Military Review

German estimates of Soviet military production before the war

89

This is a rather boring document at first glance. Tables showing the names of military factories, notes on the nature of production and the number of workers employed. There are quite a lot of these tables. It would seem that there is not much useful information in it. Meanwhile, it was a very important document and was directly related to the "Barbarossa" plan.


This is an overview of the Soviet military industry prepared by the Department of Hostile Armies of the East of the General Staff of Germany at the end of 1940: “Die Kriegswirtschaft der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken (UdSSR). Stand 1.1.1941. Teil II: Anlageband "(TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12451, d. 280). There is also the first part of this document, which contains the shortest description of the Soviet economy and its resources that can be used for war (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12450, d. 81). But the second part is more voluminous and contains much more information that is interesting for analysis.

German estimates of Soviet military production before the war
Title page of the handbook on the Soviet military industry

As already mentioned in the previous article on the topic of what the Germans knew about the Soviet military industry, the army intelligence that interviewed the prisoners was most interested in the location of military enterprises on the ground, in cities, landmarks. In terms of the nature of production and capacities, they already had a reference book prepared before the war. It was published on January 15, 1941 with a circulation of 2000 copies and, presumably, was available at the headquarters of the formations and their intelligence departments.

However, its appearance itself was associated with a question that, when planning an attack on the USSR, could not help but be interested: what is the scale of military production, how many weapons and ammunition are produced? The data obtained was clearly compared with the data on military production in Germany, from which followed the answer to another, more important question: does Germany have a chance of winning the war with the USSR? The answer was received, and we will talk about it in more detail below.

How many factories did the Germans know?


The Germans had information about 452 Soviet military enterprises. These included not only individual specialized military plants and factories, but also workshops and divisions of large factories engaged in military production. Large enterprises could have 3-4 such subdivisions, which were considered as separate military production. For example, the Leningrad Kirov Plant produced machine guns, artillery pieces, ammunition and armored vehicles. Thus, the Kirov plant included four military production facilities.

Military enterprises in the directory were categorized by industry:

• Shooting weapon - 29 enterprises,
• Artillery, tank, anti-aircraft guns - 38 enterprises,
• Artillery ammunition - 129 enterprises,
• Gunpowder and explosives - 41 enterprises,
• Chemical weapons - 44 enterprises,
• Tanks and armored vehicles - 42 enterprises,
<br>• aviation factories - 44 enterprises,
• Plants of aircraft engines - 14 enterprises,
• Shipyards - 24 enterprises,
• Optics and precision mechanics - 38 companies.

For a significant part of the factories, the directory contained information on the number of employed workers, production data, and sometimes information on the mobilization plan. For example, Novokramatorsk Machine-Building Plant named after Stalin in Kramatorsk, according to German data, had monthly capacity in 1938: for 81-mm mortars - 145, for 45-mm anti-tank guns - no data, for 57-mm tank guns - 15, for 76,2-mm anti-aircraft guns - 68 , for 102-mm anti-aircraft guns - 2; also the mobilization plan for 1937: for 240-mm guns - 4, for 240-mm howitzers - 8, for 305-mm railway guns - 2. Also, the plant produced ammunition (57-mm - 23000 pcs., 152-mm - 10000 pcs., 240-mm and 305-mm - 3500 pcs.) and armored vehicles (indicated T-32 and STK).

The most recent data that the Germans had was from 1938. I got the impression that the source was an agent or a group of agents who most likely worked in the USSR People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry and had access to classified documents. But in 1939 the agent or agents were arrested, and the flow of data on Soviet war production ceased. So the guide actually reflects the state of the Soviet military industry at best for 1939.

Also, looking at the list, I calculated that the Germans captured 147 factories from this list during the war, or 32,5%, mainly in Ukraine.

Release of chemical weapons


A noteworthy point is the German data on the production of chemical weapons in the USSR as of 1937. There were 44 enterprises in the industry, of which there were nine of the most important and powerful, located in Stalinogorsk (Novomoskovsk), Leningrad, Slavyansk, Stalingrad and Gorlovka. These enterprises, which produced more than half of the Soviet chemical weapons, had, according to German data, a monthly capacity:

• Clark I (diphenylchloroarsine) - 600 tons,
• Clark II (diphenylcyanarsine) - 600 tons,
• Chloroacetophenone - 120 tons,
• Adamsite - 100 tons,
• Phosgene - 1300 tons,
• Mustard gas - 700 cubic meters,
• Diphosgen - 330 cubic meters,
• Chloropicrin - 300 cubic meters,
• Lewisite - 200 cubic meters.

4,9 thousand tons of various chemical weapons or approximately 58,8 thousand tons per year. During the entire First World War, Germany consumed 52 thousand tons of chemical warfare agents. During World War II, Germany produced 61 tons of chemical weapons, and the Allies found about 69 tons in warehouses.

In Germany, there was no such capacity for the production of chemical weapons. In 1939, the average monthly output was 881 tons, in 1940 - 982 tons, in 1941 - 1189 tons (Eichholz D. Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945. Band I. München, 1999. S. 206). That is, the annual output was 10-12 thousand tons.

Although this issue still requires some clarification (for example, the prepared capacities significantly exceeded the actual production of chemical weapons; it would also be worthwhile to clarify the statistics), nevertheless, the overall picture for the German General Staff was quite clear. If only nine of the 44 Soviet chemical weapons factories produce five times more than the German ones in a year, and more than was spent during the entire First World War, then in such conditions a stake on chemical weapons on the Eastern Front is impossible. The enemy will have much more of it, and he will achieve an advantage using it. Therefore, it is better not to start.

Strong exaggeration of Soviet capabilities


The final part of the document provides an assessment of the general military production in the USSR. The department of hostile armies Ost apparently tried to clarify information both from agent sources and by calculation.

This estimate does not at all shine with accuracy, which is not difficult to establish by comparing it with the reporting data that we have. This suggests that German intelligence did not have direct access to current documentation and reports on military production.

It is better to systematize the information somewhat and tabulate it - with a comparison with actual war production in the USSR in 1939 and with war production in Germany in 1940. The handbook was compiled in the summer or fall of 1940 as part of the development of the Barbarossa plan, and the information from it was clearly compared with the achieved level of German production.

In Germany it was customary to measure production and capacity in monthly output, in the USSR - in annual output. Since we mainly use German data, for comparability, Soviet accounting data for 1939 were recalculated from annual to monthly average.


The general conclusion from this data is rather unexpected. The Germans greatly exaggerated the power of Soviet military production, especially in ammunition, gunpowder and tanks. No less strongly overestimated artillery with a caliber of up to 57 mm, both in the number of barrels and in the volume of ammunition production. In 1939, this category included the bulk of tank, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. The underestimation of the capacity was for rifles, rifle cartridges and large-caliber artillery.

If we look at the data that the German General Staff had at the time of the decision to attack the USSR, then it is clear from them that the German command decided to go to war due to the obvious superiority of the German army in supplying artillery with shells of 76,2 mm and above ... More than twice as many shells for 7,5 cm FK 18, 7,5 cm FK 38, 10,5 cm leFH 18/40 and so on were produced than in the USSR, according to German estimates. Shells for 15 cm K 18, 15 cm sFH 18 - 5,5 times more than in the USSR. So the German command could count on the fact that the German artillery would score the Soviet one, even if it had more barrels.


