Tsushima. Shell version. Where there is no armor

214

The effect of Russian shells on unarmored parts of armored ships


The sources for the analysis of hits on Japanese ships will be the damage schemes from "Top Secret stories", Analytical materials Arsenia Danilova, monograph by V. Ya. Krestyaninov "The Battle of Tsushima" and an article by N.J.M. Campbell "The battle of Tsu-Shima" ("Battle of Tsushima") translated by V. Feinberg. When mentioning the time of hitting Japanese ships, Japanese time will be indicated first, and in brackets - Russian according to V. Ya. Krestyaninov.

Hits on board, superstructure and decks


Mikasa


At 14:20 (14:02) 12 "the projectile hit the bow superstructure, pierced the outer skin, the bulkhead and exploded. A gap of 4,3x3,4 m appeared in the shelterdeck. Shrapnel damaged the upper and front bridges, and a small fire broke out. 17 people were injured.




Kasuga


At 14:33 (14:14) 12 ", the shell hit the hinged bridge and exploded at the base of the mainmast. A hole 1,2x1,6 m was formed in the upper deck, 7 people were killed, 20 were wounded.


Izumo


At 14:27 (14:09) a 6 "shell tore a hole 1,2x0,8 meters on the upper deck to the right of the middle pipe. Shrapnel killed 2 people and wounded 5.


At 15.05 (14:47) 12 ", the shell pierced the starboard side at the level of the middle deck near the aft tower and exploded, causing large damage to the middle and lower decks. 4 people were injured.


Another 12 ”projectile that flew in from the starboard side (the time has not been set) hit the upper deck at the port side in the stern and exploded, making a hole in the deck 1,2x0,6 m and in the side - 1,4x1,2 m. There were no casualties with this hit.


Damage scheme "Izumo" according to the medical description:
I - 14.27 (14:09), 6 ".
II - 15.05 (14:47), 12 ".
VI -?, 12 ”.


"Azuma"


At 14:50 (14:32) a 12 "shell ricocheted off the right barrel of an 8" stern gun and exploded over the upper deck. A hole 4x1,5 meters in size appeared in the deck. Large fragments severely damaged the rooms on the lower deck and even punctured the outer side. 4 people were injured.

Destruction on the upper deck:


"Yakumo"


At 14:26 (-), a supposedly 10 ”shell of one of the coastal defense battleships (since the direction is close to the aft corners and a 120-mm shell hit was recorded a minute earlier) exploded on the upper deck near the bow tower. A hole of about 2,4x1,7 meters was formed. No losses were recorded.


"Asama"


At 14.28:14 (10:2,6) a large-caliber shell exploded on the upper deck aft on the starboard side. The dimensions of the hole were 1,7x6 m. As a result of the shaking of the ship's hull, the steering was out of order for XNUMX minutes, as a result, Asama rolled to the left and out of order.


At 14: 55… 14: 58 (14:42… 14:44) two 10… 12 ”shells pierced the starboard aft and exploded on the middle deck. Shrapnel literally riddled the bulkheads, the unarmored lower deck flooring and the opposite side. Through damage to the side, the ship took in a lot of water and sank 1,5 meters astern. 2 people were killed and 5 were injured.

"Incoming" holes from the starboard side:


Damage to the port side from shells hitting the starboard side:


Bulkhead damage on lower and middle deck:


Destruction on the middle deck:


"Iwate"


At 14:30 (14:12) a 12 "shell exploded in the stern at the junction of the side and upper deck. A hole was formed in the board measuring about 1,2x1 meters. Shrapnel inflicted damage all the way to the opposite side. 4 people were injured.




At 16.10 (15:52) 12 ”, a shell exploded on the boat deck between the mainmast and the chimney. The shrapnel caused damage to superstructures, rowing ships, gun No. 5. 1 person was wounded.

At 16.20 (-) 8 "(6" according to Sasebo experts), the shell exploded on impact on the starboard side at the level of the lower deck in the bow of the ship, creating a hole 23x41 cm, through which water penetrated to the lower deck.

Tsushima. Shell version. Where there is no armor

Shrapnel and high-explosive action of Russian shells


Usually, when it hits vertical unarmored obstacles, the projectile, having flown several meters (pyroxylin or smokeless powder does not detonate on impact), exploded already inside the ship. A round or slightly elongated hole with smooth edges remained in the skin. The explosion was hardly noticeable from the outside, so it seemed that our fire had no effect. When hitting the deck, the projectile often exploded during its passage (this is due to the large meeting angle). Here you could already see the yellow-white smoke.

When large shells burst, holes were formed on the deck as large, comparable to holes from Japanese shells: 4x1,5 m (Azuma, 14:50), 2,6x1,7 m (Yakumo, 14:26), 2,4 , 1,7x14 m ("Asama", 28:1,2), and more modest 1,6x14 m ("Kasuga" 33:1,5), 0,6x18 m ("Mikasa", 45:XNUMX), which, apparently, is explained by cases of incomplete detonation of explosives.

When large shells burst inside the ship, the high-explosive effect was much stronger due to the action of gases in a closed volume, which is confirmed by the large dimensions of the deck damage of 4,3x3,4 m (Mikasa, 14:20), 1,7x2 m (Mikasa, 16:15).

Russian shells created a small number of large fragments, which flew in a narrow beam along the trajectory of the projectile (which is very clearly visible on the Japanese diagrams), had very high energy and at a distance of ten meters were able to penetrate several bulkheads and even the opposite side.

The thermal effect of Russian shells


In Tsushima, at least five cases of fire were recorded after being hit by Russian shells (and this is clearly an incomplete list).

Mikasa, 14:14 (13:56), hitting the roof of casemate No. 3. 10 rounds of 76-mm gun # 5, prepared for firing, exploded, and a small fire broke out in bed nets on the boat deck.

Mikasa, 14:20 (14:02), hitting the nasal superstructure. A small fire broke out in the bed protection around the conning tower.

Sikishima, 14:58 (14:42 or about 15:00), hitting the side under casemate # 6. A massive fire broke out on the middle deck.

Fuji, 15:00 (14:42), hitting the aft tower. Powder charges in the tower caught fire.

"Azuma" 14:55 (14:37), hitting casemate # 7. One bed net caught fire.

All of the above cases of fire were quickly extinguished.

Hitting pipes and masts


When hitting light structures (pipes and masts), Russian shells sometimes did not explode, or burst with a delay, already far overboard, without causing significant damage, but two cases should be noted separately. The first 6… 12 ”round knocked down the Mikasa's main topmast at 15:00 (-). The second shell exploded inside the Asahi's aft chimney at 15:15 (-): an inlet in the casing 38 cm, a hole in the pipe 0,9 x 1,1 m. The dimensions of the inlet, as well as the rupture without delay, suggest that it was a 12 ”round with a normal shock tube. Unfortunately, the Japanese dislike for describing pipe damage has deprived us of the details of many other hits and made it difficult to resolve contradictions. Thus, a hit into the Mikasa's rear pipe was estimated by the ship commander at 12 ", but in the pipe damage diagram, the hole size does not exceed 8".

The effect of Russian shells on armored cruisers


Perhaps the effect of Russian 152-120 mm shells on Japanese armored cruisers should be separately noted, because it was impressive.

At 15:10 (17:08) Kasagi received an underwater hole from a supposedly 6 ”shell at a depth of about 3 meters below the waterline. Moreover, it is not even clear how the damage was caused: it was a large splinter, a tangential impact of a projectile, or simply the impact of a shock wave. The fact is that an irregular hole was formed with a diameter of about 76 mm, and the projectile itself did not penetrate inside. It was not possible to stop the flooding: the hole turned out to be in a hard-to-reach place, the sump pumps did not work due to clogging with coal dust, and the water flooded two coal pits and the aft boiler room ... In this situation, at 18:00, Kasagi was forced to withdraw from the battle and urgently follow to the port for repair.


At 17:07 (about 17:00), a 6 "shell hit the stern of the Naniva in the waterline area, and at 17:40 the ship was forced to reduce its speed by half an hour and temporarily withdraw from the battle to seal the hole.

The next day at 20:05 (-) "Naniwa" again got hit by a 6 "shell from" Dmitry Donskoy "with a gap in the rear torpedo compartment. The torpedoes did not explode, but through damage below the waterline, a lot of water entered and with a roll of 7 degrees the ship was out of action.

To finally make sure that the hits of Russian shells below the waterline were deadly for the Japanese armored cruisers, you can still recall the dangerous hole received by Tsushima in the battle with the Novik, which also forced the Japanese ship to urgently end the battle.

The fact that two Japanese armored cruisers went out of action in the Battle of Tsushima from damage in the waterline area is especially indicative given the fact that in total they received no more than 14 hits from 15-20 mm shells and about 152 more hits from smaller shells on May 120-10.

Thus, Tsushima showed a very high effectiveness of the shells equipped with a delayed fuse against unarmored ships. Later, according to the results of the shooting of the cruiser "Nuremberg", the British also admit it.

The action of Japanese shells on unarmored parts of ships


In the Battle of Tsushima, hundreds of hits by Japanese shells in unarmored parts of Russian ships were recorded, so I will limit myself to the most illustrative of them, and outline the principle of operation in a generalized form.

Numerous witnesses noted the following damaging factors: a very strong shock wave, high temperature, acrid smoke of a black or yellowish-brown hue, many fragments.

When hitting an unarmored side, Japanese shells most often exploded instantly, forming large holes, but some shells exploded with a delay, already inside the ship. This difference in action cannot be explained by the standard detonation of the fuse, since all Japanese shells were equipped with the same Ijuin fuse. Apparently, with an instantaneous actuation, there was a deformation of the shell of the projectile and detonation of the shimosa, and in the case of a delay, a regular detonation of the fuse. Moreover, in high-explosive shells, due to thin walls, detonation from impact occurred more often from the most insignificant obstacles, for example, rigging or even a water surface. And for armor-piercing shells, the rupture usually occurred when the unarmored side was penetrated or immediately behind it. But there were isolated cases of unexploded Japanese shells. In addition to hitting the Sisoy Veliky described in the previous article, even on Nicholas I, a 6 ”shell pierced the side and stopped, breaking the bulkhead of the cabin.

