Military Review

Tank and its place in modern network-centric warfare


The experience of recent military conflicts (especially with the massive use of UAVs in Nagorno-Karabakh) has revealed new threats to tank and showed fundamentally different methods of conducting combat operations based on obtaining operational information about the enemy and the possibility of delivering pre-emptive strikes without engaging in direct combat. A tank subunit (as an independent combat unit) and even more so a tank (as a separate part of it) is no longer able to successfully resist them.

To counter such threats, it is necessary at a new level to unite into a single whole the coordination of actions and control of motorized rifle, tank, artillery and repair and evacuation forces (together with aviation), fire support, UAV, air defense and electronic warfare, taking part in a specific operation. Command and control of military units and formations is the subject of a separate discussion.

Today, the lower tactical level is more relevant - a platoon, company, battalion, which solves the assigned task directly on the battlefield.

Network-centric control principle

In this regard, network-centric methods of warfare are being discussed more and more often, implying a change in the command and control structure of troops, equipping them with the necessary technical means and integrating all forces and means into a single combat control system.

The network-centric principle provides for the integration of all elements of the system into a single information-coordination network. For constant exchange of information in real time and obtaining the necessary information about the enemy. For the purpose of prompt decision-making and issuing (receiving) control commands from the upper level to the lower one.

The system is based on overlapping and mutually intersecting sensor (reconnaissance), information and combat (means of destruction) grids, united at the appropriate level of command control. Moreover, each element of the structure receives only information specific to it. The system is built using modern information and network technologies with the aim of integrating geographically dispersed control objects with reconnaissance, target designation and destruction into a highly adaptive design.

The system is distributed open. And it consists of a set of autonomous objects united by a common network capable of acting both independently and in a group to perform a common target function. Individual objects, depending on the task at hand, can go out of a particular structure or enter into others.

The organizational structure of the departments, the forms and methods of performing their assigned tasks, naturally, must be modified and built into a single management architecture. To implement a network-centric system, all its elements from different branches of the armed forces must be equipped with the necessary technical means to ensure the exchange of information and the transfer of control commands.

Tank information management system

The tank, as one of the main elements of network-centric combat, must be equipped with a tank information and control system (TIUS). That will provide him with interaction with other combat units involved in solving the assigned task.

TIUS should unite all the devices and systems of the tank into a single integrated network. And in real time to remove information about the situation on the battlefield and detected targets from the thermal television and radar devices of the tank. Transfer it to the network-centric system. And also receive data from superior and subordinate commanders to the operational depth about the detected ground and air targets and enemy defense nodes.

In addition, the system must determine the location of its own and subordinate tanks and map them. To exchange data on the location of combat units and targets via closed communication channels and to form commands for subordinate control objects.

The network-centric system forms an integrated picture of the battlefield, giving tanks additional "vision" and expanding their capabilities. It also makes it possible to optimize the performance of the assigned task for each commander of the corresponding control level: observe and assess the situation in real time, carry out target designation and target distribution, control fire and maneuver of subordinate units.

To solve these problems, the tank must have its own computer complex, coupled with sights and observation devices, satellite and autonomous inertial navigation systems, an information display system, communication channels with high throughput and an appropriate level of noise immunity and cryptographic resistance.

Within the network-centric system, tanks receive a fundamentally new quality. And their combat effectiveness increases sharply with the same characteristics in terms of firepower, protection and maneuverability.

Such an open network architecture of the system also makes it relatively easy to upgrade previously released tanks and bring them up to modern requirements.

Technical means TIUS

When creating a TIUS, many technical problems must be solved. Some elements have already been tested in other systems of the same class and can be used in a tank. But there are elements that will require serious innovative efforts. These include communication channels for the exchange of information and methods of presenting data acceptable to the tank crew.

On tanks, traditionally, of the communication channels, only radio stations operating in the VHF and HF bands, which are not protected in any way and are easily suppressed by electronic warfare systems. Naturally, this is unacceptable for an information management system.

Tanks will have to organize a fundamentally different communication system using the technical capabilities of digital equipment and a new generation of radio stations operating in this range and providing the required level of noise immunity and cryptographic resistance.

Or, transfer information using technical means based on other physical principles that guarantee a stable and secure connection between system elements. It should be borne in mind that the tank has a limited reserved volume, and not all electronics can be placed in it.

The solutions should be simple and acceptable for the tank environment.

In a network-centric system, operators should be provided with a mass of heterogeneous cartographic, digital and symbolic information about the targets and their characteristics, the location of subordinate and attached objects, the state of the tank's systems and other information necessary to control the battle. Such data should be provided in a convenient form and not overload the operator. Now on many tanks this information is displayed on the monitors to the crew members.

It is well known that in a moving tank it is simply impossible to work with such information on a monitor and enter any data. The operator is thrown from side to side and it is rather difficult to achieve a stable position.

An independent eye-to-screen system is required. For example, the commander and gunner of a tank have a stable position when they hold the guidance panel with their hands, rest their forehead against the forehead of the sight and see a stabilized picture in the field of view of the sight.

In this regard, it is advisable to enter all the information in the field of view of the sight. And depending on the operating mode, the operator can set the picture: field of view or information.

Another option is to display all the information, as in aviation, on a screen fixed to the operator's headset. But a tank, according to the operating conditions, is far from an airplane. And it is not so easy to implement a similar scheme there.

These are all technical problems that specialized organizations must deal with as part of the creation of a network-centric system.

The introduction of a new control system will require changes in the structure of tank units. From the recollections of distant student years, when studying the structure of the US tank forces, I was always amazed at the presence of many control and support links at all levels of the tactical link with a large number of military personnel. We used to have in the battalion only tanks and one KShM per battalion and practically nothing else.

Now there are departments of management, communication and service. But this will not be enough in the new management system.

Tank units should receive full-fledged command and control services. Including at the company level. On a tank chassis, an appropriately equipped reconnaissance vehicle with a set of UAVs. And a communication vehicle with air defense and electronic warfare for operational interaction on the battlefield. These network elements do not exist today. And they will have to be created quickly.

Organizational problems

I already had to write that for the first time the development of TIUS for the "Boxer" tank in the 80s began in the Soviet Union. But after the collapse of the Union, the work was curtailed.

In the United States, the second generation of TIUS has already been introduced on the M1A2 tank. And the process of introducing elements of a network-centric control system for the tactical echelon in the ground forces is underway. Those that have already been successfully used during the operation in Iraq "Desert Storm".

