Military Review

Donbass was blown up to the Germans

49

Photo of 1942. German soldiers inspect the exploded structures of the Kochegarka mine in Gorlovka.


Now a somewhat more serious topic than the plans for the dissolution of collective farms by the German occupation administration. Donetsk coal basin and the circumstances of its occupation. Usually, the occupation of Donbass is spoken of very sparingly: it was captured by the Germans in October 1941, the mines were flooded, they could not get coal, underground workers, the Gestapo and, finally, the battles for liberation, which are described willingly and in detail.

In this topic, I was most surprised by two points. The first point: Donbass was not just a large, but the main industrial region in the USSR, which produced a significant share of pig iron and steel and mined a significant part of coal. In 1940, Donbass produced 94,3 million tons of coal from 165,9 million tons of all-Union production (56,8%). In the same 1940, in the Ukrainian SSR (mainly in the Donbass) 8,9 million tons of steel were smelted out of 18,3 million tons of all-Union smelting (48,6%). At the same time, the region supplied the entire European part of the USSR with coal and metal, including Moscow, Leningrad and Gorky - the largest industrial centers, and itself (together with Kharkov) formed a powerful cluster of large industrial enterprises. "Soviet Ruhr" - what else can I say?

In light of all this, surprisingly little attention was paid to the circumstances surrounding the loss of such an important industrial area. Although it was a turning point in the war, putting the country on the brink of defeat.

The second point: the Germans were able to do very little in the Donbass. This applies to coal mining, steelmaking, and other industrial production. And this is amazing. What happened to Donbass that even such a technically advanced nation could not take advantage of it? The circumstances of the occupation and the peculiarities of the work of mines and enterprises are described in the literature so sparingly that one gets the full impression of the desire to completely hide and forget this page. stories.

Why? The fact that the enemy was unable to take advantage of the Donbas is the largest military-economic victory in the war. In terms of value, it is even more significant than the defense of the Caucasus and its oil. Imagine that in the near rear of the Germans a large industrial region appears, which works even for part of the capacity, but at the same time produces 30-40 million tons of coal a year, 3-4 million tons of steel. The Germans are transferring their capacities for the production of ammunition, weapons, explosives, synthetic fuel there, they are driving masses of prisoners there to work. Wehrmacht receives ammunition weapon and fuel almost from the gates of the enterprises, and does not wait until all this is brought from Germany. The delivery arm is short, to the depth of the front rear, 300-400 km. Accordingly, each offensive is better prepared, with large supplies, which are replenished in the course of battles with new production. Could the Red Army then withstand the onslaught of German troops? I am sure that under the conditions described above, I could not.

In fact, the inability to use Donbass as a fuel and industrial base deprived Germany of the possibility of victory in a strategic sense. Already in 1942, the final defeat of the Red Army was becoming more and more illusory, since the transportation shoulder was inexorably stretched, and the possibilities of supplying supplies to the front were reduced from this. The Wehrmacht only reached the Volga. If the German army were faced with the task of fighting in the Urals, Kazakhstan, Siberia, it is very doubtful that they would be able to fight in these remote areas on a supply from Germany. The seizure and exploitation of Donbass solved this problem. But in Donbass, the Germans got shish without butter and, accordingly, lost their chances of a strategic victory.

This is how we know and appreciate the history of the war. The most important moment, which, in essence, determined the course of the entire Second World War, is almost completely overlooked and practically not studied. Thank you comrade. Epishev for our deep and comprehensive knowledge!

Complex destruction of Donbass


Having decided to hush up the history of the battles, the capture and occupation of Donbass, the party leaders responsible for the ideology created a riddle: they say, if the Germans seized Donbass in a rush and so that little was taken out of there, why did not it work into the occupation? One could explain this by the fact that the Germans were supposedly silly. But this was risky and could lead to a political squabble: if the Germans were stupid, then why did we retreat to the Volga then? Therefore, the ideological department of the Central Committee of the CPSU and its subordinate structures, including the legendary and indestructible Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army, with all their might pressed on the partisans, the underground and the Gestapo men who were chasing them. This should have made it clear that if something was left to the Germans, it was blown up by partisans or underground fighters, but in general it was the Germans who were to blame for everything: they blew up almost everything they saw.

This is all to the fact that such a strange image in the Soviet and Russian literature of the history of the occupation, which I constantly criticize, did not appear at all by chance and solved certain political problems.

