Military Review

The imperfect alchemy of Teutonic steel. The opinion of Soviet engineers in 1942

39

Trophy "crazy Tanks"" Artsturm ". Source: waralbum.ru


The subtleties of German booking


In the previous part of the material research of German armored vehicles in Sverdlovsk in 1942 was about the chemical composition of tank armor.

In reports, Soviet metallurgists noted the high hardness of German steel due to the high proportion of carbon. This, among other things, gave the armor unnecessary fragility, which the testers encountered during the fire tests.


Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) somewhere on the Eastern Front. Source: waralbum.ru

Enemy steelmakers were highly appreciated for their careful attention to the purity of the alloys obtained.

In most of the samples, the sulfur content did not exceed 0,006-0,015%, and the phosphorus content did not exceed 0,007-0,020%. Unfortunately, Soviet metallurgists did not always succeed in removing harmful impurities in this way. So, in Nizhny Tagil in tank production in the first quarter of 1942, the average phosphorus content in the armor was 0,029%, and only in the third quarter its share was reduced to 0,024%.

The degree of alloying of German steels was also of considerable interest, which significantly exceeded the domestic one in this parameter.

For example, the bulletproof armor of captured tanks up to 20 mm thick contains more than 2% nickel in silicon-chromium-nickel steel, up to 0,45% molybdenum in silicon-chromium-molybdenum steel, up to 3,5% in silicon-chromium-nickel-molybdenum steel, about 0,3% of nickel , 0,5% and molybdenum - XNUMX%, in chromium-molybdenum-vanadium steel - about XNUMX% molybdenum.

For bulletproof armor of domestic production (grades 1-P, 2-P, etc.) of the same thicknesses, much less alloyed with molybdenum and nickel steels are used. And quite often they do without these alloying elements at all.


Stalingrad trophy - Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. L. Source: waralbum.ru

TsNII-48 specialists participating in the study of armor indicate that the domestic industry has nothing to learn from German armored vehicles. Simply put, any fool can achieve high armor resistance due to the widespread use of scarce nickel and molybdenum.

And try the same trick without using expensive metals - by fine-tuning the production cycle of smelting, rolling, quenching and tempering.

In many ways, for the Soviet industry, this was a forced measure - there was a chronic shortage of non-ferrous metals. And the Germans, having conquered almost all of Europe by 1941, could afford to generously sprinkle armor with alloying elements.

The exception among the steels under study was the German chromium-molybdenum-vanadium 20–40 mm projectile armor. Analysis of these samples showed a level of alloying similar to that of domestic armor.

Continuing the research topic of alloying German armor, engineers in Sverdlovsk did not find any clear pattern between steel composition and thickness.

Recall that the following captured tanks took part in the tests - TI, T-IA, T-II, two T-IIIs with different cannons, a flamethrower Flammpanzer II Flamingo, Pz.Kpfw.38, StuG III Ausf.C / D (reckless "Artsturm ") And, according to the Russian classification of 1942, the heavy T-IV.

If we take several samples of armor with a thickness of up to 15 mm from different tanks, it turns out that in some of them their proportion of alloying elements will correspond to the norm, and in some, nickel will go off scale for 3,5%. Specialists from TsNII-48 suggested:

"The use of different and often high-alloy steel for the same thickness and type of armor is most likely due to the use by the Germans not only of the armored steel grades of their production, but also of those significant reserves of armor that were captured in the occupied countries."

Under scrutiny


The next characteristic of German armor was its appearance - a fracture, as one of the main parameters of manufacturing quality.

A bit of theory in a highly simplified form.

If a fibrous metal structure is observed at the fracture, then the quality of the armor is high, and it is quite viscous. But if there are crystalline areas or crystalline rash, then this is a sign of a gross manufacturing defect.

For example, the T-IV armor was not the most uniform in fracture analysis. With the same chemical composition and thickness, the fracture of some parts was satisfactory (and often very good with a fibrous fracture), while in other similar samples the fracture was of a substandard crystalline form.

There was a rough marriage of German steelworkers. But it was impossible to talk about such violations as about the system - after all, the sample of trophies from Soviet engineers was small.

In fairness, in connection with the rapid offensive of the Germans in 1941, the quality of domestic armor in terms of the break parameter also seriously decreased.

