Military Review

Hammerhead is not a Poseidon killer, he is a host killer

31
Hammerhead is not a Poseidon killer, he is a host killer

Taking into account the hype in the media (both ours and foreign) the topic of deep-sea super torpedoes "Status-6 / Poseidon", a number of media, almost all military-technical events in the field of naval weapons are considered "through them". Among them were news on the deployment of the US Navy's work on the development of a new broadband (with a large area of ​​destruction and a torpedo warhead) Hammerhead mine, which in some media was called the "Poseidon's killer."


This is, to put it mildly, somewhat wrong. And not only because "Poseidon" as a serial system weapons not yet.

Hammerhead vs. Poseidons.


The defeat of a high-speed deep-water object ("Status-6 / Poseidon") is possible only with a nuclear weapon or a small-sized high-speed torpedo (anti-torpedo) with a powerful deep-sea power plant (for example, Mk50 or ATT).

Successful targeting of Status-6 / Poseidon torpedoes with significantly weaker energetics (piston engines fueled by unitary fuel) of the Mk46 and Mk54 types is possible only with the starting position of this torpedo practically on the Status-6 / Poseidon course. However, the open cycle (with exhaust into the water) of these power plants excludes the preservation of high performance characteristics at a kilometer depth, respectively, the probability of hitting a Status-6 / Poseidon-type target for a torpedo-warhead of a mine complex is close to zero (or even impossible).

Note: Theoretically, the creation of non-contact detection equipment that makes it possible to issue the necessary target designation of a torpedo mine is possible, but the cost of such a mine will exceed all reasonable limits.

For this reason, the most effective way to destroy the "Status-6 / Poseidon" is the use of high-speed deep-sea torpedoes (anti-torpedoes) for high-precision target designation developed aviation search and sighting system of anti-submarine aircraft. At the same time, the initial detection was provided by a stationary (and mobile, if necessary) system for lighting the underwater environment. And this was well recognized in the United States and the USSR back in the 80s (that is, at the time of the development of work on the topic of "Status-6").
At the same time, mine weapons are extremely dangerous for the submarines themselves, including potential carriers of Status 6 / Poseidon.

Anti-submarine torpedo mine CAPTOR


Work on torpedo bombs in the US Navy began back in 1960. At the initial stage of development, there were hopes that a broadband mine would reduce the usual costs of laying mines by two (!) Orders of magnitude ... In reality, it turned out to be completely different. For example, the radius of the danger zone of a broadband mine is about 30 times the radius of the danger zone of a bottom mine, while the cost of the first (CAPTOR) in fiscal 1986 was $ 377 (in 000 fiscal year - $ 1978), and the second was less than $ 113 thousand in prices of the early 000s.

Testing of the CAPTOR prototypes began in 1974, however, the high complexity of the task led to the fact that the initial operational readiness was achieved by CAPTOR only in September 1979. Full-scale production (15 per month) was approved in March 1979. At that time, the initial plans of the US Navy included the purchase of 5785 CAPTOR mines. However, reliability problems led to a production halt in 1980 (relaunched in 1982). Fiscal 1982 - 400 Mk60 CAPTOR mines.

Subsequent purchases: 1983 - 300 Mk60; 1984 - 300 Mk60; 1985 - 300 or 475 (according to various sources) Mk60. The delivery of 600 Mk60 in 1986 is in doubt (according to other sources, about 300 minutes). The last year of production was 1987 (493 Mk60).
The laying of mines was provided by all carriers (aviation, surface ships and submarines).


At the same time, aviation (including strategic bombers of the US Air Force) and submarines (for setting active minefields near the bases of the USSR Navy) were considered the main ones.


The use of Mk60 CAPTOR mines from B-52 bombers.

The CAPTOR mine has a total mass of 1040 kg, a length of 3683 mm (the boat version has a mass of 933 kg and a length of 3353 mm), a caliber of 533 mm.

Maximum installation depth data varies from 3000 ft (915 m) to 2000 ft.
The approximate target detection range is about 1500 meters, but this is true only for nuclear submarines of the Navy built in the mid-70s, and already on 3rd generation submarines (at low-noise moves) this figure was much lower.

