Our "Pentagon Wars". Realities of domestic military R&D
Raised in a short article "Unmanned" swarms "are preparing for battle" questions require clarification in terms of Research and Development (R&D) (in general, and promising robotic systems (RTK) in particular) and countering air defense-UAVs ("At the forefront of confrontation: UAVs against air defense"). This article is the first in a series of materials about our R&D.
Director Richard Benjamin's Pentagon Wars (1988) provides an edgy and grotesque look at the wrong side of some US military research and development (R&D). A smart good movie with a lot of humor (and not American, but rather English) is highly recommended for viewing. Persons related to the military sphere or the military-industrial complex will receive a separate aesthetic pleasure.
A quite reasonable question arises: "How does it all look here?" Especially in the situation after the failure of the dates of many ROCs, the actual military-technical revolution and a significant aggravation of the military-political situation?
It is difficult to describe how all this "functions" in our country in simple Russian. If only because he can break, and he (for an accurate transmission of reality) will need the help of very strong boatswain's expressions. But we will try.
The whole "depth of our depths" - a short excursion
On this topic, there is a series (including those available on the Internet) of excellent articles by experts well-known and respected in the defense industry and the Ministry of Defense. Despite the fact that they did not raise all the problematic issues, but what they said was “enough for validol”. For those who want to understand what is generally happening with the creation of military equipment in our country, a series of these articles is highly recommended for reading. Journal "Automation tools and technologies":
No. 3/2017 "The paper underside of military electronics"
No. 3/2015 "Military electronics: an overview of the regulatory framework and practice of its application"
№ 3/2013 "Military electronics: Brownian motion in paper mazes, or life by concepts"
No. 3/2011 "Military electronics: summary from the" paper "front"
№ 3/2009 "Paper" features of the national military electronics "
No. 3/2007 "Procedural issues of the use of electronic means in military equipment: regulatory framework and the truth of life."
Taking an example from the authors (and in order to avoid using strong boatswain's vocabulary for an accurate description of what is happening), we will refer to official sources as much as possible, but with our own comments, considering it also possible to illustrate them with suitable screenshots from the film "Pentagon Wars".
First, let's find out what is a normal R&D organization?
This is (briefly):
- Normal stages of R&D of weapons and military equipment (AME) and their timing: search R&D (research work), applied R&D (with detailed justification and formation of the necessary groundwork for this appearance and requirements for promising weapons), development work ( ROC), ensuring serial production and operation (intended use) of AME with the implementation of its modernization.
- Effective and capable developers and customer structures.
- Adequate regulatory framework and adequate funding (and its size is far from the most important thing here).
- Strong scientific foundation and technological and personnel capabilities of the industry.
How did it look in the USSR?
As an illustration, you can cite (the key is highlighted) a good article by Ph.D. Major General S. Kolganov "Ordering weapons in the Soviet way":
The bulk of the work was directly carried out by ordering directorates and scientific and technical committees of the services of the Armed Forces and combat arms ...... the leadership of the Armed Forces service, combat arms, ordering directorates and scientific and technical committees formed a list of tasks for the development of the Armed Forces service and the creation of advanced weapons and military equipment with the required characteristics.
Based on this list, plan of scientific work of the branch of the Armed Forces ...
The presence of this plan ensured the personal responsibility of all officials for the results of their work ... Acceptance of research results, as a rule, took place in sharp and principled discussions, which made it possible to find the most rational solutions to the most difficult issues.
In addition, the main headquarters, directorates of the main command, branch of the military, ordering directorates acted as customers of scientific research by the nature of their activities, which significantly increased the objectivity of research conducted by research institutes and universities (and their quality). All the main results of scientific work were reported to the commander-in-chief (or commander), who at that time was the general customer of weapons for his type of Armed Forces (branch of the armed forces)... As a future consumer of the weapons being created, it was the commander-in-chief who fully imagined the role and place of new equipment in the troops, in the conduct of hostilities, and was interested in making the decisions necessary for the troops.
... The undoubted advantage of the existing system was its transparency and the presence of top officials who were objectively interested in obtaining high-quality weapons. The disadvantage was poor coordination at the interspecific level, as a result of which weapons and military equipment sometimes appeared that solved similar problems.
