1. Introduction. The current state of the defense industry
The state of the air defense reflects the general state of the defense industry and is characterized by one phrase: not to fat, I would live. There is such a confusion in the industry that it remains unclear when we will move from prototypes to serial ones. USC failed the 2011-2020 GPV program. Out of 8 frigates 22350 were built 2. Accordingly, there is no series of air defense systems "Polyment-Redut". If at the time of the laying of the frigate "Admiral Gorshkov" in 2006, its radar, borrowed from the S-350 air defense system, at least somehow met the world level, now the radar with a passive phased antenna array (PAR) will not charm anyone and the air defense system will not add competitiveness. "Almaz-Antey" also thwarted the deadlines for the delivery of the air defense system, which delayed the commissioning of "Admiral Gorshkov" by 3-4 years.
General directors of enterprises most often do not understand their field, but they know how to negotiate with the customer. If the military representative signed the act, then nothing else needs to be improved. In competitions, the winner is not the one with the most promising offer, but the one with whom contacts have long been established. If you bring an invention to the CEO, you will hear in response: "Did you bring money for development?" Addressing directly with proposals to the Ministry of Defense also does not bring results, the typical answer is: we are conducting our own developments! Five years have passed, and the proposals remain unfulfilled. This article is devoted to one of such proposals of the author, sent in 2014 to the Moscow Region.
The prestige of the company does not play a role for its management: it is important to get a government order. Engineers' earnings are low. Even if young specialists come, they leave after gaining practical experience.
It is impossible to compare the quality of Russian weapons and competing foreign ones: everything is secret, and there is no serious war that would show who is who, thank God. Syria does not give an answer either - the enemy has no air defense. But Turkish drones are causing concern - how can we answer? The author cannot answer how to assemble a swarm of UAVs for a penny in a toy store - they did not teach. But if our defense industry gets down to business, then the cost will increase by orders of magnitude. Therefore, further it remains only to talk about the usual topic - about the fight against a serious enemy and how to do it for reasonable money.
When you hear a statement like “this weapons no one else in the world has yet ”, then you start to wonder: why not? Either the whole world has lagged behind our technologies, or no one wants to have this, or it can be useful only in the last war of mankind ...
There is only one thing left - to organize the NKB (People's Design Bureau) and independently speculate on the topic of where the exit is.
2. Forgotten destroyer
Many readers believe that we do not need a destroyer, since it is enough to control an area of about 1000-1500 km from our shores. The author disagrees with this approach. Coastal complexes even without ships can shell a 600-km zone. From what ceiling the numbers 1000-1500 are taken is not clear.
In the Baltic and Black "puddles" and to control the economic zone, such ranges are not required, and destroyers are all the more unnecessary - there are enough corvettes. If necessary, also aviation will help. But in the Atlantic or in the Pacific Ocean, you can meet with AUG, and with IBM, and not only with American ones. Then you cannot do without a full-fledged KUG. In such tasks, the air defense of the frigate, even the "Admiral Gorshkov", may not be enough - you need a destroyer.
The cost of an unequipped ship is usually around 25% of its total cost. Therefore, the cost of a frigate (4500 tons) and a destroyer (9000 tons) with the same equipment will differ by only 10-15%. The effectiveness of the AA defense, the cruising range and the comfort for the crew make the destroyer's advantages obvious. In addition, the destroyer can solve the missile defense mission, which cannot be assigned to the frigate.
The destroyer should play the role of the KUG flagship. All of its combat systems must be of a higher class than the rest of the ships in the group. These ships should play the role of external information support systems and mutual protection. During an air attack, a destroyer must take over the main number of attacking anti-ship missiles and destroy anti-ship missiles in most cases with the help of a highly effective short-range air defense system (MD). The destroyer's electronic countermeasures complex (KREP) must be powerful enough to cover the rest of the ships with noise interference, and they must cover the destroyer with their less powerful KREP using imitation jamming.
