"Thundering" and others. Will our fleet get effective close range ships?
The end of the year brought the conclusion of the long-awaited contract for the corvettes of ASZ JSC. Fleet adopted head corvettes - 20385 "Thundering" from UKSK and MF RLC "Zaslon" and "Hero of Russia Aldar Tsidenzhapov" of project 20380 (with a new MF RLK "Zaslon" in a reduced configuration and the old composition of weapons). Accepted. Despite the most serious flaws in the radar (and in fact, in its combat capability).
Note: there are good reasons to believe that the real results of the firing of "Aldar Tsidenzhapov" at the RM-120 were very far from DIMK's statements.
However, it is obvious that there is
simply because the fleet has a catastrophic situation with the ship composition (especially at the Pacific Fleet).
At the same time, we have real (alas, unused) opportunities for mass serial construction of quite effective and combat-ready ships.
Logical questions arise:
After all, its purpose is clearly spelled out, including on the website of the RF Ministry of Defense?
And here are their two responses to the author's appeals to the RF Ministry of Defense:
и
Details of this correspondence and its content - in the article “A victory of common sense: the corvettes are back. Bye for the pacific ".
Obviously, at some point, someone made an "informed decision" that projects 20380 and 20385 should go to history... And now we see a somersault - they will be built again. However, after losing "nowhere" for almost five years. But this is a trifle, right?
After recent contracts for new corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 (instead of the scam from 20386), as they say,
namely: there is no scientifically verified shipbuilding policy in Russia.
Here you can remember the scandalous story with the cancellation of the Navy series of corvettes OVR in favor of extremely weak patrol ships of unknown purpose:
The most piquant thing about this rejection of the OVR corvettes is not even how the Navy once again "changed its boots in a jump," but that the declared stationary (effective) GAS did not exist then, and is not now. And it will not be in the medium term. Just at that moment this topic was very actively lobbied by a person,
These are just a few examples of the absence of any thoughtful construction of the Navy. And a demonstration that decisions on the fleet are made in a "fire order" and often in the form
From the fresh we can note the meeting and display of weapons to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in Sevastopol a year ago. For example, a project 20386 ship with a mythical (later it will be shown why this MF RLK with the current organization has no prospects for fine-tuning) "enhanced armament".
Model of an enlarged corvette of the project 20386 at the VGK show in Sevastopol in December 2019 Photo: shoehanger.livejournal.com
This project (enlarged 20386) is already in the dimension of frigate 22350 in terms of displacement and number of UKSK. And at the same time it significantly surpasses it in price with many times lower efficiency (and in fact - complete non-combat capability due to the Zaslon radar).
And this is presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief under the cameras, and the reporting person directly deceives the Supreme Commander by presenting the Redut air defense missile system on the model as “Caliber”.
Some details known at the time of that show can be found in the article "Are you contemplating an alteration of the 20386 project?"
Two ships in the same tactical weight category? No, the scam was to put the extremely weak and problematic project 20386 into a mass production instead of our really best project of our time - the frigate of project 22350. (And the project 22350 itself was wrapped in the dimension of the notoriously limited-production destroyer of project 22350M).
And this scam (and a real undermining of the combat effectiveness of the fleet and the country's defense) is reported to the Navy to the Supreme!
The catch here is that Zvezda-reductor LLC can produce either 6RP gearboxes for project 20386, or P055 gearboxes for a frigate of project 22350. And you have to choose. For some time, everything went to the fact that for the sake of 20386, not only series 20380 and 20385 would be killed, but also frigates 22350.
Accordingly, an acute public reaction is needed to all this. So that in the morning from the TV we were suddenly told that, for example, Japan again arranged for us
and together and at once.
But this article is about corvettes. All attempts of "naval thought" and the High Command to create a combat-ready grouping of new ships in the near sea zone suffered a complete fiasco. The constructed new corvettes of the 20380 project have finally begun to actively go, including to the distant sea zone. However, their real combat "value" (in quotation marks) is up to the first enemy aircraft or submarine.
Once again, it is necessary to speak and write about all this. Although the phrase
Before it's too late.
In the above dispute in absentia with the Navy, it was far from the naval commanders who were right. Simply because there was an objective analysis of the situation on the part of their opponents. What was the position of the Navy? Comments are superfluous.
Under the new contracts (as previously announced), the installation of the Zaslon RLK MF is a tragic mistake of the Navy. A mistake, for which the Navy and the Ministry of Defense are now abundantly paying those interested in this scam with budget money (despite the fact that for a number of extremely necessary items (for example, for effective air targets), the fleet has not just poverty, but poverty).
Further the price will be different - blood and many human lives. Disruption of the fleet's fulfillment of its missions as intended. And inflicting military defeat on Russia.
Just a quote (dialogue involving) a representative of military science from an organization called in defense industry circles
That is, our military science believes (apparently, without "running on a rake" with the radar of corvettes) that theoretically the option with the IBMK is supposedly better. Alas, these “mriyas” have nothing to do with reality.
With the organization and attitude to the case, which takes place, the MF RLC "Zaslon" will never be brought to the required level of combat effectiveness.
And this is an objective fact. For purely organizational reasons.
Essentially, in an integrated tower-mast structure, they "come together":
- means of detection (and this is the diocese of the Service of radio-technical weapons of the Navy and NITs REV);
- management weapons (Service of missile and artillery weapons of the Navy with the Central Research Institute of VK);
- means of electronic warfare (electronic warfare service of the Navy and NII OSIS);
- communication facilities (Communication Service of the Navy and Communication Research Center).
Formally, communication means are not included in the MF RLK, but in fact they are a single complex with the MF radar (including taking into account the problems of electromagnetic compatibility), since they are located mainly in a single integrated tower-mast structure (IBMK). This question is very difficult, to put it mildly. Previous corvettes had huge communication problems.
Nothing, maybe they will do it (integration of everything in the tower with the provision of real electromagnetic compatibility). In ten years. May be. And while “eating” several tens of billion rubles. This approach is considered the norm today.
As for space communications and target designation from "Zaslon" (shipborne equipment), it is worth quoting one lobbyist of "Zaslon":
Fans of "knocking back" and "zirconizing" American AUG should think hard about this.
These truly crooked guys want to work out and "Liana" too. And the Navy should think about an alternative developer and supplier of these tools. Otherwise, "Zircons" will have to be fired like this one looked like in the war 888 -
In the realities of the Navy with the IBMK, we have the classic "swan, crayfish and pike" (and this is taking into account the extremely slippery and dubious work performer).
Let us emphasize once again that DIMK's statement about the alleged downing of the RM-120 target by Aldar Tsidenzhapov raises serious doubts.
About the lack of correction of missiles and shooting of the "Thundering" with the "golden tower" of the "Barrier" was earlier:
Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam
Corvettes that will go into battle
Leaky Fleet Umbrella
Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing .
Why is all this chaos taking place? See the list of nannies above - with so many of them, the child simply cannot but be left without an eye. And, in fact, this is exactly what happened with the corvettes - literally (RLC).
Is there a solution to the organizational problem? There is.
Article "Where is Admiral Evmenov running?" the question was raised about the need to create a submarine warfare Directorate in the Navy:
The same is necessary in the upper hemisphere ("Office of Surface War"). For the issues there are complex, and they can be resolved only in one bundle. But in the Navy, they are torn apart in different farms (see list). Accordingly, until the farm principle of organization (both administrative and combat, including ship-based) in the Navy is overcome, the fleet is simply unable to satisfactorily organize and manage the creation of something similar to Western integrated tower-mast complexes ( IBMK).
