Military Review

Fundamentals of shipbuilding policy: principles and their application

170
Fundamentals of shipbuilding policy: principles and their application
Corvette of project 20385 "Thundering" during construction at Severnaya Verf.

Photo: press service of the United Shipbuilding Corporation

Criticism of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy for their approaches to shipbuilding would be too one-sided if not reminded from time to time of what the correct approaches should be. This is also important because the dissemination of the right ideas in society forms public opinion, and it then influences the actions of the authorities, of which there are many examples.

In order to determine the appearance of ships, it is critically important for us to understand the criteria for what is good or bad. Without this, it is impossible to choose the right technical solutions. Lobbyists of various "Horns and Hooves" use this today, justifying equipping ships with gold at a price and incapable of combat systems. And without argumentation

"What is good and what is bad",

shared by all interested people disinterestedly, you cannot argue with them.

And really:

Can you prove that an inexpensive and combat-ready complex is better than five or six times more expensive and incapable of combat? How did you define it?
And where did you get the idea that six incapacitated ships are better than seven combat capable for the same money? Who told you that?

What if, in ten years, the non-combat-ready complex will be combat-ready and surpass the one that is already combat-ready? What will you sing then? Will the war start earlier?

What kind of war, what are you talking about, we are a nuclear power, there will be no war. You ask, why then the fleet at all, if there will be no war anyway? So you are against fleet whether?

Today it is these arguments that are used to justify various sawing projects. And it is in this impudent form. On the one hand, our system has learned to forgive. On the other hand, people who do not have special education cannot distinguish between good and evil.

As a result, dishonest lobbyists, propagandists and the like are not afraid of anything and are not ashamed of anyone. Under the conditions of an all-forgiving system, they can only be opposed by knowledge, moreover, mass knowledge. Thus, we need criteria for what is right and what is wrong. Only after working through them, we will be able to move on, cutting off dead-end areas of development.

Combat power and common sense


Of all the programs of explosive increase in sea power known to us, the closest one on a historical scale is the Chinese one. Unfortunately, neither the Chinese special literature (and there is one), nor their special periodicals are translated into Russian on a significant scale.

Therefore, we can only judge the success of the Chinese by their victories. And the facts (in the form of a powerful Chinese surface fleet, which has long overtaken us) are obvious. As well as those tight deadlines in which they managed to do it.


China's successes are clear. It is impossible to ignore them.

True, there is one more interesting example.

If we step back a little, then we will find another program that also led to an explosive growth of sea power. And according to the same principles. We are talking about the "600 ships" program of the Ronald Reagan administration.

And here we know much more than just the end result. We can bring up the literature today about what the US was doing. And see the results of what China was able to do. And, even after a cursory analysis of what he saw, come to a simple conclusion: both the Americans and the Chinese did the same thing. And they came to the same results - the explosive growth of their military power.

We did exactly the opposite. And got the opposite results.

Today the Russian Navy (apart from the nuclear submarine) is about the level of South Korea.

We are (theoretically) stronger than them. Due to the nuclear submarine and some powerful ships, such as the future "Nakhimov", or, hypothetically, "Kuznetsov". If it is, of course, repaired. And the naval air regiments will actually reach a combat readiness state. Which is not even close now. And there are no signs that this will change in the foreseeable future.

Comparing yourself with the same Japan, for example, is no longer worth it. No nuclear weapons they will simply sweep us away. And not only on the seas.

It's better not to think about China and the United States. This is a different league.

What principles were guided by both the United States and China? And other countries too?

We can name them fairly accurately, especially with regard to the Americans.

So, in order.

1. More ships for the same money is better than less. Guided missile weapons allow you to win battles against superior forces due to tactical superiority (see article "The Reality of Missile Volleys: A Little About Military Superiority"), however, such possibilities are not endless. Superiority is useful in any case.

In addition, everything is not really reduced to battles between ships and ships. Moreover, this is not their main purpose in the modern era.

A simple example.

Eight corvettes (simpler and cheaper) allow you to form two search and strike groups of 4 ships and close them to enemy submarines, for example, two strait. And 4 corvettes built instead of them (more complicated and twice as expensive), other things being equal, will not be able to do this.

With the support of the artillery fire of the landing, the scheme with cheaper corvettes gives us 8 artillery barrels. And with a higher price - 4, etc.

One ship is better than zero ships. And two are better than one comparable in quality for the same money.


US Navy ships in the Pacific - quantity matters.

Someone thinks it's stupid to write such things? This is a self-evident banality.

No, this is not nonsense.

Because even now, a number of military officials, while defending against attacks from project 20386, on which they spent almost twice as muchwhat could be worth a corvette 20380 or 20385 built on sound grounds (we will return to its appearance later), uses as an argument that now so many ships are not needed for the same tasks.

And that it's okay to get one ship at double the price instead of two at the non-double price.

Do you know, for example, why it is better to build five ships than seven almost the same, for the same money?

Because in ten years it is better to have five outdated and modernized ships than seven. And this is in all seriousness being snatched today as the correct approach by some dishonest comrades. That is, see the example of arrogant lobbyists.

“Do you want more ships, not less? You want to weaken the fleet! "

This, alas, is the current reality of our country. And you have to deal with it.

It is not necessary, however, to bring everything to the point of absurdity. And to compare many unarmed pelvis (like the same project 22160) with a pair of missile frigates. Speech in the examples above (real, alas) was about ships with very close combat capabilities, almost the same.

The Americans followed a sane path - they built as many ships as possible. Until the coveted figure of 600, they did not have so much.

The Chinese are doing the same thing, with the same result.

We are not Americans or Chinese, we do not have such resources, but the principle is universal. It follows not only that 600 is stronger than 350, but also that, other things being equal (for example, equal performance characteristics or almost equal performance characteristics), two are stronger than one. Alas, but today it has to prove.

The demand for more ships, however, begs the question:

"And how to achieve this, the budget is limited?"

That's all right. The budget is limited. Therefore, the following principles are used.

2. Only systems mastered in production are installed on serial ships.

Why is this so?

It's simple, fine-tuning a product as complex as a ship can take years. The finishing of the Poliment-Redut air defense system took years. But, an important point - she was brought to head ship, not serial, and to acceptance of "Admiral Gorshkov" into the combat strength. With a number of reservations. But by the time the Andreevsky flag was raised, the frigate was combat-ready.

In the future, albeit slowly and gradually, the ships under construction of this project did without big experiments, although there are differences in design. The same third launcher 3C-14 for missiles. But some kind of supernova complexes, which were not previously found anywhere, are not put on these ships. The result is that after the issue with the main power plants has been resolved, the series has prospects, you just need to build them and that's it. Little by little, but methodically and continuously. And there will be success. Has already.


Project 22350 frigates became the most important success of the domestic shipbuilding industry. If anything will save the Navy, then these ships.
Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense, Mil.ru

In contrast to project 22350, the list of "experimental" corvettes for which systems are planned that may never become operational at all looks like this: "Thundering", "Agile", "Aldar Tsydenzhapov", "Zealous", "Strict", " Cutting". All new corvettes, the future construction of which has been announced this year, should also be added here. And "Daring-Mercury" of project 20386. Not a bad field of work for "closers" for state money.

If only serial products are installed on ships, then, firstly, the state does not bear additional costs for their fine-tuning, secondly, there is an opportunity to save money due to the mass production of products, and thirdly, manufacturers have the opportunity to financially plan. They basically know that by paying for the radar today, in a few months they will receive a set of equipment to be installed on the ship. It will not work out that the supplier will shrug his shoulders and say that he has not completed the OCD stage and that he needs to wait a couple of months (and sometimes years), make the ship on the slipway, and then (to compensate for the money unearned during the delay), climb into new loans. No price or timing shifts. This is what the use of serial systems gives.

This approach also speeds up the time for ships to enter service. And precisely because there is no need to spend money on fine-tuning, and the delivery time of the ships accelerates the time it takes to receive money for factories and reduces the risk that this money will be asked from the state under the threat of bankruptcy and disruption of the delivery time of the ships.

Moreover, contrary to what the lobbyists spread, this does not contradict technical progress. You can always start development work on a new complex, but separately from a series of ships under construction. It is possible, having the latest products ready for mass production, to install them on an old ship and modify on it.


"Pinnacle" with AFAR from "Fazotron" - instead of organizing a giant "sawmill" based on administrative resources and "unsportsmanlike methods", this worthy organization built an experimental prototype, tested it, evaluated its mistakes, then developed a real model for missile ships. Then the work stopped ...

You can start separate ROC in the form of one ship with new systems, which will then give them a "start in life", but until all this works "as it should", all other ships must go with a "serial".

Actually, many breakthrough systems were created in this way, for example, the now legendary American AN / SPY-1 radar.

3. The principle of reasonable sufficiency of performance characteristics. Attempts to make a superweapon out of a ship are our traditional misfortune, which more than once cost us the opportunity to obtain forces that are sane in terms of combat capability for reasonable money. Here again it is appropriate to refer to foreign experience.

For example, American frigates of the Oliver Perry class did not have anti-submarine missiles. An attempt to equip these ships with them would cause an avalanche-like increase in problems - at first the frigates would have risen in price. (The PLUR had to somehow be crammed there, which would require a significant redesign of the structure and an increase in displacement. Displacement would require a more powerful and larger power plant, it would require fuel, fuel - an increase in size, and so on.) Their mass construction in those quantities in which they were built would have been impossible. As a result, the tasks that “Perry” were solving would have to be solved by “Spruence”, which, in turn, would also “ask for money”, since their operation would be more expensive than that of “Perry” and so on.


Massive, cheap, serial, the same. The secret to success is simple.

In conditions when as many pennants as possible were needed to counter the Soviet Navy, the Americans did not do this. Faced with the fact that anti-submarine missions fall on the Perry, they simply dispensed with the PLUR, entrusting helicopters with the task of destroying submarines and bringing these frigates into battle groups with ships that had anti-submarine missiles.

On the other hand, the deliberate simplification of the Perry made it possible, if necessary, to simply have a huge number of simultaneously deployed towed GAS, which in modern conditions is critical for the performance of PLO tasks in a theater of operations.

For us, the same is critical, by the way. Even now. Although, for example, the basis of the propaganda behind the project 20386 are attempts to assert the opposite.


For more information on approaches to "Perry" - see article "The frigate" Perry "as a lesson for Russia: machine-designed, massive and cheap".

You can also remember the Chinese.

Creating massive corvettes for work at a short distance from the coast, which we know today as Project 056, they did not make a hangar on them. They left a simple set of anti-aircraft weapons, did not make an expensive and complex radar system, limiting themselves to simple, cheap and serial systems, but paying great attention to anti-submarine capabilities - these small ships have anti-submarine missiles.


Massive, cheap, serial, the same. The secret to success is simple.

And, for example, the corvette "Aldar Tsydenzhapov", which on December 25, 2020 was accepted into the combat composition of the fleet without full passing of state tests, has a super-expensive, very complex, non-serial and incapacitated radar system. But he does not have anti-submarine missiles - the opposite approach is evident.

The results are generally also the opposite - the Chinese hand over a new 056 about once every 4 months. With frigates of Project 054 they have everything the same - mass and serial weapons and subsystems. And dozens of simple and cheap ships in service. Technically, they are far from some ultimate perfection. But on the other hand, everything works for them, turns on, shoots and hits the right place.

And the supposedly "ultramodern" radar station on the "Thundering" corvette has the level of the 60s in terms of combat effectiveness. And the price is just like that of the finished Chinese corvette. At a single radar station, and not at the "Thundering" entirely.

Again, if you do not chase a titmouse in the sky and do not try to make a Death Star out of each ship, this does not mean that it will not be possible to work out the latest systems on some of the hulls to implement them on new projects or in modifying old ones. ...

Reasonable sufficiency is used not only when choosing weapons and equipment, but also when choosing, for example, materials - the same steel is much cheaper than aluminum or composites.

4. A ban on revision of the performance characteristics of projects of ships under construction or upgrades. This rule was accepted by the Americans and strictly observed. For any project of anything, there was a moment when the performance characteristics of the ship were frozen - after that, the Navy could no longer require any changes to the design, even if desired. That is, after that it was possible to change something in the ship only in the course of its modernization.

The benefits of this approach are obvious - it is an opportunity for shipbuilding to calmly and systematically engage in construction as quickly as possible and plan the financial activities of the enterprise. This means that there are less risks that someday the state will have to save the ship building program at its own expense.

Alas, we do not have this rule. And for serial ships under construction, and for repairs and upgrades, a completely different principle operates - no principles. So, apparently, the modernization of the BOD projects 1155 will take place under different projects.

5. Modernization "blocks".
From the impossibility of arbitrarily changing the tactical and technical tasks already during the implementation of projects, it clearly follows the need to have a regulation for the modernization of ships under construction.

A series is a long matter. For many years of serial production of a series of ships, the first of them will have time to become obsolete and require repair. Thus, it is necessary to combine the need to produce standard mass ships with serial equipment and without chaotic changes in their designs, with the need to modernize them.

The Americans give a hint. During the production of a series of ships, the need has been accumulating, both to re-equip the already built hulls and modernize a number of subsystems in them, and to update the design in production. Modernization in the USA is carried out "in blocks" - when a ship comes in for repairs, it can update the list of subsystems standard for the modernization project, and all the installed equipment has already been tested and in fact is serial. The next ship is being upgraded according to the same design with the same subsystems.

New ships are changed in sub-series - "flights", and in any case they are built in large series of standard "units". The Americans began to retreat from this only when their naval forces began to degrade, having lost the enemy and having been in this state for some time. That is, since the late 90s.

But, as they say, we would have such degradation. The affairs in our Navy are incomparable with them in any case.

6. Minimization of the list of projects, elimination of excess ROC and the like.

Simple illustration. A series of patrol ships of project 22160, a miracle corvette of project 20386, the carrier of the Poseidons PLASN Khabarovsk and the Poseidon itself have already cost significantly more than one hundred billion rubles in terms of money in this year's prices. This is the money that has already been spent and which will inevitably have to be spent now.

Много это или мало?

This is a brigade of surface ships of six units, in terms of its level approximately the same as the corvette of Project 20385, but with the radar station working as it should. Or we can say that this is a multipurpose nuclear submarine with ammunition and crew. Or ¼ of a heavy strike aircraft carrier.

At the same time, what is important - we have neither Poseidon, nor Khabarovsk, nor 20386. And, with a very high degree of probability, there will be no Poseidon at all, Khabarovsk will turn out to be very different, 20386 will not confirm the stated performance characteristics from - for fatal design mistakes, and 22160 will continue to wind circles around the Mediterranean, demonstrating our flag to the crews of the Arleigh Burkes, Ticonderogs and Hornets pilots on an almost unarmed vessel with one three-inch cannon.

The question arises - why was money spent on all this?


And we didn’t even look into smaller “sawing” topics, like the same ekranoplan. In the R&D on the "vertical" and in the list of ROCs of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, where such "miracles" are in abundance, they also did not look. And all this requires money, the very money that we allegedly lack for the minimum strength.

Rationalizing military spending can make a significant contribution to defense capability. Rationalization of approaches to naval development too. As a result, these simple principles give savings and serialization. And the serial production saves money already during the service of the ships, freeing up the saved finances for maintaining military power.

But this is for the rich Chinese and the wealthy Americans.

And what about the poor Russians? Are they saving money? Are there a rational approach to the issues of military shipbuilding?

There are no answers in all cases.

Much poorer than our likely opponents from the United States and our Chinese comrades, we just throw money, squandering it without counting.

7. Weapon systems interacting with each other must develop in an integrated manner.

We give some examples.

First example. The already mentioned American "Perry", but now in a negative way. In the course of the development of the project, the Americans made the transition to a new naval helicopter - SH-60. For all the advantages of this helicopter, it did not fit into the Perry hangar in length. As a result, a ship with a longer hangar had to be designed. And the old Perry, with a short hangar, was then handed out to the allies, since the US helicopters intended for them were subsequently removed from service.

We should not repeat this mistake.

And here we come to the second example. Also helicopter, but ours.

Right now, the laying of new corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 is being prepared. At the same time, their hangars are designed for Ka-27 helicopters, which in the anti-submarine version are no longer mass-produced. The same can be said about the hangars of the latest frigates of Project 22350. The Ka-27 is being replaced by a helicopter known as the Lamprey, which is significantly larger than the Ka-27 in size.


Model of the "Lamprey" helicopter. Large dimensions are clearly visible.

At the same time, more and more often responsible workers near the naval structures express fears that the Lamprey will not fit into the hangars of ships designed for the Ka-27.

The question arises - will there be an enlarged hangar on the new corvettes and frigates? And what about Project 22350 frigates?

