Military Review

At the forefront of confrontation: UAVs against air defense

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Source: facebook.com / Shushan Stepanyan


Article "Unmanned" swarms "are preparing for battle" aroused great interest. However, only a few questions were raised in it. A comprehensive consideration of the topic requires the disclosure of the problems of countering air defense ꟷ UAVs, as well as the organization of research and development.

This article is devoted to the opposition of air defense ꟷ UAVs (without excessive detail in history combat UAVs). Taking into account the open nature of the article and the acuteness of the problematic, we will focus only on the key points.

Initially, the active development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the West was caused (back in the 30s - 40s of the last century) not by the tasks of the "battlefield", but by the search for a means of high-quality preparation of air defense crews. It is appropriate here to recall the case of such exercises in Great Britain. Immediately before the Second World War, when the inspected air defense systems (previously successfully “perforating” target cones towed behind aircraft) could not shoot down a radio-controlled target (and with rather modest characteristics). This happened in the presence of Winston Churchill, and immediate and tough measures were taken to dramatically increase combat training. The British were in time for the war.

Vietnam


In the summer of 1965, the USSR delivered the first divisions of the S-75 air defense system to North Vietnam. Then a quiet life in the Vietnamese sky for aviation USA is over.


A burning F-105 a few moments after being hit by an S-75 missile defense system, Vietnam.

Taking into account the skillful and unconventional actions of the air defense crews (both Soviet and Vietnamese), attempts to "force a breakthrough" in the air defense with large groups of aircraft ended in large losses for the United States. We needed "other solutions", one of which was the use of electronic warfare (EW), which were actively used during the Second World War.

However, obtaining the necessary intelligence data on the Vietnamese air defense systems (to suppress them with electronic warfare) ran into serious problems. The radar of the air defense missile system was turned on for a very short time, using the data of the duty officers (who worked in a different frequency range).

The use of classic radio-technical reconnaissance aircraft (RTR) in this situation was ineffective. A high-quality recording of the signals of the air defense missile system radar and the air defense fuse of the air defense missile system was needed directly in the process of hitting the target (and the entire cyclogram of the air defense system's combat work). Only drones could do this.

The Air Force and Navy have used them since the late 30s. for testing air defense systems. However, minimizing the necessary RTR onboard equipment for installation on UAVs, as well as ensuring high-speed transmission of reconnaissance data to a special aircraft, became extremely difficult technical problems.

In the course of hard work, the mass of the RTR station was reduced by almost ten times. And (albeit with a number of difficulties), but she was able to be placed on the Ryan Aeronautical 147 UAV.


UAV Ryan Aeronautical 147.

The high technical complexity of the entire system led to multiple failures. But on February 13, 1966, everything changed. The destroyed C-75 air defense missile system of the Ryan Aeronautical 147E UAV managed to receive and transmit all the necessary amount of information.

Immediately, the revision of the UAV was started for an experimental prototype of an active jammer station (a modification of the Ryan Aeronautical 147F UAV), which, although with great difficulty, still fit on a small drone. Since July 1966, the Ryan Aeronautical 147F made several flights over North Vietnam and was not shot down, despite the use of more than 10 S-75 air defense systems on it.

In the shortest possible time, an AN / APR-26 station was made on the basis of the drone's active jamming station with mass equipment of aircraft with it. The result of this work clearly demonstrates the following: if in 1965, 4 missiles were consumed per one shot down American aircraft, then by 1967 there were already about 50 missiles.

Note: This "zeroing" of the effectiveness of the S-75 air defense system caused an immediate reaction in the USSR, with the necessary improvements (including directly in the jungles of Vietnam), with a corresponding increase in the effectiveness of the air defense system. The “shield and sword” competition continued.

Speaking about the period of the Vietnam War, it should be noted that back in 1971, the United States carried out the world's first air-to-ground missile launch from the BGM-34 Firebee UAV. However, at that time it was too complicated and ineffective. The time of such UAVs will come only in 30 years.

Near East


During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israeli side had 25 MQM-74 Chukar UAVs (targets) and actively used them during hostilities to provoke Arab air defense systems to "work for themselves" (to open and destroy them if necessary). All of them were lost during the hostilities, but they fulfilled their task.

Their use gave a powerful impetus to the creation of their own UAVs in Israel, and in a variety of guises and in many applications. Given the fact that the country was constantly at war, the issues of their combat effectiveness were at the forefront.

It should be especially canceled that for the first time in the world, the creation of ground-based launchers of anti-radar missiles (PRR) was carried out to ensure their maximum covert and sudden use of radio-emitting air defense systems. Formally, these were missiles, i.e. "Not like drones." However, it should be borne in mind that the issue of "legal separation" of the category of missiles and UAVs is still controversial. And for example, domestic experts viewed American long-range attack UAVs as a violation of the "missile" treaty on the INF Treaty.

In addition, from the experience of using the first ground-to-ground complexes with PRR, the first mass UAV-kamikaze Harpy of Israel Aerospace Industries finally appeared (already in the XXI century).

The highest point of confrontation between air defense and aircraft (both manned and UAV) was the destruction of the air defense system (19 out of 24 deployed air defense missile systems in the area of ​​30 km along the front and 28 km in depth) of the Syrians in the Bekaa valley on June 9, 1982 (Operation Artsav ").

UAVs played a decisive role in the operation, performing tasks:

- reconnaissance and observation (including from relatively small distances from the air defense missile system due to the use of unobtrusive fiberglass UAVs Mastiff);
- conducting electronic intelligence;
- electronic suppression of air defense systems;
- imitation of false targets.

Keres ground launchers ensured the sudden and most covert destruction of the AGM-78 air defense radio-emitting air defense systems.


The Keres PRR AGM-78 launcher and the SAM combat vehicle struck by it.

Having full information on the air defense system (including on camouflaged air defense systems), the Israelis disorientated her with interference and false targets, suddenly knocked out the attendants of the anti-missile defense system PRR AGM-78 of the Keres complexes and finished off the whole day (in fact, the most powerful group in terms of air defense density in the world) by air strikes.

The defeat of the Syrian air defense grouping (who had performed well in the previous war) was complete and had far-reaching military and political consequences.

At the forefront of confrontation: UAVs against air defense
Downed by the Syrian artillery UAV Mastiff. Source: National Defense, oborona.ru

With the advent of new air defense systems, the tactics of their reconnaissance by "provoking" work on the UAV continued to work. On December 6, 1983, 200 Israeli BQM-3 UAVs were shot down over Lebanon by S-74 air defense missile systems.

"Desert Storm"


During the war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, the United States used 44 BQM-74C UAVs for reconnaissance air defense systems. BQM-74 Chukar is a standard mass (80% of shooting is carried out on it) aerial target of the US Armed Forces. We have to regret very much about the absence of its analogue in our country (as a result of which the newest shipborne air defense systems in our country are even carried out State tests on inappropriate Saman and RM-15 targets, or even parachute targets, as was the case on the recent Odintsovo MRK Gosakh ).


Launch of BQM-74 Chukar targets for testing naval air defense systems. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Syria and the war with ISIS


A feature of the hostilities against ISIS of the Armed Forces of Russia and the United States was not only the wide and effective use of their own UAVs, but also the very active and massive use of "homemade" UAVs by the enemy.

Note: Despite the deliberately primitive "external design", the design of the UAV (from terrorists) was highly appreciated by specialists.


One of the shot down (planted by means of electronic warfare) UAVs. Source: Russian Ministry of Defense, mil.ru

Initially, our air defense and electronic warfare systems showed themselves very, very well.


However, when repelling subsequent strikes, “problems arose” (especially for the Pantsir air defense missile system).

It can be unambiguously argued that those who made these UAVs had very competent consultants. In addition, the nature of their use against the Khmeimim airbase unambiguously spoke of the conduct by the "interested structures" of a special operation for reconnaissance of domestic air defense systems: UAVs flew not so much to defeat targets (with the proper approach, the consequences of the first strikes could be much more difficult for us), but rather provoking the work of air defense and electronic warfare systems for their analysis.

To a large extent, this was connected with the scandal with a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of some of our air defense systems. The presence of a number of problems (further eliminated by revision) in the course of hostilities was eventually recognized by the Chief Designer of the Pantsir. The adversary (here, it is likely that the Supreme's formulation will be more precise - “so-called partners”) actively explored the strengths and weaknesses of our air defense systems in the process of using ISIS UAVs and used them.

Karabakh-2016


In the course of short hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan for the first time were the Israeli UAV-destroyers Harop of the IAI company and a number of other UAVs. Their use was in the nature of military trials with the defeat of various targets (covered armored vehicles, a moving bus, etc.).


Harop UAV launch.

An international scandal was caused by the information that surfaced in 2017 about the direct participation of representatives of the Orbiter 1K UAV developer, Aeronautics Defense Systems, in these tests (with the killings of Armenians during UAV strikes). As the saying goes, "nothing personal, just business."

The Armenians possessed a significant number of Osa-AK air defense systems, which, subject to their timely and modern modernization, could well detect large enough Harop UAVs and hit them. However, the Armenian side did not draw any conclusions from these first calls and strikes against Karabakh in 2016.

Yemen


A striking example of successful confrontation with a disproportionately more powerful military machine of the enemy is the actions of the Yemeni Houthis against the coalition led by Saudi Arabia. And here not only the courage and dedication of the Houthis themselves was observed, but also the extremely skillful, unconventional and effective use by them (and their Iranian partners) of various high-tech weapons: from the long-obsolete Elbrus ballistic missiles and aircraft R-27T (from ground-based launchers) to UAVs, with which they successfully solved not only tactical, but also operational-strategic tasks (by delivering long-range strikes on important elements of the infrastructure of Saudi Arabia).

Yes, some of their UAVs are knocked down by the Saudi air defense.


Impact UAV Samad-3 in the capture of the sight of the F-15S fighter and its wreckage.

But most of them still achieve their goals. With extremely painful consequences for the Saudis.

In fact, in this war, UAVs for (lost their aircraft) the Houthis became a strategic tool against powerful and wealthy Saudi Arabia.

Libya 2019


For the first time, the Bayraktar TB2 medium attack UAVs with guided aerial bombs (UAB) MAM-L with a range of up to 8 km and UAB MAM-C with ISN and satellite correction with a range of 14 km were widely and successfully used against air defense systems.


It should be noted that for modern air defense systems, the detection and defeat of such a UAV as Bayraktar TB2 is by no means a technical problem. Large losses of "Shell" in Libya were due to organizational reasons. As soon as they began to put things in order with this and formed an integrated air defense system, the Bayraktar UAVs began to suffer heavy losses.

Another landmark event in the fighting in Libya was the first successful use of a laser air defense system with the destruction of a UAE medium attack UAE (made in China).

Karabakh-2020


In the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan destroyed only air defense systems of Armenians on "preliminary orders": 15 combat vehicles of the air defense system (three "Strela-10" air defense systems, 11 "Osa-AK / AKM" air defense systems, one "Cub" air defense system radar ), a self-propelled installation ZSU-23-4, several launchers of the S-300PS air defense system, eight radars (four types ST-68U / UM and one P-18, 5N63S, 1S32 and 1S91). Almost complete defeat was tank and an artillery group of Armenians in Karabakh.


SAM "Osa-AK" on the video of drums UAVs of Azerbaijan in Karabakh
(false target on the right).

A decisive role in this was played by reconnaissance UAVs.

It is the massive use of shock UAVs that is the main feature of this conflict.

On the verge of a military-technical revolution


It is obvious that the scale of the use of UAVs (including large groups of them) will only grow.


Multiple-charge launcher for combat UAVs in China.

To the west, Poland already has about 1 Warmate drone UAVs. They have a short range (000 km), and "Thor" and "Shell" are able to detect and shoot them down. But their widespread use in the course of hostilities is still an extremely serious problem for our air defense. It is impossible not to shoot down, but to shoot down everything is physically impossible simply because of the lack of ammunition of the air defense system.

The situation is similar for reconnaissance UAVs. Even for the simplest, but organizationally included in the reconnaissance and strike complexes (RUK) with long-range barrel and rocket artillery. "Foam disgrace" can circle a kilometer or two. The rifleman can't get it. But if you don't shoot him down, in minutes the shells will arrive (and very accurately arrive).


"Foam disgrace" from 404. But with a warhead (or camera). Source: dan-news.info

Meanwhile, the situation for UAVs is not as simple as it seems. And even their furious supporters talk about it (especially when they resort to knowingly dubious arguments). Below is the text widely distributed on the "open spaces of the Internet" (the key is highlighted), with comments:

Military experts spent several hundred simulated tests to study how the Aegis air defense / missile defense system, supplemented by six large-caliber machine guns, and two Phalanx anti-aircraft artillery systems will respond to a surprise attack of 5-10 drones attacking a warship from different directions. Due to the miniature size of the UAVs, radars, even in good visibility conditions, recorded their approach only at an extremely small distance: less than two kilometers. At a speed of drones of about 250 km / h, the maximum time to strike after detecting a target by radars was 15 seconds. Due to the short distance, Aegis could not attack detected targets with interceptor missiles or a 127 mm cannon. It was only possible to destroy drones at close range using machine guns and Phalanx complexes. It was estimated that on average 2,8 out of 8 drones completely “skipped” the most “advanced” defenses.
The simulated test results were published in 2012. American experts saw how helpless the ships of the Navy were in front of the attacks of future "swarming" drones, and this became one of the main motives for the development of mass UAV LOCUST.