2.1. RLC destroyers "Leader" and "Arleigh Burke"
Old people still remember that there was a "golden age" in Russia (2007), when we could boldly afford not only to build a destroyer, but at least to design it. Now the dust has covered this point of the GPV. In those "ancient" times, the destroyer of the "Leader" project, by analogy with "Arleigh Burke", had to solve the problems of missile defense.
The destroyer developer decided to install on it 3 conventional MF radars (surveillance, guidance and MD SAM) and use a separate radar with a large antenna for missile defense. To save money, we decided to use one rotary active PAR (AFAR). This AFAR was installed behind the main superstructure, that is, it could not radiate in the direction of the ship's bow. Then they added a radar for adjusting artillery fire. We can only be glad that such a freak RLC never appeared.
The ideology of the Aegis air defense missile system for the US destroyers is based on the fact that the main role is played by a powerful multifunctional (MF) 10-cm range radar, which can simultaneously detect new targets, accompany previously detected ones and develop commands to control the missile defense system on the cruising section of guidance. To illuminate the target at the homing stage of the missile defense system, a high-precision 3-cm range radar is used, which ensures the secrecy of guidance. The backlight allows the missile defense system to either not turn on the radar homing head (RGSN) for radiation at all, or turn it on for the last couple of seconds of guidance, when the target can no longer evade.
2.2. Alternative Destroyer Tasks
- when you dream, do not deny yourself anything;
- try to do well, it will turn out badly.
Since we have an alternative destroyer, let's call it "Leader-A".
It is necessary to explain to the management what such an expensive toy as a destroyer can do. One task of escorting KUGs will not convince anyone, it is required to perform the functions of supporting the landing of the landing and missile defense. Let the specialists write about the submarines. The destroyer Zamvolt can be taken as a basis, but the displacement is limited to ten thousand tons. The argument that we do not have such an engine can be ignored. If you can't make your own, buy from the Chinese, we won't build that many destroyers. The equipment will have to develop its own.
Suppose that the landing can be carried out only outside the fortified areas of the enemy, but he will be able to quickly transfer some light reinforcements (at the level of 76-100 mm cannons). The destroyer will be required to carry out artillery preparation along the bridgehead using tens to hundreds of shells.
The US Department of Defense reportedly considered the Zamvolta cannon's active-rocket projectiles with a range of 110 km to be too expensive and approaching the price of missiles. Therefore, we will demand that Leader-A be able to carry out artillery preparation with conventional shells, but from a safe range, depending on the situation, up to 15-18 km. The radar of the destroyer must determine the coordinates of the point of fire of the enemy's large-caliber artillery, and the unmanned aerial vehicle must correct the firing. The tasks of ensuring the air defense of the KUG were described in second article in the series, and ABM will be described in this article below.
3. State of the radar of Russian ships
The radar of our typical ship contains several radars. Surveillance radar with a rotating antenna located on the top. Guidance radar with one rotating (S-300f) or four fixed passive HEADLIGHTS (S-350). For the MD air defense system, they usually use their own radars with small antennas of the millimeter wavelength range (SAM "Kortik", "Pantsir-M"). The presence of a small antenna next to a large one reminds history with the famous theoretical physicist Fermi. He had a cat. So that she could freely go out into the garden, he cut a hole in the door. When the cat had a kitten, Fermi cut a small one next to the big hole.
The disadvantage of rotating antennas is the presence of a heavy and expensive mechanical drive, a decrease in the detection range and an increase in the total effective reflective surface (EOC) of the ship, which is already increased.
Unfortunately, it can be difficult to achieve a unified ideology in Russia. Various firms strictly monitor the retention of their share of government orders. Some decades have been developing surveillance radars, others - guidance radars. In this situation, instructing someone to develop the MF radar means taking away a piece of bread from another.
A description of the SAM systems for destroyers, frigates and corvettes is given in one of the author's previous articles: "The missile defense has been broken, but what is left for our fleet?" From the material it follows that only the Admiral Gorshkov's Polyment-Redut can somehow be compared with the Aegis air defense system, if, of course, one accepts the half of the ammunition load and the firing range. The use on other ships in the 21st century of the Shtil-1 type air defense system is an open shame of our fleet... They do not have a guidance radar, but there is a target illumination station. The RGSN SAM must, before the start, capture the illuminated target itself. This method of guidance significantly reduces the launch range, especially in interference, and sometimes leads to re-targeting the missile defense system to other, larger targets. A civilian liner may also be caught.
