What does the Russian Aerospace Forces promise to gain operational readiness with SPEAR-3 / EW tactical missiles?

55

As you know, the military-analytical and technical material of Ilya Legat, presented a few days earlier for a broad discussion of the audience of "Military Review", "Mini-revolution in the British way: a rocket for the F-35 can change the rules of the game" became the subject of lively discussions in the most knowledgeable observer circles our information publication.

Thus, the author's list of the tactical and technical advantages of the promising stealthy tactical missile SPEAR-3, developed by the British division of the European military-industrial corporation MBDA, as part of updating the ammunition sets for the multifunctional vertical / short takeoff and vertical landing of the 5th generation F-35B "Lightning II", made some of our readers and commentators doubt the ability of the echeloned network-centric air defense systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces to effectively fend off probable massed missileaviation blows using these products.



Key technical trump cards of SPEAR-3 tactical missiles, which are worth paying close attention to


And, of course, a similar opinion of a certain part of our audience really takes place in relation to the operational-tactical alignment observed today, as well as the conclusion appearing in Ilya's review that the estimated parameters of the stealthy SPEAR-3 tactical missile, which is hastily prepared for operational readiness, allow rank this brainchild of MBDA in the list of the most effective air attack weapons used by the NATO Air Force / Navy in conventional network-centric theaters of the XNUMXst century.

Being a deeply improved hybrid modification of the stealthy gliding UAB GBU-53 / B (SDB II) and multipurpose missiles JAGM / "Brinstorm 2", as well as having an integrated compact turbofan engine "Humilton-Sundstrand" TJ-150 / "Pratt & Whitney" TJ- 130, a promising tactical missile SPEAR-3 in a standard multipurpose modification (equipped with a multichannel seeker with millimeter active radar and multispectral IR / TV sensors, as well as a computerized INS) boasts, firstly, an ultra-small RCS of the order of 0,007-0,01 kV ... m, and secondly, the ability to operate in the terrain bend mode.

The first feature can significantly complicate (and in a difficult jamming environment, completely exclude) the detection and "linking of tracks" of tactical missiles SPEAR-3 by means of radar complexes "Shmel-M" AWACS aircraft A-50U, airborne radar N035 "Irbis-E" fighters Su -35S / Su-30SM2, as well as low-altitude RLO "Podlet-K1" and illumination radars 30 / 92N6E (attached to the ZRDN S-300PM1 / S-400).

After all, it is well known that the lower limit of the effective reflecting surface of targets detected and tracked by the above radar systems is 0,01–0,02 sq. m, significantly exceeding the EPR indicators of the SPEAR-3 missiles of the standard modification.

The situation is not critical and controllable


Meanwhile, the EPR of the "jamming" electronic warfare version of this family of tactical missiles with the SPEAR-3EW index (also developed by MBDA specialists) can reach values ​​of 0,015–0,03 sq. m, which is due to the presence in the electronic architecture of these products of a distributed aperture of jamming emitting antennas and interferometric antenna arrays of electronic intelligence, which are radio contrast elements that increase the RCS significantly.

As a result, the SPEAR-3EW “jamming” (despite the generation of response noise interference, aimed at frequency) can still be detected and “processed” by the jam-resistant receiving paths of the radars of the S-300V4 and S-300PM1 / 400 anti-aircraft missile systems.

Moreover, the operation of tactical missiles SPEAR-3EW in the mode of generating multi-band radio-electronic interference will turn these products into powerful radio-emitting sources, which will be easily located and

"Captured for accurate auto tracking"

9B-1103M-200PS active-passive radar homing heads installed on domestic RVV-SD / Product 180 medium / long-range air-to-air missiles and with a mode of aiming at a source of electronic interference (referred to in the Air Force / Navy methodological manuals The United States and NATO's Naval Forces are nothing but "HOJ" - "Home-on-Jam").

As paradoxical as it may sound, equipping all SPEAR-3 modifications with Humilton-Sundstrand TJ-150 turbofan engines not only makes it possible to more effectively overcome echeloned anti-aircraft “barriers” of a potential enemy due to operating in the terrain enveloping mode, but also increases their infrared signature generated by the jet jets of the working TJ-150.

Thus, missiles of this family are heat-contrast objects detected and tracked both through the infrared channel of aviation quantum optoelectronic sighting and navigation systems of the OLS-35 / 50M type (integrated into the SUV architecture of the Su-35S and Su-57 stealth fighters), and and by means of the 10ES1-E turret optical-electronic sighting systems, which are the main help in maintaining the highest noise immunity of the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile control system.

As you can see, there is absolutely no need to talk about the ability of SPEAR-3 / EW to penetrate our A2 / AD anti-aircraft zones almost unhindered.

