Could Karabakh Resist?
Four failures
Azerbaijan has more than three times the GDP of Armenia, has oil, gas, and a convenient geographical position, which allowed it to carry out an extensive program of military modernization and largely determined the victory in the war.
It seems that "everything is clear" and "predetermined". However, not really. Even the experience of Napoleon, who said the famous phrase "God is on the side of the big battalions", has repeatedly shown that he also loves "small battalions". Especially when they fight desperately and skillfully.
From the newest stories this is an example of the opposition between the Yemeni Houthis (supported by Iran) and the coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Formally, the economic and military potentials of the parties are simply incomparable, but the "Yemeni beggars" regularly beat (and eventually actually defeated) the richest army in the world. Here it is appropriate to recall the theorizing about the "outdated Soviet military school" and "progressive modern military art of NATO", because the Saudis were beaten by a significant part of the graduates of Soviet and Russian military universities and academies.
Taking into account the rather serious potential of Armenia, its financial capabilities (including taking into account the diaspora), the geography of the area of hostilities very convenient for defense, the chances and opportunities for Artsakh and Armenia were more than.
First. A sufficient number of trained infantry, its tough combat training and engineering equipment of the combat area.
Taking into account the general line of confrontation (more than 250 km), even with predominantly mountainous terrain, the size of the Karabakh army (just over 25 thousand people) was clearly not enough for a reliable defense. Reserves were an even more pressing issue.
In fact, it was after their exhaustion (the destruction of the Armenian units in the south) that the defense of Karabakh "fell down". Before that, the Armenians held on. And they kept up pretty well (right up to the "crashing" tanks T-90).
A separate issue is the massive infiltration of not only sabotage groups into the rear of the Armenians (the famous photo with the massacre of Armenians near the road, according to available data, is a consequence of the ambush of a sabotage group of Azerbaijanis), but also of "light infantry" units.
Second. Intelligence, night vision, communications.
According to the available information, Karabakh was not just “bad” with them in the army, but “very bad”. Accordingly, one side had a clear situation, methodically knocked out the knots of defense of the Armenians, and the other was in a fog of uncertainty.
The third. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and reconnaissance and strike systems (RUK).
The problem of using UAVs was clearly identified not only in the world in general, but also quite specifically in Karabakh itself (in 2016). Moreover, this "seemingly" was even consciously realized by the Armenian military leadership (more on that below). What is done? Almost nothing. Or nothing at all. The response to the "information shaft" from the UAVs of the Azerbaijani side is literally single videos of the Armenian UAVs flying over (and the defeat of Azeris' targets).
At the same time, taking into account the extremely limited resources of artillery (especially long-range) near Artsakh, it was necessary to include it as much as possible as part of reconnaissance and strike complexes (RUK) with UAVs. Those who wish can easily find a reporting document (freely available on the Internet) on the extremely effective use of such a RUK in one of the recent military conflicts.
Fourth. Anti-UAV
Military journalist Vlad Shurygin writes:
In fact, this is a real air terror - even with adjustments for false targets, which could account for part of the attacks.
In fact, all UAVs used in the conflict have previously been used in active hostilities, and air defense systems received the necessary (both negative and positive) experience in dealing with them.
Given the fact that in this conflict, the most dangerous and problematic for modern air defense small UAVs-destroyers were not actively used, the question was to create the necessary integrated air defense system to deal with medium shock UAVs, with the involvement of the necessary equipment (for example, the Buk air defense system) and training of personnel. None of this has been done. The consequence of this was the defeat of the outdated and fragmented air defense system of Karabakh.
The effectiveness of small UAVs could be reduced by the widespread use of electronic warfare and camouflage means, however, this was very bad.
Vlad Shurygin notes:
I would like to emphasize that these measures are intended to dramatically increase the combat capability of the Armenian group in Karabakh and (in combination with a number of serious problems in the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan) lead to the disruption of their large-scale offensive.
Why was practically none of this (necessary measures for preparation and imminent war) done by the Armenian side?
Undoubtedly, the main triumphant now is President Ilham Aliyev. This victory is largely his personal merit, a consequence of his efforts and the "press" of the military and paramilitary nomenclature of Azerbaijan (and, if necessary, the involvement of Turkish specialists, up to the transfer of command of large formations of the Azerbaijani army).
Two government leaders.
Here is what the military journalist Vlad Shurygin wrote 2,5 weeks before the military disaster happened:
Excessive nationalism
But Pashinyan did not ask for peace. And here it is necessary to say about the key factor that made everything that happened possible - this is overwhelming nationalism (and on both sides).
It was the abnormally developed nationalism that prevented the Armenian side from acting rationally and in a timely manner to negotiate. And this despite the fact that the “glory of the Karabakh butcher” (with its economic and political consequences, including personal ones) did not “smile” at the enlightened Aliyev, nationalism for him was not an end in itself, but a means of mobilizing the population and the army of Azerbaijan to return Karabakh (in spite of any losses). As a result, the conditions of peace possible for Armenians were getting worse and worse every day - if they went to the negotiations on time, the conditions of peace would be much easier for them.