That is, the strength of the “Soviet system” was that resources (financial, production, human) were in the hands of those who were directly responsible for the case (there were several of them in certain types of the RF Armed Forces). Due to the fact that military missions (VP) were included in the system of ordering directorates of the services of the USSR Armed Forces, the customers knew the real situation, opportunities and problems in the defense industry organizations well, had constant and effective feedback on the decisions made and implemented.
The main weakness was not even (indicated by S. Kolganov) duplication of a number of works, but serious problems where the "interspecific coordination" began. Moreover, where the topic turned out to be without a "master", there could simply be a complete blockage. An illustrative example of this is the anti-torpedo protection (PTZ) of the USSR Navy. Having the necessary scientific and technical groundwork in order to have them at the most modern level, the USSR Navy received in fact a complete failure, due to the frank "orphanhood" of the topic ("lost" between the miners, acoustics, electronic warfare officers, "calculators", "mechanics" ).
Note. Today, the situation with the organization of this issue is even worse, because that (PTZ), which formally and in fact refers to the MPS (marine underwater arms), "Gave" to the "diocese" of the "REBovtsev", which by their nature were engaged in the "upper hemisphere" (that is, electromagnetic waves), and about what hydroacoustics and hydroacoustic countermeasures (SGPD) are, they had and still have performance.
Thus, the Soviet system really needed to be reformed. Instead, she was broken.
What is happening with us today?
The first stage was the "consolidation of customers" with the formation of "single customers" in the types of the RF Armed Forces in 2006 (in the Navy this was the Department of Orders and Supplies of Ships and Weapons).
The “logical” (in quotes) subsequent decision was the creation in 2011 of a single customer in the Ministry of Defense (Department of State Defense Order).
In addition, at that time, another major mistake was made - the withdrawal of military missions from the subordination of the customers of the services of the RF Armed Forces and the formation of a single Directorate of military representations of the RF Ministry of Defense. As a result, customers almost immediately lost not even "feedback", but an idea of the real "situation".
An illustrative example - story with diesels for the MRK series of project 22800, when the Navy until the very last moment (until the disaster with this state defense order became a fait accompli) had no idea about the real situation at the manufacturer (and the fact that its leadership initially and deliberately went actually into disruption GOZ and series of ships).
On January 1, 2014, 44-FZ entered into force. The main goal of its adoption is to defeat corruption, in which every fifth “military” ruble is being stolen today. Won? It looks like no.
From January 1, 2015 Rosoboronpostavka and Rosoboronzakaz have been abolished. The role of their "gravedigger" was performed by S. Shoigu, who addressed V. Putin in May, who imposed the resolution "I Agree" on this address. In the defense industry, this event was greeted with a bang. The Ministry of Defense at Rosoboronpostavka, as follows from the official website of the Ministry of Defense, has a new Department of Public Procurement. Generals again became the managers of the money, the intermediary disappeared. The oversight functions previously performed by Rosoboronzakaz have been distributed among other existing executive authorities.
The Institute of Military Acceptance, practically destroyed by A. Serdyukov, has been restored. Its number has increased from almost 7,5 to 25 thousand people. Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 612 in the summer of 2014 returned to the classical form and function of the VP, including control of pricing and participation in contractual work.
Current state of affairs
Briefly on the structure of the organizations of the Ministry of Defense responsible for R&D (functionality taken from the official website of the RF Ministry of Defense).
In addition, the Chief of the General Staff is directly subordinate to the Directorate (for the construction and development of a system for using unmanned aerial vehicles) of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.
Since the distant Soviet times, the Deputy Minister for Armaments was responsible for armament (in the status, like the Chief of the General Staff, first deputy). The last “chief armed man” - the first deputy minister was General of the Army Y. Borisov, however, with the appointment of the current “chief armed man” of the RF Ministry of Defense, Krivoruchko A.Yu. the status of the position was significantly downgraded, and today on the official website of the Ministry of Defense it ranks 10.
A number of structures are subordinate to him, the key of which are the following.
Main Armament Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation:
Scientific and Technical Committee (Arms Development):
Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for ensuring the state defense order (DOGOZ):
Office of military missions Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:
In addition, there is also the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army P.A.Popov, in whose subordination is Main Directorate of Research Activities and Technological Support of Advanced Technologies (Innovative Research) Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (GUNID):
Note. When creating, the GUNID was initially conceived as a "second customer" (to the main customer - DOGOZ), in relation to the promising subject matter of the Ministry of Defense. However (for a number of reasons) this was not implemented, as a result the new (no longer new) structure was de facto looking for a place for itself in the R&D "kitchen" of the Ministry of Defense. Without the function of ordering (and in the presence of a number of other structures), the current status of the GUNID is somewhat "ambiguous".