In fact, there was no mystery: Donbass was destroyed, and it was destroyed soundly, in a complex manner, which excluded its quick restoration. This was the political problem. The admission that the Donbass was blown up themselves, even before the Germans arrived, could have caused the workers, especially the miners' masses, a question of this kind: "Did we, it turns out, worked hard like convicts so that you blew everything up here?" In those difficult post-war years, such a question could have caused great events.

We are spared such difficulties and therefore can consider the question on its merits. The situation dictated just such a decision. The front gradually retreated, how long it would stand was unknown; the Germans attacked everywhere and beat everywhere; Leaving the Donbass as it is for the Germans on the move meant losing the war. That is why this industrial area had to be destroyed. Stalin made a decision in principle in mid-August 1941, immediately after the capture of Krivoy Rog and its iron ore by the Germans, without which the ferrous metallurgy of Donbass could not work. The execution of this decision was the explosion of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station on August 18, 1941. This hydroelectric power station fed mainly the Donbass.

During the evacuation, priority was given to dismantling and removing large power plants. This was the first stage of the comprehensive destruction of Donbass. The fact is that during the pre-war five-year plans the coal basin became mechanized and electrified. In December 1940, the share of mechanized coal mining amounted to 93,3%, including 63,3% with cutting machines and 19,2% with pneumatic or electric hammers (RGAE, f. 5446, op. 25, d. 1802, pp. 77 -12). Manual mining - 6,7% of production or 6,3 million tons of coal per year. If there is no electricity, then Donbass will not be able to extract about a hundred million tons of coal a year, and all this machine wealth of mine equipment becomes virtually useless.

That is, the Germans were left with only manual production. In December 1942, 68 large and 314 small mines produced 392 thousand tons of coal, which is 4,7 million tons on an annualized basis. Approximately 75% of their manual coal mining capacity.

The second stage of complex destruction is the flooding of mines. If there is no electricity, the pumps of the drainage system do not work and the mines are gradually filled with water. By the time of the liberation of Donbass at the end of 1943, 882 Donetsk mines were flooded, they had 585 million cubic meters of water. It was pumped out until 1947 according to a specially drawn up plan. Flooding is reversible, but very effective at preventing immediate coal mining. For some time, I considered flooding to be the main reason for the Germans' failures in Donetsk coal mining. However, Matthias Riedel published the data, citing a 1942 report from the mining and smelting company BHO (Berg- und Hüttenwerksgesellschaft Ost mbH), which was involved in the restoration and operation of the captured mines, which by the end of 1942 had restored 100 large and 146 small mines , 697 mines did not work, and 334 of them were flooded (Riedel M. Bergbau und Eisenhüttenindustrie in der Ukraine unter Deutscher Besatzung (1941-1944). // Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 3. Heft, Juli, 1973, S. 267) ... That is, 47,6% of mines were flooded, and not all. Their complete or almost complete flooding was apparently a consequence of the destruction carried out by the Germans during the retreat; if, of course, the data in the Soviet publications are correct.

The third stage of the complex destruction of Donbass was still blown up. History lovers from Donetsk have discovered and published the diaries of Kondrat Pochenkov, at the beginning of the war, the head of the Voroshilovgradugol association, which included the trusts of the Voroshilovgrad region of Eastern Donbass. His diaries are an interesting source as they describe several curious things. Firstly, in 1941 Donbass was not captured by the Germans entirely, but only its western and southwestern parts. Secondly, the mines were blown up in 1941. Thirdly, since the mines were blown up and the front stabilized, in the winter of 1941/42 he had to deal with the restoration of what was blown up.
According to his notes, it is clear that the mine explosions were carried out from October 10 to November 17, 1941 by a number of trusts. Crossings of cross-sections, slopes, bremsbergs and drifts were undermined, as well as mine shafts and copra above them. After such detonations, the mine required a lengthy recovery in order to resume coal mining.


On the basis of Pochenkov's notes, I drew up an approximate map of the destruction in Donbass in October-November 1941: those trusts that Pochenkov wrote about the explosion; blue - approximate front line at the end of November 1941.


Map of the location of enemy troops at the end of November 1941.