Obviously, knowing what approaches our Navy is guided by, we can predict that, most likely, no - it won't. The newest ships will be built with hangars in which future helicopters will not be able to fit. Taking into account the delay that occurs with the laying of new corvettes (the order of the President of the Russian Federation to build six ships at the ASZ was given back in August 2020), the customer still has a chance to foresee everything. There are also some frigates.

Will they be used? I would like to believe that yes.

But if the customer does not hurry up, then soon we will witness another situation, which would be very funny if it were not happening in our country. The chances of this are very high, alas.

Let's now see what principles were guided by the ordering structures of the Ministry of Defense in reality, using the example of corvettes - ships that at one time were conceived as the most massive class of surface ships in the Russian Navy.

Corvettes as an anti-example


As mentioned earlier, in the article “A victory of common sense: the corvettes are back. Bye for the pacific " initially, the project 20380 corvette was conceived as a ship with a minimum of OCD, by and large, only the Main Power Plant (GEM) should have been fundamentally new there. In the future, the ship was overgrown with new systems, as a result of which it began to consist of them almost completely. Then, after the lead "Guarding" was handed over, it turned out that the ship had to be altered again. Let's just list the stages of evolution.

"Guarding" - with ZRAK "Dagger" - head.

"Smart" - the first with Redoubt, he is also the first serial. In fact, we had to make a new project, that is, this is a DIFFERENT ship, and not just the same corvette, with the Reduta UVP instead of the Kortik. For this project (with a number of differences from each other, but not fundamental) Severnaya Verf also built Boykiy and Stoykiy, and Amur Shipyard (ASZ) built Perfect and Gromkiy... On the latter, almost all the serious shortcomings of the 20380 project were eliminated, except for problems with air defense and communications. There remained a shortage of maximum speed by 1 knot. At the same time, it is technically possible to make the air defense of the corvettes of this first "sub-series" work, just not as well as we would like. The connection also did not look like something unsolvable.

However, further into the project the radar "got" from the "Zaslon". What he brought in can be found in the articles by M. Klimov and A. Timokhin "Corvettes that will go into battle" and M. Klimova Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the Thundering fire ”.

Further, the series continued with this radar.

"Aldar Tsydenzhapov", construction of the NEA. With this ship Severnaya Verf has built and will build corvettes "Zealous", "Strogiy" and presumably two more corvettes, names for which have not been given yet. ASZ is building a corvette "Sharp", two more ships have not yet been laid down, names have not been given yet.

Thus, under the number "20380" we actually have three projects. Adjusted for the fact that the ships of the NE are somewhat different from those built at the NEA. In general, there are some differences between the ships.

In addition to the 20380 corvettes, a project 20385 corvette with reinforced armament and also a Zaroslav radar (only more complicated than on 20380) was designed on their basis. The head was so "wonderful" who passed the state tests "Thundering", the first serial "Prompt".

Two more similar ships should be built by the Severnaya Verf and four more - by the ASZ. This is the fourth project in the line of multipurpose ships in the near sea zone.

At the same time, since 2013, the Navy has decided that now both project 20380 and project 20385 are “a thing of the past”. And instead of them, a new miracle ship will be built, which has nothing in common with the old ones, except for individual systems - project 20386. The fifth in a row. For nearly fifteen years.

For those still under the illusion of Western sanctions and MTU diesels, quote:

1.03.2013

THE NAVY REFUSED THE "INVISIBLE" CORVETS OF PROJECT 20385 DUE TO HIGH PRICE

The navy abandoned the project 20385 stealth corvettes, three of which - "Thundering", "Provorny" and "Capable" - were going to be built at the "Severnaya Verf" in St. Petersburg, an informed source at the headquarters told Izvestia fleet. At a recent meeting in the Ministry of Defense with the participation of representatives of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the military decided to complete only the "Thundering" according to the original plan, and for the rest to develop a new project.

“The main thing that doesn’t suit us is the too high price and excessive armament - the Kalibr cruise missiles, which work against sea and ground targets. Project 20385 does not meet the requirements of the fleet, ”the source said. According to him, the estimated cost of one ship is about 14 billion rubles, but in reality it can reach 18 billion. For a corvette with a displacement of 2,2 thousand tons, although made using stealth technology, this is a lot. The equally modern frigates of project 11356R / M, which are now being built for the Black Sea Fleet, have a displacement of almost twice as much - 4 thousand tons, and cost the same.

The frigates of this project are ships of the open sea, with a significant range, and the corvettes 20385 are intended for the near sea zone. Sailors believe that such a powerful weapon as the Caliber is unnecessary for these small ships.

After the decision to cancel work on project 20385, only the corvettes of project 20380 will remain in the Russian Navy, all work on which is accompanied by failures.

Link. In 2013, the design of 20386 was already underway, which only in 2016 demanded 29,6 billion rubles ("Thundering" project 20385 cost 22,5 billion in 2019 prices).

It was described in detail in the articles “Worse than a crime. Construction of project 20386 corvettes - error» и "Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam".

This scandalous project runs the risk of being the most disastrous project in the domestic shipbuilding industry. And there is no point in dwelling on it - in terms of arms, this is a step backwards compared to 20385, while at a third the price (and almost twice as much as the first 20380).

Instead of a patrol boat from "all serial" we have at first an overcomplicated ship, three sub-series of the basic project 20380 ("Guarding", 20380 with basic REV, they are also with IBMK), a limited series of a more powerful version 20385, mutant 20386. And all this at the same time!

The consistency in the customer's actions is no less striking - first, abandon 20385 because of the high cost, then start making 20386 even more expensive. After that, having lost four years, announce the return of both 20380 and 20385 at the same time. Why did you lose four years? (From 2016 to the present day, multipurpose ships of the near sea zone in Russia have not been laid down).

Because the Ministry of Defense expected, well, when would something come out of 20386. And did not know how to explain the return to already canceled projects, when 20386 had already been "promoted" like a ship of the future? I had to wait just that period when the average man in the street begins to forget that he was “blown in the ears” in the past - four years. It will be funny if the ships that have not been laid down over the years will not be enough later to support the NSNF, to fulfill the tasks of nuclear deterrence and the physical survival of the population of the Russian Federation. Natural selection in its pure, crystalline form ...

Below is an illustration from the "More projects to God of projects" series.


Head 20380 "Guarding". Built one.


First episode 20380: "Smart", "Lively", "Steadfast", "Perfect", "Loud".


Project 20385: "Head" Thundering ", commissioned, the first serial" Agile ".


Project 20380 with MF RLK. “Aldar Tsydenzhapov” was commissioned, next in line were “Zealous”, “Strict”, “Sharp”.


The lead ship of the project 20386 "Daring", later it was renamed "Mercury" and tried to pass off Putin as a new one. But Putin did not believe the details here.


After that, there was a return to construction simultaneously two projects - 20380 and 20385.

Along the way, two (!) Series of different MRKs were built (at the same time, Buyanov-M also had two "subseries" - with German diesels and with Chinese ones) and ordered a series of patrol ships of Project 22160 of six units, for which the Navy has no tasks ... Now we are talking about the extension of the "patrol" series, in some modified form, and Rear Admiral Tryapichnikov, who occupies the post of the Head of the Shipbuilding Directorate in the Main Command, in one of the interviews hinted at something MRK-shaped with an increased rocket salvo.

Can you see how this dance was consistent with the previously announced principles of shipbuilding? Is it still hard to believe that our budget will not be able to handle a normal fleet?

Industry wants to eat, and the navy is a good feeding trough. As for the combat effectiveness of this entire economy, those who determine the policy in this area will not have to fight and die, and they may well not worry about anything. You can even think over obituaries in advance for the dead crews, knowing what they can die from on those tubs on which the Motherland sent them into battle.

These, for example,

"Fearlessly at the cost of their lives, they detained the enemy, despite the absence of hydroacoustic weapons and anti-submarine weapons."

And others

"At the cost of their lives, they distracted the enemy's vulture pilots from transport with refugees, without having working air defense systems."

Well, there, the heirs of "Varyag", etc. It is very convenient if you know everything in advance.

Towards the end. The order of the president for the construction of a series of six 20380s, officials from the fleet first tried to turn into the construction of 20385 in the amount of 4 units. Then two more 20380s were added to them, there at the NEA, and the contract signing process was delayed by the customer to the point that the ASZ's fulfillment of the requirements of the state armaments program (to build ships until 2027) became very difficult to fulfill.

And taking into account the fact that they have not yet been laid down (more than 4 months have passed since the President's order), then, in general, it is not clear how it will end. It is possible that our Ministry of Defense, alas, is indulging in the fact that the ASZ gets into gigantic fines and other sanctions for disrupting the state armaments program, and the subsequent pogrom of a newly revived plant. Why only? Unclear.

Today it can be predicted that if 20386 on tests shows that he can at least do something (for example, he can shoot a cannon once “off camera”, like Tsydenzhapov), then a new battle will begin to get away from 20380/5 to 20386.

If this happens, then 20386 will call into question the continuation of the 22350 frigate series, since Zvezda-reducer can produce either P055 gearboxes for 22350 frigates, or 6РП gearboxes for 20386 - they require the same equipment.

All this came with costs.

Every time a new modification or new project appeared, the creation of that modification or project was paid. Work on fine-tuning the crude systems that got on the serial ships were paid. New radars, which are still shooting at the level of the Volna air defense system of the 60s, were also paid for. And at huge prices.

Now the question has been raised about who will pay for bringing the Zaslon radar into an operational state? Which looks especially amusing given the fact that it seems to have to, in general, be redesigned.

The guys from Zaslon are sincerely convinced that the state should pay them for this holiday of life. Their conviction of this is simply unbreakable.

The position of the state is still unclear. But, apparently, it will pay. Respected people are involved in the project there, how can they not be paid?

Financial losses from all these somersaults have long exceeded ten billion rubles, and there are no signs that something will at least remain at the same level and not worsen. As "the final nail in the coffin," we will mention that the Ministry of Defense regularly disrupted funding for the construction of corvettes, which largely contributed to the delays in their construction. And what delays lead to, it was said above.

The consequences of all this are as follows - the fleet is enough for absolutely any ship, since there are simply no ships. Even the "patrol ships" of Project 22160 look like something desirable, although they can really only demonstrate the flag and nothing else. But there is no choice - the brilliant shipbuilding strategy of the Ministry of Defense and the inability of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy somehow

"Bring the system to life"

are brought to this point.

What could have happened with other approaches? Let's say right away, it could have turned out not so bad. And everything was not planned so badly.

We repeat, there should have been one ROC there - a diesel power plant with diesel engines 16D49 from the Kolomna plant. Everything else - the radar, the gun, the torpedo weapon - was supposed to be serial only.

What would happen if this original version were finally adopted? It's simple - corvettes would be built almost without technical difficulties, they would be cheaper and would be surrendered immediately in a combat-ready form. Then, of course, there would also be delays in funding. But at a lower cost, the Ministry of Defense would have allocated all the money faster in any case, simply due to the fact that it would have had to allocate less. The fleet would have more ships by now. But it happened as it happened.

And now - how to do it


Let's imagine what a corvette "based on" 20385 could be, starting from serial equipment, weapons and ship systems. And we will also appreciate how difficult and long it will take to "switch" now to such a ship.

We disassemble point by point, based on the principles listed above.

1. Ensuring mass scale. Here, first of all, we should talk about reducing the cost of the ship and excluding complex operations and overcomplicated systems from its production cycle. The first candidate here is a radar complex - you need to apply the budget option, but provide for the possibility of modernization in the future. However, everything does not boil down to him. The second way is to revise the proportion of composite materials in the superstructure. Without going into arguments about how really this add-on is heavier (there is reason to believe that it is not much), let us focus on the fact that it is cheaper, and this is more important for us. As for stealth, it's not worth talking about it seriously (in relation to the corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385).

The corvette may become heavier, its draft will increase, and the hydrodynamic resistance will increase. Which will lead to a decrease in the already insufficient speed of this ship. But, firstly, there are reserves for reducing its displacement in other structural elements. And secondly, it is necessary to carefully study the issue of optimizing the contours of the underwater part of the hull, possibly with the involvement of the forces of the KGNTs im. Krylov to select the lack of speed by contours. This issue should be studied separately. But it will most likely turn out to be solvable in one way or another.

2. Serial equipment, weapons, etc. This condition requires us at the initial stage to do with the same composition of ship systems as on the Loud corvette, minus the radar complex from the Fourke, Monument and Puma radars, which did not fully work on it from - for the fatal shortcomings of "Fourke" and the lack of radio correction of missiles. In this case, there is only one sane decision. And it is such - the unification of the radar corvette with the RTO "Karakurt", which has already been announced more than once. That is, the OVTs "Pozitiv-M" radar, the Mineral surface target detection radar. Artillery firing is perfectly provided by the Puma radar station, also serial. Such a complex is fully operational and is mass-produced. Its parameters are sufficient for firing Redoubt air defense missile systems and provide sufficient accuracy of the initial control unit for the missile.

The only problem is the line of radio correction, which this complex does not provide. But separately there is already developed and tested equipment that provides this very radio correction. The only question is to integrate it with CIUS and SAM, which will require several months of not the most difficult work.

All of the above does not in any way cancel the groundwork for the modernization of corvettes. So, when laying cable routes and selecting diesel generators, nothing prevents to provide for the possibility of more powerful consumers. For example, some non-existent yet normal, sane radar with phased antenna arrays (the Zaslon product is not such), in the compartment for the RTPU SM-588 of the Package complex it may well be possible to equip in the future a torpedo lift from a deck below the ASP cellar. In case common sense finally prevails and instead of a monstrous launcher, the fleet acquires normal rechargeable 32 cm torpedo tubes (see article. “Lightweight torpedo tube. We need this weapon, but we don't have it. ").

Alternatively, places for them can be provided on the same level with the ASP cellar, for the future. Then, at the beginning of the mass "bloc" modernization of all corvettes, these opportunities can be used. A similar reserve is needed for the AK-630M anti-aircraft artillery mounts, both in terms of the strength of the shoulder strap, supporting structural elements and the deck, and power supply. Similarly, the possibility of retrofitting the ship with guided and homing projectiles can be provided.

An important point - the removal of the monstrous radar from the corvette board can significantly reduce the volume of premises required for electronic equipment, and free up the space that the rocket deck occupies on the old 20380s. Then, in addition to the 3C-14 launcher and two Reduta launchers, the Uranus missile system may also appear on the ship.


Offensive missile weapons are highlighted in red on the collage, anti-aircraft missiles - in green. The mast corresponds to that on ships with the "Furke" radar, but it can be done differently.

Why is this necessary, if there is a UKSK?

Then, firstly, there are never too many missiles, and secondly, Uranus, unlike the 3S-14, can be reloaded directly at sea, if there is a floating crane, which was demonstrated during exercises in the Baltic.


Of course, the hypothesis about the possibility of placing such missiles together with the UKSK on a simplified version of Project 20385 still needs to be tested. On ships, any design changes must be calculated. However, if it is real, then it should be done. Or at least provide for the possibility of placing launchers in the future, if now the finances do not allow them to be received.

According to experts, such a corvette will cost about 17-18 billion rubles, which is much less than 20385 (22,5 in 2019 prices) or the last 20380 with the MF RLK (about 20).

That is, we are talking about the fact that for the cost of six corvettes - four ordinary 20385 (over 90 billion) and a pair of 20380 with MF RLC (about 40 billion) you can build seven "mobilization" 20385 in the above configuration... Moreover, they will not have to be painfully brought up, since everything will work there at once... It will be easier to upgrade them if necessary, as this will be foreseen. And the life cycle will be cheaper.

After all, the spare parts and accessories will overlap with the "Karakurt" one, the training of personnel will be easier for the same reason, you will not have to pay extra for fine-tuning the ships to the operational state, etc.

As a bonus to the seven corvettes - several hundred million rubles saved under this scheme. A trifle, but nice.

Well, and most importantly - cumulatively, these seven hypothetical 20385 "simplified" will be more powerful than the four 20385 and two 20380, which are actually planned for construction.

Alternatively, it would be possible to build the same six, but save about 17-18,5 billion rubles for the budget.


In conclusion, we note that this simplified or "mobilization" option is not an invention of the author. It was offered by a professional and high-ranking domestic specialist in the field of surface shipbuilding, whose qualifications are beyond doubt.

3. The principle of reasonable sufficiency of performance characteristics. At the same time, such a ship, which will act against a serious enemy near its own coast or together with ships more powerful, will have quite sufficient tactical and technical characteristics in order to perform tasks as intended. Lobbyists of Zaslon usually try to question this argument, claiming that the Positiv-M radar will not fight off a very strong raid, forgetting that the corvette simply has few anti-aircraft missiles, and the potential of an ultra-high-tech radar (Zaslon is not such , but its creators and lobbyists claim it) on it simply cannot be disclosed.

Application Principles 4 (ban on revision of the TTZ after the start of construction) и 5 (modernization in blocks) obvious. And it does not require special explanations.

