Military Review

Elbrus. Shelter 11. Capture story

80
Returning home, he became interested in the theme of the war in the mountains in general and the war in the Elbrus region in particular.


prehistory


There was not much literature, but then the 90s arrived, and a wave of scientific and pseudo-documentary literature filled the shelves.

I bought everything and read what is called avidly.

In total, I met 5-7 versions of the capture of Shelter 11: from quite plausible,
but not proven, to the point of frankly absurd. And who was there to tell about it?

Our eyewitnesses who survived did not expand on this topic. Germans this history also did not paint from books.

In the absence of real details, the existing versions of this story were overgrown with mythology,
in which it all boiled down to one single real fact - Shelter 11 was actually captured by the company of Hauptmann Groth.

Everything else is a matter of faith, convictions and taste of those who got acquainted with different versions of the versions.


And in the second book "The Battle for the Passes" in a large section about the hostilities in the Elbrus region, I finally came across how this story actually looked. And no speculation.

Only documents and their author's analysis.

In order not to retell it in my own words, I will give a shortened version of the chapter on the capture of Shelter 11 from A. Mirzonov's second book “The Battle for the Passes. Another look. " With the permission of the author, of course.

I think it will be better this way, since the readers will be able to feel not only the author's presentation style, but also the order of his analysis of German documents.

So, my dear reader, in this chapter we will devote our attention to the most thorough investigation of the circumstances of the capture of Shelter 11 by Captain Grotto's group.

Despite the number of versions regarding this combat episode, which are in circulation today in the literature and on the Internet, a healthy desire has appeared to deal with this issue as thoroughly as possible.

And, oddly enough, various inconsistencies (including very serious ones) that exist in the description of this event in the German military documents themselves prompted me to do this.

Somehow it turned out that before me no one had paid attention to these very inconsistencies. As a result, I would like to dot the and's in this story.


Maps


Military fate has not passed this unique object. The hotel was captured by the Germans and for several months became the main stronghold of the gamekeepers in the Elbrus region.

A fairly detailed description of these events is given by V. Tike in his work "March to the Caucasus ...".

If we ignore the distorted toponymic names and some points in the text that raise doubts, then everything is quite coherent and consistent. Those who wish can easily find on the net this book and the description of the capture of Shelter 11 in it.

I will cite one fragment of this description, which illustrates Grot's disappointment at the lack of shelters on the ground, indicated on his Russian map.

On the only available map of scale 1: 100, taken from the Russian map 000: 1, in the Elbrus region, three shelters were designated: located at an altitude of 84 m.The western shelter at the southwestern ridge of the mountain, a shelter at an altitude of 000 meters on the endless expanse of the glacier to the south of the eastern peak and the Gastukhov shelter at an altitude of 4045 meters at the southern foot of the eastern peak. (In fact, we are talking about the Pastukhov shelter. - Note. ed.)

There was neither the Western Shelter, nor the Gastukhov Shelter. However, the shelter, marked at an altitude of 4100 meters, turned out to be a modern Intourist hotel with aluminum cladding, central heating and electric light. But he was at an altitude of 4200 meters and was converted into a barracks. In addition, at an altitude of 5300, on a narrow saddle between the eastern and western peaks of Elbrus, there was a plywood shed, which was filled with ice and could hardly be used as a shelter. Not far from the hotel, around the meteorological station of a solid building, there were several plywood houses.

Provided with such inaccurate maps and completely unaware of local conditions, Captain Groth with a signalman on August 17 at 3:00 went for Schneider's reconnaissance patrol in order to get intelligence data as soon as possible.

The rest of his small detachment was ordered to wait for the column of pack and (as soon as it arrived) to follow him.

At sunrise, Captain Grotto and his signalman were at the height of the Hotu-Tau pass (3546 meters). Before them lay the tongues of the Azau, Gara-Bashish, Terskol and Dzhika-Ugon-Kes glaciers stretching for 17 kilometers from west to east.

The grotto could not believe his eyes when in the middle of this weathered, icy desert, crossed by numerous faults, six kilometers away on a cliff (650 meters higher), he saw a hotel covered with metal, sparkling in the sun.

The attentive reader in this passage will notice that the Russian map at the Groth was the only one. The markings on it were inaccurate. The grotto had absolutely no knowledge of local conditions. And he saw Shelter 11 with amazement.

This is, as it were, not at all what we know in various completely documentary films about the war in the Elbrus region, idle filmmakers and their commentators.

By the way, no one thought about why these films are shot in the Elbrus region?

It is convenient to get here and it is very comfortable to live here. There is no need to strain in order to shoot an impressive nature for a film - the cable car will take you there. You can even look into the cracks on the glacier and shoot some kind of dugout. And in the evening in the hotel bar you can speculate about the war. There really was a war here.

Somehow, those wishing to tell the public about the heroic defense of the Caucasus do not reach either the Klych gorge, or the southern slopes of the Sancharo or Allashtraku passes, or the Mastakan pass. Far away, hard, cold and wet. No hotels for you, no cable cars.

And all would be fine, but the trouble is that such films slowly and surely drive into the mass consciousness a very one-sided and distorted idea of ​​the military events in the mountains: the understanding that the fate of the Caucasus was decided in the Elbrus region.

As a rule, the authors of these films either heard little or did not know about another war in the mountains.

Meanwhile, if we go back to Hauptmann Groth, who necessarily appears in every such film (and in one of these films about the Grigoryants company, the name of Groth is mentioned more often than Lieutenant Grigoryants himself), no serious source has published any information about the pre-war Grot's stay in Russia, including his memoirs and comments of his son.

This small lyrical digression is actually not quite a digression.

What Tike wrote about was unexpectedly confirmed in one of the documents about these events.

I will cite some excerpts from a document entitled Report on the Elbrus experiment 19.08.1942/21.08.1942/30 - 1942/XNUMX/XNUMX, compiled by Hauptmann Groth on November XNUMX, XNUMX.


“The first ascent was carried out thanks to a compass, altimeter and semantic orientation to dominant heights without any problems. The maps available were very imperfect.

Maps 1: 500 and 000: 1, due to their inaccuracy, are generally not suitable for use in high-mountainous areas, while schemes 200: 000, despite their appearance (due to careless drawings and numerous inaccuracies), are dangerous.

The provided diagram A shows 3 huts (shelter) on the southern side of Elbrus, two of which are not available at all, the images are very imperfect.

But everything turned out to be correct and neat on the German-Russian tourist map of 1:50 000 captured at the meteorological station, while the captured 1:42 000 map turned out to be unusable only because of its age (year of issue 1860).


Such are the cartographic collisions. This was as a backstory to the takeover of Shelter 11.

Capture date


However, let us return to the previously cited entry in the combat log of the 1st Mountain Division, made on August 16, 1942 at 22:30.

Here is this journal entry (last paragraph).


Different authors in their studies give different dates for the capture of Shelter 11.

R. Kaltenegger in his book Gebirgsjager im Kaukasus gives the date 17 August.

The same Kaltenegger in his Weg und kampf der 1. Gebirgs-Division 1935-1945 writes that Shelter 11 was captured on 16 August.

V. Tike in his book “March to the Caucasus. Battle for Oil "gives the date of the capture of the Shelter on August 17.

To clarify this conflict, it is high time to turn to Groth's message about the seizure of the Shelter, transmitted by a radiogram. Found in the Bundesarchive and such a unique document.

Such radio messages and telephone messages were filled in by the receiving signalmen at the points of contact on the pages of special notebooks, then they were torn off and passed on to the headquarters.

The easiest way would be to read the document and close the question. But the reading was just not all right. It is more appropriate here to talk about decoding. And the matter was not only in the individual peculiarities of the handwriting of the signalman, who filled out the form in the process of receiving the message by ear. The problem is that immediately after the war, a writing reform was carried out in Germany. And my several attempts to involve native speakers in the translation of such written documents have ended in nothing.