Let me emphasize: "simulated tests", i.e. on the computer. And not in reality, where it would immediately be revealed that the Aegis radar detects these drones not at "less than two kilometers", but at distances (roughly) an order of magnitude greater. With all the ensuing possibilities of using air defense (and electronic warfare) fire weapons. And it is extremely doubtful that this is just the "accidental forgetfulness" of the persons who conducted these "simulated tests".

However, there is a problem. However, it does not lie in the recognition plane such modern radars of small-sized UAVs, but also in the presence of special modifications with the ability to classify them against the background, for example, flocks of birds.
An example of the cost of such radars is:

Lot No. 1 "0201-2018-01961. Production and delivery of RLM AFAR GIEF.411711.011, code "Pantsir-SM-SV" ". Price of the agreement: 400 (Russian ruble). Start date of the contract: 000

From the point of view of the combat stability of air defense systems and radars near the front line (and today the United States will practice the tasks of destroying our military air defense with long-range artillery), it is extremely important to ensure the operation of their radars and firing missiles in motion. And such a task for the "Tor" air defense system was solved (the "ship experience" of firing while rolling was useful).


Missile launch of the Tor-M2 complex. Source: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

"The three millionth SAM is being spent on a UAV worth $ 300."

The problem of fighting air defense against small UAVs is in the plane of their defeat, when the millionth missile defense system is spent on UAVs worth hundreds of dollars (from the comments of American generals to the reports on the successful destruction of the air defense missile systems).

Of course, this is an exaggerated example. The Houthis used much more sophisticated and effective UAVs than ISIS's $ 300 AliExpress Crafts (which the US had to deal with in Iraq and Syria). $ 3 million for the SAM is the exclusive US price tag for the wealthy Pinocchio in petrodollar countries.

The above-mentioned price tag of small UAVs made according to "military requirements" (10-20 thousand dollars) is close to that for our ATGMs of the "Kornet" and "Attack" types. ATGM "Kornet-D" must ensure defeat (including small-sized UAVs).

Has the problem of economically destroying the "extras" of small UAVs been solved? No, not solved. And there are many reasons for this (and not all of them should be given in an open article). A good example of this is the development of "Kupol" and KBP (the latter is the developer, including the "Cornet") of special "nails" - small missiles to defeat UAVs.


Model of short-range missiles "Nail", placed 4 missiles in one standard TPK SAM Pantsir-SM.

Information about work on such missiles appeared 3 years ago. But in an interview with TASS agency in January 2020, the chief designer of Pantsir admitted that she had not even reached the development level (ie, experimental design):

- It was reported about the development of small-sized missiles for "Pantsir". What is the status of these works now?
- While this is a research project, which does not bear fundamental questions, unlike a hypersonic missile, where it is necessary to pierce the dense atmosphere on hypersonic, where the control surfaces are burning. A small rocket does not require high speed, its main task is to be cheap. ... We hit such targets at a distance of 5-7 km, in the so-called near zone. It is economically feasible to make a small rocket. In addition, we can supply four times more of such missiles to the Shell.
- Are these small missiles installed in standard Pantsir launchers?
- It is planned to do so and use the same control system. Small missiles will have the same length as standard missiles, but they are smaller in diameter - instead of one standard missile, a cassette containing four ammunition will be inserted. On the machine itself, only the intellect will change.
- When can such missiles appear in the ammunition load of the complex?
- I cannot answer this question yet, but the cycle of development, production and testing of new missiles will take, I think, more than three to four years.

Obviously, there are problems. But with what? Radar sees small drones? He sees. In principle, the task of defeat is completely solved (by regular missiles). A snag (obviously) with the price of such new missiles, which suddenly becomes very "biting" (and much more than for an ATGM). But this issue (specifically on this topic and on the R&D system in general) must be considered separately.

That is, the key problem of mass small UAVs and their "swarms" for modern air defense is the military-economic: how to destroy them with an acceptable ratio of "efficiency-cost". To this can be added the problem of logistics: the presence in the ammunition load of the necessary (and sharply increased) number of missiles and the possibility of their rapid delivery and reloading of the air defense missile systems (and, in general, the presence of the necessary accumulated stock of missiles in the Armed Forces).

Of course, the question arises of the organization of air defense - not to give the enemy the opportunity to knock out our "near" air defense with medium UAVs such as Bayraktar TB2 from a safe distance and height. Despite the fact that the Bayraktar is quite a “fat” target for the Buk air defense missile system, the issue of increasing the engagement zone for the “near air defense” air defense system is very urgent. Such missiles should not be massive (since the main area of ​​operation of such air defense systems is less than 10ꟷ20 km), but they should simply be in small numbers in ammunition in case of Bayraktar-type targets. For "Pantsir" such missiles will appear in the near future. The solution for the "Torah" can be article 9M96 SAM with the provision of its application from the transport-loading vehicle of the SAM.

The problem with military air defense (and air defense in general) is that "it is still not enough." The line of contact is too great, there are too many objects (including in the rear) that need to be reliably covered. And in this situation, it is extremely important to give the combined-arms commanders (at the company level) a separate platoon of effective means of struggle, incl. with a UAV.

An effective technical solution will be the use of shells with remote detonation for automatic cannons.

The main promising option for us was the 57-mm "Derivation", the effectiveness of which was highly appreciated by experts.


At the same time, with regard to "Derivation", it is already necessary to note a serious problem, which can impose significant restrictions on its use in battle. The active use of shells with remote detonation (especially with a massive UAV raid on a wide front) over the positions of their troops, to put it mildly, is fraught (to hit people and equipment with striking elements of their own shells). Including "Derivation" in the TK ACS in order to "always know where ours are" is possibly theoretically and unconditionally necessary, but in practice (taking into account the width of the affected area), difficulties may be even because the TK ACS itself cannot reliably know where each soldier is, even in simple situations (not to mention the conditions of fire and electronic countermeasures).

Taking this factor into account, the capabilities of shells with remote detonation of a smaller caliber begin to be perceived significantly differently (despite the fact that formally they are significantly inferior to the 57 mm caliber both in efficiency and in economics). This is the path taken in the United States: giving the Bushmaster mass cannon the possibility of using new effective ammunition (including for small UAVs).


The defeat of the UAV by a shrapnel shell with remote detonation of the Bushmaster cannon. Source: Northrop Grumman

The range of application of such projectiles for the 2A42 cannons is in the area of ​​responsibility and attention (interaction and neighbor) of the platoon commander on the BMP-2. Despite the fact that such shells are very relevant not only for air targets, but also for many ground targets, the massive saturation of infantry fighting vehicles (or armored personnel carriers) with 30-mm cannons that have the ability to use shells with remote detonation seems to be much more priority. And there are such shells, and for a long time. But not in the troops:

TASS May 20, 2019. The Ministry of Defense has ordered the first batch of 30 mm guided detonation shells. The batch was ordered for state testing, as noted by the deputy general director of the Tekhmash concern Alexander Kochkin: "... I think that this work will be completed next year."


But this one is definitely good news ꟷ with a "smell". For too long these shells, which are badly needed by our army, go to the troops. Corporate newspaper ROMZ "Objective" dated 16.10.2014:

A few weeks ago, field tests of a prototype of the combined universal sight TKN-4GA-02, equipped with an additional channel of the complex for remote control of the time of detonation of projectiles (KDU VPS), were successfully passed: this is the main difference between the device and its serial prototype TKN-4GA-01 ...

The shells are equipped with a built-in remote fuse, which, after exiting the bore of the gun, receives a set of code pulses generated by the sight emitter to detonate after a time interval corresponding to the distance to the selected target. Work on the development of this topic began several years ago. ...A prototype was made, which underwent autonomous preliminary tests at the CIC, and in August 2014 was sent to the proving ground of the head contractor, JSC NPO Pribor, to conduct the first full-scale tests in real operating conditions as part of a mock-up stand, with an installation of 30 -mm cannon similar to those used at armored vehicles such as BTR, BMD, BMP, MT-LBM….The first firing tests of the TKN-4GA-02 sight were carried out at the set ranges of shell detonation in various weather conditions.

The results of the tests by the commission were previously recognized as very successful, since the efficiency of detonating the shells was about 75%, which is quite sufficient for the first prototypes of the sight and shells.

... In August-September 2014, a set of works was successfully completed on another device of OJSC "ROMZ", using the principle and function of the CDU VPS - laser programmer-emitter "Foresight-O". Based on the results of preliminary tests of the device at BMPT (Nizhny Tagil) The CD of our product has been assigned the letter "O", which confirms both the high technical level of development, manufacturing of samples, and the correctness of the chosen path of step-by-step increase in the efficiency of the use of modern armored vehicles by equipping with KDU VPS complexes of various designs.

It remains only to recall the gabions (and other means of protection) at the Khmeimim airbase, the urgent need of which was repeatedly written not only in reports, but also on the Internet. However, our planes in the combat zone continued to stand wing to wing until the roast cock pecked.

In this particular situation, there is a bad feeling that it was not us who "woke up", but that the Algerian customer of the BMPT rigidly demanded such shells (to receive the letter O1) and Gosy.

Electronic warfare factor


A drone with an Aliexpress for $ 300 cannot have any noise-immune communication system, (at the same time, suppression of noise-immune communication channels of "correct military" UAVs is a very non-trivial task), equipment resistant to electromagnetic impulses.

As a matter of fact, the minimum price of the military (with communications and electronics for combat requirements) of a UAV in the West is now in the region of 15-20 thousand dollars (with attempts to reduce it to 10 thousand dollars). And this is for tactical UAVs with a range of up to 20 km.

However, serious military equipment sometimes has problems with resistance to the effects of powerful electromagnetic fields. From the historical sketches of Captain 1st Rank V.K. Pechatnikov on testing the M-22 air defense system:

To carry out firing at the jammer, the ship had to relocate from Severomorsk to Severodvinsk ... The helicopter, specially flown from the Belarusian Air Defense District, based in Poduzhma ... during the experiments was incapacitated ... When the full power of two radio searchlights was supplied to his escort, the receiver of the reconnaissance equipment burned out, and the resulting short circuit led to a fire on the helicopter itself. He barely managed to fly to the airfield ...

It would be appropriate here to cite the article “Electromagnetic resistance weapons"From (magazine of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation" Army Collection "No. 4 for 2018):

Persistence is the property of a technical tool to perform its functions and maintain the specified parameters within the limits during and after the action of an external influencing factor.
... Currently, one of the types of new weapons has appeared - electromagnetic weapons (EMO). Its main damaging factor is a powerful impulse flow radio frequency electromagnetic radiation (RFEMI), the sources of which can be divided into two classes.
The first should include sources of directional radiation (ISI) - traditional devices of vacuum electronics (magnetrons, vircators).
The second class of emitters includes direct converters of conventional explosive (explosive) energy into electromagnetic.
... Intensive research on the resistance of vehicles to electromagnetic influences (EME) began with us, unfortunately, only in 1970. The main efforts and financial costs were aimed at creating simulators of an electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear explosion (EMP NAV). As for the methodology for the experimental assessment of resistance to the impact of EMR of nuclear weapons, little progress has been achieved so far.
New government regulations require the provision of resistance to about 30 types of electromagnetic influences and the determination of quantitative values ​​of resistance indicators, set in a probabilistic-parametric form. This is a very large and costly stage of weapon development.

On the effectiveness (or inefficiency) of domestic electronic warfare means, there are some statements from the field. Moreover, from persons, albeit biased, but had direct access to real information:

Yerevan, November 19, Sputnik. During the war in Karabakh, the Armenian side temporarily managed to limit the activity of enemy drones in the sky. The former head of the General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces Movses Hakobyan said this at a press conference on Thursday, answering a question from Sputnik Armenia.
According to Hakobyan, this was possible thanks to the deployment of the Pole 21 electronic warfare equipment in Karabakh. This allowed for four days to restrict the flights of unmanned aerial vehicles, including the Turkish "Bayraktar", which is believed to have caused the greatest damage to the Armenian Armed Forces. However, unfortunately, then the enemy managed to change the control system and "bypass" these electronic warfare means.

Nevertheless, even with limited effectiveness against UAVs (made according to military requirements), electronic warfare means remain an extremely important factor against UAVs, providing effective suppression of artisanal UAVs and thereby dramatically reducing the consumption of expensive weapons for attacking UAVs.
As a matter of fact, such a scheme of countering UAV strikes has developed in our country in Khmeimim: anti-aircraft fire weapons mainly hit those that managed to "break through" through the electronic warfare.

conclusions


If, for example, a brigade of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with standard weapons (and even enhanced air defense systems) were in Karabakh, heavy losses would still have been inevitable: simply because there were “too many” drones. Yes, their losses would have been great, but military-technical superiority and resources would still not be on our side.