The Russian military and the military-industrial complex are still defining the concept of such a system. And the proposed system of tactical echelon "Constellation-M", judging by the open access, cannot take root in the army. What is the reason for such a significant lag?

The system covers the elements involved in the implementation of the task. And each of them must be properly included in the control loop and equipped with the necessary technical means. The development of such structures involves several stages - the creation of an application concept, the algorithmicization of control processes and the production of hardware.

The development of the concept of the system and the tasks assigned to it is the business of the military. They must determine the requirements for the network and its components.

At this stage, it is necessary to determine the levels of management and the issues to be addressed at each level. As well as flows and volumes of data between the elements of the system. Requirements for noise immunity and cryptographic stability of communication channels. Parameters for displaying information both for commanders of different levels and for crew members of combat vehicles.

At the next stage, the algorithms of control processes are carried out jointly by the military and the head designer of the design.

Who deals with these issues?

In Soviet times, I had to participate in the coordination of such requirements between different heads of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Defense Industry. Even then (even with strict centralization and the existence of Academies and research institutes for the types of troops, which, as it were, were supposed to move military science), there was no particular zeal for creating new systems. And many ideas died at the stage of endless approvals.

The academies tried to do something else on an initiative basis. For example, I had to participate (at the Academy of Armored Forces at the Department of Tank Automation) in seminars where the tactics of using tanks when equipping them with means of automating the battle process were discussed. But the matter did not go further than discussions. And in no way did it translate into directive documents for carrying out such specific work.

And the head for armored vehicles 38 NII MO (Kubinka)? What could he suggest?

Previously, they were only able to test new types of equipment. And give an opinion on the requirements. There was almost no one to deal with programs for the future. And there were no necessary specialists.

Little seems to have changed over the decades. Now the Academy is gone. And it is not clear who is now developing the requirements for innovative armored vehicles?

And (according to open information) Kubinka offers some mythical tank designs. Instead of developing reasonable modern requirements for them.

The complex of such issues, as a rule, is regulated by the General Staff and its subordinate structures. But something, apparently, is not working out yet.

This can be judged by the development of an automated control system for the tactical link "Constellation-M", which (according to reviews) never took root in the army. Although, according to fragmentary information, the system already exists and has even been implemented on the Armata tank. Which has not been able to reach the army for many years.

One thing is clear for sure - the network-centric system should be developed by system specialists with relevant experience in this area.

The Sozvezdiye-M tactical control system was developed by the Sozvezdiye concern (Voronezh), created on the basis of the Communications Research Institute. As far as I remember, he was always engaged only in radio communication systems in the HF and VHF bands. And what experience does this concern have in creating military command and control systems at the tactical level? This is still a big question. What kind of specialists - this is the result.

After a long search in 1990, the head developer of control systems for rocket and space technology - NPTs im. Pilyugin. But the Union collapsed. And the work was stopped.

Decades have passed. And it looks like the same thing is happening again история... It is not clear who sets the system requirements. And they are being implemented accordingly. And the work is marking time. Everything is as it was in the 80s.

The military is still somehow unable to decide what exactly they need. And at Rostec (with a lot of questions about military equipment), it seems that their hands do not reach the point of creating a modern control system for ground forces.

However, the experience of recent military conflicts (which dictates ever-increasing requirements for the conduct of modern combat operations and for the technical equipment of the army) will inevitably force all these above-mentioned departments to hurry up and join forces to promptly create an urgently needed control system of a new level. And introduce it into the troops.
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  1. Aerodrome
    Aerodrome 17 December 2020 10: 10
    Tank and its place in modern network-centric warfare
    the war (operation) in Karabakh showed what place to think about. a tank is an excellent unit when you skillfully use it, and if there is no brain, no armor will help.
    1. Catfish
      Catfish 17 December 2020 10: 18
      There were problems not only with tanks.
      1. Aerodrome
        Aerodrome 17 December 2020 10: 20
        Quote: Sea Cat
        There were problems not only with tanks.

        well, yes, with any technical unit.
  2. Operator
    Operator 17 December 2020 10: 18
    Network center has a very distant relationship to the protection of tanks from the vast majority of threats (except for BOPS and mines - in the sense of situational awareness of enemy tanks and minefields).

    The universal protection of tanks from all other types of anti-tank ammunition is KAZ - all-aspect and interference-optical (if any).

    Network centrics refers to a completely different area - remote control and interaction of military units on the battlefield in real time. In this connection, broadband and jam-resistant radio communication is very important, which can only be provided by numerous UAV repeaters (operating in the centimeter range), computer means for digital transmission and processing of tactical data (military Internet) and compact AFAR for forming a narrow radio beam, installed on each unit of military equipment and attached to each infantry unit, starting with the squad (to exclude the enemy's direction finding).

    Rhetorical question - are there such network-centric means in the RA?
    1. Voltsky
      Voltsky 17 December 2020 10: 43
      KAZ / optics versus shrapnel
      Quote: Operator
      Network centrics refers to a completely different area - remote control and interaction of military units on the battlefield in real time.

      And also awareness increases, which has a positive effect on survivability
      1. Operator
        Operator 17 December 2020 10: 44
        And radar antennas for shrapnel are too tough, obviously laughing
        1. Voltsky
          Voltsky 17 December 2020 10: 55
          I hung up the icon and that's it, it's in the bag
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 17 December 2020 11: 37
      Quote: Operator
      Network center has a very distant relationship to the protection of tanks from the vast majority of threats (except for BOPS and mines - in the sense of situational awareness of enemy tanks and minefields).

