Military Review

A key event in the sky over the Astrakhan region. Full-scale tests of 9M317MA missiles confirmed the unique feature of domestic air defense systems

89

Undoubtedly, one of the most indicative and important for expert analysis of the episodes of the recent exercises of the mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade of the air defense forces of the Russian ground forces at the Kapustin Yar training ground is the successful interception of one of the four types of small air targets of the 9F6021E Adjutant target training complex by the 9M317MA medium-range anti-aircraft guided missile included in the ammunition load of the Buk-M3 self-propelled military air defense system. The most notable details of this interception, which provoked numerous discussions in observing circles, were: the distance to the destroyed air target, which, according to the Russian Defense Ministry, was about 40 km, as well as the operating height at the time of interception, barely reaching 10 meters (product carried out the flight in the terrain bend mode).


Based on the fact that the range of direct radio visibility of the 21S9M illumination / target designation and guidance radar placed on a 36-meter telescopic lifting and turning device is no more than 32 km (in relation to air objects, the trajectory of which runs at a height of 10 m), some observers-regulars of the "Military Review" and other domestic military-analytical portals not only doubted the reliability of the data provided by the press service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, but also rushed to accuse the department of either deliberately overstating the tactical and technical parameters of the anti-aircraft missile systems in service with the Russian military air defense funds, or the incompetence of employees (compilers news texts) press service of the Ministry of Defense.

The ability to destroy enemy targets outside the radio horizon will significantly increase the survivability of anti-aircraft missile brigades of military air defense and strategically important objects covered by them in difficult terrain


In reality, we are talking about announcing almost the first in modern stories the formation of military air defense and anti-aircraft missile forces of Russia over-the-horizon interception of an ultra-small target of a simulated enemy, achieved thanks to the use of a promising medium-range anti-aircraft missile 9М317МА, equipped with a centimeter (X / Ku-bands) active radar seeker of the "Slate" type from JSC "Moscow Scientific Research Institute "Agat". Developed on the basis of the radio-electronic architecture of active radar seeker 9B1103-M "Washer" with waveguide-slot antenna arrays (installed on RVV-BD / R-37M ultra-long-range air combat missiles) and equipped with an improved transceiver module of a two-way asynchronous data exchange line over protected radio communication channels, the active RGSN of the "Slate" type is capable of receiving data packets with target designation not only from the illumination and guidance radars of the 9S36M complexes of the Buk-M1-2 / 2/3, located on the 9T811 lifting and turning booms and self-propelled firing units of the 9A310M1- line 2 / 9А317 / 9А317М, but also from third-party radar, radio-technical and optical-electronic reconnaissance means of sea / land / airborne.

This list includes on-board Zaslon-AM radar complexes of MiG-31BM and Irbis-E interceptors of Su-35S fighters, Shmel-M radar systems of A-50U AWACS aircraft, quantum optical-electronic sighting and navigation systems OLS- UEM / OLS-50M (transmitting the elevation and azimuth coordinates of heat-contrast objects through the K-DlUE / K-DlI data exchange radio channels, the terminals of which are installed on all modern domestic fighters of the “4 + / ++” generation), as well as ground-based low-altitude detectors 48Ya6- K1 "Approach-K1" and all-altitude detectors (VVO) 96L6, attached to anti-aircraft missile divisions S-400 "Triumph".

The aforementioned element of the electronic upgrade of the Slate homing heads provides the 9M317MA anti-aircraft missiles with the ability, firstly, to confidently defeat enemy air attack weapons operating far behind the "screen" of the radio horizon (at a distance of about 50 km from the positions of the Buk-M3 air defense missile launcher), during -second, the continuation of the interception of targets "diving into the shadows" of natural objects on a complex elevated terrain (this ability is very relevant in relation to the Karabakh theater of military operations), thirdly, the destruction of operational-tactical ballistic objects attacking the anti-aircraft missile battalion "Buk -M3 "and the objects covered by it in the dive mode (at angles of 87-90 degrees, outside the elevation sector of the view of the 9S36M divisional guidance radars). What is even more remarkable, using third-party target designation, 9M317MA missiles can be launched from closed positions (without the use of the Buk-M3 complex's combat crew of the radar architecture presented by the 9S36M RPN and 9S18M3 Kupol radar detectors), which by orders of magnitude reduces the probability of detection and identification of the Buk-M3 battalion by means of such enemy electronic reconnaissance means as the in-body RTR 55000 AEELS and CS-2010 Hawk systems of the RC-135V / W Rivet Joint strategic radio / radar reconnaissance aircraft, as well as highly sensitive radiation warning stations / RTR AN / ALR-94 of the 5th generation F-22A "Raptor".

As you know, similar types of active radar seeker are equipped with super-maneuverable long-range missiles-interceptors 9M96E2 / DM (integrated into the ammunition of the S-350 Vityaz air defense missile system and shipborne Redut air defense missile systems), ultra-long-range hypersonic heavy missiles 9M82MV of the C-300V4 anti-aircraft missile systems ( capable of intercepting an over-the-horizon target at a distance of about 300-350 km), which provides anti-aircraft missile forces of the Aerospace Forces, military air defense and naval the fleet Russia has a much wider window of opportunity in erecting powerful territorial and regional anti-missile "umbrellas" over land and sea / ocean theaters of operations than the "window" available to the surface component of the US Navy and the US Army in the European theater of operations.