In this regard, the issue of emergency modernization of military air defense systems is acute to ensure effective countering to new UAV threats.

As mentioned above, the key condition for reliable UAV detection is the availability of effective mobile radars. In addition to purchasing them (and placing at least a Tiger on an armored base), an urgent modernization of the Torov, Tungusok and possibly Os-AKM existing in the army is obviously needed.

It is extremely important to speed up work on "small missiles" against UAVs and long-range (about 40 km) missiles for short-range air defense systems (as an additional means to the main ammunition for missiles with a range of 10-20 km).

The task of mass equipping troops with shells with remote detonation of 30 mm caliber (primarily due to the modernization of infantry fighting vehicles) should go beyond any queue. At the same time, the issue of organizing interaction and communication with the UAV reconnaissance radar (separate and as part of the air defense system) should be resolved.

Electronic warfare equipment (both suppression equipment and RTR, including UAV radio lines) should be included in the staffs at the battalion level (with the possibility of “division” when forming separate company tactical groups).

In addition, combat training is required (starting with research exercises) for real massive UAV raids. The ground forces have an understanding of this, but when the Navy surrenders Gosy ships with parachute targets, then this is "a mistake, worse than a crime."

Of course, these are not all the conclusions. But these are the main ones.

The extremely important and very painful issue of organizing our R&D will be considered in the next article.
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  1. Ross xnumx
    Ross xnumx 1 December 2020 05: 05
    +12
    Thanks for the article!
    Concerning:
    The extremely important and very painful issue of organizing our R&D will be considered in the next article.

    We got acquainted with these research and development work on the example of the department of Anatolia and Co.
    Creation of guaranteed no-fly zones for enemy UAVs is the most effective way to combat swarms. How can this be achieved? There are scientists. Everything can be applied here: from the creation of systems for suppressing UAV control signals in a given area and EMP guidance in a terrain area to the physical destruction of operators and a complete cleanup of the enemy's territory.
    1. lucul
      lucul 1 December 2020 10: 47
      +5
      Thanks for the article

      Surprisingly sound article, albeit with praise of Israel, in between times)))
      By conclusions:
      As mentioned above, the key condition for reliable UAV detection is the availability of effective mobile radars.

      no matter how bad but to me, from the couch , it seems necessary to supplement each motorized rifle unit with a mobile radar, with the possibility of network centrics. That is, the mobile radar detects and issues target designation to all BMP / armored personnel carriers around.
      The task of mass equipping troops with shells with remote detonation of 30 mm caliber (primarily due to the modernization of infantry fighting vehicles) should go out of turn.

      I completely agree with this - there is no need to save money here (I remember the tsar was shown a machine gun, to which he replied - they say there will not be enough cartridges for it (we will go broke), as history later showed - it was a deeply erroneous opinion).
      But shells with remote detonation are useless against the UAV, if target designation from the radar is not issued for it. Therefore, both the radar and the motorized rifle subunit (all units of equipment) must be connected by a wireless (like cellular communication) high-speed (and anti-jamming) DIGITAL bus / interface for data transmission (encrypted). Which we have yet to develop (network centric).
      What will be the result? When a drone UAV approaches an infantry fighting vehicle / armored personnel carrier of a mobile radar, it is detected and it is already met by all 30mm guns in the attacked unit, that is, in fact - a wall of fire.
      The mobile radar can be easily replaced by a UAV or any external target designation, the main thing is that the UAV / APC has the ability to transmit target designation, ideally in automatic mode (target destruction). But for this it is necessary to modernize (saturate with electronics) all our BMP / armored personnel carriers.
      Therefore, network centrics is our everything. In fact, equipping troops with network centrics is akin to equipping troops with radio stations in the 20-30s of the 20th century. Will have the same breakthrough.
      1. Old tanker
        Old tanker 1 December 2020 11: 03
        +11
        But on "Derivation" the channel for detecting SVN is optical. This is done in order not to yell at the entire battlefield with radar radiation: "I am here, fill me up first." And you offer a radar station to each unit (although it’s not clear what you mean, after all, a unit is from a squad to a battalion, inclusive). There should not be any detection radar in the subunits. Only optical detection channels, which already now quite allow the detection of airborne weapons while approaching the line of effective fire by these units.
        1. lucul
          lucul 1 December 2020 11: 37
          -4
          But on "Derivation" the channel for detecting SVN is optical.

          Does he also work at night and in fog? )))
          This is done in order not to yell at the entire battlefield with radar radiation: "I am here, fill me up first."

          Therefore, I say - which is better from a UAV or other source of target designation (reconnaissance aircraft, satellite). If they are, of course.
          1. sivuch
            sivuch 1 December 2020 13: 20
            +8
            At night - yes, in fog - no. But the enemy will have similar problems. A radar station at the department level is unrealistic.
            1. Vadim237
              Vadim237 1 December 2020 15: 04
              -2
              Why not really - portable radars are fully represented.
              1. sivuch
                sivuch 1 December 2020 15: 13
                +7
                That is, out of ten soldiers, two will carry the Harmony? (We are not even talking about money). There are other portable radars, but they are tailored for the NC. They will miss an air target at an altitude of at least 5-6 km.
                1. Vadim237
                  Vadim237 1 December 2020 19: 30
                  0
                  And why a dozen radar soldiers, okay, if there was a company that needed to make trenches and dugouts, and even then, in this case, they should be covered by air defense and air force.
                  1. bk316
                    bk316 2 December 2020 14: 37
                    0
                    Why do ten radar soldiers

                    Well, the man explained. The department does not need a single radar station in FIG. But if each department has radars connected to a single network with radars of other departments, and even this network will be DISTRIBUTED, that is, without a single control center, then firstly such a radar cannot be destroyed by any UAV, and secondly, company weapons UAVs (and not only UAVs) will constantly have target designations AT ALL DO NOT LIGHT IN THE RADIO BAND.
                    In reality, there is everything for this, the question, as always, rests on the grandmother ...
            2. bk316
              bk316 1 December 2020 18: 14
              0
              At night - yes, in fog - no. But the enemy will have similar problems.

              Absolutely. But why is radar impossible at the department level? On the boats there are portable radars .... And is it a compartment for an infantry fighting vehicle or an armored personnel carrier, but even a tiger?
              1. lucul
                lucul 2 December 2020 18: 16
                -1
                Is it the same squad on an infantry fighting vehicle or an armored personnel carrier, but at least on a tiger?

                That's right.
                If you put the means of detection and tracking passive type
                It is proposed to use the optical-electronic system of the OES OP developed by OJSC "Peleng" (Minsk)

                For each infantry fighting vehicle / armored personnel carrier motorized rifle and connect them into a single network, having previously given them the opportunity to shoot shells with remote detonation, we get a very toothy ruff, completely ready for attacks by kamikaze drones. And to destroy such armored vehicles, the UAV will have to increase the range of destruction, that is, shoot from afar, which immediately increases the size and mass of the UAV, and exposes them to the blow of longer-range air defense.
                PS with a large series, the cost of the optoelectronic radar will drop sharply - we were able to catch the price of the MiG-21 at the level of the BMP-2, all thanks to the large series of the MiG-21.
              2. Garris199
                Garris199 3 December 2020 02: 45
                +2
                It must be a fairly powerful and dimensional radar to detect such subtle targets at any decent distance, while being in the rear of the unit, so that it is not covered by the first artillery attack or mortar mine. Roughly speaking, you can't put the radar station from the Carapace on the Tiger, the BMPs will not fit, consider that you will need to essentially make the Carapace on a caterpillar track.
                For the protection of armored vehicles, the AZ of the Arena or Afghanite type suggests itself with good protection of the upper hemisphere both at the level of detection and selection, and at the classification of attacking targets.
                1. 3danimal
                  3danimal 9 January 2021 06: 10
                  0
                  How many armored vehicles with KAZ are in service?
            3. alexmach
              alexmach 2 December 2020 09: 01
              +2
              The article seemed to be about the company and battalion levels.
              And as for Derivation - yes, it is generally reasonable not to glow with radio emission on the battlefield, but the use of such means also presupposes target designation from an external command post with a surveillance radar ...
              1. Old tanker
                Old tanker 2 December 2020 17: 25
                0
                So "Derivation" goes to the zerite divisions of regiments and brigades. In general, for a long time, all the zerit units of the ground forces in a single network from the army level to the command post of batteries.
            4. Svateev
              Svateev 3 December 2020 15: 10
              0
              Quote: sivuch
              into the fog - no

              Why not? In the IR sub-range it is very far visible even in fog. The multispectral camera is of course even better.
              In addition, in the fog, the UAV itself will see just as little.
              A passive (non-emitting) optical location station is the very thing for firing at a distance of up to 10 km approximately.
            5. 3danimal
              3danimal 9 January 2021 06: 11
              0
              Thermal imagers are installed on UAVs, which does not limit their use in any weather.
          2. Old tanker
            Old tanker 2 December 2020 17: 23
            +1
            UAVs do not fly into fog.
            1. your1970
              your1970 7 December 2020 09: 44
              +2
              All this is great ... But there are nuances ...
              The proposals are reasonable - each company has a radar station, a cloud of all kinds of drones, artillery with complex shells, network-centric communications, and so on.
              And here is the global problem - all this is TOO complicated and will not allow it to be released on a massive scale in case of war. And it's not even about the high cost - it's about industry and resources.
              But the most important thing is that it is not at all clear about the war with what enemy all this splendor?
              С by whom are we at war?
              If this is the United States and NATO, then none of this is relevant. After massive nuclear strikes - all non-bunker electronics will be covered with a basin and massive Kalashnikovs and tanks of the T-34-85 level will be needed ...
              If this is Ukraine or Poland, this is also not very relevant, we will not pull a conventional war for more than half a year economically.
              If this is all possible babakh, then yes, but even then only if it is massive. With partisans with a number of up to a platoon, who can easily hide among the civilian population, this will not work either
              And even if no one attacks, when we try to make all this massive and accessible to the level of a company, we ourselves will overwhelm our economy. Without any war ...

              And there will be an effect on 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX - tanks (drones !!!) there seems to be a lot, but the crews are not prepared, there are no spare parts, the fuel has burned out, the shells are unknown where, the commander was killed, there is no communication ...
              1. 3danimal
                3danimal 9 January 2021 05: 43
                0
                tanks of the T-34-85 level

                Why such a primitive if the T-52/54 will also work?
                1. your1970
                  your1970 9 January 2021 11: 35
                  0
                  Quote: 3danimal
                  tanks of the T-34-85 level

                  Why such a primitive if the T-52/54 will also work?

                  I'm not a tanker - I'm an artilleryman repeat , I do not know what is there in the 52/54 electronics - what can become faulty with EMP ...
                  Therefore, I suggested 34-85- on which there was nothing but walkie-talkies
                  1. 3danimal
                    3danimal 9 January 2021 12: 53
                    0
                    The T-34-85 had an electric turret rotation drive. Without him, she spins very slowly.
                    T-54 - adopted for service in the second half of the 40s, had the same "vulnerability", but unlike it is stronger protected and armed.
                    1. your1970
                      your1970 9 January 2021 13: 01
                      0
                      Well, persuaded lol I agree to such a replacement ...
                      Which, in principle, does not cancel the choice of weapons, depending on the planned enemy
            2. 3danimal
              3danimal 9 January 2021 06: 09
              0
              What's the problem with a thermal imager and GPS?
    2. 3danimal
      3danimal 9 January 2021 05: 41
      0
      UAVs are moving towards ever greater autonomy (on the impact of electronic warfare).
      About the physical destruction of operators: how will you find them, how will you strike if they are in a third country, which you are not ready to declare war on?
      1. meandr51
        meandr51 17 January 2021 01: 06
        0
        That is, the third country is ready to launch UAVs for our bombing, and we - no, no?
        1. 3danimal
          3danimal 17 January 2021 17: 00
          +1
          Conflict in Karabakh.
          When UAV operators are located in Turkey, would you risk striking Turkish territory in the place of the Armenian leadership?
          And the main point: you almost never determine the location.
  2. Thrifty
    Thrifty 1 December 2020 05: 21
    +3
    Good article, the author is easily recognizable by the style of presentation of the material, by the unwillingness to call the UAV exactly the UAV, and the UAV. Hence the semantic errors, when under one name they mean barging ammunition. Although, basically, the author is right, you need to prepare for a war against the drones of the opposing side against everything, including our drones. And, given the fact that we still have the Kremlin naively hopes that the West will help us, instead of creating their own engines for strike drones, they rushed to buy Austrian ones, bought one batch of a dozen or a dozen for Oreon-type strike drones, then the United States threatened Austria with sanctions. Russia does not have the result - engines for Oreon and Altair-Altius! You need to create your own, from scratch. In the meantime, as an option, the Persians, in exchange for the modernized T72B3 tanks, exchange 30-40 of theirs shock drones. That is to say, to use "military barter". By the way, we seem to have a deeply modernized version of the Shell with a much greater range of detection, tracking, and destruction of targets. The same is true for the new Tor M3, which the Armenians simply do not have, because they themselves are few ...
    1. lucul
      lucul 1 December 2020 10: 24
      -7
      Russia does not have the result-engines for Oreon and Altair-Altius!

