Leaky Fleet Umbrella
On December 10, 2020, the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Konashenkov's Department) once again surprised us with its creativity on the next "successes" of our Navy.
10.12.2020 (16:45), officialdom of the RF Ministry of Defense (link to the MO website):
"Corvette" Thundering "in the course of state tests hit a target missile in the Baltic Sea ... Successfully carried out rocket and artillery fire at the target missile.
In accordance with the plan for the final stage of state tests of the "Gremyashchiy" corvette at the training ground located in the Baltic Sea, the ship's crew successfully fired missile and artillery fire with the Redut sea-based anti-aircraft missile system, AK-190 and AK-630 artillery mounts on the missile a target imitating an anti-ship cruise missile of a conventional enemy.
The target was an anti-ship cruise missile fired from a missile boat Baltic fleet P-257.
Anti-aircraft missiles launched from the corvette and heavy artillery fire successfully hit the designated target. The shooting was carried out in a difficult jamming environment with the use of electronic countermeasures by the "enemy".
The naval training ground of the Baltic Fleet, where the exercise took place, was closed to civilian shipping. Test rocket fire was provided by more than 10 ships and fleet support vessels participating in blocking the firing area and launching the target rocket.
Earlier, the ship's crew fired Kalibr and Onyx cruise missiles at coastal and sea targets in the White Sea. In the Barents Sea, he conducted artillery and torpedo firing.
Corvette "Thundering" is the lead ship of the project 20385. This is an improved version of the corvettes of the previous project 20380. The new corvette is distinguished from its predecessors by enhanced shock capabilities and an air defense system. "
In accordance with the plan for the final stage of state tests of the "Gremyashchiy" corvette at the training ground located in the Baltic Sea, the ship's crew successfully fired missile and artillery fire with the Redut sea-based anti-aircraft missile system, AK-190 and AK-630 artillery mounts on the missile a target imitating an anti-ship cruise missile of a conventional enemy.
The target was an anti-ship cruise missile fired from a missile boat Baltic fleet P-257.
Anti-aircraft missiles launched from the corvette and heavy artillery fire successfully hit the designated target. The shooting was carried out in a difficult jamming environment with the use of electronic countermeasures by the "enemy".
The naval training ground of the Baltic Fleet, where the exercise took place, was closed to civilian shipping. Test rocket fire was provided by more than 10 ships and fleet support vessels participating in blocking the firing area and launching the target rocket.
Earlier, the ship's crew fired Kalibr and Onyx cruise missiles at coastal and sea targets in the White Sea. In the Barents Sea, he conducted artillery and torpedo firing.
Corvette "Thundering" is the lead ship of the project 20385. This is an improved version of the corvettes of the previous project 20380. The new corvette is distinguished from its predecessors by enhanced shock capabilities and an air defense system. "
Based on the content of this news report (I repeat - official from the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), the newest corvette of the Navy could not in any way "overcome" a single large-size air target that passed the zone of destruction of the "Redut" air defense system, then "hundreds" (gun mounts A -190), and only the AK-630-02 multi-barreled assault rifles finally "conquered" it.
It is worth figuring out what happened (or could have happened).
Facts and Comments
Corvette "Thundering" of the project 20385.
And now the comments and facts. Alas, very tough.
DIMK:
Corvette "Thundering" during state tests hit a target missile. In accordance with the plan for the final stage of state tests of the "Gremyashchiy" corvette at the training ground located in the Baltic Sea, the ship's crew successfully fired missile and artillery fire with the "Redut" sea-based anti-aircraft missile system, AK-190 and AK-630 artillery mounts on the missile - a target imitating an anti-ship cruise missile of a conventional enemy.
That is, according to the "officialdom" of the Ministry of Defense, the Redut air defense system (on target designation of the extremely expensive and supposedly "promising" radar integrated tower-mast complex (IBMK) "Zaslon") could not shoot down the target, the target missile (RM) successfully "arrived "Up to 30-mm" submachine guns "of the close line of the ship's air defense (that is, already in the" dead zone "of the air defense system).
Moreover, they could not bring down her excellent 100-mm gun mount. And this despite the fact that on tests of the corvette "Loud" this gun worked like this:
The A-190 cannon ... drove the target missile into the water at 7 km, before entering the AK-630 affected area.
Quoted from the words of a test participant, a Pacific Fleet officer.