This decision was made on the basis of data, as we see today, very exaggerated. In fact, the German preponderance in the supply of artillery ammunition was much more pronounced. For example, in 76,2-107 mm shells, German production exceeded Soviet production by more than three times. The USSR produced 1939 guns of all types and calibers per month in 1417, and Germany - 560, that is, 2,5 times less. However, guns without shells for them are extremely useless.

The German generals and staff officers were, of course, aware of the tactical and strategic implications of the lack of shells. This moment was well studied by them on the experience of the First World War. The data they had said that the Soviet artillery would also experience a shortage of shells, like the Russian artillery in the First World War. This was the basis for their confidence that they would be able to defeat the Red Army.

So this handbook of Soviet war industry and war production estimates was a very important argument in favor of the Barbarossa plan.
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  1. Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko
    Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko 14 November 2020 05: 19
    12
    A short and interesting article. Thanks!
    1. The comment was deleted.
  2. Lech from Android.
    Lech from Android. 14 November 2020 05: 31
    +1
    I got the impression that the source was an agent or a group of agents who most likely worked in the USSR People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry and had access to classified documents.

    You can pick up the list of the 1939 composition and isolate approximately the people involved in this information ... although it will be more difficult to calculate a specific person.
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 14 November 2020 15: 11
      11
      Quote: Lech from Android.
      You can pick up the list of the 1939 composition and isolate approximately the people involved in this information ... although it will be more difficult to calculate a specific person.

      Everything is much simpler and more banal, because until 1939 they could openly publish a number of statistical data on our industry, and German analysts, on the basis of these data, calculated the possibilities of military production. After the outbreak of World War II, everything was naturally classified, which is why the Germans did not have materials that were important for the assessment. Well, do not forget that a huge number of German specialists came to the USSR to work on the installation and adjustment of the equipment that we purchased from Germany, and they knew the real state of affairs at our enterprises better than many in Moscow. So not everything was connected with agents, although of course they worked for German intelligence.
      On the whole, the article is quite interesting, but it is not entirely clear why the author saw the "overestimation" of the USSR's capabilities in the production of weapons and military equipment. In my opinion, it was German analysts who made a mistake in our country's ability to produce weapons not only at specialized enterprises, but also at enterprises in non-defense industries. And the fact that by switching to a wartime regime, we would restrict the workers' rights to rest and vacations, they apparently could not imagine, although we had planned this in advance. I think that if German intelligence had correctly assessed the military potential of the USSR, they would have been able to dissuade Hitler from attacking not us, but advised him to deal with England.
      1. vladcub
        vladcub 14 November 2020 19: 48
        0
        "could openly publish a number of statistics" are you kidding me? For the Soviet Union to publish data related to the defense industry? I doubt that the figures were published: how many shells or guns were fired.
        It is unlikely that foreign specialists worked at such factories in 1937-38, by this time their own specialists had already appeared in the Soviet Union. Much has been written about this
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 15 November 2020 12: 50
          +2
          Quote: vladcub
          "could openly publish a number of statistics" are you kidding me?

          Not a drop - Richard Sorge used a similar guide to Germany to encrypt his reports.
          Quote: vladcub
          For the Soviet Union to publish data related to the defense industry?

          General industrial data - this was necessary even in order to obtain loans for new projects from Western countries. On their basis, experts assess the military potential even at the present time.

          Quote: vladcub
          It is unlikely that foreign specialists worked at such factories in 1937-38, by this time their own specialists had already appeared in the Soviet Union. Much has been written about this

          You probably haven't read everything:
          From 1930 to 1940, foreign specialists managed to build 2 of the most modern plants and factories in the USSR. And so that there was someone to work there, American and German scientists and professors did a good job at the workers' faculties of the country, graduating about three hundred thousand workers. According to some estimates, the construction of the factories cost the Soviet Union US $ 2,5-XNUMX billion.


          https://wwii.space/Немецкие-специалисты-в-СССР/
          Those who worked in the USSR were good specialists and they had a good idea of ​​the possibilities of what they helped us build at that time, that's why they could give a reliable assessment of how it would work in war conditions.
          1. vladcub
            vladcub 15 November 2020 17: 58
            0
            First, the Soviet Union and the Reich are different things.
            Secondly, if such data were published, then nafig and intelligence is needed.
            Thirdly, in the Soviet Union, you yourself say that they trained workers, but not specifically at enterprises.
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 16 November 2020 11: 46
              +3
              Quote: vladcub
              First, the Soviet Union and the Reich are different things.

              The principles of intelligence are no different from country to country.
              Quote: vladcub
              Secondly, if such data were published, then nafig and intelligence is needed.

              You are confusing periodicals, which are available to everyone, and periodicals departmental publications, which may contain specific information of interest to intelligence. Departmental publications are more difficult to access, but they are not stamped publications, such as the Soviet magazine ZVO. So intelligence is needed - without it, you will not receive information for analysis.
              Quote: vladcub
              Thirdly, in the Soviet Union, you yourself say that they trained workers, but not specifically at enterprises.

              It is enough for a good specialist to get into the shop to understand at what level the whole enterprise works. These are the specialists who came to us from Germany, and then they gave a detailed report on the trip.
              1. antivirus
                antivirus 19 November 2020 16: 57
                0
                It is enough for a good specialist to get into the shop to understand at what level the whole enterprise works.