      Quite right, and I think that the author of the article is going too far. In fact, now our military must decide for themselves the main question - what to focus on in the development of our barrel armored vehicles for tanks or self-propelled guns. In my opinion, the ability of self-propelled guns to fire from more distant distances, including guided projectiles, will allow them to survive better than the same tanks that can be attacked near the line of contact by various types of ATGM and drones. This should lead to a change in the organizational structure of tank formations, at least at the level of an equal number of tank regiments and self-propelled gun regiments in the near future. But let those who have been entrusted with our weapons think about it - they know better.
    3. begemot20091
      begemot20091 17 December 2020 19: 33
      Once, at the dawn of my student youth, the head. Department of topogeodesy said a clever thing: "train. The war will begin, all these wisdom associated with satellites and other electric crap will die. And again, we will walk on horseback with a theodolite behind our back, poles, range finder or tape measure. And woe to ignoramuses who will forget simple mathematics, again we will get tables, azimuth attachments and ... Nothing human is alien to us.
      1. Inn2621
        Inn2621 3 February 2021 13: 37
        We are walking on horseback with a theodolite, and they will shoot us from drones. Everything is destroyed, the question is whether the economy will be able to make up for the losses in a timely manner?
        1. begemot20091
          begemot20091 4 February 2021 20: 32
          read carefully. how drones will fly if everything and everyone is drowned out.
    4. mva
      mva 16 March 2021 15: 59
      Well, not only UAV repeaters (operating in the centimeter range), you can go through communication on broadband noise-like signals. But no matter how much I know neither the 1st nor the 2nd in RA.
  3. 113262a
    113262a 17 December 2020 10: 29
    Oh-yo-yo! The author was brought into space! So far, most of the 72 and 64 crews in our Donbass, and even in the Russian Federation, even walkie-talkies do not shine with a switch! So. with a Chinese Motorola in your teeth from the hatch and broadcast! There are not even those responsible for the implementation of all this yet! A tablet? So you need a mobile Internet to it! Maybe Ratnikov has something there, but at the level of the platoon commander and below, fantastic! Armata and T-90 do not count!
  4. rocket757
    rocket757 17 December 2020 10: 54
    However, the experience of recent military conflicts (which dictates ever-increasing requirements for the conduct of modern military operations and for the technical equipment of the army)

    The combat process for regular armies requires complex solutions! This, after all, is not some news.
    One should not lag behind in this field, the consequences can be catastrophic ...
  5. Gvardeetz77
    Gvardeetz77 17 December 2020 11: 34
    The respected author speaks out against HF and VHF r / st, advocates digital communication, but what is it that is carried out without the use of radio waves? On fiber, probably, and therefore reconnaissance and jamming?
    It's like at one time about satellite communications, some red bands thought that there were separate wires, a radio, and a separate satellite and did not understand that there were also some frequencies between the SCS and this satellite, that it was also radio communication, but through a repeater in orbit ...
    1. iouris
      iouris 17 December 2020 12: 20
      Comrades, the radio burned out on the armored car ...
      Tell me, radio on lamps or on semiconductors?
      I repeat: the radio on the armored car burned out!
      1) Fools. 2) Communication.
    2. psiho117
      psiho117 18 December 2020 10: 29
      Quote: Gvardeetz77
      and that it is carried out without the use of radio waves? On fiber, probably, and therefore reconnaissance and jamming?

      Well, yes, we need digital radio stations with fundamentally new capabilities - both in encryption and noise immunity, and the ability to work with compressed data packets - something like military 6G. Plus, a backup channel is needed - not based on the principles of radio communication - most likely laser communication via a direct beam, through drones / satellites / repeaters, or whatever else inquisitive minds come up with.
      1. DO
        DO 15 February 2021 20: 30
        "laser communication by direct beam, via drones / satellites / repeaters"
        Yes, of course.
        But do not forget about the traditional fiber-optic cable, which is not affected by electronic warfare, and which does not emit anything outside.
        There is a type of single-fiber cable without a protective sheath, which looks like a fishing line. The fiber in it is reinforced with kelavra fibers. The short service life of such a fiber not protected by a hydrophobic gel is not a problem, because they do not live in a standing tank for months :)) They fought - they threw such a relatively cheap cable and left.
        This fiber is supplied in lengths of 2000 meters on a spool.
        Several "stumps" can be installed on the ground, connected by redundant links to the field fiber-optic network. Several stumps (to create redundancy in case of fiber breaks) are connected to the bottom of the tank with a cable - "fishing line". The tank rides, unwinding the reels with the "line". In case the tank needs reverse gear, tensioners are needed to rewind the "line" back. To ensure the operation of one fiber in both directions of transmission, it is advisable to use a standard two-wavelength seal.
        Such a communication system is ideal for external control of an unmanned robotic tank.
  6. Per se.
    Per se. 17 December 2020 12: 23
    Who deals with these issues?
    Dear Yuri Mikhailovich, there are reasons and consequences. While the Chubais and Serdyukovs are being transplanted from armchair to armchair, and an economist is engaged in medicine, and a journalist is in space, there will be no order in the tank units. This is your system "Now the Academy is gone"in the same clip.

    You remember "Armata", that it won't reach the troops in any way, but how should it get what was immediately assigned to the "platform", without bothering to test the base itself, let it be mastered by the industry, make sure of its reliability ... Pull-push from the BMP and tank, plus related equipment, all on an experienced "pig in a poke", which has not yet proven itself in the army, but has already eaten tens of billions on its own, ahead of the rest, "platform set". The necessary project was hacked, on ala platform, "budgetary" version of money and time is not a pity.

    Though "Command and control of military units and formations is a subject of a separate conversation ", but it can be noted that this control should have duplication. As noted in his comment Gvardeetz77(Anatoly)
    It's like at one time about satellite communications, some red bands thought that there were separate wires, a radio, and a separate satellite and did not understand that there were also some frequencies between the SCS and this satellite, that it was also radio communication, but through a repeater in orbit ...
    Against the "Papuans" you can press on the joystick via the satellite, in a serious conflict with the satellites there will be problems, you need duplication, even if the old fashioned way. Already in the 2008 conflict, it was clear using GPS as an example, but in a real big war, the life of satellites is generally fleeting and problematic.