The map marks what Pochenkov wrote in his diaries; it is possible that this data is incomplete and inaccurate (if at all it is possible to collect such data on mine explosions in October-November 1941). But overall, the picture is pretty clear. The central group of coal trusts around the metallurgical plants was destroyed before the arrival of the Germans and went to them in a badly damaged state. With regard to the trusts, which in November 1941 remained in the hands of the Red Army, they hurried. And this is understandable: they expected a German breakthrough to Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk). However, the front then held out, and the Germans turned their blow to the southeast, towards Rostov.

Explosion for the second time


After the mine explosions stopped, Pochenkov began shipping coal that had accumulated in the remaining mines, including those already destroyed. On December 12, 1941, the People's Commissar of the Coal Industry of the USSR, Vasily Vakhrushev, asked for ideas on the restoration of mines.
By the way Pochenkov describes the restoration work, they faced the same difficulties as the Germans. First, they were given 4000 kW of electricity, but they only needed 11500 kW for small mines; he offered to return two turbines of 1941 thousand kW each to the Severodonetsk state district power station (it was partially working, in December 22 coal was shipped for it). He was promised, but not fulfilled. In February 1942, the trusts had a maximum of 1000 kW, supplied with great interruptions. There was not enough energy for drainage, and the mines were flooded, more and more every day. Secondly, the mining was carried out by hand, and the haulage of coal was carried out by horse-drawn carts. Pochenkov complained about the lack of forage and the death of horses. On February 21, 1942, the production was 5 thousand tons per day (150 thousand tons per month). For the whole of February 1942, the Germans mined 6 thousand tons of coal in the captured part of the Donbass.

Nevertheless, by the end of April 1942, it was possible to raise the daily production to 31 thousand tons in the remaining Donbass, and in mid-June 1942, when the order to explode mines was again received, production at Voroshilovugol reached 24 thousand tons and at Rostovugol - 16 thousand tons per day.

On July 10, 1942, the mines of a number of trusts were blown up again. On July 16, Pochenkov and his comrades left Voroshilovgrad, arrived at Shakhty, around which the coal enterprises were already prepared for the explosion. On July 18, 1942, the Anthracite Mines were blown up. By this time, almost the entire Donbass was blown up, in places twice, even before the arrival of the Germans.

In general, in light of this, the difficulties of the Germans in the operation of the Donbass coal mines receive a simple and logical explanation. If mines were blown up (both underground workings and mine shafts were blown up), flooded, equipment removed, hidden, damaged, there is almost no electricity or, in any case, it is extremely insufficient for any large-scale mining (in December 1942, out of 700 thousand kW capacity was only 36 thousand kW, of which 3-4 thousand kW were supplied for the mines, that is, even less than Pochenkov had in the first half of 1942), then it was impossible to extract coal.

Donbass was blown up to the Germans
The destruction of aboveground structures at the Kochegarka mine in Gorlovka.


Interestingly, the tram in Gorlovka in 1942 was restored and supplied with electricity.

The Germans had to look for surviving or slightly destroyed mines, including small ones. But their production capacity turned out to be too small to meet the needs of railways, troops and restoration work in Donbass. They had to import coal from Silesia. According to the Wirtschaftsstab Ost report dated July 15, 1944, from the beginning of the war to August 31, 1943, 17,6 million tons of coal were imported to the occupied territories of the USSR, including 13,3 million tons for railways, 2,9 million tons for industry and 2 million tons for the Wehrmacht (RGVA, f. 1458k, op. 3, d. 77, l. 97). And in the Donbass itself, by the end of 1942, 1,4 million tons of coal were mined.

This circumstance - an acute shortage of coal in the occupied territories of the USSR - had, as already mentioned, far-reaching consequences for Germany and was one of the reasons for the strategic defeat.

I only wonder why all this had to be hidden? Is not Comrade himself? Stalin urged to "leave a continuous desert for the enemy"? In Donbass, his order was carried out very well.
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  1. Uncle lee
    Uncle lee 3 November 2020 05: 34
    +8
    In Donbass, his order was carried out very well.
    That's the whole reason ... And after the war - restored!
    1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
      Kote Pan Kokhanka 3 November 2020 14: 54
      +5
      Do not wait for an answer from the Author! In a series of his articles, he set himself a completely different goal. And he goes to her not by washing but by rolling. For instance.
      That is, the Germans were left with only manual production. In December 1942, 68 large and 314 small mines produced 392 thousand tons of coal, which is 4,7 million tons on an annualized basis.