Elbrus. Shelter 11. Capture story

Nevertheless, unlike many other similar radiograms, this one was lucky. We managed to "pull out" the text by collective efforts.

I have circled the date and time the document was sent (on the left) and the name of the officer (on the right) from whose location the message was sent, in order to make it easier for the reader to navigate.

So, the document was sent on August 17 at 21:45 (Berlin time) to the 99th regiment and the 1st mountain division.

With understanding of the text, the following happened:

"Unternehmen Groth seit 16.8 im Gang, befehl an Hertling bekannt, abe AR feindbesetzt Mittag genommen. Feind… nicht gefangen, in Starke 70 Mann auf AJ und AL zuruckgegangen. AJ noch feindbesetzt".

“Operation Grotto is in progress since 16 August, orders for Hartling have been received, AR occupied by the enemy is captured at noon.

The enemy ... not captured, by force (in composition) 70 people went back (retreated) to AJ and AL. AJ is still busy with the enemy. "

We look at the German map of the Elbrus region in the illustrations for the book.

Point AR - Hutte 4100 (aka Shelter 11), point AJ - Wachterhaus (Security House at Azau Glade), point AL - Terskol.

Well, there is also the date of August 16 and the Red Army unit of 11 people that left Shelter 70 in the direction of Polyana Azau and Terskol.

If any of the connoisseurs of the German language wants to throw a stone at me in this regard and thinks that deciphering such tablets is easy, then I can download it with such message forms in the hope of help.

There is still a lot of interesting things.

The next document is a telephone message from Groth's company to the 99GEP adjutant. Submitted on 18.08.1942/10/30 at XNUMX:XNUMX.


“The execution of Plan 17 is being delayed by the enemy. AR is captured. 4 prisoners, 1 machine gun, rifles. AR is a barracks-type hotel with a weather station. Place for 1 company. The enemy retreated to AJ - AL, also BJ.

Presumably 1 squadron. Was himself 1 hour in Russian captivity, then vice versa.

Please agree to rename the AR as "Edelweisshütte", the barracks as "General Lanz-hütte".

AR is important as the dominant point for AF and AD, I hold (it) with 12 rifles and 1 machine gun.

Positions before AL - BJ are not settled. "

Here the composition of the retreating Red Army men is indicated in the squadron (company), it is as if not that 70 people, but more.

Probably, Grotto loved his commander, and immediately proposed to rename the Shelter.

And the composition of the Grotto reconnaissance group is also visible. Judging by the number of weapons, no more than 15 people.

And here is another document.

Noon message from the headquarters of the 1st mountain division to the 49th mountain corps on August 18, 1942.

Here the printed date of August 18 is forwarded to August 17.

True, it is indicated here that the Shelter was captured in battle, and about 70 Russians retreated.


In order to understand in more detail the details of the capture of the Shelter, let us turn to the "Elbrus" folder in the Bundesarchive, which contains the documents on the ascent of the huntsmen to Elbrus.

In this case, we will not be interested in the ascent itself, but in some details of the seizure of Shelter 11, which remained outside the scope of the compressed reports presented, but ended up in several more detailed documents of the Elbrus folder.

So, the first document is the report of the refereeor Mang dated 05.09.1942/XNUMX/XNUMX.

"We conquered them Elbrus!", Prepared for the press, but at the same time passed through the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st mountain division:

“If initially it was still possible to assume that it would be possible to reach the summit avoiding a collision with the enemy, the reconnaissance carried out on August 16 completely changed these ideas.

The key point in the ascent and mastery of the Elbrus summit was the Southern Shelter, located at a dominant height in the middle of the ice. Meanwhile, news appeared that from the opposite side of the valley occupied by the enemy, Bolshevik forces were advancing in the direction of the German positions.

It was necessary to take security measures and bring the troops to combat readiness.

Captain Groth, who single-handedly intended to make a dash to the South Shelter, had (moreover) to establish whether he was occupied by the Russians.

Captain Groth went to the orphanage, from where (at his waving his handkerchief) two envoys came out to meet him.

In the house itself they had 3 officers and 6 more people.

With great difficulty, Captain Groth made it clear to the Russians that they were surrounded and trapped.

The Russians, however, did not react to this and took Captain Groth prisoner.

From subsequent conversations between officers and soldiers, it became clear that the Russians were going to take Captain Groth to their own shortest route.

When the three officers descended first, Captain Groot seized the opportunity to capture the remaining soldiers and immediately call for reinforcements.

Thus, thanks to his decisive actions, it was possible to seize the shelter.

The Southern Shelter itself (a massive building built to meet the requirements of aerodynamics) was the highest mountain meteorological station in the Soviet Union.

It was built in accordance with the most modern provisions of architecture, and part of the work on its construction was not even completed.

Adequately constructed living quarters with central heating and electricity for soldiers were in short supply. As well as high quality mountaineering uniforms, ample supplies of food and weapons, which were considered welcome trophies.

This once again showed the importance of this stronghold with its dominant height from which it was possible to control all the roads in the district.

The occupation of the Southern Shelter made it possible to remove the security personnel and place people in the building. "

Here, as we can see, there is a date of August 16, but there is no information about 70 Russians who left the Shelter.

In another report by the re-freighter Zwerger from 13 company 98 GEP entitled "The Conquest of Elbrus" dated 28.08.1942/XNUMX/XNUMX (the re-freighter was part of the ascent group) gives a more detailed picture of events at the Shelter.

By the way, the report is also written in the form of a press diary.

“August 17th. At 11:00 we start a long-term march through the Azau glacier, the sun beats down hot, our backpacks crush heavily, but the view of the ice walls is always beautiful.

In the afternoon we reach the Elbrus-Vostochny shelter, which our captain was especially eager to master.

With one weak infantry outpost, he moved forward to the shelter and found that it was still occupied by the Russians.

Alone, he approached two sentries with rifles, they were two huge guys from the Pamirs, wanted to shake hands with them, but they did not appreciate this noble gesture and took him prisoner - to two Russian officers.

Having briefly greeted the Russians, the captain briefly informed them that they were surrounded and would still be captured, since there were a lot of German soldiers around, although we were few and we were forbidden to shoot.

Two Russian officers thought that it would be best to get out, but ordered the Asians to take our captain to the Baksan valley. While both officers had disappeared, he went under escort to the meteorological station located a little higher, the present Edelweiss shelter, where he saw a whole mountain of cakes and pies on the table.

To the question - whose it is, the guards answered: officers. Then they invited our captain to sit down and have a snack together.

They also didn't make them invite themselves twice, sat down with their rifles between their knees, and leaned on as if they hadn't eaten anything good in life.

Our captain explained to them that now he is in command here. And they can quit weapon and help us, the war will end for them. At first they looked a little puzzled. But then (with a grin) they really piled rifles and a machine gun into the corner. Then our captain left the shelter, waved a white handkerchief - and our small detachment was able to take possession of a large house at an altitude of 4200 m without a single shot. Today we are tired, and the vacuum made it difficult to sleep.

But before I crawl into my sleeping bag, I look at the peaks that rise to dizzying heights under the eternal stars - the great life of the mountains reigning over everything.

And before falling into a dream, I think about the great happiness that fell to me as a German soldier, a mountain shooter, to participate in this mountain trip, which will go down in history, to feel like a German climber in full force. "

This document also indicates the date of August 17, and again nothing is mentioned about 70 Russians. Oddly enough, the least detailed information about these events is contained in the report of the Grotto himself entitled "Report on the ascent of Elbrus with the help of a high-altitude company of the 1st mountain division", compiled at the Shelter 11 on 26.8.1942.

“The first contact with the enemy took place on August 17, when the commander of a high-altitude company undertook a reconnaissance exit to the Elbrus shelter.

In the shelter on the southern foothills of the Elbrus-Vostochny peak, there were three officers and eight soldiers.

