stage - from July 10 to August 25
the third stage - from September 5 to October 20;

b) in rifle divisions of six thousand in the period - from May 15 to July 1;
c) in rifle divisions of three thousand personnel in the period - from August 15 to October 1;
d) carry out other fees in turns throughout 1941.

4. To exempt from training camps in 1941 workers and engineering and technical workers:

Commissariats of aviation, shipbuilding, chemical industry, ammunition, weapons and communications;

Kharkov plants N: N: 183 and 75, Leningrad N: 174, Moscow N: 37, Kharkov and Stalingrad tractor plants, bearing plants GP31 and GP32; the fuselage shop of the Kharkov plant "Hammer and Sickle" of the People's Commissariat for Srednom;

Kirov plant of the People’s Commissariat of Mash;

NII-20, special shops of small series of the "Electrosignal" plant, plants N: N: 197 and 203 of the Narkomelektroprom;

Kolchuginsky plant them. Ordzhonikidze, Leningrad factories "Red Vyborzhets" and them. Voroshilov Narkomtsvetmet, as well as all tractor drivers, combine harvesters for the spring sowing and harvesting campaigns.

5. Provision of food for those conscripted for training, to make from the funds of the NCO within the limits allocated for the collection of 1941, 145.000 annual food rations.

6. To attribute the costs associated with the maintenance of people and horses involved in the training camp at the expense of the NCO estimates for the maintenance of the Red Army in 1941. "

RTSKHIDNI F.17. Op.Z. D. 273.LL. 27-28. Typescript, certified copy.
=======

But the article does not show one more document "Robins" (volume 2)

=======
N: 484. RECORD VRED. HEAD OF THE MOBILE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY TO THE HEAD OF THE OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY

N: Mob / 4 / 548345cc
[no later than 20 May 1941]

I am forwarding a certificate about the training of the assigned personnel in the [fir-tree] divisions in 1941.

APPENDIX: Certificate on the training of the assigned personnel in the divisions in 1941 on 6 pages.

Vreede. Head of Mob Directorate
The General Staff of the Red Army
Colonel Glushkov

Head of the 4th department of Mob Management
Lieutenant Colonel Sinitsyn \ 245 \

REFERENCE
on the training of the assigned personnel in rifle divisions in 1941

table in xls-file (in archive) [With add. columns on the right - Approx. zhistory]

Vreede. Head of Mob Directorate
The General Staff of the Red Army
Colonel Glushkov

Head of the 4th department of Mob Management
Lieutenant Colonel Sinitsyn

CA MO RF. F.16. Op. 2951. D7242. LL 195-201. Blank, original, autograph. Litter: "Personally".
=========

Also Dmitry Shein in his LiveJournal on another page laid out 16 Directives of March-April 1941 on the conduct of training sessions in 1941 (TsAMO RF, f. 38 (Main Armored Directorate), op. 11351 (Combat Training Directorate), d. 5 (Directives of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army to increase the combat and mobilization readiness of troops)).
Below is an example addressed to the Western OVO:

========



(Corner stamp left)
People's Commissariat
Defense of the USSR
GENERAL BASE
Red Army
MOBILIZATION
CONTROL
4th Division

31 March 1941 city
N: mob / 4 / 548191ss

(Stamp)
SECRET PART
UBP GABTU KA
Secretly
VX. N: 1131ss
"16" 4 1941

OWL. SECRET
ind. N: 7

MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN SPECIAL
MILITARY DISTRICT

Copies: TO HEADS OF CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS
Non-profit organizations of the USSR / according to a special list /.

Chief of the Main Armored
Management of the Red Army

In order to increase the combat and mobilization readiness of the district troops, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

ORDERED:

1. Conduct in 1941 training camps and training of the assigned personnel of military formations, units and rear services in accordance with the attached calculations.

2. The main tasks of training camps are:

a / improving the combat training of the assigned personnel by positions and specialties in accordance with the assignment for wartime;

b / putting together combat crews 9machine gun, mortar, gun, etc. /;

c / putting together a squad, platoon, company, battalion and regiment in states close to wartime;

d / the adoption of the commanding and junior commanding staff of practical skills in commanding units.

3. The training camps of the assigned composition of military formations, units and rear services, indicated in the attached calculations, should be conducted:

a / in all rifle divisions in one line from June 1 to October 15;

/ 1 /

b / in parts of air defense and airborne missiles in several bursts throughout the summer period;

in / in fortified areas in the period from May 15 to October 1;

g / in military food and propaganda points in one queue from September 15 to December 15;

e / training of the junior command staff of the reserve from the rank and file of the reserve should be carried out in one queue in the period from May 15 to July 15;

f / training of scarce specialties should be carried out in one line from May 15 to July 1.