Here it is necessary to remember about such a very serious and respected structure as Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU), which is responsible for:
- organizing the improvement of the elements of the missile-technical (RTO) and artillery-technical support (ArtTO) system and coordinating the activities of the military command and control bodies on RTO and ArtTO issues.
At the same time, GRAU is included in the structure Logistics of the RF Armed Forces Army General Bulgakov D.V. It will be appropriate to recall:
“The information in the media that the RF Defense Ministry has liquidated the archive of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, which contained information about all Russian arsenals and weapons production for more than 500 years of history, does not correspond to reality,” A. Romanovsky said.
“This is impossible by definition, since all documents on GRAU up to the 40th century are stored in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts, from the XNUMXth-XNUMXth centuries in the Russian State Military-Historical Archive, from the beginning of the XNUMXth century to the XNUMXs (last century - IF-AVN) in the Russian State Military Archives. All these archives are part of the Rosarkhiv system, and the history of GRAU is stored in its funds, ”he added.
"Archival documents from the 40s of the XX century to the present are carefully stored in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, some of the documents on the history of the GRAU are concentrated directly in the department," said the head of the GRAU.
Meanwhile, earlier the former head of the GRAU, Colonel-General Nikolai Svertilov, said that the Russian Defense Ministry had liquidated the GRAU archive, which contained information about all Russian arsenals.
“Even the Bolsheviks in 1917 did not raise their hands to liquidate the archive of the Main Artillery Directorate of the tsarist army, as the GRAU was called then. But now, while optimizing the central directorates of the military department, under the pretext that there are no extra areas, it was decided to destroy the most valuable archive of the GRAU. In fact, we are destroying history with our own hands, ”said N. Svertilov.
N. Svertilov stressed that after the current reorganization of the GRAU, in fact, the main role of the head office for the organization, storage and provision of troops with rocket and artillery weapons and ammunition has actually lost.
“Now from GRAU, as a whole, there are horns and legs. Science was transferred to one department, overhaul - to another, storage and assembly of ammunition and missiles - to a third ", - he said.
In this publication of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the representative of the RF Ministry of Defense, to put it mildly, was not telling the truth, or rather, he was engaged in “substitution of the thesis”. Yes, the lion's share of historical documents was in the archives he indicated, but they were also in the archives of the GRAU! However, the main thing was different, the destruction of most of the documentation on current R&D (and equipment in service). And this (in fact, a deliberate sabotage) was not only with the GRAU archive, but with all the structures of the RF Ministry of Defense, then reformed. In fact, there was a direct destruction of the accumulated experience and scientific and technical groundwork for the creation of promising weapons and military equipment.
There are also types of armed forces (Navy, Aerospace Forces, Ground Forces, Strategic Missile Forces, Airborne Forces) and their scientific organizations, which seem to be responsible for the case for their intended purpose, but all the resources are not with them, but in the central bodies of the Ministry of Defense.
I emphasize once again that society considers that "the fleet is responsible for the ships", "for the aircraft - the Air Force (VKS)", "for Tanks - landowners ", - simply because" it is so logical ", but in reality it is not so, because the resources for all this are in the central bodies of the Ministry of Defense (while the services of the RF Armed Forces here, in fact, only have a "deliberative vote").
At the same time, it is necessary to understand that “resources” are not only and not so much financial, but rather decisions on the subject of work, the content of their TTZ, and the appointment of receiving commissions. For the types of the RF Armed Forces, the “right to vote” here is purely “substantial”.
The basis of irresponsibility
In fact, some are responsible for the case, without having the resources. And those who have the resources very often simply bear no responsibility for anything. In this case, it happens when a number of topics have several "curators". And also such situations when it is not very clear who should be responsible for a specific issue.
A few examples.
Example one:
Example two:
The question is about the "responsible official" in this area in the DOGOZ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. It was an almost "legendary" personality of the recent history of the Navy - ex-head of the surface ships department DOGOZ Sobolevsky AA, who "gloriously" "steered" our surface shipbuilding in the late 2000s - early 2010s. (ie during the years of the "Serdyukov pogrom" of the Main Command of the Navy), which directly supervised the development and procurement in our surface shipbuilding.