In the same turn, the ultra-small image intensifier of the standard (multipurpose) modification of this tactical missile should already today push the representatives of the defense department of the Russian Federation to initiate the intensification of the work of the N.I. V.V. Tikhomirov, "Fazatron-NIIR" and NII "Agat" on projects of promising high-energy radar detectors, target designation and guidance radars, as well as active radar seeker for missile-guided missile interceptors based on radio-photon AFAR, digital antenna arrays (CAR), and LTCC-AFAR , represented by transceiving modules, obtained by the method of low-temperature co-fired ceramics.

As you know, these types of radars have many times more highly sensitive and noise-immune receiving paths, capable of processing targets with EPR within thousandths of a square meter.
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  1. +8
    25 January 2021 05: 36
    Damantsev! Do you have a creative tandem with the Legate? One is against the grain, the other is against the grain, and the wool is in place. laughing
    Before describing the spherocon battles of aviation versus air defense, you would ask about the list of priority targets for the means of destruction available in the interspecies association.
    And it is necessary to examine "wider and deeper" who, with what, whom, how will "spud".
    1. +4
      25 January 2021 09: 35
      It seems that before reading the article, you need to clarify the author.
      Somewhere in the middle of this article, the question arose "What kind of blizzard am I reading?"
      1. +8
        25 January 2021 09: 38
        From the second paragraph came the understanding, whose pen creaked on the parchment, then “diagonally”.
        1. +4
          25 January 2021 12: 49
          From the second paragraph


          Each paragraph is no more than one sentence ..))
      2. +1
        25 January 2021 21: 15
        laughing Do not. The first two sentences are enough, sometimes even the title. Verified. hi
  2. -7
    25 January 2021 05: 40
    Quote: Yevgeny Damantsev
    ... a promising tactical missile SPEAR-3 in a standard multipurpose modification (equipped with a multichannel seeker with millimeter active radar and multispectral IR / TV sensors, as well as a computerized INS) boasts, firstly, an ultra-small RCS of the order of 0,007-0,01 sq. m, and secondly, the ability to operate in the terrain bend mode.

    We have long been in service with radars that detect targets with image intensifier = 0,0002 m2 - "Patsir-C2". Therefore, the task of detecting and destroying SPEAR-3 is doable!
    1. +6
      25 January 2021 07: 34
      Quote: Dread
      We have long been in service with radars that detect targets with an image intensifier = 0,0002 m2 -

      Yes, any radar can. The only question is at what distance. And accordingly, what can be done in response.
      1. -12
        25 January 2021 08: 05
        Quote: Jacket in stock
        Yes, any radar can. The only question is at what distance. And accordingly, what can be done in response.

        Have you lost sight, there is for every radar there is minimum RCS concept target that the radar can detect.
        For radar "Pantsir-C2" is 0, 0002 sq. m, and for Buk-M2 it is 0,05 sq. m.
        1. +9
          25 January 2021 09: 43
          Quote: Dread
          for each radar there is a concept of the minimum target RCS that can be detected by the radar.

          As far as I remember about the radio and another location, there is no minimum RCS for the radar. There is the sensitivity of the receiver, which determines the distance at which this radar can detect a target with one or another RCS. Accordingly, the smaller the target's RCS, the less distance the radar will detect this target.
          And what you are writing about is probably the minimum RCS of the target that the station can detect at its maximum operating range. Or not, I don't know what exactly you mean.
          1. -1
            25 January 2021 22: 04
            Quote: Jacket in stock
            As far as I remember about the radio and another location, there is no minimum RCS for the radar.

            Due to its high combat qualities, the Tor-M1 continues to function to this day as one of the most important air defense systems in the Russian army. The maximum speed of the targeted target is 700 m / s, as well as minimum ESR - 0,05 m2 allow to fight practically any modern UAVs, anti-radar missiles such as HARM and ALARM, as well as free-falling and guided bombs.
            https://integral-russia.ru/2016/07/14/obnovlyonnye-tory-i-buki-protivoraketnye-mastera-zhivuchesti-dlya-vojskovoj-pvo/

            The smallest EPR for the complex "Pantsir-C1" 2-3 cm²[24]
            https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%80%D1%8C-%D0%A11.

            Your statement is refuted by the presented materials!
            1. 0
              26 January 2021 14: 18
              Quote: Dread
              Your statement is refuted by the presented materials!

              By no means,
              Firstly, this is not a description of the performance characteristics, but articles by illiterate journalists-humanities.
              And secondly, even you did not give them completely, because after the words
              Quote: Dread
              The smallest ESR for the Pantsir-C1 complex is 2-3 cm²
              usually write at a distance of 20 km, and 2 sq.m. at a distance of 30 km.

              A little below everything is chewed, work hard, read it if you are really interested.
              1. 0
                28 January 2021 05: 41
                And secondly, even you did not give them completely, because after the words
                Quote: Jacket in stock
                Quote: Dread

                The smallest ESR for the Pantsir-C1 complex is 2-3 cm²

                usually write at a distance of 20 km, and 2 sq. m. at a distance of 30 km.