      It's just the maximum known monthly result multiplied by 12! At the same time, the Author in the course of the article describes the sad dynamics of 42 years, which casts doubt on such simple calculations.
  2. Asad
    Asad 3 November 2020 05: 36
    13
    The enemy needs to leave the scorched earth! Did you do everything right, I don't understand why the leadership should have been shy? They drove Napoleon home on the scorched earth, and quickly ran.
    1. Far B
      Far B 3 November 2020 06: 09
      29
      Nobody was particularly shy about anything. Something the author confuses: both in fiction and in films it was said without hiding that industrial facilities were evacuated as far as possible, that they could not - they were blown up so that the Fritzes would not get it. So the questions from the evil miners like: “What, it turns out, worked hard like convicts so that you blew everything up here?” Could only arise in the author's head. Accordingly, the subsequent "big" events are the same. Because the very same miners, I think, on the contrary, would have strictly asked the country's leadership - why the hell did our native mines transfer to the enemy in working order ?!
      Another thing is that those same films and fiction books are about exactly what was done so that the Nazis did not get the Soviet industry, in fact, the cat cried. And scientists could easily find the information they were interested in. But what is of interest to narrow specialists is not interesting to the overwhelming majority. That's the whole secret of "silence".
      1. Serg koma
        Serg koma 3 November 2020 08: 36
        13
        Quote: Dalny V
        Because those same miners, I think, on the contrary, would have strictly asked the country's leadership - why the hell did our native mines transfer to the enemy in working order ?!
        good
        Only in Kuzbass
        From Donbass to Kuzbass and other eastern regions, 17 carriages of equipment were sent. By the end of 600, workers and engineers and technicians from a number of Donbass coal trusts arrived in the Siberian region.
        The Makeyevka Research Institute, Donetsk Industrial Institute, Rubezhansk Chemical-Technological Institute and a number of schools arrived in Kuzbass.
        The Orekhovo-Zuevsky Plastics Plant (Karbolit), the Leningrad Metallist Plant, the Rubezhansk Chemical Plant, part of the shops of the Kharkov Electromechanical Plant, the Moscow Salicylic Plant and others are located in Kemerovo.
        The plants "Dneprospetsstal", ferroalloys named after Liebknecht, "Red Crucible", the main shops of Debaltsevsky and Nizhnedneprovsky machine-building plants, Slavyansky and Sergovsky foundry and mechanical plants, part of the equipment of the Mariupol and Novomakeevsky coke plants were evacuated to Novokuznetsk.
        ........
        Only from Donbass and only from the enterprises of the People's Commissariat for Metallurgy (the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy) 13 thousand skilled workers were evacuated.

        And the second aspect - where would the Fritzes get the necessary number of qualified personnel for work and restoration of enterprises? "Evacuated" from Silesia and the Ruhr ???
        So on the contrary, they tried to take out
        и
        The author of the article could have placed a photo of the person who left the diaries and made every effort so that the Fritzes would get the "empty" Donbass

        Kondrat Ivanovich Pochenkov
      2. The leader of the Redskins
        The leader of the Redskins 3 November 2020 08: 41
        15
        Apparently, the author has not read the books by Vladimir Popov "Steel and Slag", "Steel Boiled".
        Voluminous, artistic books received the Stalin Prize. Everything is available there. Why the author believes that something was hidden from the Soviet people is not known.
        1. Blacksmith 55
          Blacksmith 55 3 November 2020 10: 06
          +6
          I already mentioned these books in my commentary on the metallurgical industry.
          But the books are fiction, and the author can fantasize there to some extent.
          But it is written well, and the struggle of the underground is described.
          1. vladcub
            vladcub 3 November 2020 14: 46
            +4
            Fiction is fiction, but Pochenkov's notes are much more significant.
            For me, such books as "Steel and Slag" are secondary, and Pochenkov's notes are priority. The author wrote about what the soul ached. Diaries, memoirs and various archival documents THIS IS MORE IMPORTANT than the author's invention.! ¡!
            1. Astra wild2
              Astra wild2 3 November 2020 20: 33
              0
              I do not agree: fiction is also different. For example: "Young Guard" these were real events, real people, and the author wrote so vividly that I can see it myself. When I read the book, I completely forgot reality.
              If "Steel and Slag" is at least a quarter similar to "Young Guard" - great, but I doubt: "Young Guard" is known and will be remembered, "With Steel and Slag," as a signal flare flashed for a while and ...
        2. antivirus
          antivirus 3 November 2020 15: 12
          +1
          in 94, the father: "the devotees, verified were the Center Russia - Moscow and Moskva region, Ivanosvkaya, Gorkovskaya, part of the other oblast CR and !!!!!!!! Donbass !!!!!!!!. they were taken everywhere-- and the Kremlin, and the NKVD and the army in responsible areas ... "

