New over-the-horizon radar "Container" will cover the south and east of Russia

New over-the-horizon radars, which will detect air targets thousands of kilometers from the Russian borders, will be deployed in the southern and eastern directions. This is reported by the Ministry of Defense.

The plans for the development of the Russian system of over-the-horizon stations in the near future envisage expanding the capabilities of airspace control in the Southern and Eastern strategic aerospace directions

- said in a statement.

Major General Andrei Koban, head of the radio-technical troops (RTV) of the Russian Aerospace Forces, told the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper that the first node of a unified over-the-horizon radar reconnaissance network has been formed in Russia.

Currently, the first node of the unified over-the-horizon radar reconnaissance network has been formed. The capabilities of the station ("Container - approx.) Allow you to control the airspace of Eastern and most of Western and Northern Europe, a number of countries in the Middle East region, including Syria.

- declared the general.

According to him, the possibility of covering the "Container" radar station in the Arctic direction is currently being studied; in the near future, it is planned to cover the south and east of Russia with over-the-horizon stations.

Currently, only one over-the-horizon 29B6 "Container" type radar is being built on alert. The receiving complex of the station is located in Mordovia near the settlement of Kovylkino, and the transmitter of the station is located in the Nizhny Novgorod region. The radar monitors the airspace over Europe to great depths.

Radars are designed to detect all types of aerodynamic targets, including airplanes, cruise missiles, hypersonic aircraft and so on. "Container" is able to control flights of any air targets at a distance of about 3 thousand kilometers in the sector 240 degrees. A radar can simultaneously track over 5 of thousands of airborne objects of various types, including small ones.

Comments

[Victor_B]

I've been in this position ...
Transmitting center.
Not far from Kievka in Primorye. A year like this ... in the 89th.
As part of the commission, which proved (to complaints from the population that pets with deformities regularly appear) that this has nothing to do with this radar.
Proved ...
We took away KTPN-630 kVA from there ... Here.
There, opposite each such mast, there was such a KTP-ear.
(Complete Transformer Substation with a capacity of 630 kVA)

[Lionnvrsk]

Quote: Victor_B

KTPN-630 kVA was taken away ...
(Complete Transformer Substation

Нoutdoor performance

[Victor_B]

It's just that we always called them kt-guns.

[Victor_B]

Quote: Victor_B

There, opposite each such mast, there was such a KTP-ear.

So estimate how much e / energy it eats!
It was not for nothing that a similar station (Duga) was installed near the Chernobl nuclear power plant.

[Lionnvrsk]

Quote: Victor_B

So estimate how much e / energy it eats!

"Attention, the beach area is under radiation. Dangerous to life!"

[Thrifty]

As far as I understand, this is an addition to the Voronezh-type radar, or what are they exactly called there?

[Tiksi-3]

and the transmitter of the station is located in the Nizhny Novgorod region.

- near the town of Gorodets .....

[Imobile]

What if there are 10000 drones? And at what frequency does it work? Over-the-horizon in any way cannot catch small-sized targets, this is contrary to the principles of physics.

[Lipchanin]

Quote: Imobile

What if there are 10000 drones?

"What if he was carrying cartridges?" (from)

[ccsr]

Quote: Imobile

What if there are 10000 drones? And at what frequency does it work? Zagorizontnaya cannot catch small-sized targets in any way, this is contrary to the principles of physics.

Actually, this station is for a strategic link of the armed forces, and not for a war with drones, especially since there will be 10 thousand of them. True, it is not yet clear how these 10 thousand will cross our border without being noticed and how far they will fly, but your confidence that it will be so makes me doubt your adequacy in assessing the threats to Russia.

[Operator]

The minimum wavelength for the decameter range is 10 meters. Those. aircraft with a wingspan of 5 meters or more, made of non-radio transparent materials (aluminum, carbon fiber) will be visible - incl. the notorious Bayraktar TB2 with a wingspan of 12 meters.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

The minimum wavelength for the decameter range is 10 meters. Those. aircraft with a wingspan of 5 meters or more, made of non-radio transparent materials (aluminum, carbon fiber) will be visible - incl. the notorious Bayraktar TB2 with a wingspan of 12 meters.