Alas, such tectonic changes are not made on command and in a day. Therefore, the organizational complexity of the development should be linked to the real (and very limited) capabilities of the Navy to provide and accompany them.
With what we have today, even responsible and proactive officers have to wipe themselves off.
A real solution to the problem can only be complex, but in the existing system of the Navy (and the RF Ministry of Defense) this is impossible.
In detail about the harsh realities of our R&D organization -
Our Pentagon Wars. The realities of domestic military R&D " ,
"Our" Pentagon Wars "-2. Development chaos ".
Who could really do this to the IBMK fleet? Only an outstanding leader in the military-industrial complex, and from aviation issues. One who would voluntarily assume upon himself, among other things, “purely naval issues” (as far as they concern). And it is capable of implementing a rigid interface of all contractors within the framework of one and a real working structure.
And it could be not just a Personality (with a capital letter - in terms of personal and professional qualities), but also a person who has both powers and opportunities. Such, for example, could be Yu.I. Bely, General Director of JSC NIIP im. Tikhomirov ". And the Navy was offered this. This option is now closed. Yuri Ivanovich passed away two months ago. Our defense industry complex has suffered a grave loss.
Zaslon JSC? It's not even funny. When a person is appointed as the managing director of an organization that has taken on the development of the "super radar of the XNUMXst century" (and had previously developed only air conditioners), who left behind another large defense industry enterprise "near death", the result can only be disgrace (which DIMK negligently and posted from the shooting of "Thundering").
For comparison, since the beginning of the 2000s. in aviation between NIIP and "Fazotron" there was a tough competition for promising radars for fighters. Formally won the NIIP ("Belka" for the Su-57). However, "Phazotron" did not just breathe down his head, but periodically pulled ahead.
For example, it was Fazotron (in 2010) that made the first real hitting a target with a missile from an AFAR. Against this background, the only and extremely dubious shooting of the "Thundering" from under the golden tower of the "Barrier"
it's just a shame (not to mention the shooting of "Aldar Tsidenzhapov").
And what about the electronic warfare means of corvettes? Here's what.
The standard complex, intended for corvettes, was brought to the required performance characteristics only on "Gromkom". And then this news really delighted those involved - the electronic warfare complex has earned really well. That, in turn, indicated the prospects for its fine-tuning on other, already built ships.
Delighted? Hold on.
Now from the new corvettes (with the "golden tower") the completed and working complex TK-25 has already been thrown out! For the "golden tower" is electronic warfare too. And these electronic warfare means work in the same way as radar stations.
The fact that the organization of the "golden tower" and its developers have never invented anything in terms of electronic warfare means are trifles! After all, their presentations are so beautiful. Learn. Someday. May be.
In its advertising video "Zaslon" "cheerfully presses" the radar of the AWACS aircraft. The video, of course, was drawn by girls-designers, but according to the developer's technical assignment (JSC "Zaslon").
Apparently, the developers of the "golden tower" of "Zaslon" were slightly unaware that their electronic suppression equipment and AWACS radar ("Hokaya") operate in different frequency ranges? And, accordingly, they have a deliberately zero efficiency for its radar?
There is no need to talk about the complex use of weapons and electronic warfare equipment (with the corresponding mutual influence). It can be confidently asserted that in the corresponding programs and test methods (including state ones) this was beautifully bypassed (and the customer was certainly made guilty for this - with his "swan, cancer and pike").
Of course, they will carry out some tests - somehow it is necessary to report on "effective development". Only now it will have a very distant relation to the real conditions of the battle.
And the fact that a fight is the most difficult complex process, it is better not to remember this,
(And everything will be so beautiful at the parades, and custom-made "popular" articles in the "glossy media" will be so cheerful).
Will Zaslon start to shoot down targets? Of course, yes - it will be brought up. Just to
Will "Zaslon" be able to repel real raids? With the current organization of work, attitude and leadership - definitely not. Never.
The first "problem": the radar system.
Development of radar armament for corvettes of project 20380-20385.
On the lead and subsequent ships of the series, a general detection radar "Fourke" of 10 cm range was installed, which for many years became one of the most acute problems of corvettes.
The reasons here are from the general lack of knowledge of the radar (it was brought to a more or less operable state about 10 years after testing the head corvette!), And constructive errors in placement (for example, a "blind sector" at the stern due to shadowing by the mast).
However, the most serious problem turned out to be the "rediscovery" (and which was well known since the early 80s), that the decimeter range has serious problems when working on targets at extremely low altitudes (in the "drive layer" ).
Solvable problems (the same "Aegis", with its 10 cm, flying over the very waves of the PRK "Exocet" sees well, but this requires large energy and hardware costs).
That is, for a ship with one general detection radar, there are great doubts about the advisability of using the decimeter range, especially since there was a very good surveillance centimeter radar "Pozitiv-M", which ensured high accuracy of data output for the use of weapons and excellent work on low-flying targets.
Note. "Positive" is a development of the 80s, moreover, Ukrainian, for serial production transferred to the Typhoon plant (Kaluga), where in the late 90s the development of their domestic line began (in fact, a new radar "Positive-M") which has not stopped until now.
At the same time, the "Positive-M" was guaranteed to be efficient, provided target designation for weapons (including missiles) with the required accuracy, was mass-produced and was originally planned for installation on corvettes.
But then intrigues began.
Without any adequate justification, "Positive-M" was replaced by "Fourke", the problems with which the specialists were initially clear. Let us just recall the previously quoted quote from a specialist:
Vysotsky's enthusiasm for the new tower-mast complex from Thales became a pretext for replacing the problematic Fourke with a domestic tower (IBMK), which already included two surveillance radars: on the top of the mast - a modified Furke 10-cm range and on the edges flat canvases AFAR 3-cm radar (Zaslon's own development).
Of course, two radars (and even more so in different ranges) are better than one. In addition, the stationary placement of 4 AFAR canvases provided very fast movement of the beam within the field of view.
Progress? How to say.
For the capabilities of "Positive-M" were more than enough: both for the use of missiles, and for the control center of a very good artillery radar "Puma".
That is, from the moment the corvettes were designed, we had (and were mass-produced) a range of radars that solved all problems and did not have problems with operability, and with significant modernization potential. The ability to upgrade by means of aggregate replacement is very valuable for maintaining high efficiency of ships during service. Obviously, it is quite possible to replace the old "Positive-M" radar stations with their new modifications in repair (or right in the base), but the re-equipment of old corvettes with "gold" in cost (but actually not working for their intended purpose) "towers" from "Zaslon "Is obviously impossible.
The Corvette is a massive ship. Moreover, the anti-submarine capabilities of the grouping of forces in the near zone require a large number of optimally distributed carriers of search means (ships and helicopters from them). And turning ships into a cash cow to ensure effective use of budget funds by the "right" enterprises is a mistake worse than a crime.
Foreign experience is of interest.
An important point is that Tyles' I-MAST 400 has centimeter-band antennas located on the "tower" as high as possible (because they actually solve the problems of a low-altitude detector, and due to the height, a large range is achieved for such targets), respectively, decimeter radar antennas for I-MAST 400 located below.
IBMK I-MAST 400 on the patrol ship Holland.
When analyzing the composition of the electronic weapons of the most massive modern corvettes of Project 056 of the PRC Navy, which formally have one surveillance radar of the 10-cm range (like the Fourke), attention is drawn to the placement of navigation radars. Based on this, it can be assumed that these radars (as a rule, of the optimal 3-cm range), along with navigation, also solve the problems of a low-altitude detector of air targets in the drive layer.