          The author wanted and managed to squeeze (in the text) a sensation about "screwing up the IVS with his own"
      3. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
        Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 3 November 2020 11: 00
        +1
        Quote: Dalny V
        Because the very same miners, I think, on the contrary, would have strictly asked the country's leadership - why the hell did our native mines transfer to the enemy in working order ?!

        It would be curious to look at the miners who were "strictly inquiring" from the hands of the country in 1946. They would very quickly find a place in the mines of Vorkutlag.
        1. wehr
          3 November 2020 19: 39
          +1
          In Pochenkov's diaries, colorful pictures of how the miners did not allow the mine to be blown up.
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 3 November 2020 06: 01
    21
    It is strange why the destruction of Donbass is a secret for the author? It is a well-known fact. There was such a documentary film made for the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, "Our Biography", it seems to be called, it was mentioned there.
    1. mat-vey
      mat-vey 3 November 2020 06: 30
      +7
      So on "Big Life" even the resolution of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) was ....
      What are the flaws and shortcomings of Big Life?
      "The film depicts only one minor episode of the first
      the start of the restoration of Donbass, which does not give the correct
      understanding of the actual scope and significance of the
      Soviet state restoration work in Donetsk
      pool. In addition, the restoration of Donbass takes in the film
      insignificant place, and the main attention is paid to primitive 599
      depicting all kinds of personal experiences and everyday scenes. In view of
      the content of the film does not match its title. More
      Moreover, the title of the movie "Big Life" sounds a mockery of
      Soviet reality.
      ..... "
      1. parusnik
        parusnik 3 November 2020 16: 13
        +2
        And this, and the film I mentioned, consisted, it seems, of 60 episodes ... And it could be repeated. Interestingly, on the 70th anniversary of the OR, in 1987 they were ashamed to show it on TV. Yes, there is a typo in the commentary not for the 50th anniversary of the 60th anniversary ...
        1. mat-vey
          mat-vey 3 November 2020 16: 26
          +2
          Quote: parusnik
          Interestingly, on the 70th anniversary of OR, in 1987 they were ashamed to show it on TV

          there they already began to unleash something else - in the spirit of what was being discussed.
    2. vladcub
      vladcub 3 November 2020 16: 50
      0
      Quote: parusnik
      It is strange why the destruction of Donbass is a secret for the author? It is a well-known fact. There was such a documentary film made for the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, "Our Biography", it seems to be called, it was mentioned there.

      Otherwise, what should he write? _If there was a certain novelty in the first works, but here it doesn't smell of novelty.
      In fact, all the author's material will fit into 3 lines.
      1) Stalin hastened to blow up the mines, but it was necessary to consult with the miners, so Pelshe was silent.
      2.) The explosion of mines is MORE IMPORTANT than the BATTLE FOR THE CAUCASUS.
      3) Soviet workers made Donbass even more beautiful.
    3. wehr
      3 November 2020 20: 50
      0
      That's exactly what was mentioned. Very briefly, fluently and without details. I read a lot of literature, and the industrial Donbass interested me for a long time - everywhere the same picture. More precisely, some pitiful scraps from which you cannot add a picture.
      1. Thompson
        Thompson 4 November 2020 09: 56
        +1
        However, you managed to fold it! "Talent !!!"
        Like Pugacheva in the song of Arlecchino
    4. zenion
      zenion 4 November 2020 16: 18
      0
      So after all, under the Germans was Poland, where there was coal, Western Ukraine Stanislav, where there was oil. Didn't the mines of Poland produce coal? And Ukrainian oil refused to burn in German engines?
  4. Olgovich
    Olgovich 3 November 2020 07: 46
    12
    Imagine, what in In the near rear of the Germans, a large industrial area appears. The Germans are transferring their capacity for the production of ammunition, weapons, explosives, synthetic fuel., drive masses of prisoners there to work. The Wehrmacht receives ammunition, weapons and fuel almost from the gates of enterprises, and does not wait until all this is brought from Germany. The delivery arm is short, to the depth of the front rear, 300-400 km. Accordingly, each offensive is better prepared, with large supplies, which are replenished during battles with new production.