According to the readings of the altimeter, the shelter was located at an altitude of 4200 m, which ensured a dominant position over the entire glacial basin and exits to the eastern passes.

They managed to take possession of them easily, while part of the enemy garrison was captured, some were put to flight.

Immediately after the lesson, the shelter received the name "General Lanz - House", by analogy with the previously named weather station "Shelter" Edelweiss ".

Again the date is August 17 and again nothing about the 70 Russians, about whom Grot wrote in his reports after the capture of the Shelter.

Well, in conclusion, an excerpt from the report on the combat activities of a high-altitude company dated August 22, a document without a signature.

“August 17th. Since AR is very important (not only as an alpine base, but primarily as a military one) due to its dominant position in relation to the 3 passes, and, on the other hand, the attack with the available forces and means did not promise success, the commander of the mountain-ranger company went to to the enemy as a parliamentarian, but was nevertheless taken prisoner.

When he was evacuated to Tegenekli, he managed to capture the guards and capture AR.

The rest of the enemy fled in the direction of the Baksan valley.

Trophies were taken: food, equipment, uniforms, weapons, 4 enemy soldiers were captured.

AR is a complex of several buildings, including the Intourist hotel, a weather station and a radio station, turned into barracks. "


Regarding which unit of the Red Army was stationed at Shelter 11 at the time of the capture, interesting information was found in the combat log 214 kav. shelf (spelling preserved):

“15.08.1942/10/XNUMX ... intelligence was sent in the composition of XNUMX people under the command of Jr. Lieutenant Khasanov to Elbrus and Shelter Eleven.

On 17.08.1942/XNUMX/XNUMX, an enemy reconnaissance group was found in the indicated direction, which, taking advantage of the oversight of the patrol, captured the patrol as part of the station. Sergeant Sterlikov and two soldiers with a light machine gun.

Khasanov returned to the starting point. "

By the way, the next day, during a clash during reconnaissance from the CDKA in the direction of Glade Azau

"Ml. Lieutenant Khasanov, throwing his submachine gun, fled shamefully to the CDKA.

The date here is also August 17th. In the German version there are four prisoners, and a machine gun in a row.

Consequently, Sergeant Sterlikov and the soldiers who "made a mistake" in eating pies together with Hauptmann Groth were captured at Shelter 11. But what about the 70 Red Army soldiers who left the Shelter without a fight? Nothing about them here either.

Conclusions by date


Let's try to undermine the available information. First by date.

Still, according to most documents, it all boils down to the fact that Shelter 11 was taken by the rangers on August 17. BUT!

Who would explain how the information about the capture of the Shelter appeared in the combat log of the 1st Mountain Division on August 16 at 22:30?

This is more than a serious document, in which information, with the existing quality of communication with the subdivisions, was entered practically in real time.

If we were talking about the logs of combat actions of any of the Red Army divisions that fought in the Caucasus, then I would simply assume that the information could be entered retroactively: such logs could not be filled even for weeks, and in some divisions they were not kept at all.

And leapfrog with dates when filling out such journals retroactively was commonplace.

But in the magazines of the 1st and 4th mountain divisions of the Wehrmacht, such a situation is simply unthinkable, the pedantry in filling them is frankly amazing.

And I cannot explain this collision with the date of the capture of Shelter 11. However, with the passage of time, this circumstance, of course, no longer affects anything.

70 people


Much more interesting is the question of whether or not there was a Red Army unit in the amount of about 11 people at Shelter 70 at the time of its capture, as indicated in the reports of Groth immediately after the events, as well as in the divisional reporting documents?

Indeed, in all the official reports to the high command of the army and to the press, there is not a word about this not only from Groth, but also from other participants in the events.

In these reports, the composition of the Russians at the Shelter had already been reduced to 3 officers and 6 (8) soldiers, four of whom were captured.

Moreover, such a number of defenders of the Shelter is not confirmed by the documents of the Red Army.

I would venture to note that the Germans in this case could have their own reasons not to advertise information about the soldiers of the Red Army who left the Shelter: neither the high authorities nor the readers of the German press would understand the fact that 70 Russians were released just like that, but not taken prisoner. Moreover, against the background of victorious reports about the ascent of Elbrus.

In my opinion, this is precisely why this fact is not reflected in any way in German documents for high authorities and the general public.

And what about the information in the documents 214 kav. regiment of the Red Army, in which only a group of scouts of 10 people is mentioned at the Shelter? I believe that the command of the 214th regiment could also have very good reasons for not reflecting in the documents the abandonment of the Shelter without a fight and the retreat without an order down.

Let me remind you that at that time, order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. V. Stalin of July 28, 1942 was already in full force.

"On measures to strengthen discipline and order in the Red Army and prohibit unauthorized withdrawal from combat positions"

or in common parlance

"Not one step back!".

And the detachments acted, and the commanders who made a retreat without an order were shot. This was the harsh reality of the day.

But all this, so to speak, is just my conclusions.

But if you still ask me: "Were these 70 Red Army men at the Shelter or not?" I will answer in the affirmative.

And it's not just Groth's handwritten report. I don't think he would have ascribed such a victory to himself in the presence of a large number of witnesses from among his soldiers and officers.

There is one more essential, in my opinion, circumstance that confirms me in this conviction.

Pay attention to an interesting fact, repeatedly reflected in various German reports: there were 3 Red Army officers at the shelter at the time of the capture.

Three officers for 6 soldiers is an unimaginable ratio for reconnaissance or defense of the Shelter.

With a severe staff shortage for the officers that existed in parts of the Transcaucasus, when even junior lieutenants were sometimes put in command of the battalion, such a situation, in my opinion, is simply impossible.

But 3 officers for almost a company is quite normal.

Well, a considerable amount of food, ammunition, uniforms and equipment seized at the Shelter, which the Germans write about, is also a bastard in the same line.

And the last.

Here is a tracing paper from a two-kilometer map of the Elbrus area for August 16-18 from the documents of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st mountain division.


On it to the south of the Elbrus peak in the area of ​​Shelter 11, the position of the Red Army is indicated in red with the inscription “60 people”.

Serious people served in the intelligence department. And they did not eat their bread in vain.

So there were more than two Red Army platoons at Shelter 11 at the time of its capture. Here Hauptmann Groth has nothing to reproach.

When the book was already being prepared for publication, the next archival excavations produced one interesting document from the headquarters of the 49th Mountain Corps of the Wehrmacht, which is directly related to the history of the capture of Shelter 11.

Here are excerpts from it:

[/ Center][/ Center]
“The Grotto Group. Map of scale 1: 100. 000 at 16.08:12 Hut 00 m with strong enemy resistance was captured. The enemy retreated partially to the peaks of Elbrus, about 4100 people to the southeast in the direction of the House of Guard (Azau) and Itkola, partially to the lane. Donguz Orun. The top of Elbrus, lane. Donguz Orun, Security House (Azau) is occupied by the enemy. According to the testimony of the prisoners, they belong to the 80st squadron, the regiment and division numbers are unknown. Prisoners and trophies: 1 people, 4 machine gun, many rifles. "

Final conclusion


Nevertheless, the capture of Shelter 11 took place on August 16. Despite the fact that it was guarded by almost a company of Red Army men (70-80 people) from 1 squadron of 214 cavalry. regiment, which ceded Shelter 11 without a fight to about fifteen German mountain rangers.

Now you can put an end to this story.

I wonder why the huntsmen did not burn Shelter 11 when they left the Elbrus region?

But they could.

However, this sad fate did not pass over many years later.