Radar Corvette 056 Chinese Navy.
Do not shun rotating radars and the US Navy (the first to widely use PAR on ships). On the ships of the US Navy, the rotating radars (range of long centimeters) AN / SPS-77 (V) 1 SeaGIRAFFE, SPQ-9B, TPS-4D are massively in service. Moreover, for example, the SPQ-9B radar will be installed on the destroyers of a new sub-series to increase the efficiency of detecting low-flying targets.
Moreover, formally, the SPQ-9 is the same age as our "Positive", simply undergoing a very deep modernization (with the creation of an actually new radar in the old form factor).
USS Indianapolis (LCS-17) with TPS-4D radar.
"American" Positive-M "- radar SPQ-9B.
Returning to the Russian Navy. This year, he completed tests of the Odintsovo MRK with the Pantsir-M air defense missile system. Unlike "Kortika", the command module of which was the radar "Positive", "Pantsir-M" received a new very effective target detection system of 10-cm range with stationary AFAR canvases (developed by TsKBA). At the same time, "Odintsovo" also has a 3-cm radar "Positive-M", which very effectively complements the 10-cm SOC "Pantsirya-M".
Yes, there is some redundancy (minimal, but working version - one "Positive-M"). However, the price of such a radar complex turns out to be much lower than the "golden" (and incapable of solving problems as intended) "tower" of the "Barrier".
The absence of electronic warfare and communications equipment (installed on the ship separately next to each other) in the Odintsovo tower in the existing organizational structure of the Navy is not a disadvantage, but an advantage. For it allows them to really bring and provide not presentation, but real effectiveness.
There is the head corvette of the project 20380 "Guarding". Taking into account all the problems of the series, its real combat capability today should be considered near-zero (first of all, by means of air defense). In this situation, the installation of the Odintsovo tower-mast complex on the "Guarding" (with the replacement of "Kortika-M" by "Pantsir-M") allows the ship to breathe a second life. And what's more - to have an informed decision on the appearance of the new corvettes of the Navy.
No OCD is required for this. All work can be carried out under a repair contract. The docking of the SOTS "Pantsirya-M" and the BIUS "Sigma" of the corvette has already been completed (at the RTO "Odintsovo")
The second "problem": means of searching for submarines.
The main means of searching for submarines on the new ships of the Russian Navy is the towed active-passive GAS "Minotavr".
The network has repeatedly leaked statements about problems with its real effectiveness in the navy. Could this be? Can! For this is a complex technical system that requires serious refinement and mastering.
In this case, you need to understand that the physics of the "Minotaur" is all right. Accordingly, the issue of realizing its potential in the fleet is organizational: tough and methodical work on the development of a new GAS and constant pressure from the developer on the part of the fleet to eliminate the identified shortcomings.
Unfortunately, our Navy in terms of the use of new BUGAS more
And here is the next photo.
Ancient Egyptian patrol boats of the Chinese substring of the "Hainan" project (in fact, this is the project of our post-war large hunters of Project 122), with the latest towed GAS LFASS (and it is clear that they worked with GAS).
Maybe at the sight of this photo our admirals (and at the same time the head of the anti-submarine warfare service of the Navy) will finally feel ashamed?
In more detail on the problems of new means of searching for submarines -
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics",
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Weapons and tactics ".
The second part of the problem of finding submarines is anti-submarine helicopters.
In order not to waste time, the easiest way is to cite two documents, one after the other.
PPS - search targeting system. This is something that is no longer on the helicopter.
RGA - radiohydroacoustic equipment.
KTS is a command-tactical system.
The problem with these systems is that they cannot form all the data necessary for the use of torpedoes, that is, they do not form a single search and sighting system.
And the second document.
The prospects for the naval aviation of the Navy have appeared. Her ex-chief, Kozhin, began the long-awaited process of moving to the chair prepared for him at Radar-MMS JSC. And there is hope that his successors will finally show due responsibility and adherence to principles.
However, problems need to be uncovered. And in one of the next articles it will be necessary to return to the topic of naval aviation.
The third "problem": the possibility of mass serial construction.
And another quote from one of the leading experts in military shipbuilding:
Nevertheless, the pace of construction, even mobilization 20385 will be insufficient (taking into account the critical state with the naval composition of the Navy). And here there is only one solution - the "small corvette". That is, it is actually necessary to return to the OVR corvette.
Until recently, there were two potential options - on the basis of project 22800 RTOs at the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau and on the basis of the "Small Cheetah" of the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau. Today you can forget about the last option, ZPKB is fully loaded with work on UDC.
However, there is an extremely successful project 22800 "Karkurt", including its reinforced versions (with air defense systems and anti-submarine weapons).
"Reinforced" "Karakurt" at the VGK show in December 2019, Sevastopol.
It is important to note that the possibility of mass construction of the "mobilization" variants of the project 20380 and 22800 is fully provided with serial deliveries of weapons. The bottleneck here is the main power plants (GEM).
However, there is a solution here as well.
Kolomensky Zavod, subject to stable orders, can supply 16D49 diesel engines in any required quantity, the limiting factor is the gearbox of OOO Zvezda-reducer and stands for their assembly and testing (up to four RRP12000 per year). That is, the current capabilities of the industry ensure the construction of two ships of the corvette or BDK class (where the Corvette power plant also went).
However, increasing the number of stands (if there is a firm order) is an absolutely real task (Kolomna will provide a diesel engine). So there are no real problems here either.
The situation is most acute for the power plant for the MRK project 22800, ships on the water have been waiting for their diesel engines for years. However, there is a solution here as well.
From A. Timokhin's article "Diesel Factor" in "MIC-courier":
Since then, Zvezda has been able to increase the pace to six М507 engines a year, which cost its new director ... a career!
The position of the owner ("Sinara") in this situation, to put it mildly, is strange. Sinara's actions make one wonder whether those who believe that Sinara wants to bring Zvezda to bankruptcy and sell the vacated plant territories in St. Petersburg for housing are right? It is not a fact that this is so. But it looks very similar.
Quote:
The bottleneck in larger projects is not engines, but gearboxes manufactured by Zvezda-Reduktor. And the same owner also does not show interest in development. The country's interests just don't seem to exist there.
And there is only one solution here: both the Zvezda and the Reduction Star must be returned to the state. Optimal: with their transfer to the UEC. This will really be a strategic and system-forming decision on the ship's power plant.
1. The decision on the IBMK on new corvettes should be reviewed. The new ships should be equipped with effective, serial and proven weapons. The difference in price should be directed to emergency modifications of corvettes as part of the Navy and the elimination of their design flaws.
2. Modernization (within the framework of a serial contract, by analogy with the construction contract) of Project 22800 as a "small multipurpose corvette of the Navy".
3. To raise a question (for the spring meetings in Bocharov Ruchei) about the return of "Zvezda" and "Zvezda-Reductor" to the state (to the UEC).
All these phantom problems can be solved very quickly. There would be a desire to solve them.
Despite repeated requests, there was no response from the RF Ministry of Defense and the Navy.
Apparently the fleet has nothing to say.
Should I write like that? Certainly.
In addition, there is a very serious issue of the responsibility of officials for what is happening. A simple reply to a citizen is one thing, and quite another when there is a direct lie of responsible persons to the country's top military-political leadership.
And, as practice shows, such papers do not disappear. Even if they are deliberately pushed into the shredder for concealment, there is often a printer on the way to the shredder (and a copy often goes into the shredder).