    Nevertheless, "the network-centric system should be developed by system specialists with relevant experience in this area," like many other things, but for this the power of hucksters and renegades must end.
  7. DWG1905
    DWG1905 17 December 2020 12: 39
    To be honest, as it is doubtful that in real military operations this thing will work, they will crush them with electronic warfare. Then it is not clear how everything will work when knocking out the elements of the system. According to the idea, this system should work spaced apart, so that in case of knocking out an element, only computing power is lost, but the system continues to work. This is still probably a fantasy. The second suggests different types of tanks, the MBT concept is outdated. We need heavy vehicles that can withstand the strikes of anti-tank equipment and break through the defense and machines that enter the breakthrough with all the negative consequences for the enemy, these vehicles can only collide with a focal anti-tank defense. Accordingly, the requirements for them should be different. A tank is a tool, for different tasks you need to have different tools.
    1. aglet
      aglet 20 December 2020 10: 27
      "These cars can only collide with a focal anti-tank device."
      these machines will surely collide with aviation, which will safely destroy them, and RPG7-foreve. the role of tanks is greatly reduced, with greatly increased costs for them. a light self-propelled gun, with comparable calibers, will be more useful, in my opinion.
    2. Eroma
      Eroma 21 December 2020 08: 45
      Are you suggesting that we abandon MBT and switch to Heavy and Cruiser tanks again?
    3. mva
      mva 16 March 2021 16: 06
      And it looks like there is nothing to do with the connection. If on noise-like signals, then you will not fill it up with electronic warfare. Only we do not have such, in contrast to the adversaries.
  8. Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 17 December 2020 12: 46
    To counter such threats, it is necessary at a new level to unite into a single whole the coordination of actions and control of motorized rifle, tank, artillery and repair and evacuation forces (together with aviation facilities), fire support, UAVs, air defense and electronic warfare taking part in a specific operation.
    How true! What is a tank? This is an armored carrier of a weapon and a machine gun, designed primarily for breaking through the enemy's trench line and suppressing his machine guns. The tanks could suppress the enemy guns of the battlefield only in case of their serious numerical superiority or the awful qualifications of the enemy artillerymen already in that War.
    Now let's take what is now called "network-centric war", that is, the war of modern means of defense and attack, united by a single control based on uninterrupted communication. When was the tank attacked before? When his position on the march was discovered by aerial reconnaissance in the first place, and when he entered the line of attack in attacking orders in the second. Air reconnaissance and other reconnaissance detected tanks sporadically and did not indicate the exact location, but on the battlefield the contact was a maximum of two kilometers.
    Now reconnaissance is being carried out continuously, and with means that allow the stable detection of a tank for tens of kilometers. Even if you cover it with electronic warfare means, then detection by optical / sound / complex means, taking into account modern methods of observation and data analysis, the distance will not be shorter. And what?
    The tank will never make it to the battlefield. At all. Absolutely. In our case, it will be destroyed by long-range artillery, in the case of a potential enemy - by missiles. Its own firepower is not able to withstand these threats completely, it simply will not have enough range. Given the development of modern anti-tank weapons, this is even more merciful. All the same, the tank will not live on the battlefield, not a single shot will be fired, the line of trenches (which will still be) will never be broken through.
    In general, the place of a tank in such a war is to be melted down. If you can make a self-propelled gun with a long-range gun out of it. But no, it's better to cast the buttons.
    Tank troops are still useful. Fight those who do not have modern weapons. Whoever has it - no need to destroy your tankers. Sorry for people.
    1. Fan-fan
      Fan-fan 17 December 2020 18: 05
      Mikhail, I completely agree. Now the tank is an expensive and not a particularly necessary type of weapon. Unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft can easily deal with tanks, the Azerbaijanis have shown this clearly. Therefore, we do not need to invest much money in new tanks, but we urgently and heavily need to invest in aviation and drones.
      1. Mikhail3
        Mikhail3 18 December 2020 09: 20
        I agree. However, Mr. Sergeev is also right. Indeed, now the efficiency, that is, the destruction of manpower and equipment of the enemy is somewhere 0,3, and hardly more. What does this mean? First, of course, that the armies are provided with super-expensive and mostly unusable equipment designed to make a profit. Capitalism, alas. People pay in blood for someone's money.
        And secondly, the training of the army team is not just any, it is a negative value! That is, weapons that can still work, and there are more and more of them, are not used by more than 5-7% of their capabilities. After all, not only the supply of weapons to the army is not for war, but for profit. So an army career is not for officers, but for careerists! Like a war, so at least quit ...
        So the first thing to do is to spend money, and not only money, on the development of what is already there. I am one hundred percent sure that the Armenians could have performed dozens of times better. It's just that they are not properly trained, and their commanders ... Well, you understand.
    2. psiho117
      psiho117 18 December 2020 10: 58
      Quote: Mikhail3
      The tank will never make it to the battlefield. At all. Absolutely.

      I do not agree.
      First: with proper echeloned cover, it will arrive.
      If we start talking about tanks, then what we have at the moment is armored vehicles with a technological level of the 70-80s of the last century, with slightly shamanic electronics. Even the pseudo-breakthrough "Armata" is cheapened Object 195 is a tank being developed in the mid-90s of the last century. Armor and protective equipment, as they were at the conceptual level of the 70-80s of the last century, have remained so.
      And these supposedly "modern" tanks are opposed by means of destruction, developed mainly in the last decade. And this is a conceptual lag of 25-30 years, at least.
      It is no wonder that modern means of destruction sew this armor like paper, or hit the most vulnerable places - the roof or the cover of the engine compartment.
      Современный a tank developed taking into account all modern trends, equipped with a multi-band KAZ (and in five to seven years the KAZ will already have a built-in laser), a high-quality closed DZ and having a multi-layer anti-cumulative booking using modern alloys, polymers, ceramics, and other things (up to airgel and graphene nanotubes), with a modern network-centric LMS, and covered by other units - will be a very difficult target, for 90% of threats.

      Another thing is what really modern a tank is so expensive and difficult that even the Americans will not pull it, they are still sucking on the idea of ​​a light platform on which they plan to work out some of the innovative technologies.

      Well, and thirdly - all of the above related to the battle of more or less equal opponents - and now, the tendency is that babaev can be driven on armored vehicles of the 70s, with a machine gun of the same years.
      And yes, the Armenians in the Karabakh conflict played exactly the role of babays - because the military-technical and organizational potential of Azerbaijan was many times higher.
      Alas. hi
      1. Mikhail3
        Mikhail3 18 December 2020 11: 07
        You are right ... really not in this question) Re-read the title of the article. What is considered is not what you are writing about, but what the article is about. Secondly. Try to think about this question. In Syria, our aviation has shown serious success. By what means were they achieved?
        And no. Will not get there. If we consider the conditions specified in the title. And if he gets there, what should he do on the battlefield of the network-centric war? As such, there is no "front line". There is nowhere to break through the machine-gun fire, covering the infantry from the fire of the enemy's hand weapons. The enemy's artillery is too tough for him - and far away, and the caliber is not the same. Moreover, the enemy has no artillery. There are advanced versions of rocket launchers, and not multiple rocket launchers (in a network-centric war, they have nowhere to shoot), but in the form of separate small containers, which are camouflaged so that the tank itself will never be able to find them. Of course, he is part of the network-centric system, and he will be given target designation. But....
        In general, I can go on and on. It's a strange idea - to drag tens of tons of clumsy (and at least agile) armor to the frontline, so that it can be multiplied by zero in a matter of minutes, during which they, these tens of tons, will not solve a single tactical problem.
        1. psiho117
          psiho117 18 December 2020 11: 51
          Quote: Mikhail3
          what should he do on the battlefield of network-centric warfare?