High-explosive action of Japanese shells


The high-explosive effect of Japanese shells can be estimated by the size of the holes in the unarmored side, which they created. If we summarize the data on the damages of the "Eagle" according to the article by Arseny Danilov, it turns out that 6 "shells formed a hole in the side with dimensions from 0,5 to 1 m, 8" shells - from 1 to 1,5 m, 12 "shells - from 1,5 to 2,5 m. The size of the hole was very much dependent on the thickness of the sheets and the strength of their attachment.

A hole in the left side of the "Eagle" opposite the first pipe from a 12 ”land mine. Dimensions 2,7x2,4 m:


A hole in the starboard side of the "Eagle" shell in front of the average 152-mm turret from a 12 ”land mine. Diameter about 1,8 m:


Damage to the stern of the port side. Ahead of the 152-mm turret, a hole from an 8 "shell with dimensions of 1,4 x 0,8 m is clearly visible:


A hole from an 8 ”armor-piercing projectile in the bow of the Aurora:


Damage to the second "Eagle" chimney from a 6 ”shell received in the final phase of the battle:


Damage to the first chimney of "Nicholas I" from a 6 ... 8 ”shell, sheets were bent at the point of impact:


Holes from Japanese shells often had ragged edges bent inward, which prevented them from being sealed with specially prepared wooden shields in order to limit the flow of water during waves.

The shock wave from large projectiles was capable of deforming light bulkheads, tearing their joints, throwing away pieces of the side skin and objects inside. The shock wave from medium-caliber shells was much weaker and only destroyed the decoration, furniture and damaged things.

Shrapnel action of Japanese shells


When bursting, Japanese shells formed a huge amount of mostly very small fragments, up to metal powder. But upon hitting the "Eagle", a case of the formation of a very large fragment weighing about 32 kg was recorded.

Let us consider the number and direction of the scattering of fragments when a Japanese land mine explodes on the example of a well-documented hit of an 8 ”projectile in the middle tube of the cruiser" Aurora ". The burst of the projectile occurred at the moment the projectile passed through the pipe casing. Almost all the fragments, except for the bottom of the projectile, flew in three directions: forward, left and right. In total, 376 traces of fragments were noted, of which 133 are in the forward sector in the direction of flight of the projectile with a width of 60 ° - 70 °. 104 fragments - in the right sector 90 ° wide and 139 fragments in the left sector 120 ° wide.

A hole in the middle tube of the cruiser "Aurora" and the pattern of the dispersion of fragments:


Almost all of the fragments created by the Japanese high-explosive shells did not have very high energy. When a 12 "high-explosive projectile hit, already within 3 m from the place of rupture, the fragmentation effect was assessed as weak, although individual secondary fragments (fragments not of a projectile, but of destroyed ship structures) flew up to 8-10 m. Many cases were recorded when fragments could not to pierce even the skin of a person and simply removed from the wound with our hands. The improvised anti-fragmentation protection in the form of armored grates, steel cable, mine nets or bags with coal quite coped with its function. after the battle in the Yellow Sea, the flooding from Japanese shells near the waterline did not extend to more than two side compartments or coal pits, since the bulkheads remained intact.Fragments from Japanese armor-piercing shells had more energy and were able to penetrate several bulkheads and even the opposite side ...

Thermal action of Japanese shells


Japanese shells caused terrible fires on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which was not observed in other naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War. In World War I, almost all large and well-documented fires were associated with the ignition of gunpowder. As a result of large tests of ships by shelling ("Belile" 1900, "Swiftshur" 1919), conducted by the British, fires also did not arise. Therefore, it is necessary to understand in more detail the mechanisms of fire occurrence in Tsushima.

Fire can be caused by thermal effects of either debris or explosion gases. High explosives create a very high temperature, but for a short time and in a local volume not exceeding 10-30 diameters of the explosive volume. The temperature of the explosion gases can ignite flammable substances. From the fragments, which have a very high temperature, even wood.

According to the testimony of the participants in the Tsushima battle, the fire always started with small fires of ropes, canvas, burlap, mattresses, personal belongings or paper. One of the main sources of fires was the bunks' splinter protection, which was often hung around the conning tower. Objects of wood or coal used as shrapnel protection never caught fire immediately. If the fire was not noticed and extinguished in time, then soon it turned into a big fire. The boats, the wooden planking of the rooms, furniture, paint and putty on the bulkheads were burning. In large fires, even the wooden decks caught fire. On some Russian ships, measures were taken to remove combustible objects and structures before the battle, which very effectively limited the scope of the fires that occurred.

There were no such huge fires as in Tsushima in previous battles with the Japanese for the reason that the enemy, thanks to the concentration of fire from a large number of ships and a reduction in the distance, reached an unprecedented intensity of hits, primarily with medium-caliber shells. About 30 fires were noted on the Orel alone. This version is also confirmed by the fact that in Tsushima, huge and numerous fires raged only on ships that came under intense fire. They simply did not have time to put out fires in a timely manner.

Another very important factor in the Tsushima fires was the red-hot fragments of Japanese shells, on which, due to incomplete rupture, shimosa often burned out with a bright yellow flame. That is why the English shells, which gave a complete break, did not create fires during the tests.

Conclusions


The Russian and Japanese shells used in Tsushima were very different.

The Japanese high-explosive shell had no Russian counterparts. It had a very powerful high-explosive and incendiary effect. A large number of predominantly small fragments were formed, which scattered widely forward and to the sides. Due to the high sensitivity of the shimosa, the projectile burst at the slightest contact with an obstacle. This had its pros and cons. The advantages are that large and difficult-to-eliminate destruction of the unarmored side was carried out, a very powerful fragmentation effect on the crew, instruments and mechanisms was provided. The disadvantages are that most of the explosion energy remained outside the ship, the interior of the ship remained intact. The Japanese land mine could do almost nothing to the armor.

The principle of action of the Japanese armor-piercing projectile approximately corresponded to the semi-armor-piercing projectile ("common"), but was capable of penetrating armor only in exceptional cases. Yielding in power to a high-explosive projectile of the same caliber, it compensated for this disadvantage with the ability to hit the interior of the ship due to a later rupture and more powerful fragmentation.

The Russian high-explosive projectile, equipped with an ordinary tube, roughly corresponded to a semi-armor-piercing projectile ("common"), but, unlike Japanese projectiles, it was capable of penetrating armor, breaking apart as it passed. The fragmentation action was powerful, but directed along the trajectory of the projectile. The high-explosive effect was not much weaker than that of the Japanese shell.

The Russian high-explosive projectile, equipped with a delayed-action tube, rather corresponded to an armor-piercing projectile. He was able to pierce through armor and burst behind it.

The Russian armor-piercing projectile was fully consistent with its purpose, but at Tsushima combat distances, its energy was not enough to penetrate the vital parts of the ship. The Japanese did not have similar shells.

In my opinion, one of the objective indicators of the effectiveness of shells is the number of victims (killed and wounded). On Japanese ships of the combat line, there are 128 people for 449 hits. On "Eagle" for 76 hits - 128 people. Thus, on average, the Russian shell knocked out 3,5 sailors, and the Japanese one - 1,7.

Comparing the impact of Russian and Japanese shells, the following can be noted. The Russians had the advantage of being able to penetrate armor and more effectively influencing the crew. Among the Japanese, it is indirectly influencing artillery, means of observation and fire control, as well as the ability to initiate fires. In general, one cannot say that the Russian shells were definitely worse than the Japanese ones. They had effective methods of influencing enemy ships up to sinking (with a sufficient number of hits).

Now we can summarize. Russian shells can hardly be called the cause of the Tsushima defeat. And here the words of the participant in the battle, Lieutenant Roschakovsky, will be very appropriate:

Much now write that the outcome of the battle depended on the poor quality of our shells ... I express my deep conviction that the only reason for our defeat was a general and complete inability to shoot. Before touching on the issue of more or less perfect shells, you need to learn how to hit them.
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  1. +8
    9 October 2020 07: 01
    Eh, a good series, it's a pity that it ended quickly!
    I will repeat the question, to which I have not received an answer from anyone.
    I heard on the radio (voices of the enemy, 90s) that on our ships the aiming strips did not match the ballistics of the new armor-piercing shells, and those, accordingly, gave undershoots. Has anyone heard anything on this topic?
    There were indeed much fewer hits. Of course, lack of training, lack of shooting, tactical mistakes. But maybe there was also a factor of incorrect sights?
    1. +5
      9 October 2020 09: 43
      The series of articles lists, in one form or another, all hits on Japanese ships that can be attributed to caliber 8 "and above. If you look closely at the places of their hits, it turns out that the percentage of hits on decks, superstructures, pipes, masts on background of the projection of the ship ... In general, these are almost flights ...
      And it is precisely in flights that the bursts of ours were not seen!
      The British observers and Abo (senior art officer of Mikasa) complained very much about the splashes from our shells. And this somehow does not fit with what our sailors wrote in the testimony. Again, flights can explain this situation.
  2. +6
    9 October 2020 08: 24
    In general, one cannot say that the Russian shells were definitely worse than the Japanese ones.

    Strange :)) The whole cycle testifies to the opposite, and suddenly - on you :))))
    1. +6
      9 October 2020 09: 46
      Andrei, good afternoon!
      I wrote in the article what was the superiority of our shells, and what - the Japanese.
      And please note that the HE shell did not become the main one anywhere. And our land mine in 1911 was in fact a common, capable of penetrating medium armor, but at the same time with a huge amount of explosives.
      1. +9
        9 October 2020 10: 57
        Quote: rytik32
        I wrote in the article what was the superiority of our shells, and what - the Japanese.

        Dear Alexey! The statistical database you have cited is beyond praise. But at the same time, even from your description it clearly follows that:
        The Russian armor-piercing projectile was fully consistent with its purpose, however, at Tsushima combat ranges, its energy was not enough to penetrate the vital parts of the ship

        That is, you quite correctly point out the inability of the Russian armor-piercing to inflict decisive damage to Japanese ships. You write about high-explosive
        The Russian high-explosive projectile, equipped with a delayed-action tube, rather corresponded to an armor-piercing projectile.

        That is, the above fully applies to our land mines.
        Accordingly, the
        The Russians had the advantage of being able to penetrate armor

        is negligible - so what if the armor is pierced if vital parts of the ship have not suffered as a result?
        As a result, only one advantage remains
        The Russians had the advantage ... ... and more effective impact on the crew.