After all, as you know, the anti-aircraft missiles in service with the US Navy with active RGSN RIM-174ERAM (SM-6 Block IA), although they have a range of about 240-270 km, their flight performance continues to remain at a very mediocre level in comparison with naval versions of 9M96DM missiles, since the gas-jet thrust vector deflection system and aerodynamic rudder blocks do not provide Standards-6 with the ability to maneuver with 60-70G overloads at the terminal trajectory, which excludes even the slightest chance of intercepting such highly maneuverable winged and ballistic anti-ship missiles such as Zircon "And" Dagger ". At the same time, the 9M96DM anti-missile missiles equipped with gas-dynamic "belts" of transverse control engines are able to give odds not only to the low-maneuverable subsonic anti-ship missiles LRASM, but also to such promising hypersonic "instruments" as the AGM-183A aeroballistic missile recently promoted by the Pentagon.
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  1. parusnik
    parusnik 30 October 2020 05: 54
    26
    Good article, clears the brain in the morning smile
    1. Grandfather
      Grandfather 30 October 2020 06: 05
      +2
      The most notable details of this interception, which provoked numerous discussions in observing circles, were: the distance to the destroyed air target, which, according to the Russian defense department, was about 40 km, as well as the operating height at the time of interception, barely reaching 10 meters (the product was flying in the terrain bend mode).
      yes well nafig ... something I don’t believe. who is, somewhere is lying.
      1. Motorist
        Motorist 30 October 2020 23: 51
        +1
        Quote: Dead Day
        someone is lying somewhere

        Recently there were articles about how hard it is to find and get into an aircraft carrier (I almost got carried away!) And the bad radar of the old MIG (in the lower hemisphere), and here - this ... belay
        1. Black Colonel
          Black Colonel 1 November 2020 12: 43
          +1
          When the Tomahawks were interfered with, instead of targets in Yugoslavia, they flew to their neighbors. Then Lebed gave a killer phrase: "Well, this is necessary - DO NOT GET INTO THE COUNTRY!"
      2. ZEMCH
        ZEMCH 31 October 2020 00: 26
        +5
        Quote: Dead Day
        yes well nafig ... something I don’t believe. who is, somewhere is lying.

        You can believe me I was there))) wink
    2. Asad
      Asad 30 October 2020 07: 30
      +6
      For a simple layman, the articles of this author are hard to read! Especially in the morning!
      1. Insurgent
        Insurgent 30 October 2020 08: 35
        11
        GSN 9B1103-M "Washer" with waveguide-slot antenna arrays ..., an active RGSN of the "Slate" type is capable of receiving data packets with target designation not only from the 9S36M illumination and guidance radars of the Buk-M1-2 / 2/3 complexes, placed on lifting and swinging booms 9T811 and self-propelled firing units of the 9A310M1-2 / 9A317 / 9A317M line, but also from third-party radar, radio-technical and optoelectronic reconnaissance equipment of sea / land / air basing.

        I read, re-read, read again, but I still did not find in the article an indication of which specific "third-party means" was used to obtain target designation for this particular launch request .
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 30 October 2020 13: 32
          10
          Quote: Insurgent
          I read, re-read, read again, but I still did not find in the article an indication of which specific "third-party means" was used to obtain target designation for this particular launch

          In my opinion, everything is clear, because the article directly indicates several sources of additional target indications:
          from third-party sea / land / airborne radar, radio-technical and optical-electronic reconnaissance means.

          It can be both specialized reconnaissance aircraft with side-looking radar and IR scanners (Il-20M for example), and from reconnaissance systems installed on balloons, UAVs or probes. In this case, the question is not so much in the means of detecting over-the-horizon targets themselves, but in how to link them into a single system for collecting and processing data from different structures of the armed forces - this is where I see the root of the problem for air defense systems of ground forces when creating a new complex with more high characteristics of the range of destruction of low-flying targets.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 30 October 2020 21: 22
            -1
            It is necessary to agree with the enemy so that he does not shoot down the IL-20 AWACS aircraft.
            And then the new missiles will start to work wonders. smile
            1. bayard
              bayard 31 October 2020 02: 03
              +4
              It is unlikely that such an aircraft will appear over the battlefield, but in the operational depth in the direction of a possible strike by cruise missiles, to illuminate them for the air defense system - quite.
              Well, as a rule, in combat conditions, such aircraft do not fly without air cover.
              1. 3danimal
                3danimal 31 October 2020 05: 21
                0
                Interestingly, the naval officers let slip that for the use of the Dagger and Zircon on ships, the Il-20m will be used to issue the control center. This is where you definitely need to call and ask not to interrupt ..
            2. ccsr
              ccsr 31 October 2020 19: 27
              0
              Quote: voyaka uh
              We must negotiate with the enemy

              It is impossible to agree with the Israelis about anything - they will sell their mother too for their own benefit, so this proposal is not for us. However, Israel is not even an enemy to us - such a small speck that strives to get into the ass of Russia to create inconveniences for her.
              Quote: voyaka uh
              And then the new missiles will start to work wonders.

              At least the Israelis do not have enough intelligence and experience to create such a system - I am sure of this for sure. And what miracles the Russian military-industrial complex can do now, the whole world has learned, and after all, at first all the trends are about "cartoons", but now the ambition has diminished among the Israelis too.
              1. voyaka uh
                voyaka uh 31 October 2020 19: 39
                -1
                "At least the Israelis will not have enough intelligence and experience to create such a system" ///
                ----
                We have had those like that for ... 15 years. smile
                But an active radio seeker is not enough. It is suppressed by means of electronic warfare.
                Therefore, Israel puts on the latest missiles combined seeker: active radar
                plus IR video.
                See, she has a "crooked nose"? laughing
                This is to prevent the locator and camera from interfering with each other.
                1. ccsr
                  ccsr 1 November 2020 10: 06
                  0
                  Quote: voyaka uh
                  We have had those like that for ... 15 years.