In addition, in a number of cases there were real consequences of such appeals. And they are very positive.
For example, in the FSB for the armament of ships guard.
But this is already the subject of a separate conversation.
Note: there are good reasons to believe that the real results of the firing of "Aldar Tsidenzhapov" at the RM-120 were very far from DIMK's statements.
However, it is obvious that there is
"High decision" "accept ships as they are",
simply because the fleet has a catastrophic situation with the ship composition (especially at the Pacific Fleet).
At the same time, we have real (alas, unused) opportunities for mass serial construction of quite effective and combat-ready ships.
Public dispute with the Navy
Logical questions arise:
“How did we come to this life?
Where is our military science?
And where is the Main Command of the Navy? "
Where is our military science?
And where is the Main Command of the Navy? "
After all, its purpose is clearly spelled out, including on the website of the RF Ministry of Defense?
The main tasks of the Main Command of the Navy: organization and implementation of measures for the construction and development of the Navy.
And here are their two responses to the author's appeals to the RF Ministry of Defense:
и
Details of this correspondence and its content - in the article “A victory of common sense: the corvettes are back. Bye for the pacific ".
Obviously, at some point, someone made an "informed decision" that projects 20380 and 20385 should go to history... And now we see a somersault - they will be built again. However, after losing "nowhere" for almost five years. But this is a trifle, right?
After recent contracts for new corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 (instead of the scam from 20386), as they say,
"Facts on the face",
namely: there is no scientifically verified shipbuilding policy in Russia.
Here you can remember the scandalous story with the cancellation of the Navy series of corvettes OVR in favor of extremely weak patrol ships of unknown purpose:
Instead, it is planned to create patrol ships. The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, stated this in a blitz interview to the Central Naval Portal.
The main command does not see any prospects in the creation of ships previously designated as the "OVR Corvette". One of the main tasks of the OVR is to ensure the protection and defense of the naval forces in the areas of naval bases and in the territories adjacent to them.
This task is now performed by coastal surveillance systems, stationary sonar stations and coastal missile and artillery troops armed with anti-ship missiles of various ranges, as well as anti-submarine and strike Aviation.
The main command does not see any prospects in the creation of ships previously designated as the "OVR Corvette". One of the main tasks of the OVR is to ensure the protection and defense of the naval forces in the areas of naval bases and in the territories adjacent to them.
This task is now performed by coastal surveillance systems, stationary sonar stations and coastal missile and artillery troops armed with anti-ship missiles of various ranges, as well as anti-submarine and strike Aviation.
The most piquant thing about this rejection of the OVR corvettes is not even how the Navy once again "changed its boots in a jump," but that the declared stationary (effective) GAS did not exist then, and is not now. And it will not be in the medium term. Just at that moment this topic was very actively lobbied by a person,
"Who opened the doors of offices with his foot."
These are just a few examples of the absence of any thoughtful construction of the Navy. And a demonstration that decisions on the fleet are made in a "fire order" and often in the form
"The convulsion of naval thought."
From the fresh we can note the meeting and display of weapons to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in Sevastopol a year ago. For example, a project 20386 ship with a mythical (later it will be shown why this MF RLK with the current organization has no prospects for fine-tuning) "enhanced armament".
Model of an enlarged corvette of the project 20386 at the VGK show in Sevastopol in December 2019 Photo: shoehanger.livejournal.com
This project (enlarged 20386) is already in the dimension of frigate 22350 in terms of displacement and number of UKSK. And at the same time it significantly surpasses it in price with many times lower efficiency (and in fact - complete non-combat capability due to the Zaslon radar).
And this is presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief under the cameras, and the reporting person directly deceives the Supreme Commander by presenting the Redut air defense missile system on the model as “Caliber”.
Some details known at the time of that show can be found in the article "Are you contemplating an alteration of the 20386 project?"
Two ships in the same tactical weight category? No, the scam was to put the extremely weak and problematic project 20386 into a mass production instead of our really best project of our time - the frigate of project 22350. (And the project 22350 itself was wrapped in the dimension of the notoriously limited-production destroyer of project 22350M).
And this scam (and a real undermining of the combat effectiveness of the fleet and the country's defense) is reported to the Navy to the Supreme!
The catch here is that Zvezda-reductor LLC can produce either 6RP gearboxes for project 20386, or P055 gearboxes for a frigate of project 22350. And you have to choose. For some time, everything went to the fact that for the sake of 20386, not only series 20380 and 20385 would be killed, but also frigates 22350.
Accordingly, an acute public reaction is needed to all this. So that in the morning from the TV we were suddenly told that, for example, Japan again arranged for us
"Port Arthur with Tsushima",
and together and at once.
But this article is about corvettes. All attempts of "naval thought" and the High Command to create a combat-ready grouping of new ships in the near sea zone suffered a complete fiasco. The constructed new corvettes of the 20380 project have finally begun to actively go, including to the distant sea zone. However, their real combat "value" (in quotation marks) is up to the first enemy aircraft or submarine.
Once again, it is necessary to speak and write about all this. Although the phrase
"To sound the alarm".
Before it's too late.
In the above dispute in absentia with the Navy, it was far from the naval commanders who were right. Simply because there was an objective analysis of the situation on the part of their opponents. What was the position of the Navy? Comments are superfluous.
Under the new contracts (as previously announced), the installation of the Zaslon RLK MF is a tragic mistake of the Navy. A mistake, for which the Navy and the Ministry of Defense are now abundantly paying those interested in this scam with budget money (despite the fact that for a number of extremely necessary items (for example, for effective air targets), the fleet has not just poverty, but poverty).
Further the price will be different - blood and many human lives. Disruption of the fleet's fulfillment of its missions as intended. And inflicting military defeat on Russia.
MF RLK "Zaslon" will never be brought to the required level of combat effectiveness
Just a quote (dialogue involving) a representative of military science from an organization called in defense industry circles
"Central Research Institute of Shipwreck":
- It seems to me (and not only to me) that by 2025–2028 it will be possible to build the same number of ships of Project 20380 (simplified) as Project 20385/20380 (with Zaslon). For the supply of other components. And the second option has a significantly greater combat stability against air attack weapons.
- When it works as it should. Will it work as it should? Will it work properly ON TIME? This is an important question now.
- I agree.
- When it works as it should. Will it work as it should? Will it work properly ON TIME? This is an important question now.
- I agree.
That is, our military science believes (apparently, without "running on a rake" with the radar of corvettes) that theoretically the option with the IBMK is supposedly better. Alas, these “mriyas” have nothing to do with reality.
With the organization and attitude to the case, which takes place, the MF RLC "Zaslon" will never be brought to the required level of combat effectiveness.
And this is an objective fact. For purely organizational reasons.
Essentially, in an integrated tower-mast structure, they "come together":
- means of detection (and this is the diocese of the Service of radio-technical weapons of the Navy and NITs REV);
- management weapons (Service of missile and artillery weapons of the Navy with the Central Research Institute of VK);
- means of electronic warfare (electronic warfare service of the Navy and NII OSIS);
- communication facilities (Communication Service of the Navy and Communication Research Center).
Formally, communication means are not included in the MF RLK, but in fact they are a single complex with the MF radar (including taking into account the problems of electromagnetic compatibility), since they are located mainly in a single integrated tower-mast structure (IBMK). This question is very difficult, to put it mildly. Previous corvettes had huge communication problems.
Nothing, maybe they will do it (integration of everything in the tower with the provision of real electromagnetic compatibility). In ten years. May be. And while “eating” several tens of billion rubles. This approach is considered the norm today.
