Military Review

Marine stories. A naval nightmare and a series of accidents

57
There are battles that seem to have brought victory to one side, but if you look deeply into the root, then everything is somewhat different. These battles include the beating in Pearl Harbor, in the same folder will be the case of the night battle near the Savo Island.


However, we will deal with the conclusions at the end, but for now we will analyze what happened on that fateful night for many.


Solomon Islands, a control point in the South Pacific. Those who owned the islands could set up bases there and control, for example, traffic flows between Australia and America. It is very unpleasant for the Australians. And there New Zealand, as a member of the British Community, also stands up for distribution.

Marine stories. A naval nightmare and a series of accidents

In general, both the Japanese and the Americans wanted to control the Solomon Islands. The Japanese did better, the islands were quickly captured, engineering units were transferred there, which began to build airfields and piers.

It is clear that at the headquarters of the allies (USA, Great Britain, Australia, Holland and New Zealand) everyone grabbed their heads and began to come up with a response plan. It was decided to begin sweeping the Japanese with an iron broom on August 1, 1942. The plan was called The Watchtower and preparations began for its implementation.

Thrown off in terms of landing "for three", that is, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. A combined marine division was prepared, for the transportation of which 23 transports were prepared.

To protect the transports, all combat-ready ships after Midway were assembled: 3 aircraft carriers (Enterprise, Saratoga and Wasp), the battleship North Carolina, 5 heavy and 1 light cruisers, and 16 destroyers. Well, plus up to a heap of all kinds of escort ships, tankers, hospitals, cargo ships with supplies. In total, there are about 70 ships in total.


Australian heavy cruiser "Canberra" guarding transports

And all this beauty hit the Solomon Islands on the morning of August 7. The Japanese, to put it mildly, missed such a detachment, and therefore the landing was a complete surprise for them. The engineering units, which consisted of 90% of Koreans and Chinese, naturally did not resist, and therefore the Allies captured Guadalcanal without any losses at all. The only place where resistance to the landing was shown at all was Tulagi Island.

To say that the Japanese were in shock is to say nothing. “It wasn’t, it wasn’t, and now again” - this is about the situation in the Solomon Islands. That's right, because the Japanese simply had nothing to defend their units on the islands!


The only thing that the Imperial Japanese Navy had in the area was the so-called 8th Fleet of Admiral Mikawa. 5 heavy cruisers (one Takao class, two Aoba types and two Furutaka types), 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers.

If you look thoughtfully, all that this detachment could do was, perhaps, ruffle the allied landing forces and die heroically under the blows aviation fleet USA. However, Mikawa decided to attack the Allied fleet. But do it at night to minimize the actions of American aircraft. And this was a huge logic.

So a night swoop in order to inflict as much damage as possible on the landing ships and retreat was a very wise decision.

And then the Americans began to help the Japanese. With about the same success as in the Pearl Harbor case.

In general, it was simply unrealistic to approach Guadalcanal unnoticed, either from the side of Micronesia or from the side of New Guinea. Therefore, the Japanese used a very interesting maneuver: they walked like on a parade until they were noticed, and as soon as this happened, Mikawa moved to the southeast at full speed, and then made a sharp turn to the south.


Mikawa's flagship - the Chokai heavy cruiser

The crew of the B-17 bomber, which discovered Mikawa's detachment in the afternoon on August 7, reported on it, but since the Americans could not understand where the Japanese ships were going at all, they did not do anything. As the saying goes, "a good knock will show itself." Moreover, it was clear that the detachment was not large.

And on August 8, the commander of the landing, Vice Admiral Fletcher, decided that the operation was successful, and ordered the carrier formation to withdraw to Pearl Harbor. A highly controversial decision, Fletcher believed that the loss of 20% of the aircraft was quite significant and that the supply of aviation fuel was coming to an end.

Meanwhile, the transports continued unloading, which was supposed to continue for at least another two days.


In general, Fletcher decided that it would be easy for the transports to hold out for a day or two without aircraft and sent the aircraft carriers to the base.

But in principle, there were still enough ships to guard the transports. For a more effective defense, the squadron was divided into three groups and placed in the most likely directions of the enemy's appearance.

Near the southern tip of Savo Island were three heavy cruisers: the American "Chicago" and the Australian "Canberra" and "Australia" and two destroyers.


Heavy cruiser "Chicago"


Kent-class heavy cruiser - Australia

North of Savo were the American heavy cruisers Quincy, Vincennes and Astoria.


Heavy cruiser "Quincy"

Two light cruisers, the Australian Hobart and the American San Juan, were patrolling east of the island.

They knew about the Japanese approximately. What they are. But where and how many of them - that was the question. In general, Vice Admiral Turner, who commanded the landing forces, instructed Rear Admiral McCain, who commanded the cruisers, to conduct reconnaissance in the Slot Strait. We will never know what prevented McCain from doing this, but the reconnaissance was not carried out.

And on the morning of August 8, Mikawa approached Guadalcanal. He so skillfully dispersed his ships in the area of ​​Bougainville Island that Australian scouts, although they reported the presence of Japanese ships in the area of ​​the island, could not say exactly how many there were. Plus, reports of Japanese ships reached the American command only late in the evening.