                - even more so - in the main, energy-consuming and complex processes in the shops.
                by bottlenecks, determine the total capacity of the plant (excluding everything) - as 2 fingers on the asphalt
  3. Far B
    Far B 14 November 2020 06: 15
    20
    As if nothing surprising. The Germans had data on the available capacities, and not on their actual load. The facilities could have been mothballed.
    But the moment that the latest data were obtained in 37-38 years. They transparently hint that the notorious Stalinist "purges" were not organized out of nowhere. No, Stalin was not paranoid.
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 14 November 2020 20: 12
      +4
      Dalny, about the "big terror", is a very muddy topic. Yes, there were traitors in the army. More precisely: "comrades" with dubious convictions. In 1917, for various reasons, they supported the Bolsheviks, and then differences began. This is to put it mildly.
      But let's not forget that Yezhov and Yagoda and Frinovsky and Leushkov and many others worked in the state security and how they "worked", of course millions of niva lambs are from the evil one, but there were two innocent perpetrators for one real traitor. There are lists of people who have been denied rehabilitation.
      Even if N. S could not rehabilitate them ... And his hands were itching to hang everything on Stalin. Stalin and Beria personally shot, "and the healthy forces of the party" were dozing. If even then they did not think of showing them as lambs, then a cart and a cart
      1. Mikhail3
        Mikhail3 19 November 2020 15: 24
        0
        Svyatoslav, you have an extremely poor idea of ​​that era. In this case, judge surprisingly categorically and categorically. Read more on this topic, and choose the authors not from the modern get-together, but people of a particular cause, such as Grabin for example. Now and argue with you like that ...
        1. vladcub
          vladcub 19 November 2020 19: 52
          +1
          "people of a specific cause," or even better to talk with Stalin and Yezhov. Just kidding.
          Of course, Grabin saw and heard a lot, but are you sure that Grabin did not look back at the Central Committee?
          I read Yakovlev: "The Purpose of Life", Voronov, but I don’t remember Grabin?
          Whom I haven't read for sure - Rokossovsky, Konev. I'm going to find Chuev
          1. Mikhail3
            Mikhail3 20 November 2020 09: 05
            0
            I'm absolutely sure I looked around. Do you need the "truth"? Nobody writes it like that. For older people, I would refer to Hodja Nasreddin with his "in order to avoid", but I'll tell you easier. There are no written sources that are written without regard to anyone else. Remember this always.
            The ability to receive information, despite the fact that the author is engaged, is not always smart, afraid, angry with someone or someone is grateful, must be developed. Nothing in the world is just given, and the most expensive ways to prevent your brain from being powdered. But if you do not develop them, strangers will drag you through life by the nose so that you live for them. Not for yourself.
            It's just that modern authors do not have any information at all. Absolutely. No. From their writings, which are one continuous psycho-influence, absolutely nothing can be milked, because they know nothing. It is not important for them to write to them about 30 years in Russia, or the current situation in Hong Kong. The maximum they have is names and positions, and they often get twisted behind the Wikipedia liar.
            And those of his contemporaries who did the real thing have a lot of details and details, which, when compared with other sources, give a very curious picture. The same liar, careerist and scoundrel Yakovlev ... In general, train. It is interesting!
            1. vladcub
              vladcub 20 November 2020 16: 45
              +1
              I don't argue with Yakovlev's assessment.
              Of the current ones, I appreciate: Kremlin, partly Martirosyan. What the Kremlin likes: it tries to dispel the rubbish that was poured on Stalin. Now the trend is "mistakes of the past", albeit in a veiled form, but it does not follow the trend.
              Martirosyan is more of a publicist than a historian, and I don't really like that.
              I despise such as: Fomenko and Co., and Miltyukhov is something: behind "Suvorov" Rezun repeats that the bad Stalin was going to attack Hitler's goody. Confirms Katyn and is considered a "patriotic" historian.
    2. Lexus
      Lexus 14 November 2020 21: 13
      +8
      Michael hi,
      Stalin was the greatest leader of all time, the shrewd leader of the Great Land of Soviets. This is confirmed by the impressive number of enterprises working for defense, and by the fact that he did not hide from his duties in the bunker. Actually, including, for this, his enemies hated him then and their followers hate him today.
      1. vladcub
        vladcub 19 November 2020 20: 06
        +1
        Alexey "Lexus", I myself respect Stalin's personality. Frankly, I am far from a fan of the Communist Party, for me Stalin and the party are two different things. Stalin is a PERSONALITY, and dubious and decent personalities got along well in the party. NS's statements "about the healthy forces of the party" are a fairy tale for primary school age.
        1. Mikhail3
          Mikhail3 20 November 2020 09: 13
          0
          Do you notice that you are contradicting yourself? This happens precisely when you came to your conclusions not with the help of reason, but under psycho-influence. Look.
          Quote: vladcub
          both dubious and decent people got along well in the party.

          Were you decent? And, apparently, in very large numbers, otherwise MASS heroism, an unprecedented phenomenon in history, under the leadership of that very party, and no one else, cannot be explained. When you face death, the lying scoundrels have no authority.
          But
          Quote: vladcub
          NS's statements "about the healthy forces of the party" - a fairy tale for primary school age

          To put it mildly, these statements contradict each other. See? You are messed up. This is how it works ...
  4. Kot_Kuzya
    Kot_Kuzya 14 November 2020 06: 31
    +5
    The industrial capabilities of the USSR in 1939 and 1941 were different at times. In the summer of 1939, Germany provided a loan to the USSR in the amount of 200 million gold marks, this was a necessary condition put forward by Moscow to Berlin for the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact. With these 200 million marks, the USSR bought in Germany a lot of machine tools and other modern equipment for the production of equipment, weapons and ammunition. 200 million marks with the gold standard of 0,36 grams per mark, this is 72 tons of gold - a huge amount.
    1. Moskovit
      Moskovit 14 November 2020 07: 51
      12
      For this money, our people received such a lot of samples of military equipment, various equipment, machine tools, laboratories, that you wonder how Germany dug a hole for itself. Moreover, as soon as the Germans began to dynamite with supplies, ours immediately blocked theirs.
      1. Krasnodar
        Krasnodar 14 November 2020 10: 18
        +7
        Quote: Moskovit
        For this money, our people received such a lot of samples of military equipment, various equipment, machine tools, laboratories, that you wonder how Germany dug a hole for itself. Moreover, as soon as the Germans began to dynamite with supplies, ours immediately blocked theirs.

        The Germans underestimated the "Untermenches", who later broke their ridge
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 16 November 2020 10: 43
        0
        Quote: Moskovit
        For this money, our people received such a lot of samples of military equipment, various equipment, machine tools, laboratories, that you wonder how Germany dug a hole for itself.

        The most illustrative example of digging a hole is STZ. For the deployment of serial production of the T-34 at STZ, the plant required 253 machines. Including 107 German.
        ... among those ordered by the Stalingrad Tank Plant as necessary for the production of T-34 machines, there were:
        - screw-cutting “Heydsireich and Garbeck” 13 pcs., “Beringer” 11 pcs., “Dr. Brown” 1 pc .;
        - turning and rotary "Niles" 35 pcs .;
        - turning and multi-cutting “Guishold” 11 pcs .;
        - revolving "Heinemann" 18 pcs .;
        - Dental "Maag" 2 pcs.;
        - gearshakers “Reinecker” 6 pcs., “Lorenz” 3 pcs., “Pfauter” 1 pc.;
        - universal grinding "Schmalz" - 1 pc .;
        - intra-grinding "Wotan" 1 pc .;
        - slot grinding “F. Werner "3 pcs.;
        - grinding “Glisson” 1 pc.
        © Ulanov / Shein
      3. antivirus
        antivirus 19 November 2020 17: 01
        0
        you wonder how Germany dug a hole for itself.

        - suddenly appeared out of nowhere ...
        The French clearly understood such a union of German technologies and Soviet potentials (and raw materials) - that in 2 months they fell under Hitler.
    2. wehr
      14 November 2020 22: 15
      -1
      Guns fired
      1939 - 17 thousand
      1940 - 15 thousand
      1941 (first half) - 7,9 thousand (15,8 thousand in annual terms)
      Art shots fired
      1939 - 16,8 million
      1940 - 14,5 million
      1941 (first half) - 10,8 million (21,6 million annualized)

      Here they are such "at times" differences !!!! laughing
      1. Kot_Kuzya
        Kot_Kuzya 15 November 2020 00: 10
        -3
        Quote: wehr
        Guns fired
        1939 - 17 thousand
        1940 - 15 thousand
        1941 (first half) - 7,9 thousand (15,8 thousand in annual terms)

