Fundamentals of shipbuilding policy: principles and their application
Corvette of project 20385 "Thundering" during construction at Severnaya Verf.
Photo: press service of the United Shipbuilding Corporation
Criticism of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy for their approaches to shipbuilding would be too one-sided if not reminded from time to time of what the correct approaches should be. This is also important because the dissemination of the right ideas in society forms public opinion, and it then influences the actions of the authorities, of which there are many examples.
In order to determine the appearance of ships, it is critically important for us to understand the criteria for what is good or bad. Without this, it is impossible to choose the right technical solutions. Lobbyists of various "Horns and Hooves" use this today, justifying equipping ships with gold at a price and incapable of combat systems. And without argumentation
"What is good and what is bad",
shared by all interested people disinterestedly, you cannot argue with them.
And really:
Can you prove that an inexpensive and combat-ready complex is better than five or six times more expensive and incapable of combat? How did you define it?
And where did you get the idea that six incapacitated ships are better than seven combat capable for the same money? Who told you that?
What if, in ten years, the non-combat-ready complex will be combat-ready and surpass the one that is already combat-ready? What will you sing then? Will the war start earlier?
What kind of war, what are you talking about, we are a nuclear power, there will be no war. You ask, why then the fleet at all, if there will be no war anyway? So you are against fleet whether?
And where did you get the idea that six incapacitated ships are better than seven combat capable for the same money? Who told you that?
What if, in ten years, the non-combat-ready complex will be combat-ready and surpass the one that is already combat-ready? What will you sing then? Will the war start earlier?
What kind of war, what are you talking about, we are a nuclear power, there will be no war. You ask, why then the fleet at all, if there will be no war anyway? So you are against fleet whether?
Today it is these arguments that are used to justify various sawing projects. And it is in this impudent form. On the one hand, our system has learned to forgive. On the other hand, people who do not have special education cannot distinguish between good and evil.
As a result, dishonest lobbyists, propagandists and the like are not afraid of anything and are not ashamed of anyone. Under the conditions of an all-forgiving system, they can only be opposed by knowledge, moreover, mass knowledge. Thus, we need criteria for what is right and what is wrong. Only after working through them, we will be able to move on, cutting off dead-end areas of development.
Combat power and common sense
Of all the programs of explosive increase in sea power known to us, the closest one on a historical scale is the Chinese one. Unfortunately, neither the Chinese special literature (and there is one), nor their special periodicals are translated into Russian on a significant scale.
Therefore, we can only judge the success of the Chinese by their victories. And the facts (in the form of a powerful Chinese surface fleet, which has long overtaken us) are obvious. As well as those tight deadlines in which they managed to do it.
China's successes are clear. It is impossible to ignore them.
True, there is one more interesting example.
If we step back a little, then we will find another program that also led to an explosive growth of sea power. And according to the same principles. We are talking about the "600 ships" program of the Ronald Reagan administration.
And here we know much more than just the end result. We can bring up the literature today about what the US was doing. And see the results of what China was able to do. And, even after a cursory analysis of what he saw, come to a simple conclusion: both the Americans and the Chinese did the same thing. And they came to the same results - the explosive growth of their military power.
We did exactly the opposite. And got the opposite results.
Today the Russian Navy (apart from the nuclear submarine) is about the level of South Korea.
We are (theoretically) stronger than them. Due to the nuclear submarine and some powerful ships, such as the future "Nakhimov", or, hypothetically, "Kuznetsov". If it is, of course, repaired. And the naval air regiments will actually reach a combat readiness state. Which is not even close now. And there are no signs that this will change in the foreseeable future.
Comparing yourself with the same Japan, for example, is no longer worth it. No nuclear weapons they will simply sweep us away. And not only on the seas.
It's better not to think about China and the United States. This is a different league.
What principles were guided by both the United States and China? And other countries too?
We can name them fairly accurately, especially with regard to the Americans.
So, in order.
1. More ships for the same money is better than less. Guided missile weapons allow you to win battles against superior forces due to tactical superiority (see article "The Reality of Missile Volleys: A Little About Military Superiority"), however, such possibilities are not endless. Superiority is useful in any case.
In addition, everything is not really reduced to battles between ships and ships. Moreover, this is not their main purpose in the modern era.
A simple example.
Eight corvettes (simpler and cheaper) allow you to form two search and strike groups of 4 ships and close them to enemy submarines, for example, two strait. And 4 corvettes built instead of them (more complicated and twice as expensive), other things being equal, will not be able to do this.
With the support of the artillery fire of the landing, the scheme with cheaper corvettes gives us 8 artillery barrels. And with a higher price - 4, etc.
One ship is better than zero ships. And two are better than one comparable in quality for the same money.
US Navy ships in the Pacific - quantity matters.
Someone thinks it's stupid to write such things? This is a self-evident banality.
No, this is not nonsense.
Because even now, a number of military officials, while defending against attacks from project 20386, on which they spent almost twice as muchwhat could be worth a corvette 20380 or 20385 built on sound grounds (we will return to its appearance later), uses as an argument that now so many ships are not needed for the same tasks.
And that it's okay to get one ship at double the price instead of two at the non-double price.
Do you know, for example, why it is better to build five ships than seven almost the same, for the same money?
Because in ten years it is better to have five outdated and modernized ships than seven. And this is in all seriousness being snatched today as the correct approach by some dishonest comrades. That is, see the example of arrogant lobbyists.