                A little below everything is chewed, work hard, read it if you are really interested.

                You are confusing the radar detection range with the lowest RCS.
                1. The radar detection range is given for targets with a certain
                RCS, where RCS values ​​are selected according to the natural series: 1,2,3,4 ... (according to the average value, according to the purpose of the aircraft or aircraft type).
                2. If the author E. Damantsev had brought radar parameter - detection range and did not indicate for what RCS target or what type of aircraft, then he would have made a gross mistake.
                3.However, E. Damantsev wrote abstractly:
                As you know, these types of radars have many times more highly sensitive and noise-immune receiving paths, capable of processing targets with EPR within thousandths of a square meter.

                Therefore, he is completely right. There are EPR tables, where the EPR values ​​of aircraft and flying birds and insects are indicated, therefore E. Damantsev wrote abstractly with meaning. In vain they pounced on him.
                4. For the radar parameter - the maximum detection range, the EPR is given
                purposes, and for specific examples and values, recalculate according to the Basic Radar Equation. For the smallest RCS
                targets that the radar can still detect, do the same.
                For example, the detection range of the SOTS "Pantsir-S1" is D = 37 km for targets with EPR = 2 sq. m, then the target with the lowest RCS = 0,0002 sq. m. (2 cm2)
                Will be detected in the distance
                D = 3,7 km. That's the whole story.
                1. 0
                  28 January 2021 06: 13
                  Quote: Dread
                  You are confusing the radar detection range with the lowest RCS.

                  Am I confusing?
                  By no means.
                  I was just about this and tried to explain to you that it is pointless to indicate the minimum RCS of the target without specifying the range at which the radar is able to detect this target.
                  And I crammed the radar formula for 6 years at the university and another 6 years at the research institute. Since then, however, many years have passed, but I definitely won't mix this up.
  3. +1
    25 January 2021 05: 42
    Eugene, what to do - dance the cancan, or crawl to the cemetery? wassat But seriously, I'm sorry, but you have enough "blunders" too! !! hi Although, let's hope it's not as bad as you write. ...
  4. +1
    25 January 2021 06: 15
    Thus, missiles of this family are heat-contrast objects detected and tracked both by means of an infrared channel
    Correct me, but are such targets easy to detect from a frontal projection? In my opinion, even from the side it is not very easy, only in pursuit, and at an ultra-low altitude it may be too late, for "Shell" in any case.
  5. +4
    25 January 2021 08: 00
    receiving-transmitting modules obtained by the method of low-temperature jointly fired ceramics
    Like I'll tell you about kings and cabbage, voosche!
    Radiator technology to noise figure no sideways.
    1. +23
      25 January 2021 08: 28
      receiving-transmitting modules obtained by the method of low-temperature jointly fired ceramics

      Evgeny did not know about fired ceramics before.
  6. +12
    25 January 2021 08: 38
    Another tub of information blizzard from Damantsev.
    As a result, the SPEAR-3EW “jamming” (despite the generation of response noise interference, aimed at frequency) can still be detected and “processed” by the jam-resistant receiving paths of the radars of the S-300V4 and S-300PM1 / 400 anti-aircraft missile systems.
    The author, so these rockets are intended to be discovered! They are not only a jammer, but also decoys for air defense!
    And about "antenna arrays" - this is a traditional blunder. The author, apparently, never saw them at all.
    1. +6
      25 January 2021 10: 18
      Damantsev, why are you minus?
  7. -5
    25 January 2021 09: 51
    Quote: Undecim
    The author, so these rockets are intended to be discovered!

    Well, this is the tactic, first we knock down the false traps from electronic warfare, and then everything else, in a calm atmosphere
  8. +8
    25 January 2021 10: 51
    After reading an article by a well-known author from beginning to end, you become proud of yourself - you had enough endurance to master all the abbreviations, not to break your head with an abundance of technical information (sometimes unnecessary). It's not easier to write in a few sentences - the Anglo-Saxons (bastards) decided to use this and that against us, but we are not bastard and can oppose this with our own. Conclusion - the enemy will not pass.
  9. +9
    25 January 2021 14: 13
    As you know, these types of radars have many times more highly sensitive and noise-immune receiving paths, capable of processing targets with EPR within thousandths of a square meter.
    Damantsev constantly hangs this EPR noodles on the ears of a gullible reader.
    The effective scattering area is not a radar parameter - it is a quantitative characteristic of an object's ability to scatter an electromagnetic wave.
    For understanding.
    The range of the radar with a passive response is calculated by the formula

    As can be seen from the formula, the RCS of a target is one of the parameters that determine the maximum range at which a given radar will detect this target.
    And the smaller the RCS of the target, the smaller the distance at which a particular radar will detect it.
    Therefore, the author's phrase about "receiving paths capable of processing targets with EPR within thousandths of a square meter" is meaningless and does not carry any meaning without indicating the distance at which these same "receiving paths" will be able to "process" "a target with EPR within thousandths fractions of a square meter ".
    And the administration of the site stubbornly places this illiterate, science-like writings in the "Analytics" section.
  10. 0
    25 January 2021 17: 56
    Quote: Dread
    Quote: Jacket in stock
    Yes, any radar can. The only question is at what distance. And accordingly, what can be done in response.

