A salvo of Borey and a minesweeper thrown to rot. The problem here is that Borey need there was this minesweeper.
12.12.2020 (15:30). Department of Information and Mass Communications (DIMK) of the RF Ministry of Defense:
Pacific nuclear submarine fleet For the first time, Vladimir Monomakh launched four Bulava ballistic missiles from the Sea of Okhotsk. A salvo launch of missiles was carried out from a submerged position from the Sea of Okhotsk at the Chizha training ground in the Arkhangelsk region.
The flight of the Bulava ballistic missiles took place in the normal mode.
According to the confirmed data of objective control, the missile warheads have successfully arrived in a given area of the Chizha battlefield.
The flight of the Bulava ballistic missiles took place in the normal mode.
According to the confirmed data of objective control, the missile warheads have successfully arrived in a given area of the Chizha battlefield.
"Vladimir Monomakh" goes to shoot "Bulava".
The volley went!
For the first time, the question of prolonged non-firing of Bulava at the Pacific Fleet was raised in the media on October 22, 2018 in the article “What to ask“ Ash ”? Nuclear submarines keep the fleet on a starvation diet ".
Megaproject of the newest stories is the program "Borey" - "Bulava". Many copies have been broken about its expediency.
In fact, we have that six years after the completion of state tests of the lead boat and three years after the redeployment of the first serial ship to the Pacific Fleet, not a single firing of Bulava SLBMs from the Pacific Ocean was carried out either from the Alexander Nevsky or Vladimir Monomakh. ...
In fact, we have that six years after the completion of state tests of the lead boat and three years after the redeployment of the first serial ship to the Pacific Fleet, not a single firing of Bulava SLBMs from the Pacific Ocean was carried out either from the Alexander Nevsky or Vladimir Monomakh. ...
The article caused a significant resonance in society and among specialists. And also an extremely painful reaction in the Main Command of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense (DIMK).
The continuation was after the exercise "Thunder-2019", where the "Pacific" shooting "Bulava" announced by the officials of the Ministry of Defense did not take place - "Problematic" Thunder-2019 ". What is “wrong” in the recent exercises of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation? ".
The main question is different - why was it necessary to "drive" the newest SN RPLs into an unprepared base, moreover, into the zone of overwhelming domination of anti-submarine forces of the "so-called partners", with extremely weak anti-submarine and simply non-combatable anti-mine forces of the Pacific Fleet?
On March 17, 2020 there was a publication in the author's blog "Kamchatka" Borei "are preparing to fire" Bulava ":
Taking into account the "wild" and unacceptable situation of such a long break in the practical missile firing of the SNR submarines of the Navy's combat strength, with a very high probability, it should be assumed that in 2020 at least one missile firing "Bulava" from the Pacific Fleet (on the battlefield of Chizha).
Of course, this is very positive, and it is highly likely that this shooting will be successful (given its importance and the appropriate support from the industry).
Of course, this is very positive, and it is highly likely that this shooting will be successful (given its importance and the appropriate support from the industry).
According to available information, this time everything went smoothly: both on the Vladimir Monomakh and with the Bulava and their warheads, up to Chizhi. If all this is true, then the crew and developers can and should be congratulated.
However, uncomfortable questions about our NSNF remain. Moreover, they are the main ones.
First. Why do we need naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF)?
Quoting from a previously published article:
The key factor that makes it necessary to deploy strategic weapons on sea carriers (in the difficult physical and geographical conditions of their use and the significant superiority of the enemy's anti-submarine forces) is it is the vulnerability of the ground-based component of the NSNF to a sudden nuclear (!) "disarming" strike.
That is, even one, but guaranteed not to be tracked by an SNR with SLBMs, excluding the possibility of such a strike, is an extremely important strategic and political factor. And the main thing here is not the "number of warheads" of the NSNF, but its combat stability. That is, figuratively speaking, for the NSNF (as a system) "Bulava" is secondary to the issues of stealth, hydroacoustics, sea underwater weapons etc.
That is, even one, but guaranteed not to be tracked by an SNR with SLBMs, excluding the possibility of such a strike, is an extremely important strategic and political factor. And the main thing here is not the "number of warheads" of the NSNF, but its combat stability. That is, figuratively speaking, for the NSNF (as a system) "Bulava" is secondary to the issues of stealth, hydroacoustics, sea underwater weapons etc.
The quantitative basis of our strategic nuclear forces should be precisely the Strategic Missile Forces. And the role of NSNF is a necessary but auxiliary mechanism of strategic deterrence.