“Do you want more ships, not less? You want to weaken the fleet! "
This, alas, is the current reality of our country. And you have to deal with it.
It is not necessary, however, to bring everything to the point of absurdity. And to compare many unarmed pelvis (like the same project 22160) with a pair of missile frigates. Speech in the examples above (real, alas) was about ships with very close combat capabilities, almost the same.
The Americans followed a sane path - they built as many ships as possible. Until the coveted figure of 600, they did not have so much.
The Chinese are doing the same thing, with the same result.
We are not Americans or Chinese, we do not have such resources, but the principle is universal. It follows not only that 600 is stronger than 350, but also that, other things being equal (for example, equal performance characteristics or almost equal performance characteristics), two are stronger than one. Alas, but today it has to prove.
The demand for more ships, however, begs the question:
"And how to achieve this, the budget is limited?"
That's all right. The budget is limited. Therefore, the following principles are used.
2. Only systems mastered in production are installed on serial ships.
Why is this so?
It's simple, fine-tuning a product as complex as a ship can take years. The finishing of the Poliment-Redut air defense system took years. But, an important point - she was brought to head ship, not serial, and to acceptance of "Admiral Gorshkov" into the combat strength. With a number of reservations. But by the time the Andreevsky flag was raised, the frigate was combat-ready.
In the future, albeit slowly and gradually, the ships under construction of this project did without big experiments, although there are differences in design. The same third launcher 3C-14 for missiles. But some kind of supernova complexes, which were not previously found anywhere, are not put on these ships. The result is that after the issue with the main power plants has been resolved, the series has prospects, you just need to build them and that's it. Little by little, but methodically and continuously. And there will be success. Has already.
Project 22350 frigates became the most important success of the domestic shipbuilding industry. If anything will save the Navy, then these ships.
Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense, Mil.ru
In contrast to project 22350, the list of "experimental" corvettes for which systems are planned that may never become operational at all looks like this: "Thundering", "Agile", "Aldar Tsydenzhapov", "Zealous", "Strict", " Cutting". All new corvettes, the future construction of which has been announced this year, should also be added here. And "Daring-Mercury" of project 20386. Not a bad field of work for "closers" for state money.
If only serial products are installed on ships, then, firstly, the state does not bear additional costs for their fine-tuning, secondly, there is an opportunity to save money due to the mass production of products, and thirdly, manufacturers have the opportunity to financially plan. They basically know that by paying for the radar today, in a few months they will receive a set of equipment to be installed on the ship. It will not work out that the supplier will shrug his shoulders and say that he has not completed the OCD stage and that he needs to wait a couple of months (and sometimes years), make the ship on the slipway, and then (to compensate for the money unearned during the delay), climb into new loans. No price or timing shifts. This is what the use of serial systems gives.
This approach also speeds up the time for ships to enter service. And precisely because there is no need to spend money on fine-tuning, and the delivery time of the ships accelerates the time it takes to receive money for factories and reduces the risk that this money will be asked from the state under the threat of bankruptcy and disruption of the delivery time of the ships.
Moreover, contrary to what the lobbyists spread, this does not contradict technical progress. You can always start development work on a new complex, but separately from a series of ships under construction. It is possible, having the latest products ready for mass production, to install them on an old ship and modify on it.
"Pinnacle" with AFAR from "Fazotron" - instead of organizing a giant "sawmill" based on administrative resources and "unsportsmanlike methods", this worthy organization built an experimental prototype, tested it, evaluated its mistakes, then developed a real model for missile ships. Then the work stopped ...
You can start separate ROC in the form of one ship with new systems, which will then give them a "start in life", but until all this works "as it should", all other ships must go with a "serial".
Actually, many breakthrough systems were created in this way, for example, the now legendary American AN / SPY-1 radar.
3. The principle of reasonable sufficiency of performance characteristics. Attempts to make a superweapon out of a ship are our traditional misfortune, which more than once cost us the opportunity to obtain forces that are sane in terms of combat capability for reasonable money. Here again it is appropriate to refer to foreign experience.
For example, American frigates of the Oliver Perry class did not have anti-submarine missiles. An attempt to equip these ships with them would cause an avalanche-like increase in problems - at first the frigates would have risen in price. (The PLUR had to somehow be crammed there, which would require a significant redesign of the structure and an increase in displacement. Displacement would require a more powerful and larger power plant, it would require fuel, fuel - an increase in size, and so on.) Their mass construction in those quantities in which they were built would have been impossible. As a result, the tasks that “Perry” were solving would have to be solved by “Spruence”, which, in turn, would also “ask for money”, since their operation would be more expensive than that of “Perry” and so on.
Massive, cheap, serial, the same. The secret to success is simple.
In conditions when as many pennants as possible were needed to counter the Soviet Navy, the Americans did not do this. Faced with the fact that anti-submarine missions fall on the Perry, they simply dispensed with the PLUR, entrusting helicopters with the task of destroying submarines and bringing these frigates into battle groups with ships that had anti-submarine missiles.
On the other hand, the deliberate simplification of the Perry made it possible, if necessary, to simply have a huge number of simultaneously deployed towed GAS, which in modern conditions is critical for the performance of PLO tasks in a theater of operations.