All that is needed in this case is quiet research work in the interests of the Navy, which would determine in which direction the corvettes should develop in order to have ready-made projects for their modernization at a certain point in time. That would make it possible to sign in advance contracts for the performance of these works, to purchase all the necessary equipment and components without rushing. And then, according to the finished project, quickly, combining modernization with any kind of repair (for example, restoration of technical readiness or medium repair - depending on the age and condition of the ship), quickly do everything. This will save money according to the same scheme as construction without revisions of the TTZ and unforeseen development plans.

6. Minimization of the list of projects, elimination of excess ROC and the like. When building a series of identical ships and planning their upgrades, it is worth taking one more step and learning how to plan in advance the entire life cycle of the ship.

This is difficult, since it is never possible to predict exactly in advance how long he will actually have to serve and whether he will be on time for repairs. Nevertheless, the evolution of the ship can be incorporated into the project.

So, for example, the creation of a reserve for future modernization described above makes it possible to link the fate of the ship with the upcoming planned development projects. And determine in advance which of them will belong to the corvettes and which will not. It is quite realistic to plan something in this way for the ship, immediately setting the boundary conditions in order not to invent anything superfluous, which is still not needed for such a class of ships.

7. The principle of joint development of interconnected weapons systems also, in general, it is clear how it works. If we predict the appearance of 57-mm anti-aircraft guns with projectiles with programmable detonation, if we understand the need to mount sighting devices on the same gun carriage with the ZAK barrel block and that, in the future, we will have to abandon one block of barrels on the AK-630M in favor of a paired one " Duet ”, then all these possibilities should be provided on the ship even in conditions when it initially leaves the factory with the AK-630M ZAK. It should not be such that research has shown the need to go to the 57-mm or the "Duet", and the design does not allow them to be installed on a ship.

The design of the corvette should provide for this. Obviously, all promising missiles should be used from launchers of ships in the ranks.

The helicopter hangar should accommodate the Lamprey, the layout of which is already ready, and it seems to be final - this applies to both Project 22350 frigates and landing ships. All this should be considered as a complex and developed in conjunction, so that the ship, as a complex technical system, could fully evolve during its long service life.

Ultimately, the shipbuilding program should be interconnected with other, related programs (the same ships with helicopters, and not only in terms of size, but also in communication and information exchange systems, weapons used, such as a single light anti-submarine torpedo, and so on).

Positive examples


There are also positive examples in the domestic shipbuilding industry.

The most striking and "fresh" example of adherence to the above principles is the creation of the RTO project 22800 "Karakurt".

The author has repeatedly argued that a specialized strike ship of this class has outlived its usefulness at the conceptual level. And today it is necessary to build multipurpose ships, at least small ones, capable, among other things, of fighting submarines, and as an attacking specialized ship, a missile boat with a high (45 knots or more) speed is more appropriate.

Nevertheless, it is impossible not to notice that within the framework of the tactical and technical assignment, the work on the creation of "Karakurt" was performed flawlessly - its chief designer and the team who worked on this project were able to create a very inexpensive ship, on which there really was one significant ROC, and all systems were serial.

The bottom line is that when the price is almost half as compared to its predecessor, Buyan-M, the ship is immeasurably more powerful, faster, really capable of fighting against enemy surface ships, almost entirely consists of domestic ship systems and components.

And, if the supplier of diesel engines (PJSC "Zvezda") had not let down, the "Karakurt" could be built very quickly. With all the delays with diesel engines, the lead ship was handed over to the customer less than two years after the laying.

Everything works on these ships at once. And there won't be any painful long-term refinements.

It should be understood that a hypothetical multipurpose ship the same people would do no worse.


Photo: Pella shipyard

The approaches that accompanied the design of the "Karakurt" even today allow them to be built in large quantities and very quickly. If not for the diesel engine. And if the performer does not fail.

The second equally successful project was the project 636 submarine (three "sub-series", in American terminology - "flights") "Varshavyanka".

Alas, today they are very outdated and in need of a very deep modernization. But if it had been carried out, then these boats would have turned out to be a serious force in the naval war even today.

This is what it means not to chase chimeras, but simply to calmly do your job, without rushing and deviating from common sense.

These positive examples, as you can easily see, were the result of following only part of the above principles. And even so, the success was phenomenal. "Karakurt" and "Varshavyanka" are vivid evidence that our problems with the fleet are caused by only bad management and nothing more. When no one interferes with work, our shipbuilders and designers give results completely

“From the world average and above”.

But it was not included in the system.

Conclusion


We will not soon see the triumph of these simple, in general, principles.

They are used. And then they will be used by other countries, but not by us. We will simply look at other people's successes and envy the fact that other countries can playfully do things that we are still absolutely unable to do for organizational reasons, even if we have money and the technical ability to do the same or better.

Once again, money allows, and the industrial base also allows, does not allow the government's approach to this issue. Sometimes “rays of light in the dark kingdom”, such as “Karakurt”, will still penetrate our darkness, but this will continue to be the exception rather than the rule.

Today, in the highest echelons of power, the attitude towards the Navy has finally taken root, as to anything - a means to warm up "respected people", a means of solving the problem of unemployment, pouring money into the regions, an instrument for the internal political propaganda of our greatness and omnipotence, to sinecure, to an instrument of diplomacy, and, as the Americans say about us, "status projections." But not as a means of waging war against real corpses and "funerals". Not as a military force that must fight to the death. And sometimes - for the survival of our people and culture.

While this is so, there is no need to talk about any rational approaches to the creation of naval power, we have institutionally consolidated the primacy of form over content. We have taken "to appear" rather than "to be" as the basic value, and we deny the opposite, even at the level of the masses.

Unfortunately, individual "bursts of enlightenment" in our guide are haphazard, when no conclusions are drawn from successful decisions (for example, to continue building Project 22350 frigates) for other projects.

The people simply do not understand anything about what is happening and are waiting for the command to throw the cap up. In the long term, this is fraught with impossibly unpleasant surprises. However, it will be later, but now you can continue to enjoy the greatness.

But perhaps the situation will change in the future.

And then all these principles will be needed. So, it makes sense to study and understand them.

In the future, it is possible that they will be embodied in the form of GOSTs. Or even, perhaps, special shipbuilding laws, the need for which is long overdue, like the law on the fleet in principle.

For now, we just need to know them.

And it is desirable for everyone.

The next article will briefly list the current capabilities of the domestic industry.
Author:
Photos used:
RF Ministry of Defense, US Navy
170 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. Soko
    Soko 7 January 2021 05: 42
    +48
    The article is definitely a plus. Looking forward to continuing good
    1. Machito
      Machito 7 January 2021 06: 29
      +30
      All this leapfrog with many projects that have no analogues in the world was already in our history before the Russo-Japanese War. As a result, we had a bunch of different types of ships that could not even keep the same speed. Japanese ships were more of the same type and withstood performance characteristics in terms of speed. The Karakurt series reminds me of the Novik series (first the experimental Novik, then the head Boyarin, then the serial Kamushki). Novik, by the way, really was unparalleled in the world. The cruiser Ochakov was also not a bad series. But the Varyag cruiser series is very reminiscent of today's leapfrog with a series of almost identical corvettes. In RYAV we lost cleanly: first, our shipbuilders, then gunsmiths and admirals with their own ceremonial training of crews. A hundred years have passed and nothing has changed. The Japanese build ships of the same type in large batches. We are engaged in leapfrog projects wunderwaffe. As a result: if the Japanese want to squeeze out the Kurils, they will take out the weaker KTOF in one wicket, and then they will smash the second and third squadrons, which we will pull up from the Northern Fleet, BF, Black Sea Fleet. Well, of course we can roll them into the asphalt with a vigorous loaf. But their US allies also have nuclear weapons. And what will prevent the Japanese from making YABC? Will we use nuclear weapons in a local conflict over the islands against the Japanese, if there is a threat of retaliation against Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Sakhalin and Khabarovsk? Is not a fact. In World War II, opponents did not use chemical weapons against each other.
      1. Crowe
        Crowe 7 January 2021 07: 15
        +17
        "The strength of any fleet consists mainly of two elements: the art and morale of the personnel and the number and dignity of its constituent ships."
        Nikolai Lavrentievich Klado (1862-1919) historian and theorist of the Russian fleet
        If there is still order with the first element, then with the second ... I agree with the Author that the attitude towards the Navy at the highest level is like a tired stepson, on whom money must also be spent (this is a stone in the garden of all sorts They write with aplomb that "Russia is a land state, and therefore, we do not need a mighty fleet" continue to finance the fleet on the principle of the residual, while forgetting the length of the sea borders of this "land" power and the presence of this very fleet in a little less than half of all SBCH cash.
        1. UAZ 452
          UAZ 452 7 January 2021 10: 15
          +13
          The article seems to be just convincingly shown - what the fleet spends even the money that is allocated to it. If more will be allocated, will there be more ships? Or will there be many times more R&D with full zilch in the end? Maybe that's why they do not highlight it, because so far the return is not visible? I mean the return as a clear correlation between the investment and the actual increase in combat capabilities.
        2. Doccor18
          Doccor18 7 January 2021 13: 52
          +18
          Quote: Crowe
          ... that "Russia is a land state, and therefore, we do not need a mighty fleet" continue to finance the fleet on the residual principle, while forgetting the length of the sea borders of this "land" power and the presence in this very fleet of a little less than half of all SBCH cash.

          I absolutely agree with you. hi
          Either "according to the residual principle", then "in the mode of jumps and build-ups" ... The expenses are huge, but the results are modest. Since the fleet is a very complex system, it will not work with it in the "jumping" mode. The program is needed for decades to come. And what tasks does the General Staff set for the fleet now? Are there clear objectives? Why is the grandiose modernization of the nuclear-powered heavy cruiser being carried out, what tasks will it solve, being in splendid isolation ..? Why does the fleet need two UDCs? Ask the admirals now that they are in power, and they will not answer right away, and if they do, they will do so in general vague phrases, such as "defense capability of the state", etc. ... no clear tasks, so there are no clear requirements for the state and size of the fleet's combat strength ...
          And if there are no clear tasks, strict plans for the composition, solid requirements from the customer and strict demand from the performer, then you can endlessly produce subseries, projects and superweapons for those who have no analogues ...
          1. UAZ 452
            UAZ 452 7 January 2021 15: 07
            +7
            Totally agree with you. Fleet building is a systemic process. Campaign and cavalry attacks, the alternation of periods of "golden rain" and hunger rations in themselves turn this process into a farce. The fleet, however, like the army, cannot be mentioned from time to time.
      2. UAZ 452
        UAZ 452 7 January 2021 10: 11
        +13
        And in terms of love for parades, in particular, our MO, nothing has changed either. Obviously, from his point of view, pretty, smiling, make-up girls in beautiful uniforms in the ceremonial formation are a guarantee of the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces.
        1. Titus_2
          Titus_2 8 January 2021 00: 25
          +7
          Quote: UAZ 452
          And in terms of love for parades, in particular, our MO, nothing has changed either. Obviously, from his point of view, pretty, smiling, make-up girls in beautiful uniforms in the ceremonial formation are a guarantee of the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

          And add the priest ... this is now in trend,
      3. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 7 January 2021 11: 01
        +3
        Quote: Bearded
        Japanese ships were more of the same type and withstood performance characteristics in terms of speed.

        Well .... Not everything is so simple. Let's compare the Japanese and the Russians. The Japanese had 6 EBRs of three types, where the last 4 units of 2 types were similar in performance characteristics and had only external and internal differences in the device. We had 7 EBRs of 4 types, where leapfrog is even more beautiful. 3 units of the "Poltava" type, with similar characteristics, differed in appearance, "Peresvet" and "Pobeda" also differed in details. "Retvizan" and "Tsesarevich" were built within the framework of the same Program and TTZ, had similar characteristics, but were built by different countries and differed fundamentally in appearance. units were of 6 types, where the passport speed data had a scatter of a couple of knots. And the "Nissin" and "Kasuga" acquired on the occasion were even slower than the main cruisers and were used separately. By the way, even this couple differed in the composition of the weapons. Small cruisers, of which there were as many as 4, were of 14 types. But they could be divided into two subclasses - fast and not very fast. Where 10ka fast "dogs" were approximately equal in speed, although they differed in the composition of weapons. And the remaining 4 units of 10 types were distinguished by the variegated composition of weapons and speed data, which did not prevent them from being assembled into relatively monotonous detachments and used with a squadron. Our 8 Armored cruisers were of 4 types, although 4 of them "Rurik" - "Russia" - "Stormbreaker" were built within the same concept. Armored 3 cruisers were of 7 types, where only "Diana" and "Pallada" are of the same type, and the three "Varyag" - "Askold" - "Bogatyr" were built one TTZ, should have had similar characteristics, but differed significantly from each other, as and "Boyarin" with "Novik".
        As you can see, the rivals did not differ in obvious monotony. And if the same "Tsarevich" became the prototype of the "Borodino" series, then it was "Bogatyr" that was chosen for cloning cruisers. Moreover, all three serial ones never reached 23 nodes of the German prototype and went with mediocre 20,5-21,5 nodes. "Novik" also had its slower "pebble" clones, albeit more powerful
        The point is that the concept of the squadron was developed before the RYA, and there was a search for prototypes within the proposed characteristics. So by the age of 5-6, a relatively balanced squadron with developed types of ship should have appeared in the Far East. But the war happened earlier. smileHow would they say today - the Japanese mobilized earlier repeat
        1. Machito
          Machito 7 January 2021 12: 49
          +23
          You forgot to mention the combined hodgepodge of the Second and Third Pacific Squadrons, which have no analogues in the world of submarines in Vladivostok, the port infrastructure of the Far Eastern ports, the total superiority of the Japanese destroyer and auxiliary fleet over the Russian and many other things. But I'm talking a little about something else, and not at all about the Russo-Japanese War of a century ago.
          I am talking about the similarity of the state of the modern Russian fleet with the state of the RI fleet a century ago, and what this led to. Russia is now in even more political isolation than then. Our fleet is still divided into 4 theaters of war, but the hostile fleets (Turkey, NATO, USA, South Korea, Japan) are much stronger than then. Japan still has territorial claims to the RF (Kuril Islands) and is rapidly building up its fleet at a time when we are engaged in excessive R&D and parades. The only thing that prevents them from attacking us is nuclear weapons. But Japan's closest allies have it. What will stop Japan from making its own nuclear weapon? Why is it worse than the DPRK? Japan has a whole bunch of nuclear power plants, nuclear specialists, radioactive materials for the production of nuclear weapons, developed industry and technologies. The production of only 10 nuclear warheads will neutralize our nuclear superiority over Japan, because in the event of a local conflict over the Kuriles, we will not be able to use our nuclear weapons due to the threat of a retaliatory strike against our Far Eastern cities. The Japanese fleet surpasses our KTOF and will destroy it before the arrival of reinforcements from the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet and Black Sea Fleet will be blocked by Japan's allies in the inland seas. The overall picture is exactly the same as during the ROE. And it's not a fact that we will exchange burnt Tokyo for destroyed Vladivostok. It is easier to give the South Kuriles to the Japanese.
          I cite Japan only as an example of a hypothetical defeat of our fleet to justify the sad state of our fleet. We have plenty of other enemies as well.
          That is why Klimov and Timokhin sound the alarm. We are using our resources ineffectively, despite the threats around. We do not have a systematic strategy for the development of the fleet. Enemies will force us to build defenses.
          1. UAZ 452
            UAZ 452 7 January 2021 15: 16
            +16
            Along with R&D and parades, temples and prayer services have been forgotten. Today I read on the Fontanka that the Kronstadt sailors, led by the commander of the LVMB, defended a night prayer service in the Naval Cathedral. Now articles are being written about this, because combat training is much less interesting. Contemporaries wrote that in the besieged Port Arthur, each general considered it his duty (or a tribute to fashion) to order a prayer service for victory. For some reason, it didn't help. Can help now?
            1. Machito
              Machito 7 January 2021 15: 48
              +13
              Yeah, we go to heaven, and they go to hell. Nowadays it is fashionable to pray: you can grind off what you have stolen with cheap candles. It's easier than keeping your country safe.
            2. Keyser soze
              Keyser soze 8 January 2021 20: 34
              +3
              that the Kronstadt sailors, led by the commander of the LVMB, defended a night prayer service at the Naval Cathedral.


              And I would refuse to hang in the cathedral ... laughing I believe in quantum mechanics and its prophets like Nils Bohr, Schrödinger and his cat. I can defend a prayer service at CERN ... and wait for the Higgs boson to converge laughing
          2. Non-fighter
            Non-fighter 7 January 2021 15: 22
            +2
            What will stop Japan from making its own nuclear weapon?