The ships of the corvette and smaller class are especially poorly provided. They also have surveillance radars that are detected by conventional fighter-bombers (IB) at ranges of only 100-150 km, and you may not get 35 from the F-50. There may not be any radar guidance at all, but infrared or optics are used.
The cost of the Aegis air defense system is estimated at $ 300 million, which is close to the price of our frigate. Of course, we will not be able to compete with the Americans for money. We'll have to take ingenuity.
4. An alternative concept of radar ships
In microelectronics production technology, we will lag behind the United States for a long time. Therefore, it is possible to catch up with them only due to more advanced algorithms that will work with simpler equipment. Our programmers are not inferior to anyone, and are much cheaper than American ones.
Follow these steps:
• to abandon the development of separate radars for each separate task and make the most of the MF radar;
• select a single frequency range for the MF radar of all ships of the 1st and 2nd classes;
• abandon the use of outdated passive PAA and switch to AFAR;
• develop a unified series of AFARs, differing only in size;
• to develop the technology of group actions in the air defense of the KUG, for which to organize joint scanning of space and joint processing of received signals and interference;
• organize a high-speed covert communication line between the ships of the group, capable of not violating the radio silence;
• to abandon the use of "headless" MD missiles and develop a simple infrared homing head (GOS);
• to develop a transmission line of the signal received by the RGSN ZUR BD to the shipborne MF radar.
5. Radar complex of the alternative destroyer "Leader-A"
The value of the destroyer is also increasing due to the fact that only it can protect against ballistic missiles (BR) and KUG and objects located at a great distance (apparently, up to 20-30 km). The missile defense mission is so complex that it requires the installation of a separate missile defense radar, optimized for the task of ultra-long-range detection of subtle targets. At the same time, it is absolutely impossible to demand from her to solve most of the air defense tasks that should remain with the MF radar.
5.1. Justification of the appearance of the missile defense radar (special point for those interested)
The BR has a small image intensifier tube (0,1-0,2 sq. M), and it must be detected at ranges of up to 1000 km. It is impossible to solve this problem without an antenna with an area of several tens of square meters.
If you do not go into such subtleties of radar as taking into account the attenuation of radio waves in meteorological formations, then the detection range of the radar is determined only by the product of the average radiated power of the transmitter and the area of the antenna that receives the echo signal reflected from the target. The antenna in the form of a HEADLIGHT allows you to instantly transfer the radar beam from one angular position to another. HEADLIGHT is a flat area filled with elementary emitters, which are spaced with a step equal to half the radar wavelength.
PAR are of two types: passive and active. Until 2000, PFARs were used in the world. In this case, the radar has one powerful transmitter, the power of which is supplied to the radiators through passive phase shifters. The disadvantage of such radars is their low reliability. A powerful transmitter can only be made on vacuum tubes, which require a high voltage power supply, which leads to failures. The weight of the transmitter can be up to several tons.
In AFAR, each emitter is connected to its own transceiver module (PPM). PPM emits power hundreds and thousands of times less than a powerful transmitter, and can be made on transistors. As a result, AFAR is ten times more reliable. In addition, PFAR can emit and receive only one beam, and AFAR can form several beams at reception. Thus, the AFAR significantly improves noise immunity, since a separate beam can be directed to each jammer and this interference can be suppressed.
Unfortunately, Russian air defense systems still use PFAR, only the S-500 will have an AFAR, but for our destroyer AFAR we will demand it right away.
5.2. AFAR PRO design (special point for those interested)
Another advantage of the destroyer is the ability to accommodate a large superstructure on it. To reduce the radiated power, the author decided to increase the AFAR area to about 90 square meters. m, that is, the dimensions of the AFAR are chosen as follows: width 8,4 m, height 11,2 m. The AFAR should be located in the upper part of the superstructure, the height of which should be 23-25 m.