There was just a touching situation: there was no information about the enemy, the personnel of the group was tired the previous two days, when they were landing on the islands. True, they failed to fight, but nevertheless.

And the commander of the formation, British Rear Admiral Crutchley, who held the flag on the heavy cruiser Australia, gave the command to rest. And he went to confer with Admiral Turner. For himself Crutchley left the 1st rank captain Bode, who was also tired and went to bed. At 21 pm Turner and Crutchley began to think about where the Japanese were and what to expect from them.

Meanwhile, the Japanese were already there. After midnight a detachment of Japanese ships was already near Savo. At one in the morning, on August 9, the Japanese found the American destroyer Blue, which was patrolling ... It is difficult to say that the destroyer was patrolling, because Blue passed two kilometers from the Japanese squadron and found nothing. Apparently, everyone on the ship was also tired ...

Here, the understanding came to Mikawa's headquarters that everything is quiet and calm in the waters of Savo, and they have not yet been found. The ships were at full speed and headed for Savo. At 1.30 am Mikawa gave the order to attack, at 1.35 the signalmen discovered the southern group of ships, and at 1.37 the northern group was discovered.

In general, it is of interest how American ships equipped with radars, while conducting a radar patrol, could not detect Japanese cruisers. And why the Japanese signallers were more effective than the American radars.

Nevertheless, the Japanese ships launched an attack on the southern group. Fortunately, the northern group showed no signs of activity at all.

As it turned out, the only ship that maintained at least some combat readiness was the American destroyer Patterson under the command of Francis Spellman. Lieutenant Commander Spellman, seeing that some ships were entering the harbor, raised the alarm and opened fire on the unknown ships.

The Patterson's crew hit the Japanese light cruiser Tenryu several times from their 127-mm guns, but a 203-mm shell flew in from one of the older comrades and the destroyer's crew was not quite ready for the battle. I had to fight for survivability.

At that moment, seaplanes, taking off from Japanese cruisers, hovered over the American ships. They dropped lighting bombs over the Chicago and Canberra, illuminating the ships. The Japanese ships turned on their searchlights and opened fire.


The cruiser "Quincy" illuminated by Japanese ships under fire


Light cruiser "Yubari"

At the same time, the crew of the destroyer Bagley woke up. The ship set in motion and, having completed the maneuver, fired a torpedo salvo towards the enemy ships.

All it would be fine, but at the same time, the cruiser "Canberra", over which the "chandeliers" from Japanese aircraft were burning, gave full speed and went into circulation, dodging the Japanese shells, which quite accurately lay next to the cruiser.

Here torpedoes from "Bagley" and hit exactly the center of the cruiser. Naturally, the Canberra, which had lost its speed, became just a target for the Japanese gunners, who planted more than 20 203-mm shells in the Canberra. The Australian cruiser completely lost its speed and began to gain water. It was possible to withdraw the ship from the battle, but that was the end of its participation in the battle.


Destroyers rescue the Canberra crew


Canberra is sinking

"Bagley" after such a successful debut withdrew from participation in the battle. But what had already been done was more than enough to win. The only question is whose.

The second in line was “Chicago”. The commander of the cruiser Howard Bowie deigned to rest, so that the cruiser did not even enter the battle. The Japanese cruiser "Kako" hit the "Chicago" with a torpedo, which disabled the fire control system. Chicago pulled out of the fight.

It is surprising that the acting commander of the formation Howard Bode, for a completely incomprehensible reason, did not report on the Japanese ships to a higher authority. At least Crutchley and Turner, who conferred aboard Ternenre's flagship transport. Or Bode could try to establish control over the battles of his group's ships.

However, he did nothing of this, and the American ships took part in the battle on the principle "I can do whatever I want."

Since the southern group was actually defeated, the Japanese, as expected, headed towards the northern group. While peace and quiet reigned there, flashes and explosions of shells were mistaken for a thunderstorm, and the first alarm signal from the destroyer Patterson simply did not go through due to the fact that the island of Savo itself was on the way, which not the most powerful radio station of the destroyer could not overcome ...

So the crews of the ships of the northern group were sleeping peacefully, and the ships slowly moved across the water area.

The Japanese split into two columns and actually embraced a group of American ships.


Japanese heavy cruiser "Furutaka"

The lead "Chokai" illuminated the American ships and at 1.50 Mikawa's group opened fire.

The Chokai fired at Astoria, Aoba at Quincy, Kako and Kunigas at the lead Vincennes, while Furutaka and the destroyers began to hammer at the Quincy, which found itself in a very difficult situation.


The heavy cruiser "Chokai" fires at American ships

The Quincy resisted, having managed to fire several volleys. Two shells hit the Chokai, one even in the navigator's room, well thinning the personnel of Mikawa's headquarters. 36 officers were killed.

But the Japanese ships literally riddled the American ship, killing the commander and practically the entire officer corps of the cruiser on the bridge, plus the Tenryu hit the Quincy with two torpedoes, and the Aoba with one. Only 22 minutes passed between the hit of the third torpedo and the moment when the cruiser completely disappeared under water. At 2.38 the Quincy sank.

Vincent lasted nearly an hour. Hits were recorded on "Kako" and "Kunigas", but two torpedoes from "Chokai" and one from "Yubari" did their job and at 2.58 the cruiser sank.