Speaking about the non-contact equipment of the CAPTOR mine, it is necessary to note the extreme brevity of its description in Western literature, and moreover, the presence of direct disinformation in it (given the specifics of the issue, it is not at all surprising).
As a warhead, a special modification of the small-sized torpedo Mk 46 (Mod 4) was used. Measures to dock mines with a new (at the end of the 80s) modification of the Mk 46 Mod 5 were completed by 1989, but the consequences did not mean the termination of the serial production of CAPTOR.

CAPTOR mines were actively used by the US Navy and Air Force during combat training in the 80s (for which there was a practical version of the Mk66), however, a significant reduction in budget spending in the 1990s - 2000s sharply reduced the intensity of the use of CAPTOR, with a complete withdrawal from ammunition (to the warehouse) by the beginning of 2010.

Russian torpedo mines


The USSR Navy first created a mine with a moving missile warhead (it will not be superfluous to note here - that only thanks to the initiative officer B.K.Lyamin and his appeal in September 1951 with a letter to I.V. Stalin after the industry tried "Bury" a promising topic). Site link allmines.netto the page of the world's first mines with a moving warhead KRM.

Having started work on torpedo mines after the Americans, we were the first to successfully complete the development with the adoption of torpedo mines (and the deployment of its serial production).

From the site allmines.netpage mines PMT-1

In 1961, students of LKI Rudakov and Gumiller, under the leadership of the leading engineer A.I. Khaleeva developed a diploma project on the topic "mine-torpedo". The diploma project of non-contact equipment (NA) torpedo mines was developed by N.N. Gorokhov under the leadership of the head of the laboratory of the Research Institute-400 O.K. Troitsky.
In 1962, the chief designer V.V. Ilyin developed a pre-sketch design of a torpedo mine.
Since 1963, the project of the mine-torpedo (theme "Pilot") was headed by L.V. Vlasov, who was 33 at the time.
In 1964, the preliminary design was completed and defended. The SET-40 torpedo was adapted as a warhead, which received the code SET-40UL.
In 1965 the Dvigatel plant manufactured an experimental batch of mines.
In 1966, chief designer L.V. Vlasov. Since 1967, further work on the topic "Pilot" was continued by A.D. Bots. By this time, the unique, unparalleled in the world, rocket mines A.D. Botov RM-2 and RM-2G, which to this day, 50 years later, are in service and under the code MShM-2 (sea shelf mine) are exported.
All problems were solved, and in 1968 the mine successfully passed the factory tests.
In 1971, the world's first anti-submarine mine and torpedo complex was put into service.


Mine PMT-1 and the scheme of its use.

The creation of subsequent mines-torpedoes of the Navy was influenced by the appearance of the Captor and the desire to obtain the radius of the mine's danger zone (target detection) "no less than the Americans." The beginning of this stories was scandalously instructive.
From the book of the ex-deputy head of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Directorate (UPV) of the Navy R.A. Gusev "Foundations of the minersky craft" St. Petersburg, 2006:

From time to time, the leadership of the Navy and the Ministry of Justice Industry demanded from the military institutes directly, bypassing ordering departments, an analysis of information received from the GRU on the state of weapons and armament of potential adversaries ...

The quarrel occurred precisely on the basis of indirect data about the Captor mine, included by the NIMTI (Research Mine and Torpedo Institute) in the report to the higher authorities ... The Americans found how many mines they plan to place on the Faro-Icelandic anti-submarine line, measured the length of this line, which was divided into three times the first. The response radius significantly exceeded that of our PMT-1 ... The numbers were "hammered" into the report and boldly signed: I. Belyavsky (head of the mine department of NIMTI).

The first to react was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Smirnov N.I., who carefully read all such reports. He urgently summoned Kostyuchenko (chief of the mine department of the UPV) and asked:

- How could you allow the adoption of the PMT-1 mines, obviously inferior to the Captor mine?
Kostyuchenko, not knowing why all the fuss, began verbal maneuvering, to clarify from which side the wind was blowing:
- There is no such information ... And where did you get the information, Comrade Admiral fleet? When we adopted the PMT-1, the Americans had nothing, you remember ...
- What was the detection range in the TTZ?
Kostyuchenko answered.
- Here you go. What century do you live in the UPV? You need to order 3-5 km. Not less.
- You can order and 10. Only to do it now is impossible. Where did you get this information?
- Data should be analyzed for all sources. You must have your head on your shoulders. Know at least fractions ...
- Give me a week of time. I'll figure it out. I'll report it. ...
A couple of days later, Kostyuchenko was already at the Central Committee, on the Old Square at I.V. Koksakov:
- We have information, comrade. Kostyuchenko that the Americans seriously bypassed us in mine weapons.
... Koksakov made a wave of his hand and a couple of leaves started from the table to the floor, where Kostyuchenko was sitting ... A tenacious glance tore out of the text "in the opinion of NIMTI."
In the morning Kostyuchenko was at NIMTI, in Belyavsky's office:
- Igor, tell me where did you get the information about the Captor? Those in the General Staff, Central Committee, military-industrial complex.
- How did you get it? Very simple. They took information from various sources ... One reported the number of mines at the turn. Well, we measured the length of this "fence" on the map - and the most secret information is in our pocket.
- Well, let's say you can divide. Did you take into account that they estimated the effectiveness of such a barrier in the same source at 0,3? In our calculations, we proceed from the probability of meeting a mine of 0,7.
Belyavsky was at a loss:
- We did not take this into account.
Kostyuchenko continued:
- This is where you got the Captor's higher performance characteristics. So, Igor, prepare an addendum to your report today and send it to the General Staff and the Central Committee tomorrow.
- I won't ...
“Well then, I'll have to fire you in two weeks.
- Don't get excited, I'm going to retire myself. Only ... not two weeks, but a quarter. And then, there is no reason.
- I told you the reason: I misled the country's top leadership ... I take the order of the Minister of Defense. Be healthy, Igor.
... The order to dismiss Belyavsky came in 12 days.

From the book "Foundations of the Minersky Craft" samples of broadband mines of the USSR Navy, years of adoption and main developers:



The export version of the torpedo mine received the designation PMK-2:


Device mines-torpedoes PMK-2 (Marine mine weapons. Book 1).

Here it is necessary to note two key problems of broadband mines: the possibility of their massive placement to achieve the required effectiveness of minefields (which required compactness, moderate mass and cost of mines) and an even more acute problem - the target detection range (response) of a broadband mine. The severity of the last question is clearly shown in the conflict between the heads of the mine departments of NIMTI and the UPV.

With the compactness we have turned out "not very". Despite the fact that in terms of performance characteristics, MTPK formally "surpassed" Captor, in reality, alas, it was "skillful manipulation of numbers." For example, the superiority of the MTPK in the depth of setting was "forced" - to somehow use the large dimensions of our mines for good. For 8% of real missions of anti-submarine torpedo mines, the depth of the Captor was quite enough. Most importantly, the overall dimensions and weight of our MTPK sharply limited the capabilities of carriers and fleets to install effective minefields, while the Captor had a dimension close to our RM-0G, which provided twice the ammunition load of mines on submarines (in relation to torpedoes).

A similar solution was applied by the US Navy to the Captor.


Mine CAPTOR prepared for suspension on B-52. The compactness of the mine is clearly visible.

However, an even more critical problem for the United States (taking into account a significant reduction in the noise level of domestic submarines), and especially for the USSR and the Russian Federation, was the detection (response) range of mines.
From the article (2006) of the General Director of KMPO "Gidropribor" S.G. Proshkina:

... the capabilities of passive hydroacoustic detection devices with their traditional construction reach their limit. For 25 years, the acoustic noise level of nuclear submarines has decreased by more than 20 dB and is estimated at 96-110 dB ... As a result, the SNR interference signal ratio at the required detection distances has reached such a low level that it cannot be compensated (with the traditional construction of detection systems) either by “accumulation »When processing signals (due to non-stationary interference), or using antennas of large wave sizes (due to correction of signals on the antenna array) ... In these conditions, it becomes extremely important to form new conceptual approaches to the development of on-board equipment for MPO ...

We “valiantly failed” the last one, the last boss who tried to do something serious in this direction was just S.G. Proshkin, but he was "resigned" from his post at the end of 2006 (and he himself died untimely in 2010).
But the USA did it ...