      I have been saying for a long time that the development of new automobile engines (a line with a volume of 1 liter to 50 liters) is TABU, first for the USSR, and then for Russia. After all, the car is built around the engine, and not the car separately and the engine separately. We could churn out equipment in hundreds of thousands and all with antediluvian engines, that is, drive the shaft, and not quality superiority. This is a strategic planning miscalculation. After all, having a wide range of engines, you can develop a variety of models directly designed for a wide range of tasks. And when you have only 2-3 engines on your hands, then you don't really design, because you are tied hand and foot by the limitations of the engine.
      All this should have been done yesterday, but today it is too late, when the advanced countries are going to switch to electric motors, we were still "allowed" to engage in motor-building of internal combustion engines.
      1. 3danimal
        3danimal 9 January 2021 06: 04
        0
        this is TABOO, first for the USSR, and then for Russia

        Not Taboo (sacred prohibition), but the result of lagging behind in this area.
    2. timokhin-aa
      1 December 2020 15: 40
      +3
      from Klimov
      1. "Great specialists in terminology" to read the latest docs and official information from the RF Ministry of Defense
      for example, http://mil.ru/924gcba/equipment.htm - UNIVERSE COMPLEXES (that is, it is the UAV, not the UAV)!
      2. If the layman finds out that in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "refers to UAVs" (meat grinders at the cook, they do not apply ... PROBABLY;)) - his "condracy is enough" (and the developers "relieve stress" with "classics" and "eat with validol ")
      3. Who doesn't like - "write letters in small handwriting": https://letters.mil.ru/electronic_reception.htm
    3. Eroma
      Eroma 5 December 2020 14: 35
      0
      Considering that the drone needs to be shot down over its territory, then it's probably time to re-file some kind of La5 with a pair of multi-barreled machine guns and a dozen Needle-type missiles under the wing wink these airplanes can mow blah, I think in batches good
      1. 3danimal
        3danimal 9 January 2021 06: 02
        0
        The UAV is a very small target, but it can have an effect.
        By the way, an example is the purchase of the Super Tucano turboprop attack aircraft by the US Air Force. On which nothing prevents to put a dozen or two Stingers.
        Instead of a machine gun, I would still put the GSh-23.
    4. 3danimal
      3danimal 9 January 2021 05: 47
      0
      The shell is limited by the directionality of the launchers and their guidance means. As a result, it is helpless with a non-knightly "star" raid of ammunition.
    5. 3danimal
      3danimal 9 January 2021 06: 08
      0
      Thor is limited by the channeling means of guidance and the capabilities of the radar against low-speed targets with low RCS.
      The solution is an active seeker (like SeaRAM or NASAMS) on each rocket. And a new radar.
      And this will be a new air defense system smile
      1. Eroma
        Eroma 9 January 2021 18: 15
        0
        SAM is a point coverage weapon! In this case, the UAV is proactive and can choose targets. And LA5 or something like that, this is what you need against the UAV
        1. 3danimal
          3danimal 9 January 2021 21: 06
          0
          I answered above about La5 smile
          It could be some kind of Yak-130 with GSH-23 and a dozen "Eagles" under the wings.
          But it can be used only with the domination of its aviation over a given territory, otherwise he is a suicide bomber.
  3. Pessimist22
    Pessimist22 1 December 2020 05: 40
    -1
    And a massive strike by Calibers, Iskanders, Hurricanes and Tornadoes on pre-identified launchers, airfields, bases, etc., will not save you from UAVs?
    1. Jacket in stock
      Jacket in stock 1 December 2020 06: 43
      +7
      Quote: Pessimist22
      a massive strike with Calibers, Iskanders, Hurricanes and Tornadoes on pre-identified launchers, airfields, bases, etc.

      Yeah, but the enemy will sit on the priest exactly and wait ...
      Then whoever fired the first hit. And the first to start a war is another story. You need to be mentally prepared to "go to heaven."
      The whole catch is that it is not our doctrine to shoot first, but you need to be able to fend off the first surprise attack on us. The reaction time is seconds, the mass of the plaque is maximum.
      1. Pessimist22
        Pessimist22 1 December 2020 06: 56
        -2
        Well, I didn't know that the UAV flies in seconds and that the reaction time for them is less than for ballistic missiles
        1. Jacket in stock
          Jacket in stock 1 December 2020 07: 17
          +2
          Ballistic missiles will come from the depths of the territory, if you are not talking about MLRS, which are also ballistic.
          Or do you propose to launch "calibers" before aircraft cross the neighbors of our state border?
          And yes, a low-flying aircraft, even pilot, even unmanned, especially flying at an extremely low altitude in the folds of the terrain, can actually be detected in a few seconds.
          1. SKS_PRO
            SKS_PRO 1 December 2020 16: 33
            +4
            It is believed that this is one of the weaknesses of the UAV. They can be shot down without political consequences even in enemy airspace. The question is to learn how to use this weakness.
          2. 3danimal
            3danimal 9 January 2021 05: 57
            0
            Clarification: a few seconds before hitting him.
      2. Kart
        Kart 2 December 2020 09: 29
        -2
        Quote: Jacket in stock
        Yeah, but the enemy will sit on the priest exactly and wait ...
        Then whoever fired the first hit. And the first to start a war is another story. You need to be mentally prepared to "go to heaven."

        That is, it is assumed that ours will sit in the field and wait. A highly mobile, intelligent enemy will destroy them at this time.
        Well, this is all-propalism in its purest form.
        1. Chizhov Kirill
          Chizhov Kirill 2 December 2020 15: 26
          0
          well it was on June 22
          1. Kart
            Kart 2 December 2020 16: 44
            -2
            Nifiga is wrong.
            So it was only among Russophobes in their "history".
            In fact, they did everything they could. And we prepared as best we could.
      3. 3danimal
        3danimal 9 January 2021 05: 53
        0
        There is no paradise, alas. Non-existence.
    2. Garris199
      Garris199 3 December 2020 03: 11
      0
      I will support. As the saying goes, the best defense is offense. Here the task of our intelligence, including the RTR, is to know everything and everyone about the enemy prepared to attack. At the start of the OBD, the missiles should already fly to "congratulate" the UAV operators and not only. Yes, and videoconferencing should take the sky, but that's another story.
      1. 3danimal
        3danimal 9 January 2021 05: 55
        0
        It is naive to think that your opponent will reveal to you the location of the UAV control points. Now it may be a truck with a trailer in motion. Have you already conquered the dominance of the air, Turkey, say?
    3. 3danimal
      3danimal 9 January 2021 05: 52
      0
      Much more expensive, rougher. You may not know where the operators are.
      Which are capable of safely destroying Iskanders, Hurricanes and Tornadoes, which is really bad - together with valuable crews.
      And this has a negative effect on morality.
  4. pmkemcity
    pmkemcity 1 December 2020 05: 55
    +1
    Quote: ROSS 42
    Creation of guaranteed no-fly zones for enemy UAVs is the most effective way to combat swarms.

    I absolutely agree with you! The entire history of air defense, from World War II to the present time, suggests that it is possible to fight, and most importantly, to win, with an air enemy only if the land (sea) infrastructure of the enemy involved in the air attack is destroyed.
    1. Hagen
      Hagen 1 December 2020 12: 01
      +1
      Quote: pmkemcity
      it is possible to win with an air enemy only if the ground (sea) infrastructure of the enemy involved in the air attack is destroyed.

      This is during WWII. And today, UAVs in the Donetsk region can be controlled from Kiev or even from Washington. How do you propose, in the context of a local conflict in the LPNR, for example, to crush the ground infrastructure that controls these UAVs via satellite communications? I think, one way or another, to combat UAVs, it will be necessary to use 57 mm projectiles with controlled detonation, and perhaps even switch to 76 mm automatic cannons. For Bayraktar at 8500 meters, 57 mm is no longer scary.
      1. sivuch
        sivuch 1 December 2020 13: 25
        +1
        Not all UAVs have plates on their backs. And there have already been reports that Leer-3 (which is also a UAV) was used against the UAV, or rather the control lines.
        About Bayraktar they write 8200. But this is the maximum ceiling and, most likely, without BN. The real one will be somewhat smaller. Plus sometimes it's cloudy
        1. Hagen
          Hagen 1 December 2020 13: 33
          0
          Quote: sivuch
          About Bayraktar they write 8200.

          For the AU-220, the firing zone at an altitude of 5000 m.All the same, it will not be enough ...
          Quote: sivuch
          Not all UAVs have plates on their backs.

          The 150 km distance of the launcher from the UAV's area of ​​operation is also a serious distance to detect and destroy.
      2. pmkemcity
        pmkemcity 1 December 2020 14: 39
        0
        Quote: Hagen
        And today, UAVs in the Donetsk region can be controlled from Kiev or even from Washington.

        That is why such conflicts are insoluble until the complete destruction of Moscow or Washington.
      3. Dmitry Leontiev
        Dmitry Leontiev 1 December 2020 18: 31
        -3
        Quote: Hagen
        For Bayraktar at 8500 meters, 57 mm is no longer scary.

        But if you launch missiles not with an exploding warhead, but, say, with a couple of high-speed drones with machine guns, which will find the target themselves, finish it off themselves and return - no Bayraktar will get through even at 10000. And in general, with such a weapon in plural, the use of any swarms of UAVs will become unprofitable - each such hunter-fighter will be able to destroy a couple of UAVs, and then return to his base, descend by parachute - and after a while is ready to take off again. As a result, an expensive warhead with a guidance system is not lost. The defeat factor is not an explosion, but a machine gun burst.
        1. meandr51
          meandr51 17 January 2021 01: 15
          0
          Such a BP fighter will not find the target itself. Or find it no more than a kilometer away.
      4. meandr51
        meandr51 17 January 2021 01: 13
        0
        Shoot down or neutralize satellites.
  5. Lech from Android.
    Lech from Android. 1 December 2020 06: 28
    0
    Thank you Maxim for the article ... I read your vision of the situation with the UAV with great interest. hi
    The extremely important and very painful issue of organizing our R&D will be considered in the next article.

    Shoigu has already expressed his displeasure with them ...
    SHOYGU TASED THE MILITARY TO REFUSE UNNECESSARY AND COST PROJECTS

    https://oficery.ru/news/12668
  6. bairat
    bairat 1 December 2020 07: 04
    +3
    Dash were lost on the way. 10-20 km for close air defense, not 1020 km. The same with the cost, 15-20 thousand $, not 1520)))
  7. Bez 310
    Bez 310 1 December 2020 07: 25
    +6
    The article confirms the fears ...
    I wonder if there are such weapons and military
    technique where everything is really good with us, and not in
    advertising reports? All sorts of "Zircons" ... bring
    as an example, not necessary, since they are not in service, and 450
    km is not the launch range at which to use
    hypersonic anti-ship missiles.
    1. sivuch
      sivuch 1 December 2020 13: 27
      +6
      Well, that you, of course, all polymers, addition.
      It is far from a fact that 450 km is the maximum range for Zircon.
      1. Bongo
        Bongo 1 December 2020 14: 16
        +8
        Quote: sivuch
        It is far from a fact that 450 km is the maximum range for Zircon.

        Maybe not the maximum. But this, by and large, does not change anything, since the problem of issuing target designation has not been solved.
        1. sivuch
          sivuch 1 December 2020 14: 19
          +6
          I believe that it is, let's say, partially resolved winked
          And the farther from the native shores, the more partial.
          1. Bongo
            Bongo 1 December 2020 14: 21
            +5
            Quote: sivuch
            I believe that it is, shall we say, solved partially winked
            And the farther from the native shores, the more partial.

            I would say very strongly partially ...
            1. Kart
              Kart 2 December 2020 09: 30
              -4
              The main thing is to strongly believe in it. Repeat in front of the mirror - "Russian missiles are not scary, these are advertising, these are cartoons."
              Then it's okay.
              1. timokhin-aa
                2 December 2020 10: 10
                +2
                But in essence there is something to say? There are problems with the control center.
                1. Kart
                  Kart 2 December 2020 16: 47
                  0
                  So what?
                  There are always problems, they are solved.
                  You do not think that everyone around in the top military leadership is fools, but only you have an understanding.
                  "Tell the emperor - the British do not clean guns with bricks. We must not clean ours either, otherwise there will be a war ..."
  8. Operator
    Operator 1 December 2020 07: 35
    -2
    Comrades, the authors of the article: it is not necessary to load the former chief of the mine-torpedo warhead with information unusual for him, he even "understands" his own by borrowing from senior comrades laughing

    On the topic of the article - the main vulnerability of existing air defense systems is the presence of a radar, which is visible to airborne RTR from a distance of several hundred kilometers. After that, the air defense system, glowing in the radio range like a Christmas tree, is easily and simply destroyed by any proto-radar munition without entering the air defense zone of its air carrier.