For example, for KV tanks, the People's Commissariat of Defense allowed crystalline areas and a crystalline rash on the fracture of the armor in the first six months of the war. Previously, the standard was exclusively fibrous fracture. Despite this, the experts of the Armored Institute write in their conclusions that

the requirements for the quality of armor of hull parts are lower for the Germans than in the USSR. The samples under study have missing parts with a crystalline fracture and a wide range in the allowable hardness.

The Germans mostly used homogeneous armor of high hardness.

But heterogeneous case-hardened steel, which is difficult to manufacture, was in short supply and was used for shielding both the frontal parts of the hull and the turret.

Fire tests


The shelling of captured tanks from heavy machine guns, anti-tank rifles and cannons showed that the quality of the German armor was unsatisfactory.

The assessment was carried out in accordance with the Technical Specifications for Armor for Tanks adopted in the USSR. The claims in German steel were as follows - high brittleness and a tendency to form cracks, splits from the impact of shells and the presence of spalling from the rear.

High-hardness bulletproof armor was excellently penetrated by 12,7-mm domestic bullets from DK (Degtyarev Large-caliber). Especially effective is fire in long bursts, when breaks of 40-50 mm were formed on the armor. Fractures of the armor at the site of the holes showed very dry, fine-crystalline fractures, often even with metal delamination.

They also shot at the captured tanks at the range from an anti-tank rifle with 14,5 mm B-32 bullets. Conclusion - the gun is an extremely powerful tool for the destruction of light German armored vehicles.

A little about the vulnerable and strong parts of German armored vehicles of more serious dimensions. The forehead of the captured Pz.Kpfw.38 did not penetrate up to 45 mm shells, and the DK machine gun could only take the tank from behind. The real thunderstorm of the Czechoslovak machine was the 76-mm caliber - defeat from any angle.

Not the best quality armor was found on the captured T-III. If the 45-mm domestic anti-tank gun pierced the armor through and through, then spalls up to 3 caliber shells formed on the back side. Cracks were also forming, splitting parts into pieces. But the T-III still had to be pierced with that caliber.

The results indicate that the vehicle has a fairly satisfactory protection against 37-mm and 45-mm guns at heading angles of 25–45º. In fact, the T-III's hull sides, side and rear turret parts were vulnerable to these guns. 76-mm penetrated a German tank in any scenario.


Sump of destroyed and dismantled German tanks Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV on the outskirts of Stalingrad. Source: waralbum.ru

The "heavy" T-IV left the following impressions:

“The tank has a fairly satisfactory protection against a 37-mm projectile, which provides the ability to confidently maneuver within the range of course angles of 0-30º. Within these limits of course angles, the tank's armor reliably protects against 37-mm shells even at the shortest firing distances.

All side and stern parts are vulnerable to 37-mm shells. The most vulnerable are the unshielded part of the hull side and the upper rear part of the hull.

The tank's protection against 45-mm shells is less satisfactory, since the weakness of the unshielded part of the hull side deprives the tank of the ability to confidently maneuver under fire from a 45-mm cannon at the bow, the most important course angles.

The protection of the tank from a 76-mm projectile is completely unsatisfactory, since even its frontal parts are penetrated by this projectile at a 45º heading angle from a distance of 1100 m, and at the same time, even a slightly lower heading angle, the tank already exposes a significant area of ​​less protected parts under fire.

In the end, about the "Artshturm" self-propelled gun, the concept of which seemed to the Soviet engineers the most interesting.

Protection against 37-mm and 45-mm anti-tank guns is effective within the course angles of 0-40º.

From a distance of 1100 meters, the 76-mm Russian cannon penetrates the StuG III Ausf.C / D at a course angle of 15º.

At the same time, the TsNII-48 experts advised fellow designers to adopt the layout of an unprecedented reckless tank.
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  1. polpot
    polpot 14 January 2021 18: 10
    +12
    Thank you, interesting topic, good material.
    1. Mountain shooter
      Mountain shooter 14 January 2021 20: 16
      +3
      I didn't have to admire especially about the German armor of the beginning of the war. All the achievements of the German blitzkrieg are the inability of our command to fend off breakthroughs and outreach by mobile troops ...
      Attempts to advance as a united front, to keep an equally dense structure of troops in defense. Lack of mobile reserves for attacks on the flank of the breakthrough groupings. Massage artillery in tank-hazardous directions, and not smear it along its entire length. And communication, communication ...
      1. CTABEP
        CTABEP 14 January 2021 21: 34
        +9
        All the achievements of the German blitzkrieg are the ability to fight both at the operational level and at the tactical level, and not at all Über-tanks or Über-planes (although the planes were just good). When the gap began to close, it suddenly turned out that the world war was a war of economies, and then there was no chance.
      2. user1212
        user1212 16 January 2021 04: 02
        0
        Quote: Mountain Shooter
        All the achievements of the German blitzkrieg are the inability of our command to fend off breakthroughs and outreach by mobile troops ...