        However, first of all, it is very difficult to agree with your conclusion. You write
        Thus, on average, the Russian shell knocked out 3,5 sailors, and the Japanese one - 1,7.

        So - I highly doubt that both "Alexander III" and "Borodino" were hit by 481 Japanese shells each. And they died with almost the entire crew due to artillery fire (or from reasons caused by the impact of artillery). About the less protected Russian ships, I generally keep quiet. That is, the statistics based on the "Eagle" alone is not correct.
        But even if we agree with your conclusion about the superiority of the Russian shell in killing crews, we see that this property did not lead to a serious decrease in the combat capability of Japanese ships.
        Rђ RІRѕS,
        Among the Japanese, it is indirectly influencing artillery, means of observation and fire control, as well as the ability to initiate fires.

        It even led us to see a sharp decrease in the accuracy of Russian shooting about an hour after the start of the battle.
        Quote: rytik32
        And please note that the HE shell did not become the main one anywhere.

        At the same time, Tsushima knocked the true Great Britain astray - full-fledged armor-piercing appeared only after Jutland. And not a single power in the world subsequently went into super-lightning of armor-piercing shells, as we did.
        1. +4
          9 October 2020 14: 44
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          is negligible - so what if the armor is pierced if vital parts of the ship have not suffered as a result?

          I disagree. On very rare occasions, Japanese shells pierced the armor of our ships, but the ships sank. Our shells, for example, turned the Asama's stern into a sieve. "Asama" sank by 1.5 meters and on May 15 did not have time either to Nebogatov or Donskoy. "Iwate" gulped water from two shells: 6 "and 8" (did not explode). And if there were more such hits? The Japanese would drown!

          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          So - I highly doubt that 481 Japanese shells hit each of "Alexander III" and "Borodino". And they died with almost the entire crew due to artillery fire (or from reasons caused by the impact of artillery).

          And if ours had not been prevented from rescuing sailors from "Alexander" and "Borodino", this would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Japanese shells? :)

          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          did not lead to a serious decrease in the combat effectiveness of Japanese ships.

          But flooding on Japanese ships forced them out of order.

          And the question is: would the "Eagle" have drowned if it had been hit not by Japanese, but by Russian shells? Looking at the diagram from Arseniy Danilov's article, I would answer "yes".
          1. +4
            9 October 2020 18: 59
            Quote: rytik32
            And the question is: would the "Eagle" have drowned if it had been hit not by Japanese, but by Russian shells?

            Well, as if quite a lot of Russian shells got into "Mikasu" and he was not going to sink ...
            1. +5
              9 October 2020 21: 57

              Pay attention, noticeably more shells hit above the upper deck than below it.
              There are only three hits near the waterline.
              1. +4
                10 October 2020 22: 11
                A little bit to develop the topic "why Mikasa was not going to drown in Tsushima":
                1. Very few hits with large projectiles. Only 6 305 mm shells. Well, a few more in question
                2. No hits in the extremities. And these are the most vulnerable spots from the point of view of "drinking water". In the middle, everything is booked.
                3. Most of the hits are too high. Almost flights. And from damage to superstructures or pipes, the ship will not sink.
                1. 0
                  28 December 2021 14: 17
                  The conclusion about the approximate equality (on average) of the shells of both the Russians and the Japanese does not in any way solve the problem of inflicting "damage from which it will not drown." 6 305mm shells in this case, taking into account also the Yap firing method (1 rangefinder, then zeroing in and holding the target) is nothing, but even 6 land mines that demolished rangefinders, with constant reference to them when firing Russian ships, practically = disarming.

                  Therefore, the presumptive advantages of Russian shells and the potential impossibility of Japanese landmines to penetrate the side below the waterline had little effect on the course of the battle. In other words, it was the high explosiveness of the Japanese shells that decided the matter (violation of the consistency and accuracy of the firing of Russian ships, even if it was), while during a duel it was on armor-piercing ones that the fact that the BRK were still not battleships with their caliber would have surfaced, and then that 1 squad could (possibly) endure equal hits with AP shells better than Togo's battleships.

                  As for Roschakovsky's phrase, it is not entirely correct to compare shooting in such different conditions both in terms of the organization of fire and in terms of impact. Equal conditions were in the outset of the battle, when both sides had no damage, IMHO. And there the accuracy was not catastrophically bad.
                  1. 0
                    28 December 2021 23: 18
                    it was the high explosiveness of the Japanese shells that decided the matter (violation of the consistency and accuracy of the firing of Russian ships, even if it was)

                    Not at all. Let me draw a parallel. A modern T-72 tank is on the attack. The defenders have AGS. They release the entire box into the tank: they demolish sights, observation devices, communications. In general, the tank is blind.
                    Can we conclude from this that the AGS is stronger than the 125-mm cannon because of its "high explosiveness"?
                    Now back to Tsushima. Why is your version not correct.
                    1. Very good accuracy must also be applied to "fuasnost". Otherwise, watch the fight in WM, where the Japanese did not drown anyone and did not even suppress. Or see Jutland, where the British relied on land mines and realized that they were wrong. Armor-piercing shells were much more effective. In other words, in order for the "high explosiveness" to be played, it is necessary to shoot shells like from AGS.
                    2. The accuracy of the Japanese in the first phase of the battle was fantastic. By 14:00 "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov" had already received 6 12-inch shells.
                    Equal conditions were in the outset of the battle, when both sides had no damage, IMHO. And there the accuracy was not catastrophically bad.

                    That was just the same was bad. They closed Mikasa with a wall of splashes and no result. A more wicked use of artillery could not be imagined.
                    Mikasa received only 3 12-inch rounds in the outset of the battle - this is a complete failure. Compare with what the Japanese threw in, I wrote above.
                    Those. the reason for the defeat is the huge difference in shooting accuracy. The Japanese have significantly improved their performance compared to the FM. And we only made it worse. And the reason is in the shooting technique, or rather in its absence. What Rozhestvensky worked out with Bersenev could not work in any way. Even in theory. Therefore, Rozhdestvensky himself immediately violated all his instructions:
                    1. Didn't finish zeroing, switched to fugitive.
                    2. Did not transfer the distance to other ships.
                    3. He ordered everyone to shoot themselves.
                    1. 0
                      29 December 2021 02: 26
                      Can we conclude from this that the AGS is stronger than the 125-mm cannon because of its "high explosiveness"?

                      In this situation, yes. What is stronger than a bow or a sword? Depends on the situation. If their task is to play for time or hide, then they have successfully solved it.

                      Very good accuracy must also be applied to "fuasnost". Otherwise, watch the fight in WM, where the Japanese did not drown anyone and did not even suppress.

                      Undoubtedly, shooting past, there will be no result. All other things being equal, the comparison is made. All other things being equal, the armor-piercing of the Japanese could have a WEAK effect on the firepower of the Borodino people. Yes, maybe a couple of holes in the waterline were theirs, but the return fire could be more accurate, and the exchange would not be dry. Formally, drowning one or two battleships of Togo at the cost of 1-2 Borodinians (and shooting at Mikasa was not entirely a failure in the outset) would have been enough for the further battle to be an exhausting party, i.e. armor-piercing with the Japanese BRK against the 2nd squad was not the ultimate suppression weapon.
                      In other words, the armor-piercing ones left the Russians a chance to conduct effective fire at the cost of damaging the armor belts. High-explosive this chance was reduced to zero.

                      2. The accuracy of the Japanese in the first phase of the battle was fantastic. By 14:00 "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov" had already received 6 12-inch shells.

                      The question is, what damage would Suvorov suffer if these 6 shells were armor-piercing (and even if the smaller calibers were armor-piercing).

                      Mikasa "got only 3 12-inch shells in the outset of the fight - this is a complete failure. Compare with what the Japanese threw, I wrote above.

                      I saw a plate with 5. But it doesn't matter. The duel on armor-piercing, given the armor of Borodino, left chances for improving accuracy. High-explosive rainfall - no.

                      The Japanese have significantly improved their performance compared to WM. And we only made it worse.

                      Andrey and Ch. Thinks differently. I believe that the Japanese prudently did not give a final understanding of this issue.

                      I do not think that we were shooting super, I note that there were very few opportunities to prove ourselves. But from your analysis it follows that the Russians quite possibly had enough to put a pair of 12 armor-piercing ones successfully in order to finish the cellars or the machine, but the Japanese had less chances against the Borodino people on the armor-piercing ones.
                      1. 0
                        29 December 2021 15: 52
                        All other things being equal, the armor-piercing of the Japanese could have a WEAK effect on the firepower of the Borodinians

                        I totally agree.
                        The Japanese had fuses and explosives that were not at all suitable for BB shells.
                        Andrey and Ch. Thinks differently. I believe that the Japanese prudently did not give a final understanding of this issue.

                        This is the opinion of the AiCh. I have something else. He completely incorrectly compares "head-on", not paying attention to:
                        1) different distances;
                        2) various material support (sights, rangefinders, fire control devices);
                        3) varying degrees of fatigue and impact
                        Meanwhile, 1TOE managed to get into those conditions in which 2TOE could not do anything: without rangefinders, without zeroing from the SC, without fire control devices.
                        This is skill.
                      2. +1
                        29 December 2021 20: 59
                        Meanwhile, 1TOE managed to get into those conditions in which 2TOE
                        ceased to be from the moment a barrage of high-explosive shells hit the ships.

                        We all know Semenov's quote "it was not the same at all."

                        Hits at decent distances without rangefinders, without zeroing, without control devices (and I remember that even without optical sights) is not a skill. This is lucky. Especially considering that exercises at real combat distances were not carried out in order to appeal to the mythical gunner "Azmaz's eye always puts a projectile on 40 cables clearly without zeroing and corrections."

                        The Japanese had fuses and explosives that were not at all suitable for BB shells.

                        Well, and the consequence - instead of a dubious duel on armor-piercing (and after all, Togo did not know the real level of training in 2TOE) with 4 decent battleships + a bunch of extras that could easily end and criticized hits for the battleships (and even more so BrK) of the Japanese, an exciting game came out "kick the half-blind".
                        Reproaches to Rozhdestvensky in the absence of squadron control and "formation of plans" are certainly not out of the blue. But to be honest, in the conditions of such a beating of the flagship, it is rather ridiculous to discuss any controls or tactical plans.