This is not the point at all, but the fact that the HF range is reflected from the ionosphere, and this is at least one "jump" on paths of a thousand kilometers. Moreover, multipath, fading, atmospheric interference and other features of wave propagation in this range do not allow for accurate target designation of small objects, which is why over-the-horizon radar stations are primarily a detection system. And the reflection of the signal, as a rule, in this range occurs from the ionizing trace, which is obtained during the operation of powerful engines. That's all the physics of these systems, I have not heard about others. Perhaps you are aware, then correct ...

[Operator]

Why accurately indicate the coordinates of the target for a homing anti-aircraft missile with a target detection range of at least 10 km or a fighter with an on-board radar detection range of more than 100 km? At a distance of 3000 km, the ZGRLS issues target designation with an accuracy of 1 km.

Decameter waves make one jump from the ionosphere at a distance of 1000 to 3000 km from the ZGRLS, the resolution depends on the power of the station's computing equipment. supercomputers (manufactured in Sarov), at this distance it is possible to distinguish individual targets with linear dimensions of at least 5 meters, the distance between which is at least 100 meters.

Decameter waves make two jumps at a distance of 3000 to 6000 km. In this case, targets with linear dimensions from 50 meters can be distinguished, the distance between which is at least 1000 meters.

Decameter waves make three jumps at a distance of 6000 to 9000 km. Here you can distinguish objects with linear dimensions from 500 meters, such as an ionized trail of exhaust gases from the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a separation in distance of at least 10000 meters.

[Kalmar]

Quote: Operator

Why accurately indicate the coordinates of the target for a homing anti-aircraft missile with a target detection range of at least 10 km

In addition to the range, there is also a viewing angle, which is very far from a missile defense system from 180 degrees. And the ZGRLS does not provide data on the height of the target, so a missile with a target can very easily miss.

[Operator]

At the moment, the viewing angle of the "Container" ZGRLS stationed in Mordovia / Nizhny Novgorod region has been increased to 240 degrees. Taking into account the future system of ZGRLS located along the perimeter of the borders of Russia, no more is required.

The height of the target will be dealt with by the missile / airborne radar of the fighter.

At the same time, I would not argue / deny that the power of modern computing equipment of the ZGRLS cannot determine the flight altitude of an air target by the difference in the time of arrival of the reflected signal from the target (distinguished by the Doppler shift of the signal frequency in proportion to its flight speed) and the stationary underlying surface

[bk316]

At the same time, I would not argue / deny that the power of modern computing equipment of the ZGRLS

I don't know if you understand this (those who argue with you - definitely not), but you wrote it absolutely correctly. It all comes down to computing power. In principle, there is nothing new. But in the USSR, quite respected teams gave a conclusion about the futility of the ZGRLS. I know a person who signed such a document. AND THEY WERE RIGHT to isolate the signal and determine the signature from it then it was impossible, who knew that the computing power would increase by 5 orders of magnitude.

[Operator]

Everyone pays attention to the ZGRLS antenna fields, and the hardware and software remains in the shadows - and rightly so

[Kalmar]

Quote: Operator

The height of the target will be dealt with by the missile / airborne radar of the fighter.

The fighter - yes, the missiles are not a fact: the same problem with the viewing angles (the seeker's missile defense system is really not very big). However, it is not necessary to direct the missile defense system with the help of ZGRLS: they do not stand by themselves, there is always their own guidance radar nearby.

Quote: Operator

At the same time, I would not argue / deny that the power of modern computing equipment of the ZGRLS cannot determine the flight altitude of an air target

And it is not necessary: ​​"Container" is declared as two-dimensional, i.e. can not.

[bk316]

And it is not necessary: ​​"Container" is declared as two-dimensional, i.e. can not.

Everything is more complicated there, but in principle yes it is 2 coordinate.