            Their allies are Americans. After application in the Kuril Islands, where will it be directed? The memory of WW2 is still fresh. Read about what happened there, and how events would develop if the Japanese in 1945 "suddenly" had nuclear weapons. They would not hesitate to apply it.
            In simple terms, this cow is already very vigorous, and making uranium tips on her horns is fraught :(
            1. Machito
              Machito 7 January 2021 15: 45
              +6
              Not everything is so simple. Technologically, Japan is capable of independently, possibly in secret from the United States, produce a certain amount of nuclear warheads. Japan has a lot of American Treasuries. Will the US want to quarrel with Japan? Unlikely. They have nothing against Israel's nuclear warheads. And Japan will definitely not be twitching at the United States after WWII.
            2. SovAr238A
              SovAr238A 7 January 2021 18: 44
              +2
              Quote: Not the fighter
              What will stop Japan from making its own nuclear weapon?

              Their allies are Americans. After application in the Kuril Islands, where will it be directed? The memory of WW2 is still fresh. Read about what happened there, and how events would develop if the Japanese in 1945 "suddenly" had nuclear weapons. They would not hesitate to apply it.
              In simple terms, this cow is already very vigorous, and making uranium tips on her horns is fraught :(


              Half of Japanese youth already believe that the Russians used nuclear weapons.
              And the Russians also bombed them.
              After all, only Russians and Chinese are enemies for Japan.
              And America is good.

              So the Japanese will not use nuclear weapons in America if they do.
              Those who make the decision to strike are already modern Japanese with a reformatted level of reality and we understand who the enemy is.
              1. Airdefense
                Airdefense 8 January 2021 00: 29
                +3
                Half of Japanese youth already believe that the Russians used nuclear weapons.
                And the Russians also bombed them.


                No offense, do you know this from your interactions with Japanese youth or from the Russian-language / English-language media?
                I do not dispute, but it does not sound plausible that it would be so in their history textbooks it should be said that the USSR dropped atomic bombs on the United States. And if this were so, then the network would have a bunch of scans of such textbooks.
      4. Rakovor
        Rakovor 7 January 2021 12: 35
        +7
        No Novik is experimental and Boyarin is not the head. These are two different ships built on the same TTZ, that's all. There is no need to invent any fairy tales.
        1. Machito
          Machito 7 January 2021 12: 52
          +2
          Quote: Rakovor
          No Novik is experimental and Boyarin is not the head. These are two different ships built on the same TTZ, that's all. There is no need to invent any fairy tales.

          Does this somehow affect the concerns of Klimov and Timokhin about the diversity and unpreparedness of our corvettes? Maybe this affects the cut of money for GPV2020?
      5. DrEng527
        DrEng527 7 January 2021 17: 51
        0
        Quote: Bearded
        Japanese ships were more of the same type and withstood performance characteristics in terms of speed.

        Really? compare 4 Borodinets with Japanese EBRs in Tsushima? hi
        Quote: Bearded
        Novik, by the way, really was unparalleled in the world.

        but Boyarin is noticeably better for service, another thing died strangely, but it's not the ship's fault ... request
        Quote: Bearded
        And what will prevent the Japanese from making YABC?

        the non-proliferation treaty and the American occupation ...
      6. Achilles
        Achilles 8 January 2021 09: 44
        -6
        Quote: Bearded
        As a result: if the Japanese want to squeeze out the Kurils, they will take out the weaker KTOF in one wicket, and then they will smash the second and third squadrons, which we will pull up from the Northern Fleet, BF, Black Sea Fleet. Well, of course we can roll them into the asphalt with a vigorous loaf.

        Firstly, one gate won't work, I've heard about X-101 missiles, calibers, iskanders, zircons on the way + new missiles that have recently been released, I would have looked who wins.

        Quote: Bearded
        But their US allies also have nuclear weapons.

        Secondly, the USA i.e. its elites, who are accustomed to living luxuriously, will not be harnessed to Japan, knowing that they themselves will be destroyed. Fools (Elites), who will not be able to find almost all the world's financial flows in the hands of the United States.
        Quote: Bearded
        And what will prevent the Japanese from making YABC? Will we use nuclear weapons in a local conflict over the islands against the Japanese if there is a threat of retaliation against Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Sakhalin and Khabarovsk? Is not a fact.

        Thirdly, even if the Japanese have YaBCH, they will definitely not use it, because Yes, they can destroy the Far East (it's also not a fact, we have very good missile defense and air defense, we knock everything down, and as soon as the first missiles that we can shoot down fly, a response will immediately fly in and Japan will not have time to release the second echelon of missiles, tk. will already be destroyed), but then the very existence of Japan as a state will stand, and because of smoking, no one will go to such a thing.
        When you write about the war with Japan, think well from the beginning, and do not be lazy.
      7. bayard
        bayard 8 January 2021 13: 36
        +3
        Quote: Bearded
        Novik, then the head Boyarin, then serial Kamushki)

        I'll make an amendment.
        Boyarin was not the "lead" in the Novikov series, it was built according to a different project in Denmark (Nikolai-2's mother asked her son to give her homeland the opportunity to invest in the construction of the Pacific Fleet), had a two-shaft (and not a three-shaft one like Novik's) ) the scheme was shorter, had a power plant of 10 l / s (for "Novik" - 000 l / s), and a lower speed (17 knots versus 000). But the composition of weapons and VI were approximately the same.
        And "Varyag" was never built in series. According to one technical assignment (VI 6000 tons, speed 23-24 knots, 12 guns 6 "), cruisers were ordered at three foreign shipyards: in the USA at the Kramp shipyard" Varyag ", in Germany at the shipyard" Germany "-" Askold ", at shipyard "Vulkan" - "Bogatyr".
        At the same time, "Varyag" from this trio turned out to be the least successful, and the "Bogatyr" type went into series in Russia.

        And the situation with our Fleet (and not only the Fleet) resembles the pre-war period before the RYA ... just striking. The same stupidity, confusion in the minds and plans, wasting the budget for all sorts of nonsense and a direct path to the upcoming Tsushima.
        Worst of all, the attitude of the "king" to all this ... is the same - nothing.
        Say "let the kids feed."
        Time has passed.
        No conclusions have been drawn from previous failures.
        Priority goals have not been identified, no tasks have been set.
        Those responsible for failures are not punished ... on the contrary, they are encouraged and rewarded.
        The direct agents of the enemy's influence are lobbying for absurd projects, their OCD and the adoption of such into service by direct agents of the enemy's influence, pushing the ridiculous and ruinous projects recommended by the curators ... And it seems that everyone in power is satisfied with this state of affairs ... because even to think about incompetence and stupidity to such an extent scary ... And incompetence and malicious intent give SUCH synergy ...
        “There will be no war because I don’t want it,” said the stupid king on the eve of RYAV, and received WAR, DEFEAT, Tsushima, the loss of almost ALL of the fleet, SHAME and revolution.
        Moreover, the shame of the defeat from a third-rate non-European (!) Country, led to a contemptuous attitude from all of Europe, a deterioration in relations with Germany and (!!!) to a shameful entry into a coalition with the eternal enemy of Russia - England (Entente) ... as a result - participation in an absolutely unnecessary war with Germany, a coup on the eve of victory, the collapse of the Empire and the basement of the Ipatiev House.
        This is where the servants of the "tsar" of today are leading.
        And all of Russia with him.
        And that seems to be their purpose.

        And write off on "stupidity" SUCH ... stupid.
        Moreover, stupidity is a VICTIM!
    2. Thrifty
      Thrifty 7 January 2021 08: 04
      +3
      Alexander, what do you mean by “budget radar?” How do you imagine it in general? I understand that now the ships have a kind of parody of the radar, but it is possible that there is a certain firm or company in the country, "not admitted to the table", but having at least a project or even a finished ship radar, or in accordance with relatively quickly and inexpensively to "spoil" a certain radar station in service with, say, the Ground Forces. "Budget radar" is the loss of its capabilities in terms of range and the number of detected, identified, and taken for tracking purposes, this is the inability to work on low-flying targets, on high-velocity, or even missiles maneuvering in flight! Then it's better to install an antediluvian, old radar, even a tube one, than to have a blind "budget radar!"
      1. bayard
        bayard 8 January 2021 13: 44
        +3
        Quote: Thrifty
        What is in your concept of “budget radar?” How do you imagine it in general?

        Replace the word "budget" with the word "serial" and everything will immediately become clear to you. Such radars are available in service and are mass-produced by the industry.
        just re-read the article carefully and everything will immediately become clear to you.
    3. Evil Booth
      Evil Booth 8 January 2021 20: 48
      -4
      no thanks. multibukaf. and then I do not count anything higher than blabla if the expert does not see the banality of launching anti-ship missiles in different directions (9) that in the end it will fly half as far as a rocket and not an airplane) with the return of a third deck under one helicopter which is ALS search and rescue. and the number of air defense units will not be 1/10 of that of a land regiment for an incomplete tank regiment without others. although the ship costs like 2 divisions, and there is supposedly nowhere to put the turrets (tell this to a container ship like 1 and that's it ... nowhere). projects can be different when the seas are different. those that are built in the USA on the sver quickly freeze over. and quiet is not black. and because, for example, su34 or su35 can give 2 f35 ranges and see aug in the radar and not in khibiny from 400-600 km, while the entire air group must be kept in this piece of 1000 km all the time so that there is 1 aircraft per hundred km or 2 but an hour in an hour ... ok 2 in 2))) really our fleet will fight if it will be nothing .. everything will be decided by the air force in our seas. and if you suddenly need a referendum in Madagscar, then what is to cope with. everything is simple. I googled here F35 can be detected on multimeter radars 250 km before it drops both BGM31 for all 70 km from a height of 12 km. they will fly these 250 for half an hour where they will meet with a V-V rocket seeing stealth in short waves and / or directed by the OLS at 100 km, and if from the target launch, then 135 km from the launcher. and then the very agm is not a problem to shoot down 16 pieces with one shell ... the target is no good ...
    4. Nemchinov Vl
      Nemchinov Vl 9 January 2021 22: 20
      +2
      Quote: Soko
      The article is definitely a plus.
      Well, not so unambiguous (!)... Alexander for example understands perfectly all "sloppiness Air defense "corvettes 20380/385, as well as their"toothless for PLO ", and at the same time continues to heat for this type corvettes BMZ ... ? !! With their fabulously unjustified price, and precisely because of the redoubt ? !! How so it would seem ? !!.... He knows perfectly well that there is an alternative in the form of 11664, which, now (before the approval of the performance characteristics by the customer) raw, but most capable, even before the HEADShip was made, to change (!!).... And if you set a goal, then everything that he says in his article would easily fit there (!!!)... And not the most expensive RLK (Mineral / Positive) according to the principle - reasonable sufficiency, and the Shtil-1 air defense system, tested functional, and not as expensive as Redoubt, and the same SJSC "Zarya-2" (for industry without raising the price of corvettes) developed industrially.... and much more.... (!)... Perhaps the only thing that would make sense to change, due to the insufficient speed of a similar (according to VI) 20380 ... it is to strengthen the GEM (!!). Namely, instead of "quadruplets" from 16D49, make more powerful of promising 12SD-500 (by 8000 hp) just by developing the "500's" line .... Besides, a similar "quadruple" from already 16SD-500 (by 10000 hp), could become a promising power plant for escort frigates of small VI (3200-4000 t.) such as "Thunder" pr.12441 or "petrel pr.11356R / M (like American Peri) ....
      Such 11664 would cost no more than 20380 (!), but due to the presence UKSK, and a disabled air defense system "Calm-1"would be an order of magnitude MORE functional for both anti-aircraft defense and air defense ... (!!!).
      However, the article chooses precisely the opposition even more crazy dear 20386, (!). what would on HIS background, it seemed that 20380 not so bad and expensive initially ?!
  2. Connor MacLeod
    Connor MacLeod 7 January 2021 05: 56
    +8
    Mafia is immortal. Shipbuilding ...
    1. Sahalinets
      Sahalinets 7 January 2021 11: 12
      +6
      Why only shipbuilding? If money is being stolen and sawed from us literally in all areas, then why should it be different in shipbuilding? There is a deeply neglected disease that has been decomposing the body for a long time and the measures proposed by the author are how to treat a patient with hepatitis from yellowing of the whites of the eyes ...
      1. Connor MacLeod
        Connor MacLeod 7 January 2021 11: 35
        +5
        The only difference is that corruption in the military-industrial complex undermines National Security ...
  3. Flashpoint
    Flashpoint 7 January 2021 05: 58
    0
    Alexander, how much time do you spend on preparing materials?
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 January 2021 23: 10
      +7
      This took two evenings. In general, in different ways.
      1. Flashpoint
        Flashpoint 7 January 2021 23: 13
        +1
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        This took two evenings. In general, in different ways.

        Evenings are different, but there is also the main work. The material is bulky.
        I mean that you can refactor all your materials and publish a book.
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 January 2021 00: 57
          +7
          Uh ... a book? I don’t even know. It's kind of harsh - a book. It seems to me that I am still far from some truly immortal imperishable.
  4. Vadim Zhivov
    Vadim Zhivov 7 January 2021 06: 25
    +16
    Lucidly and God forbid that everything would be fine with us ... Merry Christmas !!! hi
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 January 2021 00: 58
      +5
      Thank you too!
  5. mark1
    mark1 7 January 2021 07: 21
    +2
    Well, Alexander, and in a number of articles you tried to belittle the role of nuclear weapons. This is what saves us in this mess. For the article, definitely +. Everything is visible here and not to a specialist.
    1. Vladimir_2U
      Vladimir_2U 7 January 2021 08: 49
      0
      Quote: mark1
      the role of nuclear weapons. This is what saves us in this mess

      I subscribe to your opinion. And yet, although the article is interesting and the author is very "in the subject", but personally I was interested in this:

      First:
      And we didn’t even look into smaller “sawing” topics, like the same ekranoplan
      Are there any design work already underway and funds allocated? And even if so, is it not a cat's tears against the background of a general mess?

      And the second:
      and as an attacking specialized ship, a missile boat with a high (45 knots and more) speed is more appropriate.
      after these lines, the author's dislike, with all due respect to him, to the shock EP seems irrational.
      It took a long time, but I will start an article about my vision of the issue on the example of the shock EP "Lun".
      1. Comrade I
        Comrade I 7 January 2021 14: 36
        +1
        An impermissible luxury, in my opinion. Too narrow specialization.
        1. Vladimir_2U
          Vladimir_2U 7 January 2021 14: 39
          -2
          Quote: Comrade Y
          Too narrow specialization

          Specifically, "Lun", yes, strictly a shock machine, as well as "as an attacking specialized ship, a missile boat with a high (45 knots or more) speed is more appropriate." But the development of anti-submarine EP was also envisaged.
      2. Titus_2
        Titus_2 8 January 2021 01: 19
        0
        From me, plus in advance .... just for the promise of an article about the EP "Lun"
        1. Vladimir_2U
          Vladimir_2U 8 January 2021 06: 43
          -2
          Quote: Titus_2
          just for the promise of an article about the EP "Lun"

          Do not expect the depth of A. Timokhin's articles. )))
    2. timokhin-aa
      7 January 2021 23: 11
      +12
      Nuclear weapons save us YET. This is a very important clarification.
  6. yehat2
    yehat2 7 January 2021 07: 44
    +10
    the author of the article did not take into account something - the industry and diversification of suppliers, on which China and the United States rely and which we do not have. Half of the problems have arisen simply because we have problems not in the navy, but in industry, the economy and the social sphere of workers. The author attributes the problems that have arisen to the cleverness of people making key decisions, but a significant part of them is objectively a consequence of the prevailing conditions. Now the United States has reduced the range of suppliers by three times and they immediately began to have exactly the same problems as ours.
    1. tlauicol
      tlauicol 7 January 2021 07: 48
      +8
      The author even gave you examples of the construction of ships and complexes entirely domestic, and you all bring down the machinations of imperialism
      1. yehat2
        yehat2 7 January 2021 07: 50
        +4
        what intrigues? I wrote about something completely different, that the problem is not in the plans, but in the premises that only the government can change (and far from immediately and not quite simply), and not the leadership of the fleet.
        Much of the leapfrog arose precisely because of this.
        Beautiful plans for unification run up against the reality of the existing 15-year lag due to the lack of significant developments and the loss of opportunities to reproduce even what has already been. This situation simply forces us to engage in risky, in fact venture projects, because what can be obtained using the described approach is a guaranteed lag in quality and performance with a guaranteed numerical lag initially. Another addition of pepper is simply the excellent economic efficiency of all shipyards located not in the best logistic and climatic places. Plans are still being made to expand shipyards in the Far East. And how to supply and provide all this ??? To borrow Shuvalov's and Medvedev's private planes and carry them on? And the south of the Russian Federation is out of work. And do you think it's normal when the design bureau is half a globe from the shipyard? They are simply not able to carry out normal supervision.
        1. tlauicol
          tlauicol 7 January 2021 08: 18
          +6
          The leadership of the fleet is just one of the main culprits of this happening.
          And what does the spread of design bureaus and shipyards on the map have to do with it? It's like this everywhere
        2. FIR FIR
          FIR FIR 7 January 2021 14: 05
          -1
          To borrow Shuvalov and Medvedev's private planes and carry them on? And the south of the Russian Federation is out of work. And you think it's normal when the design bureau is half a globe from the shipyard? They are simply not able to carry out normal supervision

          And for me, too, it has always been a question, why build a shipyard so far from the industrial and scientific centers of the country?
          1. Nemchinov Vl
            Nemchinov Vl 9 January 2021 22: 48
            +3
            Quote: FIR FIR
            And for me, too, it has always been a question, why build a shipyard so far from the industrial and scientific centers of the country?
            What did you mean ?!! SPKB from St. Petersburg shipyards (Severnaya, .... Baltiysky) and Kaliningrad "Yantar", too far ?! Or Zelenodolsk PKB from, say, the Crimean "Bay" or "Sea" ... ? !! Where do you have problems there for the "distant lands" between design bureaus and enterprises ? !!.
    2. SVD68
      SVD68 7 January 2021 10: 18
      +5
      Quote: yehat2
      The author attributes the problems that have arisen to the cleverness of people making key decisions, but a significant part of them is objectively a consequence of the prevailing conditions.