                        Togo consciously focused on powerful land mines or not - I do not know, and I have never seen information about this anywhere. But the fact that this choice of VKUPE with everything else is one of the most important factors seems obvious to me.

                        In our epistle, we “would have done differently” many things. But one thing is clear - the battle did not go at all as one would expect from experience before. It was about this that the ZPR was trying to say apparently in the testimony - he hoped that we would wave, lose several ships, drown a couple of others, at night we will pass the strait and bring the remains to V.
                        Therefore, I did not plan anything, I counted on, maybe, in fact, to give some local control centers. And what kind of control center is there, when the ZPR itself can be considered a miracle they removed the wounded, there was nothing to give the control center.
                      3. -1
                        30 December 2021 00: 44
                        We all know Semenov's quote "it was not the same at all."

                        And we all know how many shells hit "Diana" laughing
                        it is not a skill. It's lucky

                        Your argument is not serious.
                        If we were lucky, then 6-inch shells would hit the Japanese en masse. But no, there were almost no 6-inch hits ...
                        So that's exactly the skill!
                        Especially considering that no exercises were carried out at real combat distances.

                        But I already had combat experience of long-range shooting.
                        So again, the argument is past.
                        in the face of such a beating of the flagship

                        He set himself up for this beating.
                      4. +1
                        30 December 2021 14: 05
                        1) And this is the difference between conducting a battle in conditions of a small number of hits and a large one.
                        2) I do not undertake to compare the qualifications of the 6dm and 12dm servants, as well as their ballistic qualities.
                        Mastery is> X% hits. In these realities, for example, 10% would be an unequivocal evidence that at such distances it is POSSIBLE to conduct confident fire without rangefinders and centralized shooting.

                        in battle on January 27, 1904, the Japanese achieved:

                        For 305 shells, 10,13%;

                        For shells caliber 152-203-mm - 1,95%.

                        Russian
                        for large-caliber shells (254-305 mm) - 9,23%;

                        For medium-caliber projectiles (152-203 mm) - 1,27%

                        In the yellow sea, the distances have grown.
                        Japanese
                        For shells caliber 254-305-mm - 10,22%;

                        For shells, caliber 152-203-mm - 1,78%.

                        Russian
                        For shells caliber 254-305-mm - 2,82%;

                        For shells, caliber 152-mm - 0,64%.

                        Craftsmanship? I do not think.

                        He set himself up for this beating.

                        Taking to lead 2 TOE)
                      5. +3
                        30 December 2021 15: 49
                        1) And this is the difference between conducting a battle in conditions of a small number of hits and a large one.

                        Now let's compare. In the second phase of the battle in the ZhM, the Japanese "smeared" fire on all the Russian battleships: they all got it.
                        In the 1st phase of Tsushima, the Japanese focused their fire first on Oslyab and Suvorov, then only on Alexander and Borodino.
                        And now the question. And why did the rest of the non-fired at this time not stuffed the Japanese? Why Mikasa got even more damage in JM than in Tsushima. And yes, in Tsushima the Russians had twice as many ships in the line of battle.
                        Here is the answer to the question of who shot better.
                        Those. 1TOE could hit under fire, but 2TOE could not even without exposure.
                      6. +1
                        30 December 2021 18: 44
                        And somehow by 15-10 the EAGLE had already lost centralized control
                        and more
                        One 12-inch is completely disabled. gun, another has a limited range of 30 kbt (in addition, according to other sources, after being damaged, this gun could not fire for about 20 minutes, which is also significant). One six-inch tower is completely disabled, another has a limited firing sector (it could not shoot from the traverse to the stern). Also disabled three 75-mm guns.

                        Hmm. Was this 3TOE shooting at its own people?

                        Did I answer your question? I can't even imagine how quickly Suvorov, Alexander and Oslyabya lost the centralized shooting control. Possibly in the first 30 minutes of contact.
                      7. -1
                        30 December 2021 20: 48
                        Quote: d_averk
                        Did I answer your question?

                        Of course they answered:
                        "Eagle" waited more than an hour until the turn came to him and the central artillery command was put out of action. And before that, he regularly sent shells into the sea, without even observing the results of the firing.
                        This is the difference with 1TOE: there were no fountains raised in the sea, I got into the Japanese even without rangefinders and centralized control.
                        I can't even imagine how quickly Suvorov, Alexander and Oslyabya lost the centralized shooting control. Possibly in the first 30 minutes of contact.

                        Let Suvorov and Oslyabi have 15 minutes each. Alexander has 30 minutes. During this time, it was possible to break the Japanese, but ... crap with shooting (((
                      8. +1
                        3 January 2022 21: 50
                        "Eagle" waited more than an hour until the turn came to him and the central artillery command was put out of action. And before that, he regularly sent shells into the sea, without even observing the results of the firing.

                        Wait, this is unscientific. You assume that the Eagle received all his damage within a few minutes "after the end of the hour."
                        But think about it, if this is really so, then
                        у
                        Let Suvorov and Oslyabi have 15 minutes each. Alexander has 30 minutes.

                        - these were not even 15 minutes and 30 minutes. As far as I understood, the Japanese did not concentrate their fire exclusively on the flagship, they fired at it whenever possible, which is why they simultaneously dismantled both Suvorov and Oslyabya. I see no reason why some of the shells were not directed at Alexander, Borodino, Oryol.

                        Although I do not contradict you in the main idea - perhaps we could shoot much better. Again, a return to the fact that if the firefight had been on armor-piercing ones, it would be much better to reveal the real training of gunners, both ours and the Japs, because I remind you that high-explosive shells often burst from contact with rails and other persimmons. And they did their bit. But the armor-piercing could not count, for example, simply by piercing a thin barrier without detonation. Accordingly, the combat effectiveness and accuracy of the Japanese would have fallen.

                        Nevertheless, in the outset of the battle, there were hits on the ships of the Japanese, and in particular Mikasa. And then they began to decline.
                      9. 0
                        3 January 2022 22: 21
                        - these were not even 15 minutes and 30 minutes. As far as I understood, the Japanese did not concentrate their fire exclusively on the flagship, they fired at it whenever possible, which is why they simultaneously dismantled both Suvorov and Oslyabya

                        Then it is useless to argue with you.
                        For a start, check out the information about which Japanese ships were fired at. And just with the Japanese shooting technique.
                      10. 0
                        3 January 2022 22: 28
                        In the writings of your Vis-a-vis - Kolobov, approximately everything is formulated.

                        The battleship "Eagle" during the battle received from 60 to 76 hits by shells of different calibers. Unfortunately, I do not know the time of hits of this or that shell, but it is obvious that not all of them hit the ship in the first hour of the battle. It is not a mistake to assume that the total number of hits in the Eagle at a given time (i.e. from about 14.05 to 15.10when opponents lost sight of each other for the first time) some or even significantly less than the 40 shells that Togo's flagship Mikasa received in the entire battle.


                        Of the five newest battleships, Oslyabya died in the first hour of the battle, Suvorov failed, and the Eagle lost its centralized fire control. It is quite acceptable to assume that the injured Alexander III also lost its centralized fire control, but then ... then it turns out that of the five modern battleships with which the Russian squadron started the battle, full-fledged fire control remained only on one battleship Borodino ! And that is not a fact ...


                        And there was one more material, with a discussion that our ships were beating in the whole squadron at the target chosen by the flachman (or even the entire squadron), but the Japanese had an individual choice of target "if possible"
                      11. 0
                        3 January 2022 23: 40
                        In the writings of your Vis-a-vis - Kolobov, this is approximately how everything is formulated

                        Kolobov did not read the combat reports of the commanders of the Japanese ships.
                        Therefore, I advise you to first familiarize yourself with at least
                        https://sidorenko-vl.livejournal.com/37363.html
                        V. Sidorenko knows Japanese very well, if that
                        or https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/47557.html
                      12. 0
                        4 January 2022 13: 37
                        thanks, I started to study. But already there are some miracles, by the time most of the Japanese ships stopped firing at Oslyab, literally with a delta of 150-20 minutes, the Oryol was literally shot to smithereens (especially if we consider that the final firing at Oslyab first of all transferred fire to Suvorov ). Or consider that those 3 ships that did not fire on Oslyab completely mutilated Suvorov, Alexander and Borodino at once.
                        Those. given the low rate of fire (in terms of shell consumption) of the Japanese, either the shells had a super destructive force (which you disagree against), or almost 100% hits on important points of the ships.
                        The situation is poorly comprehended, the graphs only complicated it.
                        It turns out to make a ship of the Borodino type incapacitated with sufficient firepower of literally 3 ships within 15 minutes.
                      13. 0
                        4 January 2022 14: 15
                        I know more than what is written in the links.
                        From the very beginning, Mikasa and Asahi were shooting at Suvorov. A little more Azuma, but quickly switched to Oslyabya. "Mikasa" and "Asahi" fired at "Suvorov" almost until it was out of order, until it was shrouded in smoke and it became impossible to adjust the fire.
                        Then Kasuga and many who had previously fired at Oslyab suffered the fire.
                        "Fuji" began to shoot at "Alexander", as it transferred fire from "Oslyabi". Those. the huge hole in the nose is his shells.
                        The 3-minute break at Izumo is the transfer of fire to the Eagle.
                        Those who bore the fire from the Oslyabi began to shoot at the battleships of the 1st detachment. In combat reports, the target is often indistinct, for example, "a ship of the Borodino type".
                        literally with a delta of 150-20 minutes, the Eagle was literally shot to smithereens

                        The Japanese shot so well
                        or the shells were super destructive

                        No, here is one of the reports about Japanese shells

                        And they did not change during the war according to the FID
                        or almost 100% hits on important points of ships

                        It is unlikely. But the accuracy of the fire was great
                        Here is the translation of the record of the database "Mikasy" 2:40 (yap)
                        Distance 5700 m, our bow and stern 12 "guns and 6" guns, each shot almost did not miss. The target was shrouded in smoke from the explosions, making it impossible to observe [her]. Because of this, at the same hour, 41 minutes. the artillery fire has ceased, we are waiting
                      14. 0
                        4 January 2022 13: 40
                        at the same time, to nail down the "semi-battleship" Oslyaby, it took the concentration of fire from 7 ships, some up to 30-40 minutes
                      15. 0
                        4 January 2022 14: 39
                        In general, with all due respect, I see in these materials rather a confirmation of my (Kolobov's?) Theses.