[sivuch]

However, all ZGRLS, including the Container, are described as 2-coordinate.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

At a distance of 3000 km, the ZGRLS issues target designation with an accuracy of 1 km.

It is interesting how the system can give target designation at such a distance, if the state of the ionosphere itself on such routes can change within a few minutes, and all the "accuracy" will depend not on the capabilities of the supercomputer, but on solar activity, and even the latitude and longitude of the target will play a role ... Something I have little faith in it - I think that in this case something you do not finish or interpret wrong.

Quote: Operator

Decameter waves make three jumps at a distance of 6000 to 9000 km. Here you can distinguish objects with linear dimensions from 500 meters, such as an ionized trail of exhaust gases from the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a separation in distance of at least 10000 meters.

I will believe in this, but the fact that a low-power UAV flying at an altitude of 1000-2000 meters will allow itself to be detected by an over-the-horizon radar station at a distance of 1000-3000 km is hard for me to believe. The reflected signal will be so small that even fluctuating interference will not allow an object to be tethered with sufficient accuracy to provide coordinates.
However, I studied this science several decades ago, perhaps I was behind the times, so enlighten ...

Quote: Operator

Why accurately indicate the coordinates of the target for a homing anti-aircraft missile with a target detection range of at least 10 km or a fighter with an on-board radar detection range of over 100 km?

Something I did not understand, after all, it was about thousands of kilometers to the target, and while it is flying towards us, it can change its route several times - why should we track it with the most powerful over-the-horizon radar station, if the traditional air defense forces can handle it, when the goal will be their responsibility? It seems to me that you are winding up an unusual task for airborne radar stations, and this is not rational.

[Operator]

The ZGRLS is detuned from fluctuations in the ionosphere by heating this sphere - that is, by constant work, as a result, the electron density in the regions of radio beam reflection becomes one to two orders of magnitude higher than in neighboring regions. Plus the supercomputer power of the computing facility and a special program to tune out fluctuations.

Decameter waves do not care what they reflect from: from the Tomahawk aluminum glider or from the Bayraktar carbon fiber glider. The main thing is that the linear dimensions of the target are comparable to the wavelength and the target moves.

ZGRLS detects air targets while in Mordovia / Nizhny Novgorod, and destroys the targets of air defense missile systems and fighter aircraft placed directly on the theater of operations (on a tip from the ZGRLS).

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

The ZGRLS is detuned from fluctuations in the ionosphere by heating this sphere - that is, by constant work, as a result, the electron density in the reflection regions of the radio beam becomes one or two orders of magnitude higher than in the neighboring ones.

I do not know where one or two orders of magnitude came from, but I will note that, based on theory, the influence of the sun on the ionosphere is incomparable with any ZRLS station, and therefore I hardly believe that such a station can somehow strongly affect the state of the ionosphere on huge distances:

Area D
In the area D (60–90 km), the concentration of charged particles is Nmax ~ 10² – 10³ cm – 3 - this is the region of weak ionization. The main contribution to the ionization of this region is made by X-rays from the Sun. Also, additional weak sources of ionization play a small role: meteorites burning at altitudes of 60-100 km, cosmic rays, and energetic particles of the magnetosphere (brought into this layer during magnetic storms).
Layer D is also characterized by a sharp decrease in the degree of ionization at night.
In the D layer, the composition of cluster ions and the processes occurring with their participation have been studied most fully [1].
Area E
Region E (90–120 km) is characterized by plasma densities up to Nmax ~ 105 cm – 3. It is divided into regular layer E and irregular, sporadic. In the regular E layer, an increase in the concentration of electrons is observed in the daytime, since the main source of ionization is solar short-wave radiation, besides, the recombination of ions in this layer proceeds very quickly and the ion density can drop to 10³ cm − 3 at night. This process is counteracted by the diffusion of charges from the region F, located above, where the concentration of ions is relatively high, and by night sources of ionization (geocorona radiation of the Sun, meteors, cosmic rays, etc.).