Hammerhead as CAPTOR at a new technological and conceptual level


Taking into account the sharp decrease in the noise of the submarines of the USSR Navy, the effectiveness of Captor dropped significantly, and in this connection, from the end of the 80s, research began on promising options for broadband mine systems, both by the US Navy and by US firms. An example of the latter is the ISBHM mine project.


However, in the face of a significant reduction in defense spending in the 90s, all these promising studies and research never became real developments.

And now the news about the real (and moreover - forced) development of the American Hammerhead mine.
On February 27, 2020, the United States Naval Systems Command (NAVSEA) announced a tender for the design, development and production of a new sea mine, code-named Hammerhead, with particular emphasis on the ability to deploy multiple Hammerhead mines from unmanned underwater vehicles. The final request for proposals is to be published by the fall, with a contract awarded for the full development and testing of up to 30 prototypes in FY2021.

Actually, all this has been known for a long time, and has been publicly voiced since the 2000s.


From presentations of the US Navy in the mid-2000s.

However, until recently, these were only preliminary studies and presentations. The real work on the development of new min-torpedoes in the United States began in 2018. This was publicly announced in a talk by Captain Daniel George, program manager for the U.S. Navy's Mine Action Services, at the National Defense Industry Association's (NDIA) Annual Expeditionary War Conference on October 16, 2018.

The Hammerhead program plans to use the base body of the old CAPTOR, parachute system components and aircraft harness. However, the new weapon will have improved guidance sensors, electronics and software, and better batteries to power the upgraded systems ... The mine will be modular and open-architecture software with a view to adding new and improved detection and other capabilities in the future.


Hammerhead diagram showing new systems used with the Mk 60 CAPTOR

Note: based on the published scheme, an old Mk46 torpedo is used (with repair and modernization), which is quite logical and natural, and this should be a very serious lesson for the Russian Navy

From the article "Russia's naval underwater weapons today and tomorrow. Will the breakthrough be made out of the torpedo crisis":

... One cannot categorically agree with the opinion of a number of specialists (including representatives of the 1st Central Research Institute, expressed at the Army-15 round table) on the need to use a basic (new) small-sized torpedo in mine complexes. And the point here is not only that such a decision significantly increases the cost of the mine, thereby calling into question the feasibility of its creation, the main thing is that putting a modern torpedo in the mine is a direct prerequisite for disclosing state secrets. In 1968, the US Navy successfully stole two of the newest RM-2 mines from Vladivostok. Since then, the underwater technology has gone far in its development, and taking into account this factor, the warhead of the exposed mine should be a "simplified torpedo", which has a moderate cost and does not contain specially protected information.

The Americans did just that, again unlike us.

Conclusions:


1. The Hammerhead mine is actually a deep modernization (moreover, from the existing stock and ammunition) of the previously released CAPTOR mines.

2. Through the use of new technologies, it is planned to ensure not only the preservation of the CAPTOR hazardous area for modern low-noise targets, but also its significant increase.

3. The main producers of Hammerhead mines will be aircraft and submarines of the US Navy, and for the latter, as a rule, with the use of heavy combat aircraft.

A complete analysis of the combat effectiveness of the Hammerhead mine, the features of its use and place in the US weapons system is impossible without an excursion into the history of the US Navy mine weapon, the evolution of its appearance, views on its use and place in the US strategy (that's right!), The operational art of the Navy and Air Force ( !) USA.
Consideration of these issues (with lessons and conclusions for the Russian Navy) - in the next article.
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  1. Titsen
    Titsen 9 November 2020 07: 36 New
    16
    In addition to the technical details in the article, the human factor errors are well emphasized with quotes from the book!

    And immediately you begin to understand - and now it is even worse in the absence of competent specialists!
  2. Dmitry V.
    Dmitry V. 9 November 2020 09: 41 New
    +9
    Unfortunately, the reasons for making decisions in the field of armaments in the Russian Federation cannot be called logical - recall the transfer to MIT, which does not have development experience, of the task for the design of a promising SLBM with solid propellant rocket motors.
    With that backlog of carriers with solid propellant rocket motors developed by MIT, at a superficial glance, the question of unification of a land carrier with solid propellant rocket engines and a sea one seemed to be correct ... but only with the philistine luggage of knowledge, without considering the specifics of sea launch, storage and operation.
    The result is known: the beginning of work in 1997, 2018 putting into service - a cycle beyond the time limit - 21 years.
    A repeated solution of the specific features of an underwater launch, the answers to which were received back in the USSR.
    The unification was a little expensive because of the incompetence of decision-makers in the field of naval weapons.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 9 November 2020 11: 17 New
      +6
      Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
      Unfortunately, the reasons for making decisions in the field of armaments in the Russian Federation cannot be called logical - recall the transfer to MIT, which does not have development experience, of the task for the design of a promising SLBM with solid propellant rocket motors.