        Can you use proofs?
        1. wehr
          15 November 2020 01: 17
          -2
          http://www.soldat.ru/doc/mobilization/mob/chapter2_4.html
          1. Kot_Kuzya
            Kot_Kuzya 15 November 2020 03: 04
            -2
            Let's see the production of the most needed guns for the army - 122 mm howitzers, 152 mm howitzers and 152 mm howitzers-guns.
            122 mm howitzers - 1938 - 711 pieces, 1939 - 1294 pieces, 1940 - 1778 pieces, the first half of 1941 - 927 pieces, 1854 pieces would have been made at such a rate in a year.
            152 mm howitzers - 1938 - 480 pieces, 1939 - 628 pieces, 1940 - 996 pieces, the first half of 1941 - 472 pieces, 944 pieces would have been made at such a rate in a year.
            152-mm howitzer-guns - 1938 - 500 pieces, 1939 - 567 pieces, 1940 - 901 pieces, the first half of 1941 - 497 pieces, 994 pieces would have been made at this rate in a year.
            As you can see, in 1940 there was a sharp jump in the production of howitzers. Plus, since 1940, the 37-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, so necessary for the army, have finally begun to arrive relatively massively.
            It can also be seen from the tables that the total production of guns decreased mainly due to the reduction in the production of 45-mm anti-tank guns, if in 1939 they were delivered 4536 pieces, then in 1940 only 2480 pieces, in 1941 they were not delivered to the army at all ... Similarly, with the 76-mm divisional guns, in 1938 they were delivered 1643 pieces, in 1939 only 1010 pieces, in 1941 they were also not supplied to the army. Although the total production of guns remained about the same for 1939-1941, give or take a couple of thousand, but the production of large-caliber guns in percentage terms increased, and making a 122-mm or 152-mm howitzer is by far more expensive and more difficult than 45 -mm fluff.
            1. wehr
              15 November 2020 12: 40
              -3
              At times - this is 3-4 times at least, and better 5-6 times. There is no such thing in your figures.
              You blurted out nonsense, but instead of apologizing or keeping silent, you insist on it.
              1. Kot_Kuzya
                Kot_Kuzya 15 November 2020 12: 54
                -2
                Quote: wehr
                At times - this is 3-4 times at least, and better 5-6 times. There is no such thing in your figures.
                You blurted out nonsense, but instead of apologizing or keeping silent, you insist on it.

                Where did I write that the production of guns has increased significantly? Here is my quote
                The industrial capabilities of the USSR in 1939 and in 1941 differed significantly You are writing nonsense here, without even understanding what I wrote.
                1. wehr
                  15 November 2020 12: 55
                  -2
                  Do you want numbers on this issue? laughing
                  1. Kot_Kuzya
                    Kot_Kuzya 15 November 2020 12: 55
                    -3
                    Proofs in the studio.
                    1. wehr
                      15 November 2020 14: 56
                      -4
                      You are welcome. Please be sure
                      http://istmat.info/files/uploads/36699/narodnoe_hozyaystvo_sssr_za_1913-1955_gg.pdf
                      Sheet 36 is a summary table for the issue.
                      The reference book is archived and previously secret. There is also weather data.

                      If you say that it is "many times more", despite the fact that in 1937 they melted 17,7 million tons of steel, and in 1940 - 18,3 million tons, then you are lying as a political instructor. laughing
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 16 November 2020 18: 34
                  0
                  Quote: Kot_Kuzya
                  The industrial capabilities of the USSR in 1939 and in 1941 differed significantly.

                  If only ...
                  The threatening increase in the military danger and the rapid growth in the number of the Armed Forces have caused a sharp increase in the need for weapons and ammunition both for the current supply of troops and for the accumulation of necessary reserves. A natural consequence of this was a steady increase in the volume of current orders of GAU. Over the five years (1937-1941) in value terms, the order increased 6 times - from 2 to 12 billion rubles. Orders for the supply of guns increased more than 3 times (from 6,2 thousand in 1937 to 19,2 thousand in 1941), and artillery rounds - almost 4 times (from 8,4 to 32,3 million. PC.)

                  To fulfill such plans, the defense industry needed an increased consumption of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, the resources of which during this time in the country increased slightly:
                  - pig iron from 14,5 to 14,9 million tons per year;
                  - steel from 17,7 to 18,3 million tons per year;
                  - rolled products from 13,0 to 13,1 million tons per year.


                  The presence of a significant disproportion between the growth of demand for metal and the level of its production created great difficulties in the work of the entire industry, and, above all, the defense industry. Most of all, this applied to shell production, which was the main consumer of ferrous and non-ferrous metals.

                  The situation was such that if it was required to increase the production of certain types of weapons, then often this was possible only by reducing the production of other types of weapons... This, in particular, happened in 1940, when in order to increase the order for mortars it was necessary to reduce (in comparison with 1939) the plan for the supply of guns. The work of industry was also slowed down by the need to continuously master the production of new models of guns and shells.
                  © "Artillery supply in the Great Patriotic War 1941-45."
    3. Mikhail3
      Mikhail3 19 November 2020 15: 29
      +1
      Quote: Kot_Kuzya
      In the summer of 1939, Germany provided a loan to the USSR in the amount of 200 million gold marks,

      And the data in the article. And much more. What exactly gave Hitler the confidence of victory given all these data? Why was he so convinced that he could deal with the USSR? For me personally, this is the greatest mystery of the War. He was a trench soldier, he talked a lot with other veterans. There weren't people there who fought with the Russians? I do not understand.
      Inevitably, you begin to lean towards ideas about the extremely mystical consciousness of Hitler, this whole story with Anenerbe, Black Bon and other miracles.
      1. vladcub
        vladcub 19 November 2020 18: 22
        +1
        "he was a window soldier" it is true, he was a member of WWI, perhaps a good soldier, he had the Iron Cross, but he fought on the Western Front and had nothing to do with the Russians.
        "communicated a lot with other front-line soldiers" mainly with those who fought on the Western Front ..
        You have not forgotten that in WWI, the Western Front was the main one for Wilhelm, and in the East there was: the Landspher and other SECONDARY units.
        He remained convinced that they would have won, but: "stab in the back." He could decide that if the Landspher beat the Russians, then the elite units would cope with the Russians
  5. Free wind
    Free wind 14 November 2020 06: 40
    0
    Judging by the numbers, it is possible that they leaked outright misinformation. And in some cases I can't understand some things. Let's say the KV-1 tank was used and showed itself well in the Finnish war, and suddenly they write that the Germans did not know about their existence. Thank God, at least the poison was not used at the front. Although there are rumors that it happened once. In terms of shells, the lag is of course large, and in terms of powder it is very large.
    1. Simon
      Simon 14 November 2020 07: 49
      +3
      Maybe they knew that the production of KV-1 tanks at the Kirov plant and the T-34 at the Kharkov plant had begun, but they did not know their tactical and technical data, since the production of these tanks began about a year before the war and most likely data on these tanks were highly classified. German tankers themselves reported that these tanks drove them into shock when they met in battle.
      1. Kot_Kuzya
        Kot_Kuzya 14 November 2020 08: 03
        +6
        So the head of the Abwehr, Canaris, was an English agent and deliberately reported to Hitler the underestimated figures for the USSR, so that Hitler would get the impression of the weakness of the USSR and he attacked him. It was not for nothing that the Germans themselves hanged him later for treason.
        1. sergo1914
          sergo1914 14 November 2020 09: 06
          +8
          Quote: Kot_Kuzya
          So the head of the Abwehr, Canaris, was an English agent and deliberately reported to Hitler the underestimated figures for the USSR, so that Hitler would get the impression of the weakness of the USSR and he attacked him. It was not for nothing that the Germans themselves hanged him later for treason.


          Well, Canarisa also reported on the "developed network of highways" in the USSR. The surprise happened in the fall. Rasputiza. His large shoulder straps from the Eastern Front then, like according to memoirs, wanted to take the Adam's apple on this topic. Like, why is it on the "developed road" the tank cannot pass, but sinks in it on the tower.
        2. vladcub
          vladcub 15 November 2020 18: 16
          +2
          Canaris is still that fox. He tried to both yours and ours, he knew well that he wanted to hear Hitler and then said
      2. Free wind
        Free wind 14 November 2020 08: 48
        -2
        I read that the Germans blocked Leningrad to block the release of KV, I don't know whether it's true or not.
        1. Alf
          Alf 14 November 2020 21: 17
          +3
          Quote: Free Wind
          I read that the Germans blocked Leningrad to block the release of KV, I don't know whether it's true or not.