And then one more example of the "logic" (in quotes) of the decisions made:
By the way, tankers are also not the Navy, but the "diocese" of General of the Army Bulgakov (Logistics of the RF Armed Forces), specifically the DTO (Department of Transport Support). The fact that the Navy was "castrated" in terms of capabilities in the far zone by tankers, against the background of the fact that as a result of recent "reforms" entered the former Main Headquarters of the Navy in Moscow ... The rear of the RF Armed Forces is "almost trifles."
Actually, the problem is in the "jungle" of this dense, established organization, where there is no clear responsibility of officials, and those in charge have no resources.
Were there those who raised the question of the abnormality of the existing system? There were. For example, General of the Army Shamanov, Commander of the Airborne Forces, and Admiral Suchkov, Admiral of the RF Ministry of Defense. We managed to do and change some things. In any case, today the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is not an “English queen” (a literal description made by one of the RF Ministry of Defense officials “sitting on a state defense order”), as it was in 2012–2013, but quite a weighty official. Those. the weight of the apparatus increased, but the inadequate “bureaucratic framework” remained.
It's all just "slightly and slightly". For greater relief, you need to give two illustrative examples.
The first is naval aviation (with which we just have a disaster).
And the second is mine defense (MIP), where it is even worse than a catastrophe (in fact, there is simply no MIP).
When discussing the problems of the new (modernized) Ka-27M helicopter (including in terms of interaction with the ships of the Navy) with the representative of the Central Research Institute of Shipbuilding, all claims were immediately rejected by him ("this is all Fontanka" (branch of the 30th Research Institute of the Air Force, now attached to 4 Central Research Institute), "the application model is 24 Central Research Institute" (operational and strategic research of the Navy), so there can be no complaints about the Central Research Institute of Shipbuilding.
The irony of this situation is that Fontanka (the research organization of the Naval Aviation of the Navy) is not in any way subordinate to the Navy (and scientific organizations of the Navy) and is completely in the VKS system.
Mine defense is "even more fun" because
As a result, we have units of minesweepers (whose antique armament is "supervised" by the Marine Underwater Weapons Service), anti-submarine sabotage defense units (close to the head of the Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare Service), which have nothing at all against modern mines (not even non-magnetic divers' equipment) and ... Marine Engineering Service (in which there is nothing to solve this problem, but there are tasks and responsibilities). At the same time, MIS generally refers to the "diocese" of the Rear Services of the RF Armed Forces.
Or more. A highly relevant UAV for the Navy is a target designator for missile weapon systems. Whose will it be? "Rocketeers"? "Pilots" (in "detached" from the Navy "separate carriage")? Or “will you have to run until the 4th Central Research Institute and the Office for Construction and Development of the System for the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles? And you will need to "run" so many, many times. Here we can recall the fact that recently a separate "unmanned service" has appeared as part of the Main Command of the Navy.
And it will not even be very possible to condemn the relevant bosses, who are already rushing about "like squirrels in a wheel" practically without days off, but here they are encouraged to "increase the length of the races several times.
Therefore, the "servicemen" have questions: "Maybe, well, him?" and "Perhaps there will be no war?"
And if in the west of UAVs target designators for ships began to be used en masse since 1990, then Krasnaya Zvezda several years ago proudly wrote about an initiative warrant officer from a Pacific Fleet missile boat using a personal drone in exercises.
Note. Yes, the fleet began to carry out exercises with the "Eagles" and "Outposts" - they were forced. In some cases - "heavy army boots". But this is not at all what is actually needed.
By the way, "a wonderful question": "Who will be more important -" pilots "or" missilemen "(with different points of view in their organizations)?" Especially given the fact that if “something is wrong,” the military prosecutor’s office is “always happy to help”: both the developers and the military. See, for example, just an "epic story" with the military prosecutor's office of the Northern Fleet, which demanded in 2014-2015. coordination of the repair of torpedoes (including the ammunition load of the NSNF) with ... Kiev (Kiev Automation Plant). And this is just what has surfaced.
On drones. We made a breakthrough in the early 2010s, when there was no such organizational insanity. And then, those who perfectly understood that “the smell of gunpowder” could do it. "Land" (and not the Air Force, which then "filled up" everything with their "drones"). Those more than 2000 UAVs (which our Armed Forces have today) are a consequence of this breakthrough, which is now being reproduced in a mass series (with some upgrades). However, it is rapidly becoming obsolete.