        Hmmm ... well, if the Soviet commanders are the stupidest in the world, then how did the whole of Europe go to bed? After all, not only Czechoslovakia and Poland got a hat, but also the French and the British. If you delve into the world history of military art, then in 39-42, even the theory of combating German mechanized flank attacks was not completely ready, what can we say about its introduction into the army and its application in practice, which required, as you correctly noted, and communications, and reserves, and maneuver. At that time, everything that the world had was obtained by the results of PVM, where all tactics were reduced to stationary defense (trenches, kalyuchka, hedgehogs, pillboxes) and sluggish gunfire with artillery at extreme distances. The massive appearance of tanks and aircraft on the battlefield dramatically changed the war. Yes, it was in WWI, but in such insignificant quantities, besides, the forms of application of all this were not fully formulated.
        1. hjvtp1966
          hjvtp1966 19 January 2021 20: 53
          0
          It is known that victories teach nothing, and for one beaten two unbeaten give. The Germans scratched the bruised place and invented new methods of war. And the Europeans enjoyed indemnities and believed that their special invincible spirit would crush any tricks of the enemy. And they were wrong. Let's learn from the mistakes of others.
          1. user1212
            user1212 20 January 2021 06: 19
            -1
            Quote: hjvtp1966
            Europeans enjoyed indemnities and believed that their special invincible spirit would crush any tricks of the enemy. And they were wrong.

            Why do you think so? What kind of fighting spirit are we talking about if there was no French resistance at all for more than a year after the occupation? France surrendered to German troops on June 22, 1940, and only on August 21, 1941, the communist Pierre Georges shot and killed German naval officer Anton Moser, which was the first time a Nazi was killed in France.
            1. hjvtp1966
              hjvtp1966 7 March 2021 23: 51
              0
              The French nation had a rich history even before World War II. And there were many glorious and many sad events in it. Not less than ours.
  2. Mister X
    Mister X 14 January 2021 18: 22
    +2
    At the end about the self-propelled gun "Artshturm"
    76-mm Russian cannon penetrates the StuG III Ausf.C / D at a heading angle of 15º
    Author: Evgeny Fedorov


    Most likely StuG III was delivered from Ukraine

    StuG III, captured by Red Army units in full serviceability. August 1941

    During the defense of Kiev in August 1941, two serviceable StuG 111 were captured by the Red Army.
    One of them was sent for testing in Moscow, and the second, after being shown to the residents of the city, was manned with a Soviet crew and she left for the front.
  3. The leader of the Redskins
    The leader of the Redskins 14 January 2021 18: 30
    +8
    I never tire of thanking the author for the most interesting cycle of confrontation between sword and shield! Thank you!
  4. certero
    certero 14 January 2021 18: 41
    +2
    So, after all, the forty-five was an insufficient anti-tank agent in 41
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 14 January 2021 19: 17
      0
      and 45mm in the right place and we had few heavy guns and our partners were advancing competently
      1. Monar
        Monar 14 January 2021 21: 03
        +1
        The partners were advancing? Specify who is this?
    2. CTABEP
      CTABEP 14 January 2021 21: 36
      0
      Well, taking into account the German reservation schemes, it was still nothing in 1944. Disguises easily, hits the side, is cheap, weighs little. She took the Panther on board. Although, of course, this is globally - and in life, of course, she would not really want to fight as a gunner.
      1. Incvizitor
        Incvizitor 17 January 2021 19: 49
        0
        In 41m, the Germans had such an armor, but later, with the advent of Pz 4 tigers, it was not the same, and Pz 3 in the forehead is not clear ...
      2. hjvtp1966
        hjvtp1966 19 January 2021 20: 57
        0
        That's right, iron is cheap, blood is expensive. From a hundred meters, fire on the armor. Double salary - triple death!
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 15 January 2021 10: 48
      +1
      Quote: certero
      So, after all, the forty-five was an insufficient anti-tank agent in 41

      During tests in 1940, it was found that a high-quality BBS 45-mm cannon penetrates 40 mm of armor with K = 2600 (the angle of meeting of the projectile and armor is 30 degrees from the normal) from a distance of no more than 150 m. K = 2600 is just German armor "treshk" 1940-1941
      At the same time, it turned out that the 76-mm gun penetrates 60 mm of armor with K = 2450 (the angle of meeting of the projectile and the armor is 30 degrees from the normal) from a distance of no more than 400 m.
  5. Undecim
    Undecim 14 January 2021 18: 52
    +12
    TsNII-48 specialists participating in the research of armor indicate that the domestic industry has nothing to learn from German armored vehicles. Simply put, anyone can achieve high armor resistance through the widespread use of scarce nickel and molybdenum.