          Nonsense. Leningrad is the city of the Revolution, its capture would inflict enormous damage on the USSR, both economically and militarily, and especially in the political sense.
      3. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 16 November 2020 10: 46
        0
        Quote: Simon
        Maybe they knew that the production of KV-1 tanks at the Kirov plant and T-34 at the Kharkov plant had begun, but they did not know their tactical and technical data, since the production of these tanks began about a year before the war and most likely data on these tanks were highly classified

        EMNIP, uv. D. Shein wrote that in the spring of 1941 the Germans had data on the KV and T-34. But intelligence simply did not have time to release them into the troops.
    2. Alf
      Alf 14 November 2020 21: 15
      0
      Quote: Free Wind
      Let's say the KV-1 tank was used and showed itself well in the Finnish war, and suddenly they write that the Germans did not know about their existence

      There was only one KV, and the dates did not particularly share the recognized and found Abwehr. For example, the Hans never learned about the QMS and the T-100.
    3. Mountain shooter
      Mountain shooter 14 November 2020 22: 51
      0
      Quote: Free Wind
      Judging by the numbers, it is possible that they leaked outright misinformation. And in some cases I can't understand some things. Let's say the KV-1 tank was used and showed itself well in the Finnish war, and

      Let's remember again. In 38, their data flow was cut off. And the newest tanks and aircraft appeared after this year. Including KV.
  6. Simon
    Simon 14 November 2020 07: 36
    +3
    So this handbook of Soviet war industry and war production estimates was a very important argument in favor of the Barbarossa plan.

    Well, all the Nazis calculated, before the attack on us, one thing was not taken into account - the heroism and patriotism of our people. In a short period of time of the war, the leadership of our country at that time, in a short time, the main capacities of the military factories from the western part of our country, were transferred beyond the Urals and practically, in a short time, the production of military equipment and ammunition was established, which decided the outcome of the war ...
    1. demiurg
      demiurg 14 November 2020 09: 58
      13
      The transfer of factories to the Urals was developed before the war. When it became clear that sooner or later they would have to fight with Germany or England.
      The Germans planned the war the same as in France, the passivity of the local population, without storming the cities. When regiments and divisions surrender having lost 5-10-15% of the personnel.
      The Germans put everything into the first blow, and they almost succeeded. But the divisions continued to fight almost to the last soldier. Local residents began to partisan. The cities had to be stormed.
      For the first two years, the Germans dragged on radio stations, trucks from all over Europe (it was not for nothing that the French beat one of the Renault brothers in prison), the experience of generals and, most importantly, regimental / divisional level commanders (a company / platoon commander can be learned in 3-5 years, army commanders not so much is needed, but everything in between ...). And on the economy, stupidly producing more shells.
      And by the winter of 42/43, the Red Army had already gained experience. The surviving komvzoda in 41 became battalions. The army began to be saturated with radios. The mobility of the army has increased (lend-lease really helped). Plus, chemicals came from overseas (gasoline, chemical reagents, the same ammunition, even 285000000 buttons were also needed). But even without the Lend-Lease, Germany lost the race of economies. The USSR began to produce most of everything needed in the war.

      Stalingrad is not only heroism. This is also a blood experience. This is the supply of troops with everything from stew to tanks.

      Malyshev and Beria did no less for victory than Konev or Tolbukhin.
      1. Sergey Valov
        Sergey Valov 14 November 2020 16: 28
        -5
        1. Regarding the evacuation of industry - I will leave out of the brackets the delirium about the pre-planned return to the enemy of its own territory. Especially during the war with England. I’ll say something else - wouldn’t it be easier to build factories beyond the Urals right away?
        2. About trucks from all over Europe - you can't think of a greater headache for the rear service. Hence the massive death of these trucks in 1941.
        3. Without Lend-Lease, the USSR would have exactly half the amount of gunpowder and aviation gasoline with all the consequences. It's about the race of economies. Plus, about half of the TOTAL release of ammunition, the Germans passed through the air defense of Germany.
        4. About the training of junior command personnel for 3 - 5 years, everything is correct, only now they taught us during the war 3 - 5 weeks, and the poor platoon guy lived on average 30 - 50 days at the front.
        A little educational program about the evacuation of industry - not everything can actually be taken out, but this is not the main thing. Where to install this equipment? We need premises with a strong floor for the foundations of the machine tools, we need free electricity capacity, we need railways to receive raw materials and ship products, we need production areas of appropriate dimensions, we need qualified personnel to install equipment, we need a consumable tool, we need a mobile railway fleet, we need crane equipment unloading and installation of evacuated equipment, etc. Where to get all this ??? Are you going to assert that all this was prepared in advance?
        Evacuation, of course, was not somewhat different from what it is presented.
        1. Aviator_
          Aviator_ 14 November 2020 17: 59
          +6
          Regarding the evacuation of industry, I will leave out of the brackets the delirium about the pre-planned return to the enemy of its own territory.

          It's not about surrendering your territory. It is about the withdrawal of enterprises from enemy air strikes. Preparations for the evacuation of the Mariupol Metallurgical Plant began already in the 20th of June 1941.
          I’ll say something else - wouldn’t it be easier to build factories beyond the Urals right away?

          This was done (Magnitka, Kuzbass, Komsomolsk-on-Amur ...). In the European part, industry was developed purely for historical reasons.
          1. Sergey Valov
            Sergey Valov 14 November 2020 22: 40
            -1
            It is much easier and cheaper to get enterprises out of the air strikes by repelling these strikes, for which there were more than enough forces.
            I know about the construction of factories in the depths of the USSR, and factories were built there for other reasons, but much more factories were built in the European part of the USSR.
        2. Alf
          Alf 14 November 2020 21: 21
          +3
          Quote: Sergey Valov
          I’ll say something else - wouldn’t it be easier to build factories beyond the Urals right away?

          Do you know the term "logistics"?
          Quote: Sergey Valov
          A little educational program about the evacuation of industry - not everything can actually be taken out, but this is not the main thing. Where to install this equipment? We need premises with a strong floor for the foundations of the machine tools, we need free electricity capacity, we need railways to receive raw materials and ship products, we need production areas of appropriate dimensions, we need qualified personnel to install equipment, we need a consumable tool, we need a mobile railway fleet, we need crane equipment unloading and installation of evacuated equipment, etc. Where to get all this ??? Are you going to assert that all this was prepared in advance?

          Plant N18, Aviation, in Kuibyshev was transported to a reserve site created in the late 30s. See the history of the plant.
          1. Sergey Valov
            Sergey Valov 14 November 2020 22: 47
            -2
            The term logistics is not familiar, because I don’t know what it is, there is no such word in Russian. The aircraft plant in Kuibyshev was transported to the site prepared for the construction of a NEW plant, the construction of which, like many others, did not take place due to the unrealistic plans for the industrial development of the USSR.
            1. Alf
              Alf 14 November 2020 22: 50
              0
              Quote: Sergey Valov
              The term logistics is not familiar, because I don’t know what it is, there is no such word in Russian.

              Logistics is the science of transportation. Agree, it's stupid to build a plant for the production of auto parts in Siberia, if the assembly plant is in Moscow. So they built factories in the European part of the USSR with a view to peace, although they planned "just in case" further away, and much in general beyond the Urals.
        3. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 16 November 2020 11: 00
          0
          Quote: Sergey Valov
          1. Regarding the evacuation of industry - I will leave out of the brackets the delirium about the pre-planned return to the enemy of its own territory. Especially during the war with England.