    As the cheapest PRB, kamikaze drones can be used by implementing the so-called. star raid on the air defense missile system simultaneously from different azimuths in an amount exceeding the number of guidance channels of the air defense missile system, which was repeatedly demonstrated by the enemy, starting from the Bekaa valley almost 40 years ago and ending with Karabakh a few weeks ago.

    And the leadership of the domestic air defense, as always, publishes rosy information about the number of downed penny drones, without commenting in any way on the total defeat of the Syrian army in Idlib and the Armenian army in Karabakh with the loss of thousands of servicemen, hundreds of armored vehicles and dozens of air defense systems destroyed by the enemy at the cost of only dozens of UAVs and ammunition consumption of several hundred penny kamikaze drones.

    Comrades authors - the domestic air defense is in dire need of an air defense system exclusively with a passive means of detecting air targets in the form of a wide-angle video camera operating in the optical and near infrared range (coinciding with the range of video cameras for reconnaissance UAVs and kamikaze drones), as well as ground-to-air missiles "equipped with exclusively passive optical-infrared seeker with a hardware-software device for recognizing air targets by their contour.

    I report that the above wide-angle cameras cost several thousand bucks each and are widely used in building security systems, and the above GOS with firmware is installed in every smartphone produced in billions of copies per year at a price of one hundred bucks per set.

    PS Under Stalin, such negligence on the part of the leadership of the Air Defense Forces would have long been regarded as sabotage with appropriate organizational conclusions.
    1. Jacket in stock
      Jacket in stock 1 December 2020 08: 06
      +10
      Quote: Operator
      that the above wide-angle cameras cost several thousand bucks each and are widely used in security systems of buildings, and the above GOS with software and hardware is installed in every smartphone produced in billions of copies

      Yes, only all this splendor is not produced here, therefore it has no right to be used in military equipment.
      And the equipment made according to household standards is usually practically unsuitable for use.
      Although you are mostly right, our electronics industry is in a deep hole.
      Which, however, is not surprising, because in the government there are still the same people who said - why do we need to produce something ourselves, everything has already been done, we will buy.
    2. OgnennyiKotik
      OgnennyiKotik 1 December 2020 09: 11
      -4
      Quote: Operator
      Air defense is in dire need of an air defense system exclusively with a passive means of detecting air targets in the form of a wide-angle video camera operating in the optical and near infrared range (coinciding with the range of operation of video cameras for reconnaissance UAVs and kamikaze drones), as well as ground-to-air missiles equipped exclusively passive optical-infrared seeker with a hardware and software device for recognizing air targets by their contour.

      Surprisingly, I completely agree.
      High-quality cameras operating on various ranges + computer vision are simply necessary for near-field air defense. Yes, and for work on ground targets is useful.
      BMPT can be used as a base. There will be a sense from him. Guided projectiles, ATGM, MANPADS, a block of various cameras / radars, BIUS (self-target detection, choice of weapons, destruction with operator confirmation). In the USA, it is analogous to IM-SHORAD.

    3. timokhin-aa
      1 December 2020 15: 46
      +4
      From the author

      Dyusha and Co:
      Comrades, authors of the article: it is not necessary to load the former chief of the mine-torpedo warhead with information unusual for him, he even "understands" his own by borrowing from senior comrades laughing


      MK: Musier, I passed my BC back in 2008, but what I did after is none of your business.

      Dyusha and Co:
      On the topic of the article - the main vulnerability of existing air defense systems is the presence of a radar, which is visible to airborne RTR from a distance of several hundred kilometers. After that, the air defense system, glowing in the radio range like a Christmas tree, is easily and simply destroyed by any proto-radar munition without entering the air defense zone of its air carrier.


      MK: Dyusha, you're just very stupid. For the task of air defense is not to "hide" but to PROTECT. And without radar, this task is solved VERY BADLY

      Dyusha and Co:
      As the cheapest PRB, kamikaze drones can be used by implementing the so-called. star raid on the air defense missile system simultaneously from different azimuths in an amount exceeding the number of guidance channels of the air defense missile system, which was repeatedly demonstrated by the enemy, starting from the Bekaa valley almost 40 years ago and ending with Karabakh a few weeks ago.


      MK: Dyusha, you have not "arguments", but an illiterate sucking on a dirty finger. We consider, let's say BM "Tor-M2" ONE (and not a "link" as minimal in tactics), but with TZM with "unlimited number of 9M331 missiles (since there is not much data on 9M338K). We consider the "star raid" from 16 Harop UAVs (roughly 50 m / s), because If there will be at least 20 km of such UAVs, then the first UAVs are destroyed at the far border of the affected zone (15 km), during this time (V average missile defense system 600 m / s, i.e. 25 s) the rest will approach 1250 m (roughly 1,5 km), i.e. at a distance of 13,5 km, a new salvo at the next 4 UAVs (the defeat time is already about 20 s). During this time, the UAVs will fly another 1 km, i.e. the new salvo will be at a distance of 12,5 km (defeat time 19s). There are 4 UAVs left, which during this time will reach a distance of 11,5 km and will be destroyed at 10,8 km.
      ALL, ALL 16 UAVs of the "star raid" were shot down, air defense systems with a limited sector of the firing radar (but with its redeployment), and at a distance of up to 10 km. Yes, BC BM "Tor" 8 SAM 9M331 (that's why we need TZM). However, FACTS ON THE FACE, an air defense system with a GOOD radar is a BROOM, and NO OPTICS IS CAPABLE OF THIS.
      Yes, the "foam stuff" will not be detected at 20 km like the Harop, but it flies more slowly.

      Dyusha and Co:
      And the leadership of the domestic air defense, as always, publishes rosy information about the number of downed penny drones, without commenting in any way on the total defeat of the Syrian army in Idlib and the Armenian army in Karabakh with the loss of thousands of servicemen, hundreds of armored vehicles and dozens of air defense systems destroyed by the enemy at the cost of only dozens of UAVs and ammunition consumption of several hundred penny kamikaze drones.


      MK: "total defeat of the Syrian army"?!?!?!
      "Penny drones" - there, some amounts of Azerbaijan's contracts for them "shone", and they are more than impressive (and not at all "penny")

      Dyusha and Co: Comrades authors - the domestic air defense is in dire need of an air defense system exclusively with a passive means of detecting air targets in the form of a wide-angle video camera operating in the optical and near infrared range (coinciding with the range of video cameras of reconnaissance UAVs and kamikaze drones), as well as missiles "ground-to-air", equipped exclusively with passive optical-infrared seeker with a hardware-software device for recognizing air targets along their contours.


      MK: Dyusha, just such means are fatally losing in the SVN due to the short detection range and the long view of the sector. In addition, I cannot help but notice that the earth is not only "round" (and not flat as, apparently, "taught" in Dyusha's "bursa"), but also "humped", and a drone on PMV against the background of the earth's surface is an absolutely real goal (sending "hello" to all "pumps" on the "hardware and software recognition devices)

      Dyusha & Co: I report that the above wide-angle cameras cost several thousand bucks each and are widely used in building security systems,


      MK: How much they can cost only in the "6th chamber", and how much they cost REALLY - see the prices for purchases of gov (and these are quite real and JUSTIFIED prices for such products)

      Dyusha and Co: and the above GOS with software and hardware is installed in every smartphone produced in billions of copies per year at a price of a hundred bucks per set.


      MK: another illiterate nonsense of a gray mare drunk with moonshine

      Dyusha & Co: PS Under Stalin, such official negligence on the part of the air defense leadership would have long been regarded as sabotage with appropriate organizational conclusions.


      MK: Dyusha, under Stalin you would have imprisoned many with your pseudoscientific Achinea (designed as a denunciation). BUT THEN WOULD COME FOR YOU, and with a very "specific" article


      On my own behalf, I will add - Andryusha, from units, subunits, combat units of ships, aircraft, etc. - not bosses, but commanders. This is information for you to eliminate illiteracy, yours.
  9. Toucan
    Toucan 1 December 2020 07: 44
    +7
    Unfortunately, the respected author does not always understand what he is writing about. No.
    The radars of the air defense missile systems were turned on for a very short time.
    What "Air defense radar", SOC or SNR? If you undertake to write on this topic, please adhere to the generally accepted terms in the professional environment. In addition, in Vietnam during the described time period there was no C-75 air defense system, but there were SA-75M, which is far from the same ... No. It is necessary to study the material more thoroughly.
    There are a number of other blunders. In addition, the information would be better understood if this publication was split into two parts.
    1. timokhin-aa
      1 December 2020 15: 47
      0
      From the author

      Tucan: Unfortunately, the respected author does not always understand what he is writing about.

      MK: Unfortunately, the dear opponent does not understand what he is objecting to

      Tucan: What is "SAM radar", SOC or SNR?

      MK: The meaning is obvious that first of all the CHR. However, there were options for SOC (when using an external control center and turning on SOC (+ PRV) by command)

      Tucan: In addition, in Vietnam during the described time period there was no C-75 air defense system, but there were SA-75M

      MK: Wrong. To be precise, there were CA-75s (without M). The overwhelming majority of the air defense system was 10cm there.
      1. Toucan
        Toucan 1 December 2020 15: 57
        +3
        In the guidance documents there is no such concept of "air defense radar" No. They would write right away correctly, and there would be no questions. No.
        In Vietnam, there were exactly the CA-75M, and not part, but all.
        Frankly speaking, it is strange that you are butting about this.
        Below, Bongo left a link to his cycle on air defense of Vietnam. I hope you trust him in this matter?
      2. Bongo
        Bongo 1 December 2020 16: 32
        +7
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The meaning is obvious that, first of all, CHR. However, there were options for SOC (when using an external control center and turning on SOC (+ PRV) by command)
        The "meaning" for an unprepared reader not familiar with the specifics of air defense is absolutely not obvious. request
        Alexander, I'm still very curious, but what altimeters were there in Vietnam in 1965?

        I read with great interest your publications on naval topics. But what would you say about an author who undertakes to cover a topic that he does not understand very well, and at the same time tries to argue when he is pointed out inaccuracies? Of course, I can still find something to complain about in the publication, but what is already being discussed, in my opinion, is enough.

        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Wrong. To be precise, there were CA-75s (without M). The overwhelming majority of the air defense system was 10cm there.
        In 1965, it was definitely CA-75M "Dvina" 10 cm range. This complex differed from the first modification of the SA-75, which was put into service in the late 50s, with better mobility and noise immunity. Moreover, the presence CA-75M in Vietnam is confirmed by credible sources.


        Alexander, with all due respect, you probably shouldn't be like different operators, and "operate" with unreliable information.
        1. timokhin-aa
          2 December 2020 10: 09
          +1
          I am not an author, the author is Maxim Klimov, I posted his article under my account.
          1. Bongo
            Bongo 2 December 2020 13: 23
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            I am not an author, the author is Maxim Klimov, I posted his article under my account.

            Alexander, all the more you shouldn't have resisted. No.
            But in general, I liked the article. Although it is not without flaws and inaccuracies. Good luck!
  10. Operator
    Operator 1 December 2020 08: 11
    -6
    Quote: Jacket in stock
    only all this splendor is not produced here, therefore it has no right to be used in military equipment

    I don’t understand, comrade Jacket is in stock, do you really think so, or do you want to play along with the saboteurs? bully
    1. Jacket in stock
      Jacket in stock 1 December 2020 08: 41
      +3
      Quote: Operator
      do you really think so or do you want to play along with the saboteurs?

      Yes, I think so that those mentioned by Comrade Operator household gadgets are produced in billions of copies not from us and are not suitable for use in weapons systems.
      Both in terms of technical parameters and due to possible sanctions.
      But we have optical systems for observation, detection and guidance, and for a long time. They are included in the standard set already starting with the C-75 mentioned here.
      1. Toucan
        Toucan 1 December 2020 10: 34
        +5
        The television optical sight (TOV) has been used on the latest modification of the C-75M3 since the mid-70s.
        In Vietnam, the SA-75M TOV was replaced by the so-called "doghouse", which housed an operator with a simple optical sight, which was supposed to visually accompany the air target.
        It is clear that the effectiveness of such a method was not high, but when suppressing the radar channel, there was no particular choice.
        As for the video cameras of smartphones, comparing them with specialized optoelectronic systems is amateurishness.
        1. sivuch
          sivuch 1 December 2020 13: 30
          +4
          TOV was installed on M4 immediately and on M3 during modernization. Even the Vietnamese could not stand it for a long time in a doghouse without air conditioning.
          1. Bongo
            Bongo 1 December 2020 14: 15
            +6
            Quote: sivuch
            TOV was installed on M4 immediately and on M3 during modernization. Even the Vietnamese could not stand it for a long time in a doghouse without air conditioning.