Note. Photo scans are provided by A. Mirzonov and are published with his permission.
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  1. Artavazdych
    Artavazdych 15 December 2020 18: 18
    +11
    Very interesting.
    Based on those events in the 70s, the film "White Explosion" was shot. True, there the plot unfolds in the mountains of Abkhazia. Recommend.
    1. Alexey Sommer
      Alexey Sommer 15 December 2020 18: 31
      -3
      And for what they put a minus?
      1. Artavazdych
        Artavazdych 15 December 2020 20: 23
        +1
        Oh, there are some ...
        It's good that you answered, I confused the name of the film. The film is called "Snowdrops and Edelweiss".
        They are both good.
        1. Alexey Sommer
          Alexey Sommer 15 December 2020 21: 18
          +2
          White explosion looked not long ago.
          Good movie. It's even strange that I haven't seen it before.
          Vysotsky plays.
  2. Thrifty
    Thrifty 15 December 2020 18: 34
    +7
    What conclusions should be drawn from this? The absence in a country with an abundance of mountain ranges of units capable of fighting in conditions of a low oxygen level in the atmosphere, almost led to the loss of such a strategic region of the country as the Caucasus, and Transcaucasia too! They fought, learning from their mistakes, which in general could have been avoided. ...
    1. 210ox
      210ox 15 December 2020 19: 05
      +3
      I agree. But I want to say that the formation of mountain rifle subunits is a long process, selection, preparation Before the war they did not have time to do it. So I had to learn in battles, with blood and defeat, etc.
  3. sevtrash
    sevtrash 15 December 2020 18: 55
    +15
    It seems that the article lacks data. One Hauptmann came out, said - and there are a lot of us everywhere and 70 people fled. Should there be patrols at all? And that there is a wild forest around this shelter and immeasurable opportunities to approach unnoticed? It turns out that two platoons were sitting in this shelter, the stern Hauptmann came and said "Boo!" and everyone ran away? Maybe it was somehow different?
  4. Avior
    Avior 15 December 2020 18: 57
    +16
    about 70 people of the Red Army, who were either at the shelter, or not, the following assumption suggests itself.
    Our company climbed to the shelter, reconnaissance and officers - part of the company officers - were in front to organize the reception of the company. But the Germans were the first to do it.
    The company with the officers who had returned from the Shelter went back, and did not reach the Shelter, Groth at first simply did not know about it when he initially reported. It is clear that, with his relatively small group, no one would have accused him of not taking an entire company prisoner, on the contrary, it would be his merit that he drove the whole company.
    Later I learned from our prisoners that there was a company, and information about it got into various sources.
    Ours, for obvious reasons, did not advertise that they had retreated from the Germans - it’s easier not to write that they were there, especially since by their arrival, it turns out, the Germans were already there, and they did not retreat from the shelter, but an order to they did not have an assault on the already occupied Shelter - they had an order to settle down, and not to storm, which is not at all the same thing.
    Something like this.
    1. Wretched
      Wretched 15 December 2020 22: 49
      +4
      For Avior. The grotto in the very first message about the seizure of the Shelter reported 70 Red Army soldiers. In the above excerpt from the book (after the heading "Date of capture") there is a photograph of the BD magazine of the 1st mountain division with a record of this on August 16. But the moderators for some reason removed the translation of this entry, leaving only a snapshot. And also removed almost the entire introduction.
      History is what it was. Therefore, I prefer to deal with documents, facts, circumstances and their analysis. Everything else is speculation, speculation, fantasies, myths, tales, etc. about the mountain war in the Caucasus, formed long before me. This, by the way, is the main reason why I undertook to study documents from Germany and ours. And he walked through all the places of hostilities in the Caucasus with his feet in order to figure out what and how on the spot. And then I came to writing books.
      And about the officers-quarters who walked in front to organize the reception of the company - he smiled. Nobody expected the Germans at the Shelter. The weather station worked in its own mode, everything was quiet and peaceful, even with pies and buns, as can be seen from German documents.
      1. Avior
        Avior 16 December 2020 02: 44
        -1
        I would venture to note that the Germans in this case could have their own reasons not to advertise information about the soldiers of the Red Army who left the Shelter: neither the high authorities, nor the readers of the German press would understand the fact that 70 Russians were released just like that, but not taken prisoner. Moreover, against the background of victorious reports about the ascent of Elbrus.

        This assumption, sorry, does not hold water. It would be great if they drove out the many times superior enemy.
        But the Germans did not get this message. Although we know about them only from the Germans, more precisely, only personally from the Grotto. After all, he personally went, and called the others when there was no one else there.
        Nobody expected the Germans at the Shelter.
        and what was the company of soldiers doing there if the Germans were not expected?
        I don’t think that it is so easy to explain why the Germans themselves did not write about the whole company of the enemy - "they were not taken prisoner."
    2. snerg7520
      snerg7520 16 December 2020 06: 22
      +1
      About the Avior version.
      The only consistent version of the 70 fighters of squadron 214 like that does not stretch an owl onto the globe. Regiment of the Red Army at Shelter 11.
      I will add that, perhaps, the company with the returned officers still tried to return Shelter 11 and for some time the capture of Shelter 11 by the Germans hung in the balance, but finding itself in a difficult position in the battle in the mountains, accepted the proposal of the Germans about a corridor for withdrawal, which consolidated the capture by the Germans Shelter.
      That exhaustively explains the disappearance of the company from German and Soviet documents: everyone has a stigma in the gun.
  5. Cure72
    Cure72 15 December 2020 19: 16
    +7
    An interesting article. I read it with interest!
  6. Assyrian
    Assyrian 15 December 2020 19: 27
    +7
    Very interesting article! I read it with great interest. Present research.
    I myself am looking for facts on individual episodes of the war. Sometimes you have to collect it bit by bit.
    Author 5 + !!!
    1. Ravik
      15 December 2020 19: 34
      +11
      Thank you!
      Your assessment should rather be addressed to the author of the book.
      Shoveling the entire Bundesarchive for your own money is worth a lot!
      1. 2 Level Advisor
        2 Level Advisor 15 December 2020 19: 42
        +6
        Well, regarding the fact that the Shelter has become the "main base of the rangers", of course, you turned it down - I went to Elbrus and made a base there - there is no sense at all, nothing covers up and you will be worn out to carry resources there, and there is not much space, but otherwise - an excellent article -Thank you!
        1. Ravik
          15 December 2020 19: 50
          +8
          Thank you for your rating.
          The Germans simply did not have enough time.
          Winter came and then everything collapsed in Stalingrad - I had to leave.
          They say Adolf swore very much when he learned about the hoisting of flags on Elbrus.
          He sent them to the passes to fight, and they went in for sports ...
          1. Assyrian
            Assyrian 15 December 2020 21: 06
            +4
            Found the magazine BD 214 cavalry regiment. Very interesting, not only the battle for Shelter 11, but also further events. I recommend to members of the forum.
          2. Doctor
            Doctor 15 December 2020 21: 19
            +4
            They say Adolf swore very much when he learned about the hoisting of flags on Elbrus.
            He sent them to the passes to fight, and they went in for sports ...

            Yes, in Speer's Memoirs:

            Then it was reported that a unit of mountain rangers captured Elbrus, the highest point in the Caucasus, a peak surrounded by vast glaciers, and installed the German battle banner on it. Of course it was a pointless affair; however, it is quite harmless, just an adventure of avid climbers. We all even showed a certain condescension to this episode, which seemed to us completely insignificant and irrelevant.

            Before that, I had seen Hitler in a rage. But rarely did he explode so much as upon receiving this report. The fit of rage lasted for several hours, as if this trick had thwarted his entire strategic plan.