    And try the same trick without using expensive metals - by fine-tuning the production cycle of smelting, rolling, quenching and tempering.

    May the author forgive me for being straightforward, writing nonsense. This always happens when the technical subtleties are described by no specialist.
    There is a theory of metallurgical processes, a tough science that studies all phase transformations in the production of steel and products from it, the role of chemical elements in these transformations, the optimal content and ratio of alloying additives to obtain certain properties.
    Therefore, no one will "abundantly spice up" steel with expensive alloying additives, such as a larger rash, we have a lot of it. "A lot" is just as bad as "little".
    And no tricks can replace nickel, chromium, molybdenum, vanadium. Otherwise, no one would have bothered. Fine-tuned production - that's all. And how the Soviet metallurgy was fine-tuned, this is a separate conversation.
    1. Zhan
      Zhan 14 January 2021 20: 53
      +7
      hi
      Quote: Undecim
      Therefore, no one will "abundantly spice up" steel with expensive alloying additives, such as a larger rash, we have a lot of it. "A lot" is just as bad as "little".
      And no tricks can replace nickel, chromium, molybdenum, vanadium. Otherwise, no one would have bothered. Fine-tuned production - that's all. And how the Soviet metallurgy was fine-tuned, this is a separate conversation.

      hi The author did not go into the technological details of the production of armor, in fact the article about the research of armor, although he gave a rather detailed report on the tests in the article. Although this is a very sore subject. For the British and Americans, the armor was quite plastic and there was practically no death of the crews due to the chipping of fragments of armor from the hit of the BS. Well, the Allies did not have to urgently and faintly reschedule production, as we evacuated beyond the Urals and deployed machines in the open air, and we also needed to adjust the necessary volumes and quality of armor production. Not every American and Englishman will be able to work in such conditions. hi
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 15 January 2021 10: 51
      +5
      Quote: Undecim
      And no tricks can replace nickel, chromium, molybdenum, vanadium.

      I immediately remembered how our specialists in 1941 tried to replace the scarce tungsten in the core of the sub-caliber projectile they were developing. From what they tried to make a core - the result was always the same: there was no penetration, the core crumbled on the armor. Thank God, GAU closed the work on these ersatz in time, and had to go the other way - to look for tungsten.
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 15 January 2021 11: 25
        +8
        Yes, it was no longer necessary to search, by that time they had found. But get it ...
        The Lyangar mine in Tajikistan was located at an altitude of 2000 meters above sea level, in Kyrgyzstan - generally in the zone of eternal ice. All this started to produce products in 1943-1944. And before that it was really hard.
  6. svp67
    svp67 14 January 2021 18: 56
    -2
    Hmm ... and all that the Germans had bad ... and the armor was useless ... but how could they, with such bad armor, get to Stalingrad and Maykop on these tanks?
    1. Valerikk
      Valerikk 14 January 2021 19: 44
      +7
      Not everything was bad for them. A little later, good tigers and panthers appeared with them - and for some reason they rode the good ones from Stalingrad to Berlin. We probably skated.
      1. CTABEP
        CTABEP 14 January 2021 21: 40
        0
        The tiger was very good at one time, what can I say. But the Panther somehow was no longer to the court.
      2. svp67
        svp67 15 January 2021 05: 22
        -4
        Quote: Valerikk
        A little later, good tigers and panthers appeared with them - and for some reason they rode the good ones from Stalingrad to Berlin. We probably skated.