But there was an excellent artillery radar "Puma", which was "thrown out" from the newest corvette of project 20385 (and the last 20380). Under the pretext that IBMK "Zaslon" supposedly "solves all problems."
Here, one cannot but note the fact of shooting at single target rocket.
Given the fact that on corvettes (including the "Thundering") there is no radio correction of the missiles, the target distribution of the missiles becomes virtually random. And here missed targets in a dense "shashlik" plaque are simply inevitable.
For comparison, an example from the 80s. on testing a normal and correct air defense system (cap. 1 rank Pechatnikov V.K):
The culmination of the test was a volley of four targets. If during the tests of the M-22 and S-300, for various reasons, multi-channel firing was repeated, then for the "Dagger" this was not necessary. Targets were launched from the coastal complex in the Balaklava area. To observe the shooting and provide insurance, the Black Sea Fleet brought 19 pennants onto the battlefield. The target range was 9,7 seconds. All these pennants were left without work because the MPK-147 coped with all the targets superbly.
The current "effective managers" (in uniform and without) are so afraid to shoot! Because they know how "embarrassment" it can end.
DIMK:
The target was an anti-ship cruise missile fired from a Baltic Fleet missile boat R-257.
The R-257 missile boat has a long-obsolete Termit missile system, whose huge rocket (P-15M or RM-15 target missile) in no way corresponds to real goals (neither in visibility, nor in flight altitude). And here we are not even talking about "promising air attack weapons", the RM-15 is not able to fully imitate even the "Harpoon" anti-ship missile system of the late 70s of the last century.
The Navy is simply afraid to shoot at its analogue IC-35 (RM-24). That was clearly shown by the 2016 shooting in the Black Sea Fleet. When the RM-24 was specially driven into the water, in fact, before entering the zone of destruction of anti-aircraft fire weapons of ships.
DIMK:
Anti-aircraft missiles launched from the corvette and heavy artillery fire successfully hit the designated target. The shooting was carried out in a difficult jamming environment with the use of electronic countermeasures by the "enemy".
The author declares with confidence that this statement has nothing to do with reality. And it's just a lie. The maximum that could be ꟷ "dipoles were poured." Just so that they are. And it was possible to "report" about the alleged use of electronic warfare means.
This is a very important question, especially given the extremely "slippery" factor of the impact of their electronic warfare means on the firing channels of anti-aircraft fire weapons. Taking into account the fact that this problem in the "valiant Navy" organizationally has a classic "Krylov organization" ("swan cancer and pike" - missilemen, RTS and REB members). To touch this topic deeply, to put it mildly, "is not recommended." (There will be no war? Perhaps there will be no).
DIMK:
Earlier, the ship's crew fired Kalibr and Onyx cruise missiles at coastal and sea targets in the White Sea. In the Barents Sea, he conducted artillery and torpedo firing.
Here Konashenkov's department "modestly forgot" to mention that the artillery fire in the north was at a simulated (!) Target. That is, there was no real target at all.
Thus, until now, "Thundering", despite repeated promises in the media (and postponements), could not shoot down anything before this shooting.
And now let's go over the issue in detail again.
Air defense problem
The topic of air defense of corvettes has already been raised at Voennoye Obozreniye. Examples include the following articles:
"Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam" и "Corvettes that will go into battle."
These publications had significant resonance. Including among specialists. And a number of positive consequences. Alas, very insignificant. We'll have to re-enumerate the problems (not all) that the air defense systems of these new ships have.
1. The critical problem of the air defense of corvettes is the lack of radio correction of missiles.
Specialists and bosses were well aware of this problem since the mid-2000s. Nevertheless, nothing was done to solve it until the "valiant Navy" began to "lash in the media" for it. Today this deficiency can be eliminated in a short time. There are technical solutions for this. However, there are no organizational ones. Why change something, if you can again "cheat" on a single "tag" (RM-15)?
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that it was on the corvettes 20385 that nothing was done for radio correction. For the task was "simply" - somehow and quickly "shove" the ship to the fleet.
To direct questions to the representatives of "Zaslon", the answer to the radio correction of the missile defense system was (close to the text):
“We didn’t go through this, they didn’t ask us.”