For us, the same is critical, by the way. Even now. Although, for example, the basis of the propaganda behind the project 20386 are attempts to assert the opposite.
For more information on approaches to "Perry" - see article "The frigate" Perry "as a lesson for Russia: machine-designed, massive and cheap".
You can also remember the Chinese.
Creating massive corvettes for work at a short distance from the coast, which we know today as Project 056, they did not make a hangar on them. They left a simple set of anti-aircraft weapons, did not make an expensive and complex radar system, limiting themselves to simple, cheap and serial systems, but paying great attention to anti-submarine capabilities - these small ships have anti-submarine missiles.
Massive, cheap, serial, the same. The secret to success is simple.
And, for example, the corvette "Aldar Tsydenzhapov", which on December 25, 2020 was accepted into the combat composition of the fleet without full passing of state tests, has a super-expensive, very complex, non-serial and incapacitated radar system. But he does not have anti-submarine missiles - the opposite approach is evident.
The results are generally also the opposite - the Chinese hand over a new 056 about once every 4 months. With frigates of Project 054 they have everything the same - mass and serial weapons and subsystems. And dozens of simple and cheap ships in service. Technically, they are far from some ultimate perfection. But on the other hand, everything works for them, turns on, shoots and hits the right place.
And the supposedly "ultramodern" radar station on the "Thundering" corvette has the level of the 60s in terms of combat effectiveness. And the price is just like that of the finished Chinese corvette. At a single radar station, and not at the "Thundering" entirely.
Again, if you do not chase a titmouse in the sky and do not try to make a Death Star out of each ship, this does not mean that it will not be possible to work out the latest systems on some of the hulls to implement them on new projects or in modifying old ones. ...
Reasonable sufficiency is used not only when choosing weapons and equipment, but also when choosing, for example, materials - the same steel is much cheaper than aluminum or composites.
4. A ban on revision of the performance characteristics of projects of ships under construction or upgrades. This rule was accepted by the Americans and strictly observed. For any project of anything, there was a moment when the performance characteristics of the ship were frozen - after that, the Navy could no longer require any changes to the design, even if desired. That is, after that it was possible to change something in the ship only in the course of its modernization.
The benefits of this approach are obvious - it is an opportunity for shipbuilding to calmly and systematically engage in construction as quickly as possible and plan the financial activities of the enterprise. This means that there are less risks that someday the state will have to save the ship building program at its own expense.
Alas, we do not have this rule. And for serial ships under construction, and for repairs and upgrades, a completely different principle operates - no principles. So, apparently, the modernization of the BOD projects 1155 will take place under different projects.
5. Modernization "blocks". From the impossibility of arbitrarily changing the tactical and technical tasks already during the implementation of projects, it clearly follows the need to have a regulation for the modernization of ships under construction.
A series is a long matter. For many years of serial production of a series of ships, the first of them will have time to become obsolete and require repair. Thus, it is necessary to combine the need to produce standard mass ships with serial equipment and without chaotic changes in their designs, with the need to modernize them.
The Americans give a hint. During the production of a series of ships, the need has been accumulating, both to re-equip the already built hulls and modernize a number of subsystems in them, and to update the design in production. Modernization in the USA is carried out "in blocks" - when a ship comes in for repairs, it can update the list of subsystems standard for the modernization project, and all the installed equipment has already been tested and in fact is serial. The next ship is being upgraded according to the same design with the same subsystems.
New ships are changed in sub-series - "flights", and in any case they are built in large series of standard "units". The Americans began to retreat from this only when their naval forces began to degrade, having lost the enemy and having been in this state for some time. That is, since the late 90s.
But, as they say, we would have such degradation. The affairs in our Navy are incomparable with them in any case.
6. Minimization of the list of projects, elimination of excess ROC and the like.
Simple illustration. A series of patrol ships of project 22160, a miracle corvette of project 20386, the carrier of the Poseidons PLASN Khabarovsk and the Poseidon itself have already cost significantly more than one hundred billion rubles in terms of money in this year's prices. This is the money that has already been spent and which will inevitably have to be spent now.
Много это или мало?
This is a brigade of surface ships of six units, in terms of its level approximately the same as the corvette of Project 20385, but with the radar station working as it should. Or we can say that this is a multipurpose nuclear submarine with ammunition and crew. Or ¼ of a heavy strike aircraft carrier.
At the same time, what is important - we have neither Poseidon, nor Khabarovsk, nor 20386. And, with a very high degree of probability, there will be no Poseidon at all, Khabarovsk will turn out to be very different, 20386 will not confirm the stated performance characteristics from - for fatal design mistakes, and 22160 will continue to wind circles around the Mediterranean, demonstrating our flag to the crews of the Arleigh Burkes, Ticonderogs and Hornets pilots on an almost unarmed vessel with one three-inch cannon.
The question arises - why was money spent on all this?
And we didn’t even look into smaller “sawing” topics, like the same ekranoplan. In the R&D on the "vertical" and in the list of ROCs of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, where such "miracles" are in abundance, they also did not look. And all this requires money, the very money that we allegedly lack for the minimum strength.
Rationalizing military spending can make a significant contribution to defense capability. Rationalization of approaches to naval development too. As a result, these simple principles give savings and serialization. And the serial production saves money already during the service of the ships, freeing up the saved finances for maintaining military power.
But this is for the rich Chinese and the wealthy Americans.