    Have you lost sight, there is for every radar there is minimum RCS concept target that the radar can detect.
    For radar "Pantsir-C2" is 0, 0002 sq. m, and for Buk-M2 it is 0,05 sq. m.

    - There is no such thing, Losers, "the minimum RCS that can be detected by the radar", this is nonsense! There are concepts range at which this radar is capable of detecting a target with a standard RCS, for example, 1 mXNUMX... Hence, we "dance".
    1. -1
      25 January 2021 19: 31
      Quote: Outsider
      - There is no such thing, Losers, "the minimum RCS that can be detected by the radar", this is nonsense! There are concepts of the range at which a given radar is capable of detecting a target with a standard RCS, for example, 1 m². Hence, we "dance".

      Dear forum users! Before you is an illiterate strategist from Israel who does not know the subject of RPU (radio receivers) and radar from the word at all. He has been repeatedly written about this here.
      The radar receiver has the final value of the limiting sensitivity of the receiving path, which determines the minimum value of the RCS of the target, which can be detected by the radar at its range, without the loss of information from the target at the entire range.
      1. +1
        25 January 2021 19: 57
        Wrote it wrong. It will be right -
        The radar receiver has the final value of the limiting sensitivity of the receiving path, which determines the minimum value of the RCS of the target that the radar can detect at its range!
        1. -1
          25 January 2021 20: 20
          PS The smallest EPR for the complex "Pantsir-C1" 2-3 cm²[/ b] [24]
          https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%80%D1%8C-%D0%A11

          Outsider - the above expression also refutes your judgment.
        2. +3
          25 January 2021 20: 41
          As the classics said: "Well damn vaasche!" Detection is a probabilistic process, and the probability of detection depends on the ratio of the Signal ENERGY and the spectral density of the receiver's internal noise, and the latter is somehow related to the same sensitivity. But the signal energy is a tricky thing, and depends not only on the power of the transmitter, but also on something else. And most importantly, having the same transmitter power, the radar can study signals of different energies, and therefore, for the same target, with a given probability, detection will occur at different ranges! And the second conclusion, by increasing the signal energy at a constant transmitter power, it is possible to detect a target with any RCS at a given range, but the ratio between the transmitter power and the signal energy for a specific combat radar is unlikely to be found anywhere, because this will immediately reveal a lot of characteristics that are not intended for open discussion.
          1. +2
            25 January 2021 23: 10
            And the second conclusion, by increasing the signal energy at a constant transmitter power, it is possible to detect a target at a given range with any RCS,


            More careful. Even with signals with a wide base, even with a continuous sinusoid, you will still rest against time. Yes, yes, that is the simplest time by which you need to multiply the power in order to get the energy you need in the receiver, in order to exceed that very noise N by the required number of times. So "any EPR" is too much. And then inadvertently during this time and the rocket from old age will crumble. wink
            1. 0
              26 January 2021 09: 18
              More careful
              What's the problem? You know this is the right time to discover 3 sq.m. at a distance of 400 km? Why such confidence in RCS values ​​in the form of many zeros after the decimal point? And for real values ​​of EPR it will not take much time, even with a poorly painted rocket, the paint will not have time to peel off! smile
              1. 0
                26 January 2021 09: 39
                Why such confidence in RCS values ​​in the form of many zeros after the decimal point?

                No trust. 0,3-0,5 for a stealth plane. (This is without taking into account smart flight, taking into account the dips of its diagram) For this thing, it is possible an order of magnitude less. But that's not the point. It will not have to be detected and shot down by a super-locator with spaced-apart antennas, but by a conventional anti-aircraft gun and small missiles. The same "Shell". This is where the real troubles of reduced ESR come out. There, and so everything is at the limit in terms of reaction time. And it will be just barely enough.
                Think about it. They created a weapon for the aircraft, which was previously used only by helicopters. Strike at a previously explored target. Flies up, identifies, chooses a target. Herself.
                I see only one drawback - the small mass of the warhead. You need to hit the bull's-eye. And even then it's not a fact that you will make a hole.
                1. +1
                  26 January 2021 09: 44
                  Quote: dauria
                  I see only one drawback - the small mass of the warhead. You need to hit the bull's-eye. And even then it's not a fact that you will make a hole.

                  Unfortunately you are wrong. The mass of the warhead is more than enough.

                  1. 0
                    26 January 2021 09: 51
                    Unfortunately you are wrong. The mass of the warhead is more than enough.