      MIT had no experience in the development of SLBMs. But he had experience working with solid propellant motors.
      On the other hand, the solid-propellant SLBMs of the Makeyevites of the Russian Navy did not suit in terms of mass and size. Only the USSR could build "water carriers" for 16-meter 80-ton SLBMs.
      Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
      With that backlog of carriers with solid propellant rocket motors developed by MIT, at a superficial glance, the question of unification of a land carrier with solid propellant rocket engines and a sea one seemed right

      Yes, there was no unification. There was the use of developments on ICBMs to create an SLBM.
      Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
      The result is known: the beginning of work in 1997, 2018 putting into service - a cycle beyond the time limit - 21 years.

      We take the R-39. The beginning of development - 1971 Putting into service - 1984
      But the trouble is that the P-39 put into service with the Customer's TK did not match. It was accepted only because the lead SSBN, project 941, had been in the fleet for a year, and it was no longer possible to leave it further without the SLBM adopted for service.
      The customer's specification was only R-39UTTKh. When did she appear? wink
      1. Fizik M
        Fizik M 9 November 2020 11: 21 New
        +5
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Only the USSR could build "water carriers" for 16-meter 80-ton SLBMs.

        935 and 955 under "Bark" were MUCH more compact than 941
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Yes, there was no unification. There was the use of developments on ICBMs to create an SLBM.

        There was a "distribution of suckers" under the "sauce" of unification.
        See the very first articles on the topic and interviews by MIT. Mr. Solomonov VERY hates being poked at them
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The Customer's TK corresponded only to R-39UTTH

        does "BulaFa" match?
      2. Dmitry V.
        Dmitry V. 9 November 2020 13: 19 New
        +4
        Quote: Alexey RA
        On the other hand, the solid-propellant SLBMs of the Makeyevites of the Russian Navy did not suit in terms of mass and size. Only the USSR could build "water carriers" for 16-meter 80-ton SLBMs.

        Here it is - so apparently Alexey reasoned :)

        That 36,4 t and 1150 kg of PN (BulavaM 2016) has the ability to break through pack ice like R-39 (1984 g 90t 2250 kg PN)? The technical assignment for the R-39 provided for firing in any roughness of the sea from under the ice of a certain thickness, the ARSS would not have fended off, which made the structure heavier, but solved a lot of unique tasks, such as ice start.
        What made it possible to change the SSBN patrol areas - to use areas covered with ice of a certain thickness, which became an unpleasant surprise for the adversary - Orion will not deliver buoys through the pack ice very well? Which made it much more difficult for the adversary to identify areas for patrolling new boats, as all the critics of the R-39 forget about it ...

        I do not remind you that the throw weight of the R-39 is twice as much as 2550kg 10x200 Kt blocks + false targets or 1150 kg (6x150 Kt) for Bulava M - in combat capabilities Bulava is a step back, cheaper boats are a plus.
        And yet - the element base, when creating the R-39 - weighed several times more, one astrocorrection system of which cost - the manufacturing accuracy went off scale, each titanium stud, the connection of the shells - 4.5 rubles in Soviet prices - more than one hundred pieces in each frame.
        KBM would cope with the task faster and cheaper on a new element base and new fuels.

        Quote: Alexey RA
        The customer's specification was only R-39UTTKh. When did she appear?

        When the industry mastered new fuels and the opportunity arose to redesign.

        Quote: Alexey RA
        We take the R-39. The beginning of development - 1971 Putting into service - 1984

        The R-39 was not called successful in KBM either, however, taking into account those tasks for the P-39, payload range, and other requirements, it turned out how it happened. Taking into account experience, miniaturization of BB, element base and simplification of those tasks, KBM would have created no worse than MIT, only in 11-12 years and not in 21 years.
        From the people who had a hand in the creation of the R-39.