Given the enemy's enormous superiority in naval theaters, and his effective anti-submarine forces, the opinion about the need to carry most of the deployed delivery vehicles and warheads into the sea is nothing more than information sabotage (which was very successfully imposed on us in the 90s within the framework of START II Treaty).
At the same time, it is necessary to clearly understand that the formulation of "task No. 1" to our general-purpose naval forces (MSNF) as a cover for the NSNF actually cuts the possibility of conducting successful (active) hostilities (because the entire initiative is given to the enemy).
It is characteristic that the US Navy has received with great satisfaction the deployment in our country since the beginning of the 70s. intercontinental SLBMs, realizing that the offensive activity of the USSR Navy will thereby be largely curtailed in favor of the passive task of "covering NSNF in the bastions."
Second. The number of missiles in a salvo
At first glance, a lot of shooting and a lot of rockets is very good. However, when the issue is considered comprehensively, everything turns out to be more complicated.
The problem is that a submarine ballistic missile (SLBM) is not just an expensive item, but a very expensive item. Specific data on domestic SLBMs were not provided.
However, according to Western counterparts (for example, UGM-133A Trident II), the corresponding price tags are close to the cost of combat aircraft. In other words, a four-missile salvo of new SLBMs is very cool and expensive (a rough analogue, is tantamount: simultaneously smashing four new Su-35s on the ground).
It is necessary not only to realize that resources for the purchase of weapons are limited, but also that they are not taken out of thin air, but redistributed among other defense spending.
For example, parachute targets were used to conduct State tests of the new Pantsir-M air defense missile system. That is, with targets in the fleet, extreme poverty. But at the same time, a "mace-rocket feast" is going on nearby, where money and resources "flow like a river" ...
It must be understood that there was no military or technical sense in this 4-rocket salvo.
Or was it?
Project 955 has already made a four-rocket salvo.
Or did he make it so that
"Had to repeat"?
Here you can recall the film "Military Acceptance" on the Kamchatka "Boreys" (from the video from the missile compartment of "Alexander Nevsky" it is clear that he fired a two-missile salvo from neighboring mines located near the midship of the submarine (accordingly, there is reason to think about shooting a salvo , to put it mildly, were feared).
In the end, it would have been much more reasonable to fire both Pacific Boreis (two missiles each).
In addition, in 2020, the Navy (without carrying out the entire volume of necessary tests) pushed the act on the new AICR "Prince Vladimir" (955A is not "955 with the letter A", but actually a new project) - link... This is where a volley was really needed (and not a single launch of an SLBM, as it was in reality)!
In other words, a single launch of SLBMs was quite enough for two Kamchatka "Boreys" (as was done regularly and in accordance with the documents by the old nuclear submarine cruisers (APCR) of the project 667BDR of the 25th division).
Third. Marine underwater weapons (MPS) and countermeasures
From the article “Where is Admiral Evmenov running?»:
In the fall of 2006, the author of this article had a conversation with the Head of the Department of Anti-Submarine Weapons of the Navy (UPV of the Navy), Rear Admiral G.V. Melentyev. (a very ambiguous and extremely cautious person).
Just before the conversation, Melent'ev received a telegram from VA Osipov, General Director of Gidropribor Concern. with "proposals" for the delivery of the head order of project 955 "Yuri Dolgoruky".
The cautious Melentiev was simply "bubbling" with indignation from these "proposals"! And now "a very good question" - why was Yuri Dolgoruky commissioned by the industry? And even more "good" - and with what "Yuri Dolgoruky" today?
Just before the conversation, Melent'ev received a telegram from VA Osipov, General Director of Gidropribor Concern. with "proposals" for the delivery of the head order of project 955 "Yuri Dolgoruky".
The cautious Melentiev was simply "bubbling" with indignation from these "proposals"! And now "a very good question" - why was Yuri Dolgoruky commissioned by the industry? And even more "good" - and with what "Yuri Dolgoruky" today?
A public answer to this question has recently appeared in the form of photographs of loading the USET-80 torpedo junk onto the newest project 955 APCR in Kamchatka (and a photo of a torpedo deck with ammunition) and comments. ( Link).
Today, the "strategist" ammunition includes only one type of naval underwater weapon - the morally and technically obsolete USET-80 torpedoes (even the year of adoption - the 80th, says a lot) ... For today on "Borey" the program is installed only for the use of USET-80 torpedoes).
Loading of the ancient USET-80 torpedoes on the Borey, they are also on its torpedo deck.