          What surprises you so much? The war with England is a war primarily with its "fighting hamsters" - the countries of the cordon sanitaire (Finland, Poland, Romania). The same Poland, until the end of the 30s, was considered by the General Staff of the Red Army as a very serious enemy (which is not surprising for a country that in 1935 had only twenty-five regular rifle divisions from Vladivostok to Leningrad).
          Quote: Sergey Valov
          I’ll say something else - wouldn’t it be easier to build factories beyond the Urals right away?

          No money left. It's one thing to build a plant in a more or less populated European part with its infrastructure and personnel. And the other is beyond the Urals.
          The main question is personnel: how to lure workers there. For a qualified specialist in the 30s (with their staff shortage) is akin to a ballet prima donna: if something does not suit him, then he simply stops going to work, after which he gets a job at another plant, where he is torn off with his hands. And from the old factory he is automatically dismissed, even without the application and the director's visa.
          It was planned to start solving the problem of transferring industry in the Third Five-Year Plan. But it was during it that the war began.
          1. Sergey Valov
            Sergey Valov 16 November 2020 15: 11
            -2
            The war with England is the war with England. To hammer a coalition against the USSR to the British in the 20s and 30s failed. I completely agree with you about Poland, but nevertheless the USSR was stronger. As for the construction of factories beyond the Urals, on my part it was sarcasm, I had to put a smiley face. As for the maneuver of labor resources, I disagree with you. In those days, the desire of people was little taken into account, and it was dangerous to refuse the offer to go to hell. Another question is that there were very few specialists, much less than was required for the industry.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 16 November 2020 16: 17
              0
              Quote: Sergey Valov
              The war with England is the war with England. To knock together a coalition against the USSR for the British in 20-30 years. failed

              And they wanted to fight the USSR for real? There was no need to put together anything - the "cordon sanitaire" was not called that for nothing. Poland from may you, Great Romania and Great Finland to the heap. The Poles were ready to cooperate even with the Germans for the sake of "beating the Russians".
              Quote: Sergey Valov
              I completely agree with you about Poland, but nevertheless the USSR was stronger.

              Once again: 25 personnel divisions for the entire Red Army from Vladivostok to Leningrad. Of these, 50% are in the Far East. The term for the mobilization and formation of territorial divisions in practice was at least a month. Moreover, the mobility measures with weapons and equipment were provided only by the end of the 30s (and immediately after that the army reform began, after which the mobility measures were again not provided with weapons and equipment).
              Quote: Sergey Valov
              As for the maneuver of labor resources, I disagree with you. In those days, the desire of people was little taken into account, and it was dangerous to refuse the offer to go to hell.

              And who will send an experienced skilled worker on whom the whole plan of the shop / plant is held, to hell on earth? wink
              I wrote about this category of workers. For whom in the old places they held on with all hands and who, almost, calmly changed places of work for new ones, taking advantage of the loophole in the legislation regarding absenteeism. This loophole was closed only in 1940.
              3. To prohibit the unauthorized departure of workers and employees from state, cooperative and public enterprises and institutions, as well as the unauthorized transfer from one enterprise to another or from one institution to another.
              Leaving an enterprise and institution or moving from one enterprise to another and from one institution to another can only be allowed by the director of the enterprise or the head of the institution.
              (...)
              5. To establish that workers and employees who voluntarily left state, cooperative and public enterprises or institutions are tried and are sentenced by the people's court to imprisonment from 2 months to 4 months.
              To establish that workers and employees of state, cooperative and public enterprises and institutions go to court for a prosecution without a valid reason and are sentenced by a people's court to correctional labor at work for up to 6 months and withholding wages up to 25%.
              In this regard, cancel compulsory dismissal for absenteeism without good reason.

              6. It is established that the directors of enterprises and heads of institutions for evading the trial of those guilty of unauthorized departure from the enterprise and the institution, and those guilty of absenteeism without good reason, are brought to justice.
              Also establish that directors of enterprises and heads of institutions who have recruited persons who are hiding from the law, who have voluntarily left enterprises and institutions, are subject to judicial responsibility.
              © Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 26, 1940 "On the transition to an eight-hour working day, to a seven-day working week and on the prohibition of unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions."
              1. Sergey Valov
                Sergey Valov 16 November 2020 17: 38
                0
                “And who will send an experienced skilled worker?” - if the director of the plant receives an order to send personnel to a new location, then he (the director) will not utter a word.
                "And they wanted to fight the USSR for real?" - so that's what we're talking about.
                "Once again: 25 personnel divisions for the entire Red Army" - yes, I do not dispute that, I mean that in a one-on-one clash, Poland had practically no chance of winning. Germany before 1941 as a real enemy of the USSR also could not be considered. Until 1941, the USSR had no really dangerous opponents. There was military hysteria, there were no opponents.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 16 November 2020 18: 27
                  0
                  Quote: Sergey Valov
                  if the director of the plant receives an order to send personnel to a new location, then he (the director) will not utter a word.

                  Mwa ha ha. Here is an example of how such an order was carried out in a much more organized and connected discipline and subordination of the Red Army:
                  So for example, out of 8 people sent by the 45th rifle division to the positions of deputy commanders of the company for political affairs, 6 have negative characteristics:
                  Ml. political instructor R. - expelled from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) candidates in December 1940;
                  Ml. political instructor K. - in December 1940, the KDP of the 45th rifle division pronounced a severe reprimand for hooliganism and harmful talk. It works badly in the unit now;
                  Art. political instructor B. - in December 1940, the KDP of the 45th Infantry Division pronounced a severe reprimand for drunkenness and corruption in everyday life.
                  Ml. political instructor M. - speaks Russian poorly, does not want to study, never did political studies, did not finish any courses, education of 4 groups. He has an unhealthy mood, several times he raised the issue of secondment to the Uzbek SSR, does not want to take his family to Ukraine.
                  Ml. political commissar L. - the formation of the 4 group, almost does not speak Russian, does not work in a company because of ignorance of the language.
                  Political instructor J. - presented himself for dismissal from the army as an unworkable and undisciplined political worker.
                  From the 8th Panzer Division arrived ml. political instructor B., expelled from the CPSU (b) The District Party Commission still September 1940 years.

                  In the cover of the shortage of the OU KOVO is dressed up, and the division received enlisted personnel and corporals from 10 and 15 tank divisions. The quality of the corporals sent is very low, the latter cannot fulfill the posts of junior command personnel, both in terms of their development and training. Among the sent corporals: 211 people. of non-Russian nationality who speak Russian poorly, 2 Germans, 1 Persian, 7 illiterate people, 70 illiterate people, demoted from the junior commander to the rank and file for indiscipline 11 people, who were on trial before the army and 18 were convicted, whose relatives were repressed - 12 people, unfit for combat service - 20 people.
                  All sent corporal are used now in their posts
                  junior command staff, but they are of little use, because rank-and-file Red Army soldiers in 1940 are better trained today.
                  © Katukov
                  Now imagine - how the civil director will carry out the order on the secondment of engineers and workers from his enterprise. smile
                  Quote: Sergey Valov
                  Yes, I do not dispute this, I mean that in a one-on-one collision, Poland had practically no chance of winning.