Those. Such a huge influence is exerted on the ionosphere by other sources that it is hard for me to believe that an airborne radar station will be able to oppose this with its electromagnetic radiation, no matter how powerful it is.

Quote: Operator

ZGRLS detects air targets while in Mordovia / Nizhny Novgorod, and destroys the targets of air defense missile systems and fighter aircraft placed directly on the theater of operations (on a tip from the ZGRLS).

It gives some direction to the appearance of air objects, but in my opinion it is beyond its power to give precise target designation. All the same, these stations are not intended to combat enemy aircraft and UAVs, but primarily to instantly determine the massive launch of missiles from the same US submarines or surface ships located near our borders. I see no other point in maintaining such an expensive and energy-consuming system.

[Operator]

The ionosphere is needed for the ZGRLS for the sole purpose - as a mirror for the locating beam and reflected radiation. Therefore, what exactly will pump the ionosphere over the ZGRLS with electrons (probing beams of a radar or solar radiation) does not matter.

Another thing is that in the polar regions of the ionosphere, its funnel-shaped shape distorts the shape of the mirror, which makes the use of ZGRLS in the northern direction ineffective - the main direction of the use of strategic bombers and cruise missiles by the Americans.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

The ionosphere is needed for the ZGRLS for the sole purpose - as a mirror for the locating beam and reflected radiation.

I will not discuss this topic, if only because I know too well the influence of the ionosphere on the passage of low-power signals in the HF range on a thousand-kilometer path. That is why I am oppressed by doubts about what you are trying to justify, because the reflected signal from small-sized objects will be even less than from the correspondent station. We may see a signal, but classifying it and binding it to coordinates will be a big problem - I'm sure of that.

[Operator]

The radiation power of the ZGRLS is of the order of a megaWatt.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

The radiation power of the ZGRLS is of the order of a megaWatt.

This is not the point at all, but the fact that you yourself wrote that the ionized layer is something like a mirror, and rightly so. So signals up to 32 MHz will be reflected from the ion layer artificially caused by the operation of powerful engines much stronger than the same signals that will be re-emitted from an aircraft or UAV structure. It's physics, and you can't argue with that. That is why the reflected signal and the re-emitted signal differ in power characteristics at the input of the receiving equipment, and I doubt that even the mathematical capabilities of modern computers will make it possible to correctly identify the signal at such ranges - the signal-to-noise ratio has not yet been canceled when designing the receiving equipment.
If you are in the subject, then estimate how much electricity needs to be supplied to this station in order to have MW at the output, and how vulnerable this system is, even from the point of view of cable networks. So its only purpose, like that of the Cock in the famous fairy tale of Pushkin, who was supposed to crow, and not to track planes and UAVs.

[Operator]

To power the transmitting radio equipment of the ZGRLS, several power units of thermal, hydraulic and / or nuclear power plants are used. Power is supplied from several sources at once.

ZGRLS is really vulnerable in the first minutes of a military conflict with NATO or the United States. But its task is to give external target designation as of the last minute of the pre-war time, after which anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles with airborne seeker are launched for accurate guidance at the terminal flight segment.

With the beginning of an armed conflict, all radars without exception will become useless - due to EMP and areas of ionized air from nuclear explosions. So the failure of the ZGRLS in the first minutes of the conflict is a common disadvantage of the radar.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

ZGRLS is really vulnerable in the first minutes of a military conflict with NATO or the United States.

We do not even know how many illegal immigrants we have, and which of them lay low, waiting for a conditional command. So I do not rule out that sabotage measures may disable these stations even before the start of hostilities.

Quote: Operator

So the failure of the ZGRLS in the first minutes of the conflict is a common disadvantage of the radar.

Stationary - yes, but mobile radars can be brought out in advance to secret areas and wait for a command to turn on. So the question should be considered in a different plane - how accurately we will be able to determine the beginning of the enemy's preparation for a nuclear strike, and this is already a task of a different level than those solved by the ZGRLS.