                    Handsomely. Like any advertisement. But in reality it doesn't look like that. Have you seen the Grad-type SRZO shell? The result will be the same. Broken asphalt and a Zhigulyonok with holes two steps away. And the main "universal" ammunition for aviation remains the 250-kg bomb.
                    1. +1
                      27 January 2021 14: 33
                      Quote: dauria
                      Unfortunately you are wrong. The mass of the warhead is more than enough.


                      Handsomely. Like any advertisement. But in reality it doesn't look like that. Have you seen the Grad-type SRZO shell? The result will be the same. Broken asphalt and a Zhigulyonok with holes two steps away. And the main "universal" ammunition for aviation remains the 250-kg bomb.


                      And what does the Grad have by default with a warhead with a detonation delay fuse?
                      Or does the Grad warhead corps have a similar SDB warhead?

                      Maybe all the same, the purpose of warheads is different and, accordingly, the algorithm of operation and the quality of the targets hit are also different?

                      Here's another video - not advertising at all ...
                2. 0
                  26 January 2021 10: 16
                  It will not be necessary to detect and shoot it down with a super locator with spaced antennas, but with an ordinary anti-aircraft gun and small missiles
                  There is no need to embrace the immensity. Such weapons will lead to the death of systems "rotating and waving antennas in all directions." There will be either sectoral detection and engagement systems, without any mechanics, or division into a system of all-aspect information support of the near-field zone and a set of sectoral systems of multichannel destruction based on external target designation.
                  1. 0
                    26 January 2021 10: 28
                    on the system of all-aspect information support of the near zone and a set of sectoral systems of multichannel destruction by external target designation.


                    Was it all reduced to the Israeli "iron dome"? How naive techies are when it comes to the practice of war.
                    1. 0
                      26 January 2021 11: 27
                      And where does the "dome"? And do the military understand something better? It is too expensive to shoot "radars", and without them it is cheap, but not effective, then "circular and echeloned", then "Shell" is one against all, and even cheaper, but all at once ...
  11. +2
    25 January 2021 20: 18
    You are the hell!
    "What does this headline on the Military Review promise us ?!"
    The author is Evgeny Damantseva!
    If I'm wrong, minus me right in the most negative minus !!!
    The truth is - Damantsev ?!
    Honestly - I didn't read the article, didn't see the author: only the title of the article ...
  12. +2
    25 January 2021 20: 57
    As you know, these types of radars have many times more highly sensitive and noise-immune receiving paths, capable of processing targets with EPR within thousandths of a square meter.

    Dear author, do you cultivate such fencing grass yourself ?! A thousandth of a square meter is a strip of 1cm x 10cm! Modern radars can see such "noodles" well!
    Sincerely
  13. -1
    25 January 2021 22: 29
    Humilton, yeah. I wonder how many more mistakes are in the text.
  14. -2
    26 January 2021 14: 01
    Quote: Dread
    Wrote it wrong. It will be right -
    The radar receiver has the final value of the limiting sensitivity of the receiving path, which determines the minimum value of the RCS of the target that the radar can detect at its range!

    - No matter how much you, an ignoramus, "get better", you write nonsense and it still does not work out correctly. And in the whole normal world, for any radar, they give it a target determination range with a standard EPR - for the Americans this is 1 m²... And from here you can recalculate the target detection range with any RCS.
    For example, the radar of the F-35 APG-81 aircraft:
    EPR = 1 m² - D = 160 km, from here:
    EPR = 0.1 m² (Su-57) - D = 90 km
    EPR = 0.01 m20 (J-51?) - D = XNUMX km
    EPR = 0.001 m² - D = 28.5 km
    EPR = 0.0001 m22 (F-35, F-16) - D = XNUMX km
    EPR = 10 m29 (MiG-284) - D = XNUMX km
    RCS = 20 m² (Su-27, Su-30SM, Su-35S) - D = 338 km
    EPR = 30 m31 (MiG-374) - D = XNUMX km
    1. 0
      28 January 2021 04: 16
      Quote: Outsider
      EPR = 0.0001 m22 (F-35, F-16) - D = XNUMX km

      Outsider, you are not only ignorant ...
      Advertising illiterate videos of firms Lockheed - Martin leave for yourself.
      You don't know what kind of image intensifier is,
      therefore, write these children's data, confusing the mean RCS with instantaneous values. This has been repeatedly told to you for more than 4 months, and you continue not to understand elementary things.
    2. +1
      28 January 2021 09: 54
      I don’t know where the nonsense comes from about the difference in RCS by an order of magnitude between the J-20 and the Su-57, I don’t know, and where did you get the idea that the RCS of the Su-35 is equal to the RCS of the Su-27. You see, when the Su-27 and its analogues were being created, they did not think about the fighter's EPR and there was no way to count and reduce it. And when the Su-35 and its peers were created, such methods were, respectively, from all 4th generation aircraft, it is possible to cut off huge RCS values ​​with minimal effort simply because of the low start effect.