        This is a really interesting pattern. While we had the T-34 and KV "having no analogues in the world", we were retreating, but as the T-34 and KV became ordinary and inferior in terms of basic combat characteristics to German tanks, we suddenly went ahead ...
        1. Valerikk
          Valerikk 15 January 2021 11: 44
          +5
          So maybe it’s not the armor that matters, but the ability to use it?
          It is important that our potential was much higher than that of Germany. Both economic and spiritual. Indeed, in 41-42, they were practically based on willpower.
          But when they learned to fight, everything changed radically. This study was given with a lot of blood, but they could. How can you imagine what it cost - it becomes scary, how did you survive?
          "Nails would make of these people ..."
          1. svp67
            svp67 15 January 2021 12: 42
            +1
            Quote: Valerikk
            It is important that our potential was much higher than that of Germany.

            Controversial statement.
            Quote: Valerikk
            So maybe it’s not the armor that matters, but the ability to use it?

            I won't even argue ...
            1. Valerikk
              Valerikk 15 January 2021 13: 06
              +1
              Quote: Valerikk
              It is important that our potential was much higher than that of Germany.

              Controversial statement.

              Otherwise they would not have won
        2. Incvizitor
          Incvizitor 17 January 2021 19: 59
          0
          And the ability to fuel projectiles parts is bullshit? Maybe there were problems with this?
          https://military.wikireading.ru/4896
          in the report on the hostilities of the 8th Mechanized Corps from June 22 to 26, 1941 (by the beginning of the war it had 71 KV, 49 T-35, 100 T-34, 277 BT, 344 T-26, 17 T-27 ) it was reported: “The majority of the KV and T-34 combat vehicles had an experience of practical driving from 3 to 5 hours. For the entire period of the corps existence, the combat materiel and personnel were not completely withdrawn to tactical exercises and were not practically tested as issues of marching training, and on actions in the main types of combat. Tactical aggregation was carried out no higher than the scale of a company, battalion and partly a regiment. "

          From the report of the commander of the 41st Panzer Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps on July 25, 1941 on the division's combat operations (by the beginning of the war there were 312 T-26 and 31 KV-2 tanks) it follows that the 152-mm KV-2 guns there was not a single shell. The mechanics-drivers of the KV tanks were completely unprepared, since the tanks arrived 7-8 days before the German attack. 15 KV tanks, which arrived before the start of the war, had many technical defects, in particular, the side clutches and air cleaners did not work well. In addition, the report said: “The material part of the division ... in the period from 26.6 to 7.7.41 passed 900-1000 km without spare parts and motors, which basically put it out of action ... During the march it was out of order 23 SQ.
    2. CTABEP
      CTABEP 14 January 2021 21: 39
      +7
      Because they knew how to fight, this is the most important thing. And we were not in 1941. Everything else is secondary, so if you read different authors - everyone had tanks, sorry, they had shit (just someone had T-34, someone had Shermans, and someone had T-III / IV / V / VI ). Well, and still a world war - a war of economies, as soon as the gap in skills began to narrow, it suddenly turned out that fighting half of Europe against the whole world is such an idea.
      1. sen
        sen 15 January 2021 03: 38
        +2
        Because they knew how to fight, this is the most important thing.

        Not only. There was no army as such, no "war machine". There was anarchy, confusion, outright non-professionalism of the commanders. And the German "war machine" ran like clockwork. The Germans were well aware that there are no "trifles" in military matters and they planned everything, and then meticulously carried it out, which surprised our people, accustomed to the mess, a lot.
        Example. Rust had a predecessor. Hitler, in order to check our air defense, organized the flight of a German plane, without warning, through the entire European part of the USSR to Moscow. The aircraft was detected by the air defense in a timely manner, but due to a damaged telephone cable (it was damaged by our own air defense the day before) there was no report to Moscow and, accordingly, no measures were taken. For three days they argued over who should repair the cable: the airfield service or the air defense, although the cable repair time is about 5 minutes.
        The aircraft fuel depots for the North were located in the Caucasus, and the arms depots of the ground forces directly on the border, far from their troops.
        The German attack did not cause, but only "highlighted" the chaos that was already in our army. Only Zhukov was able to bring relative order. And this is his main merit. Zhukov is condemned that the innocent suffered, but in that shortage of time it could not be otherwise.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 15 January 2021 11: 11
          +7
          Quote: sen
          Warehouses of aircraft fuel for the North were located in the Caucasus

          This is not a mess, but the weakness of the domestic industry.
          Extraterritorial storage of fuel was the scourge of border districts. And the reason for it was simple - there are no tanks. The industry promises to supply tanks for the district storages in 1942. Before that, store the fuel where there are containers. That is, at the place of processing. For example, 75% of the ZOVO fuel was stored in Maikop.
          Alas, the fuel is not shells, you cannot put it on the ground. smile
          Quote: sen
          and the weapons depots of the ground forces directly on the border, far from their troops