        PS
        On the R-39 at one time I made an educational film for students of aircraft departments, which is still kept under the stamp somewhere :))
        Firsthand.
        1. S. Viktorovich
          S. Viktorovich 9 November 2020 14: 24 New
          +1
          YS Solomonov (MIT) - "this is the head". At the time when the equipment of the Navy with the Bulava was "handed over" to him, this fact saved both the RV SN and the strategic forces of the Navy from destruction.
          1. Fizik M
            Fizik M 9 November 2020 14: 48 New
            +3
            Quote: S. Viktorovich
            YS Solomonov (MIT) - "this is the head". At the time when the equipment of the Navy with the Bulava was "handed over" to him, this fact saved both the RV SN and the strategic forces of the Navy from destruction.

            for the Navy this (MIT and BulaFa) became a "stone on the neck"
            and personally, according to Solomonov, my assessment is negative, and to put it mildly ...

            I guess on what topic you might have crossed paths with Yu.S.
            1. S. Viktorovich
              S. Viktorovich 9 November 2020 15: 16 New
              +1
              The situation for the industry was saved by our common "friend" Serdyukov, as it does not seem a couple of doxal now. While on Miass's board of directors, he, without knowing it, retained a vital part of Russian industry. And Yu.S. Solomonov is not only clever, but also a part of the circle of decision makers.
              1. Fizik M
                Fizik M 9 November 2020 15: 25 New
                +3
                Quote: S. Viktorovich
                also a part of the circle of decision makers

                WAS
                but there is reason to believe that he is trying to "come in again"
                Quote: S. Viktorovich
                Yu.S. Solomonov is not only clever

                I have grounds for the opposite assessment
                and this is not only "Bulava"
                1. S. Viktorovich
                  S. Viktorovich 9 November 2020 15: 36 New
                  0
                  The mace is a thing of the past. I talked with Yuri Semenovich for a couple of decades as part of his cooperation. An honest man and fought for the cause at a time when many had their tails between their legs under the conventional "Chubais", and the fleet was generally in ...
                  Beer drinks non-alcoholic, and I dry wine.
                  1. Fizik M
                    Fizik M 9 November 2020 15: 41 New
                    +3
                    Quote: S. Viktorovich
                    I talked with Yuri Semenovich for a couple of decades as part of his cooperation.

                    I already understood
                    I have an EXTREMELY NEGATIVE attitude towards THIS (new) topic in general
                    the components there are very useful and promising, but the general idea is "a mistake is worse than a crime"

                    An honest man and fought for the cause

                    Sure? But I am not, and there are good reasons for my CONFIDENCE in this.
                    1. S. Viktorovich
                      S. Viktorovich 9 November 2020 15: 53 New
                      +1
                      THIS topic is not technical, but political and economic, and it can be assessed at the level of making appropriate decisions.
                      1. Fizik M
                        Fizik M 9 November 2020 15: 59 New
                        +2
                        Quote: S. Viktorovich
                        THIS topic is not

                        I know
                        I have already given my assessment
                        and it is not technical (in terms of technology, there are very sensible things)
                      2. S. Viktorovich
                        S. Viktorovich 9 November 2020 16: 10 New
                        +1
                        Thank you for your understanding, your assessments of the materials on this resource, for the most part, are nice to me.
    2. Dmitry V.
      Dmitry V. 10 November 2020 09: 31 New
      0
      Quote: Alexey RA
      The customer's specification was only R-39UTTKh. When did she appear?

      It appeared when funding was reduced to the 1st (one) experimental rocket in 2-3 years ...
      And the decision of the commission was far from unambiguous (from open sources)


      http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-441.html
  • Normal ok
    Normal ok 9 November 2020 10: 40 New
    11
    These are the articles that should form the informational basis of VO!
  • silberwolf88
    silberwolf88 9 November 2020 10: 44 New
    +4
    The competition between "shell and armor" continues ... the direction is very promising ... and of course, the improvement of weapons of this class must be constantly dealt with ...
  • iouris
    iouris 9 November 2020 12: 19 New
    0
    You can attack Greenland ...
  • S. Viktorovich
    S. Viktorovich 9 November 2020 14: 12 New
    +1
    The last phrase from S. Proshkin's quote is key. The theory gives the limits of noise suppression and signal extraction, and they are not achieved. Now there are algorithms and examples of implementation (in related industries), the Element base allows.
    1. Fizik M
      Fizik M 9 November 2020 14: 21 New
      +3
      Quote: S. Viktorovich
      The last phrase from S. Proshkin's quote is key