      And there are hardly any aircraft with RCS less than 0.025.
  15. -1
    26 January 2021 14: 22
    Quote: Dread
    PS The smallest EPR for the complex "Pantsir-C1" 2-3 cm²[/ b] [24]
    https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%80%D1%8C-%D0%A11

    Outsider - the above expression also refutes your judgment.

    - You are looking at the wrong place of the link, you need to look here:
    https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%80%D1%8C-%D0%A11#%D0%A1%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B0_%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F,_%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B6%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%B8_%D1%83%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BD%D1%91%D0%BC
    The 1RS1-1E radar station for detecting dm-range targets was created at VNIIRT. For targets with effective scattering area 2 m² detection range is 32-36 km.
    ......................
    We take:
    EPR = 2 m² - D = 34 km
    From here, consider what you want, for example:
    EPR = 0.0002 m² - D = 3.4 km.
    EPR = 0.0003 m² - D = 3.78 km
    1. 0
      28 January 2021 04: 01
      Quote: Outsider
      The 1RS1-1E radar station for detecting dm-range targets was created at VNIIRT. For targets with an effective scattering area of ​​2 m², the detection range is 32-36 km.
      ......................
      We take:
      EPR = 2 m² - D = 34 km
      From here, consider what you want, for example:
      EPR = 0.0002 m² - D = 3.4 km.
      EPR = 0.0003 m² - D = 3.78 km

      Outsider, get it right from the start
      conversation - about the minimum RCS of the target that can be detected by the radar, not your recount. You can also recalculate for image intensifier = 0,0001 m2, for example D = 2,859 km. However, the radar 1RS1-1E does not see a target with RCS less than 2 cm2. Therefore recalculation cannot be produced for purposes with an image intensifier less than a minimum of 2 sq. cm, which is above and indicated. You have been saying this for more than 2 months, and you all cannot understand.
  16. +1
    28 January 2021 09: 46
    "Holy Jewels", "Holy Spirs". Does the author generally understand that the "Speer" -3 is a small anti-tank, or anti-ship missile, the same Hellfire? What does the Su-35 radar have to do with it? If such a missile is a reason for pride for the Britons, then what can we say about our missiles, which are planned to be placed on the Su-57. There is not 100 kg of weight, but 700 and the range is much greater.
  17. -1
    28 January 2021 12: 56
    Quote: Dread
    Quote: Outsider
    EPR = 0.0001 m22 (F-35, F-16) - D = XNUMX km

    Outsider, you are not only ignorant ...
    Advertising illiterate videos of firms Lockheed - Martin leave for yourself.
    You don't know what kind of image intensifier is,
    therefore, write these children's data, confusing the mean RCS with instantaneous values. This has been repeatedly told to you for more than 4 months, and you continue not to understand elementary things.

    - I repeat for the "dummies" and illiterate creatures like them: INSTANT EPR VALUES ARE NOT INTERESTED BY ANYONE AND NEVER, AND ARE NOT GIVEN ANYWHERE - because there is NO NEED: not a single radar or radar station determines and does not give instant EPR values, but ONLY THE AVERAGE !! laughing Children should know this.
    Always and everyone is interested in the AVERAGE values ​​in a certain sector, rather wide... For example: frontal RCS of the aircraft - in front, approximately +/- 30 ° from the longitudinal axis. And if the wavelength is not indicated, we are talking about the X-band, 2.5 cm - 3.75 cm, or 8-12 GHz.
    Therefore, when they say that the RCS of the F-22 / F-35 is about 0.0001 m², it is the frontal RCS in the three-centimeter range.
    ........................
    There is another option: in the Soviet / Russian Air Force, it was traditional to give (and accept for calculations in Air Force units) EPR from the front hemisphere at a 3/4 angle with a standard set of weapons.
    The following values ​​were accepted:
    MiG-29 - 10 m²
    Su-27 - 15 m²
    Tu-22M3 - 35 m²
    1. 0
      28 January 2021 18: 29
      Quote: Outsider
      - I repeat for the "dummies" and illiterate creatures like them: INSTANT EPR VALUES ARE NOT INTERESTED BY ANYONE AND NEVER, AND ARE NOT GIVEN ANYWHERE - because there is NO NEED: not a single radar or radar station determines and does not give instant EPR values, but ONLY THE AVERAGE !! Children should know this.