          Complete the task bully
          Another thing is that the tasks for a tank, in such conditions, will change, perhaps radically. So yes, you are right at the same time - that the tank in its current form has nothing to do on the battlefield of a network-centric war with a more or less equal enemy - it is oversaturated with anti-tank equipment, and the tank will quickly be burned.
          And you are wrong when you say that there is no niche for a highly secure, integrated mobile platform equipped with a high-precision weapon system. hi
          1. Mikhail3
            Mikhail3 18 December 2020 14: 30
            What task? Why is he needed, this Vasya? The greatest danger to the military in the early stages of any serious war is themselves. Their mossy representations, the times of the Ochakovsky and the conquest of the Crimea (without a fight)) Tell me a highly protected platform of the battlefield today. Who will withstand the fight not with women, but with really equipped people? That is the sadness that nothing highly protected in the tank has long been gone. Knock out the sniper from the third floor - please. But if the sniper is backed by an RPG of the required class, or a portable unit, drain the water. Sushi paddles, trample the phase ...
        2. Eroma
          Eroma 21 December 2020 09: 18
          I'm not a military man and maybe I can't catch up wassat
          But I do not at all agree with the description of the situation that the tank will not reach it, because it will be noticed and destroyed somewhere else in the forest twenty kilometers from the front line, if there is such a line at all No. Why does everyone consider us to be losers? A war or a battle, as I understand it, begins with a struggle for air and for "ether" i.e. for a stable connection at home and for the destruction of communication at the enemy! We have something to fight for both air and ether. Means of struggle are not only electronic warfare, or even not so much, the main means are still long-range systems that destroy command posts in the rear, airfields, control points for UAVs, radars, and what the enemy has useful there. An offensive by tanks begins after at least parity in the air and air has been achieved with the enemy, or even an advantage has been obtained in the form of suppressing his control systems, i.e. the enemy is deprived of the opportunity to track our rear, and possibly their laughing Then the tanks fulfill their role, clearing the route of movement of troops from the enemy, destroying the defensive areas, all these tasks cannot be solved by "remote war", only contact combat and in it the armor is what the doctor ordered.
          1. Mikhail3
            Mikhail3 21 December 2020 09: 48
            Well, that is, you think that a network-centric war is, first of all, a war for ether and other means of communication. Well, you are absolutely right) It is. Moreover, if you can try (only try) to suppress all these means in the area of ​​the operation, and even achieve partial success, then with control points ...
            Network-centric war control will be on a different continent altogether. This is the dream of American gamers, with which they infected their computer-illiterate dads and older brothers! They say we will win, sitting at home in comfortable chairs!
            The weak point of the network-centric war (one of) is the people directly participating in it. A kind of soldiers, who are rearranged from a safe control center across the field to a mortal by gamer boss.
            The question is that there are not many of these people on the field. There will be no Kursk Bulge. There is no solid line of trenches. They do not sit still, they move all the time. And thanks to the means of individual camouflage, which are much more effective on them than on robots and drones, they can only be detected when they collide almost closely.
            We attack people, and we attack repeaters, repeaters and other means that send out target designation and control of equipment. Naturally, all our targets are multilayered covered with autonomous small-sized automatics, attacking everything that moves and does not respond to the request "friend or foe". What can a tank do here? A person can remain invisible to such means for a very long time, getting close. And the tank? No paste, no coatings will hide it from a simple radar, there are also tens of tons of armor! This iron is never covered with anything so that it does not distort the radio picture around it. And you won't hide, you won't dive into the funnel, the tank is too big for that ...
            And why is all this? Bring a machine gun to a couple of spotters? So if we managed to detect them, thanks to modern aiming systems, they can be shot from a kilometer, or even more, without spending resources on attempts to mask a pile of metal, which is a huge and unnecessary platform for excessively heavy weapons at this distance.
            Well, etc.
            1. Eroma
              Eroma 21 December 2020 14: 39
              I don't believe in a mobile war where there is no front line! it is not physically possible! In WWI in the west there was such a phenomenon as "Run to the sea!", Its meaning boiled down to the following: German and French troops ran into each other on their border and the German command decided to bypass the northern flank of the Allied forces, through Belgium, the Allies reacted to this maneuver moving their reserves to the north, and began a run to the sea in an attempt to bypass the enemy's flank, until they reached the North Sea, so the front stopped until the end of the war, until tanks were invented and the Americans arrived with new cannon fodder.

              Yes, a lot has changed, but the troops have not become completely autonomous, they still need supplies and there is a supply line to each unit, which must be protected and which must be cut to win. In this regard, nothing has changed since the time of Napoleon, only the means of solving the problem. If the opponents have come into contact somewhere, no one will break the contact in order to leave to fight in a more convenient place. From the point of contact, the same race along the flanks will begin in order to cover them and break through, respectively, and the front will begin to expand in different directions in order to improve the position on the flank. The mobility of troops allows you to quickly defeat the enemy to a great depth, anticipating or outstripping him in the concentration of forces. I read Manstein, I was surprised that war is solid mathematics! And network-centricity allows you to implement, on a certain scale, the principle: SOLDIER is the firepower of the entire army! Those. for example, if a company of motorized riflemen, advancing to point A, discovers a tank brigade there, this does not mean that the guys were not lucky, but this is a common situation, the task of motorized riflemen is to take a position so that they would not be dared with the first salvo and be able to issue target designation, and there are already Calibers, Daggers, Coalitions, Tornads, Eagles, Hermes and what else will be there at hand, for example, an 82mm mortar, within 30 minutes they disassemble a tank brigade into atoms! (By the way, the Americans implemented this principle back in WWII! I don’t remember what the team was called, but on it all the firepower capable of reaching the specified point threw everything and began to beat at that very point! In such a situation, one UAV that was not shot down or not suppressed EW is quite capable of deciding the fate of the battle by transmitting the coordinates of key targets at the right time to defeat.

              As for gamers, if you disable reconnaissance assets in the battle area, they cannot influence the outcome of the battle even from the moon, because stupidly will not imagine what is happening there at all. But the fighters on the battlefield, even without satellites, are quite capable of creating problems for especially light forces without serious protection, and in this case, tanks are the best guarantee that your plan will be implemented and your units will reach where they need to, when needed, and will not hide from ATGM snipers and do not wait for kamikaze shells (which I can already end) to move on.