                  You will tell your fairy tales to others - we have already heard them after the use of the Israeli missile in the Karabakh war, when you tried to compare it with the Iskander.
                  Quote: voyaka uh
                  This is to prevent the locator and camera from interfering with each other.

                  You actually didn’t understand that the essence of our development is to use third-party radiation sources to destroy fast-moving objects at ultra-low altitudes outside the electronic visibility zone.
                  So that you don't fantasize much, first give the performance characteristics of your rocket and its cost, and then everything will become clear. Then we'll see what the Americans have given you for armament.
                  As for the use of air defense missiles against ground targets, in the USSR they knew how to do this already in the 60s - you are simply not in the subject, so you rush with your "Rafal".
                  1. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 2 November 2020 19: 44
                    0
                    Quote: ccsr
                    You actually didn’t understand that the essence of our development is to use third-party radiation sources to destroy fast-moving objects at ultra-low altitudes outside the electronic visibility zone.

                    The essence of our development is the "landing" of the standard air-to-air missile guidance scheme: the main section of the missile launcher goes on an inertial system with radio correction, and upon arrival in the target area, it turns on the ARLGSN and starts searching and target acquisition.
                    The only difference is that, on the hike, signals for trajectory correction are calculated according to data from external sources, since the radar station of the battalion and the radar station of the SDU do not see the target.
                    Quote: ccsr
                    As for the use of air defense missiles against ground targets, in the USSR they knew how to do this already in the 60s - you are simply not in the subject, so you rush with your "Rafal".

                    And what does the ground target have to do with it? Your opponent from the Promised Land gave an example of a missile defense system for work on air targets equipped with REP stations. Combined seeker in this case will allow to continue aiming at the target even if the lock is disrupted by the radio channel.
                    1. ccsr
                      ccsr 2 November 2020 20: 19
                      +1
                      Quote: Alexey RA
                      the main section of the missile defense system goes on an inertial with radio correction, and upon arrival in the target area, it turns on the ARLGSN and begins to search and lock the target.

                      Upon arrival in the target area, it may not be there - you probably forgot about it. By the way, who will carry out the correction outside the radar coverage area of ​​the air defense complex, can you tell us more about this? I think it's not even worth mentioning the fact that suppressing the missile control channel is not even worth mentioning - the massive launch of the American CD in Syria confirmed this, when not all the missiles even reached the target.
                      Quote: Alexey RA
                      Your opponent from the Promised Land gave an example of a missile defense system for working on air targets, equipped with REP stations.

                      The opponent gave an example without the performance characteristics and the cost of the complex, and therefore all his reasoning is just the usual verbiage praising Israeli military equipment, although there may be only a small percentage of Israeli military equipment in these missiles.
                      Quote: Alexey RA
                      Combined seeker in this case will allow to continue aiming at the target even if the lock is disrupted by the radio channel.

                      And of course the enemy does not know how to use electronic warfare means to suppress the GOS in the final section - well, well ...
                      1. Alexey RA
                        Alexey RA 3 November 2020 12: 50
                        0
                        Quote: ccsr
                        Upon arrival in the target area, it may not be there - you probably forgot about it.

                        We read carefully:
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        the main section of the missile defense system is inertial with radio correction

                        Radio correction just ensures the launch of the missile defense system in the area of ​​the current target position. And not to the calculated point, the position of which was determined at the time of launch (as it would be with a pure INS, without radio correction).
                        Quote: ccsr
                        By the way, who will carry out the correction outside the radar coverage area of ​​the air defense complex, can you tell us more about this?

                        For a complex with a range of "Buk" - no one. The missile defense system goes in the visibility zone of its radar until it reaches the point of inclusion of the ARLGSN.
                        Quote: ccsr
                        And of course the enemy does not know how to use electronic warfare means to suppress the GOS in the final section - well, well ...

                        The enemy will have to press two bands at once - radio frequency and infrared.
                      2. ccsr
                        ccsr 3 November 2020 13: 13
                        +1
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Radio correction is precisely what ensures the launch of the missile defense system in the area of ​​the current target position.

                        I also want to understand from you how an Israeli missile receives information about the location of a moving target if it is outside the radar range of their complex. As far as I understand, the boastful opponent does not know anything about this, but he already believes that Rafal fifteen years ago was able to do what we have just come to.
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        The enemy will have to press two bands at once - radio frequency and infrared.

                        And what is impracticable here, if even in the Soviet army there were electronic warfare systems of any frequency range, and fired thermal missiles on airplanes and helicopters were used in Afghanistan against IR heads? Or is it impossible to use electronic warfare equipment and fired charges from a low-flying aircraft?
          2. Black Colonel
            Black Colonel 1 November 2020 12: 46
            +1
            In addition to the Il-20, there are radars on other airplanes: MiG-31, A-50, A-100, etc.
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 2 November 2020 20: 28
              +1
              Quote: Black Colonel
              In addition to the Il-20, there are radars on other airplanes: MiG-31, A-50, A-100, etc.