And what about the poor Russians? Are they saving money? Are there a rational approach to the issues of military shipbuilding?
There are no answers in all cases.
Much poorer than our likely opponents from the United States and our Chinese comrades, we just throw money, squandering it without counting.
7. Weapon systems interacting with each other must develop in an integrated manner.
We give some examples.
First example. The already mentioned American "Perry", but now in a negative way. In the course of the development of the project, the Americans made the transition to a new naval helicopter - SH-60. For all the advantages of this helicopter, it did not fit into the Perry hangar in length. As a result, a ship with a longer hangar had to be designed. And the old Perry, with a short hangar, was then handed out to the allies, since the US helicopters intended for them were subsequently removed from service.
We should not repeat this mistake.
And here we come to the second example. Also helicopter, but ours.
Right now, the laying of new corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 is being prepared. At the same time, their hangars are designed for Ka-27 helicopters, which in the anti-submarine version are no longer mass-produced. The same can be said about the hangars of the latest frigates of Project 22350. The Ka-27 is being replaced by a helicopter known as the Lamprey, which is significantly larger than the Ka-27 in size.
Model of the "Lamprey" helicopter. Large dimensions are clearly visible.
At the same time, more and more often responsible workers near the naval structures express fears that the Lamprey will not fit into the hangars of ships designed for the Ka-27.
The question arises - will there be an enlarged hangar on the new corvettes and frigates? And what about Project 22350 frigates?
Obviously, knowing what approaches our Navy is guided by, we can predict that, most likely, no - it won't. The newest ships will be built with hangars in which future helicopters will not be able to fit. Taking into account the delay that occurs with the laying of new corvettes (the order of the President of the Russian Federation to build six ships at the ASZ was given back in August 2020), the customer still has a chance to foresee everything. There are also some frigates.
Will they be used? I would like to believe that yes.
But if the customer does not hurry up, then soon we will witness another situation, which would be very funny if it were not happening in our country. The chances of this are very high, alas.
Let's now see what principles were guided by the ordering structures of the Ministry of Defense in reality, using the example of corvettes - ships that at one time were conceived as the most massive class of surface ships in the Russian Navy.
Corvettes as an anti-example
As mentioned earlier, in the article “A victory of common sense: the corvettes are back. Bye for the pacific " initially, the project 20380 corvette was conceived as a ship with a minimum of OCD, by and large, only the Main Power Plant (GEM) should have been fundamentally new there. In the future, the ship was overgrown with new systems, as a result of which it began to consist of them almost completely. Then, after the lead "Guarding" was handed over, it turned out that the ship had to be altered again. Let's just list the stages of evolution.
"Guarding" - with ZRAK "Dagger" - head.
"Smart" - the first with Redoubt, he is also the first serial. In fact, we had to make a new project, that is, this is a DIFFERENT ship, and not just the same corvette, with the Reduta UVP instead of the Kortik. For this project (with a number of differences from each other, but not fundamental) Severnaya Verf also built Boykiy and Stoykiy, and Amur Shipyard (ASZ) built Perfect and Gromkiy... On the latter, almost all the serious shortcomings of the 20380 project were eliminated, except for problems with air defense and communications. There remained a shortage of maximum speed by 1 knot. At the same time, it is technically possible to make the air defense of the corvettes of this first "sub-series" work, just not as well as we would like. The connection also did not look like something unsolvable.
However, further into the project the radar "got" from the "Zaslon". What he brought in can be found in the articles by M. Klimov and A. Timokhin "Corvettes that will go into battle" and M. Klimova Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the Thundering fire ”.
Further, the series continued with this radar.
"Aldar Tsydenzhapov", construction of the NEA. With this ship Severnaya Verf has built and will build corvettes "Zealous", "Strogiy" and presumably two more corvettes, names for which have not been given yet. ASZ is building a corvette "Sharp", two more ships have not yet been laid down, names have not been given yet.
Thus, under the number "20380" we actually have three projects. Adjusted for the fact that the ships of the NE are somewhat different from those built at the NEA. In general, there are some differences between the ships.
In addition to the 20380 corvettes, a project 20385 corvette with reinforced armament and also a Zaroslav radar (only more complicated than on 20380) was designed on their basis. The head was so "wonderful" who passed the state tests "Thundering", the first serial "Prompt".
Two more similar ships should be built by the Severnaya Verf and four more - by the ASZ. This is the fourth project in the line of multipurpose ships in the near sea zone.
At the same time, since 2013, the Navy has decided that now both project 20380 and project 20385 are “a thing of the past”. And instead of them, a new miracle ship will be built, which has nothing in common with the old ones, except for individual systems - project 20386. The fifth in a row. For nearly fifteen years.
For those still under the illusion of Western sanctions and MTU diesels, quote:
1.03.2013
THE NAVY REFUSED THE "INVISIBLE" CORVETS OF PROJECT 20385 DUE TO HIGH PRICE
The navy abandoned the project 20385 stealth corvettes, three of which - "Thundering", "Provorny" and "Capable" - were going to be built at the "Severnaya Verf" in St. Petersburg, an informed source at the headquarters told Izvestia fleet. At a recent meeting in the Ministry of Defense with the participation of representatives of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the military decided to complete only the "Thundering" according to the original plan, and for the rest to develop a new project.
