"We'll see!" On the importance of the media and publicity of "burning" issues
In a number of articles by the author, the issues of critical shortcomings of new ships and extremely acute problems of the real combat capability of the Navy were raised earlier.
Questions arise: "What to do"? And most importantly - "How?"
first... This is an awareness of the severity and causes of problems, the need for their unconditional solution.
Second... In criticism, it is very important to have constructive proposals for solving the identified problems ("technical solutions").
The third... Management decisions that are effective taking into account all the existing "organizational insanity" ("organizational decisions").
It is necessary to understand that, given the current system, even high-ranking officials have limited (sometimes quite) managerial capabilities to solve complex complex problems. When they are interspecific and interdepartmental. And it is doubly especially when the big interests of "authoritative businessmen" and "fat cats" of the defense industry complex are involved in the case.
Perhaps it will not "explode"!
Conversation at the 2017 International Maritime Defense Show. The developer's representative conducts a “tour of the company's stand,” which the author has joined. You need to be able to ask the right questions at the right time. And he followed when it came to "innovative power lithium ion battery."
It is installed on a torpedo instead of a disposable one for practical shooting.
Dialogue (verbatim):
- There are.
- Do you understand what this can lead to ?!
- Of course, we are qualified engineers!
- So why?
- Well, explosion and fire.
- Where ?! Where are you going to put it?
- Well, on a submarine. But let's hope this doesn't happen.
The author made inquiries about the specialist with whom he spoke. To be honest, I was asked not to pull this history “To the public”, literally (about a specialist of the enterprise):
A couple of examples of what the effects of a lithium-ion battery explosion look like.
Video of the explosion and fire of "Tesla" (with a lithium-ion battery) on the Moscow Ring Road (Moscow).
Tesla's engines are rated at 225, 270 or 310 kW. The battery in question ("Lyon") was made for a product with an engine power of 390 kW.
What is an explosion and fire of ammunition on a torpedo deck? Clearly.
Moreover, "everyone understood and understands everything."
Based on what "hydra" and you personally pushed into the fleet a product that never did not pass tests in the standard configuration (with a combat battery), and from which you and your you shy away like the devil from incense (I mean "Comrade Kant"), batteries that have not passed safety tests, with forged documents. you are aware of the explosion and fire of a lithium ion battery on torpedo deck?
Report officially? Yes, there were reports, and multiple reports.
The main military prosecutor's office? There it, too, "did not arouse interest," replied the fleet. In the style "everything is fine, beautiful marquise".
December 2019, writes (on one of the special forums) "Extraordinary employee of DOGOZ" (Department of the Ministry of Defense for the State Defense Order):
In this "everything is fine", and in DOGOZ, which only in 2019 "suddenly saw the light" (and in fact - "covered the fifth point" with a piece of paper) that it can "explode and blaze" (on the torpedo decks of submarines). And the fleet, which, understanding all the possible consequences (explosion and fire on the torpedo deck), nevertheless “signed and agreed” ...
And everything is very simple:
Note. The word "Losharik" sounded above. In the context of a serious accident with human lives and a heroic struggle for the survivability of the crew of the AS-31 nuclear deep-water station (unofficial name "Losharik"). There were no such illegal things on "Losharik". This can be stated with certainty.
In the case of Lyon, it was different. Torpedoes with deliberately "problematic" batteries that did not pass the required tests (including safety tests) were shoved onto the boats by all crooks. That is, it is not even "negligence", but much worse.
And the Losharik is an example of the nature of the consequences if the Lyon entered the fleet. Only the scale would have been incomparably worse, given the presence of ammunition "around".
Society and media
What is the conclusion of all this?
Even a principled and responsible officer, even the highest (admiral), are within the framework of the established system.
Situation on navy, in the Ministry of Defense and the defense industry is such that even a high-ranking and honest leader is in a very strict framework of what he can do. And he cannot do very much. Or maybe, but only if someone does part of what is needed "bypassing the system."
And in this situation, the role of honest mass media is not only to inform society (including about serious problems), but also to give responsible leaders what they can effectively use “at the top” in the interests of the country and business.
Specific situation. A longtime acquaintance says that he is ready to put documents on the problems of the Navy on the table (to a very high-ranking person), but a strict condition:
The point is that these documents cannot be used by villains against the boss himself, having brought them under the DSP or "stamp" on "formal grounds".
Result. The digest of articles that are in the public domain goes to the top. Yes, you cannot say much in the open media, and in reality everything is much worse. But at least so, than not at all.
Lessons from "Nerpa"
On November 8, 2008, during sea trials in the Sea of Japan on the Nerpa nuclear submarine, 20 members of the delivery team and the submarine's crew were killed due to the unauthorized operation of the LOKh fire extinguishing system and its filling with a poisonous composition. The perpetrators of the terrible state of emergency were “appointed” by the submarine commander D. Lavrentyev and the bilge sailor D. Grobov.
Previously, the author has already described the situation around this order in the "Military-Industrial Courier" - "The tragedy on the Nerpa: facts and questions" part1 и Part 2.
“... at 0 hours 38 minutes on the Nerpa nuclear submarine, the software of the Molybden-I remote automated control system for general ship systems (SDAU OKS) failed, as a result of which without operator command the alarm for the differential pressure in the pipelines of the LOH system (boat volumetric chemical alarm about the supply of a fire extinguisher to the compartment) was triggered, the left column of the OKS CPU was out of order and remained inoperative ...