In the comments to articles on UAV swarms, they tried to object to the author: they say, we have "Geoscan" (which is outdated), effective "parades of copters" with a huge number of UAVs involved.
Alas, this example is "by". Starting with the fact that these are civilian UAVs, and with a rather simple "logic" of the "swarms" functioning. And ending with the fact that, according to the available information, in "Geoscan" and so "everything is good" and "hemorrhoids" with developments for the RF Ministry of Defense, they are, to put it mildly, not interested. According to the latter, it may have changed (but they were not at the "Army-2020", which is quite obvious), but a few years ago this was exactly the case.
However, only all of the above problems are not limited.
Licensing
Do you want to do something (develop and release) for the Ministry of Defense (even a simple nail)? Then, if you please, for a start, get a license that you (your company) is a "purebred dog", and not some "rootless mongrel":
I stress once again:
The real situation. Organization. The CEO and the military representative are sitting. They break their heads. The issue of compulsory obtaining a license for the production of weapons and military equipment (previously not required) arose. And without it, further deliveries are excluded. However, obtaining this license immediately becomes the basis for a criminal case: “illegal business”. (How did you ship (and receive) the products before?)
But component parts in the overwhelming majority of cases (and non-corrugated products - almost always) are intersectoral products ...
A vivid example of the savagery of the current licensing situation, the facts after the loss of two aircraft at Kuznetsov during its military service. After the rupture of the aerofinishers at Kuznetsov, the fleet urgently summoned (to the Mediterranean) specialists from the Proletarian Plant, which was refused. Since the plant had the corresponding license at the place of its actual location. And work in the Mediterranean was not mentioned in the license. That is, it was already illegal business and fell under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. "Homeland needs"? In response, the Navy was reminded how many people had actually "sat down" earlier for such a "need" (in strict accordance with the current legislation) ... The question was still "somehow solved". But from a legal point of view, it was still a "gray area".
Moreover, licensing is not at all under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, but the Ministry of Industry and Trade (with one caveat: documents for licensing are accepted certified, including by military acceptance). Moreover, even if the documents are in complete order, there are many completely legal formal grounds for refusing to grant a license (especially in a competitive situation). Of course, there are “good Samaritans” who are ready to help “for a small bribe” and “arrange everything” (regardless of the applicant's real ability to work on the subject claimed for a license).
In conclusion - about the need for licensing the development of weapons and military equipment. Until 2001, this type of activity was not subject to licensing: the law of the Russian Federation of September 25.09.1998, 158 No. XNUMX-FZ allowed the designers of diodes and even tanks to work miracles without any license. But the law stopped this idyll: so that engineer Petrov could legitimately invent the world's best "nails", his general director Ivanov had to obtain a license for the right to develop them.
The paradox is that “if you are careful, you can” engage in de facto development of military equipment, “calling” this process R&D (research work). "Just" experimental samples of products (or complexes) must be made with the RKD and "all the requirements" in order to "deftly" bring what has turned out to be tested within the framework of the "Regulations for proactive development ..."
It is amazing, but true: this "Provisions ..." of the military-industrial complex, contrary to a bunch of federal laws, actually worked (and made it possible for developers to act on the creation of promising models of weapons and military equipment). In this regard, the expediency of replacing it with a document of a much lower level (order of the Ministry of Defense), to put it mildly, raises doubts.
Meanwhile, the thought involuntarily arises: is licensing necessary at all? Such a thought, in particular, after reading (the article), where it is happily reported that after 205 years of activity, NPO Izhmash finally received the first Rosoboronzakaz license for the development, production and sale of ammunition. But how did this enterprise produce these ammunition for 205 years without a license? And will this ammunition be the best in the world thanks to a license?
As they say, no comment.
Scientific and technical groundwork is the most critical R&D problem
Scientific and technical groundwork (NTZ) is a "foundation" not only for the modern weapons and military equipment themselves, it is also the awareness of how to effectively use them. Essentially - an understanding of modern war (and the ability to wage it).
С the official website of the Ministry of Defense:
To date, the key elements have been clarified that determine the priority areas for creating a scientific and technical reserve for promising types of weapons, military and special equipment (AME). This primarily concerns the "List of basic and critical military technologies for the period up to 2025" and "The list of priority areas for fundamental, predictive and exploratory research in the interests of ensuring the country's defense and state security for the period until 2025".