      What conditions have led to the construction of ships of projects 21631, 20386, 22160?
      1. yehat2
        yehat2 7 January 2021 11: 39
        +3
        that you ran into specific projects? The problem is not in them, but in the filling that is available at a particular moment in time and its correspondence at that moment to probable partners.
        And projects are a consequence of frantic attempts to catch up, when the pursuit of quantity turns into simply the creation of useless ballast, except for ships from which performance characteristics are not particularly required. And please note that the actual descent of ships depends heavily on the demand for advanced performance characteristics. The more requirements, the more problems.
        And the foundations of the problems, the consequence of which the author describes here, are laid at completely different points - for example, in the reduction of specialized groups that create components, in the complication of obtaining the necessary components (for example, try to buy, by law, not the cheapest, but the most necessary light bulb or order something that rare and difficult) or in elementary corruption, when all work becomes fictitious and goes only for the sake of developing budgets.
        The fleet has very little influence on such things, and they largely determine the implementation of programs.
        But what to say, even the St. Petersburg shipyard is experiencing difficulties in the banal provision of high-quality metal alloys.
        And what about the elementary absence of a system for training skilled workers?
        When there are not enough welders to work on schedule. Are the evil admirals to blame for this, too?
        1. yehat2
          yehat2 7 January 2021 11: 46
          +6
          and I almost forgot - the fleet does not receive regular funding. It goes in fits and starts. And ships are also built in small-scale or piece-by-piece snatches. There is no question of sufficiency at all.
          See how the su-57 is made. Piece by piece! And what about the ships? Accept on the bulkhead per quarter? The Americans and the Chinese are simple - they KNOW that each year they will receive a sufficient budget for a number of serious programs. They do not need to convulsively make piece ships that replace 5 years of building a fleet.
          1. Comrade I
            Comrade I 7 January 2021 14: 33
            +4
            And that is precisely why in no case should you spend money on all sorts of mind-blowing projects and give in to lobbying. And build what is. But there is still something.
            I still did not understand what did not suit you in the article. The author is talking about the construction and unification of the existing ones.
            1. Nemchinov Vl
              Nemchinov Vl 9 January 2021 22: 56
              +2
              Quote: Comrade Y
              ... and give in to lobbying.
              tried and stopped a series of incapacitated and expensive 20380 / ..385 .... They even tried to present 11664 to the president, but ... Something went wrong again, and at Army 2020, they again decided to order corvettes 20380/385. ... despitethat they are both EXPENSIVE and not functional ... (!!!)... According to principle, -
              Quote: Comrade Y
              And build what is
              ... what is it ... me it can cost us a lot, - It doesn't matter ? !!...
  7. Alexander Galaktionov
    Alexander Galaktionov 7 January 2021 07: 55
    +5
    There is a photo of the Karakutsa MRK Mytishchi and Odintsovo, so they have different superstructures, you can detail the differences And the author also gives the radar and the performance characteristics do not give them anything to compare, an example at what distance the plane with an EPR 1m2 at a height of 1 km and a rocket can be seen with EPR 0,8 m2 at an altitude of 15 meters above sea level and at what distance the ship
  8. Alexander Galaktionov
    Alexander Galaktionov 7 January 2021 08: 04
    +6
    The author wants a normal radar station to be on corvettes for +, but along the corvette contours, UKSK and also Uranus, this is time and money again.Here you have to choose either UKSK or Uranus, or if there are 6 corvettes in each division, then 3 with Uranus 3 s UKSK A about contours and UKSK with Uranus, let it be a series after we build these Corvettes from radar standards for all Fleets
  9. Alexander Galaktionov
    Alexander Galaktionov 7 January 2021 08: 08
    +5
    As for the Karakuts, there are 507 more than 3 to produce a year, it seems that there are no so many lines And so pr 22350 with 3 UKSK super good there you can fish, conventionally 16 Caliber and 8 Onyx or 16 Onyx and 8 Caliber
  10. tasha
    tasha 7 January 2021 08: 20
    +2
    Massiveness, of course, is wonderful ... The ships still need to be maintained.
  11. Alexander Galaktionov
    Alexander Galaktionov 7 January 2021 08: 30
    +1
    Generally interesting what if Yantar has ellings in length and width that allow you to build frigates pr 22350, let build
    1. jayich
      jayich 9 January 2021 14: 05
      0
      Project 1155 was built, and 22350 will be even smaller. So yes there is
  12. Alexander Galaktionov
    Alexander Galaktionov 7 January 2021 08: 34
    +1
    And so in general nonsense if the air defense of the Corvettes is not any, then that it was impossible to put air defense Calm on 3 missiles from 12 corvettes?
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 January 2021 13: 20
      +9
      The calm is heavy, huge, besides, it is necessary to drive the 9M96 series, they are needed in the ZRV too.
      1. Machito
        Machito 7 January 2021 16: 11
        +2
        We are waiting for the continuation of the series of articles good soldier
      2. Nemchinov Vl
        Nemchinov Vl 10 January 2021 00: 06
        +1
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Calm heavy, huge
        heavier than redoubt and IMBK ....?! But what about the functionality of the systems for entering shipbuilding programs ... ?! He is at least capable (!)... and the redoubt ? !! (https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-12/1608724725_546446345634.jpg) .... ?!
        .
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        ... besides, we need to drive the 9M96 series, they need it
        without antenna Polyment ? !! Directly on corvettes where they are incapacitated ? !!.... Did you have a fight with Maxim, or something ? !!
      3. Nemchinov Vl
        Nemchinov Vl 14 January 2021 10: 50
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The calm is heavy, huge, besides, it is necessary to drive the 9M96 series, they are needed in the ZRV too.
        ...?! as he used to say Leonid Filatov, "What is your mother, do you order to understand ...?" ..., -
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        And really:
        Can you prove that an inexpensive and combat-ready complex is better than five or six times more expensive and incapable of combat? How did you define it?
        And where did you get the idea that six incapacitated ships are better than seven combat capable for the same money? Who told you that?
        - this is from the article if what? !!!.
  13. Alexander Galaktionov
    Alexander Galaktionov 7 January 2021 08: 57
    0
    The author touched upon the modernization of pr 1155 good from the third time, everything seems to have taken into account the Package, Calm, they will also add the UKSK on the sides, they can still deliver Pantsiri M as on the MRK Odintsovo
  14. Boris55
    Boris55 7 January 2021 09: 23
    -14%
    Quote: A. Timokhin
    ... the dissemination of the right ideas in society forms public opinion, which then influences the actions of the authorities ...

    Correct and incorrect ideas are formed in the media society (TV, cinema, books, Internet, etc.). Until recently, the media had the exclusive right in shaping public opinion, bringing the "necessary" information to the public and keeping silent about the "unnecessary" information. But, in turn, the media is financed by someone, employees are recruited with a certain life position that suit employers ... With the advent of the Internet, their monopoly on opinion formation was shaken.

    So it turns out that the dissemination of information in society, which forms the opinion of the people, is dealt with by the authorities (not necessarily acting) on ​​which the opinion of the people seems to be exerting.

    As for shipbuilding.
    First of all, we must proceed from the doctrine of the state: we are defending ourselves or we are attacking. There are three times less ships for defense than for attack. It is from this that we must proceed.



    ps
    The people really have an impact on power, but not on a direct, not an egregorial level. As an example: tired of mumble Brezhnev - they got a hunchback talker, tired of a talker - they got a drunkard, tired of drunk - got normal.

    Quotes about the influence of the people on the government:
    - "An idea becomes a material force when it takes possession of the masses" - K. Marx (1844).
    - "Everything happens in the best way in accordance with the real morality and ethics of all participants in the process" - COB.
    - "... the Kingdom of God will not come in a noticeable way, and they will not say: behold, it is here, or: behold, there. For behold, the Kingdom of God is within you" Luke 17: 20-21.
    1. Comrade I
      Comrade I 7 January 2021 14: 24
      +4
      As for shipbuilding.
      First of all, we must proceed from the doctrine of the state: we are defending ourselves or we are attacking. There are three times less ships for defense than for attack. It is from this that we must proceed.

      Defense is also not as simple as at first glance. What and how much does a purely "protective" Navy need?
      Protection of the coast as such, i.e. prevention of landing and massive shelling. Protecting your bases. Protection of SSBN bases in particular. Protecting the deployment of these SSBNs. And what is always forgotten self defense.
      And this is not to mention the fact that in the modern world, defense is far from limited to defending its territory. And this is a topic for another conversation.
      So the number of ships and other weapons for a purely defending Navy still needs to be determined based on specific tasks.
      This is what the author is talking about. Therefore, I will separately note the following (although I do not at all say that you deny this or argue with the author about this, I just want to emphasize). The article also talks about efficiency, cheapness and reasonable size of the fleet. And the fact that now everything is being done the other way around, and a lot of money is being wasted. As a result, they receive forces at the output that are insufficient even to solve problems within the framework of the current doctrine.
    2. A_Lex
      A_Lex 7 January 2021 18: 22
      +6
      The people really have an impact on power, but not on a direct, not an egregorial level


      Rare nonsense designed to confuse.
  15. Hermit21
    Hermit21 7 January 2021 09: 42
    -36%
    Judging by the volume of schiza, for some reason the dosage of neuroleptics was reduced to Klimotymohin
  16. Usher
    Usher 7 January 2021 09: 58
    -2
    Someone thinks it's stupid to write such things? This is a self-evident banality.

    No, this is not nonsense.

    No, in England at the beginning of the 20th century they also thought, as it were, cheaper. But having built "cheap" battleships, they realized with horror that they didn’t give up a ship that could not resist classmates and other ships. The British also wanted mass production and launched intermediate cruisers, "light" Yorkies with 6 203mm cannons, into production. The result is natural in a battle with classmates, in a battle in the Java Sea, I got a full blow. What's better? 6 or 10 guns? The answer is obvious 10. I'm afraid there may be a similar trap. When ships are obviously weak. The British, after the experience with battleships (I forgot their name), decided that it was necessary to make the most powerful ships.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 January 2021 13: 18
      +19
      The question is that we have a choice not between weak and strong ships, but between a standardized series of large numbers, or the SAME ships, but with "gold" priced and non-working complexes screwed to them.
    2. DrEng527
      DrEng527 7 January 2021 17: 58
      0
      Quote: Usher
      6 or 10 guns? The answer is obvious 10.

      in fact, the article says something else - it's better to have 2 CR with 10 guns, or 3 CR with 6 ... repeat
  17. Scaffold
    Scaffold 7 January 2021 10: 26
    -21%
    "For us, the same is critical, by the way."
    Alexander, you can't do that. This level of illiteracy is Yandex.Zen, not a serious article. wassat
    1. agond
      agond 7 January 2021 11: 13
      +1
      Quote: Usher
      The British, after the experience with battleships (I forgot their name), decided that it was necessary to make the most powerful ships.

      If you do not set the task of domination at sea, then the most powerful ships are not needed in principle. , and if we have a northern country for six months ice near the coast, then the problem of dominance is in principle not solvable, our lot at sea is a pure defensive doctrine, and we also have a lack of funds and low productivity in shipbuilding ... it is easier for us to develop defensive infrastructure along the coast and on the islands, to build small ships of the coastal zone and non-nuclear submarines of a new generation, maybe more
  18. Simple
    Simple 7 January 2021 10: 59
    +3
    We are talking about the "600 ships" program of the Ronald Reagan administration.

    Then it would be appropriate to cite the "thousand ships" program, which was going on during WWII and a little after. A million dollars apiece. All 1000 units were built and most of them were safely sunk in one of the bays of the Potomac River. Lessons need to be taken both from the gains and from the failures of the studied side.
    1. Simple
      Simple 7 January 2021 17: 28
      +1
      Not 1000, but 296 ships were built - my mistake.


      https://www.maritime.dot.gov/history/vessels-maritime-administration/ships-mallows-bay
  19. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 7 January 2021 11: 07
    +5
    There is nothing to comment on - a definite plus! good hi
  20. Radikal
    Radikal 7 January 2021 12: 03
    +8
    Quote: yehat2
    what intrigues? I wrote about something completely different, that the problem is not in the plans, but in the premises that only the government can change (and far from immediately and not quite simply), and not the leadership of the fleet.
    Much of the leapfrog arose precisely because of this.
    Beautiful plans for unification run up against the reality of the existing 15-year lag due to the lack of significant developments and the loss of opportunities to reproduce even what has already been. This situation simply forces us to engage in risky, in fact venture projects, because what can be obtained using the described approach is a guaranteed lag in quality and performance with a guaranteed numerical lag initially. Another addition of pepper is simply the excellent economic efficiency of all shipyards located not in the best logistic and climatic places. Plans are still being made to expand shipyards in the Far East. And how to supply and provide all this ??? To borrow Shuvalov's and Medvedev's private planes and carry them on? And the south of the Russian Federation is out of work. And do you think it's normal when the design bureau is half a globe from the shipyard? They are simply not able to carry out normal supervision.

    I believe that geography and climate have nothing to do with it - the Norwegians, Swedes and Finns, being in the north of Europe, build good military and civil ships. The point is precisely in the very approach of the country's leadership, and the fleet in particular, to naval development. Here is the incompetence of those who lead and control this process, banal unpunished theft, often disguised as some kind of know-how, and popularly referred to as "sawing". Well, there are other reasons indicated by some previous commentators. All this, in the aggregate, gives that result, or rather the lack of a proper result in the creation of an effective, combat-ready and modern Navy. sad
  21. Scaffold
    Scaffold 7 January 2021 13: 11
    0
    After all, when it was still written, but still relevant: "devastation is not in the closets, but in the heads!"
  22. A_Lex
    A_Lex 7 January 2021 13: 17
    +6
    The article does not say the main thing - which of the managers was actually punished for wrong decisions or improper execution of orders? If no one, then only a naive person can count on a change in the situation. And if the punishment system were in place, then all this generally reasonable attempt to chew on materiel in order to attract the general public to its side would simply not be required, just as it was not necessary in the USSR to try to explain to everyone the basics and principles of shipbuilding policy.

    In this case, the initial intention of the manager does not play any role at all. He can be a spy and think about sabotage, a corrupt official and think about how to fill his pocket in any way that is unfit for a professional, which means it is very difficult to try to think, but in any case, the wrong decisions of the manager lead to an error in the implementation of the project, which means they inflict real harm. And for a mistake you need to punish, because impunity corrupts. If a person makes a mistake, and he gets away with everything, he has no motivation to improve. This obvious truth, which does not need to be explained at all, has been brought to the point of absurdity in Russian realities, when impunity of the management level has become almost the norm.

    How to punish is also known. For civil servants, criminal terms, for private traders - the seizure of the enterprise into state property. Potential far-fetched objections like “then no one wants to mess with this at all” is deliberate nonsense. On the contrary, when the merciless inevitability of punishment looms, people who want to get titles and government contracts for free will think three times whether it is worth the risk for personal gain. The inevitability of punishment will simply line up the crowd of freeloaders, lining up to arrange a personal career and gain access to the state budget, which means more normal people will have a real opportunity to do something useful for the country.

    A person should be punished for a mistake that does real harm. This is an axiom. And the larger the mistake, the more severe the punishment should be. A manager's mistake, of course, is usually large-scale. And at the same time, it is the manager who has both the personnel and the resources to carry out preliminary assessment, comparison, analytical and research work in order to significantly increase the chances of making the right decision. If a person makes a mistake, but this is not automatically followed by punishment - that's all, we can assume that this is a crazy society, because the most important rule is not fulfilled in it.
    1. DrEng527
      DrEng527 7 January 2021 18: 00
      +2
      Quote: A_Lex
      The main thing is not said in the article - which of the managers was actually punished for wrong decisions or improper execution of orders?

      to the point! drinks
    2. DrEng527
      DrEng527 7 January 2021 18: 06
      +1
      Quote: A_Lex
      how it was not necessary in the USSR to try to explain to everyone the basics and principles of shipbuilding policy.