The Astoria was frankly stupid. The captain, awakened by the explosions, at first ordered not to shoot, because sleepily it seemed to him that the fire was being fired at his own. The Astoria was ripped open by the whole squad, practically all the ships of Mikawa's squad were shot at the cruiser. “The American cruiser turned into a blazing sieve, with which it was not clear what would happen faster - sink or burn.


Heavy cruiser "Astoria"

The last ship in the northern guard group was the destroyer Ralph Talbot. They stumbled upon him by accident, the destroyer was also patrolling half asleep when it was discovered by the Furutaki group. The Talbot received 5 hits from 203-mm shells, but in the conditions of a thunderstorm, the destroyer disappeared. The damage was severe, but worth it. The fact is that the Japanese decided that there were enemy ships undetected until that moment in the area.

At 02:16, when the Japanese cruisers were still firing at the American ships with might and main, Mikawa held a meeting with his headquarters. It was necessary to decide what to do next, since the squadron clearly needed time to reload the torpedo tubes and regroup to attack the transports.


Japanese heavy cruiser "Kinugasa"

As a result, Mikawa's headquarters made a landmark decision - to leave. At 2.20 a.m. a retreat was played on the ships, the Japanese ships stopped firing and went to the assembly point northeast of Savo.

The most interesting in this stories - the results.

The result for the American fleet was the loss of four heavy cruisers with more than 1000 crew members. "Canberra" was finished off by its destroyers, "Astoria" burned out and sank a few hours after the end of the battle. Quincy and Vincennes were already at the bottom by then.


American heavy cruiser "Quincy" at the last dock

The service by American sailors did not stand up to scrutiny. Radar patrols, signalmen, combat crews - all demonstrated the level of Pearl Harbor. Which was the reason for the defeat.

Yes, modern radars were not a reliable means of detection at that time, and often they did more harm than help. But no one canceled signal services and sentinels. And the fact that the Americans are 100% relaxed is an indisputable fact.

There was an investigation into the incident. Admirals Turner, Fletcher and Crutchley were found not guilty of the outrage that had taken place. The captain of the heavy cruiser "Chicago" Howard Bode was found guilty, whom Crutchley had left as the commander of the "southern" group during his absence. Howard Bode shot himself on April 19, 1943. In general, there was a reason, because the only thing that Bode could and did not do was not raise the alarm, which doomed the northern group to defeat.

The only thing that somewhat maintains the reputation of the American navy is that the submarine S-44 on August 10, when Mikawa's squadron was heading back to base, attacked a group of ships and sank the heavy cruiser Kako. Small but consolation.

Defeat? How can I say ... We look at the Japanese.

There, too, everything is very, very difficult. It seems that they sunk 4 heavy cruisers, they finished two destroyers pretty well, victory?

No.

The landing was not destroyed, and the Allied offensive was not thwarted. Guadalcanal remained under Allied control, and the transports, which Mikawa's group could easily sink, subsequently supplied ground forces for months. That, in principle, some researchers directly associate with the further defeat of Japan in the campaign for the Solomon Islands.

Mikawa found himself in a difficult position. He did not know where the US Navy aircraft carriers were at the moment, which, in theory, with the onset of dawn, could make a chop of his squad. He mistakenly believed that there were still Allied ships in the area, "unmarketable" and ready for battle.

Plus he believed that the ships had used up too much ammunition.

In fact, it would be better to drown transports not with the main, but with the auxiliary caliber. But most of the officers supported Mikawa's idea of ​​"ripping the claws", but can we clearly say about the victory of the Japanese fleet?

The five Mikawa heavy cruisers had 34 203 mm barrels of firepower. Five American and Australian cruisers - 43 barrels of the same caliber. But the Japanese cruisers carried 56 torpedo tubes, plus almost the same number were on the destroyers and light cruisers. And the Japanese used the torpedoes in full. The Americans, too, were hit by torpedoes, the whole question is that they are somewhat not in the right place.


Heavy cruisers Furutaka and Kinugasa

But despite the loss of ships and people, which, of course, weakened the US fleet (they had to keep silent for two whole months about the results of the battle), the strategic initiative remained with the Americans.

The heavy defeat at Savo Island did not change the alignment on the front line in the South Pacific at all. Moreover, a serious struggle began for Guadalcanal, which lasted more than a year. Naval battles for the Solomon Islands continued until the end of 1943.


So, apart from moral satisfaction from the defeat in battle, the Japanese had nothing else. Japan has absolutely not been able to extract any positive aspects, except for political successes.

And if Mikawa was bolder ... If he attacked transports, the alignment could be completely different. But the second Pearl Harbor happened. That is, the battle won had absolutely no effect on the war.


But at least the Japanese won the battle as if by notes.
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  1. Ross xnumx
    Ross xnumx 9 January 2021 05: 34
    +3
    The Japanese split into two columns and actually embraced a group of American ships.

    Captured, carried away ... good
    So, apart from moral satisfaction from the defeat in battle, the Japanese had nothing else. Japan has absolutely not been able to extract any positive aspects, except for political successes.