Based on the results of the analysis of the development of new weapons and military equipment, significant changes were made to the list of military technologies, mainly related to the development of complexes of unconventional weapons, hypersonic aircraft, communication and control systems. Each military technology contains a detailed description in the form of a passport, reflecting its focus, critical characteristics, level of readiness, estimated cost and other parameters necessary for further use in the preparation of the state armament program (GPV) and the state defense order (SDO). As a result, the revised list includes 9 basic, 48 critical and 330 military technologies.
The key questions are: "Who pays?" and "Who Calls the Tune?" In order to “save money”, even under Serdyukov, the RF Ministry of Defense decided that the Ministry of Industry and Trade should be primarily responsible for the formation of a promising NTZ (and the Ministry of Defense - “buying (choosing) the goods you like in the store”).
It turned out the same. Without resorting to the boatswain's expressions, we will simply quote the material from the magazine "Armament and Economics" No. 4/2012."The role of scientific and technical groundwork in the innovative processes of creating advanced weapons: problems and solutions" (direct link to PDF-file)
In fact, the phrase “general directions for conducting scientific and technological research require an improvement in the procedure for drawing up, agreeing and implementing the list” is a “fig leaf” of the actual defeat of the system of formation of scientific and technological research for the RF Armed Forces. Some of our successes in the overwhelming majority of cases are the personal work (and merit) of a number of responsible leaders, and not the system (which has actually been destroyed).
Let's just quote a few blocks from the previous articles of the author (and speeches at the events of the RF Ministry of Defense).
The most acute problem of the Navy's R&D is the deliberately unrealistic timing of work. The real minimum development period for a torpedo is 6 years (and usually more), and these figures are in line with world experience. Unrealistic R&D deadlines are not only their inevitable disruption, which forces the developer to make sub-optimal design decisions, significantly limiting the possibility of the developed MPS sample.
Another problem is the presence (more precisely, the lack) of the necessary scientific and technical groundwork for the successful conduct of R&D. Practically all R&D projects in recent years began without a sufficient and reliable NTZ, thereby setting the deadline and problems with the implementation of the TTZ ROC.
Link
... without carrying out complex research and development, we will not get a modern MPO. Today we do not have a full-fledged scientific and technical groundwork even in order to write a substantiated TTZ ROC. Example: ROC "Lomonos", which was supposed to become the base in the adopted "Concept for the development of naval underwater weapons." At the Army-2015 forum it was announced that the Lomonos ROC was closed. The reasons were clear, and they were named - unrealistic terms and requirements, lack of a normal scientific and technical groundwork.
Separately, it should be said about the level of scientific and technical support for the work carried out by industry. There are three components:
- scientific research organizations (NIO) of the Navy;
- Department of State Defense Order (DOGOZ);
- military acceptance.
In the NIO of the Navy, where the TTZ was developed, the ROC "Lomonos" knew perfectly well the whole unreality of this, nevertheless, it was done.
Further - the Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for ensuring the state order (DOGOZ) is actually responsible "for the line" in the plan, for the case - not.
The customer system that existed in Soviet times had a lot of flaws, but in it the resources were in the hands of the boss who was responsible for solving the problem, and he knew the real situation (through acceptance).
In order for the system that we have today to work effectively, it is necessary to introduce dual subordination to the Office of Military Representations (UVP) and DOGOZ, for example, at the level of deputy commanders for armament of the Armed Forces (with the formation of the corresponding apparatus).
But the most important issue is the formation of a scientific and technical reserve, for this we need comprehensive research and development. If there is no money for them, then it will be necessary to reduce the number of ships, because without critically necessary scientific research and testing, we cannot further ensure their real combat capability.
The same persons, who submitted false reports to the management about the imaginary well-being, under the pretext of “lack of money” in the “fat financial years” simply “strangled” all R&D on the subject of IGOs. The wildness of the situation is that even in the difficult 90s, the RF Ministry of Defense tried to preserve critical R&D as much as possible (and preserved them!), Because there was an understanding that there is no future without them.
Characteristic is the discussion that unfolded at the IGO conference of the Army-2015 forum on one of the “innovative detection systems” that the Navy NIO “prescribed” in almost all current R&D projects. The head of the development organization admitted that from the real groundwork there are only "results of mathematical modeling", and the range is very small. At the same time, its implementation was "justified" by the termination of promising research projects on the subject of acoustic CLOs! As they say - "a mistake is worse than a crime"! Maybe the point is that the head of the torpedo department of the NIO of the Navy had a thesis on this "innovative topic"?