            Hello! Colleague Tucan (Vasily) is right by and large. The S-75M4 air defense system was not built very much, mainly TOV was installed on the S-75M3. But only those that were available in the USSR air defense.
  11. Zaurbek
    Zaurbek 1 December 2020 08: 15
    +2
    I read that there is another direction in the fight against UAVs - the identification of launchers and their destruction.
  12. horror
    horror 1 December 2020 08: 36
    0
    At the beginning of this year, there was already an experience of countering our military specialists and Syrian air defense against Turkish UAVs in Idlib, the Turks inflicted tangible losses on the Syrian Armed Forces, largely due to the use of their UAVs, but then the situation stabilized thanks to active countermeasures in the airspace. I think our military even then made certain conclusions on the use of air defense and reb against uavs.
    1. OgnennyiKotik
      OgnennyiKotik 1 December 2020 08: 52
      -4
      Quote: horror
      the Turks inflicted tangible losses on the Syrian Armed Forces,

      They were catastrophic in comparison with the losses of the enemy. I counted the losses of both sides, based only on photo / video, after Turkey's direct intervention in the conflict. https://lostarmour.info/
      19.02-05.03
      Syria, 54 units:
      10 (T55 / 62/72)
      10 (BMP 1)
      17 (2S1 / 3)
      3 (IVECO TRAKKER 420 + M46 130MM)
      9 (BM21, HM-20)
      2 (ZSU-23-4)
      1 (72V6-E2 Carapace)
      1 (Su-24)
      1 (L-39)

      Turkey + apposition, 12 units
      4 (M60) +1 (T55)
      2 (GZNP) +1 (BMP 1)
      2 (Anka-s)
      2 (Bayraktar TB2)
  13. OgnennyiKotik
    OgnennyiKotik 1 December 2020 08: 42
    -6
    Thanks for the quality article.
    Concerning Karabakh. Azerbaijan also used electronic warfare against Armenian air defense, probably on UAVs, possibly ground-based. Radar against REP is many times more vulnerable than UAVs.
    Hakobyan's stated 3-4 days of restrictions on drone activity is due to bad weather, which can be seen from the reports of Anna news and their interviews. Although in the last 10 days the number of UAV strikes decreased, apparently they began to save kamikaze and aerial bombs, and there were at least a minimum of targets.
  14. silberwolf88
    silberwolf88 1 December 2020 08: 52
    0
    and there are answers to the UAVs ... including the use of a "swarm" of controlled ones ... EMP is considered very effective ... burning and disabling the control electronics ... many developed countries are working on this topic ... cons, of course, and there are such systems too (everything in the affected area suffers from EMP ... and for example, limited energy sources ... but everything can be solved ... we are waiting for new systems ... or a swarm of cheap antidrones ... created on a 3D printer. ..
  15. ZAV69
    ZAV69 1 December 2020 09: 30
    +1
    A very correct sober article. Tired of reading that drones are a wunderwaffle that will win everyone and that we have nothing to fight with them. But it turns out it’s not a wunderwaffe. You can fight them, and there is something. There are problems, but they can be solved.
  16. Operator
    Operator 1 December 2020 09: 45
    -7
    Quote: Jacket in stock
    we have optical systems for observation, detection and guidance, and for a long time

    And why, then, in the confrontation with the air defense UAV, each time there is a bit, comrade Jacket in stock? laughing
    1. Jacket in stock
      Jacket in stock 1 December 2020 11: 16
      +3
      Quote: Operator
      Why, then, in a confrontation with an air defense UAV, every time there is a bit

      Well, like bae, not everyone.
      And here above, in the article under discussion, it is written about it. With an integrated approach and the availability of funds, the issue is resolved.
      But the "operator" is not a reader ...?
      1. Operator
        Operator 1 December 2020 11: 19
        -6
        It is useful to distinguish serial UAVs from those made on the knee "collective farm" laughing
    2. sivuch
      sivuch 1 December 2020 13: 33
      +5
      Actually, not everyone. As the UAV was removed from the sky, so Serakib was taken.
  17. Glory1974
    Glory1974 1 December 2020 09: 55
    +2
    It is necessary to fight UAVs in a complex, building a system of many elements. It should contain reconnaissance means of the UAVs' bases and their control points, means of fire destruction of the ground infrastructure of the UAV, the line of defense of its troops, air defense means of the unit commander, etc.
    No modernized "Pantsir" by itself will become protection against UAVs.
  18. Nikolaevich I
    Nikolaevich I 1 December 2020 10: 10
    +5
    Well, well ... "The material is hefty anti-flesh!" Gutarit Author "appropriate"! But have there been such articles (and after Karabakh - in agramadic quantity ...), urging "to give up everything and urgently" tsigel, tsigel..ay-lyu-lyu "to grab the drones ... Karabakh, yak manure in the hole ", and having made a strong-willed decision:" Karabakh is ours! ", Deployed there an integrated, well-organized, sufficient air defense system? Did the UAVs scare the troops in Libya, Syria, if the" crazy clowns "? At present, it is necessary to informally study the results of hostilities with the successful use of UAVs ... draw conclusions and test them during specially organized exercises! If it is necessary to change the structure, the organization of air defense units, change! But the goal is to make the most and effectively use that A lot of money has been invested in the existing air defense assets ... changing them "abruptly" will not work ... there is no money! It may be better not to read articles "on the verge of panic", but to think a little about measures to improve air defense and urgent actions what? And the measures must be "found"!
    1. "Anti-aircraft nails" to "Shell" have already been mentioned ... (But they were mentioned for the first time about three years ago ... no less! Is nothing ready, as the Author says?) The Author also "offended" "TORA". .. Recently there was a message that for this SAM is being developed (or developed?) Its own "anti-aircraft screw"!
    2. You can not ignore MZA too! But you shouldn't count on 57 mm ... not everywhere it will be possible to attach it! (By the way, the Author is frightened in vain by the fragments of anti-aircraft shells over the battle formations of his troops! Measures are already being considered to neutralize such harm, even for smaller caliber MZA ...) As for the 30-mm shells of remote detonation, there is also not all abgemakht here! Such shells are expensive, and their effectiveness is currently being questioned when compared with calibers, for example, 40 mm. It is possible that a 40-mm anti-aircraft projectile with a controlled detonation will be made easier and cheaper ... (adjustable 40-mm projectiles have already appeared ...) MZA systems with a caliber of 35 mm and 40 mm are very widespread in the world ... the Chinese, for example, they abandoned 37 mm and switched to 35 mm. What if "Pantsiri" and "Tunguska" were re-equipped with 40-mm guns? Well, "Pantsir" -ZRPK ... and "Tunguska" -ZPRK ... more expedient! To create adjustable 40-mm projectiles, you can try using the master-slave concept ... the author of the idea assures that such projectiles should be cheaper! ("Leading" - projectile without explosives, but with a more "advanced" guidance system ... "slave" - ​​projectiles with explosives and with the simplest control system ... controlled by the "leader" ... shooting is carried out in bursts (for example, 5 shells : 1 "master" +4 "slaves") To detect, track air targets, along with radars, you can attract lidars ... UAVs (!) Should not be left unattended: 1. "anti-aircraft" loitering ammunition; 2. generators interference flying in the "orders" of enemy shock and reconnaissance UAVs ...
    PS I suppose that work on the creation of missiles under the MNTK project is intensifying in the USA ... there should be good "products" with a combined (semi-active radar and laser seeker), working with radars and lidars ...
    1. musketon64
      musketon64 1 December 2020 17: 47
      0
      Quote: Nikolaevich I
      But you shouldn't count on 57 mm ... not everywhere it will be possible to attach it!

      I remembered the Italian SPA "OTOMATIC 76" with a 76-mm naval cannon on the chassis of the OF-40 tank with a range of helicopter destruction up to 8 km.
      1. Nikolaevich I
        Nikolaevich I 1 December 2020 17: 57
        +2
        Quote: musketone64
        I remembered the Italian SPA "OTOMATIC 76" with a 76-mm naval cannon on the chassis of the OF-40 tank with a range of helicopter destruction up to 8 km.

        Duc, and did not attach! This ZSU was not accepted into service ...
        1. musketon64
          musketon64 1 December 2020 18: 36
          0
          This ZSU was not accepted into service ...


          Perhaps ahead of her time? At the time when it was developed, the fight against UAVs was not so relevant. For the Otomatic ZSU, shots were developed with two types of shells: fragmentation shells with semi-finished striking elements and an armor-piercing sub-caliber shell with a detachable pallet. The mass of a shot with a projectile of the first type is 12,5 kg (projectile - 6,35 kg), an initial velocity of 910 m / s. The projectile is detonated by means of a radio fuse. At the same time, its body, made of tungsten alloy, is crushed into 3750 cubic damaging elements capable of penetrating an 8 mm thick aluminum body at a distance of 10 m. spherical shape, which have the same penetration at a distance of 40 m.At the same time, three 650-mm fragmentation projectiles, when firing at a target located at a distance of 6 km, are equivalent in their damaging effect to 76 3-mm projectiles of a similar type. Also for the Otomatic ZSU it was envisaged to create shots with projectiles with an adjustable flight path,
          1. Nikolaevich I
            Nikolaevich I 1 December 2020 20: 08
            +2
            Quote: musketone64
            Perhaps ahead of her time? At the time when it was developed, the fight against UAVs was not so relevant

            But the fight against helicopters was relevant! The then excitement of the helicopter district was about the same "kind" as now "unmanned"! And then the excitement arose as a result of the awesome success of helicopters in the fight against tanks in Vietnam and the Middle East! The performance characteristics of anti-aircraft missile weapons of that time were worse than now (especially in terms of "altitude" ...) at a much higher cost compared to anti-aircraft guns! So the idea came up to use medium and even large-caliber anti-aircraft artillery against helicopters! On the pages of "popular military" magazines, various scenarios for the use of anti-aircraft artillery of "considerable" calibers against combat helicopters were discussed ... even some exercises were held in the troops to test "ideas"! In the Soviet (Russian) army, 57-mm anti-aircraft guns were considered in the first place (S-60 ... ZSU-57-2 ...) and even 100-mm anti-aircraft guns! But the excitement gradually subsided! They just started to consider this helicopter problem "for real" ... not formally! We weighed everything for and against ... determined real measures ... took them to execution and corrected the situation ... Modified air defense systems, MZA, "acquired" low-altitude mobile radars ... And anti-aircraft artillery of medium (even large ...) calibers turned out to be an "extra link"!
            1. musketon64
              musketon64 1 December 2020 21: 06
              +1
              Quote: Nikolaevich I
              But the fight against helicopters was relevant! The then excitement of the helicopter district was about the same "kind" as now "unmanned"!


              And there is! But now the economic aspect is important in the fight against drones. A helicopter is an expensive "toy" and it is quite justified to spend a much less costly missile (or two) on its destruction. But to demolish all sorts of "Bayraktars" or the expensive rackets released by them with artillery shells. The presence of significant ammunition also plays an important role in the fight against UAVs, especially when they are used on a large scale. The ZSU "OTOMATIC 76" has 70 shots, of which 27 are ready to fire. And this is twice as much as that of our "Shell". The affected area of ​​such a ZSU can be expanded by installing a pair of containers with missiles on each side.
              1. Nikolaevich I
                Nikolaevich I 2 December 2020 08: 26
                +2
                That's how it is ... yes, not quite so! How much does the "famous" Bayraktar cost? 5 pieces of green lemons? Well, let it be with a discount, 3 lemons ... Let the zur for the "Shell" is worth milen ... everything is in profit, it turns out! "Anti-aircraft nails" appear ... they are cheaper. How much does the Kornet ATGM cost? 200 thousand "green"? "Bulat" are going to be made cheaper ... by 120 thousand, for example .... If the "anti-aircraft nail" will cost the same? In any case, an adjustable (guided) projectile for the ZSU-76 is unlikely to be cheaper ... maybe more expensive! In the "clean" rocket variant (24 zur), the "Shell" will take up to 96 "nails"! ZSU-76 will not be able to take 70 guided shells ... for a "gun" it is too expensive! And the effectiveness of "free flying" shells decreases as the range and "altitude" to the target increase, even despite the increased "fragmentation"! 70 shells ZSU-76 will not shoot down 70 drones! wink More ... ZSU-76 was "sharpened" for helicopters! This means, with a range of 8 km, a relatively low altitude! "Bayraktar" flies at an altitude of up to 8 km! So sho ... shoot it down at 500 meters from installation?
  19. Dmitry V.
    Dmitry V. 1 December 2020 11: 43
    +4
    SAM S-75. After which the quiet life in the Vietnamese sky for the US aviation ended

    Well, not right away - do not forget that the Americans quickly found countermeasures - for example, a dive (the fuel intake of the tank of the first series of missiles, when diving, grabbed an airlock and the rocket engine stalled), approach to the target at low altitudes, provoking a rocket launch and processing positions SAM by strike and assault aircraft, etc.
    1. Jacket in stock
      Jacket in stock 1 December 2020 12: 22
      +2
      Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
      we must not forget that the Americans quickly found countermeasures -

      Of course they found it, but this is the end of a quiet life. Before that, they flew like on a training ground.
      1. zyablik.olga
        zyablik.olga 1 December 2020 12: 51
        +6
        The Americans lost most of the aircraft in Vietnam to anti-aircraft artillery, and the losses were in the very first raids. As a "training ground", the Americans have never flown in Southeast Asia. No.
        1. Jacket in stock
          Jacket in stock 1 December 2020 13: 16
          +3
          Quote: zyablik.olga
          As a "training ground", the Americans have never flown in Southeast Asia.