    And later, political successes were blown away by atomic bombings, and the Americans calmly feel themselves on the territory of former irreconcilable enemies ...
    1. NDR-791
      NDR-791 9 January 2021 06: 58
      +10
      Americans feel comfortable in the territory of former implacable enemies ...
      And irreconcilable enemies forgetting the "Spirit of Yamato" kiss their shoe ... and live not badly. And, by the way, because of this phenomenon, phrases like "declare war and surrender" or "... we would drink Bavarian" slip through some people. At the same time, they don't want to learn history, and they don't want to know anything.
  2. saigon
    saigon 9 January 2021 07: 22
    +14
    Actually, the Japanese fleet was not interested in the Solomon Islands at all. All this confusion was started at the insistence of the army command.
    Somehow suddenly found out that New Guinea is completely inaccessible for the troops in terms of movement from north to south.
    Well, the idea arose - we will bypass the adversary from the flank, so they began to tinker (not at all in a hurry to the airfield on the Guadalcanal).
    The refusal to break through to transport is caused by many factors.
    Mikawa collected ships for battle in an emergency order (they belonged to different fleets), rebuilding the formation after the battle, the amount of fuel on the ships and the fear of being hit by coastal aviation in the morning (the Americans got the Guadalcanal from the bases).
    Moreover, it is worth noting the skill of maneuvering the Japanese in a night battle (and the allies too). Normal maps of this area did not exist for either one or the other, no one was going to fight or just swim there before.
    1. Fat
      Fat 9 January 2021 21: 50
      +2
      It seems to be true, but not quite so ... The Japanese strategically sought to create a "security belt" for своих communications ... The clash may have been unexpected for both belligerents. Then, yes, and yes, to fight there on a full scale, no one was going to ... It all had to be "a little not there" ... And Mikawa really showed himself well, commanding "whatever" and "anywhere". Usually the task of the Japanese fleet was extremely formalized, but here it is quite the opposite ...
  3. unknown
    unknown 9 January 2021 08: 19
    +11
    The author of the article, as usual, took the photos of the ships somewhat freely.
    The article dealt with the "Chicago" cruiser of the "Northampton" class.
    And the article presents a photo of a cruiser belonging to the "Baltimore" class.
    1. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 9 January 2021 16: 21
      +7
      )))
      The author is in his repertoire. I was looking for a picture of "KRT Chicago" and found CA-136 Chicago instead of CA-29 Chicago. Okay, at least RIM-8 Talos did not.
  4. Phil77
    Phil77 9 January 2021 08: 51
    +12
    I'll add a photo, also * Quincy *.
    1. Phil77
      Phil77 9 January 2021 10: 05
      +6
      Quote: Phil77
      I will add

      Excuse me, I will add that the wreck of the ship was discovered during the Ballard expedition, yes, yes, it was he who examined the wreck.
      1. Macsen_wledig
        Macsen_wledig 9 January 2021 19: 01
        +4
        Quote: Phil77
        I will add that the wreck of the ship was discovered during the Ballard expedition, yes, yes, it was he who examined the wreck of the ship.

        Maybe someone will be interested ...
  5. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 9 January 2021 09: 41
    +24
    Well, it is written in the author's style with the author's jambs (the forum users have already pointed out the inconsistency of the photo of the cruiser "Chicago", which shows a later copy of the "Baltimore" type).
    Someone calls what happened a tragic coincidence, someone ordinary races .... sloppiness, but in this battle a lot of circumstances were superimposed on each other that led to the tragedy of the American fleet. The author also did not show the significance of the golden hit in the Shokai navigator's cabin, where a few maps of the adjacent area were destroyed. Many sources point to this as one of the reasons, very significant, for Mikawa's refusal to attack the transports. As a result, the main task, for which everything was started, was not fulfilled. In this case, the fleet ensured the actions of the army, but it failed. So there is parity in "lucky coincidences". The Japanese worked with the destruction of the guards, and the Americans - with the rescue of the landing.
    The Japanese, with their desire to go to the end, and the sacrifice that manifested itself at the end of the war, miscalculated in the described mess at the Savo Island, when it was necessary to go all the way in destroying the landing. An extra hour spent on raiding transports would have yielded far more dividends than destroying a cruising patrol. But again, it is easy for us to reason after the fact when the whole alignment is clear, but if we were in Mikawa's place? ... As well as in the place of the same Langsdorf?
    Article like, will go to popularize naval topics in VO. Although, as always, questions to the author for details request
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 9 January 2021 18: 47
      +1
      I am not a military man or a historian - something tells me - the fleet, at the request of the army and aviation, carried out an operation and was not going to drop the landing. as the admiral was assigned the task so "in place" at his own peril and risk he worked out.
      For the Yap, the main thing was the stability of the entire grouping on the Solov-ah and NGVinea. Not one base.
    2. Normal ok
      Normal ok 10 January 2021 02: 39
      0
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Well, it is written in the author's style with the author's jambs (the forum users have already pointed out the inconsistency of the photo of the cruiser "Chicago", which shows a later copy of the "Baltimore" type).
      Someone calls what happened a tragic coincidence, someone ordinary races .... sloppiness, but in this battle a lot of circumstances were superimposed on each other that led to the tragedy of the American fleet. The author also did not show the significance of the golden hit in the Shokai navigator's cabin, where a few maps of the adjacent area were destroyed. Many sources point to this as one of the reasons, very significant, for Mikawa's refusal to attack the transports. As a result, the main task, for which everything was started, was not fulfilled. In this case, the fleet ensured the actions of the army, but it failed. So there is parity in "lucky coincidences". The Japanese worked with the destruction of the guards, and the Americans - with the rescue of the landing.
      The Japanese, with their desire to go to the end, and the sacrifice that manifested itself at the end of the war, miscalculated in the described mess at the Savo Island, when it was necessary to go all the way in destroying the landing. An extra hour spent on raiding transports would have yielded far more dividends than destroying a cruising patrol. But again, it is easy for us to reason after the fact when the whole alignment is clear, but if we were in Mikawa's place? ... As well as in the place of the same Langsdorf?
      Article like, will go to popularize naval topics in VO. Although, as always, questions to the author for details request