Here, by the way, is an exhaustive answer to the “storytellers” that have appeared about the supposedly “newest super-air defense system IBMK Zaslon”. In the "development of budgetary funds" on this topic, the task of hitting missiles on a maneuvering target, in fact, was not set.
2. The excellent artillery radar "Puma" became the "crutch" for the air defense of the project 20380 corvettes. For example, during tests of the Pacific Fleet's head corvette, she drove the RM-15 into the water at a distance of 7 km.
This is a clear example of the fact that a number of radio-technical means exist and are serially produced, which simply and "on the vine" solve the whole complex of air defense problems of the corvette. They already exist, serial, effective ("Positive-M" + "Puma" + equipment for radio correction of missiles). And many times cheaper than the "golden" (but at the same time unable to control the missile defense system in the air) IBMK "Zaslon".
A logical question arises, why does the country need ships and navy? To keep her safe? Or as an opportunity for the "development of budgetary funds" by "reputable businessmen" (and at the expense of the country's defense capability)?
3. RM-15 ꟷ is in no way a "Harpoon" (and certainly not new anti-ship missiles). The fleet simply does not have effective targets.
Officer (cap. 1 rank) from the Feodosiya training ground at the Tsushima forum:
It is enough to look at the dimensions of the P-15M and "Harpoon" and everything is clear.
In addition, there was a nuance: RM was altered from combat (they turned off the "head", put, if required, a cargo model instead of a warhead, and devices for the self-destruction system with given flight parameters ꟷ ASL-1, -2), and combat, in turn, were divided on P-15M with radar seeker and TGSN.
For the "industry" and the SAM testers, this was of great importance, since in the radar seeker, even in the switched off form, the "dish" "the antenna in the fairing played the role of a significantly amplifying RCS of the radar-angle, and the thermal seeker did not give such an effect.
It is clear that the industry was extremely interested in the use of RM with radar seeker on tests to increase the reliability of detection at a given line and capture on the automatic tracking of the control system of the air defense missile system flying at heights of 5 м15 m RM-15M.
RM does not fly at a stable altitude for a variety of reasons and on the last 16 km of flight it "has the right" to be at the lower boundary in height - 5 m, and at the upper - 15 m, the average - 10 m. This is like "industry" is lucky.
We, by all means (starting with "our people" at the technical position of the RM preparation (Sevastopol, Karakopy) and ending with the commander of the firing RCA) tried to set the AP to a minimum height of 5 m, and the "industry", of course, fought for 15 m.
In addition, there was a nuance: RM was altered from combat (they turned off the "head", put, if required, a cargo model instead of a warhead, and devices for the self-destruction system with given flight parameters ꟷ ASL-1, -2), and combat, in turn, were divided on P-15M with radar seeker and TGSN.
For the "industry" and the SAM testers, this was of great importance, since in the radar seeker, even in the switched off form, the "dish" "the antenna in the fairing played the role of a significantly amplifying RCS of the radar-angle, and the thermal seeker did not give such an effect.
It is clear that the industry was extremely interested in the use of RM with radar seeker on tests to increase the reliability of detection at a given line and capture on the automatic tracking of the control system of the air defense missile system flying at heights of 5 м15 m RM-15M.
RM does not fly at a stable altitude for a variety of reasons and on the last 16 km of flight it "has the right" to be at the lower boundary in height - 5 m, and at the upper - 15 m, the average - 10 m. This is like "industry" is lucky.
We, by all means (starting with "our people" at the technical position of the RM preparation (Sevastopol, Karakopy) and ending with the commander of the firing RCA) tried to set the AP to a minimum height of 5 m, and the "industry", of course, fought for 15 m.
PKR P-15M with radar and thermal seeker.
Are there any solutions here? Certainly. And this has been clear since the 80s. Only the Navy did nothing to make them the standard means of its combat training ("there will be no war"?).
The fleet is afraid to shoot at targets even RM-24 (converted old anti-ship missiles "Uran"), because it fears a repetition of "Monsoon" (arrival on board of a heavy engine not shot down RM-24).
The Navy has nothing like the Chukar mass target of the US Navy, and most importantly, it is not necessary (for there is only one concern).
4. The unprincipled position of responsible officials and leaders towards the state of the air defense of ships and the fleet is obvious... It is not superfluous to remind here that one of the key officials personally responsible for all the air defense failures of project 20380 corvettes is the ex-Deputy General Director of the Almaz Central Design Bureau for armaments, Lysenko, who, after being fired from Almaz (after , that he has heaped up with the armament of new ships) "surfaced" in ... "Zaslon" (the developer of the IBMK). And here remains just put the link.