                        1) Togo's ships fired with an individual choice of targets (unlike the Russians, in which either the entire 1 squadron was hitting the same place as Suvorov, or the whole squadron in general). This allowed them to better deal with bursts and zeroing (not to mention the quality of the explosions of their shells when zeroing in)
                        2) Not a single ship of the 1st detachment was in greenhouse conditions for more than an hour.
                        a) Mikasa fired all the time either at Suvorov, or at Alexander or at Borodino
                        b) Fuzdzi, after the first 15 minutes, transferred the fire from Ostanb to someone from Borodino.
                        c) Asahi shot until 14-41 at Suvorov, then at Alexander. 15-14 apparently transferred fire either to Borodino or to Oryol (but by this moment Oryol had already had at least 10 hits)
                        d) Kassuga, after the first 20 minutes, hit someone from Borodintsy.
                        e) Izumo generally endured the fire constantly (or stopped).
                        f) Tokiwa hit Oslyabi for 25 minutes and only from 14-17. The question is, did she shoot before and at whom
                        g) Yakumo hit Oslyabi from 22 minutes to 37 minutes.
                        h) Asama and Iwate did not hit Oslyabi.

                        Accordingly, until I read more detailed layouts for each ship, it turns out that almost all the time any other ships except Oslyabi were under fire from three to 6 ships. At the same time, in the absence of the imperative to "hit the flagship", most likely everyone got it alternately (otherwise the Eagle would not have had so much damage by 15-15).
                        Memoir Kostenko writes

                        Hits on the "Eagle" began shortly after the opening of fire enemy. First many shells lay between the "Eagle" and "Oslyabya", but then the "Oslyabya" began to receive damage in the bow, and the "Eagle" - in the stern. The enemy armored cruisers were firing from 8- and 6-inch guns. ..


                        Accordingly, although this is a lyric, but you can see that the ships of the Japanese shot any ships of the 1st detachment that were convenient for them (not covered with smoke like Suvorov, for example, at some point).

                        Actually, not the best shooting of the Russians was exaggerated by the fact that within literally half an hour the main soldiers were torn apart by high-explosive shells.


                        Fuji, Tsushima

                        14.11 - Oslyabya, 6 200 m


                        14.14 - a 12-inch shell hit the Oslyabya, distance 5 m

                        14.15 - "Oslyabya", 5 m

                        14.18 - "Oslyabya", 4 m

                        14.21 - the second ship (of the "Borodino" type), 5 m

                        14.38 - second ship, 4 600 m

                        14.40 - first ship, 4 700 m

                        14.42 - second ship, 5 400 m

                        14.52 - 5 200 m

                        15.10 - the third ship of the "Borodino" type, 3 m

                        It can be seen that the fire was constantly endured, I see no reason why other ships of Togo did not act this way, moreover, in discord.

                        Again, they would have fired with armor-piercing - perhaps the number of hits on our ships would have been less (only accurate hits in the body would have worked, and not by "flying over the boat"), and our ships would have fired at least a little more targeted fire, and given the concentration on Mikasa, they had a chance to inflict damage on him as well, if not better than in the Yellow Sea. Thus, we would have exchanged Oslyabya (which apparently would have finished off anyway) for Mikasa, which is not so bad for starting a battle. Well, this is already so, galimous alternative)
                      16. 0
                        4 January 2022 15: 26
                        1)
                        right
                        2) Not a single ship of the 1st detachment was in greenhouse conditions for more than an hour

                        Why an hour? according to Rozhestvensky's instructions, 3-4 shots were fired for zeroing. What were our gunners doing the rest of the time? The answer to this question is the main reason for Tsushima.
                        f) Tokiwa hit Oslyabi for 25 minutes and only from 14-17. The question is, did she shoot before and at whom

                        https://sidorenko-vl.livejournal.com/38950.html
                        Asama and Iwate didn’t hit Oslyabi

                        Asama beat Navarin.
                        Iwata, first along Suvorov (left side), then along Nikolai, then along Borodino
                        until I read more detailed layouts for each ship

                        In the meantime, draw up a maintenance schedule based on the data you have. Lay out. Then there will be no such delirium.
                        If anything I will correct or add, if there is a mood.
                        Actually, not the best shooting of the Russians was exaggerated by the fact that within literally half an hour the main soldiers were torn apart by high-explosive shells.

                        Stop absolutizing the high-explosive effect. The French fired at Jena and generally abandoned the landmines - the armor-piercing was so much better. Or do you think the French are fools?
                        By the way, they were one of the first to make mines with a picrink, even before the RYAV.
                      17. +1
                        3 January 2022 21: 43
                        And now the question. And why did the rest of the non-fired at this time not stuffed the Japanese?

                        Were they not fired upon, if Eagle lost several guns and centralized fire control after an hour? How did it happen if the shooting was concentrated on Surovov?
                        And here we will recall that each ship in Togo was essentially free in the choice of target.

                        So the question is how "no impact".
                    2. 0
                      29 December 2021 21: 25
                      Very good accuracy must also be applied to "fuasnost". Otherwise, watch the fight in WM, where the Japanese did not drown anyone and did not even suppress.

                      And as I understand it, the landmines were torn there differently (according to Semenov). And of course the accuracy has increased among the Japanese.

                      The advantages of high-explosive suppression in the accumulation of damage, for armor-piercing it is highly desirable either the ability to penetrate an armor belt or a lachot, otherwise you can survive dozens of hits. And heavy land mines dozens of hits accumulate in any case a negative effect by fires, loss of l / s, loss of traction in the car and the removal of officers in the case of our "fungi". Of course, then it is not difficult to repair such a ship, but who will give Togo on the spot.

                      Or see Jutland, where the British relied on land mines and realized that they were wrong. Armor-piercing shells turned out to be much more effective


                      This is a different time, different ships, different distances, different systems and principles of fire control (and, I note, ships in the squadron). Well, in principle, another battle with different goals.
                      And I would not say that the German ships from the Hipper group got off easily.

                      And let's dot the i - If Jellicoe had not yawned and received a telegram from the headquarters about the zeppellins, and intercepted HochseeFlotte from Horns Reef, it wouldn’t matter whether it was high explosive or not. It would be a beating.


                      If Rozhdestvensky could behave similarly to Scheer, and after the clash of the cruising forces, simply try to go back, and not wave the main forces - Tsushima in its historical form would not exist.
                      1. +1
                        30 December 2021 00: 52
                        And as I understand it, the landmines were torn there differently (according to Semenov).

                        No. This is Semyonov invented. The Japanese landmines were the same. There is a Japanese article on this.
                        for armor-piercing it is highly desirable either the ability to penetrate the armor belt

                        So ours did it!
                        And once again, pay attention to the consequences of 1-2 hits in the stern section near the overhead lines at Asama, Iwate and Sikishima.
                        And that's just 1-2 shells !!! And they cannot be called Lakishot.

                        So the Japanese land mines played because they hit a lot. If the Japanese had British landmines, the battle would have ended even earlier. And if there were also Russian armor-piercing guns along with British land mines - in general, in a couple of hours.
                      2. +1
                        30 December 2021 14: 13
                        They played because their hits made it almost impossible to aim firing with the very dangerous armor-piercing Russians.
                        What the whole speech is about - accurate fire with Japanese armor-piercing would not prevent us from stuffing the Japanese ships "at the waterline". But accurate fire with land mines almost immediately disarmed.
                        And along the way, he solved the second problem - if, contrary to expectations, he did not drown until nightfall, then take out the anti-mine artillery and sink the destroyers at night.
        2. +4
          9 October 2020 14: 55
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          At the same time, Tsushima led Britain astray.

          Let's just look at the composition of the ammunition (on the barrel), for example, "Invincible" before PMA:
          Armor-piercing 24
          semi-armor-piercing 40
          land mines 16
          And compare with Mikasa in Tsushima:
          Armor-piercing 30
          land mines 80
          1. +7
            9 October 2020 15: 51
            Quote: rytik32
            Let's just look at the composition of the ammunition (on the barrel), for example, "Invincible" before PMA:

            Exactly
            Quote: rytik32
            Armor-piercing 24

            And those are of disgusting quality (black powder)
            Quote: rytik32
            semi-armor-piercing 40
            land mines 16

            both those and others - with fuses of almost instant action. Only the EMNIP in semi-armor-piercing ones was it tuned so as to explode when overcoming armor, that is, there was still some minimal slowdown
            Quote: rytik32
            And if there were more such hits? The Japanese would drown!

            Which ones? :)))) Here you write
            Quote: rytik32
            "Iwate" gulped water from two shells: 6 "and 8" (did not explode).

            In this case, one of the recommended shells
            The 8 ”(6” according to Sasebo's experts) exploded when hitting the starboard side at the level of the lower deck in the bow of the ship, creating a hole 23x41 cm through which water penetrated to the lower deck.

            Let's imagine that a Japanese projectile got there, making a hole up to 2 square meters. I think the effect would be much more interesting.
            Quote: rytik32
            And if ours had not been prevented from rescuing sailors from "Alexander" and "Borodino", this would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Japanese shells? :)

            there were few survivors on Alexander anyway, and the same applies to Borodino.
            Quote: rytik32
            And the question is: would the "Eagle" have drowned if it had been hit not by Japanese, but by Russian shells? Looking at the diagram from Arseniy Danilov's article, I would answer "yes".

            My answer is just the opposite.
            Yes ... it looks like it's time for me to take up the pen now :))))))))))))
            1. +7
              9 October 2020 16: 10
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Let's imagine that a Japanese projectile got there, making a hole up to 2 square meters.