              Quite right, and the Il-20M was cited as an example of the placement of equipment, and not as the main means of use. On the contrary, this aircraft will in no case be used to provide air defense for the ground forces - this is too expensive a vehicle, and it will be located far from the battle line, and its reconnaissance tasks are of a higher level.
  2. Phoenix
    Phoenix 30 October 2020 10: 07
    +8
    But it has little to do with reality. The article is replete with words like parasites "by orders of magnitude", "at times", "not the slightest chance" ... The author writes not from the mind, but from the heart, so to speak)))
  3. Okolotochny
    Okolotochny 30 October 2020 12: 23
    +3
    good Especially a bunch of acronyms, names, etc.
  • Gunther
    Gunther 30 October 2020 06: 09
    +6
    Quote: parusnik
    Good article, clears the brain in the morning smile

    no, the witnesses of the sect of Saint Bayraktar and SkyStriker, she will not clear the brains, but rather cause the burning of the reference point. laughing
    1. military_cat
      military_cat 30 October 2020 07: 38
      +6
      Being a burning operator of an air defense system, in my opinion, is still less pleasant. And jokes about the sect of the holy "bayraktar" at this moment, probably, are not very joking either. Not to see in the "bayraktar" a serious threat is some kind of voluntary refusal to use the brain for its intended purpose.
      1. neri73-r
        neri73-r 30 October 2020 08: 53
        15
        Turkish drones hardly threaten the Russian Armed Forces, if only our Armed Forces participate in a local conflict of low intensity, without the ability to use the entire complex of domestic air defense. In the event of a real, real war, with the same Turkey, the operators of these drones will "burn" in the first place, since we have the opportunity to operate weapons to the entire depth of the theater of military operations! And in particular, the control points of unmanned aircraft will be amazed in the first place! And a drone without a man is iron. Normal air defense, electronic warfare, electronic warfare, tactical and operational-tactical weapons.
        1. qQQQ
          qQQQ 30 October 2020 09: 15
          -2
          Quote: neri73-r
          In the event of a real, real war, with the same Turkey, the operators of these drones will "burn" in the first place

          Sounds great, but there are nuances. How and with what to detect PU with a given accuracy? And then, without delay, deliver the weapon there, because no one will stand still.
          1. LifeIsGood
            LifeIsGood 30 October 2020 10: 56
            +8
            Um ... how do you imagine it? UAV operators, along with all the infrastructure of the airfield, will travel around the country constantly changing their position?))) laughing
            1. qQQQ
              qQQQ 30 October 2020 19: 24
              -1
              Quote: LifeIsGood
              UAV operators, along with all the infrastructure of the airfield, will travel around the country constantly changing their position?)))

              No, they will stay in one place (sarcasm). That's exactly what I think, only they don't need to carry anything, everything fits into several kungs, and they can be at a fairly large distance from airfields, maintenance at the airfield, control is far away.
              1. ZEMCH
                ZEMCH 31 October 2020 02: 33
                +3
                Quote: qqqq
                and they can be at a sufficiently large distance from aerodromes, service at the aerodrome, control is far away.

                If you are talking about Bayraktar, then you are not much mistaken, they cannot change position quickly, but emit rather strongly at certain frequencies, and are removed at once to the entire depth of the theater wink
                1. Alex777
                  Alex777 2 November 2020 09: 25
                  0
                  they cannot change position quickly, but emit rather strongly at certain frequencies, and are removed once to the entire depth of the theater

                  I would not like to participate in a big war.
                  But in Syria, are Bayraktars still flying?
            2. Object.F7
              Object.F7 31 October 2020 15: 08
              +1
              UAV operators will maneuver at the speed of the Earth's lithospheric plates
          2. passerby
            passerby 30 October 2020 11: 04
            15
            Quote: qqqq
            Sounds great, but there are nuances. How and with what to detect PU with a given accuracy? And then, without delay, deliver the weapon there, because no one will stand still.

            PUs are radio-emitting targets, and emitting in a well-defined frequency range. As far as I remember, for the destruction of radio-emitting targets a separate detachment of forces and means is allocated, and the identification of such targets is the main task of electronic intelligence.
            1. qQQQ
              qQQQ 30 October 2020 19: 30
              -1
              Quote: bystander
              PUs are radio-emitting targets, and emitting in a well-defined frequency range.

              There are also nuances here, if the control is via a satellite, there is a narrow beam, how will you look for the source? As far as I know, this is not a radar, it is not so easy to detect and identify that it is a control signal, otherwise the game would not be worth the candle. On paper, it is all simple, but in the real world, as far as I know, only once did the Jews destroy an Iranian launcher in Syria, and it is not known how they discovered it, maybe intelligence tried.
              1. ZEMCH
                ZEMCH 31 October 2020 02: 50
                +3
                Quote: qqqq
                There are also nuances here, if the control is via a satellite, there is a narrow beam, how will you look for the source? As far as I know, this is not a radar, it is not so easy to detect and identify that it is a control signal, otherwise the game would not be worth the candle. On paper, it is all simple, but in the real world, as far as I know, only once did the Jews destroy an Iranian launcher in Syria, and it is not known how they discovered it, maybe intelligence tried.


                If on the fingers, then the frequencies of all satellites in the transmitting and receiving trunks are known, if zonal, as you say, a narrow beam, then the more the coverage area is known, to ensure control of each device you need its own transceiver on the ground, there are not so many satellites, each a simultaneously operating station takes power from the spacecraft retranslator, therefore, a good powerful signal from the ground is needed to control the UAV.
                In short, our intelligence has the means to detect launchers on enemy territory, and electronic warfare to drown out control over the theater of operations.
                1. qQQQ
                  qQQQ 31 October 2020 08: 51
                  0
                  Quote: ZEMCH
                  In short, our intelligence has the means to detect launchers on enemy territory, and electronic warfare to drown out control over the theater of operations.