          These weren't warehouses that were close to the border. This front line came too quickly to warehouses deep in the districts.
          The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of the 3rd and partially 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.
          © "Artillery supply in the Great Patriotic War 1941-45."
          The warehouse of the first category of ZOVO was located in Zakopytye (Gomel region) - practically on the border with the RSFSR. The Germans approached Novovzybkov, located nearby, already in August 1941.
    3. ecolog
      ecolog 15 January 2021 22: 40
      +1
      it's not about the armor, or rather, not only about it. The French tanks were also better protected. The point is in the strategic initiative and skillful interaction of the combat arms.
      The strategic initiative allows you to choose the time and place for the main blows, to concentrate forces, while the enemy is forced to cover large sections of the front by stretching his cover divisions into a thin thread.
      The presence of well-oiled and harmoniously organized mobile mechanized formations makes it possible to break through the defenses and surround the enemy with limited mobility before he can retreat or throw up reserves.
      When your tanks are supported by numerous motorized infantry reinforced with a large number of anti-tank artillery, then you will easily gain a foothold in the occupied territory and successfully repulse enemy counterattacks. When your large-caliber artillery up to 203 mm on high-speed tractors follows the tanks and motorized infantry, and does not lag behind the lines, then you will break through the extended defenses of the rifle divisions. And you will need tanks primarily for rear raids and outreach, and not to fight other people's tanks. For this there is a pto.
  7. antivirus
    antivirus 14 January 2021 19: 15
    0
    at the heart of the quality of steel - a janitor with a broom - as he swept, removing dust - and superfluous "additives-inclusions" did or did not fall into the forms.
  8. Maki Avellevich
    Maki Avellevich 14 January 2021 20: 36
    +2
    In many ways, for the Soviet industry, this was a forced measure - there was a chronic shortage of non-ferrous metals. And the Germans, having conquered almost all of Europe by 1941, could afford to generously sprinkle armor with alloying elements.

    this statement must be supported by data tables. mining of nickel, vanadium, molybdenum in Germany and the USSR, quantity of armor steel produced, etc.
    without this, it is somehow difficult to accept these lines on faith.
  9. Niko
    Niko 14 January 2021 23: 29
    +3
    Thanks to the author for the article (it is certainly not devoid of some drawbacks) BUT compares favorably with many, many "studies" of "analyzes", etc. , so that the author is trying to give specific data, specific research on a specific issue. And not a reprint of other people's "thoughts about" under the color of personal emotions, as has become customary recently.
  10. sen
    sen 15 January 2021 03: 42
    +4
    A little off topic. The Bryansk State Technical University (BSTU) has developed a new technology for the manufacture of durable, light and cheap armor for military equipment using wire, defense enterprises are interested in the technology, RIA Novosti was told at the Advanced Research Fund (FPI).
    "According to the new technology, the armor is grown by the additive method by fusing the wire. Then it is hardened with the help of a wave deformation effect. The technology was developed at BSTU together with the FPI and transferred to Russian enterprises - manufacturers of armored vehicles," the organization said.
    The fund noted that the new technology significantly reduces the cost of metal in the production of armor plates and at the same time provides an increase in their strength compared to steel manufactured by the standard rolling method. In addition, such armor is 15-30 percent lighter.
    https://ria.ru/20210113/tanki-1592808114.html
  11. tasha
    tasha 15 January 2021 05: 31
    +2
    Based on the materials of two articles, it can be concluded that the specialists of the TsNII-48 could not predict the appearance of German heavy tanks.
    I wonder what conclusions they made following the shelling of T-III and T-IV tanks with anti-tank rifles?
    A little about the vulnerable and strong parts of German armored vehicles

    Armor is, of course, something new wink
  12. Elturisto
    Elturisto 15 January 2021 11: 15
    -2
    A sensible article that breaks the faith in the genius of German engineering is a good lesson for the current authorities of the Russian Federation, who are Germanophiles.
  13. looker-on
    looker-on April 6 2021 01: 31
    0
    In many ways, for the Soviet industry, this was a forced measure - there was a chronic shortage of non-ferrous metals. And the Germans, having conquered almost all of Europe by 1941, could afford to generously sprinkle armor with alloying elements.

    Non-ferrous metals were lying under their feet in Europe? There were no deposits of the listed metals in Russia by 41?