                  So the Red Army did not even dream of such a collision. In all plans, at best, a coalition of Poland, Romania and Finland, which joined them, was considered, and at worst - the same, but with the support of Britain, France and a simultaneous attack by Japan on the Far East.
                  1. Sergey Valov
                    Sergey Valov 16 November 2020 18: 54
                    0
                    "And now imagine - how the civil director will carry out the order on the secondment of engineers and workers from his enterprise" - he will either fulfill it or put his party card on the table with all that it implies. The times were not modern. My relatives were thrown around the country in a similar way, and one even died, since he was sent to where he was contraindicated for health.
                    As for the memoirs of Katukov, you have not discovered anything new for me, a common practice characteristic of the USSR at all times.
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 17 November 2020 16: 07
                      0
                      Quote: Sergey Valov
                      either he will fulfill, or he will put his party card on the table with all that it implies.

                      For what? He posted workers in the required numbers. And that some of them are idlers and drunkards, while others quit their jobs automatically for absenteeism - so let the director of that plant have a headache about this.
                      The directors are primarily asked for the fulfillment of the plan, which is impossible without experienced personnel. And the excuses "we have allocated workers for the new plant"they don't bother anyone - the answer will be"had to prepare new".
                      As for the party card - in the NKAP, the dismissed director was punished ... by the appointment of a director to the plant, the director of which was sent to the place of the removed one. smile
                      1. Sergey Valov
                        Sergey Valov 17 November 2020 17: 33
                        0
                        "Punished ... by appointment" - and there were many such cases?
                        “He seconded the workers” - that's what we are talking about, he could not disobey.
                2. strannik1985
                  strannik1985 16 November 2020 18: 50
                  0
                  yes, I do not dispute this, I mean that in a one-on-one collision, Poland has a chance to win

                  Our General Staff assessed the capabilities of Poland in 6 months, subject to the provision of financial and technical assistance from England and France. Moreover, the Polish army did not represent anything special, for example, 65 ~ 70 vehicles in the Polish PD.
  7. Kwas
    Kwas 14 November 2020 11: 20
    +1
    Well, the guide is incomplete and ambiguous. An advantage in large caliber shells? So the Germans also had a fleet, and was actively building, I suppose a lot is needed for heavy ships, but this does not apply to the German-Soviet war. The tanks are nonsense. It seems that in terms of numbers, ours only have twice as much, but how did it happen that the advantage at the beginning of the war was six times (and was supported throughout the war)? There are no figures for combat aircraft, but this is extremely important! Rather, the Germans underestimated our industry, and therefore climbed, otherwise they would have tried to solve it peacefully. But another option is also possible, in the spirit of Rezun. If someone would put on the table real data on the number and production of tanks and planes, he would have reason to think "This is against ME!" - and attack to get ahead. But there is no evidence that he had such data.
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 14 November 2020 19: 15
      +3
      "Rather, the Germans underestimated our industry," it seems, Schellenberg quoted Hitler as saying that if he knew more precisely about the Russian tank potential, he would not start a war.
      They had a rivalry between Canaris and Himmler: whose intelligence is better
    2. Alf
      Alf 14 November 2020 21: 24
      -2
      Quote: Kwas
      If someone would put on the table real data about the number and production of tanks and aircraft, then he would have reason to think

      There is a famous statement by Aloizovich when he found out that Soviet tank factories began to produce 1000 tanks a month - "If I knew this before, I would have thought whether it was worth starting this war."
      After the start of the war, the German military attaché responsible for the military-economic assessment of the USSR was shot "for providing false information."
      1. Ryazan87
        Ryazan87 15 November 2020 01: 09
        +4
        After the start of the war, the German military attaché responsible for the military-economic assessment of the USSR was shot "for providing false information."

        Who is this poor fellow? German military attaché in the USSR in 1941 - Ernst-August Köstring. He died in 1953 in Germany.
  8. Knell wardenheart
    Knell wardenheart 14 November 2020 12: 02
    +1
    Have there been any comparisons between the aircraft industry? Everything is clear with tanks and cannons, but the "second head" of the German dragon was precisely aviation.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 November 2020 11: 10
      +1
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      Have there been any comparisons between the aircraft industry? Everything is clear with tanks and cannons, but the "second head" of the German dragon was precisely aviation.

      Yes, it would be interesting to see if the Germans knew about the actual mobilization of the aircraft industry of the USSR in 1940. It's funny that its reason was the overestimation of the deputy head of the Air Force Research Institute I.F. Petrov of the German capabilities for the production of aircraft ("70-80 cars per day") ...
  9. andrewkor
    andrewkor 14 November 2020 16: 02
    +2
    Not a great, but informative book of memoirs of the head of GAU ND Yakovlev "About artillery and a little about yourself."
  10. Aviator_
    Aviator_ 14 November 2020 18: 02
    +1
    102 mm anti-aircraft guns - 2;

    Where did the Germans get this anti-aircraft caliber? From the weapons of the Novik-class destroyers?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 November 2020 11: 14
      +1
      Quote: Aviator_
      Where did the Germans get this anti-aircraft caliber? From the weapons of the Novik-class destroyers?

      Then, from the "Red Caucasus" - 102-mm anti-aircraft guns B-2. smile
      Most likely, they were referring to 100-mm guns. That's just, EMNIP, made their plant "Bolshevik" in Leningrad, and not NKMZ. So the intelligence seems to have missed the mark.
  11. vladcub
    vladcub 14 November 2020 19: 07
    +1
    Quote: Lech from Android.
    I got the impression that the source was an agent or a group of agents who most likely worked in the USSR People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry and had access to classified documents.

    You can pick up the list of the 1939 composition and isolate approximately the people involved in this information ... although it will be more difficult to calculate a specific person.

    You can calculate the probable agent with an accuracy of 70. Take the list of workers of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry who had access to such materials and check who was arrested in 1939. Then look at the files in the NKVD archives. In the NKVD there were many bone-breaking watchdogs, but there were also those who knew how to think. Linden affairs can be distinguished from natural ones, but the employee is painstaking and cannot be done at once.
  12. Konnick
    Konnick 14 November 2020 21: 53
    +1
    Quote: ccsr
    I think that if German intelligence had correctly assessed the military potential of the USSR, they would have been able to dissuade Hitler from attacking not us, but advised him to deal with England.


    Wouldn't advise. Intelligence chief Admiral Canaris, being an agent of British intelligence, deliberately underestimated the data on the defense industry and the army of the Soviet Union.
    Even Guderian, in his memoirs, mentioned the phrase of Hitler - If I knew how many tanks the Russians have, I would not start this war.
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 15 November 2020 13: 01
      +1
      Quote: Konnick
      Intelligence chief Admiral Canaris, being an agent of British intelligence, deliberately underestimated the data on the defense industry and the army of the Soviet Union.

      All the same, when planning any war, the final decision is made not by intelligence structures, but by operational ones - this is how the army is structured in the modern world. Canaris was not the first person in the Wehrmacht, but what they do with intelligence chiefs is well known from the pre-war history of the GRU, when leaders were changed for various reasons. But there is not a single planning document at the level of NGOs where Golikov's signature would be, as far as I know. And besides Canaris, at least two more structures of Germany conducted intelligence against the USSR, there, too, not all were simpletons.
  13. wehr
    14 November 2020 22: 10
    0
    Quote: ccsr

    Everything is much simpler and more banal, because it was just that until 1939 they could openly publish a number of statistical data on our industry, and German analysts, on the basis of these data, calculated the possibilities of military production.