Former Deputy Head of the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate of the Navy R.A. Gusev wrote:
"Why is USET-80 not MK-48?" Because Zaporozhets is not Chrysler.
That is, we have a wildest situation when an ancient Zaporozhets is located on the newest strategic agro-industrial complex,
the very new modification of "whose brains" were "reproduced on a domestic basis"
from an American torpedo of 1961, the battery of which was made according to an American patent of the 40s, and the chief designer of the engine died back in 1969.
If someone in the Aerospace Forces offered to hang the R-57 guided missiles of the MiG-3 fighter on the Su-21, he would be sent to Kashchenko. And in the valiant Navy, this is the basis of torpedo ammunition.
For the ins and outs of this shameful situation, see."Arctic torpedo scandal" .
One more point should be noted when mentioning the new torpedoes.
The fact that not a single submarine of the Navy received the prize of the Commander-in-Chief for torpedo training with torpedoes "Physicist-1" (despite its formally high characteristics) clearly speaks not even of the difficulties with the development and development of new weapons, but in fact about the inability of the Navy solve this problem.
This issue will be discussed in more detail later in the article devoted to how the Physicist torpedo was created and killed (of course, based on open data).
It is no better with countermeasures (and anti-torpedo protection).
Rear Admiral A. Lutsky, retired, wrote ("Marine collection" No. 7 for 2010):
It is proposed to equip the Yasen and Borey submarines under construction with PTZ systems, the technical specifications for the development of which were drawn up back in the 80s of the last century, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these means against modern torpedoes indicate an extremely low probability of not hitting the evading submarine.
From the article "APKR" Severodvinsk "was commissioned to the Navy with critical deficiencies for combat effectiveness. There is no anti-torpedo protection for submarines ":
The country has invested enormous funds in new submarines. The Borey-Bulava program turned out to be the most expensive in the RF Armed Forces.
There are no technical problems to have effective underwater weapons and countermeasures, and this does not require any prohibitive means. However, these "newest" submarines are simply "naked" in front of the enemy's weapons, while they themselves have a lot of shortcomings and defects in their underwater weapons.
There are no technical problems to have effective underwater weapons and countermeasures, and this does not require any prohibitive means. However, these "newest" submarines are simply "naked" in front of the enemy's weapons, while they themselves have a lot of shortcomings and defects in their underwater weapons.
Here it is appropriate to recall that the Knyaz Vladimir APRK of the latest project 955A was commissioned by the Navy industry without any real tests of countermeasures.
The mastering of anti-torpedoes “Lasta” by our submarine has been disrupted. Rear-Admiral Lutsky wrote above about the extremely low efficiency of the "Module-D" complex (declared on the "Boreys", according to the official information of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on "Army-2015").
Moreover, the under a far-fetched pretext, self-propelled anti-torpedo protection devices were removed from the ammunition load of the naval submarines (including the NSNF).
And here already some good questions arise:
"What is it: stupidity or deliberate sabotage and undermining the combat effectiveness of the Russian Navy and Armed Forces? Moreover, undermining precisely the ability to carry out tasks of nuclear deterrence? Who benefits from this? Why is this done? "
Fourth. Ice shooting
Until now, the Russian and Soviet navies have not fired a single torpedo shot under the ice with the homing system turned on.
The enemy regularly conducts special anti-submarine exercises in the Arctic with massive torpedo firing (up to two dozen torpedoes per submarine), in readiness to arrange massacres and unpunished execution of naval submarines (including NSNF) on orders.
Initiative officers of the Navy raised the issue of conducting such firing many times. That's just one example.
However, this did not arouse interest in the command of the Navy, as a result of which the question was voiced publicly. For example:
"Defense order" 2013 No. 3 "Torpedoes go under the ice", Mikhail Komarov, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, Vladimir Polenin, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor.
November 05.04.2019, XNUMX
"NVO" "ICEX - the Arctic threat to Russia"
"Arctic torpedo scandal" .
Rear Admiral (Ret.) V.Ya. Dudko (interview to FAN agency):
Until now, the shooting necessary for this has not really been carried out, although the Americans do it all the time. But such proposals have been prepared and, if necessary, can be implemented.
However, everything turned out to be much worse. And the "bottom" of the Navy was "pierced". Both in 2019 and in 2020: the Navy was never able to conduct such firing.
"Why shoot if you can lie?"
Including top management.
No. 312/4/4421 of 15.05.2019. The handling of information on the state of the submarine forces of the Navy and the Northern Fleet, received by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, has been reviewed by the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
This situation is not true.