“The main thing that doesn’t suit us is the too high price and excessive armament - the Kalibr cruise missiles, which work against sea and ground targets. Project 20385 does not meet the requirements of the fleet, ”the source said. According to him, the estimated cost of one ship is about 14 billion rubles, but in reality it can reach 18 billion. For a corvette with a displacement of 2,2 thousand tons, although made using stealth technology, this is a lot. The equally modern frigates of project 11356R / M, which are now being built for the Black Sea Fleet, have a displacement of almost twice as much - 4 thousand tons, and cost the same.
The frigates of this project are ships of the open sea, with a significant range, and the corvettes 20385 are intended for the near sea zone. Sailors believe that such a powerful weapon as the Caliber is unnecessary for these small ships.
After the decision to cancel work on project 20385, only the corvettes of project 20380 will remain in the Russian Navy, all work on which is accompanied by failures.
THE NAVY REFUSED THE "INVISIBLE" CORVETS OF PROJECT 20385 DUE TO HIGH PRICE
The navy abandoned the project 20385 stealth corvettes, three of which - "Thundering", "Provorny" and "Capable" - were going to be built at the "Severnaya Verf" in St. Petersburg, an informed source at the headquarters told Izvestia fleet. At a recent meeting in the Ministry of Defense with the participation of representatives of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the military decided to complete only the "Thundering" according to the original plan, and for the rest to develop a new project.
“The main thing that doesn’t suit us is the too high price and excessive armament - the Kalibr cruise missiles, which work against sea and ground targets. Project 20385 does not meet the requirements of the fleet, ”the source said. According to him, the estimated cost of one ship is about 14 billion rubles, but in reality it can reach 18 billion. For a corvette with a displacement of 2,2 thousand tons, although made using stealth technology, this is a lot. The equally modern frigates of project 11356R / M, which are now being built for the Black Sea Fleet, have a displacement of almost twice as much - 4 thousand tons, and cost the same.
The frigates of this project are ships of the open sea, with a significant range, and the corvettes 20385 are intended for the near sea zone. Sailors believe that such a powerful weapon as the Caliber is unnecessary for these small ships.
After the decision to cancel work on project 20385, only the corvettes of project 20380 will remain in the Russian Navy, all work on which is accompanied by failures.
Link. In 2013, the design of 20386 was already underway, which only in 2016 demanded 29,6 billion rubles ("Thundering" project 20385 cost 22,5 billion in 2019 prices).
It was described in detail in the articles “Worse than a crime. Construction of project 20386 corvettes - error» и "Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam".
This scandalous project runs the risk of being the most disastrous project in the domestic shipbuilding industry. And there is no point in dwelling on it - in terms of arms, this is a step backwards compared to 20385, while at a third the price (and almost twice as much as the first 20380).
Instead of a patrol boat from "all serial" we have at first an overcomplicated ship, three sub-series of the basic project 20380 ("Guarding", 20380 with basic REV, they are also with IBMK), a limited series of a more powerful version 20385, mutant 20386. And all this at the same time!
The consistency in the customer's actions is no less striking - first, abandon 20385 because of the high cost, then start making 20386 even more expensive. After that, having lost four years, announce the return of both 20380 and 20385 at the same time. Why did you lose four years? (From 2016 to the present day, multipurpose ships of the near sea zone in Russia have not been laid down).
Because the Ministry of Defense expected, well, when would something come out of 20386. And did not know how to explain the return to already canceled projects, when 20386 had already been "promoted" like a ship of the future? I had to wait just that period when the average man in the street begins to forget that he was “blown in the ears” in the past - four years. It will be funny if the ships that have not been laid down over the years will not be enough later to support the NSNF, to fulfill the tasks of nuclear deterrence and the physical survival of the population of the Russian Federation. Natural selection in its pure, crystalline form ...
Below is an illustration from the "More projects to God of projects" series.
Head 20380 "Guarding". Built one.
First episode 20380: "Smart", "Lively", "Steadfast", "Perfect", "Loud".
Project 20385: "Head" Thundering ", commissioned, the first serial" Agile ".
Project 20380 with MF RLK. “Aldar Tsydenzhapov” was commissioned, next in line were “Zealous”, “Strict”, “Sharp”.
The lead ship of the project 20386 "Daring", later it was renamed "Mercury" and tried to pass off Putin as a new one. But Putin did not believe the details here.
After that, there was a return to construction simultaneously two projects - 20380 and 20385.
Along the way, two (!) Series of different MRKs were built (at the same time, Buyanov-M also had two "subseries" - with German diesels and with Chinese ones) and ordered a series of patrol ships of Project 22160 of six units, for which the Navy has no tasks ... Now we are talking about the extension of the "patrol" series, in some modified form, and Rear Admiral Tryapichnikov, who occupies the post of the Head of the Shipbuilding Directorate in the Main Command, in one of the interviews hinted at something MRK-shaped with an increased rocket salvo.
Can you see how this dance was consistent with the previously announced principles of shipbuilding? Is it still hard to believe that our budget will not be able to handle a normal fleet?
Industry wants to eat, and the navy is a good feeding trough. As for the combat effectiveness of this entire economy, those who determine the policy in this area will not have to fight and die, and they may well not worry about anything. You can even think over obituaries in advance for the dead crews, knowing what they can die from on those tubs on which the Motherland sent them into battle.