The cost of AFAR is determined by the price of the MRP kit. The total number of PPMs is determined by the step of their installation, which is equal to 0,5 * λ, where λ is the radar wavelength. Then the number of PPM is determined by the formula N PPM = 4 * S / λ ** 2, where S is the AFAR area. Therefore, the number of PPMs is inversely proportional to the square of the wavelength. Taking into account the fact that the cost of a typical PPM weakly depends on the wavelength, we find that the price of the AFAR is also inversely proportional to the square of the wavelength. We will assume that with a small batch size, the price of one AFAR PRO APM will be $ 2000.
Of the wavelengths allowed for radar, two are suitable for missile defense: 23 cm and 70 cm. If you select the 23 cm range, then 7000 PPMs are required for one AFAR. Taking into account that AFAR must be installed on each of the 4 faces of the superstructure, we get the total number of antipersonnel mines - 28000. The total cost of a set of antipersonnel mines for one destroyer is 56 million dollars. The price is too high for the Russian budget.
In the range of 70 cm, the total number of PPMs will decrease to 3000, the price of the kit will drop to $ 6 million, which is quite a bit for such a powerful radar. It is difficult to estimate the final cost of the missile defense radar now, but the cost estimate of $ 12-15 million will not be surpassed.
5.3. MF radar design for air defense missions (special point for those interested)
Unlike missile defense radar, MF radar is optimized to obtain maximum accuracy in measuring the target trajectory, especially low-altitude anti-ship missiles, and not to achieve maximum detection range. Therefore, in the MF radar, it is necessary to significantly improve the accuracy of measuring angles. Under typical conditions of target tracking, the angular error is usually 0,1 of the radar beam width, which can be determined by the formula:
α = λ / L, where:
α is the antenna beamwidth, expressed in radians;
L is the vertical or horizontal length of the antenna, respectively.
For AFAR about we get the width of the beam vertically 364 °, and the horizon - 4,8 °. Such a beam width will not provide the desired accuracy of missile guidance. In the second article of the series, it was indicated that to detect low-altitude anti-ship missiles, it is required to have a vertical beam width of no more than 0,5 °, and for this the antenna height should be about 120 λ. With a wavelength of 70 cm, it is not possible to provide an antenna height of 84 m. Therefore, the MF radar should operate at much shorter wavelengths, but there is one more limitation here: the shorter the wavelength, the more the radio waves attenuate in meteorological formations. Too small λ cannot be chosen. Otherwise, for a given beam width, the antenna area will be too reduced, and with it the detection range. Therefore, for ships of all classes, a single MF radar wavelength was chosen - 5,5 cm.
5.4. MF radar design (special item for those interested)
AFAR is usually manufactured in the form of a rectangular matrix, consisting of N rows and M columns of MRP. With a given APAR height of 120λ and a PPM installation step of 0,5λ, the column will contain 240 PPMs. It is absolutely unrealistic to make a square AFAR 240 * 240 PPM, since almost 60 thousand PPM will be required for one AFAR. Even if we allow a threefold decrease in the number of columns, that is, allow the beam to expand horizontally up to 1,5 °, then 20 thousand PPMs will be required.Of course, such PPM power as for a missile defense radar is not required here and the price of one PPM will decrease to $ 1000 , but the cost price of PPM 4 AFAR set of $ 80 million is also unacceptable.
To further reduce the cost, we propose instead of one more or less square antenna to use two in the form of narrow strips: one horizontal and one vertical. If a conventional antenna simultaneously determines both the azimuth and elevation of the target, then the strip can only determine the angle in its plane with good accuracy. For MF radar, the task of detecting low-altitude anti-ship missiles is a priority, then the vertical beam should be narrower than the horizon. Let's choose the height of the vertical strip 120λ, and the width of the horizontal one - 60λ, along the second coordinate the size of both strips will be set to 8λ. then the dimensions of the vertical strip will turn out to be 0,44 * 6,6 m, and the horizontal one 3,3 * 0,44 m. Further, we note that it is enough to use only one of the strips to irradiate the target. Let's choose horizontal. On reception, both strips MUST work simultaneously. With the indicated dimensions, the beam width of the horizontal stripe in azimuth and elevation will be 1 * 7,2 °, and the vertical one - 7,2 * 0,5 °. Since the signal from the target is received by both strips simultaneously, the accuracy of measuring the angles will be the same as for one antenna with a beam width of 1 * 0,5 °.