As for space communications and target designation from "Zaslon" (shipborne equipment), it is worth quoting one lobbyist of "Zaslon":
In 10 years ... the "Liana" will be finished to a working state.
Fans of "knocking back" and "zirconizing" American AUG should think hard about this.
These truly crooked guys want to work out and "Liana" too. And the Navy should think about an alternative developer and supplier of these tools. Otherwise, "Zircons" will have to be fired like this one looked like in the war 888 -
"Somewhere there at random."
In the realities of the Navy with the IBMK, we have the classic "swan, crayfish and pike" (and this is taking into account the extremely slippery and dubious work performer).
Let us emphasize once again that DIMK's statement about the alleged downing of the RM-120 target by Aldar Tsidenzhapov raises serious doubts.
About the lack of correction of missiles and shooting of the "Thundering" with the "golden tower" of the "Barrier" was earlier:
Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam
Corvettes that will go into battle
Leaky Fleet Umbrella
Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing .
Why is all this chaos taking place? See the list of nannies above - with so many of them, the child simply cannot but be left without an eye. And, in fact, this is exactly what happened with the corvettes - literally (RLC).
Is there a solution to the organizational problem? There is.
Article "Where is Admiral Evmenov running?" the question was raised about the need to create a submarine warfare Directorate in the Navy:
The presence of acute problems with the construction of submarines, their combat training and the issues of their intended use not only requires remembering and finally implementing the report of Vice-Admiral Chernov, today a much deeper solution is required: the creation of a Submarine Warfare Directorate in the Main Command of the Navy with the separation from special services of the Navy of the corresponding "underwater" units and their subordination to the Department of Submarine Warfare.
The same is necessary in the upper hemisphere ("Office of Surface War"). For the issues there are complex, and they can be resolved only in one bundle. But in the Navy, they are torn apart in different farms (see list). Accordingly, until the farm principle of organization (both administrative and combat, including ship-based) in the Navy is overcome, the fleet is simply unable to satisfactorily organize and manage the creation of something similar to Western integrated tower-mast complexes ( IBMK).
Alas, such tectonic changes are not made on command and in a day. Therefore, the organizational complexity of the development should be linked to the real (and very limited) capabilities of the Navy to provide and accompany them.
With what we have today, even responsible and proactive officers have to wipe themselves off.
A real solution to the problem can only be complex, but in the existing system of the Navy (and the RF Ministry of Defense) this is impossible.
In detail about the harsh realities of our R&D organization -
Our Pentagon Wars. The realities of domestic military R&D " ,
"Our" Pentagon Wars "-2. Development chaos ".
Who could really do this to the IBMK fleet? Only an outstanding leader in the military-industrial complex, and from aviation issues. One who would voluntarily assume upon himself, among other things, “purely naval issues” (as far as they concern). And it is capable of implementing a rigid interface of all contractors within the framework of one and a real working structure.
And it could be not just a Personality (with a capital letter - in terms of personal and professional qualities), but also a person who has both powers and opportunities. Such, for example, could be Yu.I. Bely, General Director of JSC NIIP im. Tikhomirov ". And the Navy was offered this. This option is now closed. Yuri Ivanovich passed away two months ago. Our defense industry complex has suffered a grave loss.
Zaslon JSC? It's not even funny. When a person is appointed as the managing director of an organization that has taken on the development of the "super radar of the XNUMXst century" (and had previously developed only air conditioners), who left behind another large defense industry enterprise "near death", the result can only be disgrace (which DIMK negligently and posted from the shooting of "Thundering").
For comparison, since the beginning of the 2000s. in aviation between NIIP and "Fazotron" there was a tough competition for promising radars for fighters. Formally won the NIIP ("Belka" for the Su-57). However, "Phazotron" did not just breathe down his head, but periodically pulled ahead.
For example, it was Fazotron (in 2010) that made the first real hitting a target with a missile from an AFAR. Against this background, the only and extremely dubious shooting of the "Thundering" from under the golden tower of the "Barrier"
after ten years of “efficient use of generous budgetary funding”,
it's just a shame (not to mention the shooting of "Aldar Tsidenzhapov").
And what about the electronic warfare means of corvettes? Here's what.
The standard complex, intended for corvettes, was brought to the required performance characteristics only on "Gromkom". And then this news really delighted those involved - the electronic warfare complex has earned really well. That, in turn, indicated the prospects for its fine-tuning on other, already built ships.
Delighted? Hold on.
Now from the new corvettes (with the "golden tower") the completed and working complex TK-25 has already been thrown out! For the "golden tower" is electronic warfare too. And these electronic warfare means work in the same way as radar stations.
The fact that the organization of the "golden tower" and its developers have never invented anything in terms of electronic warfare means are trifles! After all, their presentations are so beautiful. Learn. Someday. May be.
In its advertising video "Zaslon" "cheerfully presses" the radar of the AWACS aircraft. The video, of course, was drawn by girls-designers, but according to the developer's technical assignment (JSC "Zaslon").
Apparently, the developers of the "golden tower" of "Zaslon" were slightly unaware that their electronic suppression equipment and AWACS radar ("Hokaya") operate in different frequency ranges? And, accordingly, they have a deliberately zero efficiency for its radar?
There is no need to talk about the complex use of weapons and electronic warfare equipment (with the corresponding mutual influence). It can be confidently asserted that in the corresponding programs and test methods (including state ones) this was beautifully bypassed (and the customer was certainly made guilty for this - with his "swan, cancer and pike").
Of course, they will carry out some tests - somehow it is necessary to report on "effective development". Only now it will have a very distant relation to the real conditions of the battle.
And the fact that a fight is the most difficult complex process, it is better not to remember this,
"There will be no war."
(And everything will be so beautiful at the parades, and custom-made "popular" articles in the "glossy media" will be so cheerful).
Will Zaslon start to shoot down targets? Of course, yes - it will be brought up. Just to
"Report on the use of funds."
Will "Zaslon" be able to repel real raids? With the current organization of work, attitude and leadership - definitely not. Never.
Problems that don't really exist
The first "problem": the radar system.
Development of radar armament for corvettes of project 20380-20385.
On the lead and subsequent ships of the series, a general detection radar "Fourke" of 10 cm range was installed, which for many years became one of the most acute problems of corvettes.
The reasons here are from the general lack of knowledge of the radar (it was brought to a more or less operable state about 10 years after testing the head corvette!), And constructive errors in placement (for example, a "blind sector" at the stern due to shadowing by the mast).
However, the most serious problem turned out to be the "rediscovery" (and which was well known since the early 80s), that the decimeter range has serious problems when working on targets at extremely low altitudes (in the "drive layer" ).
Solvable problems (the same "Aegis", with its 10 cm, flying over the very waves of the PRK "Exocet" sees well, but this requires large energy and hardware costs).
That is, for a ship with one general detection radar, there are great doubts about the advisability of using the decimeter range, especially since there was a very good surveillance centimeter radar "Pozitiv-M", which ensured high accuracy of data output for the use of weapons and excellent work on low-flying targets.
Note. "Positive" is a development of the 80s, moreover, Ukrainian, for serial production transferred to the Typhoon plant (Kaluga), where in the late 90s the development of their domestic line began (in fact, a new radar "Positive-M") which has not stopped until now.
At the same time, the "Positive-M" was guaranteed to be efficient, provided target designation for weapons (including missiles) with the required accuracy, was mass-produced and was originally planned for installation on corvettes.
But then intrigues began.