These, for example,
"Fearlessly at the cost of their lives, they detained the enemy, despite the absence of hydroacoustic weapons and anti-submarine weapons."
And others
"At the cost of their lives, they distracted the enemy's vulture pilots from transport with refugees, without having working air defense systems."
Well, there, the heirs of "Varyag", etc. It is very convenient if you know everything in advance.
Towards the end. The order of the president for the construction of a series of six 20380s, officials from the fleet first tried to turn into the construction of 20385 in the amount of 4 units. Then two more 20380s were added to them, there at the NEA, and the contract signing process was delayed by the customer to the point that the ASZ's fulfillment of the requirements of the state armaments program (to build ships until 2027) became very difficult to fulfill.
And taking into account the fact that they have not yet been laid down (more than 4 months have passed since the President's order), then, in general, it is not clear how it will end. It is possible that our Ministry of Defense, alas, is indulging in the fact that the ASZ gets into gigantic fines and other sanctions for disrupting the state armaments program, and the subsequent pogrom of a newly revived plant. Why only? Unclear.
Today it can be predicted that if 20386 on tests shows that he can at least do something (for example, he can shoot a cannon once “off camera”, like Tsydenzhapov), then a new battle will begin to get away from 20380/5 to 20386.
If this happens, then 20386 will call into question the continuation of the 22350 frigate series, since Zvezda-reducer can produce either P055 gearboxes for 22350 frigates, or 6РП gearboxes for 20386 - they require the same equipment.
All this came with costs.
Every time a new modification or new project appeared, the creation of that modification or project was paid. Work on fine-tuning the crude systems that got on the serial ships were paid. New radars, which are still shooting at the level of the Volna air defense system of the 60s, were also paid for. And at huge prices.
Now the question has been raised about who will pay for bringing the Zaslon radar into an operational state? Which looks especially amusing given the fact that it seems to have to, in general, be redesigned.
The guys from Zaslon are sincerely convinced that the state should pay them for this holiday of life. Their conviction of this is simply unbreakable.
The position of the state is still unclear. But, apparently, it will pay. Respected people are involved in the project there, how can they not be paid?
Financial losses from all these somersaults have long exceeded ten billion rubles, and there are no signs that something will at least remain at the same level and not worsen. As "the final nail in the coffin," we will mention that the Ministry of Defense regularly disrupted funding for the construction of corvettes, which largely contributed to the delays in their construction. And what delays lead to, it was said above.
The consequences of all this are as follows - the fleet is enough for absolutely any ship, since there are simply no ships. Even the "patrol ships" of Project 22160 look like something desirable, although they can really only demonstrate the flag and nothing else. But there is no choice - the brilliant shipbuilding strategy of the Ministry of Defense and the inability of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy somehow
"Bring the system to life"
are brought to this point.
What could have happened with other approaches? Let's say right away, it could have turned out not so bad. And everything was not planned so badly.
We repeat, there should have been one ROC there - a diesel power plant with diesel engines 16D49 from the Kolomna plant. Everything else - the radar, the gun, the torpedo weapon - was supposed to be serial only.
What would happen if this original version were finally adopted? It's simple - corvettes would be built almost without technical difficulties, they would be cheaper and would be surrendered immediately in a combat-ready form. Then, of course, there would also be delays in funding. But at a lower cost, the Ministry of Defense would have allocated all the money faster in any case, simply due to the fact that it would have had to allocate less. The fleet would have more ships by now. But it happened as it happened.
And now - how to do it
Let's imagine what a corvette "based on" 20385 could be, starting from serial equipment, weapons and ship systems. And we will also appreciate how difficult and long it will take to "switch" now to such a ship.
We disassemble point by point, based on the principles listed above.
1. Ensuring mass scale. Here, first of all, we should talk about reducing the cost of the ship and excluding complex operations and overcomplicated systems from its production cycle. The first candidate here is a radar complex - you need to apply the budget option, but provide for the possibility of modernization in the future. However, everything does not boil down to him. The second way is to revise the proportion of composite materials in the superstructure. Without going into arguments about how really this add-on is heavier (there is reason to believe that it is not much), let us focus on the fact that it is cheaper, and this is more important for us. As for stealth, it's not worth talking about it seriously (in relation to the corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385).
The corvette may become heavier, its draft will increase, and the hydrodynamic resistance will increase. Which will lead to a decrease in the already insufficient speed of this ship. But, firstly, there are reserves for reducing its displacement in other structural elements. And secondly, it is necessary to carefully study the issue of optimizing the contours of the underwater part of the hull, possibly with the involvement of the forces of the KGNTs im. Krylov to select the lack of speed by contours. This issue should be studied separately. But it will most likely turn out to be solvable in one way or another.
2. Serial equipment, weapons, etc. This condition requires us at the initial stage to do with the same composition of ship systems as on the Loud corvette, minus the radar complex from the Fourke, Monument and Puma radars, which did not fully work on it from - for the fatal shortcomings of "Fourke" and the lack of radio correction of missiles. In this case, there is only one sane decision. And it is such - the unification of the radar corvette with the RTO "Karakurt", which has already been announced more than once. That is, the OVTs "Pozitiv-M" radar, the Mineral surface target detection radar. Artillery firing is perfectly provided by the Puma radar station, also serial. Such a complex is fully operational and is mass-produced. Its parameters are sufficient for firing Redoubt air defense missile systems and provide sufficient accuracy of the initial control unit for the missile.