I. Dylevsky, Deputy Head of the General Staff School.
This situation is not true.
I. Dylevsky, Deputy Head of the General Staff School.
Of course, the GOU GSH did not come up with this fig leaf itself (although it participated). Obviously, its basis was
"Gallant report of the Navy",
having nothing to do with reality.
Fifth. Anti-submarine support
The anti-submarine support of the Kamchatka Boreyevs is two ancient IPC project 1124M that have not undergone even minimal modernization. New corvettes to replace them, Project 20380, for modern submarines are "game" (and not "hunters" for them).
Anti-submarine aviation?
New IL-38N with Novella? Without even touching on the fact that Novella as a search and targeting system was outdated back in the 90s (while this is the only really working and relatively modern complex in our country), the fleet received it in a “castrated form”.
Just a question: "Where are the new novel buoys in government procurement?" Antiquity of the RSL-16M type is purchased in commercial quantities and for a very considerable price tag. But their range on modern low-noise submarines is several hundred (!) Meters. This long-known fact was accidentally exposed in the advertising materials of "Radar-MMS".
The problem was solved simply and effectively: instead of modifying the complex ("Kasatka") to meet modern requirements, these numbers were simply removed from the advertisement. At the same time, the situation itself no longer raises questions when an organization ("Radar-MMS"), which has not developed or handed over to the customer a single search and targeting system, is appointed the head of the Naval Aviation for them. As they say, the commander of the Naval Aviation, Mr. Kozhin, who is leaving for a well-deserved rest, has already prepared a good place there.
Individual tests on a topic similar to modern Western aviation search and sighting systems cause us a shock, because very bad conclusions suggest themselves regarding the survival of submarines. Moreover, in the West, all this has long been mastered (since the 90s)
"Routine of combat training."
Our submarine may have at least zero noise, but it will still be detected due to low-frequency acoustic illumination (up to aviation buoys).
There is an opinion that one of the main reasons for the apparent slowdown in the development of effective anti-submarine weapons in our country was that their effectiveness raised very inconvenient questions about the unrestrained infusion of funds (and their development by effective managers) into obsolete (and relatively easily detectable) submarine projects.
It should also be mentioned about the practically destruction of the topic of "non-traditional search means" in our country.
Head of the Department of Advanced Design, Central Research Institute. Krylov Andrey Vasiliev recalled the deputy commander-in-chief of the USSR Navy for shipbuilding and armaments, Admiral Fyodor Novoselov:
“At the meeting, he did not give the floor to the head of the institute, who was eager to talk about experiments to detect the surfaced trace of a submarine using the radar.
Much later, at the end of 1989, I asked him why he dismissed this question.
Fedor Ivanovich replied: "I know about this effect, it is impossible to defend against such detection, so why upset our submariners?"
Much later, at the end of 1989, I asked him why he dismissed this question.
Fedor Ivanovich replied: "I know about this effect, it is impossible to defend against such detection, so why upset our submariners?"
What do we have in the end?
Borei in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Rear Admiral V. Ya. Dudko (one of the most successful submariners of the USSR Navy, who successfully discovered the Ohio SSBN and disrupted its first deployment in 1982):
From the point of view of the General Staff, it was a protected area, since it seemed that it allowed the deployment of anti-submarine defense forces in the shortest possible time. But, from the point of view of the secrecy of the PKK SN, ... is an open and very favorable area, which allows for long-term and covert tracking of our ships at great distances.
Our command and we, so we were taught and hammered into our heads, believed that the PKK SN is not vulnerable…. A unique tracking experience, completely new ways to check the lack of tracking of our missile carriers, which, unfortunately, no one was interested either because of their employment, or did not believe, or did not want to recognize the low secrecy of the PKK SN in the "protected" areas ...
Our command and we, so we were taught and hammered into our heads, believed that the PKK SN is not vulnerable…. A unique tracking experience, completely new ways to check the lack of tracking of our missile carriers, which, unfortunately, no one was interested either because of their employment, or did not believe, or did not want to recognize the low secrecy of the PKK SN in the "protected" areas ...
Sixth. Mine support
At the moment, the Russian Navy includes 11 RPK SN, deployed in the Pacific Fleet and the Northern Fleet.
At the same time, in the combat composition of these fleets a month ago there was no no one modern anti-mine ship (PMK). Moreover, there was not a single modern anti-mine underwater vehicle in the ranks.
In order to report to the President, a new PMK "Yakov Balyaev" of project 12700 was dragged to the Pacific Fleet urgently along the Northern Sea Route.