      You haven't listed everything about yourself yet ... you are not interested in instantaneous values, but you are writing exactly about them с Lockheed-Martin commercials.
      The average image intensifier F-22 (F-35) is 0,3 (0,35) m2 in the front hemisphere. And "Pantsir-C1" will detect target data (for our case) at a distance
      D ~ 23 km (~ 23,93 km) excluding line of sight.
      Quote: Outsider
      RCS = 20 m² (Su-27, Su-30SM, Su-35S) - D = 338 km

      outsider- EOP Su-35 is 1,5 m2, like Raphael, approximately, in the front hemisphere. All your given data are deliberately underestimated.
  18. -1
    28 January 2021 13: 01
    Quote: Dread
    Quote: Outsider
    The 1RS1-1E radar station for detecting dm-range targets was created at VNIIRT. For targets with an effective scattering area of ​​2 m², the detection range is 32-36 km.
    ......................
    We take:
    EPR = 2 m² - D = 34 km
    From here, consider what you want, for example:
    EPR = 0.0002 m² - D = 3.4 km.
    EPR = 0.0003 m² - D = 3.78 km

    Outsider, get it right from the start
    conversation - about the minimum RCS of the target that can be detected by the radar, not your recount. You can also recalculate for image intensifier = 0,0001 m2, for example D = 2,859 km. However, the radar 1RS1-1E does not see a target with RCS less than 2 cm2. Therefore recalculation cannot be produced for purposes with an image intensifier less than a minimum of 2 sq. cm, which is above and indicated. You have been saying this for more than 2 months, and you all cannot understand.

    - Well, of course you can and of course - he will see, an eccentric - if the goal is to bring it closer! laughing lol
    You are higher here Undecim 25 January 2021 14:13 said everything? Read his post carefully?
    1. -1
      28 January 2021 17: 57
      Quote: Outsider
      - Well, of course you can, and of course - he will see, the eccentric - if the goal is to bring her closer!
      Undecim above January 25, 2021 14:13 told you everything? Read his post carefully?

      Quote: Dread
      The radar receiver has a finite value of the limiting sensitivity of the receiving path, which determines the minimum value of the target RCS that can be detected by the radar at its range!

      outsider- teach RPU (radio receivers) and what is limiting sensitivity and signal-to-noise ratio. You have a big knowledge gap. And also do not forget about the meaning of words in Russian.
      Quote: Outsider
      Undecim above January 25, 2021 14:13 told you everything? Read his post carefully?

      Outsider, it's ugly to write a lie!
      Undecim wrote not for me, but abstractly about the author E. Damantsev.
      laughing
  19. -1
    28 January 2021 13: 35
    Quote: dauria
    on the system of all-aspect information support of the near zone and a set of sectoral systems of multichannel destruction by external target designation.


    Was it all reduced to the Israeli "iron dome"? How naive techies are when it comes to the practice of war.

    - Study, study and study - to the fullest enlightenment:
    https://www.rada.com/products/mhr


  20. -2
    28 January 2021 17: 22
    Quote: EvilLion
    "Holy Jewels", "Holy Spirs". Does the author generally understand that the "Speer" -3 is a small anti-tank, or anti-ship missile, the same Hellfire?

    - No, not the same. Twice as many.
    What does the Su-35 radar have to do with it? If such a missile is a reason for pride for the Britons, then what can we say about our missiles, which are planned to be placed on the Su-57. There is not 100 kg of weight, but 700 and the range is much greater.

    - The fact is that in the F-35 there are 8 such missiles, which means they cover 8 targets... And the penetration of one meter of reinforced concrete is enough to break down almost any structure.
  21. 0
    28 January 2021 23: 41
    Quote: Dread
    Quote: Outsider
    - I repeat for the "dummies" and illiterate creatures like them: INSTANT EPR VALUES ARE NOT INTERESTED BY ANYONE AND NEVER, AND ARE NOT GIVEN ANYWHERE - because there is NO NEED: not a single radar or radar station determines and does not give instant EPR values, but ONLY THE AVERAGE !! Children should know this.

    You haven't listed everything about yourself yet ... you are not interested in instantaneous values, but you are writing exactly about them с Lockheed-Martin commercials.
    The average image intensifier F-22 (F-35) is 0,3 (0,35) m2 in the front hemisphere. And "Pantsir-C1" will detect target data (for our case) at a distance
    D ~ 23 km (~ 23,93 km) excluding line of sight.

    - No, my naive friend! You are retelling a very popular runet bike that has nothing to do with reality. you want it to be, but this not So.
    I have already quoted my favorite picture many times, a computer model created by Chinese graduate students, which illustrates all this wonderfully. Here is the X-47B UAV:



    Here is his radar signature drawn by a large computer.

    Quote: Outsider
    RCS = 20 m² (Su-27, Su-30SM, Su-35S) - D = 338 km


    Tell me what is the frontal RCS of this UAV, according to the picture? The scale is logarithmic, in dBsm, otherwise the figure will be too inconvenient:
    20 dBsm = 100 mXNUMX
    10 dBsm = 10 mXNUMX
    0 dBsm = 1 mXNUMX
    -10 dBsm = 0.1 m²
    -20 dBsm = 0.01 m²
    -30 dBsm = 0.001 m²
    -40 dBsm = 0.0001 m²
    -50 dBsm = 0.00001 m²
    outsider- EOP Su-35 is 1,5 m2, like Raphael, approximately, in the front hemisphere. All of your given data are deliberately understated.