The only problem is the line of radio correction, which this complex does not provide. But separately there is already developed and tested equipment that provides this very radio correction. The only question is to integrate it with CIUS and SAM, which will require several months of not the most difficult work.
All of the above does not in any way cancel the groundwork for the modernization of corvettes. So, when laying cable routes and selecting diesel generators, nothing prevents to provide for the possibility of more powerful consumers. For example, some non-existent yet normal, sane radar with phased antenna arrays (the Zaslon product is not such), in the compartment for the RTPU SM-588 of the Package complex it may well be possible to equip in the future a torpedo lift from a deck below the ASP cellar. In case common sense finally prevails and instead of a monstrous launcher, the fleet acquires normal rechargeable 32 cm torpedo tubes (see article. “Lightweight torpedo tube. We need this weapon, but we don't have it. ").
Alternatively, places for them can be provided on the same level with the ASP cellar, for the future. Then, at the beginning of the mass "bloc" modernization of all corvettes, these opportunities can be used. A similar reserve is needed for the AK-630M anti-aircraft artillery mounts, both in terms of the strength of the shoulder strap, supporting structural elements and the deck, and power supply. Similarly, the possibility of retrofitting the ship with guided and homing projectiles can be provided.
An important point - the removal of the monstrous radar from the corvette board can significantly reduce the volume of premises required for electronic equipment, and free up the space that the rocket deck occupies on the old 20380s. Then, in addition to the 3C-14 launcher and two Reduta launchers, the Uranus missile system may also appear on the ship.
Offensive missile weapons are highlighted in red on the collage, anti-aircraft missiles - in green. The mast corresponds to that on ships with the "Furke" radar, but it can be done differently.
Why is this necessary, if there is a UKSK?
Then, firstly, there are never too many missiles, and secondly, Uranus, unlike the 3S-14, can be reloaded directly at sea, if there is a floating crane, which was demonstrated during exercises in the Baltic.
Of course, the hypothesis about the possibility of placing such missiles together with the UKSK on a simplified version of Project 20385 still needs to be tested. On ships, any design changes must be calculated. However, if it is real, then it should be done. Or at least provide for the possibility of placing launchers in the future, if now the finances do not allow them to be received.
According to experts, such a corvette will cost about 17-18 billion rubles, which is much less than 20385 (22,5 in 2019 prices) or the last 20380 with the MF RLK (about 20).
That is, we are talking about the fact that for the cost of six corvettes - four ordinary 20385 (over 90 billion) and a pair of 20380 with MF RLC (about 40 billion) you can build seven "mobilization" 20385 in the above configuration... Moreover, they will not have to be painfully brought up, since everything will work there at once... It will be easier to upgrade them if necessary, as this will be foreseen. And the life cycle will be cheaper.
After all, the spare parts and accessories will overlap with the "Karakurt" one, the training of personnel will be easier for the same reason, you will not have to pay extra for fine-tuning the ships to the operational state, etc.
As a bonus to the seven corvettes - several hundred million rubles saved under this scheme. A trifle, but nice.
Well, and most importantly - cumulatively, these seven hypothetical 20385 "simplified" will be more powerful than the four 20385 and two 20380, which are actually planned for construction.
Alternatively, it would be possible to build the same six, but save about 17-18,5 billion rubles for the budget.
In conclusion, we note that this simplified or "mobilization" option is not an invention of the author. It was offered by a professional and high-ranking domestic specialist in the field of surface shipbuilding, whose qualifications are beyond doubt.
3. The principle of reasonable sufficiency of performance characteristics. At the same time, such a ship, which will act against a serious enemy near its own coast or together with ships more powerful, will have quite sufficient tactical and technical characteristics in order to perform tasks as intended. Lobbyists of Zaslon usually try to question this argument, claiming that the Positiv-M radar will not fight off a very strong raid, forgetting that the corvette simply has few anti-aircraft missiles, and the potential of an ultra-high-tech radar (Zaslon is not such , but its creators and lobbyists claim it) on it simply cannot be disclosed.
Application Principles 4 (ban on revision of the TTZ after the start of construction) и 5 (modernization in blocks) obvious. And it does not require special explanations.
All that is needed in this case is quiet research work in the interests of the Navy, which would determine in which direction the corvettes should develop in order to have ready-made projects for their modernization at a certain point in time. That would make it possible to sign in advance contracts for the performance of these works, to purchase all the necessary equipment and components without rushing. And then, according to the finished project, quickly, combining modernization with any kind of repair (for example, restoration of technical readiness or medium repair - depending on the age and condition of the ship), quickly do everything. This will save money according to the same scheme as construction without revisions of the TTZ and unforeseen development plans.
6. Minimization of the list of projects, elimination of excess ROC and the like. When building a series of identical ships and planning their upgrades, it is worth taking one more step and learning how to plan in advance the entire life cycle of the ship.
This is difficult, since it is never possible to predict exactly in advance how long he will actually have to serve and whether he will be on time for repairs. Nevertheless, the evolution of the ship can be incorporated into the project.
So, for example, the creation of a reserve for future modernization described above makes it possible to link the fate of the ship with the upcoming planned development projects. And determine in advance which of them will belong to the corvettes and which will not. It is quite realistic to plan something in this way for the ship, immediately setting the boundary conditions in order not to invent anything superfluous, which is still not needed for such a class of ships.