              Russian 12 "made the deck gap 4,3 x 3,4 meters.
              Could a Japanese shell make such a gap?
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              but ... it looks like it's time for me to take up the pen now :))))))))))))

              Great idea!
            2. +4
              9 October 2020 17: 13
              My answer is just the opposite.
              Yes ... it looks like it's time for me to take up the pen now :))))))))))))

              Well, Andrey, it will be interesting to read your analysis. We are waiting hi
              And thank you very much to Alexey for the work. The scale of work with sources is impressive.
              It was damn exciting. good
              1. +8
                9 October 2020 22: 06
                The work is simply magnificent, there is not even a conversation here. Yes, I have different conclusions, but this does not negate the enormous work of respected Alexei. Even if he did not draw any conclusions at all, such a systematization deserves the highest praise.
            3. +1
              11 October 2020 19: 57
              Yes ... it looks like it's time for me to take up the pen now :)))))

              Greetings SW. Andrew. Yes, it's time ...))) Just do not consider (as uv. Alexey) only large calibers. Yes, I know your thesis that only they are effective ... this is generally true, but Tsushima is an exception, for many reasons and in many ways ...
              1. +3
                11 October 2020 22: 10
                I would love to look at medium calibers, but there is little data on them. Mostly special cases are described.
            4. +1
              16 October 2020 21: 55
              Oh-oh-oh, we look forward to! hi
        3. +3
          10 October 2020 08: 13
          Andrey, what super-lightweight of armored shells are you writing about?
          The Russian 12 "projectile weighed 331 kg, and the Japanese (actually English) 385 kg.
          The French 12 "shell had a mass of 349 kg.
          The German 15 "caliber projectile weighed 760 kg, and the English one of the same caliber - 885 kg.
          In WWII the situation was repeated: German 15 "- 800 kg, and English 14" - 720 kg.
          The Germans had enough.
          1. +7
            10 October 2020 11: 10
            Quote: ignoto
            The Russian 12 "projectile weighed 331 kg, and the Japanese (actually English) 385 kg.

            Exactly. That is, the Russian shell was 14% lighter than the British one.
            Quote: ignoto
            The French 12 "shell had a mass of 349 kg.

            Dotsushima. But after Tsushima for the 305-mm guns of the Dantons and Kurba, 428-435 kg shells arr 1906 were created.The Germans used 405 kg shells, we - 471 kg
            Quote: ignoto
            The German 15 "caliber projectile weighed 760 kg, and the English one of the same caliber - 885 kg.

            Right. But the German 380-mm projectile had the same mass-to-cubes ratio as the 305-mm.
            That is, yes, the German 380-mm cannon was built on the principle of "light projectile - high muzzle velocity", but at the same time its projectile was much less lightweight than the Russian 331,7 kg (corresponding to 405-kg for a 305-mm cannon)
  3. +2
    9 October 2020 10: 51
    It had a very powerful high-explosive and incendiary effect. A large number of predominantly small fragments were formed, which scattered widely forward and to the sides.


    In the photo, a high-explosive shell hit the tube of the "Thunderbolt" cruiser and, as we can see, some of the fragments are large.
    1. +3
      9 October 2020 12: 12
      I will assume that these are fragments of an armor-piercing shell.
      In the description of 8 "damage to" Aurora ", the photo of which I gave in the article, it is written that some of the fragments even pierced the opposite side, ie they were large and high-speed.
      1. +1
        9 October 2020 12: 55
        Quote: rytik32
        I will assume that these are fragments of an armor-piercing shell.


        It can be assumed that this is the hit of a "semi-armor-piercing" projectile. Such shells were put into service in England, in my opinion in 1901, as the British wrote, it is "designed to penetrate thin armor." But I don't know whether such shells were delivered to Japan or not.
  4. 0
    9 October 2020 11: 13
    I will add a little bit of alternative, only real. No shells from the future.
    Based on the experience of battles in the ZhM and the Korean Strait, it was possible to draw conclusions about the upcoming battle distance. And to understand that it is unlikely that you will have to use armor-piercing shells. Moreover, 152-mm, which could not pierce anything. Those. for 203-mm guns and larger, leave somewhere around 20% of armor-piercing shells, and the rest - land mines with a Baranovsky pipe and smokeless powder. For 152-mm - abandon armor-piercing altogether. Leave only landmines with Brink and pyroxylin (20%) for close range, the rest - re-equip the landmines with Baranovsky and smokeless powder. Well, you can take a little cast iron, especially since there were a large number of them - for zeroing and secondary purposes. Segment projectiles - remove. It was already clear that they were ineffective.
    1. 0
      9 October 2020 11: 40
      Or maybe all the same it was necessary, on the contrary, to converge at a dagger range of fire, where BB are most effective?
      1. +5
        9 October 2020 12: 00
        To do this, you need to have a speed advantage.
        1. -2
          9 October 2020 12: 15
          Not always, you can catch it with a maneuver. There were incidents ... And again, management comes to the fore ... And as for 2TOE, its complete absence
        2. -2
          10 October 2020 08: 24
          The Japanese had no technical superiority in speed.
          The first detachment was slowed down by the Fuji, which could not go more than 15 knots.
          And, taking into account the operational fuel overload, more than 14 knots. Best case scenario.
          The second squad was slowed down by "Azuma", with completely identical speed characteristics.
          At the same time, with proper preparation for battle (unloading from part of the construction overload, cleaning the underwater part), battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabya type would have a similar speed.
          1. +2
            11 October 2020 12: 26
            Quote: ignoto
            battleships of the "Borodino" and "Oslyabya" type would have a similar speed.

            Even if everything is so (which is not a fact) it is five against twelve ...
            1. 0
              11 October 2020 18: 51
              Ivan, you are losing time to answer Nikolay (... unloading from part building overload)))? Oh well...
              1. +3
                11 October 2020 19: 42
                What to do, man is weak request
            2. 0
              11 October 2020 21: 36
              Quote: Senior Sailor
              Even if everything is so (which is not a fact) it is five against twelve ...

              Better all the same four. I wouldn’t dare to shove Oslyaby into close combat. But Borodino, for dagger fire point-blank, are best adapted. And given their excellent firing angles, it would be very difficult for Togo to parry such attacks.

              Well, even five against twelve is much better than twelve against one, which was in the real battle at Tsushima.
          2. 0
            12 October 2020 14: 50
            At the same time, with proper preparation for battle (unloading from part of the construction overload, cleaning the underwater part), battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabya type would have a similar speed.

            I read that the bottom of the sinking ships in the Tsushima battle was oddly not overgrown with shells! And this is after crossing the tropics.
            1. 0
              13 October 2020 23: 31
              Right! And even the Japanese were then interested in what we cover the bottom.
              1. 0
                14 October 2020 22: 09
                In general, they were cleaned with cables during the campaign. I remember from Pearl it seems that he refused to clean so as not to damage the patented anti-fouling coating.
      2. +3
        9 October 2020 12: 26
        Quote: Nehist
        Or maybe all the same it was necessary, on the contrary, to converge at a dagger range of fire, where BB are most effective?


        With no speed advantage? How is it ...
        1. +2
          9 October 2020 22: 21
          Speaking of speed.
          I recently read a book by Taube. Very interesting data in places.

          It turns out that Rozhestvensky himself understood that the squadron could go 12 knots.
          1. +1
            11 October 2020 20: 19
            Quote: rytik32
            It turns out that Rozhestvensky himself understood that the squadron could go 12 knots

            Alas, this does not follow from the quoted passage. The order to the ships "get ready to have 12 knots" does not mean the speed of the squadron speed of 12 knots, they are completely different things. As you know, at a squadron speed of 12 knots, ships, in order to stay in formation during evolutions, sometimes need to develop more than 12 knots.
            1. 0
              11 October 2020 20: 50
              And can you tell us in more detail what such evolutions of Rozhdestvensky required an increase in the speed of individual ships of the squadron?
              1. +2
                11 October 2020 21: 50
                Quote: rytik32
                And can you tell us in more detail what such evolutions of Rozhdestvensky required an increase in the speed of individual ships of the squadron?

                It's very simple - in order to maintain a squadron speed of, say, 9 knots, ships belonging to the squadron must be ready to give at least 11 knots
                1. +1
                  11 October 2020 22: 00
                  Let's take a fight in ZhM. At least look at ours, at least at the Japanese - no one kept 2 nodes in reserve. They drowned in full.
                  1. +2
                    12 October 2020 06: 24
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Let's take a fight in ZhM. At least look at ours, at least at the Japanese - no one kept 2 nodes in stock

                    Just - they kept it. The same Japanese usually did not go faster than 15 knots.
                    1. +2
                      12 October 2020 08: 25
                      Someone from the English wrote that Mikasa and Fuji could then hold 15,5 knots for an hour at most.
                      That's why we didn't go faster than 15.
                      1. +2
                        12 October 2020 09: 39
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Someone from the English wrote that Mikasa and Fuji could then hold 15,5 knots for an hour at most.

                        Well, in practice, they calmly walked 15 bonds for long hours :))) This is impossible if the British are right.
                        Alexey, the fact is that during any rebuild, ships need to add a little speed to compensate for the difference in turning radii and a common mistake at the turning point - there are no buoys there, it is determined by eye. If this is not done, then the gaps in the wake formation will stretch, and not all ships will be equally. It's just physics, against which, as they say, "you can't argue." By the way, this mechanism was described by the flagship mechanic 2TOE Obnorsky
                        There were no special practical tests of new ships at full speed while sailing. Usually there was a signal: "The squadron has 10 knots to move." Since 10 knots was considered an economic move. But, in reality, only the lead ship had a smooth course, while the rest of the ships of the squadron had to move up to 12 and up to 15 knots, depending on evolution and various accidents. It was especially difficult when the demand for quick execution was required, and on the following ships, a larger number of boilers had to be kept behind the head. In the 2st detachment of the 2nd squadron, this was still achieved easily, but together with the 12nd detachment, "Navarin" and "Sisoy the Great" had a very difficult time, since they have a parade course of no more than 10 knots, and therefore during the course head in XNUMX knots - they had to have full speed.
                      2. +2
                        12 October 2020 09: 58
                        As for me, Obnorsky is greatly exaggerating (he also indicated 17 knots of full speed for Borodintsev), so I don't think that to maintain 10 knots of the course, you need to have 15 knots, but 12 is still highly desirable :))))
                      3. +1
                        12 October 2020 22: 29
                        About Borodino they write that the condition of their vehicles before the battle was even better than when they left Libava.
                        Andrey, do you really think that the admiral in his order meant the individual speed of the ships? Like ... "Navarin", what's behind you? Come on 10 knots! "" Nikolay, slow down to 8 knots, completely ran into "Nakhimov"!
                      4. +2
                        14 October 2020 07: 19
                        Quote: rytik32
                        About Borodino they write that the condition of their vehicles before the battle was even better than when they left Libava.