Without any adequate justification, "Positive-M" was replaced by "Fourke", the problems with which the specialists were initially clear. Let us just recall the previously quoted quote from a specialist:
no one is interested in how, in fact, these undoubtedly excellent missiles will fly, in the absence of a radio correction line and disgusting target designation from "Fourke" ... So to speak, according to the "fire and forget" scheme. About what?! About the goal? Or a rocket? The developers of the air defense missile system diligently bypass all sharp corners of the type: “How will your missile defense system see the target in case of target designation errors in the region of 1 degree? The answer is "He will see" ... and so on.
Vysotsky's enthusiasm for the new tower-mast complex from Thales became a pretext for replacing the problematic Fourke with a domestic tower (IBMK), which already included two surveillance radars: on the top of the mast - a modified Furke 10-cm range and on the edges flat canvases AFAR 3-cm radar (Zaslon's own development).
Of course, two radars (and even more so in different ranges) are better than one. In addition, the stationary placement of 4 AFAR canvases provided very fast movement of the beam within the field of view.
Progress? How to say.
For the capabilities of "Positive-M" were more than enough: both for the use of missiles, and for the control center of a very good artillery radar "Puma".
That is, from the moment the corvettes were designed, we had (and were mass-produced) a range of radars that solved all problems and did not have problems with operability, and with significant modernization potential. The ability to upgrade by means of aggregate replacement is very valuable for maintaining high efficiency of ships during service. Obviously, it is quite possible to replace the old "Positive-M" radar stations with their new modifications in repair (or right in the base), but the re-equipment of old corvettes with "gold" in cost (but actually not working for their intended purpose) "towers" from "Zaslon "Is obviously impossible.
The Corvette is a massive ship. Moreover, the anti-submarine capabilities of the grouping of forces in the near zone require a large number of optimally distributed carriers of search means (ships and helicopters from them). And turning ships into a cash cow to ensure effective use of budget funds by the "right" enterprises is a mistake worse than a crime.
Foreign experience is of interest.
An important point is that Tyles' I-MAST 400 has centimeter-band antennas located on the "tower" as high as possible (because they actually solve the problems of a low-altitude detector, and due to the height, a large range is achieved for such targets), respectively, decimeter radar antennas for I-MAST 400 located below.
IBMK I-MAST 400 on the patrol ship Holland.
When analyzing the composition of the electronic weapons of the most massive modern corvettes of Project 056 of the PRC Navy, which formally have one surveillance radar of the 10-cm range (like the Fourke), attention is drawn to the placement of navigation radars. Based on this, it can be assumed that these radars (as a rule, of the optimal 3-cm range), along with navigation, also solve the problems of a low-altitude detector of air targets in the drive layer.
Radar Corvette 056 Chinese Navy.
Do not shun rotating radars and the US Navy (the first to widely use PAR on ships). On the ships of the US Navy, the rotating radars (range of long centimeters) AN / SPS-77 (V) 1 SeaGIRAFFE, SPQ-9B, TPS-4D are massively in service. Moreover, for example, the SPQ-9B radar will be installed on the destroyers of a new sub-series to increase the efficiency of detecting low-flying targets.
Moreover, formally, the SPQ-9 is the same age as our "Positive", simply undergoing a very deep modernization (with the creation of an actually new radar in the old form factor).
USS Indianapolis (LCS-17) with TPS-4D radar.
"American" Positive-M "- radar SPQ-9B.
Returning to the Russian Navy. This year, he completed tests of the Odintsovo MRK with the Pantsir-M air defense missile system. Unlike "Kortika", the command module of which was the radar "Positive", "Pantsir-M" received a new very effective target detection system of 10-cm range with stationary AFAR canvases (developed by TsKBA). At the same time, "Odintsovo" also has a 3-cm radar "Positive-M", which very effectively complements the 10-cm SOC "Pantsirya-M".
Yes, there is some redundancy (minimal, but working version - one "Positive-M"). However, the price of such a radar complex turns out to be much lower than the "golden" (and incapable of solving problems as intended) "tower" of the "Barrier".
The absence of electronic warfare and communications equipment (installed on the ship separately next to each other) in the Odintsovo tower in the existing organizational structure of the Navy is not a disadvantage, but an advantage. For it allows them to really bring and provide not presentation, but real effectiveness.
"Decompose an unsolvable problem down to components that provide a comprehensive solution within an existing organization."
There is the head corvette of the project 20380 "Guarding". Taking into account all the problems of the series, its real combat capability today should be considered near-zero (first of all, by means of air defense). In this situation, the installation of the Odintsovo tower-mast complex on the "Guarding" (with the replacement of "Kortika-M" by "Pantsir-M") allows the ship to breathe a second life. And what's more - to have an informed decision on the appearance of the new corvettes of the Navy.
No OCD is required for this. All work can be carried out under a repair contract. The docking of the SOTS "Pantsirya-M" and the BIUS "Sigma" of the corvette has already been completed (at the RTO "Odintsovo")
The second "problem": means of searching for submarines.
The main means of searching for submarines on the new ships of the Russian Navy is the towed active-passive GAS "Minotavr".
The network has repeatedly leaked statements about problems with its real effectiveness in the navy. Could this be? Can! For this is a complex technical system that requires serious refinement and mastering.
In this case, you need to understand that the physics of the "Minotaur" is all right. Accordingly, the issue of realizing its potential in the fleet is organizational: tough and methodical work on the development of a new GAS and constant pressure from the developer on the part of the fleet to eliminate the identified shortcomings.
"The road will be mastered by the walking one."
Unfortunately, our Navy in terms of the use of new BUGAS more
"Lying on the couch."
And here is the next photo.
Ancient Egyptian patrol boats of the Chinese substring of the "Hainan" project (in fact, this is the project of our post-war large hunters of Project 122), with the latest towed GAS LFASS (and it is clear that they worked with GAS).
Maybe at the sight of this photo our admirals (and at the same time the head of the anti-submarine warfare service of the Navy) will finally feel ashamed?
In more detail on the problems of new means of searching for submarines -
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics",
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Weapons and tactics ".
The second part of the problem of finding submarines is anti-submarine helicopters.
In order not to waste time, the easiest way is to cite two documents, one after the other.
In. No. UG-56166 dated 01.09.2020
To the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation
Report.
"On critical problems of naval anti-submarine aviation of the Navy"
I hereby report:
Due to the fact that the real detection ranges of low-noise submarines (PL) by passive radio-hydroacoustic buoys (RGAB) of the Navy today objectively amount to several hundred meters (including RGAB RGB-16M, purchased under the state defense order), to talk about the possibility of any they do not have an effective anti-submarine search.
Anti-submarine helicopter Ka-27M in the process of modernization has lost ... PPS (PPS "Octopus", developed 70s - 80s.). Instead of it, two "crutches" were installed - RGA "Kema" ("Dalpribor") and KTS (as part of the radar station from "Fazotron"), which are in no way able to replace the PPS.
It's not the developers' fault. What the Navy MA ordered the industry, it got it! Similarly, the lowered hydroacoustic station (OGAS) "Ros-VM", due to the preservation of the old high-frequency antenna, has extremely limited performance characteristics (compared to the western powerful low-frequency OGAS, our "Ros-VM" is simply pathetic and wretched). Most importantly, the OGAS Ka-27M does not provide multi-position operation with the RGAB (for "illumination" and detection of low-noise submarines) and GAS ships (that is, what ALL modern western anti-submarine helicopters do).
To the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation
Report.