However, as it was already said, the Azerbaijanis with nationalism, too, was more than "in order".
Note: In "theory", love for one's nation is impossible without respect for others, but the practice is too often quite the opposite, and in this particular case - overshadowed by many reason (and conscience). Both sides were “good” (in quotes!).
From the memoirs of Vlad Shurygin, about the catastrophic Spitak earthquake (1988):
When the disaster struck, after half an hour he got up to the table and did not leave him for almost two days. Even that his family was alive, he learned from others. He could not abandon the sick and save his own, a sense of duty did not allow. A girl was brought to the hospital with severe fractures and bleeding. He operated on her for four hours. Returned from the other world. His parents rushed to thank him with tears and spoke to him in Armenian. He said he didn't understand. That is not an Armenian. The father asked who you are? He said Azerbaijani. Then the father spat on the floor, turned around and left.
An elderly Armenian woman, when she found out from a nurse that the doctor who would operate on her was not an Armenian, but an Azerbaijani, got off the gurney and tried to crawl away with broken legs!
From Andrey Konchalovsky's film “Heydar Aliyev. Burden of Power ":
In this formulation of the film, the word “answer” is most shocking, moreover actually said by a famous Russian director (commissioned by the Heydar Aliyev Foundation)! Is it possible to "justify" new crimes by previously committed crimes of other persons (including of another nationality)? And there is reason to believe that this was not an "accidental slip".
USSR Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov (from the transcript of the meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee of 29.02.1988/XNUMX/XNUMX on the tragedy in Sumgait):
Witness M. Mamedov (from the materials of the criminal case):
Then there was Baku and the expulsion of Armenians from Azerbaijan (the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia was already underway), the bloody "first Karabakh war" with the Khojaly tragedy (and a number of others).
I emphasize once again - there can be no excuses for new crimes by old ones. Moreover, instead of "draconian measures" and the most severe punishment of the guilty and those involved (on both sides!), The USSR leadership showed weakness and spinelessness. This became a "trigger" to the demise of the USSR and to the tragedy of many nations (including in the Caucasus).
The wounds inflicted then “bleed” in both peoples, largely to the point of complete loss of adequacy.
A striking example of this is the murder of the Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan at NATO courses in Budapest in 2004 by Azerbaijani officer Safarov (16 blows on a sleeping person with an ax specially bought for this purpose).
According to the media and the unofficially published protocol of the first interrogation of Safarov, he explained the motives for his act as follows:
In Hungary, Safarov received a life sentence, but in 2012 he was extradited to Azerbaijan, where he was immediately not only pardoned by President Aliyev, but also received another military rank (!). This event caused outrage all over the world (there is no need to talk about Armenia).
And it was this factor (nationalism) that excluded the possibility of negotiations and compromises, which was even publicly expressed by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin. Until the military catastrophe of the Armenians became a fait accompli.
At the same time, it is necessary to understand that an agreement on the cessation of hostilities is far from peace. And whether it will be depends on all parties to the conflict (and on those involved in its settlement).
Our peacekeepers really went into "scorching heat" that could well "blaze" in a "blast furnace". Nevertheless, only the actions of the Russian side today give a chance not so much to resolve the conflict now, but to simply prevent the inevitable bloody massacre yesterday. And in this regard, the actions of the RF Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Ministry and the President personally deserve the highest praise.
The instability factor of the truce
At the same time, the key factor of instability today is the position of the Armenian side. The military catastrophe caused an acute internal political crisis in Armenia (with the inevitable search for the culprit).
Of course, the first culprit is Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. And he directly bears the main responsibility for the disaster.
However, even in the Russian media, instead of a deep analysis of what happened, they began to make Pashinyan a "scapegoat" and look for the reasons "in Soros", "the West", etc. Of course, this factor exists, but it is not the main one. During the period when Armenia was heading towards disaster, why was the rest of the Armenian elite silent? And most importantly, why did the military keep silent (about the most serious problems)? Including those who were directly supposed to “report and do” (and in fact they had all the resources for this)?
The quotes that we will give below are more like "trash" or "house-2". For anything, just not a hard analysis of the reasons for the defeat, determination of conclusions or the development of emergency measures for the current situation.
Let us quote below the statements from the official resources of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia.
Let's start with the Minister of Defense of Armenia:
November 15, 2020 Statement (website of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia):
The video mentioned is an obvious manipulation of information, since in a video filmed in 2016, the then First Deputy of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia David Tonoyan spoke about the Israeli UAVs used against the Armenian forces during the hostilities in April 2016, mainly Harop-type kamikaze UAVs. , while under his words are shown completely new attack UAVs of the Bayraktar TB2 type of Turkish production, which were used in 2020. … Bayraktar operate at incomparably higher altitudes and are much more difficult to detect. Israeli Harops, both during the hostilities of 2016 and in 2020, can be relatively easily detected and struck by Armenian air defense units. In particular, during the hostilities in 2020, Armenian air defense units shot down about 200 Israeli Harop-type UAVs.... ... Armenian forces managed to destroy a significant number of Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, as a result of which the enemy in some cases was forced to stop their flights altogether.