[Operator]

I don’t know about the saboteurs, but the fact that all radars without exception in the first minutes of a nuclear conflict will be disabled by EMP and ionized air is a guarantee.

[Grigory_45]

Quote: Operator

ZGRLS issues target designation

ZGRLS cannot issue target designation, especially air defense systems. This is an observation station. Then the object must be caught with other radars.

[ccsr]

Quote: Gregory_45

ZGRLS cannot issue target designation, especially air defense systems. This is an observation station.

Absolutely right - this is exactly how they thought, and they were never credited with the possibility of accurately targeting some objects, especially if they were moving.

[Kalmar]

Quote: Operator

in the case of using the so-called supercomputers (produced in Sarov)

I completely forgot to ask: what kind of supercomputers are made in Sarov? There was only one piece of news on this topic: in 2018, a photonic computer was patented there. Those. developed general principles, tested some devices to demonstrate them. Industrial production of such systems is out of the question now or in the foreseeable future. If you have any other information - share.

[Operator]

Several years ago multicore and multiprocessor supercomputers assembled in Sarov were distributed among Russian research centers. Our organization had already used an imported supercomputer, so there was no need for us. Now I do not work in this area.

[Kalmar]

Quote: Operator

Several years ago multicore and multiprocessor supercomputers assembled in Sarov were distributed among Russian research centers.

Do the military really use them? There are also completely foreign components, almost nothing of their own.

[Operator]

I can neither confirm nor deny your assumption

[Imobile]

News is filed as anti-drone radar found

Radars are designed for detecting all types of aerodynamic targetsincluding airplanes, cruise missiles, hypersonic aircraft and so on. "Container" is able to control flights any air targets at a distance of about 3 thousand kilometers in a sector of 240 degrees. The radar can simultaneously track more than 5 thousand airborne objects of various types, including small.

[Operator]

ZGRLS at a distance of up to 3000 km detects any UAV with a wingspan of 5 meters or more, made of aluminum and carbon fiber.

You can substitute specific UAV models yourself.

[Kuroneko]

Quote: ccsr

True, it is not yet clear how these 10 thousand will cross our border without being noticed and how far they will fly,

I also don't understand why over the horizon also track drones at distances of 3 thousand km? Will they fly that much? And they won't come across any conventional radar stations along the way? The person apparently does not know that over-the-horizon radars, although they have a huge range, they also have a huge "blind spot". Already five hundred kilometers are practically useless. These are precisely the systems that are "long-range", for general early awareness, but for everything that is close - something else is used.

[Oleg1263]

These are not her goals. It's not her job to detect drones. Moreover, at a distance of even 1000 km this flock does not threaten anything (yet).

[APASUS]

Yes, we seem to urgently need to cover the Caucasus, and the South as a whole.

[Lipchanin]

Radars are designed to detect all types of aerodynamic targets, including airplanes, cruise missiles, hypersonic aircraft, and so on. The "container" is capable of controlling flights of any air targets at a distance of about 3 thousand kilometers in a sector of 240 degrees. The radar can simultaneously track more than 5 thousand airborne objects of various types, including small ones.

So what stealth bomber can now crawl towards us unnoticed?
Yes, no

[_Ugene_]

This station cannot direct air defense missiles, it is surveillance, therefore, after detection, this stealth bomber needs to be detected and captured by another radar in cm or mm. range, and with this there will be problems

[Lipchanin]

This station cannot direct air defense missiles, it is a survey station, therefore, after detection

Well, since it detects, it means that the air defense can.

which can direct air defense missiles, in cm or mm. range, and with this there will be problems

Well, all problems can be solved.
And I will not give a guarantee that this problem was not solved

[_Ugene_]

Well, since it detects, it means that the air defense can.

the fact of the matter is that no, the container operates in the meter wavelength range and in this range stealth is not very different from non-stealth, but you need to aim the rocket in cm or mm. range, and in them stealth just gives out surprises to the pigs, as a result, a situation may turn out that the eye sees and the tooth does not
but at least you can raise aircraft to intercept, but the interceptor radar will also work in the see range

[Lipchanin]

Quote: _Ugene_

as a result, a situation may turn out that the eye sees and the tooth is numb

I am not siyon in this matter. I just expressed my opinion and therefore I will not argue

[sivuch]

The container operates in the meter wavelength range
Actually - in decameter (10-100m). Stealth technologies still work in meter-long stealth technologies, even though they have more EPR. The rest is written below.