                        You understand that this could not be just physically, with the possible exception of Borodino. Well, there can be no better cars after such a transition.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Andrey, do you really think that the admiral in his order meant the individual speed of the ships? Like ... "Navarin", what's behind you? Come on 10 knots! "" Nikolay, slow down to 8 knots, completely ran into "Nakhimov"!

                        No :))) The admiral meant that the ships should have enough boilers under steam to give 12 knots if necessary as soon as it becomes necessary. In this case, a squadron move of 9-10, and maybe 11 knots was provided (I doubt the latter somewhat)
                      5. 0
                        14 October 2020 08: 45
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        You understand that this could not have been simply physically, with the possible exception of Borodino. Well, there can be no better cars after such a transition

                        Why then? The machines have run in! "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" were no less in the Far East, and their cars were in excellent condition. Why should everything be bad for the ships of the 2nd TOE?
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        No :))) The admiral meant that the ships should have enough boilers under steam to give 12 knots if necessary as soon as it becomes necessary. In this case, a squadron move of 9-10, and maybe 11 knots was provided (I doubt the latter somewhat)

                        Here are the orders at the beginning of the battle in the GM:
                        At 12 o'clock. signal: "Have 13 knots to move"
                        Those. "to move" is the speed of the entire squadron, not individual ships.
                      6. +2
                        14 October 2020 09: 56
                        Quote: rytik32
                        "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" were no less in the Far East, and their cars were in excellent condition.

                        Alexey, where does the information come from that their cars were in excellent condition? :))
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Here are the orders at the beginning of the battle in the GM:
                        At 12 o'clock. signal: "Have 13 knots to move"

                        This is a different signal. "Prepare to have a move" and "Have speed" are different commands
                      7. 0
                        14 October 2020 18: 10
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Alexey, where does the information come from that their cars were in excellent condition? :))

                        Are we walking in circles again?
                        I gave in the previous topics the results of the "Tsarevich" on the measured mile in the PA (17 knots at 14 tons of displacement).
                        And Schensnovich's testimony to the commission of inquiry, from which it follows that "Retvizan" with a full supply of coal could give 16-17 knots. Which is very good against the background of barely elongated 18 knots during tests at normal displacement.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        This is a different signal. "Prepare to have a move" and "Have speed" are different commands

                        Where is the other? And there and there "have a move."
                      8. +3
                        15 October 2020 10: 57
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Are we walking in circles again?
                        I gave in the previous topics the results of the "Tsarevich" on the measured mile in the PA (17 knots at 14 tons of displacement).

                        Alexey, I don’t remember your objection. And if I had read it, I would have answered.
                        Firstly, the cast-iron parts of the car broke down on the whole road of the Tsarevich. I don't remember if they were replaced with steel ones
                        Secondly, the Tsarevich showed 17 knots for half an hour. This is not a very serious indication of the quality of the machines.
                        Thirdly, before the tests, the Tsarevich stood for a whole month in Arthur and went through the mechanisms.
                        And Schensnovich's testimony to the commission of inquiry, from which it follows that Retvizan, with a full supply of coal, could give 16-17 knots.

                        EMNIP readings sounded like this
                        In total, about 500 tons of water was poured into the ship. The deepening has increased by 10 dm. and the stroke has decreased by almost one knot. With a full supply of coal prepared for the proposed passage to Vladivostok, the move could be no more than 15-16 knots

                        And this is not the speed of Retvizan after coming to Arthur, but the speed of Retvizan after repairs in Arthur
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Where is the other? And there and there "have a move."

                        "Prepare to have a move" - ​​to be ready to give the specified move if necessary. Requires the ship commander to keep the boilers in a position to produce the necessary steam for the specified move immediately
                        "Have speed" - follow at the specified speed. That is, develop it
                      9. 0
                        14 October 2020 20: 11
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Why then? The machines have run in! "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" were no less in the Far East, and their cars were in excellent condition. Why should everything be bad for the ships of the 2nd TOE?

                        First, they weren't. Secondly, the quality of work at Forges and Chantier and Crump and Sons is still higher than at domestic factories (although far from ideal). Thirdly, no matter how weak were the repair capacities in Port Arthur, they were still an order of magnitude superior to those of VTE.
                      10. +1
                        12 October 2020 22: 25
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Well, in practice, we calmly walked 15 bonds for long hours :))) It's impossible if the British are right

                        In ZhM, just not for long hours, and when it was completely pinned and there was a risk of not catching up with the Russians until dark, Togo ordered to increase the speed to 15 knots. I didn't let Fuji go any faster. Yes, and "Sikishima" broke down before the battle, because of which it even had to drop the squadron speed to 12 knots.
                      11. 0
                        13 October 2020 03: 13
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Someone from the English wrote that Mikasa and Fuji could then hold 15,5 knots for an hour at most.

                        Dear colleague, will it not bother you to indicate who exactly? And if possible, a screenshot from the collection of reports, please.
                      12. +1
                        13 October 2020 08: 44
                        I could not find a fragment on the move, I will look a little later.
                        Until this one came across
                      13. 0
                        13 October 2020 15: 38
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Until this one came across

                        Thanks, but there is no information here that supposedly
                        Quote: rytik32
                        "Mikasa" and "Fuji" could then hold 15,5 knots for an hour maximum

                        "Fuji" goes back and forth, but "Mikasa" ...
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I could not find a fragment on the move, I will look a little later.

                        Will wait.
                      14. +2
                        13 October 2020 18: 37
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Will wait

                        Found that snippet, but I retell it wrong. There Mikasa and Fuji were ready to give 15,5 knots in an hour. I admit my mistake.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Thanks, but there is no information here that supposedly

                        But there is information that a 15-knot squadron move is the maximum that the Japanese could count on, with the speed of individual ships (apparently "Fuji") no more than 16 knots.
                      15. +2
                        14 October 2020 04: 18
                        Quote: rytik32
                        there is information that a 15-knot squadron move is the maximum that the Japanese could count on, with the speed of individual ships (apparently "Fuji") no more than 16 knots.

                        As follows from the attached fragment of the report, 15 knots is the maximum at which together with "Fuji" one could go without fear that this the battleship will pump up.

                        The information on how much the other three battleships could give, I personally did not come across in the collection of reports.
        2. -1
          9 October 2020 22: 21
          Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
          With no speed advantage? How is it ...

          Who told you that, for example, the 2st squad of the 1nd TOE did not have an advantage in speed over the XNUMXst squad of Togo?

          Another thing is that a large unit, since the time of the ancient Greeks, is usually divided into units of ships with similar characteristics and interacting with each other in battle. Well, if you dump everything in a huge and stupid heap, then of course oh .. Alas, of course he did not possess such elementary knowledge of the ZPR.
          1. +3
            10 October 2020 00: 11
            Well, I would not be so categorical. Knew all this Rozhestvensky, here it is necessary to take into account the mentality of the officers of the RIF who, having received an order, as a rule, did not differ in independence. That in the case of ITOE, that with the 1nd, the tasks were not correctly set. Here the squadron commanders tried to implement the task that they were given, each to the best of his knowledge, and it turned out that the VKF as a commander is stronger than the ZPR hi
            1. -5
              10 October 2020 22: 02
              Quote: Nehist
              Well, I would not be so categorical.

              But I insist on this categorical nature! Even with a general, rather weak background of officers of the RI fleet - Rozhdestvensky is the worst of the worst!

              I will repeat myself for the tenth time. Any of the squadron's junior flagships would have fought the Tsushima battle an order of magnitude better than Rozhdestvensky. Not the fact that they would have achieved a convincing victory, but the complete and catastrophic defeat is the result of the "activity" of that very Admiral Rozhestvensky. : (((((
              1. +5
                11 October 2020 10: 34
                Quote: Saxahorse
                Any of the squadron's junior flagships would have fought the Tsushima battle an order of magnitude better than Rozhdestvensky.

                I will correct you. I would not "spend" in reality.
                As soon as "Suvorov" went out of action, our squadron began to demonstrate effective methods of getting out of enemy coverage:
                turn under the tail and divergence on counter courses;
                turning away from the enemy and breaking the distance ...
                1. -2
                  11 October 2020 21: 28
                  Quote: rytik32
                  As soon as "Suvorov" went out of action, our squadron began to demonstrate effective methods of getting out of enemy coverage:

                  So it is, I completely agree! The battleships held out for several hours against 15-20 minutes under the command of Rozhdestvensky. In fact, they owe their death exclusively to overloading, if the commander had taken care of at least bringing the ships to normal displacement before the battle, most likely there would have been a draw like in the Yellow Sea.
      3. +1
        9 October 2020 22: 25
        Quote: Nehist
        Or maybe all the same it was necessary, on the contrary, to converge at a dagger range of fire, where BB are most effective?

        I totally agree with you! The rapprochement does not increase the chances of the Japanese, the landmines are equally torn by 40 and 10 cables, but the rapprochement dramatically increases the chances of the Russians. And the percentage of hits will unwittingly grow, and penetrations will become numerous and dangerous.
        1. +1
          10 October 2020 08: 28
          Moreover, battleships of the "Borodino" type belonged to the so-called "dump" type.
          Ships, the advantage of which, thanks to the tower placement of artillery, is revealed in battle not in a line, but in a dump. But, for this, the command staff must be properly trained.
          1. +1
            11 October 2020 12: 29
            Quote: ignoto
            belonged to the so-called "dump" type.

            What type?
            1. +1
              11 October 2020 19: 10
              ... and Retvizan is an EBR of the "raider" type, the Garibaldians are cruisers of the "battleship" type ... laughing
    2. +4
      9 October 2020 11: 51
      Quote: rytik32
      Those. for 203-mm guns and larger, leave somewhere around 20% of armor-piercing shells, and the rest - land mines with a Baranovsky pipe and smokeless powder.