                  You can spot it, no one argues, but with what error? If we use the PRR on the signal, then, as far as I remember, even in the Vietnam war against the C125 shrikes, they learned to put a hindrance in range. Artillery work in the area, so again everything depends on the error in determining the coordinates of the source. To muffle, as far as we know, the energy of the jammer should be many times larger, if not by orders of magnitude, and it can also fly there according to the same principle as by the launcher by drones. It must be borne in mind that the launcher is located deep in the rear, and while something arrives there, there are also air defense systems and we must proceed from the calculation that it is no worse than ours. In my opinion, the destruction of launchers is not an easy task and it will not be massive. The best air defense is our tanks at the enemy's airfield, only this way and not otherwise, the defense is always losing.
              2. vadimtt
                vadimtt 31 October 2020 12: 35
                0
                Specifically, in this case, there will be no satellites. Well, only if the United States does not fit in for a NATO partner.
      2. LifeIsGood
        LifeIsGood 30 October 2020 11: 03
        +8
        And what is the threat (if you have normal air defense) from a flying log with wings? And these "bayraktars" are good only when the enemy cannot normally block the air.
      3. Sidor Amenpodestovich
        Sidor Amenpodestovich 30 October 2020 13: 45
        +7
        Quote: military_cat
        Not to see in "bayraktar" a serious threat is some kind of voluntary refusal to use the brain for its intended purpose.

        Is it wiser to overestimate Bayraktars, raising them to the rank of superweapons, from which there is practically no protection?
  • military_cat
    military_cat 30 October 2020 06: 10
    -12 qualifying.
    Confronting AGM-83A (which no one is shooting at you) is, of course, very convenient, but won't the next "Bayraktars" spread all this happiness?
  • And Makarov
    And Makarov 30 October 2020 06: 18
    21
    Much depends on the EPR of potentially dangerous targets. Eugene did not mention this.
  • tralflot1832
    tralflot1832 30 October 2020 07: 57
    +1
    Just as a man in the street, I’ll say that ours are already making complexes for intercepting UAVs. But the Americans, the creators of drone UAVs, in view of the progress and straightforwardness to acquire other countries with their own UAVs, found themselves in the position “And the king is naked!” Against the UAV “Kostya Saprykin” they have only Petriot, confusing the mood of the operators. Watching the promotion in Saudi Arabia!
  • AlexVas44
    AlexVas44 30 October 2020 08: 10
    +8
    Quote: ASAD
    For a simple layman, the articles of this author are hard to read! Especially in the morning!

    I am one of the simple ones. I read to the phrase " based on the electronic architecture of active .... waveguide-slotted ... " and realized that it was not mine.
    But here's the start: "successful interception of one of four types of small air targets", here what, the other three did not intercept? Or is it also not for a simple mind information?
    1. LifeIsGood
      LifeIsGood 30 October 2020 10: 54
      +5
      Dear me too from simple hi But all the same, I'll say a few words in defense))) The article focuses on interception over-the-horizon low-flying target... The rest are passing in passing) Everything is written normally) Do not list all types of intercepted targets and the actual result of this interception)
  • Ratmir_Ryazan
    Ratmir_Ryazan 30 October 2020 08: 17
    0
    Cool, now you can sleep peacefully.
  • Charik
    Charik 30 October 2020 08: 29
    -2
    which by orders of magnitude reduces the likelihood of detecting and identifying the Buk-M3 battalion by means of such enemy electronic reconnaissance systems as the RTR 55000 AEELS and CS-2010 Hawk intra-fuselage systems of the RC-135V / W Rivet Joint strategic radio / radar reconnaissance aircraft, as well as highly sensitive radiation warning / RTR AN / ALR-94 stations of the 5th generation F-22A "Raptor". wassat - a rocket, probably with an active head - if it emits, it means it glows - it means where it starts from - the smoke trail or I don't understand this?
    1. ZEMCH
      ZEMCH 31 October 2020 02: 58
      +1
      Quote: Charik
      - a rocket, probably with an active head - if it emits, it means it glows - it means where it starts from - the smoke trail or I don't understand this?

      The detection station and the firing complex are geographically separated, you can see the operating radar, but not the launching ones, and such devices that the target simulates will not have time to respond to the active seeker.
      After launch and destruction, the radar does not actively emit, it is removed from the place and is no longer seen))).
      And you can also start a microwave oven with an unlocked door 500 meters away and everyone will see it
  • Avior
    Avior 30 October 2020 08: 30
    +8
    Let's just say, if the author was not Damantsev, then this would be really important news.
    And since the author is Damantsev, first you need to sell yourself through the thicket of rubble of his style of presentation, and secondly, look at what other authors write on this topic, and in order to understand what is true and what is not.
    Such as,
    ... active RGSN of the "Slate" type is capable of receiving data packets with target designation

    from optical location stations, if the author himself writes that
    ... quantum optoelectronic sighting and navigation systems OLS-UEM / OLS-50M (transmitting the elevation and azimuth coordinates of heat-contrast objects through radio data exchange channels

    That is, these stations do not transmit the third coordinate, the range.
    And what, do not heat contrast do not transmit? no visible range?
    In general, Damantseva is good, but I would like to see a similar article from a more serious author.
    1. lucul
      lucul 30 October 2020 12: 34
      -2
      Such as,
      ... active RGSN of the "Slate" type is capable of receiving data packets with target designation