      just the last phrase in the article is not given - because it is erroneous - incl. on this question there was a very tough intersection with Proshkin, which ended (for me) with a completely peaceful tea party with him in the late afternoon

      already in the 2010s I learned that work on the "other option" (what I was talking about) was started by him immediately - the very next (and possibly on the same day, the specialists were called by him immediately after I left), but less than a month later he was "gone"
      1. S. Viktorovich
        S. Viktorovich 9 November 2020 14: 46 New
        +1
        I also had a meeting with S. Proshkin at that time. We didn't agree. He had no orders, and what I offered him was not understood.
  • K298rtm
    K298rtm 9 November 2020 21: 02 New
    +1
    1. Maxim, thanks for the interesting article (it is always useful and interesting to know the opinion of the pros).
    2. Until we create an efficiently operating system for lighting the situation in operationally significant areas (in the air, surface and underwater environments), mine weapons will pose a serious threat to our pl.
    3. Maxim, you have not described the functioning of the CLO. If there is such information (of course, open), then I would like to see it on VO.
    1. Fizik M
      Fizik M 9 November 2020 21: 47 New
      +2
      Quote: K298rtm
      CLO operation

      without going into details
      fр about 30KHz, phase direction finding method
      real detection range is usually 1100-1400m
      the SGPD classifier, most likely there was (4 models) in it, but it was for "screening out" imitators, and at fairly short distances (approximately equal to the real radius of the Captor danger zone)
      the main drawback is low noise immunity from obstruction interference, but how was the situation with the GPSD in our country request , You know perfectly well ...
      The "analogue" of this classifier in real shooting showed that it "sneezes deeply" on products of the MG-34 type, it reliably weeds them out
      1. K298rtm
        K298rtm 9 November 2020 21: 53 New
        +1
        Thank you for your prompt response.
        If I remember correctly, in Captor, detection and primary classification is a silo, and an active channel is a torpedo seeker?
        1. Fizik M
          Fizik M 9 November 2020 22: 06 New
          +2
          Quote: K298rtm
          and the active channel

          in the article in the ZVO, the asset was even BEFORE the torpedo was fired
          the Americans wrote about the silo of the "combat channel" - "analogue of PUFFS", which is an obvious nonsense (there is no required aperture for antennas)
          data are different, incl. and "non-public sources", so for me personally - an open question
          1. Lexus
            Lexus 10 November 2020 04: 28 New
            +3
            Maksim hi,
            Thank you and Alexander for the interesting material!
          2. Fizik M
            Fizik M 10 November 2020 04: 36 New
            0
            in the evening I will post an article from the ZVO on Captor
  • ZEMCH
    ZEMCH 10 November 2020 02: 44 New
    +2
    The article is interesting, I look forward to continuing! good
  • Vinnibuh
    Vinnibuh 16 November 2020 12: 09 New
    -1
    It's cool to read about "those who have no analogue in the world" and how we all pabedim, but the propoganda reminds of the 3rd Reich, when the polar fox came to them. Solid super weapon)
  • Evgenii Xolod
    Evgenii Xolod 16 November 2020 17: 27 New
    0
    As far as I know, after certain depths relative to the source (radar), detection is difficult or impossible. + Actually, as I understand it, you can start from the mouth of the Lena, the range should be enough. That is, you can intercept only off your coast.
    This weapon is created to inflict irreparable damage, and may not actually have a binding directly to the city. Hence the question, is the electrical tape enough to isolate the coast along the entire length? And proceeding from the question, the price of such monitoring is of interest, both creation and operation. I'm afraid that it will be cheaper not to touch the owners of such weapons systems.
  • vmo
    vmo Yesterday, 12: 04 New
    0
    какой то набор технических выводов ,в большинстве не реальных,и выводов технически безграмотных,автор тат слабо знает тему,что становится стыдно за такую не грамотность,набор картинок ни чего путнего.