    - These are crystal dreams that the Su-35S, and even with missiles, had an EPR = 1.5 m², but "this cannot be, because it can never be", - It has an all-aluminum airframe and absolutely nothing, like the Su-27, does not cover the VNA and LPC blades in the input devices... Therefore, its EPR from the front hemisphere is the same as that of the Su-27.
    For the Su-57, according to its creators, and what is recorded in the patent for its manufacture, EPR, in a circle, is given from 0.1 m² (you must understand - frontal, and even after installing the radar blocker), up to 1 m² (you must understand - from the side, under the 4/4 angle).
    It is average, smoothly changing (as far as possible).
    Here, drawn by my non-artistic hand, the middle line is the very mean value of the RCS, which is perceived and issued by any radar, not every small sharp tooth:

    1. +1
      5 February 2021 06: 39
      Quote: Outsider
      - No, my naive friend! You are retelling a very popular runet bike that has nothing to do with reality. you want it to be, but it is not.
      I have already quoted my favorite picture many times, a computer model created by Chinese graduate students, which illustrates all this wonderfully. Here is the X-47B UAV:

      An illiterate strategist from Israel -
      What area of ​​expertise are you from? You do not know radar at all, write frank fakes and try to make friends.
      You are as illiterate as your fictional Chinese graduate students:
      1. Image intensifier tubes are given for a certain frequency (wavelength)
      E-M fields.
      You do not know this with your imaginary Chinese graduate students, and the computer does not know this and does not know how to calculate the average value of the image intensifier over the area.
      2. Cite a tailless as an example and do not understand that the tail unit further increases the image intensifier.
      3. The image intensifier tube of the Su-35S is equal to 1,2 m2 and is approximately equal to the image intensifier tube = 1,5 m2 of Raphael.
      And before you write your illiterate statements, not a specialist, look at the suspension of weapons - maybe you will understand something. If there were radar blockers or other design solutions were applied, then the Su-35S image intensifier came close to the Su-57 image intensifier.
      Outsider - no need to write fables!
      4. Outsider - you played so hard with the illiterate specialists of Lockheed - Martinthat your fakes - EOP F-35 decreased morethan 100 times the coverage score, which is sheer stupidity. Learn materiel with them.
      5. Outsider - learn to count the average
      the value of image intensifier by area, illiterate strategist!
  22. -1
    29 January 2021 01: 00
    Quote: Dread
    Quote: Outsider
    - Well, of course you can, and of course - he will see, the eccentric - if the goal is to bring her closer!
    Undecim above January 25, 2021 14:13 told you everything? Read his post carefully?

    Quote: Dread
    The radar receiver has a finite value of the limiting sensitivity of the receiving path, which determines the minimum value of the target RCS that can be detected by the radar at its range!

    outsider- teach RPU (radio receivers) and what is limiting sensitivity and signal-to-noise ratio. You have a big knowledge gap.

    “I'm really starting to forget what you never knew! laughing
    And also do not forget about the meaning of words in Russian.

    - But I definitely don't need to teach me Russian ... wink
    Quote: Outsider
    Undecim above January 25, 2021 14:13 told you everything? Read his post carefully?

    Outsider, it's ugly to write a lie!
    Undecim wrote not for me, but abstractly about the author E. Damantsev.

    - ?? I have not said anywhere, this post is addressed to you personally. But it exists, it is useful, read it - and you will learn a lot of new things for yourself ... lol
  23. -1
    29 January 2021 01: 16
    Quote: EvilLion
    I don't know where the nonsense comes from about the difference in EPR by an order of magnitude between the J-20 and the Su-57

    - Yes, everything is from the same place - from the network ...
    I don’t know, and where did you get the idea that the RCS of the Su-35 is equal to the RCS of the Su-27.

    - Sheathing of both of them is made of pure unalloyed duralumin. The design is almost identical. so why should the EPR be different?
    You see, when the Su-27 and its analogues were being created, they did not think about the fighter's EPR and there was no way to count and reduce it.

    - There were already ways to count, there were already ways to measure. They just didn't bother with it.
    And when the Su-35 and its peers were created, such methods were, respectively, from all 4th generation aircraft, it is possible to cut off huge RCS values ​​with minimal effort simply due to the low start effect.

    - "With minimal effort" there is a devil with two "cut" something! All this costs years of work and tens of billions of dollars - if you want to get the result... And if for little money, then it turns out the Su-57, and even the Indians say that it is very much lacking in stealth. That's why they didn't take.
    And there are hardly any aircraft with RCS less than 0.025.

    - Ah, those sweet dreams! How they warm the soul of sofa hamsters ... "We do not have - it means that no one has!" But this is not true.
    That is why American stealth and Chinese stealth fly with Luneberg lens blocks, and on the Su-57 there was no Luneberg lens block, and there never will be. For an elementary reason - he was not lying around with stealth ...


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