      from optical location stations, if the author himself writes that

      They wrote to you that from any external target designation, even the list was brought from what. On October 26, the Orion UAV was adopted, with an altitude of 7 m, which theoretically gives it a radio horizon of 000 km. In addition, the rocket head itself has a good seeker with a detection range of under 300-20 km.
      1. Avior
        Avior 30 October 2020 13: 29
        0
        Are you an author?
        I have written a specific question to the article - how can you give "target designation" to a rocket with an external device that does not measure the range to the target, which is what the author himself writes about?
        If you know the answer to it, write, if not, why this post?
        1. kit88
          kit88 30 October 2020 13: 55
          11
          Avior, forgive me for getting in, but it's like a public discussion ...
          The author really has everything in a heap and separate systems and complexes. But you understand that in any OLS there is a channel for measuring range by means of an LD (laser rangefinder). Further on board the information goes to the TCS (K-Dl ...), and then it is transmitted to external consumers via a secure channel. And as they say, a 9M317M type rocket with an active RGSN is really capable of directly receiving target designation from AWACS aircraft, multipurpose fighter-interceptor radars, ground and ship radars with appropriate information exchange equipment.
          hi
          1. Avior
            Avior 30 October 2020 14: 18
            0
            The laser range finder OLS UEM, for example, is capable of measuring a range less than half the range of the OLS, the author himself does not write that he indicates the range.
            That's why I wrote that there should be a serious article on this topic, and not "from Damantsev."
            hi
            1. kit88
              kit88 30 October 2020 14: 31
              +8
              laughing
              Well, thank God for not writing. Otherwise, right now, in this context, the speech would have gone into virtual gyro-stabilized platforms and other auto-tracking zones, the article would have increased by a couple more paragraphs, and an unprepared reader would have forgotten what the speech was originally about ...
              wink hi
              1. Avior
                Avior 31 October 2020 10: 16
                0
                Can you provide links to confirm the text of Damantsev's article?
                To discuss something with Damantsev, you first need to figure out what is real in his article, and what is purely according to the ideas of Damantsev himself
                1. kit88
                  kit88 31 October 2020 11: 38
                  +9
                  Welcome.
                  Damantsev has many statements in his article. Let's dwell on one thing, what exactly confused you in the article?
                  I want to note that I am not the author's lawyer from any side.
    2. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 30 October 2020 16: 06
      +1
      Quote: Avior
      In general, Damantseva is good, but I would like to see a similar article from a more serious author.

      In order to admit that in the press service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation someone knows the concept of a radio horizon, you need to be exactly Damantsev. As far as I remember, there this interesting effect is known as "earth curvature".
  • Cop
    Cop 30 October 2020 08: 44
    +7
    Hello Mr. Damantsev! From time to time I read your articles. In my opinion, what is missing from them is the economy. Let me explain, how much is 9M317MA worth? The cost of Bayractors, orbiters, etc., if desired, you can estimate. Well, imagine a picture of an air defense missile system deployed in its armament, which is equipped with "BUK-M3". A flock of "Orbiters", for example, is attacking him. How many of them are needed for the ZRD to lose its combat effectiveness? Well, you found them, as soon as they approached 40 km., The ZRD fired back and suddenly some of the orbiters start throwing out, for example, dipole reflectors, and some Anka cuts in its electronic warfare. We can estimate the simultaneous salvo of the ZRD. How many zur-s will hit the target. Take a look at how the “Ayzers” operate in Karabakh. A small reconnaissance drone hangs over the front line, the Armenians don't even see it. He directs artillery to the strongholds of the Armenian army and it interferes with the ground there. And then you can advance in parade formation. The loss of even a dozen of these small drones is nothing compared to the loss of an important stronghold. This is how the Azerbaijanis broke through to Shusha yesterday. What do you think can be used to fight such small drones on the front lines? You can't take the methods described here seriously: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=djsMufjDt0Q
    From SW. Your reader.
    1. lucul
      lucul 30 October 2020 12: 29
      -1
      Take a look at how the “Ayzers” operate in Karabakh. A small reconnaissance drone hangs over the front line, the Armenians don't even see it.

      Laughter, therefore, hangs over the territory of another country, so that it is not shot down)))
      If it hung over the territory of Karabakh, it would have been lying on the ground for a long time. Regarding, they do not even see - here is a visual picture as they do not see, even the trajectory in time is drawn:

      What do you think can be used to fight such small drones on the front lines?

      First, they are going to put new small rocket-nails on Shell, with a large ammunition load, especially against a swarm of mini kamikaze drones. The second method - Derivation - air defense 57mm cannon with shells with remote detonation, with a firing range of 5 km.
      1. Konnick
        Konnick 30 October 2020 14: 17
        -2
        Quote: lucul
        First, they are going to put new small rocket-nails on Shell, with a large ammunition load, especially against a swarm of mini kamikaze drones. The second method - Derivation - air defense 57mm cannon with shells with remote detonation, with a firing range of 5 km.

        How simple !!! And how do you think to detect the drone and how to control the "new small rocket" and is this rocket self-guided or simply visually controlled by the operator?
        That's it ... Air defense derivation ... 57mm cannon.
        Keyword - are going to put
        1. lucul
          lucul 30 October 2020 15: 36
          +1
          how do you see the drone

          Yes, just like that, all the movements of the drone are visible at a glance.
      2. Cherry Nine
        Cherry Nine 30 October 2020 16: 04
        0
        Quote: lucul
        Laughter, therefore, hangs over the territory of another country, so that it is not shot down)))
        If it hung over the territory of Karabakh, it would have been lying on the ground for a long time

        And, that is, the Armenians are not ashamed to shoot down the OTR cities, but are they ashamed to shoot down the drone? Very interesting, thanks.
      3. Cop
        Cop 31 October 2020 10: 13
        +1
        Quote: lucul
        Laughter, therefore, hangs over the territory of another country, so that it is not shot down

        Really laugh ... The commander of the Artsakh army apparently got lost and drove into the territory of a neighboring state and there was hit by a drone ...
        Quote: lucul
        They don't even see about it - they don't even see a visual picture, even the trajectory in time is drawn ...
        Did you paint yourself? We could have tried.
        Quote: lucul
        First, they are going to put new small rocket-nails on the Armor, with a large ammunition load, especially against a swarm of mini kamikaze drones ...
        I saw how the Jews in Syria bred the Armor with just two drones in the video they published. Imagine 49 of these drones flying onto the shell. Enough ammunition?
        Quote: lucul
        The second method - Derivation - air defense 57mm cannon with shells with remote detonation, with a firing range of 5 km.
        How will its Derivation detect?
        1. lucul
          lucul 31 October 2020 11: 08
          0
          Really laugh ... The commander of the Artsakh army apparently got lost and drove into the territory of a neighboring state and there was hit by a drone ...