          Well, I don’t know, I don’t know.
          Officers who had passed Vietnam told us students that they flew very tightly and were not afraid of anything.
          There was even a bike that the first S-75 missile shot down 3 aircraft at once.
          My father-in-law at that time in Haiphong was, and he brought that rocket, he confirmed that it was not a bike.
          1. Bongo
            Bongo 1 December 2020 13: 46
            +7
            Quote: Jacket in stock
            There was even a bike that the first S-75 missile shot down 3 aircraft at once.

            Bike ... No.
            According to Soviet data, on July 24, 1965, two SA-75M "Dvina" anti-aircraft missile divisions shot down 4 American F-3C Phantom II fighter-bomber at the expense of 4 missiles. The Phantoms sailed in close formation with a bomb load at an altitude of 2 meters. The Americans recognized only one F-000C shot down, and the other two damaged.
            Quote: Jacket in stock
            Well, I don’t know, I don’t know.
            Officers who had passed Vietnam told us students that they flew very tightly and were not afraid of anything.

            They flew tightly, because one aircraft in the group carried an electronic warfare container and covered the rest with active interference.

            A detailed cycle about the air defense of Vietnam, in each publication there is an active link to the previous one. hi

            https://topwar.ru/143772-sistema-pvo-vetnama-chast-1.html
            https://topwar.ru/144028-sistema-pvo-vetnama-chast-2.html
            https://topwar.ru/144266-sistema-pvo-vetnama-chast-3.html
  20. antivirus
    antivirus 1 December 2020 12: 23
    0
    Tolbino is everywhere. All over the world already.

    Due to the short distance, Aegis could not attack detected targets with interceptor missiles or a 127 mm cannon. It was only possible to destroy drones at close range using machine guns and Phalanx complexes. It was estimated that an average of 2,8 out of 8 drones completely “skipped” the most “advanced” defenses.

    everything rests against the electric / energy and a properly hammered grounding peg.
    and the triangle will be drunk, even if it is a pralleppiped.
    USE YOUR ADVANTAGES - YAO. and hi with them, who saved on nuclear reactors in the 50-70s and is now moving the UAV.
  21. geologist
    geologist 1 December 2020 12: 29
    -1
    And what will happen when fast, maneuverable drones appear, which with a wild angular velocity will circle over the objects of attack, as is done in computer games. For example, in the space epic EVE, there is no air defense mechanism against drones at all and salvation is only in disguise or your own armor fields, screens, as well as in an attack on a carrier ship of small horror films. The extreme carelessness of some calculations of air defense installations, which generally stand in an open field, is surprising. Well, there is no bulldozer at hand and all kinds of inflatable false targets, but after all, nobody canceled the shovel and the branches could be chopped with an ax. A smoky fire against a laser will probably also be a hindrance, though not for everyone. My old laser rangefinder worked every time through a cloud of dust, although I was aiming at a reflector, and when aiming at ordinary stones, its efficiency dropped sharply with distance.
  22. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 1 December 2020 12: 33
    +2
    That is, the key problem of mass small UAVs and their "swarms" for modern air defense is the military-economic: how to destroy them with an acceptable ratio of "efficiency-cost".

    This problem cannot be solved. It is unsolvable in principle - a technical impasse, as well as the interception of shells and artillery mines.
    An effective defense is the first place to attack the enemy with a superior number and cheaper UAVs. And on the second, disguise, including dim sum, and strengthening the position of the infantrymen.
    This, of course, does not interfere with creating aerostatic barriers, training drone fighters, using KAZ to protect pillboxes and bunkers, and so on.
    1. Alex Nevs
      Alex Nevs 2 December 2020 16: 21
      0
      This is what I was leading all the time. And not to the constant question "Who did it?" Who was the first to shoot and who was the second to ruffle all this at the root of the "Reichstag".
    2. FrankyStein
      FrankyStein 29 January 2021 19: 12
      0
      With this approach, nothing can be solved for sure. And then you will be very surprised when someone else does it.
  23. IM v
    IM v 1 December 2020 12: 54
    +2
    So, you can try to summarize:
    UAV damage area:
    1. Earth. Base or command post.
    2. Air. Place of movement in space.
    3. Earth. Place of impact or, in other words, place of immediate protection from impact.

    Destruction in the first paragraph. Reconnaissance and fire engagement with missile or aircraft weapons.
    Destruction in the third paragraph. In fact, the most difficult and obviously losing, but it is also clear how.
    EM or Optical Suppression, Missile and Missile Countermeasures.

    Third point. Air. There is no description of how to stop or destroy a UAV in the air BEFORE approaching the target.
    It goes without saying that lifting fighters on each drone is an expensive pleasure.
    But what prevents you from launching your UAV like an enemy UAV fighter?
  24. Dmitry V.
    Dmitry V. 1 December 2020 12: 58
    +7
    In general - the conclusion is correct - urgent modernization of the military air defense is needed.

    The main threat to military air defense - long-range artillery and tactical reconnaissance UAVs of light class - the same is true.

    What is the author not taking into account?
    It is impossible to make military air defense strong everywhere - in the deployment area - yes, in the defensive area - partially yes. However, the lines of communication are impossible to protect along the entire length, you cannot give air defense means to each column. Air defense logistics are not as efficient as maneuvering air attack weapons.
    The means of attack, in the form of tactical reconnaissance UAVs of a light class, UAVs-kamikaze, shock UAVs of the middle class - can quickly change the area and mass the attacks, overloading the military air defense.

    Which of these can be concluded?
    The main means of countering unmanned strike and reconnaissance systems should be unmanned interceptors, the basis of which could be ready-made power plants based on cruise missiles (with revision in terms of resource), armed with both cheap means of destruction (artillery complexes (such as "ballerinas" GSh-301 with stock of shells 300-350 pcs) with an effective range of target destruction of 50-1000 m, and light missiles with a range of destruction up to 500-10000 m, equipped with detection equipment in the infrared range, optical and in the future - compact radar detection stations.
    The maximum take-off weight of such a middle-class UAV interceptor is 3000-3500 kg, which implies, for example, the use of one or two power plants based on the 37-01 turbojet engine (with an increase in the resource, possible retrofitting with an afterburner - the interceptor should be able to quickly relocate, since means of attack will begin to increase the speed of reaching the attack area).
    Such an engine is not enough for independent takeoff, which entails launching by catapult or by means of powder boosters (respectively, folding wings for ground transportation). There is enough fuel for loitering in the covered area for up to 24 hours.

    Such loitering interceptors of the middle class for military air defense, with the possibility of a non-aerodrome launch, will provide a quick maneuver of air defense forces, the concentration of funds in the desired area, and cover communications over a large area.
    Detection of air targets in the optical, in the infrared range.
    The disadvantage of such an air defense system when operating in conditions of unstable communication of the enemy's electronic warfare is the delegation of the AI ​​decision to open fire. Those. UAV interceptors should be equipped with a radar identification system ("Friend or Foe").
  25. Tektor
    Tektor 1 December 2020 13: 20
    -1
    Here in one TV report it was said about the protection of the Sochi OI from UAVs. In particular, it was said that none of these one and a half could break through to the stadiums. We have developed an interceptor UAV that, with the help of a network, caught those trying to penetrate. Probably it is possible to develop, if not already done, a roll of this net, which would be cut off after another "client" hits and discarded. A new spread of the grid would be ready for the next "client".
  26. sivuch
    sivuch 1 December 2020 13: 47
    +3
    Another option for dealing with UAVs
    https://syria.mil.ru/news/[email protected]
    The electronic warfare specialists of the Central Military District installed an invisible barrier for the conventional enemy's strike drones, the purpose of which was to disable a critical facility in the Kirov region. Ground reconnaissance assets have found more than ten small drones heading for guarded positions. The scouts identified the drones that use illegal armed groups to deliver and detonate improvised bombs. Leer-3 ".
    or this one https://www.aviaport.ru/digest/2020/09/02/651651.html
    Also, specialists with the help of the "Leer-3" complex put a reconnaissance UAV on the ground, located at an altitude of about one kilometer.
  27. musketon64
    musketon64 1 December 2020 14: 33
    +1
    Of course, these are not all the conclusions. But these are the main ones.

    --------------------------------------------
    These are defensive methods. It is necessary to disclose the topic of ATTACK suppression of UAV flights by the method of direction finding and the destruction of control stations and launchers during their advance to the UAV launch position by means of aviation, their own UAVs, MLRS and others. Thus, reducing the number of targets and lightening the load on air defense systems.
    1. Drago
      Drago 2 December 2020 09: 44
      0
      Spot Position
    2. Drago
      Drago 2 December 2020 09: 51
      +1
      It is impossible to detect the control position of the RPV. All modern RPVs are controlled
      with the help of UAV repeaters in the high-frequency range. And the higher the frequency of the wave, the more the radiation pattern resembles a laser beam-needle. It is difficult to detect it even by means of a terrestrial RTR. And this is already yesterday.
    3. SKS_PRO
      SKS_PRO 2 December 2020 10: 43
      -1
      At the beginning of 00, the Americans operated their UAVs from a base on their territory via satellite channels. The Turks are already building a satellite communication channel on their bayraktars.
      Musk is already launching thousands of micro-communication satellites, incl. in the interests of the military.
      In general, the idea of ​​fighting "UAVs by the method of direction finding and destroying control stations" is somewhat ineffective, and against "launchers during their advancement to the UAV launch position" methods are absolutely similar to those in the fight against art and other conventional weapons.
  28. sivuch
    sivuch 1 December 2020 14: 39
    +3
    Yes, I forgot to add - for the Thors they also offered a small rocket (and not in standard containers)
    Maybe now the matter will get off the ground
  29. RNO
    RNO 1 December 2020 14: 58
    0
    I saw the new achievement of invisibility I thought of something myself.
    air defense can destroy an invisible plane?
    uav can compare? with "AI uav"? (uav with artificial intelligence) or a robot uav
  30. DWG1905
    DWG1905 1 December 2020 15: 27
    +3
    Interesting article, thanks to the author! Why are acoustic means of detecting UAVs not considered, when they are crossed with a computer, it should turn out, and for other air targets flying at a speed less than the speed of sound will also work. Moreover, it can be combined with optics. From my own experience, the UAV is practically invisible at an altitude of 900 m, but it rumbles noticeably, i.e. all objects using the engine to create lift in the acoustic range are detected. It is clear that the detection of air targets in the acoustic spectrum has not been dealt with for 60 years. But there are hydroacoustic technologies, in principle it is the same. Radar stations in a war with a technologically advanced enemy will be carried out. It is clear that the air defense personnel and the customer and the industry are sharpened on the radar and it is mentally difficult to take up a new direction. But everything that radiates will be detected and destroyed. The second direction is radio-technical multi-echelon reconnaissance, starting from constant air duty at a distance from the front line of Il-20 aircraft, ending with UAVs with RTR in order to detect control points and the UAV itself. Moreover, I think the RTR and the destruction of control points is the main thing that the UAV operators would be afraid to turn on the transmitters as well as the radar air defense personnel.
    1. Falcon5555
      Falcon5555 1 December 2020 20: 20
      +1
      not visible, but it rumbles well,
      The rattling will not be heard on the battlefield. But outside of combat, yes, that's also an idea.
  31. Belimbai
    Belimbai 1 December 2020 16: 21
    0
    Or maybe it is worth considering the creation of counter-drones ... hunters for "colleagues" ... with small arms on board?
  32. Dmitry Leontiev
    Dmitry Leontiev 1 December 2020 17: 07
    0
    These conclusions lack the most effective, in my opinion, point for countering swarms of UAVs - high-speed robotic hunter-fighters with small arms, which could simultaneously be launched in large enough quantities towards the swarm and independently clear the sky from any such targets as cheaply as possible - knocking them down with a machine gun.
    They can be launched using rocket boosters; have aircraft engines as cruising engines, and land with a parachute within their base. All that is needed is to equip them with an autonomous control complex and an aiming complex. In autonomous mode (when, for example, control is jammed), they themselves must search for targets, approach them and hit them with machine-gun fire. If one is defeated, seek and hit the next. And when the fuel runs out - to descend and throw a parachute, focusing, for example, on some special optical marker of your base. And in the absence of radio interference, they can be controlled remotely - by a single computer coordination system that distributes targets between them. But even without it, it will still be effective and cheap: no waste of expensive missiles; instead, the reusable use of these smart robots.
  33. Dmitry Leontiev
    Dmitry Leontiev 1 December 2020 18: 56
    +1
    Quote: Kostadinov
    This problem cannot be solved. It is unsolvable in principle - a technical dead end