"On critical problems of naval anti-submarine aviation of the Navy"
I hereby report:
Due to the fact that the real detection ranges of low-noise submarines (PL) by passive radio-hydroacoustic buoys (RGAB) of the Navy today objectively amount to several hundred meters (including RGAB RGB-16M, purchased under the state defense order), to talk about the possibility of any they do not have an effective anti-submarine search.
Anti-submarine helicopter Ka-27M in the process of modernization has lost ... PPS (PPS "Octopus", developed 70s - 80s.). Instead of it, two "crutches" were installed - RGA "Kema" ("Dalpribor") and KTS (as part of the radar station from "Fazotron"), which are in no way able to replace the PPS.
It's not the developers' fault. What the Navy MA ordered the industry, it got it! Similarly, the lowered hydroacoustic station (OGAS) "Ros-VM", due to the preservation of the old high-frequency antenna, has extremely limited performance characteristics (compared to the western powerful low-frequency OGAS, our "Ros-VM" is simply pathetic and wretched). Most importantly, the OGAS Ka-27M does not provide multi-position operation with the RGAB (for "illumination" and detection of low-noise submarines) and GAS ships (that is, what ALL modern western anti-submarine helicopters do).
PPS - search targeting system. This is something that is no longer on the helicopter.
RGA - radiohydroacoustic equipment.
KTS is a command-tactical system.
The problem with these systems is that they cannot form all the data necessary for the use of torpedoes, that is, they do not form a single search and sighting system.
And the second document.
The prospects for the naval aviation of the Navy have appeared. Her ex-chief, Kozhin, began the long-awaited process of moving to the chair prepared for him at Radar-MMS JSC. And there is hope that his successors will finally show due responsibility and adherence to principles.
However, problems need to be uncovered. And in one of the next articles it will be necessary to return to the topic of naval aviation.
The third "problem": the possibility of mass serial construction.
And another quote from one of the leading experts in military shipbuilding:
In general, in the place of the leadership of the Central Design Bureau, I would, on the contrary, suggest mobilization 20385 with a metal superstructure and without an IBMK (with the REV complex from 22800: "Positive", "Mineral", 10 cm SOC from "Pantsir"). It would be quite possible to keep within 15-17 billion. By itself, this 20385M (mobilization) will already be a new project. Yes ... no associated OCD. But a new set of documentation should be developed anyway. Yes, it will not cost a billion, but it will be a really massive and relatively inexpensive ship in the near sea zone, capable of operating in the far sea zone due to its displacement and the presence of roll stabilizers.
Nevertheless, the pace of construction, even mobilization 20385 will be insufficient (taking into account the critical state with the naval composition of the Navy). And here there is only one solution - the "small corvette". That is, it is actually necessary to return to the OVR corvette.
Until recently, there were two potential options - on the basis of project 22800 RTOs at the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau and on the basis of the "Small Cheetah" of the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau. Today you can forget about the last option, ZPKB is fully loaded with work on UDC.
However, there is an extremely successful project 22800 "Karkurt", including its reinforced versions (with air defense systems and anti-submarine weapons).
"Reinforced" "Karakurt" at the VGK show in December 2019, Sevastopol.
It is important to note that the possibility of mass construction of the "mobilization" variants of the project 20380 and 22800 is fully provided with serial deliveries of weapons. The bottleneck here is the main power plants (GEM).
However, there is a solution here as well.
Kolomensky Zavod, subject to stable orders, can supply 16D49 diesel engines in any required quantity, the limiting factor is the gearbox of OOO Zvezda-reducer and stands for their assembly and testing (up to four RRP12000 per year). That is, the current capabilities of the industry ensure the construction of two ships of the corvette or BDK class (where the Corvette power plant also went).
However, increasing the number of stands (if there is a firm order) is an absolutely real task (Kolomna will provide a diesel engine). So there are no real problems here either.
The situation is most acute for the power plant for the MRK project 22800, ships on the water have been waiting for their diesel engines for years. However, there is a solution here as well.
From A. Timokhin's article "Diesel Factor" in "MIC-courier":
At present, Zvezda is able to produce three M507 engines a year with a guarantee ... The M507 is, simply put, a pair of two M504s. Is it possible to obtain acceptable tactical and technical characteristics on the "halves" of the M507? It turns out you can. Nowadays, multi-shaft water jet installations are becoming more widespread in Western countries…. Instead of three M507s, four M504s can be used, each of which will work on its own water cannon. And we will solve the problem again, because even with the current capabilities of PJSC "Zvezda" for the supply of diesel engines, it will be possible to build up to two such ships per year without increasing the production of engines.
Since then, Zvezda has been able to increase the pace to six М507 engines a year, which cost its new director ... a career!
The position of the owner ("Sinara") in this situation, to put it mildly, is strange. Sinara's actions make one wonder whether those who believe that Sinara wants to bring Zvezda to bankruptcy and sell the vacated plant territories in St. Petersburg for housing are right? It is not a fact that this is so. But it looks very similar.
Quote:
Last year, Zvezda entered two sets a year: six M507 engines. Progress, no ... But somehow the new director did not please the Sinarovskoy administration. I guess what ... and that's it. Next year, most likely, two orders will be delivered, but this is the inertia of last year.
The bottleneck in larger projects is not engines, but gearboxes manufactured by Zvezda-Reduktor. And the same owner also does not show interest in development. The country's interests just don't seem to exist there.
And there is only one solution here: both the Zvezda and the Reduction Star must be returned to the state. Optimal: with their transfer to the UEC. This will really be a strategic and system-forming decision on the ship's power plant.
Conclusions
1. The decision on the IBMK on new corvettes should be reviewed. The new ships should be equipped with effective, serial and proven weapons. The difference in price should be directed to emergency modifications of corvettes as part of the Navy and the elimination of their design flaws.
2. Modernization (within the framework of a serial contract, by analogy with the construction contract) of Project 22800 as a "small multipurpose corvette of the Navy".
3. To raise a question (for the spring meetings in Bocharov Ruchei) about the return of "Zvezda" and "Zvezda-Reductor" to the state (to the UEC).
All these phantom problems can be solved very quickly. There would be a desire to solve them.
PS
In. No. 916533 dated 17.08.2020
To the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the RF Armed Forces
To the President of the Russian Federation
Putin Vladimir Vladimirovich
Report.
According to the statement for the media of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Evmenov, on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation, materials are being prepared for concluding a state contract for the construction of 6 corvettes of project 20380 at Amur Shipyard JSC (ASZ JSC). Taking into account the critical state of the Pacific Fleet's ship composition, insecurity of deployment and combat stability of the naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), this order is extremely necessary.
At the same time, of course, the critical shortcomings of project 20380 (with which the project is currently “limited combat-ready”) in terms of anti-submarine weapons and air defense of the ship must be eliminated.
1. An effective solution to anti-submarine problems unambiguously requires the presence in the ammunition of the corvette of anti-submarine missiles (PLR) "Answer" of the missile weapon complex (KRO) "Caliber". In fact, without submarines, a corvette, even with good search means, is a "game" for enemy submarines (submarines), and with submarines - a "hunter" for them.
2. The Ka-27M helicopter can in no way replace the PLR corvette, due to the extremely low characteristics and search capabilities (both the outdated high-frequency lowered hydroacoustic station (OGAS) "Ros-VM", and the RSB-16M radio acoustic buoys) and defeat PL.
3. Taking into account the versatility of launchers for the PLR "Answer" and other missiles KRO "Caliber", the possibility of launching with it the missiles "Onyx" and "Zircon", on the new corvettes it is clearly necessary to place a launcher for missiles "Onyx" / "Caliber "/" Onyx "/" Zircon ", i.e. new corvettes of JSC "ASZ" should be built according to project 20385 (with KRO "Caliber").