            Even a few days later, in front of everyone and everyone, he vilified "these crazy climbers" who "should have been brought before a military tribunal." In the midst of the war, they play with their ambitious toys, - he continued indignantly, - they occupy this idiotic peak when he ordered to concentrate all forces on a breakthrough to Sukhumi.
          3. GKA72
            GKA72 17 December 2020 16: 31
            0
            Well this is primarily athletes, and soldiers by necessity.
        2. Wretched
          Wretched 15 December 2020 22: 00
          +6
          I will try to answer, as the author of the book, your "bent". To visit Elbrus and understand the logic of wartime events in the Elbrus is far from the same thing. In order to make such judgments, you need to know the situation and the sequence of hostilities in the Elbrus region, and preferably not from pseudo-documentaries.
          There is no bend here. From the moment of the capture of the Shelter and until the departure of the Red Army from the Baksan Valley in mid-November 42. Shelter 11 was the main stronghold of the gamekeepers in the Elbrus region for the simple reason that it was a really comfortable place to live in the absence of any other similar places in the hands of the Germans. All other strong points were in rocks or on ice. The shelter allowed for the rotation of units for the purpose of rest, the command of the combat area and the main transshipment point from which the supply of food and ammunition to the advanced units was located. There was a specific order from the command of the 1st Mountain Division not to surrender the Shelter under any circumstances.
          1. Wretched
            Wretched 15 December 2020 22: 17
            +5
            Answer to the 2nd level Advisor, but for some reason the text was inserted here.
            1. Mordvin 3
              Mordvin 3 15 December 2020 23: 34
              +2
              Quote: Wretched
              Answer to the 2nd level Advisor, but for some reason the text was inserted here.

              Everything is fine. Clicking on the arrow shows who you replied to. As for the crazy climbers from Edelweiss, if sclerosis does not confuse me, they tried to crawl to Elbrus with their banner in the 90s. The border guards intercepted them, it seems.
            2. 2 Level Advisor
              2 Level Advisor 16 December 2020 08: 41
              -1
              I meant, Alexander, that the huntsmen in the Elbrus region are, as I understand it, the Edelweiss division. Accordingly, why a whole division:
              1. have a main base in shelter 11, where a maximum of 100 people can be accommodated;
              2. from where nothing, including the top of Elbrus, you can not control (from the northern side you can climb, from the Shelter you will not really see, and to intercept - too far and not fast);
              3. And most importantly, from Azau, in the gorge (where it is much more comfortable), to the Shelter 8-10 km uphill, and from autumn to spring - to Elbrus, it's generally fun to climb - and now from the pros, few people dare to walk, a blizzard can charge for a week, and in a blizzard, it's better not to walk in the mountains
              4. I always believed that the main base of the gamekeepers was just in the Azau glade.
              That is, there was simply a strong point, but hardly the main base.
              1. Wretched
                Wretched 16 December 2020 09: 36
                +3
                Yes, I get it, Nikolai. Your judgment was rather emotional. And I correctly grasped that it was done in the absence of understanding how and what happened there. I will answer point by point.
                1. Initially, only one high-mountain company under the command of the Grot entered the Elbrus region through the Khotyu Tau lane. The build-up of forces there proceeded gradually to an incomplete battalion (this includes all the defenders).
                2. Elbrus is not a goal, it is an episode. They needed an exit to Transcaucasia through the Donguz Orun lane and further movement down the Inguri. Since August 25, when they assessed the situation, including the height and relief, the command of the 49th Mountain Corps refused to move through the Elbrus region altogether. The directions of the main blows have been moved to other locations. The task was simply to hold positions in the Elbrus region, for which the Shelter was the only comfortable housing.
                3. They tried to take Azau by swoop on August 17 and 18, but with only one platoon. Ours fought back and the huntsmen never returned to this. Their leading midfielders were at Krugozor and the Ice Base. Well, on the passes of the GKH.
                Actually, I set myself the task of expanding in detail on the basis of documents how and what happened in each area of ​​hostilities in the high mountains of the Caucasus. Therefore, in each section by direction there is a documentary chronicle of events, and then an analysis of these documents and a description of the main events.
                1. 2 Level Advisor
                  2 Level Advisor 16 December 2020 12: 52
                  0
                  I certainly understand that you are deeper in the "topic" Alexander, but I always believed that at one time, the Baksan gorge and Azau, including, were occupied by the Germans, but did not go further, therefore I commented on it. After all, our people were evacuated from the gorge through Donguz Orun,
                  Link: "-But all the above measures of state bodies and the military
                  the manuals were belated and not fully implemented, so
                  how from 13 to 20 August the Germans have already completely occupied five regions
                  republics: Zolsky, Baksansky, Kubinsky, Primalkinsky, Nagorny, with
                  September 20 to 26 - Prokhladnensky, Urozhainensky, Tersky. Remaining 7
                  districts of the republic and the city of Nalchik were still rear territories [UTSDNI
                  AS KBR F. 1. Op. 1. D. 908. L. 8] ".
                  -By order of the command of the Transcaucasian Front were
                  evacuated from the Baksan gorge through the Donguz-Orun pass, part 392
                  rifle division, as well as tungsten and molybdenum, large and small horned
                  livestock, materiel, mortars and guns [TsAMO F. 392. Op. 178554. D. 2. L. 100, 105].
                  I did not immediately understand that we were talking only about the initial episode of hostilities in the Elbrus region, but the author of the article said "for several months" - this is what confused, because several months is the time that the Elbrus region was with the Germans, and after the capture Baksan gorge - why is the main base of the Elbrus region in the Shelter?
    2. Krasnoyarsk
      Krasnoyarsk 15 December 2020 21: 09
      +3
      Quote: Assyrian

      I myself am looking for facts on individual episodes of the war. Sometimes you have to collect it bit by bit.

      In the late 60s or early 70s, the book "The Secret of the Marukh Pass" was published.
      I don't remember the author. There are many photographs in the book. The story of the battles of our two regiments with the "Edelweiss" rangers and on the passes "Marukhsky" and, it seems, "Naursky" is told.
      It was according to the plot of this book that Vysotsky wrote the song - "War Song"
      1. Assyrian
        Assyrian 15 December 2020 21: 18
        +4
        I am more attracted to documents. Combat logs, maps, etc.
        Mostly from the site "Memory of the People". If you shovel for a long time, a puzzle sometimes develops. Moreover, they are gradually posting new documents.
      2. Ravik
        16 December 2020 12: 36
        +2
        I clarify.
        The mystery of the Marukh glacier.
        Author Vladimir Gneushev
        1. Krasnoyarsk
          Krasnoyarsk 16 December 2020 13: 03
          0
          Quote: Ravik
          I clarify.
          The mystery of the Marukh glacier.
          Author Vladimir Gneushev

          Accepted. Thank. hi
  7. Klingon
    Klingon 15 December 2020 19: 58
    +6
    "Stellung bis Al- BJ nicht bereinigt" should be translated as "position before AL - BJ is not cleaned, the word" bereinigen "means - clearing or stripping, but not as not the meaning that the author gave
    1. Wretched
      Wretched 15 December 2020 22: 14
      +5
      Thanks for your clarification. I especially liked the word "should". This verb has about five meanings, including the one that you gave. I would also agree with the translation "not removed", but "cleansing" has a completely different military meaning. In order to judge so categorically as you did, you need, at least, to have an idea of ​​the context of what is being discussed. Do you know what Al-BJ items are? Where were they and in whose hands were they at the time of the report? And at what distance from them were the rangers, if we talk about cleaning up or using a different meaning of the verb? And I will tell you that point Al is the village of Itkol, and point BJ is generally the Donguz Orun pass. The Germans will enter Itkol only in November, and not the Donguz Orun lane at all. What cleaning, what are you talking about?
      1. Klingon
        Klingon 16 December 2020 03: 18
        +3
        I read the document you cited in the original and since I do not need to translate according to the dictionary, I gave you the correct translation from my point of view and the most logical in context what this Grotto wrote about
    2. alpamys
      alpamys 15 December 2020 23: 17
      +1
      Quote: Klingon
      "Stellung bis Al- BJ nicht bereinigt" should be translated as "position before AL - BJ is not cleaned, the word" bereinigen "means - clearing or stripping, but not as not the meaning that the author gave