      That is why, instead of AB, they built God knows what, they simultaneously drove 941 and 667BRDM, as well as 1144 and 1164, projects 945 and 971 ... request
      1. A_Lex
        A_Lex 7 January 2021 18: 14
        +1
        That is why instead of AB they built God knows what


        The implication was that then the situation with the fleet was incomparable with the present. But in general, in the future, yes, everyone will have to explain
        1. DrEng527
          DrEng527 7 January 2021 18: 21
          +2
          Quote: A_Lex
          The situation with the fleet was incomparable with the present.

          There was still a mess - different types of ships of the same purpose, strange "domestic" types of ships, a stake on "asymmetric" solutions, which were more expensive, had little functionality, etc. request
          1. A_Lex
            A_Lex 7 January 2021 18: 26
            +1
            The mess was still the same


            A consequence of the constant paradigm shift. In the United States, the paradigm does not change - "we are the best, so everyone else owes us."
            1. DrEng527
              DrEng527 7 January 2021 18: 29
              +2
              Quote: A_Lex
              A consequence of the constant paradigm shift.

              Gorshkov was at the head of the fleet for 30 years - his legacy! request
  23. demiurg
    demiurg 7 January 2021 13: 41
    -12%
    Timoshkin is great. Deftly mixes soft and warm. And hype on this.
    Comparing the financial capabilities of China, the United States and the Russian Federation is directly fashionable, stylish, youthful.
    Perry is a cool ship. PLO is good. Only without Spruens in bad weather with the submarine can not do anything. And the anti-ship missile system cannot shoot down, in polygon conditions. And on the shore to shoot from a 76mm bang is the most it. The perfect ship.
    11540 to equalize with 22160 and 20386 it is necessary to be able to. It is indecent to even compare the fleet 22160 and 20386 as needed.
    The undaunted one must just compare 20380. And suddenly both 20380 and 20385 are better anyway. Who here recently angrily denounced that on Shaposhnikov Daggers in the role of air defense, eh?
    The fact that 20386 turned out to be niochin, well, we were not the only ones who got our feet in fat with modularity. The USA has already stamped more than a dozen littorals, and now they are also suffering.
    The versatility of ships is not from a good life.
    I also remember micro-lenses for the Baltic. Aviagra level theorist.
    Although he writes great. This cannot be taken away.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 January 2021 14: 12
      +14
      Comparing the financial capabilities of China, the United States and the Russian Federation is directly fashionable, stylish, youthful.


      And here it is, balabolka? The principles are universal - at least two ships are built, at least one hundred and two. All of the above is one of the ways to SAVE money.
      Your intellect hasn't mastered this, huh?

      Perry is a cool ship. PLO is good. Only without Spruens in bad weather with the submarine can not do anything.


      Blah blah blah.
      Outstanding understanding of PLO principles. With such knowledge, it is necessary to hide out of shame in the closet, and not to jump on the forums.

      The perfect ship.
      11540 to equalize with 22160 and 20386 is necessary to be able to.


      This is not in the article, these are voices in my head, discuss with them and not with me please.

      The fact that 20386 turned out to be niochin, well, we were not the only ones who got our feet in fat with modularity. The USA has already stamped more than a dozen littorals, and now they are also suffering.


      That is, we cannot learn from the mistakes of others, we must repeat them, right?

      It's time for you to be treated, citizen.
      1. demiurg
        demiurg 7 January 2021 14: 50
        -2
        But the fact that you are rude, inadequately responding to criticism, I wrote before.
        Okay, I'm old, stupid and inexperienced.
        Let's build massively from what is, and what the Russian Federation can produce in large quantities in 2000. And what would we have now? A bunch of undaunted ones who can't even be upgraded? With daggers as air defense, and Uranami as anti-ship missiles. Well, the Russian Federation and now Talvary can build for itself in dozens. Only you (after balabolka you do not deserve any other treatment addressed to me) will be the most dissatisfied.

        Consider Perry a good ship just because of a good GUS? What else does he know besides detecting submarines?
        The fact that their US was able to build a lot doesn't make them good vehicles for example.

        I mean, no? Which one of us has voices in our heads?
        Project 22350 frigates became the most important success of the domestic shipbuilding industry. If anything will save the Navy, then these ships.
        But 22160 is a waste of money. 20386 should remain the first and only one, here I completely agree.

        So what about unarmed microlenzags in the Baltic, naval commander? Can we go to the doctor together?
        1. A_Lex
          A_Lex 7 January 2021 15: 01
          +9
          And what would we have now? A bunch of undaunted ones who can't even be upgraded? With daggers as air defense, and Uranami as anti-ship missiles.


          The shipbuilding program in the Russian Federation resembles a computer upgrade strategy, in which the user constantly postpones the upgrade under the pretext that "I will miss this processor and vidyahu, because soon there will be better ones, but I will also skip them, because they will be followed by even better ones. I'll skip it too, because I'll wait for even better ones. "

          This upgrade strategy is inadequate because it has the wrong goal setting. The wrong goal is to get maximum performance for a minimum of money, which results in constant postponement of the upgrade until later.

          Correct goal setting is to get sufficient performance that meets the tasks right now and in the short term with the possibility of a cheap upgrade in the medium term and not think about the long term, because the platform itself is likely to change.

          Those. the right goal is to have enough functionality here and now, not to try to save money at all costs. And to postpone the upgrade for the future in order to try to get even better for the same money, this is an attempt to save money. Such a strategy does not bring anything good precisely because it has the wrong goal.
          1. demiurg
            demiurg 7 January 2021 15: 22
            -3
            Timoshkin writes a lot that is correct, only he forgets to mention some of the reasons why.
            Mentioned the same Phazotron, what kind of fellows. And these fellows FAR for the MiG-35 can not finish. For ten years now. Even for export, for real money. and digging deeper into such interconnected heap problems.
            20380-385 were made from what is, and what they can produce, and what will not become obsolete when leaving the slipway.
            Better than a redoubt, we have medium-range air defense for ships and is not expected. Calm is still the last century, there are no DB missiles of 4 per cell, and only radio command guidance.
            Replacing German diesels with Kolomna, these are both pros and cons in one glass. As for me, the plus of production in the Russian Federation outweighs the minuses of the resource, speed and efficiency.
            I don't know hydroacoustics, it's weak even for a sofa expert.
            It is quite a corvette at the world level, with national cockroaches included.
            Yes, Timokhin wrote correctly, if you insert a spacer into Karakurt, you can get an analogue of the 056 project, with a series of 15-25 units. But it is dangerous to let go of these ships that are more than 100 miles from the coast. AKA 76, 1-2 Pantsir-M, TA 2 * 3, possibly UKSK with PLUR and anti-ship missiles and quite possibly a helicopter platform. So for me it's easier to cut existing ships by adding a spacer with weapons.
            1. A_Lex
              A_Lex 7 January 2021 16: 02
              +7
              only he forgets to mention some of the reasons why.


              I am far from the idealistic idea that at present there is a person who thinks exclusively about the industry as a whole and completely out of touch with anyone's interests. If he lays out the generally correct principles, that is good in itself.

              Replacing German diesels with Kolomna, these are both pros and cons in one glass. As for me, the plus of production in the Russian Federation outweighs the minuses of the resource, speed and efficiency.


              Localization of the production of critical systems and units should not even become a rule, but an axiom. Verified by the actions of the "allies" in WWII, sanctions against the USSR immediately after WWII, and sanctions since 2014. Those. there can be no alternatives for such a solution, because too many were burned in the past.

              if you insert a spacer into Karakurt


              It is necessary to decide on the final set of only essential functions for each project, without trying to get a "universal" in each case. These functions should already be sufficient for the current task. After that, by a strong-willed decision to approve a standard building for each of the 5 serial projects and prohibit making changes to the building within the next 7-8 years.
              1. demiurg
                demiurg 7 January 2021 16: 08
                0
                It is necessary to decide on the final set of functions for each project, without trying to get a "universal" in each case. These functions should already be sufficient for the current task. After that, by a strong-willed decision to approve a standard building for each of the 5 serial projects and prohibit making changes to the building within the next 7-8 years.


                The trick is that Karakurt is in the series. In mass. And it will be 18 pieces. If you design the insert, then there will be no problems with radar, communications, or serial production.
                Personally, I would try to do this by combining the MRK and the OVR ship into one class.
                1. A_Lex
                  A_Lex 7 January 2021 16: 20
                  +4
                  Personally, I would try to do this by combining the MRK and the OVR ship into one class


                  If it does not go against the cheapness and simplicity.

                  In fact, it turns out that at the moment, in addition to cruisers / destroyers and MAPLs, other projects should be strictly specialized. Any attempt to universalize a project increases complexity, increases costs, including maintenance costs, delays construction and testing, and in fact turns into a big problem.
            2. alexmach
              alexmach 8 January 2021 16: 24
              0
              Yes, Timokhin wrote correctly, if you insert a spacer into Karakurt, you can get an analogue of the 056 project, with a series of 15-25 units. But it is dangerous to let go of these ships that are more than 100 miles from the coast.

              But is it still better than just Karakurt?
              + for an adequate comment.
          2. timokhin-aa
            7 January 2021 16: 25
            +6
            Great comment, thanks. Capacious comparison.
        2. timokhin-aa
          7 January 2021 16: 21
          +4
          So what is there about unarmed micro-lenses in the Baltic


          What are you speaking about?

          Can we go to the doctor together?


          Why do I need it?
          1. demiurg
            demiurg 7 January 2021 16: 39
            -1
            Whose handiwork?
            It is especially important to pay attention to the mine war. We must set a minimum of hundreds of mines per day of hostilities. For this, submarines, aircraft, and landing ships, and, the very same “light forces” - missile boats, can be involved. Nothing prevents one from five to six mines in each place of a different type. In the end, during the Great Patriotic War, torpedo boats completely laid mines. Moreover, since we are building simple and cheap boats, nothing prevents us from having “light” forces and high-speed mine production boats, even simpler and cheaper than a missile boat equipped with a primitive set of self-defense equipment and armed with mines. Such boats could well act at the time of impact on the coast of our aircraft, and under its cover, and provide speedy and accurate staging of a large number of mines of various types, such that for technical reasons aviation cannot set.

            To flood the Baltic with such boats and small submarines. And after such pearls still talk about what corvettes the Russian Federation needs.

            You need two doctors. Even by three.
            1. Psychiatrist.
            2. The doctor who will heal your memory.
            3. Psychologist, to relieve aggressiveness.
            1. timokhin-aa
              7 January 2021 22: 11
              +7
              No, I don't need any of this, from the words "boat armed with mines" it doesn't even logically follow that it is armed ONLY with mines.
              L-logic, buddy.
              It is necessary to be treated ON TIME.
  24. practus
    practus 7 January 2021 14: 20
    0
    It is a pity that the capacities of Sevastopol are not used.
  25. realist
    realist 7 January 2021 14: 20
    0
    of course it is more efficient to have more warships with 90 percent compliance than the ideal than fewer with 100 percent compliance. but the problem in general is with production, there are few shipyards, few specialists, few suppliers of materials and systems, there is no production of diesel engines, turbines and gearboxes.
    Probably it is worth while to build a fleet from available, available resources - than wait for the development of promising!
    1. demiurg
      demiurg 7 January 2021 14: 57
      +4
      Probably it is worth while to build a fleet from available, available resources - than wait for the development of promising!

      No.
      We must always look years ahead. From the moment of financing to the commissioning of the ship, it will take ten to twelve years. If the series is large, the entire series will take twenty years to build. And he will be in the ranks for another thirty years. Total half a century.
      Either provide for a reserve of space for future modernization, or immediately lay in the construction budget that in 10 years the ship will have to replace part of the weapons.
      It is more correct to put a dagger-shaped plug in place of the future normal air defense. Which will be completed in 3-5 years, but you won't have to spend money on deep modernization.
      1. realist
        realist 12 January 2021 20: 40
        0
        it's hard to say what will work in 10-20-30 years, only the modernization option is a utopia.
  26. A_Lex
    A_Lex 7 January 2021 14: 28
    +9
    It follows not only that 600 is stronger than 350, but also that, other things being equal (for example, equal performance characteristics or almost equal performance characteristics), two are stronger than one. Alas, today it has to be proved.


    And you, Alexander, and other popularizers can only be advised forever put aside all these "alas" and take as a strict rule constantly prove and explain things "obvious to specialists" when compiling texts on special topics for a mass audience. Moreover, explain in detail and in extremely simple language.

    Unfortunately, in the Russian mentality (from which it is likely that for a long time it will be necessary to beat out this rotten desire for elitism and self-exaltation with forged boots) there is a vicious practice of identifying an educated specialist with a representative of some almost other world, which, so to speak, descends to "simple sinners "and has an extremely limited reserve of patience, after the exhaustion of which the irritated recommendation" to step to study the materiel "follows.

    Such an arrogant dismissive position (which, of course, not every specialist shows at all, but the practice itself does exist) leads to big problems. Moreover, the paradox is that the very educated specialist who is simply eaten by a clever careerist in the struggle for access to positions and the budget gets on his head. The conclusion from this is simple. The best friend of an educated specialist is the general public, which, albeit not in details, but in general terms, understands well what a specialist does in general, and therefore can evaluate his activities and support.

    And when people shrug their shoulders en masse and say something like "well, to figure this out, we need professors", everything is lost, in the conditions of Russian irresponsibility the song of a specialist is sung, because, deprived of public support, he remains alone with experienced masters of intrigue and kickbacks.

    Thus, the main task of any specialist is to deeply specialize in some professional topic "not to break away from the team", but to himself, having advanced in understanding a special field of activity, constantlyto bring up the knowledge and understanding of the professional topic and the whole society as a whole to their level. This is essentially selfless devotion; it should become the rule for life.
  27. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 7 January 2021 14: 40
    +3
    a balanced and wise article by the respected Alexander Timokhin, but ... the most important component has been missed, what is the list of necessary ships? and how many of them are needed, 2 what are their tasks ... in order of discussion, I propose 1 one type of SSBN 1 one type of tactical nuclear submarine 2. one type of frigate (Gorshkov)
    only for the formation of the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet

    3 one type of MPK (based on (karakurt)) 4 one type of battery charge, i.e. Varshavyanka without a diesel engine but with an increased number of batteries ... only for the formation of the Baltic Sea Fleet Black Sea Fleet Caspian Japanese and Okhotsk

    5 one type of minesweeper with improved weapons for all waters in a large series

    all ships of the first and second rank to the oceans, and the MPK and MRK to the seas, stop laying down other ships for 7 years,
    1. Dude
      Dude 7 January 2021 15: 54
      +1
      I want to clarify:
      ... one type of tactical nuclear submarine ...
      What do you mean - SSGN (APLRK)?
      ... one type of battery charge, that is, Warsaw without a diesel engine but with an increased number of batteries ...
      I mean, not to bother with Stirling, but to follow the Japanese path, developing Li-Po batteries with increased capacity?
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 7 January 2021 16: 11
        -1
        I mean ash, .... and yes, do not bother, but make an electric boat, at least R&D, the waters are small, and it will be enough, quiet and economical ... what is your opinion?
        1. Dude
          Dude 7 January 2021 17: 30
          +2
          Quote: vladimir1155
          I meant ash, ... and yes, don't bother, but make an electric boat, minimum R&D, the water area is small, and it is quite enough, quiet and economical ... what is your opinion?
          There is enough R&D. A very difficult task. Large-capacity batteries are a very capricious thing. They get warm and sometimes explode, not only in phones. But the Japanese seem to have succeeded.
          Not so long ago, there was a good article on VO on the topic of submarines with VNEU:
          https://topwar.ru/170310-neatomnye-podvodnye-lodki-s-anajerobnymi-jenergeticheskimi-ustanovkami.html
  28. A_Lex
    A_Lex 7 January 2021 15: 33
    -1
    Attempts to do superweapon from the ship is our traditional trouble, which more than once cost us the opportunity for reasonable money to get forces sane in terms of combat capability.


    Do you know why? The explanation is simple. Superweapons are needed to obtain guaranteed advantages. A guaranteed advantage is needed to be sure guarantees victory. And if you have a means that guarantees you victory, then the enemy will not attack you... Those. roughly speaking, if you have a "wunderwaffle", then no one will climb on you. It is clearly seen how nuclear weapons are currently used as such a wunderwafele, the argument of which is constantly used to justify why now you can not strain yourself.