"All is well, lovely marquise"? “More than 200 enemy UAVs” shot down? - "Why should you feel sorry for them, you bastard?"
The end of this statement is just "fine":
"Unparalleled" Armenian drone UAVs
Here it is appropriate to recall the “unparalleled” Armenian shock UAVs. The press service of the NKR Defense Army reported this:
The military of Nagorno-Karabakh also provided a video where you can see how a drone hits a target.
The device was developed and manufactured by specialists of an unrecognized republic. The military did not disclose the detailed tactical and technical characteristics of the UAV, but they claim that the UAV is not inferior to the analogues produced by leading arms manufacturers. The drone operates independently of various location systems, has high maneuverability, and is reliably and easily controlled. The press service of the armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh also noted the great shock capabilities of the new apparatus.
В the news - there is. And in the troops? Isn't it a "picture" well known to the Russian viewer (and reader).
The RA Defense Minister's vision of the priorities for the development of the defense sector and the armed forces (as of June 9, 2020) can be read by the link RA MO and do not forget to compare with how it was in reality.
Or maybe he is "not very competent"? Civil all the same, especially since (taken in the same place):
Okay, let's read the words of the military - the Chief of the General Staff.
Address of the Chief of the General Staff of the RA Armed Forces, Colonel General Onik Gasparyan, November 17, 2020 (link MO RA):
Some politicians have accused that the leadership of the armed forces provided the head of state with an unrealistic analysis of the likely nature of the enemy's actions and the capabilities of his armed forces. This is not true!
I was appointed Chief of the General Staff on June 8 and already on June 12 I presented to the RA Prime Minister, and a few days later to the Security Council, an analysis of the military-political situation in the region, as well as the capabilities of our armed forces.
Based on the analysis, I made proposals to improve the level of the state's military security. In particular…
The proposal was accepted by the Security Council and the Prime Minister, but the question was asked: "And if we cannot avoid war, what should we do?" I replied that in the war imposed on us, we must try to inflict heavy losses on the enemy as soon as possible and force him to abandon further actions. I pointed out that we must avoid a long war, given our resources. Numerous proposals were discussed and approved, the implementation of which was supposed to significantly increase our combat potential. This also applied to the acquisition of weapons and military equipment, and comprehensive support for combat operations.
It was a real heroic battle and a battle for survival ... The Armenian people can be proud of their soldier, officer and general. "
And if the Armenian soldiers and officers in Karabakh really fought and died heroically, then very bad questions arise about the generals. Incl. and by outright avoiding responsibility ...
Fisherman uniform
And a scandal erupted (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the RA National Assembly on Defense and Security Issues Andranik Kocharyan against VIPs of the RA Ministry of Defense), but instead of actually revealing the problems, it got a grotesque comedic character, up to anecdotal claims and no less anecdotal official responses from the RA Ministry of Defense ( link:
On November 16, Defense Minister David Tonoyan appeared in parliament in a uniform, the rules for wearing which were determined by order 1694 of the RA Ministry of Defense dated December 24, 2019. In other words, not only is it not an "incomprehensible" form, but it is also approved by the defense department with all the necessary procedures and the rules for wearing it with all the details are established. And if the chairman of the NA Standing Committee on Defense and Security Issues even tried to inquire about this issue, based on his position, he would have been informed that for about a year the civil servants of the RA Defense Ministry have been wearing this uniform. In other words, Mr. Kocharian with the expression "fisherman's uniform" actually insulted several hundred civil servants of the Ministry of Defense, who wear this uniform with honor every day. "
This is what is happening now in Armenia together with a real debriefing. Instead of identifying and fixing the problems that led to the military disaster.
Why "couldn't"
The last and most important thing. Why, with all the real possibilities, Karabakh still could not withstand.
Armenian politician Andrias Ghukasyan answers the questions of Novaya Gazeta ( link):
I was shocked: there was not the line of defense that we were told about: it was supposedly very powerful and almost insurmountable.
- What did you see instead of her?
- Along the entire almost XNUMX-kilometer line from the Araks River to the Mrava mountain range there were no serious fortifications. Trenches were simply dug, there were dugouts and firing points, which were very clearly visible not only from the air, but even from the ground - from both sides. Even then, this could not but cause concern. I periodically returned to this topic, but it was impossible then to promote it in Armenia.
- Почему?
— There was a tenacious myth about an invincible army, to criticize the army is to pour water on the enemy's mill, such thoughts can only be expressed by defeatists. So it was believed.
- The myth was probably backed up by stories about the construction of defensive structures, the purchase of weapons, about defense spending ... And could you check this?
—The myth rested only on political statements of different levels... During some military holidays or parades, people gathered and made speeches. All of them boiled down to the fact that we have a powerful and heroic army, many times superior in professionalism to the army of Azerbaijan, therefore both the borders of Armenia and the line of contact in Artsakh are reliably protected. "
I stress once again:
Doesn't this remind you of anything?
And this is not some "minor trifle". Lies, self-praise, humiliation of the enemy - up to the complete loss of the ability to adequately perceive the situation and act. - This is what became the key factor in the defeat of Armenia in Karabakh.
Draw conclusions.
Information