    It is quite a solvable problem. If, instead of itself, the rocket will aim a machine gun at the drone, spread the drone to them, and then return by parachute back to the base. In this case, the use of UAV swarms will become unprofitable: the drone is lost, and the countermeasure is reusable. In the presence of such missiles in the plural, there is no point in attacking a swarm of drones - everyone will be blown up on approach and nothing more. At the same time, the rocket can output not one such homing anti-machine gunner drone, but, say, a couple. And each of them, after the destruction of one drone, takes on the next - and so on in order. And having used up ammunition or fuel, he calmly returns to the base by parachute.
  34. dgonni
    dgonni 1 December 2020 19: 15
    +1
    Klimov is handsome. Respect for the review!
    But I will add a couple of comments.
    First! The explosion or elimination of a 57mm projectile at an altitude of 50+ meters does not threaten the infantry. This is not a land mine with an F1-type shell! And a programmable projectile with a bunch of small submunitions. Therefore, by.
    Second! The target detection system and the ammunition programming system were initially flawed!
    For through the optical channels in the haze, fog and dusty conditions, Derivation will be blind. Well, programming a projectile using a laser beam has the same breakdowns! And if in the 57 mm caliber it is possible and will be brought to a more or less suitable state, which I personally doubt, then in the 30 mm caliber it will not be one hundred percent.
    For? For instead of creating and implementing an electronic programmer, we went the simplest and seemingly affordable way. But this path in the west was rejected for the above reasons.
    The absence of a radar station puts the very principle of firing a programmable projectile into the category of impracticability.
    To understand this, you just need to look at the video demonstrating the work of Erlikon. The whole essence of programmable detonation is just tied in small calibers, on the formation of a continuous cone of fragments in the path of a drone or rocket. And the determination of the parameters of the target's movement for its formation is the cornerstone. That is easily done by a radar man and optics do not do it.
    Therefore, I wang the appearance of programmable shells and strapping at mattress mats for Vulcan-Flank by two years later. And we will continue to refine the conceptually flawed principle.
    P.S. Where did they get the microelectronics for the 30mm caliber, I won't even ask.
  35. Falcon5555
    Falcon5555 1 December 2020 19: 52
    +2
    My sofa menie - in addition to what the author mentioned, it would be necessary to mention optoelectronic (preferably including the infrared spectrum) cameras plus penny computers with software for round-the-clock image recognition, as well as the detection of UAVs and ground transmitters with which they are in touch, by their radio emission , blinding cameras of UAV lasers, as well as what to do with "dead" craters over anti-aircraft systems and with "dead" zones covered by local objects and terrain. But overall, the correct article.
    1. agond
      agond 1 December 2020 20: 26
      +1
      A 57mm projectile has a length of about 23 cm and occupies about a volume of about 0.5 liters, if you make a thin shell and fill it with balls with a diameter of 10mm, then 200-300 pieces will go there, and there will still be space, if you shoot such a projectile, it is in the barrel of the gun, will spin up to high speeds (like any other), if somewhere on the trajectory of its flight there will be a controlled destruction of the shell, then the balls under the action of the centrifugal force of rotation will diverge in the form of a cone, thus creating a very uniform talus, which is very convenient for hitting a UAV, and given their large number and high speed, the range of hitting by balls will be quite large
      1. Falcon5555
        Falcon5555 1 December 2020 22: 08
        +3
        I did not dispute the 57mm shells. Can you answer the author? In my opinion, not necessarily balls, and centrifugal force is not enough. Shell fragments and high-explosive effect are also good. And any air defense, even the times of the 2nd world. wars are the same thing - everything is pouring from the sky, but this did not bother anyone, and there were no such mass deaths from shell fragments. The air defense of Moscow and Leningrad during the war is a fucking cloud of 80 - with something millimeter anti-aircraft guns.
      2. Tamer
        Tamer 2 December 2020 14: 22
        0
        Quote: agond
        A 57mm projectile has a length of about 23 cm and takes about a volume of about 0.5 liters, if you make a thin shell and fill it with balls with a diameter of 10 mm, then 200-300 pieces will go there, and there will still be space

        100 balls fit into 0,5 l winked
  36. Cowbra
    Cowbra 2 December 2020 01: 52
    +3
    The trick is that one of the first uses of UAVs in the war was described by Stepanov in the book "Port Arthur" ... The Shmetillovites threw grenades at the Japanese from kites wink
  37. VasYok
    VasYok 2 December 2020 02: 03
    0
    This bell is ringing for you

  38. riwas
    riwas 2 December 2020 04: 44
    +2
    Against UAVs and loitering ammunition, not only specialized air defense is needed, but also total, "built-in" air defense, i.e. ground vehicles must have their own air defense. For example, BMPT, along with ATGM, must have a Sosna missile defense system.
  39. Basarev
    Basarev 2 December 2020 13: 32
    +1
    Electronic warfare is not omnipotent. Small missiles may not be enough. But remote blasting is a really worthwhile measure. Only for this we need serious electronics: I saw a vidos where the western shell even had its own small radar station. And a hundred ready-made striking elements. This is what you need to strive for. And not like ours - a pipe from the times of Napoleon. But I see my own swarm as the best means against the enemy swarm.
  40. Last centurion
    Last centurion 2 December 2020 13: 35
    +1
    I just need to have my own tactical swarms of medium-range drones. Then the enemy will know that attacking defenseless ground targets such as tanks or infantry, he will receive a completely symmetrical mass removal of infantry or other logistical support. Better that it was some kind of rocket swarm, which could seed the airspace behind enemy lines with a swarm of air drones, wheeled with mines ... but whatever. By the way, about the handicrafts with "aliexpress for 300 bucks" - so far only gps is vulnerable there; the point flight itself can be programmed without problems in 15 minutes. But fortunately, optical flow sensors are now on sale (say, 27 bucks from matek) and cheap lidars (but they cost 100 bucks) ... in the long run, and in general, if you make friends with the camera and write 40 lines of code in python tensorflow to recognize objects and another 60 lines to receive data from the lidar ... then it is possible for the quadric to not sit down in failsafe if communication is lost, but, say, fly in a spiral or sinusoidal search for a target by optical flow at a height of 10 meters with measuring distances with a lidar and building a map a la robot vacuum cleaner. But all this together is not trivial to make friends. But a bunch of decent programmers can. I think it will appear in a year. Who thought four years ago that inav would have such cool routing for example? and now it is.
  41. Radikal
    Radikal 2 December 2020 15: 43
    +3
    Quote: lucul
    Thanks for the article

    A surprisingly sensible article, albeit with praise for Israel, in between))) ...
    I agree, most likely Israel is testing the air defense of the Khmeimim base, but Israel is a "sacred cow" for the GDP, so, as always, the troops located there are blown away! sad
  42. Alex Nevs
    Alex Nevs 2 December 2020 16: 15
    0
    A flock of analysts flew in. And into tears. Yes, how many times have already been frayed, blah-weapons against countries such as "Honduras, Gabon ... and so on." For example, the Poles sent their thousand UAVs to destroy the RF radar - I think the result will be clear? Or again, a concern like "Who did it?"
  43. Lirik R
    Lirik R 2 December 2020 18: 50
    -1
    Quote: Bez 310
    The article confirms the fears ...


    Don't be alarmed at all)

    Quote: Bez 310
    I wonder if there are such weapons and military equipment where everything is really good with us, and not in advertising reports?


    And who and where exactly says "everything is good"? Link to the studio!

    Quote: Bez 310
    Any "Zircons" ... do not need to be cited as an example, since they are not in service, and 450 km is not the launch range at which hypersonic anti-ship missiles should be used.


    Take a look at the ground segment of the early warning system - it may feel better.
    1. agond
      agond 2 December 2020 19: 35
      +1
      Quote: Falcon5555
      In my opinion, not necessarily balls, and centrifugal force is not enough. Shell fragments and high-explosive effect are also good.

      The centrifugal force is needed not to create additional acceleration for the balls (if the projectile flew at a speed of about 800-900 m / s before the shell was destroyed, then after its destruction the balls will fly at the same speed) centrifugal force is needed to evenly distribute the balls in the talus, and the distance between they will increase more slowly than when a conventional anti-aircraft projectile is detonated, that is, in an area of ​​about 100m to 200m from the place of destruction of the shell, the balls will pose a danger to the UAV, although they will lose speed much faster than the projectile, but this can also be used if you shoot in burst 3-5 shots each, the last shells may have a longer delay in the destruction of the shell and will be able to catch up with the already formed talus from the first shots, thereby creating a general talus of increased size and density of balls ...
      1. agond
        agond 2 December 2020 19: 40
        +1
        Quote: Last centurion
        Better that it was some kind of rocket swarm, which could seed the airspace behind enemy lines with a swarm of air drones, wheeled with mines ... whatever.

        A missile for delivering a UAV to the enemy's rear is a very interesting idea.
  44. chastnik64
    chastnik64 2 December 2020 22: 37
    0
    Tell me who's in the subject. Have you ever tried something like rockets or mini-Buratino shells with a volumetric explosion against a swarm of drones?
  45. hostel
    hostel 3 December 2020 02: 15
    0
    Bravo, Author !!!
  46. aleksandaravin
    aleksandaravin 3 December 2020 12: 13
    0
    A very competent review!
  47. Svateev
    Svateev 3 December 2020 15: 20
    0
    Good article. But one serious point:
    the Israelis ... suddenly knocked out the attendants of the PRR AGM-78 air defense systems of the Keres complexes and throughout the day finished off (in fact, the most powerful group in terms of air defense density in the world) with aviation strikes.

    It's not just the SAMs on duty. The PRR is not allowed to turn on the radar at all: as soon as it turns on, get the PRR. For this, the Israelis made ground-based PRRs so that they constantly stood at the launch range from the air defense, which the PRR on the aircraft cannot do. That is why the Israeli aviation worked with practically impunity.
    A very serious lesson for us. But I'm afraid not learned.
  48. Pas2x
    Pas2x 3 December 2020 21: 09
    0
    The article is very detailed. The role of UAVs will only grow further. Given such an active race in this promising area, it can last endlessly. With varying degrees of success on both sides. And apparently the most reliable and cheapest will still not be the detection and destruction of hundreds of drones, but the detection and destruction of the control center of this swarm. Fortunately, the range of such a center is likely to be very close to the line of contact.
  49. napalm
    napalm 3 December 2020 21: 17
    -2
    There are 1000 UAVs in Poland, and if there are 10000. What to do? For some reason, the text reminded of the movie The Matrix where they could hold back the swarm for just a few minutes, and then a breakthrough. And the electro-magnetic impulse, or whatever it was called, destroyed both the attackers and the defense.
    1. Pas2x
      Pas2x 3 December 2020 21: 48
      0
      If Poland (and this automatically sounds - NATO) dares to start this, then there should be no doubt about the use of nuclear weapons against the aggressor. And the problem with the control centers will be solved in a matter of minutes. For, in principle, I doubt the logic of trying to fight against NATO only with conventional weapons. Violence is definitely ...
  50. Alexey G
    Alexey G 4 December 2020 02: 01
    0
    Yes, it's a good article! I especially liked the author's historical approach to the evolution of the use of this weapon in chronological order! Very useful information!
    To the disadvantages of the article, I would refer the question of confronting this weapon! Here, the author's positions seem to be quite controversial, although due to the fact that the problem is very complex and new, in general, an attempt to solve it also deserves attention!
    Really modern weapons, as predicted by the American philosopher O. Toffler, is becoming more intelligent and independent! This intelligence is a consequence of improving information systems with which we have problems! The author correctly notes that if our Russian brigade was defending in Karabakh, then its losses would also be great!
    This is perhaps even modestly stated! I do not even exclude such defeat!
    Serious doubts are caused by the conviction of the author and many commentators in the ability of the radar to be an effective tool in the fight against unmanned aerial vehicles!
    The author himself writes that "the air defense / missile defense system Aegis, Due to the miniature size of the UAV, the radars, even in good visibility conditions, recorded their approach only at an extremely small distance: less than two kilometers." And I could not defeat 8 attacking drones, but what can we say about a swarm of 20-30 devices ??
    At the same time, the author recommends developing radar-based systems! This looks contradictory!
    2 km is too close for counter action! The missiles are too late and the guns are not as accurate as they should, because the drone is not a Japanese kamikaze plane and is very small!
    And yes, the radar itself illuminates itself and therefore directs shells and missiles at itself!
    Perhaps you need to look for some new means of location, perhaps sound location of the atmosphere, because the propeller of the bayrakter makes a sound, and with the help of special noise sensors you can hear about its approach at night or in the fog! Yes, at sea in a storm it is not very effective, but in the mountains in defense with relative silence it can be possible! At least during the Second World War, this is how they defined the approach of a swarm of fascist bombers!


    1. agond
      agond 4 December 2020 18: 05
      0
      If the enemy attacks with swarms of UAVs, missiles piloted by aircraft, or a flock of tanks, crowds of robots, it doesn't matter, the critical use of any weapon should be equated with weapons of mass destruction and answered with nuclear weapons, and the price of the issue should be announced in advance, for all "beekeepers" with swarms ,
      And the drone of a UAV is not an air defense missile, it is an apparatus primarily for flying over foreign territory, which means this weapon is not for defense, but for attack, that is, the weapon of the aggressor.