          There ALL the territory of Armenia is smaller than one Moscow region))). And as for the size of Nagorno-Karabakh, I generally keep quiet, there you can shoot from a neighboring country with anything you like.
          Did you paint yourself? We could have tried.

          Just radar data))) But your propaganda does not show this)))
          I saw how the Jews in Syria bred the Armor with just two drones in the video they published.

          Is this about that fake video from a lot of glues? So it was taken apart frame by frame))).
          Imagine 49 of these drones flying onto the shell. Enough ammunition?

          With rockets-nails - quite)))
          How will its Derivation detect?

          Have you heard anything about external target designation? Here it is)))
  • Errr
    Errr 30 October 2020 09: 27
    +1
    From the end of the article:
    ... but also to such promising hypersonic "instruments" as the AGM-83A aeroballistic missile recently promoted by the Pentagon.
    We lost one, Eugene, and instead of AGM-183A it turned out to be AGM-83A. But the Bulldog (AGM-83) was never hypersonic. smile
  • Nikolaevich I
    Nikolaevich I 30 October 2020 09: 57
    +4
    Interestingly the girls are dancing! ”Damantsev writes about" external target designation "and" its diversity "in relation to the 9M317MA ... Well, this is possible if the published data on the 9M317MA are considered reliable ... But ... the fact that this seeker is an active radar and itself can be guided to the target beyond the "horizon, is that no one is already" thrilled "?
    1. Avior
      Avior 30 October 2020 13: 31
      -1
      In order for the active seeker to aim at the target, it must first be brought to the target, and how to do this if the air defense missile system does not see the target is a problem.
      1. Nikolaevich I
        Nikolaevich I 30 October 2020 13: 50
        +2
        Quote: Avior
        how to do this if the air defense system does not see the target is a problem.

        For this, there is an INS and a radio command correction ... Information about "over-the-horizon" targets can be received by the command center of the complex ...
  • Konnick
    Konnick 30 October 2020 14: 37
    +1
    ... but there is a nuance. Both the air defense missile system and the "Adjutant" target complex developed by the same Almaz-Antey aerospace defense complex.

    Petka, do you want me to tell you about the paradox?
    Vasily Ivanovich, leave me alone! After the nuances, I don't talk to you! fellow
  • Al Asad
    Al Asad 30 October 2020 14: 41
    -1
    Quote: kit88
    laughing
    Well, thank God for not writing. Otherwise, right now, in this context, the speech would have gone into virtual gyro-stabilized platforms and other auto-tracking zones, the article would have increased by a couple more paragraphs, and an unprepared reader would have forgotten what the speech was originally about ...
    wink hi

    After the introduction, I already vaguely began to understand the "essence of being" laughing
    The author needs to conduct mass hypnosis sessions for the military
  • Konnick
    Konnick 30 October 2020 15: 20
    -1
    "A key event in the sky over the Astrakhan region. Full-scale tests of 9M317MA missiles confirmed the unique feature of domestic air defense systems"

    "The ability to destroy enemy targets outside the radio horizon will significantly increase the survivability of anti-aircraft missile brigades of military air defense and strategically important objects covered by them в difficult terrain conditions"

    Polygon "Kapustin Yar" difficult terrain "???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
    1. lucul
      lucul 30 October 2020 15: 42
      -2
      The ability to destroy enemy targets outside the radio horizon will significantly increase the survivability of anti-aircraft missile brigades of military air defense and of strategically important objects covered by them in conditions of difficult terrain"

      Polygon "Kapustin Yar" difficult terrain "???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????

      Read carefully, I highlighted the necessary, it's not about Kapustin Yar.
      1. Konnick
        Konnick 30 October 2020 15: 50
        -1
        So the tests were at the Kapustin Yar test site? Why write about a difficult terrain, the tests took place without a difficult terrain.
        1. lucul
          lucul 30 October 2020 15: 59
          0
          So the tests were at the Kapustin Yar test site? Why write about a difficult terrain, the tests took place without a difficult terrain.

          The key word is OUTSIDE the RADIO HORIZON, i.e. beyond the limits of physical visibility.
          This is paramount in mountainous areas, just paramount.
          1. Konnick
            Konnick 30 October 2020 16: 05
            -2
            Do not compare the transmission of radio waves in mountainous and flat areas. BEYOND THE RADIO HORIZON it's not BEYOND THE RADIO HORIZON.
            1. lucul
              lucul 30 October 2020 16: 38
              0
              Do not compare the transmission of radio waves in mountainous and flat areas. BEYOND THE RADIO HORIZON it's not BEYOND THE RADIO HORIZON.

              It's not about the passage of waves, but about external target designation, before the drone could emerge from behind the mountain, launch a gliding bomb and hit the target.
              And now, if from external target designation, the air defense system will see the drone behind the mountain as clearly as on the flat terrain.
  • Turist1996
    Turist1996 30 October 2020 15: 27
    +7
    If we discard all the husk from Eugene: they conducted field tests of the upgraded missile for the Buk air defense system. The modernized rocket, due to the introduction of a data transmission channel from third-party (relative to the complex) guidance and targeting means, was able to intercept low-flying targets that go beyond the radio horizon of the detection and guidance means of the complex itself.
    Well, something like this.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 2 November 2020 19: 53
      +1
      Quote: Turist1996
      The modernized rocket, due to the introduction of a data transmission channel from third-party (relative to the complex) guidance and targeting means, was able to intercept low-flying targets that go beyond the radio horizon of the detection and guidance means of the complex itself.