"They covered their nakedness with a fig leaf."
And the problem is not even that “I. Balyaev "alone. The problem is that the ships of Project 12700 have an absolutely outdated concept (which would have looked good in the 80s of the last century), but today it is
"Ships to the very first bottom mine with a modern fuse"
(on which either the secondary battery itself or its only mine action apparatus will be blown up).
Note. The issues of the critical state of the mine defense of the Navy will be considered in one of the upcoming articles, including because the arguments of the publications of the Military Review (articles "What is wrong with our minesweepers?" и "What's" wrong "with the newest PMK project 12700") were used by a group of "representatives of military science" in a publication in one of the specialized publications, and in a very incorrect form (with a distortion of their meaning). Accordingly, an analysis on this topic is needed both for revealing the existing problems of the PMO and for our "military science".
And that is not all.
One has only to carry out tests similar to the American "shock trials" (where all the ships pass through them), and we will just have a "complete shock".
For they will end with catastrophic results not only for practically all ships of new projects, but also for the "newest PMK" project 12700. And all specialists are well aware of this! And therefore
"In no case should such tests be carried out" - at the parade our "ships" are so beautiful (and "perhaps there will be no war")!
There are technical solutions to these problems. However, the use of them fully (and not a palliative of the type of spiral-cable shock absorbers) does not give the naval
"Ostrich sticking its head in the sand"
from serious problems.
By the way, it is this problem that explains the actual sabotage of the work with "Last". The wildness of the situation is that it can be confidently asserted that "Right now" "Last" (for example, with a non-standard launcher on the superstructure for target designation of the station "Arfa-M") can reliably and confidently use the old "Warsaw" of project 877 (according to the new - open question).
Moreover, the old "Ryazan" of Project 667BDR will most likely be able to do this. But the newest "Borei" and "Ash" for some reason turn out to be unable to do what they are obliged to do well under the project and state contract. And what did the old boats of the second generation of the USSR Navy do normally?
The answer is simple. Then they did not hide from problems, did not "sweep them under the plinth." And let not all, but the majority decided. And now - at the head of the corner
“Parade, PR and hockey”.
conclusions
The conclusions from all this will be very tough.
The key requirement for NSNF is high combat stability... In the case of the Russian Navy, it is a fiction. Both for technical reasons and, first of all, for organizational reasons.
In fact, we have simply, as they say, scored on the combat stability of the NSNF: torpedoes, countermeasures and new means of searching for submarines, defense of naval bases.
Allegedly, the newest AICRs are accepted by the Navy with ancient and non-working underwater weapons, without protection and with critical design flaws of the ships.
At the same time, a large-scale PR campaign was launched to advertise the allegedly high efficiency of our submarine forces. It is addressed not only to society, but also to the highest political leadership. At the same time, for the submarine (and especially for the Bulava and Borei), the country pours simply colossal funds, which are mastered by effective managers in the industry.
The "role of the fleet" here is "not to interfere with this process"
(thanks for what will be
"Warm and satisfying place"
after the fleet).
With all this, we have extremely acute problems in a number of areas of military development (starting with fifth generation fighters and AWACS in the Air Force, armored vehicles and ammunition in the ground forces and the same minesweepers and targets in the Navy).
The NSNF of the Pacific Fleet, deployed in the zone of dominance of the enemy's anti-submarine forces, in fact, have practically no combat value:
• there is no anti-mine and anti-submarine support;
• there are no new torpedoes (which is - antique "firewood");
• there are no new missiles (anti-ship missiles and PLR);
• no anti-torpedo protection.
Despite the scandal with the complete absence of under-ice torpedo firing, the Navy showed complete incapacity to move this issue off the ground.
With the unrestrained infusion of funds into the NSNF (and into the “second NSNF” with the Poseidon) and in the show with the Bulava, the Navy resembles a subject in an expensive frock coat, but at the same time in torn trousers and barefoot.
But in the reports of the fleet -
Full hockey.
In this situation, the question arises about the advisability of such generous funding of the NSNF.
Yes, the Strategic Missile Forces have their own difficulties. (The same formulation of the question on the BZHRK is actually a recognition of the problems with the combat stability of mine and mobile soil complexes).
But at least the Strategic Missile Forces are not hiding from problems. And one way or another they strive to solve them (and not hide them, as in the Navy).
This does not in any way negate the need for NSNF in principle. As a means of guaranteed retaliation.
Alas, today it is not absolutely guaranteed.