    What else can you think of? Already in 1934, many detailed statistical reference books (for example, on state farms) were labeled "Not subject to publicity" or "Not subject to publication". The publication of the indicators of the third five-year plan of 1939 was, firstly, numbered, and secondly, the part with the table was labeled "Not subject to publication."
    The famous fun of Soviet statistics to publish data as a percentage of an unknown number also appeared in the 30s.
    1. Alf
      Alf 14 November 2020 22: 51
      0
      Quote: wehr
      The famous fun of Soviet statistics to publish data as a percentage of an unknown number also appeared in the 30s.

      To deceive the enemy and completely confuse their own. laughing
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 15 November 2020 13: 07
      +1
      Quote: wehr
      What else can you think of? Already in 1934, many detailed statistical reference books (for example, on state farms) were labeled "Not subject to publicity" or "Not subject to publication".

      It's not a neck at all - at least figure it out.
      Quote: wehr
      The publication of the indicators of the third five-year plan of 1939 was, firstly, numbered, and secondly, the part with the table was labeled "Not subject to publication."

      And what of it? Do you even know the conduct of secret office work in the USSR in order to speculate on the words "Not subject to publication"? There is no such stamp of secrecy - for a start, at least understand this before carrying nonsense.
      Quote: wehr
      The famous fun of Soviet statistics to publish data as a percentage of an unknown number also appeared in the 30s.

      You do not know about another "fun" that existed in the USSR until the collapse, when local print publications could not be subscribed to abroad by our citizens, but only the central press. Why would you not wonder?
      1. wehr
        15 November 2020 14: 22
        -2
        Vulture or not vulture - and the data has not been published. And there was no willingness to risk. So your version that the German intelligence officers read everything in open publications is a linden!
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 15 November 2020 14: 33
          +1
          Quote: wehr
          Vulture or not vulture - and the data has not been published.

          As many specialized reference books in limited editions were published in various people's commissariats in departmental printing houses. The fact that they did not get into the press did not mean that they were secret and did not get into the libraries of departments.
          Quote: wehr
          So your version that the German intelligence officers read everything in open publications is a linden!

          I didn’t say that everything can be found in reference books, but the fact that military attachés of all countries bought any reference books and studied periodicals is known from the memoirs of intelligence professionals, you just don’t know about it.
          1. wehr
            15 November 2020 14: 59
            -1
            You are here trying to show everyone how smart you are.
            And I studied these reference books, and open, and departmental, and previously secret. So, from those reference books that were sold openly, it was impossible to find out information about military production. Moreover, I also have German documents that confirm this.

            And you puff up further; maybe someone will believe. laughing
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 15 November 2020 15: 12
              +1
              Quote: wehr
              And I studied these reference books, and open, and departmental, and previously secret.

              And I cooked some, so what?
              Quote: wehr
              So, from those reference books that were sold openly, it was impossible to find out information about military production.

              Don't fool people because you have no idea how open source specialists work. For example, in the USSR, the journal "Foreign Military Review" was published, and it used materials from the open press. So this magazine was subscribed to by all military attachés of foreign countries, and moreover, it was one of the most informed magazines in the world. You are clearly not in the subject of who published it and where they got the material from.
              Quote: wehr
              And you puff up further; maybe someone will believe.

              When you hold something like that in your hands, then you will indicate who you can trust, and who, like you, has no trust.
              1. wehr
                15 November 2020 16: 03
                0
                A, from ZGV laughing

                There was always more information in the Western press. In Germany, for 38 marks and 50 pfennigs, one could buy a directory with a bunch of all kinds of information, including the deployment of the GSVG troops. I wrote about this in my 2019 book. I will not say which one, you should know it.
                And what could be subtracted in Soviet publications?
                This is essentially a fraudulent trick to talk about one thing while keeping in mind something completely different. In this case, you pass off the mores of the Western press for the mores of the Soviet press, and you still get into an indignantly insulted pose.
                1. ccsr
                  ccsr 16 November 2020 11: 30
                  +1
                  Quote: wehr
                  I wrote about this in my 2019 book.

                  I wonder what kind of book, maybe post a link. The very fact that intelligence works and you do not deny using open sources of information, as I understand it? Progress is evident ...
                  Quote: wehr
                  And what could be subtracted in Soviet publications?

                  There are a lot, especially in local and departmental publications, which often could not correctly assess how their information could be used by specialists.
                  Quote: wehr
                  In this case, you pass off the mores of the Western press for the mores of the Soviet press, and you still get into an indignantly insulted pose.

                  Come on, and do not bother too much with this, you just clearly began to teach someone who understands much more than you in this matter.
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 16 November 2020 11: 20
              +1
              Quote: wehr
              So, from those reference books that were sold openly, it was impossible to find out information about military production.

              Hmm ... Do you remind you of the well-known story of how analysts of a potential adversary quite accurately calculated the location and capacity of Soviet nuclear facilities in the Urals from a photograph of the central control room of Uralenergo in Sverdlovsk published in Ogonyok and articles from open departmental publications? smile
  14. flc9800
    flc9800 15 November 2020 17: 04
    0
    for 81-mm mortars - 145 Probably, the respected author meant 82-mm mortars after all? Is not it ?
  15. ccsr
    ccsr 16 November 2020 11: 38
    +1
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Do you remind you of the well-known story of how analysts of a potential adversary quite accurately calculated the location and capacity of Soviet nuclear facilities in the Urals using a photograph of the central control room of Uralenergo in Sverdlovsk published in Ogonyok and articles from open departmental publications?

    This is just one of the well-known examples when, based on the capacity of the commissioned facilities and knowledge of the surrounding infrastructure, it is possible to predict what kind of production is expected if nothing is openly reported about it.
    There is an example from the past, when the most valuable information about the development of military equipment was obtained from a garbage recycling plant, where a recruited employee selected papers that came from a design bureau developing equipment for aircraft.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 November 2020 18: 43
      0
      Quote: ccsr
      There is an example from the past, when the most valuable information about the development of military equipment was obtained from a garbage recycling plant, where a recruited employee selected papers that came from a design bureau developing equipment for aircraft.

      It was not for nothing that Leslie Groves, in his project, recruited the staff of the janitors who took the papers "from the basket to the oven", exclusively by illiterate people. smile
  16. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 17 November 2020 17: 14
    0
    Without Lend-Lease, the USSR would have exactly half the amount of gunpowder and aviation gasoline with all the consequences.

    Most likely not twice, but 20% less, and only after 1942.
    Plus, about half of the TOTAL release of ammunition, the Germans passed through the air defense of Germany.

    The release of German air defense ammunition did not hit 50% even in 1944. And during the entire war, several times less.
  17. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 18 November 2020 12: 04
    0
    Production of 75 mm shells and more in Germany in a thousand pieces.
    For anti-aircraft artillery 1940 - 3700; 1942 - 16700; 1943 - 16600 and 1944 - 18400.
    For field, PT artillery and tank guns (over 75 mm); 1940 - 23300; 1942 - 40000; 1943 - 76300; 1944 - 89400.
    How easy it is to be convinced of ammunition for anti-aircraft artillery not more than 20%.
  18. Python 57
    Python 57 Yesterday, 23: 25
    0
    Слабенько в СССР с танками было...совсем слабенько! Только непонятно, как к декабрю 1941 у немцев скопилась 21 000 советских танков! При том, что у РККА осталась ещё 4000 из предвоенных запасов. Не считая произведенных во втором полугодии. У немцев на 22.06 было всего 3600 примерно.