    The answer is simple. Russians or at least a certain part do not want to fight. Moreover, Russians are irrationally afraid of war, despite the fact that, in general, war in one form or another is the norm for human society. They want a weapon that guarantees a relaxed and serene pastime. Those. in fact, they want a utopia, which in reality is impossible. And the USSR, with its methodical and routine work, in the end caused irritation, because apparently many, imbued with the bourgeois worldview, argued in the style of "well, when, finally, will this long-awaited communism come, in which it will no longer be necessary to work selflessly or in general strain, and you can finally lie down and relax. " This ideal in the form of a fruitful Oblomov doing nothing in the end destroyed everything.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 7 January 2021 17: 13
      -4
      It is very good that the Russian Federation has a superweapon RVSN, it guarantees victory over any enemy whoever he is and wherever he is, a kind of sword kladenets, and part of this sword is a RPKSN with a mace and blue
      1. A_Lex
        A_Lex 7 January 2021 17: 36
        +6
        It is very good that the Russian Federation has a superweapon RVSN, it guarantees victory over any enemy whoever he is and wherever he is, a kind of sword kladenets, and part of this sword is a RPKSN with a mace and blue


        This "kladenets sword" of the USSR did not help. While the USSR lived in the rhythm of "we only dream of peace," the situation was not only stable, but there was steady progress in many areas of culture, science, and the national economy. Once relaxation and pleasure became valuable, everything collapsed. By the way, it is very characteristic that a fabulous, and therefore unrealistic, terminology such as "sword-kladenets" is used to describe nuclear weapons. After all, thoughts about utopia or the very same heaven on earth are essentially dreams about making a fairy tale come true, i.e. deliberately unrealistic, within the framework of reality, which in principle is impossible.

        War is peace. Those. if you want peace, not even forever, but in the foreseeable future, you will have to daily prepare for war, which the USSR did most of the time. As soon as you start to rest on your laurels and, all the more, you give up the war under unrealistic, far-fetched pretexts, such as "suddenly found mutual understanding with Western partners" - you will get degradation and war for the company.
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 7 January 2021 17: 42
          0
          this sword kladenets helped the ussr, the ussr was not attacked .... although every day they were preparing for a hot war, they played a cold one, and why? the answer is clear as God's day ..... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YkmhywrEeqM
          1. A_Lex
            A_Lex 7 January 2021 17: 48
            +6
            this sword kladenets helped the ussr, the ussr was not attacked


            The USSR was not attacked because they knew that he would definitely strike back, since the USSR had no oligarchs, the center of vital interests was in the territory of a potential enemy. Therefore, it was not for nothing that at one time one of the key questions for a career was "are there any relatives abroad", because there were enemies abroad and then they knew it for sure. And now the rearmament program is being conducted in such a way that when you see the results, you understand that since the leadership is making a mess in such an important area, it means that thoughts about the possibility of a potential war do not have the highest priority now as they used to.
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 7 January 2021 18: 24
              -1
              Quote: A_Lex

              The USSR was not attacked, because they knew that he would definitely strike back, since the USSR did not have oligarchs, the center of vital interests was

              wrong! , you just listed a few incoherent superficial facts .... died because they "lost the true faith", the country was destroyed by those who did not have relatives abroad and were not an oligarch, those who worked in the Central Committee of the CPSU were killed by disbelief! , and as a consequence, the absence of an inner core, principles, and as a consequence of schizophrenia, logic and a false understanding of one's interests, ... these are the basics of manipulating consciousness
              1. A_Lex
                A_Lex 7 January 2021 18: 31
                +5
                the country was destroyed by those who did not have relatives abroad and were not an oligarch, those who worked in the Central Committee of the CPSU


                The country was ruined by those who wanted to become an oligarch, who wanted to live beautifully at the expense of betrayal, who wanted to appropriate assets that work in the interests of everyone. The country was ruined by the very bourgeois consciousness based on poor personal egoism.

                died because they "lost the true faith"


                Well, it means that this "faith" has not yet been acquired, since the degradation continues.
                1. Nestor Vlakhovski
                  Nestor Vlakhovski 7 January 2021 19: 15
                  -4
                  And don't you be ashamed to keep pushing your rotten propaganda slavery communism?
                  Nobody needs your "highly spiritual" concentration camp, nobody is interested in it. Russians want to live with dignity.
                  1. Vladimir1155
                    Vladimir1155 7 January 2021 20: 51
                    +1
                    what does worthy mean? ... here is an example of blindness, it is worthy without a pension and work, this is complete poverty embellished with loans, these are children selected by the guardianship and sold abroad for organs, this is 115 percent taxes, this is a complete collapse of morals through the corrupt media, this lawlessness of legal proceedings ... is it your worthy? Is it not in a great country, but in torn to pieces, small colonies, exploited like banana republics only in the cold? this is a free export of natural resources ...

                    Poem by I.V. Stalin, written by him at the age of 18. He walked from house to house, Knocking at other people's doors, With an old oak panduri, With his simple song. In his melody and in his song, Like a clear sunbeam, the great truth sounded - A lofty dream. turned into stone, He knew how to make them beat. He awakened the minds of many, Dozing in deep darkness. But people who forgot God, Keeping darkness in their hearts, They presented him with a full bowl of poison.
                    1. Nestor Vlakhovski
                      Nestor Vlakhovski 7 January 2021 21: 47
                      -3
                      what does worthy mean?
                      It means free, means able to defend their interests.
                      without a pension and work, this is complete poverty embellished with loans, these are children selected by the guardianship and sold abroad for organs, these are taxes of 115 percent, this is a complete collapse of morals through corrupt media, this is a complete lawlessness of legal proceedings
                      What is this about, why did you write this? If you have all the choice between surviving in a concentration camp and "this", and you can't even imagine a decent life for yourself, then I have bad news.
                      great country
                      Great by what standards? Size, army, yadrenbaton? - such a reason for pride. No wonder it fell apart.
                      exploited like banana republics only in the cold? this is a free export of natural resources ...
                      so who is stopping you from producing competitive products? Why even Asians joined civilization without any problems, while in Russia there is still a demand for "their own way"? Maybe your "faith", "spirituality" and "braces" are not suitable for the development of the country and the people?
                      1. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 8 January 2021 01: 24
                        0
                        Quote: Nestor Vlahovski
                        It means free, means able to defend their interests.

                        where and how do you imagine it ...... you seem to be ready for the Maidan, did not learn from the Ukrainians and Belarusians and did not learn from the Americans (today one woman in your beloved capitol (Washington DC) was simply shot so as not to "defend her. interests "..... and what are you going to defend? but do you even imagine your interests at least? or do you have a fog from the school curriculum and newspaper headlines of the rain TV channel? what are your interests ?, the wind is in your head."
                        first formulate before you "defend" them .... otherwise there is a young mess in your head and the wind, stereotypes alone .... will give you a hat and it hurts when you start defending your interests ... and in general the right to defend ... . is this your fetish? is it valuable in itself or what else do you need to be happy? can the Chinese? Yes, because the young Chinese on the Tian Ai Myn Square were simply shot by thousands of automatic weapons when they decided to defend their interests, now everyone works there for pennies and without a pension with high productivity ... you need this, so go to China and work there , even though the benefit from you will be to the brotherly country and the wind will disappear from your head
                      2. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 8 January 2021 01: 45
                        -1
                        in the ussr I lived under Khrushchev, under Brezhnev, under Andropov and Chernenko, under Gorbachev under Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev ... what do you think? So I worked in America for a long time with the Americans, half of them are rogue in the USA, who have never worked and have no free hundreds of dollars, the rest of RED NEC have been plowing their whole life like horses without vacations and all the same, everything is in full credit, was in Spain in Italy, in Sweden ... there was (why do our homeless people stink only in the subway, and the Swedish ones even on the street 50 meters away?), not some special "civilization" that we would not have noticed, with what it is eaten? what is it for you? young man ? do you seem to have grown up in a Lviv village?
                    2. Vladimir1155
                      Vladimir1155 8 January 2021 01: 57
                      -1
                      Quote: Nestor Vlahovski
                      and the other - you can't even imagine a decent life, then I have bad news.

                      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQ8EC5aw-mA
              2. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 7 January 2021 20: 44
                0
                Quote: A_Lex
                Well, it means that this "faith" has not yet been acquired, since the degradation continues.

                yes, they didn’t find it in shit
  • Hog
    Hog 7 January 2021 15: 53
    +5
    "Your words, yes to God in the ears."
    Well, at least to our high-ranking officials.
    The article is unambiguous +.
    PS: Maybe the truth will be useful, as with 20386.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 7 January 2021 17: 48
    +2
    Bitter truth! However, it can be noted that this has been happening in the Navy for a long time. request
  • Nestor Vlakhovski
    Nestor Vlakhovski 7 January 2021 17: 53
    -7
    "What is good and what is bad"
    This is a very correct question. I think that the fleet should serve for the good of the people, and not be its burden and an anchor that pulls to the bottom.
    What kind of war, what are you talking about, we are a nuclear power, there will be no war. You ask, why then the fleet at all, if there will be no war anyway? So you are against the fleet or what?
    These are common questions that the "defenders of the fleet" persistently evade.
    Of all the programs of explosive increase in naval power known to us, the closest one on a historical scale is the Chinese one.
    Taking China as an example, it might be worth starting from the premises and the set goals, and not talking nonsense about Reagan's mobilization program, which was exclusively propagandistic in nature, with the main task of further increasing Soviet spending on "guns instead of butter." And what this led to we all remember.
    It is simply impossible to comment on the rest of the author's shiza, this person lives in some otherworldly reality, far from the laws of nature and even simple logic ..
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 January 2021 22: 15
      +8
      So these are common questions that the "defenders of the fleet" persistently evade


      Nobody shies away from anything, read the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, it says when nuclear weapons are used, and it is also desirable to comb through Western specialized publications, there is the question "how can we fight the Russians without crossing the" nuclear threshold "key and basic.

      which was exclusively propagandistic in nature,


      And count the cases, and the balabolka?

      It is simply impossible to comment on the rest of the author's shizu


      The keyword is impossible here, because the material presented is so much beyond your comprehension that you really cannot comment on it in a responsible manner, the complexity for you is prohibitive.
      1. Nestor Vlakhovski
        Nestor Vlakhovski 7 January 2021 23: 37
        -4
        Nobody evades anything, read the military doctrine of the Russian Federation, it says,
        This answer is evasion. They ask YOU quite intelligible questions, and in return they receive a link with an agitation ...
        If paper directives completely replace your own mind, then I don't see any problems at all, the Russian fleet fits so perfectly into the existing formal base, as far as all these doctrines do not coincide with reality.
        And count the corps
        So count, Reagan's naval program was never implemented, but its main goal was achieved - the USSR went bankrupt in the flaring cold war. In this sense, it can and should be compared with a similar space program of SDI.
        The keyword is impossible here, because the material presented is so much beyond your comprehension
        Stop disgracing yourself, no one needs your excuses.
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 January 2021 00: 50
          +5
          This answer is evasion. They ask YOU quite intelligible questions, and in return they receive a link with an agitation ...
          If paper directives completely replace your own mind, then I don't see any problems at all.


          People like you don't see problems in anything at all until these problems finish them off. In fact, the use of nuclear weapons carries so many risks, and in some cases political costs, that it will often be simply impossible.
          And that's not counting the fact that its power is often overestimated.
          A separate story is the ability to strike in principle, for example, the use of cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead requires a lot of time to compose and water flight missions, then it requires maintaining launch conditions - bringing the launch vehicles to the required line, etc.
          At the same time, it is required to ensure the survival of the carriers up to this point.
          The use of floating bombs requires aircraft capable of breaking through air defenses around the target, etc.
          I'm just too lazy to chew this on to all self-confident horses, the confidence of different individuals that I will definitely be with them, such "smart" to communicate as with people is a mistake.

          So count, Reagan's naval program was never implemented, but its main goal was achieved - the USSR went bankrupt in the flaring cold war.


          It was not done, but it was ALMOST done. And her goal was not only, but at first and not so much to ruin the USSR, read the American documents of those years, they were published.

          Stop disgracing yourself, no one needs your excuses.


          These are not excuses.
          Who are you for me to make excuses in front of you? Moderate self-importance. You are nobody. Zero. Your hypertrophied conceit does not mean anything outside of your cranium, if it is noticed by someone, it is only as an annoying factor, like a mosquito that does not let you sleep.
          And I will never make excuses to you for anything, it’s just some folly to think that I am making excuses to you for something.

          Consider this comment a favor on my part.
    2. Dude
      Dude 8 January 2021 00: 59
      0
      Quote: Nestor Vlahovski
      "What is good and what is bad"
      This is a very correct question. I think that the fleet should serve for the good of the people, and not be its burden and an anchor that pulls to the bottom.
      What kind of war, what are you talking about, we are a nuclear power, there will be no war. You ask, why then the fleet at all, if there will be no war anyway? So you are against the fleet or what?
      These are common questions that the "defenders of the fleet" persistently evade.
      Of all the programs of explosive increase in naval power known to us, the closest one on a historical scale is the Chinese one.
      Taking China as an example, it might be worth starting from the premises and the set goals, and not talking nonsense about Reagan's mobilization program, which was exclusively propagandistic in nature, with the main task of further increasing Soviet spending on "guns instead of butter." And what this led to we all remember.
      It is simply impossible to comment on the rest of the author's shiza, this person lives in some otherworldly reality, far from the laws of nature and even simple logic ..

      Banderchik, you got rid of your "anchor" (the fleet, that is), squealing joyfully - so what do you want, old man? wink
      Rejoice and float on inflatable mattresses.
      What are you some kind of boats, are you planning to buy?
      What for?
      You have enough mattresses, that's enough!
      Build at least a corvette - come and talk wink
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 8 January 2021 02: 38
        +1
        Quote: Dude
        Banderchik, you got rid of your "anchor" (the fleet, that is), squealing joyfully - so what do you want, old man?
        Rejoice and float on inflatable mattresses.
        What are you some kind of boats, are you planning to buy?
        What for?
        You have enough mattresses, that's enough!

        he also wants civilization, but he does not know that civilization is ... the presence of toilets with a water drain ... we have a lot of such toilets everywhere in the Russian Federation and they are in stores, they are in my cottage on every floor, bender people who grew up in uncivilized Lviv villages want civilization, this is natural and understandable, the most civilized country is Poland! Why? because everywhere in the EU there is a Polish plumber, "Civil Engineering" is called, so that Bendera residents can touch civilization on a regular basis, there are many toilet bowls in the EU and they are usually clean, because they are washed regularly, who does? Bendera's people wash, (because they ruined both the Academy of Sciences and Motor Sich and the Nikolaev shipyards where they work, that work is the lot of Muscovites, that's civilization to wash it in Bendera style), the dream of civilization is realizable! ..... hurray! ...... I have a deja vu, Yesenin raised and chewed this topic about the conflict between the toilet bowl and the Temple in his poem "the country of scoundrels" ... how long has it been, but everything has remained so. ... Vanity...
  • Usher
    Usher 7 January 2021 18: 38
    -2
    Quote: DrEng527
    Quote: Usher
    6 or 10 guns? The answer is obvious 10.

    in fact, the article says something else - it's better to have 2 CR with 10 guns, or 3 CR with 6 ... repeat

    War experience has shown that 2 CR with 10 guns is better. In the same example of the battle in the Java Sea in 1942. 4 Japanese CRs, 2 of them were light and inferior in everything except speed and torpedoes went into battle with 5 Allied CRs, of which 2 fairly strong Dutch LCs, 1 American TKR and 1 British-built TKR and 1 Australian LC. One of which was just the same not heavy Exeter.
    1. agond
      agond 7 January 2021 20: 10
      -1
      Quote: vladimir1155
      one type of charge for accumulators, that is, Warsaw without a diesel engine but with an increased number of batteries ... only for the formation of the Baltic Fleet Black Sea Fleet Caspian Japanese and Okhotsk

      You propose to remove the diesel from Varshavyanka, remove the diesel fuel tanks and, due to the released weight, add batteries, they will not pull, there are 1600 tons of water in it, that is, 40% of the 3960 tons of underwater displacement !! , however, some strange boat project was invented in the USSR
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 7 January 2021 21: 00
        -2
        The double was not invented in the USSR, it was invented when there was no nuclear submarine, it solved problems in the DMZ, and therefore the diesel. Now there is a nuclear submarine, for example, the United States has completely abandoned the nuclear submarine, for closed seas, a small submarine is needed that is quiet, far from walking, and do not frighten me with the tones of water, I know, Why will this replacement of the diesel engine and its economy affect the ascent to the dive? Why did you drag water here by the ears?
        1. Usher
          Usher 8 January 2021 00: 42
          -2
          Quote: vladimir1155
          The double was not invented in the USSR, it was invented when there was no nuclear submarine, it solved problems in the DMZ, and therefore the diesel. Now there is a nuclear submarine, for example, the United States has completely abandoned the nuclear submarine, for closed seas, a small submarine is needed that is quiet, far from walking, and do not frighten me with the tones of water, I know, Why will this replacement of the diesel engine and its economy affect the ascent to the dive? Why did you drag water here by the ears?