Based on the results of the commission's work, it was established:
1. The system was technically faulty and did not provide operation for its intended purpose.
2. The alleged cause is a malfunction (failure) in the operation of the main software processor controlling the system operation.
In view of the above, I note that the automatic system event recorder recorded the command, ... as a command given by the operator, although in fact the command was not given to the watchkeepers.
Representative of NPO Aurora (enterprise - system developer) specialist V.G. Lukova cannot give objective explanations in essence of the detected failure, since she is not a system programmer. The reason for the actuation of the fire extinguisher supply sensors of the LOH system is also not established.
Lavrentiev's report contains the whole essence of the "Nerpa case". There is a party who wants to not fulfill the contract at any cost, but to "push" it away. And there is another side, which, proceeding from a sense of duty and understanding the full measure of personal responsibility for solving the assigned task, requires high-quality execution of the state order. On the last one there are both people in uniform and civilian specialists who have retained their honor and conscience, who understand the negative consequences of the problems of the Indian customer with the Nerpa.
Rear Admiral Voitovich (Pacific Fleet) on the investigation of the Nerpa:
What followed is a very relevant and for today example of a real solution to one of the acute problems of the Navy and a fair court decision.
Despite the obvious fabrication of the criminal case against the members of the Nerpa's naval crew (and against the background of rejection of any real investigative actions against the persons who poured poison into the fire extinguishing system (and the facts of massive automatic failures)), there was a clear state of doom in relation to the accused ...
I will not give the well-known names (of the officials) that were used in this case, but in fact everything remained “the crew was appointed guilty”.
The author of this article worked for a long time with Admiral G. Suchkov, an adviser to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, and invited interested persons from the Nerpa's crew to go to him. But they no longer believed in anything or anyone.
The event that turned the "outlined course of events" was a post on the Sevastopol forum:
The next day, the author prepared a set of materials for Admiral Suchkov about what happened on the Nerpa, where the first item was the citation of this post. After reading it (and not yet reaching the main part), Suchkov grabbed the receiver and called the commander of the Pacific Fleet S. Avakyants, literally (there was a loud voice in the receiver, and everything was clearly audible):
We will omit the details of Avakyants' answer. Those who have closely followed the situation understand with sufficient accuracy what was being discussed. But I will quote the last two phrases (literally):
To which Suchkov replied with the words included in the title of this material:
Then a number of actions were taken to maximize public disclosure of the fabricated circumstances of the shameful criminal case and the real reasons and facts of the tragedy that took place on the Nerpa.
The public reaction also played a very large and positive role here, especially the active participation of the "Submariners' Club".
Bottom line: the truth still triumphed.
Yes, not all. For the wrongly accused only. And no one was looking for the real culprits (some of them very quickly left the country "for a very long treatment abroad").
But this took place only thanks to the tough public disclosure: both the circumstances of the tragedy and the problems. Including thanks to the honest work of the media.
And this applies not only to Nerpa.
The incident made it necessary to open and actually eliminate serious problems of automation of the 4th generation of new submarines of the Navy (before that, its "glitches", up to the unauthorized operation of fire extinguishing systems, were not only on the "Nerpa", but also in the orders of the 4th generation, built in Severodvinsk). Moreover, in the circle of specialists there were serious doubts that they, in general, could be eliminated. For "organizational reasons."
That is, the Nerpa (its automation, the same for our entire fourth generation of submarines) was brought up (more precisely, the development of events forced the VIPs of the industry to set the task of unconditionally fine-tuning the automation of new submarines).
"Troubled Admiral"
Against the background of all the problems of our shipbuilding, a series of Project 11356 frigates and Project 6363 submarines for the Black Sea Fleet is perceived as an absolute success.
And a very large role in this was played by Admiral G.A. Suchkov. Moreover, these decisions themselves (his proposals and actions) at the time of adoption were assessed by specialists very ambiguously, with sharp criticism of the shortcomings of these ships.
In addition, the author himself raised these sensitive issues in communication with Suchkov.
The answer was:
Admiral Suchkov was the one who started the reconstruction of the Main Command of the Navy, which was defeated in the course of thoughtless "reform" at the turn of 2010.
And it was not "in a narrow circle", he requested proposals on this part from many initiative officers. This resulted in a number of documents addressed to the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense, which had positive consequences.
Are there different opinions on the issue?
He arranged not just "boxing", but a head-on collision of different sides in his presence, he demanded real comparative tests.
For example, the last comparative torpedo firing was carried out in the mid-2000s. After the "torpedo scandal" with the batteries, they were carried out precisely at his request (after an appeal to the Minister, and with a corresponding decision).
Yes, Gennady Aleksandrovich was not always right (only the one who does nothing is not mistaken). For example, the subject of sharp (sometimes extremely sharp) discussions with him were questions of hydroacoustics.
But he really "fought" for the cause, not being afraid to cross the "formal framework".
Admiral Suchkov died in August 2013.
PS
A serious question arises about the veterans of the fleet (including senior officers and admirals). About their position on today's most pressing problems of the Navy (stealth against new means of searching for submarines, conditions with air cover for the forces of the fleet and bases, underwater weapons and especially anti-torpedo protection, etc.), with which our fleet, entering the war against any serious enemy, is waiting for the next "Tsushima pogrom."
And this is not only the factor "to honestly report to the society" (or the Supreme). This is also very important in order to really help those who are now in the ranks of the RF Armed Forces.
Someone who understands the severity of the situation, but does not have the ability (within the framework of the current system) to really change something.
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