      cleared accurate translation
      1. Wretched
        Wretched 16 December 2020 09: 11
        +1
        I agree with the "cleaned". "Cleaned" is not the right word. In order to clean up, you must first take (settlement or locality), and only then do the cleanup.
  8. Catfish
    Catfish 15 December 2020 21: 46
    +7
    Thank you very much for the work done! good
    It was really fun to read. I am a person far from mountaineering, but I heard about Captain Groth, his huntsmen and flags on Elbrus back in the sixties. Then there was "Vertical" - a handful of snow with a rifle sleeve in hand and a newsreel to the song of Vysotsky. Somehow everything went together, now, thanks to you, I learned the details. Thank you.
    1. beeper
      beeper 15 December 2020 23: 42
      +4
      hi Dear Constantine, I sincerely join your Kind Words to the Author and his Helpers! good
      Somehow it so happened that all the time, since childhood, I came across fiction and memoir literature about the battles in the Crimea and the Kuban, on the Caucasian passes ...
      And about the seizure of Shelter 11 by the Germans, there have been so many rumors and versions, official and "conspiracy", over the years ... So, it was very interesting to learn more or less reliable details!
      An excerpt about the German flag on Elbrus and the raging of the Nazi Führer from the memoirs of A. Speer, therefore, I also firmly sunk into my memory, even when I first read his book.
      And, of course, the film "Vertical" and the songs of Vladimir Semyonich Vysotsky are unforgettable - they inspired and inspire optimism ...
      After all, these are our mountains, they will help us!

      It is a pity that everything is found out so late - it turns out about those battles, and with such incredible difficulty grains of reliable information are obtained - after all, there were living witnesses and participants in those events with us, and the relatives of the dead soldiers for decades were waiting with hope for news of their "missing" ".... request
      Good health and prosperity to you, Konstantin, your loved ones and all adequate readers of the Site! drinks
      Peaceful Sky overhead!
      Sincerely. soldier
      1. Catfish
        Catfish 15 December 2020 23: 54
        +2
        Dear Pischak, thank you for your good wishes. smile

        All the very best to you and your loved ones! drinks
  9. Roman 4912
    Roman 4912 15 December 2020 22: 55
    +1
    Were or were not these 70 Red Army men at the Shelter? " I will answer in the affirmative.

    Are they affirmatively or not?
    I'm not interested in anything else. Since the Germans filled in the KTB meticulously, but not all of them reported "upward".
    1. Wretched
      Wretched 16 December 2020 09: 17
      +4
      They definitely were. They are indicated in combat documents (ZhBD, reports) transmitted through the service. In the reports that Groth wrote for the high command, the main topic was the ascent of Elbrus. There is nothing about 70 Red Army men at the Shelter. And in the materials for the German press about the ascent, prepared by reporters and participants in the ascent, too.
  10. alpamys
    alpamys 15 December 2020 23: 16
    +7
    a year ago, a neighbor who served in Edelweiss in Crete died and when I met him at home, I tried to ask as much as possible about the war. Once a year, in his words, after the war, the former Edelweiss (he even had a sticker on his car, an Edelweiss flower on a green background with the signature "Veteran") held meetings in the Alps and shared their stories there, there was a conversation with eyewitnesses and about the seizure of the Shelter 11. I asked him to retell, if in short: the Germans suggested that the Red Army men surrender the shelter without a fight, promising to give a corridor and let them pass through themselves. The Russians left with about 100 weapons. The shelter was not destroyed, the Red Army men left leaving everything as it is. Later, the Germans captured one Russian soldier from those who tried to recapture the Shelter back and became their kind of a caretaker. When it became clear that there was no point in keeping the mountains and Shelter 11 any longer, the huntsmen left, leaving everything in the same state in which they got it.
    ps .. there were a lot of details, but due to the prescription they got stuck with me, although my grandfather, despite his age, remembered them well.
    1. Avior
      Avior 16 December 2020 02: 48
      +1
      Agree, this does not explain why the Germans later did not report that there was an enemy there.
      1. alpamys
        alpamys 16 December 2020 03: 27
        +1
        Quote: Avior
        Agree, this does not explain why the Germans later did not report that there was an enemy there.

        I skimmed through the article and missed this moment, I just decided to tell you. about what I heard from the former Edelweiss.
        I myself read that the Germans blew up the roofing felts and broke the Shelter, so at this moment I got stuck asking again several times, the answer was, - they left leaving everything untouched.
        ps ..
        AR is a barracks-type hotel with a weather station. Place for 1 company. The enemy retreated to AJ - AL, also BJ.

        I will assume that the letters are designations on the map as on a chessboard, German drawings are also readable.
        1. Avior
          Avior 16 December 2020 03: 30
          +2
          in fact, just in the version you outlined, perhaps, you can see the reason - they were afraid of accusations of collusion with the enemy. From their idea with the flag, and so the higher authorities were not delighted.
          1. alpamys
            alpamys 16 December 2020 03: 37
            +1
            Quote: Avior
            in fact, just in the version you outlined, perhaps, you can see the reason - they were afraid of accusations of collusion with the enemy. From their idea with the flag, and so the higher authorities were not delighted.

            It is unlikely, I heard enough stories from the Germans that conspiracy with the enemy is a trifle, and about how they smoked "with Ivanov" in the neutral zone in the long breaks between battles, one said that they even had to drink, but they were soldiers from the infantry.
            1. Avior
              Avior 16 December 2020 03: 41
              +1
              I think such stories need to be filtered slightly, soldier stories tend to be exaggerated.
              There must be some reasonable explanation
              1. alpamys
                alpamys 16 December 2020 03: 48
                +3
                Quote: Avior
                I think such stories need to be filtered slightly, soldier stories tend to be exaggerated.
                There must be some reasonable explanation

                Did you serve in the army? there is little that can be reasonably explained. wink
                1. Avior
                  Avior 16 December 2020 03: 51
                  +1
                  Served. And he told stories too smile
                  But there must still be an explanation of why the Germans did not want to tell that they had driven out the enemy.
                  1. alpamys
                    alpamys 16 December 2020 04: 02
                    0
                    Quote: Avior
                    Served. And he told stories too smile
                    But there must still be an explanation of why the Germans did not want to tell that they had driven out the enemy.

                    then only one option, did not want to report on collusion with the Russians.
                    although there are examples based on the Soviet docks that the Germans did not even take their weapons from the captured Red Army soldiers in the Crimea.
                    here https://cont.ws/@Colonel-Cassad/1844099
                    1. Avior
                      Avior 16 December 2020 06: 22
                      +2
                      Thanks for the link
                      it is based on the diaries of a Simferopol citizen during the war
                      In the State Archives of the Republic of Crimea, a number of diaries from the war period are stored. The most interesting of them is from Simferopol, Kh.G. Lashkevich. In the diary, the author reflected all the events as they originated, immediately entered all his thoughts and all events on the pages of the diary.

                      I found his diaries, they interested me very much.
                      https://prozhito.org/person/45
                      There were a lot of unexpected things.
                      1. alpamys
                        alpamys 17 December 2020 02: 53
                        0
                        Quote: Avior
                        There were a lot of unexpected things

                        Can you share what surprised you?
                        the author has many contradictions that are incomprehensible to me, then how his Russian German officer ranked as an Aryan race and immediately writes how the Germans mocked the Russians. There is such a book for the leadership of the SS and Reich from 3, called "The SS and the question of blood" so it stands that the Russians are equal to other peoples of Europe, mainly in the northern part of it and belong to the Nordic race.
                      2. Avior
                        Avior 17 December 2020 02: 56
                        +2
                        how his Russian German officer ranked as an Aryan race

                        Yes, and it is also
                  2. Aviator_
                    Aviator_ 16 December 2020 14: 57
                    +2
                    the Germans did not even take their weapons from the captured Red Army men in the Crimea.