              And another nuance, such an incredible illumination of the battlefield and the possibility of means of destruction of everything and everywhere, makes a mobile war impossible! Only well-defended units capable of withstanding the onslaught of some force will be able to move. And NINJA does not win wars, they only contribute to victory, but there must be those who need to help hi
              1. Mikhail3
                Mikhail3 22 December 2020 09: 09
                Quote: Eroma
                I don't believe in a mobile war where there is no front line!

                Vadim, such things are not a matter of faith. They are the prerogative of accurate knowledge and reason. Everything is built from this. Here I have a few hours of time, maybe (if something unexpected does not happen again) I am making a review article on this score, otherwise the people, I see, do not understand at all.
                Very short. What is war, why do smart people start and wage it? How has the war changed in the current conditions? Manstein could not answer these questions; in his time, modern trends were only outlined. If you think through these questions properly, you will find the answers yourself.
                No. No front line is needed to defeat Russia, for example. Or we can defeat the European Union. It will be even much easier for us ...
                1. The comment was deleted.
                2. Eroma
                  Eroma 22 December 2020 13: 13
                  I have no special knowledge, so I rely only on reason and logic what
                  In the wars of civilized gentlemen, the goal is always the same: MONEY! Depending on the task, the scale and method of warfare is different. For example, the United States and Russia today, in my purely opinion, the conflict is only over oil and gas to the heap. The US needs to stake out the US market for shale, and the European market should buy Arab oil for bucks, and we should go through the forest crying
                  The best way to remove Russian energy resources from Europe is a war, but a local one, it should not be so large-scale as to use nuclear weapons, but serious enough to make a political decision on the embargo on the purchase of Russian energy resources. Therefore, they pump at the borders, as they are looking for options, trying different ways to drag us in somewhere, and then what happens. For this war, tanks are not needed, no one to take Moscow, or they are not going to storm Kaliningrad and they do not expect that we will march to the English Channel. They need missile firefights, air battles or at sea as much as possible, but it is better to just provoke the Russian army to something with someone and generally stay on the sidelines (although Putin is still solving all issues with the help of "proxy .." bully ). Another question is how we look at all this.
                  1. Mikhail3
                    Mikhail3 22 December 2020 14: 04
                    This is a slightly different question. Not related to the topic. And what you described can be done exclusively with the help of a "proxy". It will be impossible to ignore the direct participation of, say, the United States in some sort of "low-intensity war." Such a war goes all the way to a complete escalation to astonishment quickly. Yesterday they fired from RPGs, and tomorrow you will see - they cover each other with nuclear volleys. All the war games that both sides waged for decades came to this result.
                    So, as long as there is enough intelligence and caution, there are only conflicts "not connected" with the great powers.
    3. Sanichsan
      Sanichsan 10 January 2021 00: 02
      Mikhail totally disagree. what you described is a virtual war of the star empire with the willows. by the way, the ivoks won there wink
      it doesn't work as you described. there is a chance that this will work, but it is far from a fact. Saudi Arabia has a completely modern fleet of equipment, but this does not prevent the Houthis from using the T-34-85, shooting down modern UAVs and even drowning CLS leased by the Saudis from the United States. even the USA cannot implement what you described. hypothetically, this could work against the Papuans who do not have electronic warfare equipment, and if they have the ancients and do not know how to use them. in practice, even against the Papuans it does not work.
      1. mva
        mva 16 March 2021 16: 25
        It also works not only against the Papuans, but also against us. Watch the battle at Hasham in Syria. Our main battle tanks T72B3 could not even reach the line of contact. So, everything is correct, the tank will not be able to reach the front line.
        1. Sanichsan
          Sanichsan 17 March 2021 17: 35
          Quote: mva
          Watch the battle at Hasham in Syria. Our main battle tanks T72B3 could not even reach the line of contact.

          what are "yours"? what is the contact line ??? what T72B3 ??? are you delusional
          judging by the stream of consciousness, your level is Wikipedia.
          “As it became known later, the group included fighters of the local militia (members of Arab tribal formations), soldiers of the Syrian army, fighters of the Shiite Afghan brigade“ Fatimiyun ”and Russian citizens acting under a contract with the Syrian side. the newspaper "Kommersant" quoted the fighters of the tribal formations leading the offensive, and the so-called detachments of hunters for the "Islamic State" (ISIS Hunters), reinforced by Russian fighters, marched in the second echelon. . "
          is this yours on T72B3? wassat
          I will also remind you that the Americans began to act only after the Americans asked the headquarters of the Russian group about what was happening, the Americans were told that ours were not there. request
          Quote: mva
          So, everything is correct, the tank will not be able to reach the front line.

          what else will not be able to reach the front line? helicopter? airplane? drone? assault groups? wassat examples of how all this destroyed yourself will find in the internet?
          I repeat again
          Quote: SanichSan
          hypothetically, it can work against the Papuans who do not have electronic warfare equipment, and if they have the ancients and do not know how to use them.

          which was shown by the defeat of the column at Hasham. request
  9. ZEMCH
    ZEMCH 17 December 2020 13: 53
    In the United States, the second generation of TIUS has already been introduced on the M1A2 tank. And the process of introducing elements of a network-centric control system for the tactical echelon in the ground forces is underway. Those that have already been successfully used during the operation in Iraq "Desert Storm".