Link
Scientific research work (R&D)
From the speech of the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Yuri Borisov to the participants of the general meeting of members of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences on December 7, 2012:
Link
Draws attention to the excess of 500% of expenditures for the project 885 "Ash" (and which in the form stipulated by the State contract of the Navy and the industry, have not been able to pass until now. For example, "Last" and everything connected with it). Here it is appropriate to recall the disgrace with the weapons (and the old torpedoes USET-80 and "Physicist-1") demonstrated to the President of the country a year ago in Sevastopol (under the Laika project), despite the allegedly "successfully completed" R&D on it.
It should be admitted that before that, a significant part of the research and development work of the RF Ministry of Defense was an outright “use of budget funds” with minimal results. At the same time, even in the most difficult 90s, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation carried out a number of research projects that allowed us to preserve and develop the modern scientific and technical groundwork. In spite of all extremely acute problems, the relevant leaders understood that it was impossible to "cut" these R&D projects, because the future would be "cut down" with them.
In the course of Serdyukov’s reforms, many “modern and effective managers” came to the Ministry of Defense, who were taught in the MBA to “cut the cost” (cut costs). And they were the first to "cut" the absolutely incomprehensible "science" (including the military). If there is no one of our own, we will buy it abroad!
Serdyukov has not been in the Ministry of Defense for 7 years, many of his mistakes have been corrected, but the problem of pogroming promising research projects in the Ministry of Defense has been preserved and is still acute. There are several extremely acute problems with serious long-term negative consequences:
1. The Ministry of Defense, even under Serdyukov, “killed” almost all R&D, believing that R&D supposedly “should be conducted by the Ministry of Industry and Trade”.
2. There is no money, but I really want "unparalleled" and superior to everything and everyone. Accordingly, outright lies flourished violently in various “cartoons” of presentations for management. I emphasize that this is not about propaganda from TV, but about “internal” documents of the Ministry of Defense (and other structures, for example, reports to the Presidential Administration).
3. There are practically no managers left in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation who are able to effectively conduct and control R&D.
Sooner or later, resuming OCD with such a background and such approaches at a normal healthy level will be impossible.
The system needs to be changed.
But more about that next time.
PS. About "cartoons and scientific and technical groundwork"
- Hello, is this Vadim Pavlovich Lukashevich?
- Yes, I'm listening to you.
- The leading designer of the NPO Molniya is speaking to you (mentions his last name). We have a problem - could you explain why on your website www.buran.ru Buran is separated from the second stage of the Energia launch vehicle by the impulse of four shunting engines, and not six?
Stunned by such a question (after all, the leading designer of the Buran development organization calls me), I hesitantly ask again:
- Why are six engines firing and not four?
“We have carried out a computer simulation of the separation process of our product and the second-stage unit, and we have to use six motors to damp the arising oscillations during plane-parallel divergence, without collisions. And you only have four on your site ... Why?
- Wait, but you have developed "Buran" and implemented all the separation issues! You have simulated everything thousands of times and performed it in flight on November 15, 1988! What do I have to do with it? I just drew a beautiful cartoon ... For my website ... I wanted to make a screensaver so that a beautiful picture similar to reality would spin on the computer screen ...
- But you have a four-engine compartment, and we get only six. Why do you only have four?
- Well, we drew "from a lantern", as I understand it, without any calculations and even more so dynamic models. We just drew a beautiful cartoon. If you are modeling on real data, and you get six, then six is correct. What is the problem?
- So we make six for a new product. We simulate on a computer stand - four does not work without collision. We report to the general. And he convenes a large meeting and says that we do not understand anything, because Lukashevich's website is divided by four engines (he saw it himself). And this is fuel economy. If you cannot do it yourself - call Lukashevich and find out how he did it! So I'm calling ...
And I just crawl under the table ... Where I remember that Vladimir Putin, in his last message to the Federal Assembly, speaking about the new strategic missile "Sarmat", showed the whole world a cartoon that we made with screenwriter Andrey Pochtarev in the mid-2000s in Ostankino for a couple of hours "on the knee" for the next release of the "Shock Force" program of the First Channel about "Satan".
I still remember the question of a 3D designer: "What are we going to bomb?"
And my answer is, "Fuck Florida!"
And in the picture, the Sarmat-type is ripping holes in Florida with our MIRVs ...
Well, why not a movie? About our Pentagon Wars?
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