    This can only be imagined as a fantasy: it meant the construction from scratch of factories for the production of GERMAN ammunition, weapons, explosives, synthetic fuel, the training of TENS of thousands of workers and the creation of supply chains, provision of transport, etc. many years and a lot of money, which the Hitlrovites did not have at all.

    And even the enterprises captured by the whole Soviets could produce only SOVIET weapons and ammunition from SOVIET components according to SOVIET technologies.

    Everything, of course, can be altered, rebuilt, created, retrained, but this, again, is time, money, people. Where from?

    Even the captured entire military industry of advanced France for many years of occupation did not release no Tigers, no armored vehicles. no Junkers, no shells.

    In the conditions of war, the author's assumption was impossible in principle.
    1. Kwas
      Kwas 3 November 2020 19: 07
      +1
      This remark is correct in principle, but incomplete. The Germans received quite a few of our weapons as trophies, and used this whenever possible. So the captured production of our weapons or ammunition would be useful to them. But the main thing is that coal, pig iron, electricity and steel have no national identity. And a working production of this alone would have a huge effect.
      1. zenion
        zenion 4 November 2020 16: 21
        0
        After all, specialists are the most important thing at any enterprise. Working in factories where tanks and aircraft were built, the hard workers' guns and shells had armor. And the miners and steelworkers had double armor.
    2. Moskovit
      Moskovit 3 November 2020 19: 08
      0
      For some reason, the Germans were not prevented by the difference in standards and weapons for 5 years very well to exploit the Czech industry.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 4 November 2020 04: 59
        0
        Quote: Moskovit
        For some reason, the Germans were not prevented by the difference in standards and weapons for 5 years very well to exploit the Czech industry.

        Czech industry is ugh compared to the potential of the French.

        And what did France give out to the front?
        Almost nothing!

        And yes, let's not forget that Czechoslovakia was in the Reich with 1938 year.

        And what are the "different" standards? The Germans supplied their components to emergency situations
        1. Moskovit
          Moskovit 4 November 2020 09: 15
          0
          20% of the trucks in the German army were French. Aircraft motors, artillery pieces.

          In total, 1941 aircraft were built at French factories from 1944 to 2637. Among them are two French vehicles: 515 transport Caudron C.440 and 120 multipurpose Potez 63.11, used as training vehicles. The main issue was made up of German training and support vehicles Siebel Si.204, Fieseler Fi.156, Messerschmitt Bf.108 and Arado Ar.396, Focke-Wulf FW.189 scouts, transport Junkers Ju.52, Dornier Do.24 and Arado seaplanes Ar.196.

          But in fact, the fact is that French products were expensive for the Germans, and the quality did not suit the military. The Czechs were cheaper and more agreeable.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 4 November 2020 15: 43
            0
            Quote: Moskovit
            20% of the trucks in the German army were French. Aircraft motors, artillery pieces.

            Trophy motors 1940, as well as guns.
            Quote: Moskovit
            In total, 1941 aircraft were built at French factories from 1944 to 2637. Among them are two French vehicles: 515 transport Caudron C.440 and 120 multipurpose Potez 63.11, used as training vehicles. The main issue was made up of German training and support vehicles Siebel Si.204, Fieseler Fi.156, Messerschmitt Bf.108 and Arado Ar.396, Focke-Wulf FW.189 scouts, transport Junkers Ju.52, Dornier Do.24 and Arado seaplanes Ar.196.

            You yourself are not embarrassed to write this nonsense? This is 1 (one) percent of the capacity of France and then-from GERMAN components, i.e. NOTHING
            Quote: Moskovit
            But in fact, the fact is that French products were expensive for the Germans, and the quality did not suit the military. The Czechs were cheaper and more agreeable.

            The French in 1940 were far ahead of Germany both in the number of tanks / aircraft produced and in quality.

            Not satisfied? FAILED!

            What is there to say about Donbass - unscientific fantasy
    3. wehr
      3 November 2020 19: 48
      +2
      Come on! Just offhand, the military modification of the Ju-52 was produced in France from July 1942. I still don't remember everything.