    You tell the American veterans of Iraq))) many of their comrades suffered from the "friendly" fire, or the Marines who were in the Desert Storm did not understand what to do and why they were sent to the Hamers to fortified areas, and not tanks))) wink
  10. DWG1905
    DWG1905 17 December 2020 14: 40
    One can object to the previous post. Too primitive concept of military operations, they are too different. There is no need to overestimate the effectiveness of any weapon, the efficiency of more than 0.3 in real combat operations does not happen, i.e. you can miss, you can hit, but not hit the target, etc., and in general it is a hunt to live. Any artilleryman in a self-propelled guns understands, you hesitate a little bit and will fly in, you will be nervous means making mistakes. The target can be detected, but not defined by your own or others. Practice shows the consumption of ammunition is only growing, precision weapons are for a landfill or a local conflict with the Papuans.
    Yes, modern hostilities will be characterized by mad losses, especially at the first stage, until the potential of the opposing sides diminishes (wear off).
    But a tank can live for a long time, they can change technically, the method of movement can change, but the principle of an armored vehicle with a weapon capable of conducting combat operations when exposed to enemy weapons will remain unchanged. And in order for the tanks to reach the front, it is necessary to suppress the enemy. Those. tanks alone do not fight, a system called ground forces with the support of the Aerospace Forces is fighting, this is by the way. For one tank, on average, 30 infantry corpses, so fighting with tanks is economically more profitable. Infantry to the front with enemy dominance in firepower, reconnaissance, etc. will not reach at all and will not reach. It is necessary to consider different types of military operations. It is one thing to drive spirits, another thing to break through the front line or conduct a counter battle, when the battle formations are mixed and it is not clear where their own, where the strangers are (here, intelligence will not help much) or the tank army entered the breakthrough and went to the rear of the enemy to sow chaos. With approximately equal technical capabilities, the winner is the one with better skill, intelligence and a little luck.
    1. Mikhail3
      Mikhail3 17 December 2020 14: 57
      As of today, you are right. For now. But this will not last long. Precision ammunition is an excessively expensive and unnecessary toy. I will not set out the principles, I advise you to simply believe - now there is an opportunity not only to increase the accuracy of modern weapons with minimal alterations, but to increase it to 60-80%. This has not been applied until now simply because of the inertia of thinking. However, as soon as someone finally realizes what's what, armored vehicles will knock out like nuts. So tanks and armored personnel carriers are already the past.
      The most effective way to fight will be the "Indian War". Again. And this threatens with big shocks)
      1. agond
        agond 17 December 2020 17: 02
        It is usually accepted to consider a tank as a kind of mobile and protected platform, mainly for a cannon, I think it makes sense to make mobile and protected platforms for missiles, and in general it is not bad to install retractable AFAR antennas with a data transmission system for other cars and aircraft on both
  11. Tektor
    Tektor 17 December 2020 17: 01
    It's just that each tank should be assigned a Derivation-Air Defense, which should ensure its safety and the object in the upper hemisphere, while in cover / disguise.
    1. Mikhail3
      Mikhail3 18 December 2020 09: 09
      What is the value of such a tank? It has a short-range cannon. Its armor does not hold long-range projectiles and missiles, and will not hold, not fence something like "Mouse". Why is he ?.
      1. Tektor
        Tektor 18 December 2020 11: 16
        The tank cannon has an insufficient rate of fire, a small ammunition load and expensive shells. And the anti-aircraft machine gun does not have guided shells with remote detonation. Those. the tank is defenseless when several drones and other means of destruction are simultaneously attacked on it. Derivation-air defense has a rate of fire of up to 200 rounds per minute or 3 rounds per second with guided projectiles or projectiles with remote detonation, which is more than enough to defend the designated object from the simultaneous attack of dozens of weapons at once.
      2. psiho117
        psiho117 18 December 2020 11: 40
        Quote: Mikhail3
        Its armor does not hold long-range shells and missiles,

        Tank first you need to detect - when operating from defense, there is every opportunity to disguise it from most detection means, as well as saturate the defense with false targets and jammers (in an attack, everything is much more difficult, and most likely, the attacking potential of armored vehicles can only be realized by the side that is significantly superior to the enemy in all parameters).
        Then - you need take a shot (i.e. push some kind of platform / carrier and shoot / launch a rocket, etc.) - at this stage there are a lot of opportunities for countermeasures - destruction of the carrier, countermeasures by means of interference, creation of false targets.
        Then, the rocket / drone kamikaze must hit into the tank - here comes the turn of intercepting the missile by air defense means, blinding it by means of electronic warfare, the work of the KAZ and KOEP of the tank itself.
        After that, the means of destruction, if it has already reached the tank, should hit it to a vulnerable point (roof or top of MTO), or simply explode at the optimal distance for the formation of a cumulative jet. This, again, can be counteracted - anti-cumulative screens, built-in KAZ dynamic protection. Potentially, the DZ will become a reusable electromagnetic / electrothermal one.
        Further - you need pierce the armor - again, this can be counteracted in many different ways - from improving the armor protection itself, by adding new materials (graphene composites, airgel), and using conceptually new methods - electromagnetic armor, for example.