[_Ugene_]

the greatest decrease in EPR in stealth in mm. and see ranges, much worse in the decimeter range, to make an object unobtrusive in the meter range, when the wavelength is comparable to the object's own dimensions, changing its shape is in principle impossible

[Cyril G ...]

To what extent are ZGRLS generally effective?

[voyaka uh]

"The container operates in the meter wavelength range and in this range stealth is not much different from non-stealth, but you need to aim the rocket in cm or mm" ///
----
Bomber B-2 (and its replacement B-21) is also a problem for VHF radars.
Large chopped forms without small parts.
But the F-22 and F-35 meter radars are cut because of their tail.

[_Ugene_]

yes, the dimensions of the bombers are tens of meters, it is quite possible that in the previous order, i.e. meters, their EPR is less than the real one, but, as I was corrected here, the Container operates in the 3-30 MHz range, i.e. 10-100 m, i.e. one order of magnitude with the size of the bomber, at these frequencies, perhaps, the bomber will not hide

[sivuch]

With this radar, these problems become solvable. If only because you will have to look for targets in a relatively small solid angle, and not 360 by 90. And then - the usual accumulation of signals

[rotmistr60]

detection of air targets thousands of kilometers from Russian borders

This is, of course, another "surprise" for NATO. Otherwise, in Europe, someone is pondering how to hack Russia's air defense system in a "limited armed conflict."

[Operator]

According to the local outskirts technod-la, 5000 air targets should be located at a distance of at least 100 km from each other

[sasha ..................]

this installation is not an innovation without analogues, as many believe, but just a copied version of the radar stations that were on alert duty in the USSR; two in Ukraine near Nikolaev and in Chernobyl, better known as Chernobyl 2, and one in the Khabarovsk Territory, and they worked for about 3000 km, so the Russians or deliberately underestimate the numbers of their copy ... these are not only anti-missile systems, but also atmospheric a wide range of weapons that can cause changes in the weather from earthquakes and tsunamis, and affect and destroy the consciousness of people. the only drawback of these installations, besides how to make people sick in the head, they can track missiles only with the engines turned on, and with current nanotechnology, it is not surprising to understand that they will be ineffective against most launch vehicles, which means that these installations work with one goal - to suppress / change the will of a person ... since there is also an antidote, in some countries there are anti-radar installations that create non-linear effects in the ionosphere, thereby interfering with the normal functioning of the nodes.

[ccsr]

Quote: sasha ..................

and in Chernobyl, better known as Chernobyl 2,

You probably did not leave Chernobyl after the well-known disaster, and this affects your perception of our past.
Learn the story:

The first early warning radars, which are part of individual radio engineering units (ORTU), began to function in the early 70s. These were two stations of the Dnestr-M type on the Kola Peninsula near Olenegorsk (RO-1 node) and in Latvia in Skrunda (RO-2 node). These stations were intended to detect approaching warheads from the North Pole and track launches of PRBMs in the Norwegian and North Seas.

https://topwar.ru/98987-otechestvennye-sredstva-rannego-raketnogo-preduprezhdeniya-chast-1-ya.html

[ficus2003]

From the article:

The capabilities of the station allow контролировать airspace of Eastern and ...

Not to control but to view.

[Old26]

Quote: ccsr

You probably did not leave Chernobyl after the well-known disaster, and this affects your perception of our past.
Learn the story:

Actually, comrade, this Sasha is right, remembering about Chernobyl. We are not talking about over-the-horizon, but over-the-horizon stations. And there really were three. One, experimental, near Nikolaev, one in the Chernobyl region ("Duga-1" and one in the Far East ("Duga-2).