In the process of target detection, it is impossible to say in advance at what point of the irradiating beam the target will be. Therefore, the entire height of the irradiating beam of 7,2 ° must be covered by the receiving beams of the vertical strip, the height of which is 0,5 °. Therefore, it will be necessary to form a fan of 16 beams spaced vertically by 0,5 °. AFAR, in contrast to PFAR, can form such a fan of rays for reception.
Let's determine the price of AFAR. The horizontal strip contains 2000 PPMs at a price of $ 1000, and the vertical strip contains 4000 purely receiving modules at a price of $ 750.Then the price of the kit for all 4 sides of the superstructure will turn out to be equal to $ 20 million. Doll.
Figure: 1. The layout of the AFAR on the verge of the superstructure
1 - AFAR PRO radar 8,4 * 11,2m (width * height). Beam 4,8 * 3,6 ° (azimuth * elevation);
2 - horizontal AFAR MF radar 3,3 * 0,44 m. Beam 1 * 7,2 °;
3 - vertical AFAR MF radar 0,44 * 6,6 m. Beam 7,2 * 0,5 °.
The final resolution in angle, formed by the intersection of the beams of two AFAR MF radar, = 1 * 0,5 °.
In one of the upper corner cutouts of the missile defense radar antenna there is free space where it is supposed to place the radio intelligence antennas. The antennas of the REB transmitters can be located in other cutouts.
6. Features of the functioning of the missile defense radar and MF radar
The task of detecting a BR is divided into two cases: detecting by an existing control center and detecting in a wide search sector. If the satellites recorded the launch of the BR and the direction of its flight, then in a small search sector, for example, 10 * 10 °, the detection range of the head part (RH) of a BR with an image intensifier is 0,1 sq. m increases by 1,5-1,7 times compared to the search without control center in the 100 * 10 ° sector. The problem of the control center is somewhat eased if a detachable warhead is used in the BR. then the BR housing with an image intensifier is about 2 sq. m flies somewhere behind the warhead. If the radar first detects the hull, then, looking through this direction, it will detect the warhead for a long time.
The missile defense radar can be used to increase the efficiency of the MF radar, since the use of the 70-cm range gives the missile defense radar a number of advantages over conventional surveillance radars:
- the maximum permissible power of the PPM transmitter turns out to be many times higher than that of the PPM of shorter wavelength ranges. This makes it possible to drastically reduce the number of PPMs and the cost of APAR without losing the total radiated power;
- the unique antenna area allows the proposed radar to have a detection range that is much greater than even that of the Aegis MF radar;
- in the range of 70 cm, the radio-absorbing coatings on stealth aircraft almost cease to function, and their image intensifier intensifies almost to the values typical for conventional aircraft;
- most enemy aircraft do not have this range in their CREPs and will not be able to interfere with the missile defense radar;
- radio waves of this range are not attenuated in meteorological formations.
Thus, the detection range of any real aerial target will exceed 500 km, of course, if the target comes out over the horizon. When the target approaches the firing range, it is transmitted to a more accurate tracking in the MF radar. At ranges of at least 200 km, an important advantage of combining two radars into one radar is increased reliability. One radar can perform the functions of another, albeit with some degradation in performance. Therefore, failure of one of the radars does not lead to complete failure of the radar.
7. The final characteristics of the radar
7.1. List of tasks for an alternative radar
The missile defense radar should detect and preliminarily accompany: the warheads of the ballistic missile; hypersonic anti-ship missiles immediately after leaving the horizon; air targets of all classes, including stealth, except for low-altitude targets.
The missile defense radar should interfere with the radar of the Hokkai AWACS aircraft.