      I completely agree. A situational success did not bring the Japanese a strategic victory.
  6. bubalik
    bubalik 9 January 2021 09: 52
    +8
    The second in line was “Chicago”. The commander of the cruiser Howard Bowie deigned to rest, so that the cruiser did not even enter the battle

    ,,, yes this time we can say lucky ,,, the second time. At the beginning of the summer, as a result of a daring attack by Japanese submarines in the port of Sydney, it can be said by pure chance that the Kuttabul ferry was sunk instead.
    what Bode could and did not do - he did not raise the alarm, which doomed the northern group to defeat
    .
    Historians have questioned the competence of senior Allied officers. Muirhead Gould hosted a dinner party on the night of the attack, and one of the main guests was a senior US Navy officer in Sydney Harbor, Captain Howard Bode of USS Chicago. Both officers were skeptical that any attack could have taken place. Muirhead-Gould arrived aboard the HMAS Lolita at about midnight, an act he described as trying to learn about the situation. But later, Lolita's crew members said that when Muirhead-Gould boarded, he immediately scolded the captain and crew of the patrol boat and quickly dismissed their report. Junior officers in Chicago provided similar descriptions of Bode's return on board, and members of both crews later stated that Muirhead-Gould and Bode were intoxicated. It was only after the destruction of HMAS Kuttabul that both officers took the attack seriously.
  7. bubalik
    bubalik 9 January 2021 10: 02
    +8
    The Japanese cruiser "Kako" hit the "Chicago" with a torpedo, which disabled the fire control system. Chicago pulled out of the fight.

    ,,, damage, explosion of a torpedo in the bow and a dent in the stern area from an unexploded torpedo.

    1. Phil77
      Phil77 9 January 2021 10: 15
      +3
      Quote: bubalik
      torpedo explosion

      Hello my friend! Q. And who found the remnants of * RT-109 *. Yes, it was he who was commanded by John F. Kennedy. wink
      1. Phil77
        Phil77 9 January 2021 10: 35
        +7
        Quote: Phil77
        John Kennedy

        Well ??! Yes, the same Ballard! Number * one * in the world of underwater archeology! Heck!
    2. bubalik
      bubalik 9 January 2021 11: 02
      +5
      ,,, but in January 1943 near Rennell Island they still drowned.

      Last minutes
  8. 27091965
    27091965 9 January 2021 10: 29
    +4
    the Japanese, as expected, headed for the northern group. While peace and quiet reigned there, flashes and explosions of shells were mistaken for a thunderstorm, and the first alarm signal from the destroyer Patterson simply did not go through due to the fact that the island of Savo itself was on the way, which not the most powerful radio station of the destroyer could not overcome ...


    " Patterson message: "warning, warning, unidentified ships entering harbor." the message was received on the Vincennes, but it did not reach the captain, sleeping in the cabin adjacent to the pilot's cockpit, and it is not certain that it was heard by the senior officer on the bridge. The warning was also heard on the Quincy, but was not relayed to the artillery control posts. "
    There are many inaccuracies in the article, but in principle it is interesting to read.
  9. Olgovich
    Olgovich 9 January 2021 10: 52
    +8
    The Japanese acted absolutely competently and made the most of it: it would be stupidity to remain in the morning to defeat the US aircraft carriers (and the Japanese commander HAD to take this into account and knew that they were)).

    And to fight with them during the day, you need all the other means that he did not have.
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 9 January 2021 18: 20
      +5
      He didn't know the carriers were gone.
      In this case, the prize was the transports with the landing force and supplies, and the bonus of the escort cruiser. Mikawa took the bonus and refused the prize. We can talk as much as we like about the fear of aircraft carriers and the fear of being hit by aircraft in the morning, but the task was not completed - the transports were not destroyed, which led to the retention of the Americans and subsequently resulted in a series of battles with the death of the Hiei and Kirishima and attempts. " Tokyo express "supply. And if Mikawa had completed the task, the Americans, with the departure of their aircraft carriers, the death of cruisers and the loss of transports, could be destroyed on Guadalcanal with the problem of delaying a new landing, which would give the Japanese a respite. And it is not known how everything would have turned out later. But this is "if only"
      And so the landing party held out and the Americans threw forces to hold the bridgehead. And the Japanese rushed to support the army when it became problematic. Although Mikawa could solve the problem at the root, albeit with a hypothetical version of the loss of a number of ships ...
      Morality. The Japanese, having dealt with the guards, abandoned the main task of helping the army to hold positions by destroying the landing ships with supplies. That's all the conclusions ... Of course, attacking transports with heavy cruisers behind you is very reckless, but completing a combat mission can be a long and dangerous road. Mikawa was reinsured, in the end the Japanese lost. They would have lost later, but you have to go to the end when you rush ...
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 9 January 2021 20: 57
        +3
        Quote: Rurikovich
        We can talk as much as we like about the fear of aircraft carriers and the fear of being hit by aircraft in the morning, but the task is not completed


        One more task stood in the way of the "task" —the Amer. cruisers.