7. The principle of joint development of interconnected weapons systems also, in general, it is clear how it works. If we predict the appearance of 57-mm anti-aircraft guns with projectiles with programmable detonation, if we understand the need to mount sighting devices on the same gun carriage with the ZAK barrel block and that, in the future, we will have to abandon one block of barrels on the AK-630M in favor of a paired one " Duet ”, then all these possibilities should be provided on the ship even in conditions when it initially leaves the factory with the AK-630M ZAK. It should not be such that research has shown the need to go to the 57-mm or the "Duet", and the design does not allow them to be installed on a ship.
The design of the corvette should provide for this. Obviously, all promising missiles should be used from launchers of ships in the ranks.
The helicopter hangar should accommodate the Lamprey, the layout of which is already ready, and it seems to be final - this applies to both Project 22350 frigates and landing ships. All this should be considered as a complex and developed in conjunction, so that the ship, as a complex technical system, could fully evolve during its long service life.
Ultimately, the shipbuilding program should be interconnected with other, related programs (the same ships with helicopters, and not only in terms of size, but also in communication and information exchange systems, weapons used, such as a single light anti-submarine torpedo, and so on).
Positive examples
There are also positive examples in the domestic shipbuilding industry.
The most striking and "fresh" example of adherence to the above principles is the creation of the RTO project 22800 "Karakurt".
The author has repeatedly argued that a specialized strike ship of this class has outlived its usefulness at the conceptual level. And today it is necessary to build multipurpose ships, at least small ones, capable, among other things, of fighting submarines, and as an attacking specialized ship, a missile boat with a high (45 knots or more) speed is more appropriate.
Nevertheless, it is impossible not to notice that within the framework of the tactical and technical assignment, the work on the creation of "Karakurt" was performed flawlessly - its chief designer and the team who worked on this project were able to create a very inexpensive ship, on which there really was one significant ROC, and all systems were serial.
The bottom line is that when the price is almost half as compared to its predecessor, Buyan-M, the ship is immeasurably more powerful, faster, really capable of fighting against enemy surface ships, almost entirely consists of domestic ship systems and components.
And, if the supplier of diesel engines (PJSC "Zvezda") had not let down, the "Karakurt" could be built very quickly. With all the delays with diesel engines, the lead ship was handed over to the customer less than two years after the laying.
Everything works on these ships at once. And there won't be any painful long-term refinements.
It should be understood that a hypothetical multipurpose ship the same people would do no worse.
Photo: Pella shipyard
The approaches that accompanied the design of the "Karakurt" even today allow them to be built in large quantities and very quickly. If not for the diesel engine. And if the performer does not fail.
The second equally successful project was the project 636 submarine (three "sub-series", in American terminology - "flights") "Varshavyanka".
Alas, today they are very outdated and in need of a very deep modernization. But if it had been carried out, then these boats would have turned out to be a serious force in the naval war even today.
This is what it means not to chase chimeras, but simply to calmly do your job, without rushing and deviating from common sense.
These positive examples, as you can easily see, were the result of following only part of the above principles. And even so, the success was phenomenal. "Karakurt" and "Varshavyanka" are vivid evidence that our problems with the fleet are caused by only bad management and nothing more. When no one interferes with work, our shipbuilders and designers give results completely
“From the world average and above”.
But it was not included in the system.
Conclusion
We will not soon see the triumph of these simple, in general, principles.
They are used. And then they will be used by other countries, but not by us. We will simply look at other people's successes and envy the fact that other countries can playfully do things that we are still absolutely unable to do for organizational reasons, even if we have money and the technical ability to do the same or better.
Once again, money allows, and the industrial base also allows, does not allow the government's approach to this issue. Sometimes “rays of light in the dark kingdom”, such as “Karakurt”, will still penetrate our darkness, but this will continue to be the exception rather than the rule.
Today, in the highest echelons of power, the attitude towards the Navy has finally taken root, as to anything - a means to warm up "respected people", a means of solving the problem of unemployment, pouring money into the regions, an instrument for the internal political propaganda of our greatness and omnipotence, to sinecure, to an instrument of diplomacy, and, as the Americans say about us, "status projections." But not as a means of waging war against real corpses and "funerals". Not as a military force that must fight to the death. And sometimes - for the survival of our people and culture.
While this is so, there is no need to talk about any rational approaches to the creation of naval power, we have institutionally consolidated the primacy of form over content. We have taken "to appear" rather than "to be" as the basic value, and we deny the opposite, even at the level of the masses.
Unfortunately, individual "bursts of enlightenment" in our guide are haphazard, when no conclusions are drawn from successful decisions (for example, to continue building Project 22350 frigates) for other projects.
The people simply do not understand anything about what is happening and are waiting for the command to throw the cap up. In the long term, this is fraught with impossibly unpleasant surprises. However, it will be later, but now you can continue to enjoy the greatness.
But perhaps the situation will change in the future.
And then all these principles will be needed. So, it makes sense to study and understand them.
In the future, it is possible that they will be embodied in the form of GOSTs. Or even, perhaps, special shipbuilding laws, the need for which is long overdue, like the law on the fleet in principle.
For now, we just need to know them.
And it is desirable for everyone.
The next article will briefly list the current capabilities of the domestic industry.
Information