                    I read the material on the link. It's them the Tatars they did not take away their weapons so that they would not be armed again later.
                2. frog
                  frog 16 December 2020 10: 38
                  +1
                  What for? I'm talking about a specific case ...
                  Starting with the fact that in the event of a battle the shelter would be destroyed (who cares?), Ending with the fact that the "edelweiss" could be on the stubborn Nazis and romantic, sorry, what happens among mountaineers. That is, he did absolutely right, seven dozen ivans of a burnt shelter are not worth. But to explain it all to the staff down there ..... "What the master does not know, it will not hurt the master" wink
                  1. Avior
                    Avior 16 December 2020 10: 54
                    +2
                    no one prevented him from writing that the Rusish Ivans ran in panic, seeing the brave soldier of the Fuhrer.
                    but this is not in the official records.
                  2. Avior
                    Avior 16 December 2020 10: 54
                    +2
                    no one prevented him from writing that the Rusish Ivans ran in panic, seeing the brave soldier of the Fuhrer.
                    but this is not in the official records.
                    1. frog
                      frog 16 December 2020 12: 43
                      +1
                      Oh how! One time would be enough for me, honestly wink Joke repeat
                      But I kind of said that the character might not be the Nazi from the poster. It could well have been the same ... "And before the war, a German guy took the slope with you ...." Why would he? Smart bosses appreciated the whole shelter, stupid - nothing to explain ... But this is so, version ... For the role of truth in the final instance, almost never claimed winked
                    2. GKA72
                      GKA72 17 December 2020 19: 03
                      0
                      alpinists are quite possibly a special caste. I watched the memories of our military climber, I do not remember the last name, he said that he met acquaintances on the other side and agreed.
                    3. frog
                      frog 17 December 2020 21: 31
                      0
                      About those and speech .... Anyone could be, who are the details upstairs reports in such situations?
                    4. Wretched
                      Wretched 18 December 2020 14: 31
                      0
                      It is from these "climbers" Noname that all these nonsense (I can't find another word) about the war in the mountains come. I would like to see such clever people who would go "to the other side" to the enemy to look for acquaintances. Yeah. And among the gamekeepers, of course, everyone was chatting in Russian as if they were their own. But here's the thing: something was unlucky neither for the company of Grigoryants, nor for many others who are still being pulled out of the glaciers. Either they did not meet acquaintances, or they could not agree.
                    5. Wretched
                      Wretched 18 December 2020 14: 44
                      -1
                      Here is a sample of similar inventions by one filmmaker for people with mental disabilities. And many of those who read it believe.
                    6. GKA72
                      GKA72 18 December 2020 15: 02
                      0
                      According to the veteran, it was like this. Our men went on reconnaissance and on the third day, already in the dark, during the halt they began to call him by name from behind the rock. It turned out that the Germans had discovered them a long time ago, but this German recognized ours and offered to leave quietly, we did not see you, you us. Something like this without details. By the way, before the war in the mountains of the Caucasus, there were a dime a dozen German climbers and many spoke Russian pretty well.
                    7. Wretched
                      Wretched 18 December 2020 20: 37
                      0
                      Unfortunately, the name of the veteran, his military unit, date and area of ​​the reconnaissance remained unknown. This is not the main thing in this story, right? Well, since the veteran told me, this is the pure truth without options. How can you not trust a veteran?
                      And regarding a dime a dozen of German climbers before the war in the Caucasus - well, at least someone brought their number, based on the documents (and at that time and with that mode, the mouse would not have slipped because of the cordon without fixing in the same Intourist). But no, silence. Whoever would have named the surname of what German is, again, not unfounded. But no. All the Germans who allegedly walked around the Caucasus and drew maps, they were without names. But all from the Edelweiss division, of course.
                    8. GKA72
                      GKA72 19 December 2020 11: 24
                      +1
                      Alexander Gusev and military climbers, 3-minute video about the Germans in the Caucasus before the war
                    9. Wretched
                      Wretched 19 December 2020 22: 31
                      0
                      And where is the link to the video?
                    10. GKA72
                      GKA72 19 December 2020 23: 55
                      0
                      as written, and type in the search engine
                    11. Wretched
                      Wretched 20 December 2020 17: 08
                      +1
                      I looked. If you mean what A. Marshal broadcasts until 3 minutes about how Gusev walked before the war with the Germans, then this is all the same broadcast of terry myths and conjectures. This is definitely not an argument. In none of his works did Gusev describe climbing with the Germans. If you mean the mention of a German with whom Gusev allegedly flew to the Caucasus in an airplane before the war and then, as it were, recognized him killed at the pass in officer's uniform, then this is also, sorry, an artistic device of Gusev himself in his book "Elbrus on Fire" ... There was neither this pass nor the German officer, whom Gusev supposedly recognized. If interested, I can justify.
                      This film was made for the 75th anniversary of the Victory and is a frank set of conjectures and propaganda cliches in the worst traditions. People needed to master the money, well, they did it. I was involved in the work on this film as a consultant. The interview was recorded for 3 hours. I answered questions from the filmmakers about Gusev's participation in the battles in the Klukhor direction. As a result, I am present in the film well, if a minute (in total) with zero informative component. I still didn't understand why they needed me. And it's great that they shortened it this way. At least I'm ashamed that I took part in its creation. Although everything there depended on the director's vision - he needed to do a pretentious thing and work off the money. By the way, which is good again, I worked there for free. I would have taken the money, in general it would have been disgusting. After that, he swore to participate in such events.
                      But then, according to all my developments for the film, I wrote a whole section "A.M. Gusev and the battles in the Klukhor direction" in my second book, where I documented that much of what Gusev wrote about was just his fiction and about the killed officer, including. His book is an adventure story, and it is perceived as the memoirs of a veteran. Certain events described in the book did take place, but some of the very significant moments described by him did not exist in reality. Including, there was no famous, at the suggestion of Gusev, undermining a rock on the heads of the Germans with a charge of 100 kg. ammonal. Something like that.
                    12. GKA72
                      GKA72 20 December 2020 20: 24
                      0
                      But then, according to all my developments for the film, I wrote a whole section "A.M. Gusev and the battles in the Klukhor direction" in my second book, where I documented
                      And read?
                    13. Wretched
                      Wretched 21 December 2020 22: 07
                      0
                      If you do not mind spending money, you can write to me at [email protected], so as not to produce commerce here. In short, according to the German officer allegedly recognized by Gusev, everything is simple there. Gusev gives dates in his story, which greatly simplifies the work with military documents. So, the losses of officers in those battalions of the 98th regiment of the 1st mountain division of the Wehrmacht that fought in the Klukhor direction are known and recorded in combat documents. The episode described by Gusev with the capture of the pass and the recognized officer could not have been earlier than September 1 and later September 7, 1942. During this period, there were no losses of officers of the regiment. The closest casualties among the officers of the 98th regiment were Lieutenant Feldmeyer (killed 27.08) and Lieutenant Hubatius (killed 27.09). It's simple. When Alexander Mikhailovich was writing his book, he did not think that someday the documents of the 1st Mountain Division would be available for study and that someone could check what he had written. In his book, there are not one or two such fantasy episodes. Including the storming of the Klych Pass, which is famously described in the book.
                      I absolutely did not set myself the goal of somehow refuting the reliability of what he described. It was just interesting for me to see how the episodes described by him were reflected or not reflected in military documents for us and the Germans.
  • BAI
    BAI 16 December 2020 09: 40
    +1
    1.
    Somehow, those wishing to tell the public about the heroic defense of the Caucasus do not reach either the Klych gorge, or the southern slopes of the Sancharo or Allashtraku passes, or the Mastakan pass. Far away, hard, cold and wet. No hotels for you, no cable cars.

    There are many traces of the war on the Klukhor Pass.
    2.

    As a matter of fact, in July 1993 he was just like that.
    1. frog
      frog 16 December 2020 10: 40
      0
      There are many traces of the war on the Klukhor Pass.

