Vainakh split, or the Caucasus in anticipation of Moscow decisions
Recall that Ramzan Kadyrov reported to the federal authorities that three militants were killed by Chechen security forces at the Ingush village of Galashki. As a comment to this statement of Kadyrov, the Ingush head Yunus-Bek Yevkurov said that the death of the militants did not come at all because of the actions of the Chechen special forces, but due to the fact that there was some unintended explosion, and the Chechen fighters after the explosion transported two killed and one wounded militant on the territory of Chechnya.
It would seem that after the statements of the heads of the two North Caucasian republics, they should have calmed down, but the hot Vainakh blood continued to play in the veins of political figures. Ramzan Kadyrov expressed a storm of indignation with the words of his Ingush colleague and said that Yevkurov did not show enough zeal in the fight against extremism in the territory of his republic, and therefore, the quotation: "there is no order here." After his tirades about the "inaction" of the Ingush leader, Ramzan Kadyrov noted that it was time to create a real border between Ingushetia and Chechnya, and not be content with what it is.
After the designated conflict, experts unanimously started talking about the fact that a special version of the conflict is being planned in the North Caucasus - a local political one. Kadyrov, during her time at the helm of Chechnya, managed to form a self-assessment of the ideal leader of the North Caucasus region. Kadyrov is young (he is 36 years old) and at the same time he has quite a solid managerial experience, heading the Chechen Republic since 2007. Kadyrov is trying to demonstrate full loyalty to the Kremlin, but at the same time he does not shy away from using his own political methods to achieve his goals. The Kremlin gives Kadyrov a real carte blanche, allowing him to achieve tangible results in the field of the head of the Republic. Well, the methods by which Ramzan is guided in this way are somehow not taken by officials to criticize. Someone sees this as a kind of counterexample of the interaction of the federal center with the North Caucasian leaders after the Yeltsin failure to “curb” Dzhokhar Dudayev before the 1 of the Chechen campaign and during it. Someone is inclined to believe that Kadyrov himself is a very, very convenient figure for the Kremlin, since in suppressing unwanted formations for themselves, in fact, they are guided by principles that are declared in one form or another by the federal authorities.
Speaking about Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, it should be noted that in his case there is a much more rigid framework for conducting republican policy than in the case of Ramzan Kadyrov. The framework is for Yunus-Bek Bamategireevich himself. The fact is that Yevkurov is a man who received his higher military education during the time of the USSR, and therefore, naturally, he has other ideas about how to achieve stability in the Republic. Evkurov simply by definition cannot afford to allow himself to use the forces and means at his disposal to restore order in the Republic by means of constitutional methods. Whether this is good or bad is a question from a different plane.
On the one hand, it seems to be necessary to pay attention to the result, but for now this result looks more digestible in Chechnya, which is headed by Kadyrov. But on the other hand, it is necessary to look somewhat forward and analyze the working methods of regional leaders, at least in the medium term. Could Kadyrov’s precedent “my Republic be my will” become a new slogan for other leaders of the North Caucasus regions? Would such a position not lead to that very regional deadlock, the beginnings of which we see today after the skirmish of Yevkurov and Kadyrov? I would like to believe that this whole conflict is a temporary clouding that will quickly disperse.
One should not forget that Russia is moving to electing the heads of the subjects of the federation, and in the case of the North Caucasus in terms of election, politicians who are guided by very strict principles, including the principles of quite obvious nationalism, can be the first to take the lead.
By the way, Kadyrov’s words about the final delimitation of Chechnya and Ingushetia are one example of the fact that he wants to further strengthen his position in the region and become a kind of regional leader, playing with his political weight. It must be admitted that Kadyrov’s popularity in the North Caucasus today is very high. But this popularity, what a sin to conceal, he achieved not only because of his “special” policy, but also because of generous federal funding from Moscow. If the leaders of the neighboring North Caucasian republics see that the leader’s role can only come to them after they show their people that they can look at federal laws and the Constitution of the Russian Federation, then they can be pulled out of all existing frames. Moreover, judging by the published federal programs, funding for the North Caucasus is declining. And this reduction in funding is quite capable of heating up the already difficult situation in the region.
If the same Kadyrov can work in the direction of stabilizing the situation in the Chechen Republic and with a rather modest cash infusion from the state treasury, then he is honored and praised. But if it comes to the option of supporting the authorities only under conditions of excessively generous financial support, is it worth it to consider the “Kadyrov's miracle” to be strong.
In this regard, Yevkurov already makes it clear that his principles are in no way connected with fluctuations in the level of financial support from Moscow. In any case, he will continue to work in that vein, both in terms of combating extremism in Ingushetia, and in terms of solving economic problems.
But now it becomes especially important what decision the federal center will take to smooth out the emerging North Caucasian rivalry between Yevkurov and Kadyrov. If today Moscow tries to close its eyes to the Caucasian squabble, then after a short time the verbal duel may well turn into a much more serious conflict. Given that both leaders obviously perceive themselves to be the bearers of the only correct policy in the region, the new conflict can really flare up.
In this case, it is not necessary to put out of brackets the external forces, which, in passive contemplation by official Moscow, the outlined confrontation between the Chechen and Ingush leaders is able to extract their own benefits from the situation. After all, the conflict field in the North Caucasus can be used to solve destructive tasks, which again will make it possible to raise the head of radicalism with the active support of well-known sponsors of world terrorism.
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