Instead of the "autumn nuclear war", there was a "winter" one, a little more modest
Instead of "autumn nuclear war" - "winter nuclear war"
First, let's turn to the officialdom:
The Russian military under the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - President V.V. Putin received a nuclear training exercise, the Defense Ministry said.
During the maneuvers, they worked out the actions of calculations of launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces, crews of strategic aviation and the nuclear submarine of the Northern fleet.
Combat training launches of an intercontinental ballistic missile, a ballistic missile of a submarine, high-precision long-range air-launched cruise missiles were carried out from the Plesetsk State Test Cosmodrome, from the Barents Sea, as well as by Tu-160 and Tu-95ms aircraft from Engels and Ukrainka airfields.
Training strikes with strategic missiles were launched at the Kura (Kamchatka) and Pemboy (Komi) training grounds.
During the maneuvers, they worked out the actions of calculations of launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces, crews of strategic aviation and the nuclear submarine of the Northern fleet.
Combat training launches of an intercontinental ballistic missile, a ballistic missile of a submarine, high-precision long-range air-launched cruise missiles were carried out from the Plesetsk State Test Cosmodrome, from the Barents Sea, as well as by Tu-160 and Tu-95ms aircraft from Engels and Ukrainka airfields.
Training strikes with strategic missiles were launched at the Kura (Kamchatka) and Pemboy (Komi) training grounds.
Some, by analogy with last year's autumn strategic command and staff exercises (SPE) of the nuclear forces "Thunder-2019" called them "Thunder-2020". However, this is wrong. The event has no code name, it has a different status - this is training. The autumn exercises of strategic forces are usually held every year and have received a bunch of different nicknames in the troops, in the networks, and in the media: "seven-hour nuclear war" (by analogy with the famous exercises "Shield" of nuclear forces - both strategic and non-strategic, as well as missile defense, PKO and TAP of the USSR in 1982, which received such a nickname in the West), "autumn shootout", "autumn nuclear war" (or even "war") ... and there are many of them. They take place at the end of the summer training period and are their final stage. This usually happens in October. Their name was not disclosed before, the exception was 2019. "Subject" they can be associated with the main exercises of the RF Armed Forces of the year, that is, "Caucasus", "Center", "East" or "West", where nuclear forces are strategic , and non-strategic ones, of course, are involved (usually without real launches).
Last Argument of Kings Command Post Exercise
Most of the personnel of the strategic nuclear forces are involved in the command and control squadron in various degrees of involvement, of course, and not forgetting about the duty forces (which are also involved). Ordinary forces are also actively involved in the command and control squad: from various units and formations of special forces to missile forces and artillery, aviation, military air defense and air defense forces of the aerospace forces. In alarm, not only the regiments of the Strategic Missile Forces are raised with the development of various schemes for covert deployment "in the forests" of a mobile group, for example, or work on the installation of warheads on carriers (it is clear that such training is not carried out in real performance, but then suddenly on the other side of the ocean near misunderstanding), naval strategic nuclear forces and their support forces. The FSB, the National Guard Troops, and many others, including local government agencies, are “twitching”. Of course, SNF exercises are held more than once a year, and exercises with the regiments of the Strategic Missile Forces mobile grouping and the mine grouping, as well as with Long-Range Aviation and NSNF, are held regularly throughout the year. But their scale is often smaller, although the level of involvement and involvement of attached formations of various other power structures may be similar to the command and control squads.
There is a completely different level of planning of events and involvement of the work of headquarters at the SCS. Of course, not everything is performed “in real life,” therefore this is also a command post exercise. A different level and participation of the country's top military-political leadership - the President and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief not only "formally supervises" the exercises, but also actively participates in them, working out their role: making decisions both in the outset of a virtual global war and in their transition to a nuclear phase - exactly those decisions that only he can make, and, of course, choosing from various options for the development of events and the use of a nuclear sword of the state the one that he considers necessary. The same applies to the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, etc. However, the level of involvement of top officials at the Command and Control Command does not differ much.
Guesses about riddles
And everyone was waiting for these SKSHU SNF this year, but they did not happen in October. Before the start of this event, there was a lot of different speculations in "expert" circles and among various idle analysts. This was due to the fact that the expected by all "autumn nuclear war" was either late, or was canceled, and various reasons were invented for this: either the ubiquitous coronavirus was dragged in, or a parody of the elections from our "American partners", still called " probable enemy number one. " They say that there is already a tense situation, necromancers from the Democratic Party have already raised legions of the dead from their graves and sent them to vote for the candidate whom the deceased consider, apparently, practically one of them, society is split, and the Kremlin decided not to provoke and canceled the "nuclear war. " To be honest, I believe more in the "coronavirus" version and the associated savings.