          Sorry, but you are writing some kind of nonsense. What has the US refusal to do with DPL? This is generally an out of place example. It's like talking about the weather and inserting the line "oh look what kind of asphalt".
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 8 January 2021 01: 26
            -3
            Quote: Usher
            What has the US refusal to do with DPL?

            You said that it is impossible to refuse DEPL, but I explain to you that it is possible and even has already given up one superpower, why are we worse?
            1. Usher
              Usher 8 January 2021 01: 31
              -3
              Quote: vladimir1155
              Quote: Usher
              What has the US refusal to do with DPL?

              You said that it is impossible to refuse DEPL, but I explain to you that it is possible and even has already given up one superpower, why are we worse?

              Well, first of all, I didn't say that. And secondly, do you think what's good for mattresses is good for us? The doctrines are different, the waters are different, the climate is different, the economy is different. Is it clear now? Diesel-electric submarines are several times cheaper to build and operate than nuclear submarines. We have defensive doctrine. A diesel-electric submarine is ideal for this. Well, there are advantages besides the price. The same noise, which is less.
              1. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 8 January 2021 01: 33
                -2
                Quote: Usher
                Diesel-electric submarines are ideal for this. Well, there are advantages besides the price. The same noise, which is less.

                not less but more, and an electric submarine is more ideal, it does not snort and is smaller in size ...
                1. Usher
                  Usher 8 January 2021 01: 50
                  -3
                  Quote: vladimir1155
                  Quote: Usher
                  Diesel-electric submarines are ideal for this. Well, there are advantages besides the price. The same noise, which is less.

                  not less but more, and an electric submarine is more ideal, it does not snort and is smaller in size ...

                  I apologize to ask, why do you smoke there? Farewell. If your SP is "snorting" then it seems like a clinic.
  • Lirik R
    Lirik R 7 January 2021 19: 56
    -7
    Quote: Scaffold
    "For us, the same is critical, by the way."
    Alexander, you can't do that. This level of illiteracy is Yandex.Zen, not a serious article. wassat


    I agree. Preparation of articles corresponds to the level "Yandex Zen" and only)
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 January 2021 22: 16
      +8
      You write as if you understood something.
      1. Usher
        Usher 8 January 2021 00: 49
        -5
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        You write as if you understood something.

        I understood what you want to say in the article. We must not chase the stork in the sky, but rivet the tits in the fist with a quiet glanders. There is truth in your words, but we do not have all the information available. Above, the person wrote that the problem even not management, but in the situation itself lagging all industry and government. There is nowhere to get competent engineers and designers, even if they crack, even spend trillions of money, the exhaust will be the same. Now they are trying to do something. Although I agree with part of your arguments. As I said above, we just don't know everything. Here you should not only look from the bell tower of the fleet. The fleet is a tool, not a goal itself. If they want UDC, it means that they know something and for what it is needed.
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 January 2021 01: 09
          +4
          Above, the person wrote that the problem is not even management, but in the situation itself, the lag of the entire industry and the state. There is nowhere to get competent engineers and designers, even if they crack, even spend trillions of money, the exhaust will be the same.


          Well, who do you think is doing what we already do? The same corvettes, Karakurt, submarines? The fact that the problems are generated by the TTZ is just evidence that the promka can still do something, they just order it not what the Navy needs.
          1. The eye of the crying
            The eye of the crying 8 January 2021 02: 13
            -1
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Well, who do you think is doing what we already do?


            With a "lag all industry "you can still produce something. The Union produced quite a lot of T-26s in the interwar period.
            1. timokhin-aa
              9 January 2021 14: 38
              +2
              The Soviet Union in the interwar period produced some more T-28 and T-35, as well as BT.
              An analysis of the components that were used on these tanks seems to hint that it was possible to make something completely different from them and the metal spent, if you understand what.
              Alas, no one could tell our ancestors what they did not know then (and that they had nowhere to find out).

              But we know what to do. We just don't. This is the fundamental difference between the now situation and the then situation.
      2. Lirik R
        Lirik R 28 January 2021 17: 40
        0
        I had enough nonsense about ZGRLS and their "bypass" for the eyes. I just can't bring myself to be serious ..
  • tigoda
    tigoda 7 January 2021 22: 48
    -7
    Completely empty and incompetent article. I quote "it is necessary to bring the air defense system separately from the ship's project ...". And who the hell needs it separately? And who will allocate money to fine-tune the complex that is not going to be installed anywhere?
    What a moronic reasoning!
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 January 2021 23: 08
      +3
      I quote "it is necessary to bring the air defense system separately from the ship's project ...".


      This is not in the article, these are your voices in your head.
  • SpbGenn
    SpbGenn 8 January 2021 01: 04
    +2
    Very well-reasoned article. Question to the author: Mr. Timokhin, who is your article intended for?
    Admirals and chiefs of staff will naturally spit on it - they are also the main experts. Supervisory authorities? There, too, not everything is clear, they are not allowed to make decisions. Do you hope that your theses will be read by senior officials? Unlikely. And we are simple layman can only build cellars in dachas in case of a big mess ...
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 January 2021 01: 10
      +6
      Without going into details, I will say this - previous experience tells me that my voice is sometimes heard.
      Especially when I'm not alone.
      This article is a way to be not alone. Like many others.
      1. SpbGenn
        SpbGenn 6 February 2021 17: 16
        0
        It is already gratifying that there are those to whom your ideas still reach.
  • SiberianGun
    SiberianGun 8 January 2021 02: 34
    +1
    I will read the article later, but by what the person writes, it looks very healthy. And the Russian corrupt bureaucracy has no trust at all, which once again adds a plus to the article. The problem is that the entire system of bureaucracy is so structured that there cannot be good and competent management specialists capable of making effective decisions.
  • Alexander Galaktionov
    Alexander Galaktionov 8 January 2021 05: 21
    0
    Question to the Author, there will be an article which author sees the modernization for boats pr 636?
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 January 2021 15: 15
      +3
      For example, here is Klimov's article
      https://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2019-06-28/1_1050_warszawa.html

      And here is mine
      https://vz.ru/society/2019/11/28/1010767.html
  • Narak-zempo
    Narak-zempo 8 January 2021 09: 41
    +1
    And, with a very high degree of probability, "Poseidon" will not be at all

    How will it not be so?
    This is, in fact, our brace. It is necessary to bring it at any cost so that the people do not fall into the mortal sin of despondency.
    The author swung at the basics.
    1. agond
      agond 8 January 2021 12: 10
      +1
      Quote: agond

      There are 1600 tons of water in Varshavyanka, that is, 40% of the 3960 tons of underwater displacement !! , however, some strange boat project was invented in the USSR

      The fact that in the 636 project 40% of the ballast 1600t is not my invention, it is an invention of its designers, it is not clear how they managed to think of this before, or they were simply paid extra for each ton of displacement, so they poured water into the project, or maybe it was advised those who issue a design assignment, otherwise how to explain such a strange fact., but anyway it turned out to be a rare design that has no analogues abroad. It only remains to hope that modern designers of non-nuclear software will take into account foreign experience, that is, they will use a single-case scheme more widely.
  • Volly
    Volly 8 January 2021 14: 06
    0
    Although the article contains a lot of sound thoughts, it also raises questions decently.

    From ideas that I fully support:

    1. Production should be from serial components, while prototypes are tested on the lead ship.
    2. The ship must provide for the possibility of modernization.

    Now questions:

    1. With whom and how will the war with the use of the fleet take place?
    2. It is clear that two good and inexpensive ships are better than one expensive and bad one. But if there are two cheap and bad versus one expensive and bad, which could potentially become cheaper and better, then everything is not so simple. In general, there may be more than two options.
    3. What is the basis for the belief that Poseidon will not exist at all?
    4. Are the specifications for 20386 revised? After all, judging by the show in Sevastopol, it will have Caliber. Maybe we continue to criticize what no longer exists?
    5. What systems were originally planned for 20380? Why did it take 16D49?
    6. Р055 vs 6РП: this is the current situation. From the point of view of the future, this can even be seen as a positive moment.
    7. The barrier was testing something at the stand on Ladoga. And these tests were supposed to show some results that inspired confidence. Otherwise, the installation of the Barrier immediately on a series of ships looks complete absurdity. Because what if it doesn't take off?
    8. A missile boat with a high (45 knots or more) speed - which power plant and with what contours? What missiles?
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 January 2021 13: 24
      +1
      1. Well, here a couple of times already almost with the Turks did not work, for example.
      In general, the fleet is needed just to be afraid to twitch, but for this it must be able to pile on anyone, and not just be "for show", as we have.

      2.
      It is clear that two good and inexpensive ships are better than one expensive and bad one.


      Well, not everyone, do you understand? And the choice is just that. And everything is chosen never based on common sense.

      3. Not a belief, a guess. On rumors "from there".

      4. Judging by the photo of the case - no. "Big" 20386 is a project for the future, if it comes out small.

      5. OVTs Positiv radar, 53 cm torpedoes, 76 mm cannon, etc. everything is only serial. Diesel engines are cheaper to operate than turbines, therefore 16D49

      6. Nothing positive about this FP 6 is insanity at the conceptual level.

      7. Yes, after it was discovered that nothing worked for them at all, they were puzzled by the stand on Ladoga. But it's too late, the complex has already been replicated and now half of the new BMZ ships in our country consists of experimental stands.

      8. Even among the lightning, one ran 48 knots, she was specially dragged to the factory, the hull was measured to repeat it. GEM naturally GTU, KRO can even be "Uranus", so as not to overcomplicate.
  • evgen1221
    evgen1221 8 January 2021 17: 10
    -3
    From everything described in the article, as an amateur amateur, I understood that shipbuilding is such a thing where, without building, without rolling back the ship, figs you will immediately understand whether it is good or slag, and from this follows another - to build many but different in concepts and filling ships and run in, the best is already in the series, but it is still expensive and can only afford countries that are rare in terms of economy and industrial development, because it is expensive. In our case, in general, h.z what to do and how. The best way is probably a naval alliance with China and hide behind its fleet, solving in general the common interests with it at sea.
  • certero
    certero 9 January 2021 02: 54
    0
    First you need to decide on the concept of why Russia needs a fleet at all?
    Well, then there is absolutely accurate information that large and large ships are much more profitable than small ones. Simply because they serve much longer and provide more comfortable conditions for conducting combat operations.
  • tone
    tone 9 January 2021 07: 37
    +1
    Alexander, specially registered to leave you my thoughts on the article. It seems to me that you are fundamentally wrong. They are XNUMX% right about how to build the fleet correctly, but what do these admirals need to build it ?! Not a penny of money should be given now to the navy while they are ruled by a rotten aorumped army, for which the main thing is not to protect the country, but to protect their own interests. Well, for example, a miracle happened and you gave them ships. So they will love them. Destroy. Or they will be misused.
    You don't have to go far, they destroyed Chabanenko and Fearless. And what about the new corvettes at KTOF? They provide, together with the four BODs, the deployment of SSBNs ?! No, they have not done this and will not. Entertain the headquarters of the fleet showing off on berth 38 in Vladik. Well, there will be more corvettes on KTOF in Kamchatka, they will not. Under the current leadership of the fleet, the new ships will in no way improve the defense capacity of the Motherland. Until the cleaning takes place, no money should be given for the fleet. Otherwise, they will not be enough where they can save us in the air defense, the videoconferencing anger is not so rotten ...
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 January 2021 13: 25
      +2
      Cleaning is needed without question, and there is still someone to replace the cleaned with. But one does not contradict the other - the clearing of random people from the Navy and its construction do not contradict each other.
  • Plate
    Plate 9 January 2021 09: 18
    +1
    It seems to me that I have already seen these principles in another article here on the VO ... And with the same example - the US Navy under Reagan.
    1. agond
      agond 9 January 2021 17: 00
      +1
      And so we decided, ships are required ...
      1 bigger size "more spacious"
      2 more quantity
      3 less cost, labor and other resources
      4 fast to build
      5 having the function of "modularity", that is, having the ability to quickly replace equipment, weapons in the flesh before complete alteration, restructuring, modernization.
      It is probably possible to comply with paragraphs 1.2.3.4, considering that in the USA, dry-cargo ships of the Liberty type were built very quickly, there are other examples. and if there is a shortage of high-power marine diesel engines in the country, then the stern of the ship can be wider and the engines can be placed across the hull
      But in order to fulfill paragraph 5, you will have to make serious changes to the basics of shipbuilding,
      1. timokhin-aa
        9 January 2021 17: 56
        +1
        5 having the function of "modularity", that is, having the ability to quickly replace equipment, weapons in the flesh before complete alteration, restructuring, modernization.


        No. The groundwork is simply needed for modernity - reinforced seats, a margin for electrical power, cooling and, in rare cases, weight.
  • koramax81
    koramax81 10 January 2021 02: 51
    -2
    "Therefore, we can only judge the successes of the Chinese by their victories. And the facts (in the form of a powerful Chinese surface fleet, which has long overtaken us) are obvious." this is the first thing.
    Secondly, I am not a specialist in the fleet, but there is an opinion that it was written either by the designer whose project was banned, or by another hater.
    Yes, there may be problems in the construction of this or that type of weapon: only a ship is not a truck or a tank, where in the next trial version everything is removable (and even then not always). And in hindsight, all the fellows ...
    If you have a project or specific thoughts - contact the Ministry of Defense, and they will support
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 January 2021 12: 51
      +2
      If you have a project or specific thoughts - contact the Ministry of Defense, and they will support


      I love people who not only were born as adults and do not know what happened yesterday and who did all this, but also teach those who are older to live. And with an unshakable confidence in the accuracy of their guesses.

      https://topwar.ru/174057-pobeda-zdravogo-smysla-korvety-vozvraschajutsja-poka-dlja-tihookeancev.html
      1. agond
        agond 10 January 2021 15: 39
        -1
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        No. The groundwork is simply needed for modernity - reinforced seats, a margin for electrical power, cooling and, in rare cases, weight.

        This is a half-measure, such as to sew an extra pocket to the trousers just in case, a different approach is required here, to significantly reduce the cost and speed up the construction of the mass of ships with the ability. their further deep modernization, it is necessary to abandon the age-old tradition of building ships, when both, the bottom, and sides, and transverse and longitudinal bulkheads, and decks, everything is built immediately at the shipyard and remains with the ship until the end of its service life, (example photo by the author of the topic, ship the hull, deck and superstructures are visible in the shop) if we want to build quickly and a lot must be built at the beginning of the "trough" blank, (may the sailors forgive me for this term. a trough with double walls without any internal partitions and decks, and after a crane we lower very large blocks of "cubes" with the corresponding filling into it with the same width and different lengths and heights, depending on their functional purpose, in the intervals between the blocks "cubes" and with the sides, if necessary, bulkheads and decks can be installed, then the cubes are connected by communications and a finished ship is obtained. If in the future there is a need for something in the ship to alter, modernize, or even change the purpose of the ship, the blocks of cubes are taken out and replaced with others with different functional properties.
  • Escobar
    Escobar 18 January 2021 17: 33
    0
    In the long term, the construction of ships has shown itself in series positively on the example of the Sarych destroyers. Unable to replace their engines after breakdowns, they disassembled some representatives of the series for parts, but kept others in the ranks.
  • Shubin Petr Kostantinovich
    Shubin Petr Kostantinovich 18 January 2021 21: 05
    0
    An interesting and useful article with many specific examples and sensible suggestions. A number of the presented principles already have a "beard", since they were known, but alas, did not work even in Soviet times. But then the superpower could somehow compensate for the "excess costs." Now these principles are extremely relevant, since (among other things) the real rhythmic work of the domestic defense industry to fulfill the state defense order is actually significantly difficult, slowed down and is associated with significant risks in market conditions under current legislation (223 FZ, etc.). Unfortunately, neither the strategic design for construction, the path of development of the Navy on the part of the leadership of both the Navy and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is visible, which is clearly shown in the article. In my opinion, it is enough to compare the length of Russia's sea and land borders in order to understand and realize the paramount importance of the Navy's combat capability for the defense capability of the Fatherland, and to draw concrete conclusions. With the modern development of means of detection, tracking and guidance, it has long been advisable to abandon the pseudostels NK, and to design them in such a way that they should be properly armed with air defense, missile defense, anti-missile defense and anti-aircraft defense systems for a worthy rebuff to a potential enemy in the world's longest sea area.
  • 3danimal
    3danimal 25 January 2021 06: 20
    0
    With regard to project 22800: with a "minimalist" air defense, it costs 2 billion. How much will its price increase with the same Pantsir-M?
    And he is absolutely helpless against the SP.