4. The duration of training camps and preparation is indicated in the attached calculations.

5. Training of junior commanding personnel of the reserve to cover the shortage of military units and the accumulation of reserves to be carried out at the military units. For training, involve the rank and file of the reserve who have completed active service in the cadre units of the Red Army at the age of not older than 30 years. To conduct training in the most important scarce specialties in accordance with mobilization needs. Upon completion of the training, those who passed the test as a junior reserve command staff should be awarded the rank of junior sergeant.

When assigning a rank, be guided by the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army N: mob / 3/546073 of March 14, 1941.

6. Training of specialists in short supply should be carried out at rifle, cavalry and tank formations deployed in the western regions of the BSSR in the most important scarce specialties, in accordance with mobilization needs. For training to attract assigned to military units from among the military service of the former Polish army.

/ 2 /

Mainly to train: mortarmen, artillerymen of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery, laboratory technicians, radio operators, sappers, tankmen and specialists of field auto bakery factories.

7. The military council of the district, taking into account the interests of the national economy and local conditions, is allowed, without exceeding the total number of people involved in the training, to make its own changes in the specified dates for the training and in the number of people involved in each formation and separate unit. Provide for training in some rifle divisions from June 1.

8. The plan for the training, indicating separately the commanding, junior commanding and rank-and-file personnel involved in training training for each formation and separate unit, the exact dates of the training and the collection points, should be submitted to the General Staff of the Red Army by May 5, 1941.

9. When organizing training camps, require unit commanders to inform the leaders of industrial enterprises, collective and state farms in advance about the upcoming involvement of military personnel from these enterprises and farms in training camps. The call of the assigned staff for training camps should be carried out by the method of verification mobilization, with the task of checking the calculations of mobil plans.

10. On the passage of training camps, make marks in the military cards of those liable for military service and in the registration cards. At the end of the fees, oblige those liable for military service to appear at the registration authorities for marks on the passage of fees in the registration cards.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: smaug78

But the article does not show one more document "Robins" (volume 2)

Not shown. But he is mentioned - he was definitely in the LJ article.

Subsequently, the number of assigned personnel of rifle divisions called up for training was increased (see the note of the chief of the mob directorate of the general staff):

The main thing is that people were called up on the US-41 - privates and junior command personnel. But from the fact that they were stuffed with rifle divisions, their combat effectiveness increased little. For the equipment from the n / x division did not receive. And without the mobilization of traction and transport, peacetime divisions even an artillery regiment could not normally relocate, let alone supply the division in the field, in isolation from the point of permanent deployment.

[smaug78]

So this is my answer to

and in 1941 the readiness of the army in the West was supposed to be by mid-June under the guise of US

is DrEng527's fantasy

[Trilobite Master]

The stronger the enemy, the more honorable the victory.
The author revealed to us one more term, from which the German victories of the initial period of the war were formed, for which thanks to him. I do not see anything reprehensible in this and I do not understand the indignation of some commentators.
The disputes over the surprise of the attack are also surprising. If the war ended in a week, then it is understandable, everything was decided by the surprise of the attack. If most of the losses in this war occurred in the first week of the war - well, la, surprise would play a role. But when the war lasted almost four years, and the losses of the first days against the background of the general losses of the parties are simply invisible - guys, what are you talking about? It is possible to refer to suddenness to justify the failures of the first three days, no more. "Surprise" is a fairy tale of Soviet times, which was used to justify a series of serious military defeats in 1941, the reasons for which lie in something completely different.
I do not often speak here on the themes of the Second World War, but today, perhaps, I will allow myself.
The majority of commentators, both the advice-haters, such as Olgovich, and the advice-lovers, of whom there are "innumerable", I think, need to understand a simple thing. At the time of the attack on the USSR, the German army surpassed the Red Army in almost all main indicators. She was better armed and equipped, better trained, better technically equipped, had better supplies and support, more combat experience and more qualified command personnel at all levels of command, especially at the grassroots. It was the best army in the world. Therefore, the defeats of the Red Army in the initial period of the war were inevitable, for as long as one of the sides knows how to fight better in an armed confrontation, it will win.
The fact that the USSR did not break down, and the Red Army managed to withstand and increase its level, while the level of the Wehrmacht was steadily declining, as a result of which it caught up with it, and then surpassed it - another story. This is the merit of the Soviet government and the Soviet people.
But in the initial period of the war, it simply could not be otherwise, and "surprise" here plays the same role as decorating a wedding car with ribbons against the background of all other wedding preparations.