Or, as some believed until recent events, the cancellation of the "autumn war" is an "element of bargaining" with the future (many have already decided everything) democratic leadership of the United States - it is very fashionable in our community of "experts" to discuss "bargaining", "exchange of positions" and the like, they are both "Poseidon" and "Burevestnik2" and "Dagger" with "Zircon" are ready to "change". As if the United States at the moment has something to offer us in response, and this, excuse me, is not so - neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Defense Ministry will agree to any unequal exchanges. And the “experts” are trying to “change” the wrong things, they were not created for that, investing so much effort to “pass” them. Yes, and our Minister of Foreign Affairs, it seems, is not called Eduard Amvrosievich, and everything is fine with the Russian language. And the extension of START-3, excuse me, is, of course, very good and necessary, but not in exchange for what the Americans would like to get - it will cost. More precisely, we can do without the Treaty, but in this case their problems are their problems. Although, of course, the world will not become safer without START-3.
SKSHT is a different event, but the informational impact is the same
Yes, indeed, there were no autumn command and control squads, but the “elections” in the USA were hardly the reason: the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation made it clear by the measures taken that it did not care about dancing overseas. But instead of them, the SCST was held, which is usually held somewhere in the spring, although not always. The differences in the event, on the one hand, are significant, and on the other, not very. "Not really" - this is in terms of the number of launches of the actual strategic nuclear "products", it is almost identical to the traditional autumn "shootings", plus or minus, of course. After all, year after year does not happen, and sometimes malfunctions happen, as in that year on "Thunder" with SSBN "Ryazan" in the Red Banner Pacific Fleet.
In terms of "practical" use, if, God forbid, it comes to it, such a failure does not solve anything - for that there are duplicate powers, and the calculation of the combat consumption of charges and missiles, when they try to send warheads to the same important targets from different missiles and even different carriers, if possible. One will not arrive - another will arrive. But in terms of training, such failures are even useful - they allow you to fix something in advance. In terms of PR, it is not very good, because the illiterate population does not know all these subtleties, and different “truth broadcasters” in the media and networks don’t want to know this, their task is completely different - fame, “hype”, well, and earning money - both honest and various grants.
So in terms of launches and informational impact, SCSHT differs little from SCSU, and usually people do not delve into such subtleties. “They fired rockets,” the pictures are beautiful on Twitter or YouTube - and that's good, we'll see, we'll be happy (or not - depends on the political position and nationality of the information consumer). But in terms of the work of the nuclear forces themselves, there are much more differences. There is no such thing affecting all strategic nuclear forces, non-strategic (tactical) nuclear forces and various support structures, starting from the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, there is no command post. They are attracted, but more modestly. And the Strategic Missile Forces, or YES, or the NSNF of the two fleets - too.
The main thing is that the headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces, the General Staff of the Aerospace Forces, YES, the headquarters in the fleets are much more modestly strained - the war is going on in a much more "paper-computer" format than in exercises. And one more thing - there are always two sides in the autumn exercises. "Western" and "Eastern", "Red" and "Blue", but even "North" and "South" - in any case, it is clear who is who. And part of the forces and means of the headquarters works out for the "red", and part - for the bad guys from across the ocean and their various hangers-on. Those guys are bad in any case, even if a scenario is played with our side using a "strike at the appointed time", say, based on intelligence data about the preparation of the first strike by the enemy (politicians can talk about "only retaliatory" strikes, but the military, sorry, there is no time nonsense). But in training, everyone plays for their own, although, of course, the enemy's actions are also available and emulated. In general, it is also an extremely useful event.
What have they let in and what have they forgotten, and will they let them in later?
The reader is probably already aware of the launches from the video "highlighted" on the official resources. This is the launch of the Yars ICBM of an unidentified modification (Yars, Yars-S or Yars-M) of the mobile version from Plesetsk, the launch of the Sineva R-29RMU2.1 SLBM with the Liner combat equipment with the SSBN K- 44 "Karelia" of the Red Banner Northern Fleet - all to the Kamchatka Kura. Also, two launches of air-based long-range cruise missiles were spotted - the Kh-55MS from the Tu-160 from the heavy bomber division in Engels and the Kh-101 (which imitated a thermonuclear X-102 strike) from the modernized Tu-95MS from the Ukrainka airbase. Neither "Caliber" missiles, nor missiles from the "Iskander-M" complex, either quasi-ballistic, or 9M728 or 9M729 cruise missiles, were present this time, or they were not reported about their launches.
Another thing is interesting - in the warnings about the expected launches, the launch from the Red Banner Pacific Fleet, of course, the SLBM was and is listed. But the date in NOTAM is indicated - December 11-14. Moreover, according to some indications, this may not be the launch of the R-29RKU-02 SLBM from Ryazan, as usual, but the launch of the R-30 Bulava, which until that time could not operate at the Kizha training ground in the north. And not because the missiles "do not reach," of course. So I wonder if this launch will take place and when exactly. And what exactly will fly. Why the launch was postponed to a later date, after the completion of the main part of the SCSHT (which, by the way, does not last a couple of hours or even one day usually, if we are talking about a "quiet war" on maps and computers, of course) is unknown. Perhaps, it will be issued as a launch within the framework of the second, third strikes, after additional reconnaissance of targets, by the surviving forces. Or it will simply be announced as a combat training launch without reference to the event. If, of course, something does not interfere and the launch cannot be postponed, this is also possible. Or canceled altogether. And in this case, the Pacific will have a "debriefing".
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