        And finally, you need deal enough damage to the tank, in order for him to stop performing his combat mission - this, again - there are several ways of countering - an armored capsule for the crew, duplication of equipment, fire-fighting systems, etc.
        In short, not everything is as simple as it seems.
  12. evgen1221
    evgen1221 17 December 2020 17: 02
    If the enemy has a variety of unsuppressed drones, the place of the tank is on the battlefield, well, somewhere deep underground in a thick concrete sarcophagus. The positional stoylovo was drawn from the UAV in my opinion.
  13. prior
    prior 17 December 2020 17: 10
    Network-centric war is now impossible, only limited network-centric conflict is possible.
  14. Konnick
    Konnick 18 December 2020 11: 02
    In a war with an enemy of equal equipment, they primarily seek to destroy the command and control system by missile strikes, i.e. command posts and a communication system, since the disruption of the command and control turns the army into an armed crowd. The network-centric system looks tempting, it was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines. If we recall the experience of the Great Patriotic War, then the defeat of the Crimean Front in May 42 was due to the defeat of headquarters and communication centers by the Luftwaffe, assembled for this from the entire German southern group of forces, and our aviation, evenly distributed over all sectors, could not do anything from - for the great air superiority of the Germans. Hope only for setocentric control is obviously losing. Moreover, with the help of this tank control system, attack the trenches, which may not exist.
    1. agond
      agond 18 December 2020 20: 06
      Until now, the tank was focused only on combating ground targets with tanks and enemy fortifications, however, the main losses of tanks are from attacks from the air, from planes, helicopters and now from UAVs, a logical way out suggests itself to build tanks to deal primarily with air targets , and ground later
  15. Kazimir Prutikov
    Kazimir Prutikov 20 December 2020 16: 31
    American military theorists today are already writing not about network-centric war, but about multimodal war. This is when the firepower of air, sea and ground forces is combined into one network, including information that comes from satellites. Moreover, the decision on the use of means of fire destruction can be made by an ordinary soldier equipped with the appropriate communication equipment. Genaral Milli (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army) once said that if you are in one place for more than two hours in the zone of destruction of enemy fire weapons, then you are dead. This applies to absolutely everything - to tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, rocket launchers or electronic warfare, sea vessels, all kinds of aircraft carriers, etc. There simply cannot be any defensive line. And the deployment of large connections is closer than 150 km. - like death. The war takes on a partisan character.
    1. Evil Booth
      Evil Booth 23 December 2020 21: 01
      laughing let them write. in the us army, the training programs are higher than the colonel, and there is no and never will be. it was in the Soviet army that there were unified headquarters mobile in the troops and the interspecies and the air force and air defense acted together, and thousands of sorties per day during the Second World War did you know not at random.
  16. Eroma
    Eroma 21 December 2020 09: 33
    In a network-centric war, I am interested in how the general information system will turn off the machines that have fallen to the enemy from the system? Otherwise, one abandoned T90 will burn everyone crying in addition, enemy hackers will be able to launch the virus into the network through it and flood the left infa if the communication channel is hacked.
    If the T90 is too small a system through which something cannot be poured into the general network, that is, a division or brigade, it will definitely be possible there! belay
    How can the system understand that KSHM is captured and is pushing bullshit into the air?
    1. mva
      mva 16 March 2021 16: 45
      A physical key is required to access the KShM information system. Maybe now it's a biometric one, I haven't sat in them for a long time. those. it is only through betrayal that can be done. And only storytellers can tell about hackers who quickly break into an unfamiliar information system. But it was possible to betray before, in the days before the network-centric wars, there is no difference. It was just that then the orders reached the executor longer.
  17. tank64rus
    tank64rus 21 December 2020 16: 54
    But Marshal Ogarkov started everything. ACCS is his brainchild. He served in a tank regiment where, back in 1985, the "Maneuver" system was being worked out in full. Much was revolutionary. In general, it was difficult, but the regiment was very friendly. There was no one like this in the world. But an era of betrayal and collapse was approaching. The regiment then passed 72 deuces and received the old 62 second. All KShM and other vehicles were handed over. And off it went.
    1. Tavrik
      Tavrik 22 December 2020 13: 44
      Yes, Maneuver was an interesting system. Very advanced in many ways. With its own stack of exchange protocols. With its own software. With the ability to work on low-speed communication channels ... But "not to the court" came. It turned out to be too innovative. In principle, it was a network centric larva that died as soon as it was born ...
  18. vervolk
    vervolk 22 December 2020 08: 16
    The place of a tank in modern warfare is in the same place as horse-drawn artillery and a wooden lance and an officer's saber and full profile trenches. In the dustbin of military history in general. After all, what is a tank according to its current concept? This is a large caliber armored cannon. The concept of using small subunits under cover and while providing for all other branches and types of troops. Sappers are clearing mines, aviation is providing air cover, motorized riflemen are driving off infantry with anti-tank guns, artillery support divisions are conducting counter-battery combat, etc. and all for what? So that the tank would put a shell from a cannon somewhere? and now loitering ammunition appears over the battlefield. that is, the same shells that need to be planted. Yes, they can be shot down by means of electronic warfare or short-range air defense, but you can fight them. But they are cheap and uncrewed. So is it worth coming up with crutches for the "tank" concept? it's like dressing cavalry in bulletproof blankets and attaching a laser blade to the peak. It is worth revising the very concept of an armored vehicle with a crew on the battlefield as a means of breaking through the defense. Otherwise, our honored military commanders will find themselves in the stupidly impotent position of Budyonny and Voroshilov, who defended the ideas of cavalry as a striking force on the battlefield and the role of political consciousness in the combat effectiveness of subunits, while the Wehrmacht equipped commander tanks and attack aircraft with radios, perfecting the concept of a blitzkrieg as interaction of arms and types of troops on the battlefield ... The tank will undoubtedly remain as a useful tool of military influence, but no longer as the main striking force of the breakthrough of mobile units.
  19. Tavrik
    Tavrik 22 December 2020 13: 53
    Quote: DWG1905
    To be honest, it is somehow doubtful that this thing will work in real hostilities, they will be crushed with electronic warfare.

    "You can't crush everyone!" I mean, you can't beat the entire frequency range from HF to microwave. PPRP has existed for a long time. The question is in monitoring the status of channels and automatic routing between them.
    1. mva
      mva 16 March 2021 16: 50
      PPRCH yesterday, clogged elementary. This is a frequency agility competition. Whoever has the fastest is on horseback. And that would not be hammered, you need to mask - work on noise-like signals.
  20. Evil Booth
    Evil Booth 23 December 2020 20: 58
    one picture as t64 overcomes t72 already everything! am
    and in the subject, the author plots less than a long-distance captain.
    Moreover, for years, the journal of the Ministry of Defense has been publishing exercises with personnel and diagrams of those same network-centric ones), while real and not some kind of notions of aka NATO of the USA and others. links as I understand nizya insert)
  21. S. Viktorovich
    S. Viktorovich 26 December 2020 12: 51
    Tank control systems outside of other carriers of weapons and control points are profanity, just like the control systems of the airborne forces, artillery, etc. separately. The problem can only be solved by introducing an interdepartmental system, at least at the level of the "tactical link" (ESU TK).
  22. Maksim_ok
    Maksim_ok 18 February 2021 15: 36
    Disgrace that there is such a lag. without secentrics and tius, and there can be no question of victory in modern combat. the main thing now is information. coupled with its receipt and processing. know where you are, where the neighbors are. where is the enemy and what he is doing. the "fog of war" has largely dissipated, but not for everyone
  23. Oleg_p
    Oleg_p 20 February 2021 19: 34
    They speak since 2.02.21. you can't swear on the net. Otherwise, I would have sent the author ... LEARN THE MATCH, at least.
    This is where it came from?
    "An independent system" operator's eyes - screen "is needed. For example, the commander and gunner of a tank have a stable position when they hold the guidance panel with their hands, rest their forehead against the forehead of the sight and see a stabilized picture in the sight field of view.

    In this regard, it is advisable to enter all the information in the field of view of the sight. And depending on the operating mode, the operator can set the picture: field of view or information.

    Another option is to display all the information, as in aviation, on a screen fixed on the operator's headset. But a tank, according to the operating conditions, is far from an airplane. And it's not so easy to implement a similar scheme there. "
    There are "command devices" in tanks a long time ago. The very ones that "reflect the path traveled", On paper. Yes, these devices are not in every tank. But they are not needed in every tank. And the space provided for in the design for the tablet IS IN THE TANK! As is the INFORMATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE - i.e. TO WHOM and with what kind of INFORMATION TO WORK.
    In principle, the main content of the article is generally not related to real management issues. "Network-centric war" - what is it? Is this an area of ​​schizophrenic abnormalities in the author's brain?
    Is there such a term in the terminology of our military? Not? Well, don't be creative! Fit the required functionality into the existing management structure. There is no need for "revolutions" where it is necessary to increase "efficiency". "Revolutions" will not help there, but only harm.
    There is nothing to invent for God knows what - LEARN the MATCH.