        It took time.

        Stay in the morning, die from planes.

        Mikawa is right, IMHO. Relying on the foolishness of the enemy or relying on luck is no less foolishness hi
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 11 January 2021 13: 52
        0
        Quote: Rurikovich
        And if Mikawa had fulfilled the task, the Americans, with the departure of aircraft carriers, the death of cruisers and the loss of transports, could be destroyed on Guadalcanal with the problem of delaying a new landing, which would give the Japanese a respite.

        Why weren't they destroyed in real life - after Turner took DESO the next day after the night battle? wink
        Virtually everything the Marines were left with on the island was disembarked before the battle at Savo, along with the 1st and 2nd landing echelons. The unloading was so ... energetic that already during the landing of the 1st echelon a report came: there is nowhere else to land, the landing zone is crammed with supplies (during exercises, part of the previously landed combat units were usually involved left in reserve - and the result was not long in coming).
  10. TermNachTer
    TermNachTer 9 January 2021 10: 58
    +9
    The author somehow does not notice that Mikawa acted "blindly". He did not know where the aircraft carriers were or where the US battleships were. At dawn, his cruisers and destroyers, who shot most of the w / c, could become an excellent target for mattress mats. By the way, the author is not alone in this statement. Mikawa, after a couple of days, the Hasirian strategists began to accuse that he had not destroyed the transport at Lunga Point. Sitting in an office in Tokyo or in a cabin on the Hasira-jima raid, the situation is seen quite differently than at night on the Solomon Islands, under the fire of Anglo-Saxon eight-inches))))
    1. Rurikovich
      Rurikovich 9 January 2021 11: 56
      +2
      So Mikawa was tasked with destroying the transports. wink
      1. saigon
        saigon 9 January 2021 17: 15
        +3
        Mikawa appeared at the battle site a day earlier than the Americans expected him. From here, and a voyage on a cruiser on the type of confer and a formal transfer of command.
        Mikawa acted very quickly, collecting ships in an emergency, extremely unbalanced formation, an obvious shortage of destroyers, ships of different fleets, and in addition Mikawa could not know for sure whether or not there was enough fuel.
        Well, the transports still washed away and the marina amers starved a little.
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 9 January 2021 17: 59
          +3
          The Americans consulted about the departure of the aircraft carriers. And already after the fact, with full trousers from the rout, they finally UNLOADED THE TRANSPORTATIONS, which helped the landing party a lot. So Mikawa made a rustle, but did not fulfill the main task - the destruction of transports. The rest is all secondary and not important. request
          1. Fat
            Fat 10 January 2021 00: 12
            +1
            Quote: Rurikovich
            Mikawa made a rustle, but did not fulfill the main task - the destruction of transports. The rest is all secondary and not important.

            Andrey Nikolaevich, thank you. That is how much I had to deal with the "analysis" of the actions of the Imperial Navy. Always the navy did not fulfill the "main task", SOMETHING interfered with in Leyte Gulf ... Are there any enemies of the Japanese military?
            Either ignorance of the situation, then cowards and traitors. Don't you feel sad about this? On the way - the reconnaissance failed, they did not find transports, there was not enough "technical power".
            The result is natural.
          2. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 11 January 2021 13: 08
            0
            Quote: Rurikovich
            And already after the fact, with full trousers from the defeat, they still FINALLY UNLOADED the TRANSPORT, which greatly helped the landing party.

            This is the ambush that Turner urgently left Guadalcanal on August 9 without completing unloading of transports.
            The forces ashore had 17 days 'rations - after counting captured Japanese food - and only four days' supply of ammunition for all weapons.
            © First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
            That is, the landed troops had food for 17 days and ammunition for 4 days of fighting. At the norm, EMNIP, 60 days for food and 14 days for ammunition.
            And Turner was going to leave even before the defeat of the cruising compound - because of the withdrawal of Fletcher's AUG.
            At a conference on board Turner's flagship transport, the McCawley, on the night of 8 August, the admiral told General Vandegrift that Fletcher's impending withdrawal meant that he would have to pull out the amphibious force's ships.
      2. Macsen_wledig
        Macsen_wledig 9 January 2021 18: 53
        +2
        Quote: Rurikovich
        So Mikawa was tasked with destroying the transports.