MF radar detects and accurately tracks: air targets of all types, including low-altitude anti-ship missiles; enemy ships, including those beyond the horizon and visible only along the upper part of the superstructure; submarine periscopes; measures the trajectory of enemy shells in order to determine the probability of a shell hitting a destroyer; measures the caliber of the projectile and the organization of anti-cannon fire at large calibers; gives advance warning, 15-20 seconds in advance, to the crew about the numbers of compartments that are in danger of being hit.
In addition, the MF radar should: direct missiles; receive signals from jammers both independently and relayed by missile defense systems; correct the firing of your own guns at radio-contrast targets; carry out high-speed information transfer from ship to ship up to the horizon range; carry out covert transmission of information with the announced radio silence mode; to organize an anti-jamming communication line with the UAV.
7.2. The main technical characteristics of the radar
Radar missile defense:
The wavelength range is 70 cm.
The number of PPMs in one AFAR is 752.
Pulse power of one PPM - 400 W.
Power consumption of one AFAR is 200 kW.
The detection range of the BR hull with RCS 2 sq. m without control center in the search sector 90 ° × 10 ° 1600 km. The detection range of a warhead ballistic missile with an RCS of 0,1 mv without a control center in the search sector 90 ° × 45 ° is 570 km. If there is a control center and a detection sector of 10 * 10 ° - 1200 km.
The detection range of the Stealth aircraft with an RCS of 0,5 sq m, flight altitudes up to 20 km and an azimuth search sector of 90 ° in air defense mode is 570 km (radio horizon).
Angle measurement error in both coordinates: at a distance equal to the detection range - with a single measurement - 0,5 °; when accompanied - 0,2 °; at a range equal to 0,5 detection range - with a single measurement - 0,0,15 °; when accompanied - 0,1 °. The error in measuring the bearings of the Stealth aircraft with an RCS of 0,5 sq. m at a maximum firing range of 150 km - 0,08 °.
MF radar characteristics:
The wavelength range is 5,5 cm.
The number of PPM horizontal AFAR - 1920.
Pulse power of PPM - 15 W.
The number of receiving modules in the vertical AFAR is 3840.
Power consumption of four AFAR - 24 kW.
The azimuth measurement error when adjusting artillery fire at a radio contrast target at a distance of 20 km is 0,05 °.
Detection range of a fighter with EPR 5 sq. m in the azimuth sector 90 ° - 430 km.
Detection range of the Stealth aircraft with RCS 0,1 sq. m without control center - 200 km.
The detection range of the ballistic missile head by the control center in the angular sector 10 ° × 10 ° is 300 km.
The detection range of a projectile with a caliber of over 100 mm in an angular sector of 50 ° × 20 ° is 50 km.
The minimum height of a detectable anti-ship missile at a distance of 30 km / 20 km is no more than 8 m / 1 m.
The fluctuation error in measuring the azimuth of an anti-ship missile flying at an altitude of 5 m at a distance of 10 km is 0,1 mrad.
The fluctuation error in measuring the azimuth and PA of a projectile with an RCS of 0,002 m2, at a distance of 2 km - 0,05 mrad.
The peak speed of receiving and transmitting information on the UAV is 800 Mbit / s.
The average speed of receiving and transmitting information is 40 Mbit / s.
The speed of transmission from ship to ship in stealth mode with "radio silence" is 5 Mbps.
The proposed radar is far superior to the radar of Russian ships and the Aegis radar, while maintaining a reasonable cost.
The use of a 70 cm wavelength range in the missile defense radar made it possible to provide an ultra-long detection range for targets of all types, including stealth, both in missile defense and air defense modes. Noise immunity is guaranteed by the absence of this KREP range in the enemy's IS.
The narrow beam of the MF radar makes it possible to successfully detect and track both low-altitude anti-ship missiles and projectiles. This allows the destroyer to approach the coast at a line-of-sight distance and support the landing.
The use of AFAR MF radar to organize communications between ships allows all types of high-speed communications, including covert communications, to be provided. Noise-immune communication with the UAV is provided.
If the Ministry of Defense listened to such proposals, such a radar would already be ready.
The next article is supposed to consider the creation of a small aircraft carrier with an air wing in the form of a sixth-generation UAV.