      Most likely, the channel was received not by missiles, but by the ground part of the guidance equipment. Because the commands for trajectory correction are calculated and issued by it. And the rocket only fulfills them.
  • _Ugene_
    _Ugene_ 30 October 2020 19: 04
    -1
    assumptions and wishes of the author disguised with long sentences in the hope that while the reader reaches the end he will forget what it is all about
  • Volder
    Volder 30 October 2020 19: 09
    -3
    For some reason, there are no comments in defense of the American SM-6. Many readers and authors of "VO" are of the opinion that the SM-6 could theoretically shoot down the Russian "Zircons" and "Daggers". I expect a reasoned disagreement with Damantsev.
  • voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 30 October 2020 21: 13
    +2
    "such highly maneuverable winged and ballistic anti-ship missiles such as" Zircon "and" Dagger "///
    ----
    Highly maneuverable? smile
    The higher the speed, the less maneuverability. The forces of inertia interfere, miracles do not happen.
    1. Sanichsan
      Sanichsan 31 October 2020 00: 29
      +1
      Quote: voyaka uh
      miracles do not happen

      Well, any sane person will confidently say that more than 40 knots under water cannot be moved due to the fact that a dense medium, friction, etc. Physics and strength of materials quite specifically testify to this, but the Flurry over there gives 200 knots (as they say), and 100 in the last century could.
      so I would not promise about miracles wink if you or I do not know how to do this, it does not mean that it cannot be done.
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 31 October 2020 01: 24
        +1
        1) There is a price for everything. The flurry was uncontrollable. He was removed from service.
        2) Su-35 is super-maneuverable. But at what speed? 0.5-0.6 MAX.
        If you turn the nozzles at a speed of 0.9 MAX, then the plane will lose control
        and crash. Forces of inertia.
        3) Iskander flies at a speed of 8-10 MAX. But before hitting the target, it slows down
        up to 3 MAX. Otherwise it will not get there. Forces of inertia.
        All of these (2 and 3) are good, useful weapons. But...
        Speed ​​comes at a price: either accuracy drops or maneuverability is lost.
        1. Sanichsan
          Sanichsan 31 October 2020 01: 34
          +1
          Quote: voyaka uh
          1) There is a price for everything. The flurry was uncontrollable. He was removed from service.

          modernized, removed the old yes
          judging by this first point, you could not understand what it was about.
          I gave you an example of something that would seem impossible, but it turned out to be possible request disappointed that you did not understand even written in plain text ...
          Quote: voyaka uh
          3) Iskander flies at a speed of 8-10 MAX. But before hitting the target, it slows down
          up to 3 MAX. Otherwise it will not get there. Forces of inertia.

          uh huh. and the Vanguard flies MAX 20 and maneuvers. tell me, you were not among those experts who argued that this is not possible and contrary to physics? wink
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 31 October 2020 02: 38
            0
            "Vanguard flies 20 MAX and maneuvers" ///
            ---
            At a speed of 20 MAX, the maneuver is a "light swing" by + - 1-2 degrees. Arc
            will be over 1000 km. If you maneuver more sharply, then the Vanguard will leave the main
            trajectory forever, and a little sharper - it will spin and tear it to pieces.
            The same forces of inertia.
            ----
            Our discussion has lost its meaning. All the best! hi
  • iouris
    iouris 31 October 2020 10: 51
    +1
    "Loitering SAM" is something special!
  • Aibolit
    Aibolit 31 October 2020 11: 53
    +2
    is the successful interception of one of the four types of small-sized air targets of the 9F6021E “Adjutant” target-training complex by means of the 9M317MA medium-range anti-aircraft missile included in the ammunition load of the Buk-M3 self-propelled military air defense system. The most notable details of this interception, which provoked numerous discussions in observing circles, were: the distance to the destroyed air target, which, according to the Russian Defense Ministry, was about 40 km, as well as the operating height at the time of interception, barely reaching 10 meters (the product flew in the terrain bend mode).
    belay
    Where does he take this nonsense?
    "Adjutant" (UMTK 9F6021E)


    some observers-regulars of the "Military Review" and other domestic military-analytical portals not only questioned the reliability of the data provided by the press service of the RF Ministry of Defense, but also rushed to accuse the department of either deliberately overstating the tactical and technical parameters of the military air defense

    Yeah
    MAKS 2003-2005
    ARGS Slate is used in air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles (Buk-type air defense systems).
    Provides: search, capture and tracking of moving targets on preliminary target designation of radars of air carriers or anti-aircraft complexes; measurement of angular coordinates, angular velocities and speed of approach of the missile to the target; generation and transmission over a digital communication line of signals for missile control systems.

    what performance (antenna diameter), so is the capture

    ARGS Slate-Antenna diameter 280 mm
  • VOENOBOZ
    VOENOBOZ 31 October 2020 13: 31
    0
    Cool photo, such power at the start, mesmerizing.
  • Gust
    Gust 31 October 2020 23: 30
    0
    This is Buk-M1. M3 looks and starts differently.
  • vel1163
    vel1163 1 November 2020 12: 28
    0
    Something not a single practical interception. Just talking
  • Alexey-74
    Alexey-74 2 November 2020 08: 46
    0
    A good article, even if there are inaccuracies, we still do not recognize all the performance characteristics of the various components of our air defense / missile defense systems (top secret), but still the overall picture is developing and one can only be proud of our air defense forces.