      And in Riga there was a plant that assembled Fw-190.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 4 November 2020 05: 05
        0
        Quote: wehr
        Come on! Just offhand, the military modification of the Ju-52 was produced in France from July 1942. I still don't remember everything.

        Give the figures and how much 0,00001% of the capacity of France it was. Engines for the Ju-52, whose? Instruments? Armament? Do not make me laugh.

        And yes, you just have NOTHING to remember: no tanks, no guns, no ammunition, no ships, practically nothing!
        Quote: wehr
        And there was a factory in Riga, collecting Fw-190.

        lol laughing WHO made engines, materials, weapons, etc.?
  5. Daniil Konovalenko
    Daniil Konovalenko 3 November 2020 07: 52
    19
    The author is trying to reveal a secret that did not exist.
  6. Vlad.
    Vlad. 3 November 2020 08: 13
    -3
    The article is good. The author has done a great job. And figures and facts ... That's just a subtext (in my opinion), some kind of liberal. It resembles a well-known series, such as "Leningrad had to be handed over".
    And here - to preserve the Donbass, for the sake of some hard workers who worked hard, and of course leave the enemy unharmed, so that these hard workers continued to work hard for the good of great Germany.
    Thanks to such "researchers" the meanings are distorted. Why else did the Author conduct such a deep analysis?
  7. BAI
    BAI 3 November 2020 09: 28
    13
    could arouse among the working people, especially among the miners' masses, a question of this kind: "Did we, it turns out, worked hard like convicts so that you would blow everything up here?"

    An extremely stupid statement of the question. Where did the author get this from? It is well known that the question was: "Either destroy or leave the enemy." Everyone understood everything and did not cause any rejection.
  8. Lewww
    Lewww 3 November 2020 10: 30
    +6
    Why? The fact that the enemy was unable to take advantage of the Donbas is the largest military-economic victory in the war.
    Everything is upside down in the author's head - he considers defeat a victory.
    another internet nonsense
  9. evgen1221
    evgen1221 3 November 2020 12: 54
    +6
    I don’t know how it is taught today and since 92, but we were born in 79th at school everything was very clear in the textbooks it was written - Donbass was a very important industrial area and its loss for us is sad, but it was impossible to leave it whole or slightly broken to the Germans, from In addition, it was clear to us, the 6th grade teachers, that we had demolished it ourselves so as not to let the enemy take advantage of our labor, and no one had any questions of principle.
    What and for what purpose the seytsas can be questions about the destruction of their industry in the areas left by the army, I can’t suggest. What should the enemy have left to save? Maybe we'll come back someday? So chtoli? Article what does Kolisurengoy want to cause the next hand-wringing?
  10. voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 3 November 2020 13: 17
    +9
    So the plan for the transfer of industry to the Urals was developed
    even before the war.
    And it began to be implemented AFTER A WEEK after the start of the war.
    When large-scale tank battles were still raging near the border.
    Stalin's after the blitzkrieg in France and the Finnish war
    there was no illusion that the war would go east.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 3 November 2020 14: 47
      +4
      Quote: voyaka uh
      So the plan for the transfer of industry to the Urals was developed
      even before the war.

      To be precise, there were two plans. The first is the plan for the evacuation of industry in the event of war, which has been developed since the 20s. The second is a plan to create an industrial base in the central and eastern regions of the USSR in peacetime, within the framework of the Third Five-Year Plan, with the help of enterprises in the European part of the country.
      Although both of these plans were closely intertwined - the "second sites" of the factories, to which they eventually left for evacuation, were built according to the plans of the Third Five-Year Plan.
  11. Aviator_
    Aviator_ 3 November 2020 13: 47
    +4
    Their complete or almost complete flooding was apparently a consequence of the destruction carried out by the Germans during the retreat; if, of course, the data in the Soviet publications are correct.