5. Without real tests, there will be no real revealing of problems and their elimination... This means that in a real war, our ships will be shot.
And here it is useless to talk about "new air defense systems" if the methods of their testing (and combat training) are deliberately flawed. Therefore, ships are surrendered by firing at "buckets of diesel fuel", ancient "tag" (or in general - parachute targets, as it was recently with the MRK "Odintsovo").
The new unobtrusive anti-ship missile system of the US Navy LRASSM.
6. IBMK "Zaslon".
The situation when a serial plant, without an experienced design bureau, a test base, "suddenly takes up" the development of a "super detection system", to put it mildly, raises questions. The normal answers to them, given the proper formulation of questions, could be the formation of an effective development team, a good poster base (namely good, honest, and not what is now on Ladoga). Of course, the point about the leaders of this work is extremely important.
However, in fact, among them are the former deputy. general for armaments of the Central Marine Design Bureau, personally responsible for the failure of the air defense of the corvettes of the Navy, and the ex-general director of the Amur shipyard (on which there are a lot of questions, including the "Nerpa case" - an accident with human casualties on the Nerpa submarine)
After that, the "price tag" of this radar complex ("soared" almost to the cost of the entire lead corvette of project 20380) no longer raises questions, as well as the "methodology" of testing, as well as the delivery of this "innovative radar" by "single tag".
So far there remains a "very interesting question": "What radars will be on the new ASZ corvettes?" For “certain persons” have a very strong desire for the “Zaronovskie” IBMKs to be there again. At the same time, I repeat: there is a ready-made, effective and many times cheaper solution ("Positive-M", "Puma", "Monolith" or "Mineral"). And no R&D is required for its implementation, all work can be completed in a few months (including the placement of means of radio correction of missiles) under a serial contract.
7. Perennial systemic problems The air defense of our ships, moreover, about which it was initially known, pose a very tough question for the responsible officials.
Tomorrow our ships will go into battle. And what course: to the position of the volley with our excellent percussion weapons on the enemy or "the shortest course to the ground" (to the bottom) ꟷ is decided today.
What we have with the air defense of ships (except for the frigate of project 22350) is not even a "leaky umbrella".
De facto there is no air defense. And practically any properly organized raid of air attack means (even a strike by an anti-ship missile system of the "Harpoon" level of the early 80s) will be fatal for almost any naval ship.
Burning Iranian missile frigate Is Sahand (F-74) after being hit by anti-ship missiles and UAB. 1988 year. Some results of the American operation "Praying Mantis" in the Persian Gulf. Our ships are waiting for the same.
Note. Clarified information - "Redoubt" on "Thundering" still shot down the target, and accordingly the artillery worked again at the simulated target. Some consider this a "success" of the IBMK.
Shooting video.
I disagree. The fact that air targets are shot down by air defense systems is not news from the late 50s. The question is in repelling real raids, but with this, the "Thundering" with the IBMK "Zaslon" (like all corvettes of the project 20380 and 20385) is doing very badly, and even without the use of electronic warfare by the enemy.
A very good question, how would the "Thundering" air defense system work with the simultaneous operation of the electronic warfare system for suppression? It is not difficult to conduct such an experiment. There is an Il-114 flying laboratory for testing "rocket heads" and ships. However, in the Navy, no one needs this - "there is only one concern." Yes, and extremely inconvenient facts of the "leakage" of our air defense "umbrella" can be revealed.
Our fleet does not want to hear about mass targets with characteristics (RCS, speed, flight altitude). Shooting at targets-simulators of supersonic anti-ship missiles - these are also Western fleets. About "Thursday exercises" (regular training of the British Navy on Thursdays by aircraft with electronic warfare equipment and simulators of the seeker of missiles), we also do not want to know.
An infantry regiment can at least bury itself in the ground from air strikes.
The ships (ours), with the way things are going now, are waiting
"The shortest course to the ground"
ꟷ to the bottom.
"Target shot down?" (large-sized and relatively high-flying "tag") ꟷ "Sign the ship's acceptance certificate"! "There will be no war" ... Perhaps "there will be no" ...
Information