[tasha]

Good comment.

"Surprise" is a fairy tale of Soviet times, which was used to justify a series of serious military defeats in 1941, the reasons for which lie in something completely different ...
At the time of the attack on the USSR, the German army surpassed the Red Army in almost all main indicators.

When reading articles and books on the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, I keep asking myself the question - what is the reason, why? Three + - a million prisoners ... Airplanes abandoned at airfields, tanks on the sides of front-line roads ... How is that?

[smaug78]

Quote: Trilobite Master

and "surprise" plays the same role here as decorating a wedding car with ribbons against the background of all other wedding preparations.

Deployed Red Army, with statutory densities, etc. hardly reached Berlin at 41, but Operation Typhoon would not have happened either ...

[Trilobite Master]

The deployed Red Army would most likely be destroyed in a border battle. The more forces would fall under the first blow of the Germans, the more difficult it would be to make up for these losses. In the summer, a fresh, replenished with all the necessary German army in the immediate vicinity of its supply bases ... I do not think that anyone could have resisted it at all, even the Red Army. In the fall, tired, far from the main bases, with worn-out material, I doubt it ...

[smaug78]

Quote: Trilobite Master

The deployed Red Army would most likely be destroyed in a border battle.

The deployed Red Army, in principle, could not have been destroyed in a border battle, so it would not have been there ... The main battles were supposed to be fought along the Stalin line (the old border).

[tasha]

I liked the article. It would be good to highlight the last two paragraphs in a separate chapter - Results, and compare the dynamics of the accumulation of reserves in the ZOVO USSR, at least since the beginning of 1941.
An interesting figure - 164 days of food supply in the German division on 22.06

In addition, by June 29, 1941, the Western Front had lost 30% of its ammunition stocks and 50% each of its fuel and foodstuffs.

All the main warehouses with stocks of material resources on the eve of the war were located 30-80 km from the state border ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: tasha

All the main warehouses with stocks of material resources on the eve of the war were located 30-80 km from the state border ...

For the same ammunition, this is, to put it mildly, incorrect.
The warehouse of the 1st category of the ZAPOVO was located in Zakopytye (Gomel region, near the border with the RSFSR). Warehouses of the 2nd category - near Lepel and Minsk.

The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of 3-nd and partially of the 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (of the 1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.

Of the total number of district warehouses, 10 were built in the pre-Soviet period, 20 were organized in 1941 in the Baltic republics, Western Belarus and Ukraine on the basis of military warehouses already existing there, 13 were equipped in the open air, and the remaining 68 warehouses were created during the Soviet era in mainly in 1930-1940

© Artillery supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45.
That is, the bulk of the artillery depots were located outside the old border - for in 1930-1939. borderland-41 belonged to Poland, and it was somewhat difficult to build warehouses of the Red Army on this territory at that time ..

[tasha]

In addition, by June 29, 1941, the Western Front had lost 30% of its ammunition stocks and 50% each of its fuel and foodstuffs.

All the main warehouses with stocks of material resources on the eve of the war were located 30-80 km from the state border, as a rule, in large cities. In connection with the retreat of our troops, many bases and warehouses, due to the impossibility of using and evacuating, were either blown up, or destroyed by enemy aircraft, or abandoned. By June 29, more than 60 district warehouses remained in the territory occupied by the enemy, including 10 artillery, 25 fuel, 14 food, 3 armored vehicles. The total losses by this time were: ammunition - more than 2000 cars (30% of all front reserves), fuel - more than 50 thousand tons (50% of reserves), armored vehicles - about 500 cars. food fodder - about 40 thousand tons (50% of reserves), clothing property - about 400 thousand basic sets (90% of reserves). Losses of engineering, transportation, medical and sanitary property and chemical protection means reached 85-90% of the front's reserves.

The rear of the Western Front in the first days of the Patriotic War. I. Boyko

[smaug78]

Quote: Thick

Sometimes the German regiment of heavy vehicles killed our armored army already in numbers, if we count by vehicles.

Will you please with the numbers?

[Fantomchik]

Supply with the clarity of the clockwork? And what about the supply of winter uniforms?

[Red Alert]

Quote: Far In

There were enough abnormal figures there and besides this - Shevardnadze, Yakovlev ... Gorbachev would not have pulled such nonsense into one funnel.

what now is crying over the past

And no one calls to cry over the past. And no one calls to return it either, because that water has already flowed away. But to return the country to the previous vector of development is a very possible and feasible task.

In modern realities, this is almost impossible. Alas