    Therefore, the author does not doubt the reliability of the Nazi data.
  12. 7,62h54
    7,62h54 3 November 2020 15: 31
    +6
    Destroy before retreating, so that the enemy does not get it. This strategy has been used successfully since the collapse of the USSR. Factories, collective farms, hospitals. Only in whom they see the enemy, and before whom they retreat.
  13. Astra wild2
    Astra wild2 3 November 2020 19: 50
    +1
    The author does not know the laws of war at all: are retreating destroying infrastructure in order to make the enemy's position as difficult as possible?
    It is unlikely that the Wehrmacht consisted of idiots, they should have, that in the Soviet Union they will not be laid "carpet paths". So they understood that they WILL NOT LEAVE the working mines, the only thing that they could count on was that not everything would be destroyed in a hurry.
  14. yriuv62
    yriuv62 3 November 2020 19: 53
    +3
    The author wanted to kick the glavpur and weaved nonsense. About how the Germans were not allowed to use Donbass in Soviet times, they not only knew, but were also publicly proud! And only the author knows nothing about this, at best, and most likely deliberately lies.
    1. wehr
      3 November 2020 20: 43
      -3
      All comments are a heart-rending cry: "We don't want to know!" laughing

      Yes, no question: I will collect the material and write a book in German.
      And you keep reading, and, most importantly, re-educate Glavpurov's tales, from which the historical truth will certainly shine through the centuries. laughing
      1. evgen1221
        evgen1221 4 November 2020 12: 15
        +1
        What is that homespun truth that you are our heavenly father? In the fact that always, if it was impossible to hold the territory for your own forces, any warehouses, reserves were always destroyed and easy access to resources for the enemy was made difficult, or a common human being would be cut out by a brother and the whole family, but then you will be fed up during work and ply on everything else, because the individual is more important than society. What is this article for? What thought did you want to say? And why didn’t they say her this thought, are you afraid of what or just wanted to catch a hype? The article is empty, so you can write about the sockets in soyas, with the same aplomb - why were they different than in Europe? You certainly have to repent that they did not use the message and did not make them so immediately, and in general it is a party and the entire Soviet people guilty that he used sockets of other standards and generally tried and was able to protect his land. Kolya go to school, there's nothing to dirty paper.
        1. wehr
          4 November 2020 15: 48
          0
          Germans love statistics and an accurate, step-by-step description of the process.

          And you will continue to make up for Glavpurov's tales and Epishev's thoughtful reasoning.
  15. Radikal
    Radikal 3 November 2020 23: 36
    +2
    The author somehow "floats" between - it was right or wrong to destroy industry in the Wehrmacht's offensive zone. Does he want to sow doubt? For what purpose? sad
  16. Radikal
    Radikal 3 November 2020 23: 39
    +2
    Quote: wehr
    All comments are a heart-rending cry: "We don't want to know!" laughing

    Yes, no question: I will collect the material and write a book in German.
    And you keep reading, and, most importantly, re-educate Glavpurov's tales, from which the historical truth will certainly shine through the centuries. laughing

    A-ha-a - the poet's heart could not stand it! You shouldn't be hysterical - you just need to clearly define your position. hi
  17. Radikal
    Radikal 3 November 2020 23: 52
    +2
    Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
    Quote: Dalny V
    Because the very same miners, I think, on the contrary, would have strictly asked the country's leadership - why the hell did our native mines transfer to the enemy in working order ?!

    It would be curious to look at the miners who were "strictly inquiring" from the hands of the country in 1946. They would very quickly find a place in the mines of Vorkutlag.

    Of course, you know better, you probably have some experience .... lol
  18. Mmm.
    Mmm. 4 November 2020 09: 39
    0
    Good article. Simple and tasteful of charcoal.
  19. Thompson
    Thompson 4 November 2020 09: 52
    0
    The phrase of the author - Donbass was destroyed in particular.
    Apparently, in his opinion, it was necessary to leave everything to the Fritz, so that it would be even harder for us to fight.
    But!!! Today the author would write - Donbass was not destroyed, which created additional difficulties for us ... etc. These are the ExPers who are analyzing the affairs of the hard years.
    The article sucks. Sorry to remove the cons
  20. Assyrian
    Assyrian 6 November 2020 11: 49
    0
    Quote: wehr
    In Pochenkov's diaries, colorful pictures of how the miners did not allow the mine to be blown up.

    Why write an article when the whole point of your experiences is in this one sentence. wink
    I read the comments and became happy, the members of the forum are not being guided by camouflaged "research".
    And the author with his hands up continues to squeeze dubious articles. And there is no prosecutor's office against him.
    And he, like that snake, changes its skins, but there is still little sense. As if the viper did not dress up like a bunny, but a tooth with poison is still visible. am