        If I remember correctly, Mikawa set the task for himself ...
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 9 January 2021 19: 04
          +3
          So yes, Mikawa himself developed the operation, he set a goal himself - the destruction of the assault transports. I don't see the difference. Moreover, in this case, the fleet acts in the interests of the army smile
      3. TermNachTer
        TermNachTer 9 January 2021 20: 30
        +4
        What source was the information taken from, what tasks did Mikawa set? As I understand it, he acted purely on a whim. The samurai were at Lunga Point, a day after the start of the landing. I think Tokyo was just "digesting" information.
        1. 27091965
          27091965 9 January 2021 21: 24
          +2
          Quote: TermNachTER
          What source was the information taken from, what tasks were Mikawa set? As far as I understand, he acted purely on a whim


          This appears to be taken from the 1945 interrogation of Captain Kenkichi Kato.

          " To avoid confusion and accidents, we moved in one column during the night. Since our mission was to bypass Savo Island, fire on your transports and then retreat, we did not expect any difficulty. On the way, we received a report that one of your transports was on fire, so we felt we could easily detect your powers.. "
          1. TermNachTer
            TermNachTer 9 January 2021 21: 55
            +3
            He doesn't write anything about teams from Tokyo. Neither Mikawa himself nor his early. Headquarters, Captain Okhmai, do not say that they received any instructions.
            1. 27091965
              27091965 10 January 2021 12: 15
              +1
              Quote: TermNachTER
              He doesn't write anything about teams from Tokyo. Neither Mikawa himself nor his early. headquarters, Captain Okhmai, do not say that they received any instructions


              Dear Nikolay. The team was like that. It did not indicate that it was necessary to conduct a battle near the Savo Island. It was given by Admiral I. Yamamoto, and it was required to conduct a “decisive counterattack” against the Americans. Some sources indicate that initially the plan of Vice Admiral G. Mikawa was not approved in Tokyo, but after a short period of time, Vice Admiral G. Mikawa received permission to conduct the operation he developed.
  11. Alien From
    Alien From 9 January 2021 13: 51
    0
    Roman thanks! Great article and photo!)
  12. Peaceful SEO
    Peaceful SEO 9 January 2021 17: 50
    +3
    Eh. Recklessness is a terrible thing in war. And in peacetime too
  13. Macsen_wledig
    Macsen_wledig 9 January 2021 18: 49
    +5
    Therefore, the Japanese used a very interesting maneuver: they walked like on a parade until they noticed, and as soon as this happened, Mikawa moved to the southeast at full speed, and then made a sharp turn to the south.

    The author would not hurt to look at the maps or express his thoughts more clearly.
    Mikawa made a turn to the south around 0630 on August 8, much later not only the 1st, but also the 2nd detection of his compound ...

    And on the morning of August 8, Mikawa approached Guadalcanal.

    Simple what? :)

    Here torpedoes from "Bagley" and hit exactly the center of the cruiser.

    I wonder if the author can prove this hypothesis?
    Or is it just a series of "hot"? :)

    The Astoria was frankly stupid.

    I wonder what night battles the author took part in to assess the actions of other people?

    The result for the American fleet was the loss of four heavy cruisers.

    I wonder, when was this "Canberra" transferred to the US Navy? :)

    PS I seem to understand who the author is "mowing" for: Alexander Bolnyh, but, unlike the latter, he lacks neither knowledge, nor fantasies, nor erudition ... :)
    1. unknown
      unknown 10 January 2021 08: 01
      +3
      It would be better if the author took an example from Andrey from Chelyabinsk.
      Then this article would end with the phrase: "To be continued ..."
      This article could become the first in a series of articles that would analyze the pre-war tactical attitudes of the parties (and this battle is a brilliant implementation of the pre-war Japanese installations for night combat using artillery and torpedo weapons) and their evolution during the war.
      The characteristics of the weapons of the parties and their comparison would be given.
      Reservation schemes would be given, especially since both the Japanese and the Allies (I do not specifically use the term "Anglo-Saxons", because in the United States forty percent of the white population are descendants of the Germans) heavy cruisers of different generations participated in this battle, and there was would compare them.
      The damage and survivability of heavy cruisers in Japan, USA and Great Britain would be analyzed.
      All night battles in the Pacific Ocean involving heavy cruisers would be analyzed, taking into account the above.
      But, since the author of this material is not Andrey from Chelyabinsk, I think that we will not wait for such a series of articles ...
      1. Macsen_wledig
        Macsen_wledig 10 January 2021 12: 29
        +2
        Quote: ignoto
        It would be better if the author took an example from Andrey from Chelyabinsk.
        Then this article would end with the phrase: "To be continued ..."

        You have to work ...
        Especially when you consider how much material Guadalcanal has about the company.
  14. CTABEP
    CTABEP 9 January 2021 19: 55
    +4
    Interesting. The ships of those years, of course, were handsome, especially not disfigured by camouflage.

    By the way, it is very similar when they start to measure frags in WWII. Yes, the Germans fought better at the tactical level (and before 1943 it was better everywhere), but the war is not a desmatch with a score on the scoreboard. Yes, we had more losses. Who won - this question will be answered by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.
  15. Usher
    Usher 10 January 2021 09: 37
    -3
    A definite plus! But
    Howard Bowie deigned to rest, so that the cruiser did not even enter the battle. The Japanese cruiser "Kako" hit the "Chicago" by a torpedo, which disabled the fire control system. Chicago pulled out of the fight.