      Not only on Klukhor ..... But who cares ???
      Far away, hard, cold and wet.
  • Aviator_
    Aviator_ 16 December 2020 14: 45
    +1
    The problem is that immediately after the war, a writing reform was carried out in Germany.

    As far as I know, the writing reform was carried out in Germany after WWI, until 1918 the Gothic script was used there, and then the Latin script. There was also handwritten Gothic writing. So Germans aged 40 and over could well write in Gothic out of habit.
  • alpamys
    alpamys 17 December 2020 03: 06
    +2
    I wonder why the huntsmen did not burn Shelter 11 when they left the Elbrus region?

    asked my ex about it
    Rangers of Edelweiss, he said that mountain riflemen have their own rules of behavior in the mountains, they left the Shelter in the same state in which the Russians gave it to them.
  • lexxing
    lexxing 18 December 2020 17: 14
    0
    I will not discuss the essence of the article. I will clarify only on the technical side of the article.
    The author assures that the difficulties of translating the radiogram are connected with the "writing reform" carried out in Germany immediately after the war. At the same time, the author did not have any difficulties in translating other German documents of the same time, which are given in the article. As it turns out illogical - here the reform prevented, it did not interfere.
    Let me note that of the spelling reforms (not writing) in Germany in the twentieth century, only one is known - 1996.
    The 1944 reform was planned and prepared, but was not carried out, in 44 the Germans were no longer up to the reforms. By the way, after the war, this was also not the main problem. The reform of 1996 concerned only, so to speak, "technical" issues (who wants more details from Google to help). And it did not create any special difficulties not for native speakers, not for foreigners who speak German.
    The problem with the translation arose due to the fact that all radio operators, of all countries, when recording radiograms, use a kind of stenography (in each country, naturally, its own). Otherwise, it is impossible to write down a text more than 10-12 words by ear - already at the 6-7th word you start to get lost. And in the case of a military radiogram, this is fraught!
    Therefore, the help of native speakers in this matter was useless. Here you need a textbook, according to which radio operators were taught. You can probably find it only in Germany. Or a native speaker, a radio operator, not necessarily a war participant, not necessarily a military man, shorthand is not a code. It has hardly changed much over time. But such a person is also not so easy to find. They are all no longer young, and modern methods make it possible to do without this method of recording information. Although I'm not completely sure here
    1. Wretched
      Wretched 18 December 2020 21: 24
      0
      Thank you for your detailed point of view. Let's figure it out. Really, handwritten the texts in German WWII combat documents cause problems with reading and translation. And not with me, but with native speakers. For me, this is generally a Chinese letter. And the Germans themselves told me about the reform of writing (or, more correctly, spelling). For what he bought, as they say.
      And unlike handwritten ones, typewritten the texts do not really cause problems with translation, because they are typewritten. Well, what is illogical here? But I can be even more specific - an authentic translation of German even typewritten combat documents of that war are far from always within the reach of not only a qualified translator, but even native speakers, for the simple reason that their text is full of specific military abbreviations, terminology and abbreviations in which a civilian understands nothing. And translating military texts is no easier than, say, texts on medicine or metallurgy.
      Now regarding the reforms. You have it written very convincingly. And I understand that your point of view is practically unshakable. Nevertheless, I would very, very much recommend to you, as well as to everyone who wants to understand these issues, to type in the search engine "Zutterlin's font". And please read what has been written on this topic. It is very possible that your understanding of what the handwriting of the letters of the German alphabet was like before and during the war, as well as after the war, will change. Or maybe it won't. Much depends on a person's desire to understand and accept.
      The stenography in these radio messages and telephone messages has absolutely nothing to do with it. There are several thousand of them in my archive, I probably didn't count them for sure. There is a more readable handwriting, there is less, but in any radiogram you can still make out some words (as in the one given in the article) and they are all written in full and without any abbreviations. If you want to be sure, I can throw you a dozen offhand for study. And shorthand is, by the way, a set of symbols and their combinations. Please look at the text of the radiogram. Are they there? No, the point is different. At that time, the outlines of the letters were different among the Germans and modern Germans do not know this outline, even quite mature people. This is the point.
      And then, do you really think that every field telephone in the dugout and every radio station had signalmen with shorthand skills at the intermediate point of communication? Really? Where were there so many of them? But in this case, such stenographers should have decoders for their scrawl, because the text of the received message ended up on the commander's table. Or were all the commanders of the Germans also no stranger to stenography in order to decipher the records of radio operators? Is it too difficult?
      In any case, your point of view is interesting, if only because you paid attention to moments that others did not pay attention to.
      1. lexxing
        lexxing 19 December 2020 09: 57
        +1
        The Sutherlin typeface is not a reform. At the time we are talking about, it was used everywhere. As for its difficulties - the translation of photocopies of documents from the German camp (where my grandfather died) personally did not cause any problems for me. Despite the fact that I am not a native speaker. True, 40 years ago, I spoke German more or less freely (they taught me from the age of 4 at home - my mother was a teacher of German). But the lack of language practice today has reduced my knowledge to a minuscule. I ran into the Germans a couple of times (now) - it was hard. But he translated the documents a couple of years ago. The sentences were written in full, without abbreviations, so there were no difficulties, even if some letter raises a question, the general meaning is clear.
        Regarding the system of records at communication centers. I wrote "kind of a kind of shorthand".
        All radio operators use the abbreviation system, talk to live radio operators (of course, if you find it). It is impossible to record text by ear in a combat situation. This is not a dictation at school, they will not repeat it three times. Moreover, this abbreviation system is not individual, it should be read by other people familiar with it. This system is part of the training of a radio operator.
        And in 1942, the Germans' training of radio operators was at the proper level. I'm not afraid to say even higher than ours. and not only in connection, but everywhere. At 44-45 the situation was already different. Everything and everyone has already gone into business there!
        1. lexxing
          lexxing 19 December 2020 10: 05
          +1
          By the way, I forgot to add since 1941, the use of Gothic italics in Germany was prohibited
          1. Wretched
            Wretched 19 December 2020 22: 29
            0
            I am not a linguist. And I believe you. But I believe more in the Germans who justified the impossibility of reading handwritten radiograms for me. Sorry.
        2. Wretched
          Wretched 19 December 2020 23: 30
          0
          Well, in order to draw a line under the reasoning about stenography among the Wehrmacht radio operators, relying on your experience in reading camp documents, I will suggest that you translate this radio message. If you succeed, then stenography has nothing to do with it. If you refer to the presence of stenography, then please indicate the stenographic characters that, in your opinion, are contained in the text. Gabelsberger shorthand symbols, for example, will help you.
          I am not a theorist, I am a practitioner. I succeeded, albeit in part, and without a "textbook, according to which radio operators were taught" and without searching for "live radio operators" of the Wehrmacht. It will be interesting to compare the results.
          1. Mound
            Mound 2 May 2021 19: 08
            0
            There is no stenography or any specific abbreviations here. For example, SMG and LMG are common abbreviations for heavy and light machine guns. Really good German speakers can read such radiograms with practically no spaces. Of course, today even the Germans themselves need experience and the desire to learn this font in order to understand the content of such messages, but there is nothing super difficult here.
  • Cho Pohavat
    Cho Pohavat 10 February 2021 10: 52
    0
    According to my version: There was a meteorological station. People were sent to evacuate the equipment. For 70 people there were 5 rifles and not a single cartridge. In preparation for the descent, a German officer came out to them and offered a deal. They give to take out the equipment on the promise not to burn the station. To reinforce their words, 2 machine gun fires sounded on the left and right.
    While descending the equipment, several people ran to fetch cartridges and rifles. Approximately 12 people launched an attack on the station, but they were already met by a burst of machine-gun fire from reinforcements that approached the Germans. In general, the testimonies of the parties in this episode coincide on key points.