4. Taking into account the strict funding limitation, construction time frame, the only possibility of this is to replace the extremely expensive radar complex (RLC) of the IBMK “Zaslon” with the used and effective products “Positive-M”, “Monument” (or “Monolith”), “Puma ".
Note: today - not a single air target was shot down by the IBMK "Zaslon", taking into account the acceleration of the deadlines for the delivery of the lead ship with it (the corvette "Thundering") to the Navy, there are good reasons to believe that certain persons are striving to carry out tests under deliberately simplified conditions combat, for example, shooting at targets (RM-15M) with an altitude and visibility (EPR) more than an order of magnitude greater than real targets). It is also necessary to mention here the massive disruption of JSC Zaslon (developer of the IBMK) of work on radar topics for aviation.
The decision to install the IBMK "Zaslon" on new corvettes is a "time bomb" under the entire program, because:
• the real working capacity of the IBMK (and the ability to solve problems as intended) has not yet been ensured, and all the terms for this have been disrupted by the developer;
• there are good reasons to believe that there are complex and unresolved issues in the IBMK ... (cut out);
• for contractor work under the project 20380 IBMK "Zaslon" is the most expensive and risky component, while the necessary tasks are reliably performed by serially produced products with many times lower cost.
5. Another factor in saving financial resources and ensuring the specified construction time frame can be the replacement of a composite superstructure with a metal one. Previously, the installation of an expensive composite superstructure was justified by the thesis of "reduced visibility", which was not confirmed by real tests of serial ships.
6. Work on the completion of the project 20380 for this does not require the implementation of additional R&D, and can be carried out within the framework of the "serial" GOST RV 307 as "completion of the serial design". These works do not require additional funds, because the cost of corvettes, much more efficient in terms of combat capabilities, turns out to be lower than the current "game" of project 20380, and the overall terms of work are ultimately reduced (which allows the fleet to reliably rely on new ships).
7. The proposed "mobilization" version of the project 20380/20385 (with KRO "Caliber", with "Positive-M" instead of IBMK "Zaslon") has high combat qualities, moderate cost, reliably provided for the possibilities of mass serial construction by counterparty supplies, and is suitable for construction in many shipyards.
Thus, with a slight revision of the project 20380 (without additional R&D), its main disadvantages can be eliminated (with a simultaneous multiple increase in combat potential), the cost can be significantly reduced and the mass serial construction of new ships for the Russian Navy can be reliably ensured.
I am reporting on your decision.
November 15.08.2020, XNUMX
Best regards, captain 3rd rank in reserve Klimov Maxim Aleksandrovich
To the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the RF Armed Forces
To the President of the Russian Federation
Putin Vladimir Vladimirovich
Report.
According to the statement for the media of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Evmenov, on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation, materials are being prepared for concluding a state contract for the construction of 6 corvettes of project 20380 at Amur Shipyard JSC (ASZ JSC). Taking into account the critical state of the Pacific Fleet's ship composition, insecurity of deployment and combat stability of the naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), this order is extremely necessary.
At the same time, of course, the critical shortcomings of project 20380 (with which the project is currently “limited combat-ready”) in terms of anti-submarine weapons and air defense of the ship must be eliminated.
1. An effective solution to anti-submarine problems unambiguously requires the presence in the ammunition of the corvette of anti-submarine missiles (PLR) "Answer" of the missile weapon complex (KRO) "Caliber". In fact, without submarines, a corvette, even with good search means, is a "game" for enemy submarines (submarines), and with submarines - a "hunter" for them.
2. The Ka-27M helicopter can in no way replace the PLR corvette, due to the extremely low characteristics and search capabilities (both the outdated high-frequency lowered hydroacoustic station (OGAS) "Ros-VM", and the RSB-16M radio acoustic buoys) and defeat PL.
3. Taking into account the versatility of launchers for the PLR "Answer" and other missiles KRO "Caliber", the possibility of launching with it the missiles "Onyx" and "Zircon", on the new corvettes it is clearly necessary to place a launcher for missiles "Onyx" / "Caliber "/" Onyx "/" Zircon ", i.e. new corvettes of JSC "ASZ" should be built according to project 20385 (with KRO "Caliber").
4. Taking into account the strict funding limitation, construction time frame, the only possibility of this is to replace the extremely expensive radar complex (RLC) of the IBMK “Zaslon” with the used and effective products “Positive-M”, “Monument” (or “Monolith”), “Puma ".
Note: today - not a single air target was shot down by the IBMK "Zaslon", taking into account the acceleration of the deadlines for the delivery of the lead ship with it (the corvette "Thundering") to the Navy, there are good reasons to believe that certain persons are striving to carry out tests under deliberately simplified conditions combat, for example, shooting at targets (RM-15M) with an altitude and visibility (EPR) more than an order of magnitude greater than real targets). It is also necessary to mention here the massive disruption of JSC Zaslon (developer of the IBMK) of work on radar topics for aviation.
The decision to install the IBMK "Zaslon" on new corvettes is a "time bomb" under the entire program, because:
• the real working capacity of the IBMK (and the ability to solve problems as intended) has not yet been ensured, and all the terms for this have been disrupted by the developer;
• there are good reasons to believe that there are complex and unresolved issues in the IBMK ... (cut out);
• for contractor work under the project 20380 IBMK "Zaslon" is the most expensive and risky component, while the necessary tasks are reliably performed by serially produced products with many times lower cost.
5. Another factor in saving financial resources and ensuring the specified construction time frame can be the replacement of a composite superstructure with a metal one. Previously, the installation of an expensive composite superstructure was justified by the thesis of "reduced visibility", which was not confirmed by real tests of serial ships.
6. Work on the completion of the project 20380 for this does not require the implementation of additional R&D, and can be carried out within the framework of the "serial" GOST RV 307 as "completion of the serial design". These works do not require additional funds, because the cost of corvettes, much more efficient in terms of combat capabilities, turns out to be lower than the current "game" of project 20380, and the overall terms of work are ultimately reduced (which allows the fleet to reliably rely on new ships).
7. The proposed "mobilization" version of the project 20380/20385 (with KRO "Caliber", with "Positive-M" instead of IBMK "Zaslon") has high combat qualities, moderate cost, reliably provided for the possibilities of mass serial construction by counterparty supplies, and is suitable for construction in many shipyards.
Thus, with a slight revision of the project 20380 (without additional R&D), its main disadvantages can be eliminated (with a simultaneous multiple increase in combat potential), the cost can be significantly reduced and the mass serial construction of new ships for the Russian Navy can be reliably ensured.
I am reporting on your decision.
November 15.08.2020, XNUMX
Best regards, captain 3rd rank in reserve Klimov Maxim Aleksandrovich
Despite repeated requests, there was no response from the RF Ministry of Defense and the Navy.
Apparently the fleet has nothing to say.
Should I write like that? Certainly.
"A drop hammers a stone."
In addition, there is a very serious issue of the responsibility of officials for what is happening. A simple reply to a citizen is one thing, and quite another when there is a direct lie of responsible persons to the country's top military-political leadership.
And, as practice shows, such papers do not disappear. Even if they are deliberately pushed into the shredder for concealment, there is often a printer on the way to the shredder (and a copy often goes into the shredder).
In addition, in a number of cases there were real consequences of such appeals. And they are very positive.
For example, in the FSB for the armament of ships guard.
But this is already the subject of a separate conversation.
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