    Surprisingly, Acting Force Commander Howard Bode

    So Bode or Bowie?
    1. Macsen_wledig
      Macsen_wledig 10 January 2021 13: 01
      +1
      Quote: Usher
      So Bode or Bowie?

      Bode, Howard Douglas (Ping)
  16. Cure72
    Cure72 10 January 2021 09: 53
    +3
    As always, it is in the comments that you find a lot of interesting things !!!
  17. Selevc
    Selevc 10 January 2021 16: 04
    0
    Thrown off in terms of landing "for three", that is, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. A combined marine division was prepared, for the transportation of which 23 transports were prepared.
    That is, the landing operation on the islands was planned and carried out in 3 !!! countries and the Japanese did not know it !!! They also did not detect the exit of the landing ships and escort ships from the ports. Yes !!! - apparently intelligence in Japan was severely lame at least during this period of the war !!!
    1. Macsen_wledig
      Macsen_wledig 10 January 2021 16: 26
      +1
      Quote: Selevc
      That is, the landing operation on the islands was planned and carried out in 3 !!! countries and the Japanese did not know it !!!

      This is the vision of the author ...
      The Americans planned it. If so interesting, read Morison.

      Quote: Selevc
      Yes !!! - apparently intelligence in Japan was severely lame at least during this period of the war !!!

      So the airfield on Guadalcanal was needed for this: to control the approaches to Australia
  18. TatarinSSSR
    TatarinSSSR 10 January 2021 18: 55
    0
    Thanks for the article, very easy to read and interesting. In general, there would be more such articles on VO about various naval battles of World War II.
  19. Black lotos
    Black lotos 11 January 2021 00: 45
    +2
    And if Mikawa had been bolder ...

    Gunichi Mikawa was a very experienced and intelligent admiral.
    He is the third in academic performance on the stream and he was at the signing of Versailles.
    As for the bolder. He took part in many battles (figuratively for "battleships") and was also in the attack on Pearl Harbor and Midway.
    And after that he is reproached for "aircraft carrier fear! There is also a limit of luck!"
    The Battle in the Bismark Sea was its finale. Aviation destroyed (and torpedo boats)
    And the Americans have not missed it.
    And the admiral himself lived to be 92 years old, having survived almost all the high American command of his opponents.
  20. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 11 January 2021 13: 13
    0
    In general, it is of interest how American ships equipped with radars, while conducting a radar patrol, could not detect Japanese cruisers. And why the Japanese signallers were more effective than the American radars.

    Mwa-ha-ha ... the 1942 American naval radar is a device that is very difficult to get to work and that fails for the slightest provocation.
    In the report of the commander of the AV Enterprise on the battles in the Solomon Islands, there is a wonderful proposal: "The radar does not see targets that are visually observed by signalmen".
  21. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 11 January 2021 13: 42
    +2
    And if Mikawa was bolder ... If he attacked the transports, the alignment could be completely different.

    Considering that Turner pulled away from the island the next day without completing the unloading, even destroying the transports would have made little difference. And taking into account the fact that part of the TR would be washed ashore, the supply of the 1st DMP could become even better than in real life. smile
  22. Sergey79
    Sergey79 12 January 2021 10: 11
    +1
    I read it with pleasure. Thanks to the author. I knew about this fight, but I read the sources without light humor ...
    1. Macsen_wledig
      Macsen_wledig 12 January 2021 10: 53
      0
      Quote: Sergey79
      I knew about this fight, but I read the sources without light humor ...

      It's a pity there is no hand-face smiley ...
      Although no ... You can.
      1. Sergey79
        Sergey79 15 January 2021 09: 51
        +1
        HZ .... Maybe I miss two higher educations and an academic degree to understand your subtle humor to my comment ...
        1. Macsen_wledig
          Macsen_wledig 15 January 2021 10: 38
          0
          Quote: Sergey79
          HZ .... Maybe I miss two higher educations and an academic degree to understand your subtle humor to my comment ...

          You know, two higher educations in the absence of academic degrees are enough for me (it was lazy, to be honest) to understand that it is at least ugly to write with humor about the battle in which more than 1000 Allied sailors died (and by the standards of naval battles this is a lot) ...
          1. Sergey79
            Sergey79 15 January 2021 18: 10
            +1
            And the war is always "ugly" .... But even on it, it is somehow hard without humor.
            1. Macsen_wledig
              Macsen_wledig 15 January 2021 19: 13
              -1
              Quote: Sergey79
              And the war is always "ugly" .... But even on it, it is somehow hard without humor.

              This is understandable.
              But not with such "humor", as the author of the article presents everything.
  23. andrew42
    andrew42 18 January 2021 19: 27
    0
    The Japs had something inexplicably chronic about this — not picking up the fruits of victory. Starting from Pearl Harbor, and ending with the same Guadalcanal. This is pi to all the pseudo-samurai psychopathicity, and the complete lack of mercy for the defeated enemy. Paradox. It seems that the senior officers of the Mikado fleet wanted to "fight longer" so that they had something to tell their grandchildren. lucky American guys, oh lucky And not the last time.
  24. uralant
    uralant 27 January 2021 17: 09
    0
    Why wasn't McCain surprised? So it's nevertheless nepotism, so to speak, the gene level. Yes, but my son is not to blame for anything!