      The only question is where to get them?
      Colleague, at what point did Aurora get 8 hits?
      Simply, either these are the only hits that can be credited to the 8 "Kassagi" and "Chitose." Or, it is from the Garibaldians who had a shootout with the cruisers of Enquist.
      P.S. The work done is huge and fat + !!!
      1. +2
        9 October 2020 14: 29
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        The only question is where to get them?

        Even with the World Championship of the fleet.
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Colleague, at what point did Aurora get 8 hits?
        Simply, either these are the only hits that can be credited to the 8 "Kassagi" and "Chitose." Or, it is from the Garibaldians who had a shootout with the cruisers of Enquist.

        This is not the only 8 "hit in the" Aurora "

        Information about the circumstances can be found at http://www.navylib.su/ships/avrora/09.htm
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        The work done is huge and fat + !!!

        Thank you!
        1. +3
          9 October 2020 18: 56
          Quote: rytik32
          Even with the World Championship of the fleet.

          Are they there?
          At that time, there were exactly one and a half battleship with modern art on the Black Sea Fleet. The rest have mostly cast iron shells in ammunition.
          Polenov's book is in my paper, but there this moment is not fully understood. Moreover, it is written about this hole:
          Under the forecastle (starboard side) a hole from a 152-203-mm projectile with an area of ​​1,2 m2

          that is, it could be a 6 "hit.
    3. +1
      10 October 2020 08: 17
      In some monographs dedicated to the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, there is a mention of the fact that some of the shells were of German production. What do you know about this?
      1. +1
        11 October 2020 12: 30
        EMNIP was in the materials of the historical commission. 1000 six-inch shells, and their quality was unsatisfactory.
        1. +1
          11 October 2020 19: 17
          ... 1000 six-inch shells ...

          That's interesting, I didn't know this. Who? I. ordered only cases (and filling and tubes in Russia) or assembled? Then what were you equipped with?
    4. +1
      11 October 2020 13: 40
      Segment projectiles - remove. It was already clear that they were ineffective
      ... And how will we fight off the destroyers?
      1. +1
        11 October 2020 15: 28
        And how will we fight off the destroyers?
        Mine cannons (3 "or less). They seem to be designed for this. And against someone larger than a destroyer - they are already ineffective.
      2. +1
        11 October 2020 21: 41
        Quote: Not the fighter
        ... And how will we fight off the destroyers?

        From destroyers, remarkably cast-iron shells help. The destroyer, where you don't get into it, it's all boilers and pipes. You will not sink, of course, but you will spoil it and deprive it of the course. wink
    5. -2
      16 October 2020 22: 00
      Why Rozhestvensky, as an artilleryman, did not do this?
    6. 0
      28 December 2021 14: 45
      This is, alas, an alternative. Any fight is won many months before.
      By building adequate ships. Organization of supply and training of l / s. Developing strategies and tactics. The development of shells and the correct selection of them in the ammunition load. If this background is poorly executed, then further "any heroism is a consequence of someone's carelessness." Based on your own conclusions in the article, we can say that if the method of organizing the shooting were different, the measuring gauges were not constantly required, the transmission of instructions to the plutongs worked normally, Russian ships and their armor-piercing could pile Togo until the conditional stalemate. And by the way, this would be more predictable than "unknown" problems with shells
  5. +2
    9 October 2020 12: 31
    I agree with the author - the quality of the shells was not the determining factor.
    The best training of the Japanese gunners and the high speed of the Japanese squadron determined the winning tactics of the battle and victory in the battle at Tsushima ..
    1. 0
      10 October 2020 08: 40
      Best training Japanese gunners?
      And were ALL Japanese literate?
      What kind of fiction?
      The Meiji Revolution in Japan took place in 1867.
      Japan from the Middle Ages, with a complete absence of manufacturing production, jumped into capitalism.
      Oh really ?
      Modern Japanese people learn their mother tongue until the age of THIRTY.
      And at that time he still had to CREATE, teach TEACHERS, build schools, and only then teach others.
      How old is independent Ukraine?
      Does the Ukrainian technical language exist?
      In general, does the Ukrainian language exist?
      Why did the completely wild Japanese succeed, but the enlightened Ukrainians failed?
      Suffice it to recall that, for example, the modern German language, based on a completely artificial pronunciation, was created in 1901.
      RYAV is still a mystery.
      On our side, there are no less mysteries.
      When was this war?
      Each country had its own chronology, brought together by the end of the 30s of the twentieth century.
      What enemy was this war with?
      1. +5
        11 October 2020 12: 33
        Quote: ignoto
        And were ALL Japanese literate?

        Yes. The Japanese have opted for universal primary education.
        Quote: ignoto
        The Meiji Revolution in Japan took place in 1867.
        Japan from the Middle Ages, with a complete absence of manufacturing production, jumped into capitalism

        In our country, the "great reforms" began six years earlier. We, in general, also did not really get out of feudalism by that time.
      2. 0
        12 October 2020 11: 15
        Quote: ignoto
        Best training Japanese gunners?

        That's right, we read from V.I. Semenov.
        https://libcat.ru/knigi/dokumentalnye-knigi/biografii-i-memuary/258978-214-vladimir-semyonov-tragediya-cusimy.html#text
        Not only had I never seen such a shooting, but I hadn't even imagined it. The shells rained down continuously, one after the other ... (Japanese officers said that after the surrender of Port Arthur, in anticipation of the second squadron, they prepared for its meeting in this way: each gunner fired five combat sets of shells from his gun when firing at a target. Then the worn-out guns were all replaced with new ones.)


        I looked around. What destruction! .. Burning wheelhouses on bridges, burning debris on the deck, heaps of corpses ... Signal, rangefinder stations, posts watching the fall of shells - everything is swept away, everything is destroyed... Behind - "Alexander" and "Borodino", also shrouded in the smoke of a fire ...
  6. +1
    9 October 2020 17: 27
    "They didn't know how to shoot and there was no move ..." The century-old phrase remains valid.
    At the same time, the 2TOE ships had a centralized artillery fire control system. The gunners were required to follow the instructions received and, thus, training could concentrate on this, which is probably easier than calculating the distance, corrections at the level of guns, towers, casemates. At the beginning of the battle, the 2TOE's firing could be more accurate, after the defeat and disabling of the centralized control system, including due to the peculiarities of the Japanese shells, the control issues moved to a lower level, more dependent on the experience of the gunners, which determined the advantage of the Japanese in fire impact?
    Could the destruction of the centralized artillery fire control system be, if not a key, then a significant factor in the destruction of the RIF at Tsushima?
    1. +5
      9 October 2020 18: 50
      Quote: sevtrash
      Could the destruction of the centralized artillery fire control system be, if not a key, then a significant factor in the destruction of the RIF at Tsushima?

      This was certainly one of the factors.
      After the divergence of counterattacks, hitting the Japanese became quite rare. This is evidence of the suppression of fire, although the guns themselves were still for the most part serviceable.
      Another question is that ours did not hit much in the outset of the battle. For example, Campbell's figure of 19 hits (of which 5 12 ") in Mikasa in the first 15 minutes of the fight should be adjusted. 2 12" shells were actually 12-pound (75-mm). Only 3 12 "hits are very few. And here you can't attribute the destruction of the centralized artillery fire control system.
      1. +1
        9 October 2020 20: 16
        Quote: rytik32
        And here you can't blame the destruction of the centralized artillery fire control system.

        The experience and practice of military operations is an invaluable thing, and the Japanese had and used it. What 2TOE did not have. It turns out that Nord Ost 23 was a deliberately disastrous adventure. It turns out that the only reasonable action for Rozhdestvensky was to evade an immediate battle, or bypass Japan (which was considered a feasible option at Nebogatov's headquarters), or the creation of an operating base in Cam Ranh.
        1. +3
          10 October 2020 19: 08
          The base in Cam Ranh was not possible to establish. France is a shitty ally. Brita and the states would immediately burst into violation of international law
        2. +3
          11 October 2020 12: 35
          Quote: sevtrash
          either bypassing Japan (which was considered a feasible option at Nebogatov's headquarters)

          Nebogatov had slightly fewer ships. In principle, if they (Nebogatov and ZPR) had not met, what the devil is not kidding, maybe the third squadron slipped while the Japanese smashed the second.
        3. +2
          12 October 2020 15: 06
          establishment of a base of operations in Cam Ranh.

          What other base? Read the documents of those years. Nobody sold us coal in Asia, and you mean creating a base !!!! The squadron from Vietnam carried all the coal on itself. There was no more AT ALL. Only Vladivostok. Therefore, there is no need to invent fables about the creation of bases and the cruising of the Vladivostok detachment in the yellow seas.
    2. +3
      9 October 2020 22: 17
      Quote: sevtrash
      At the same time, the 2TOE ships had a centralized artillery fire control system.

      Alas - it was not. In Poltava, the devices were removed from Alexander and Borodino at the project stage. Orel and Suvorov were again placed at the end at the request of a number of officers. Including Makarov.
  7. +4
    9 October 2020 22: 45
    Thank you very much for the interesting episode! The ending is also quite interesting, although not all conclusions can be immediately agreed with.

    Apparently, with an instantaneous actuation, there was a deformation of the shell of the projectile and detonation of the shimosa, and in the case of a delay, a regular detonation of the fuse. Moreover, in high-explosive shells, due to thin walls, detonation from impact occurred more often from the most insignificant obstacles, for example, rigging or even a water surface.

    This is clearly a simplistic and erroneous representation. Yes, shimosa is more prone to detonation than black powder or pyroxylin, but this of course requires a very strong blow. A projectile weighing hundreds of kg should stop almost instantly to create an overload sufficient for detonation. It is extremely doubtful that this can be achieved by touching the rigging, this is definitely the work of the Japanese sensitive fuses. Well, please do not forget that the "thin walls" of high-explosive shells are very relative .. In real life, these are "thin" tens of centimeters of steel :) And this water is not a soft pillow. Water is an almost incompressible liquid and the impact on water is comparable to impact on steel or concrete. It is no coincidence that underwater holes from shells in the history of battles just cried a cat. The shells usually just ricochet from the water.

    I do not quite agree with your opinion about the uselessness of armor-piercing shells, including those for medium caliber 6 ". They showed several penetrations of the roof of casemates at Tskim distances, for example. And these are deadly hits for warships. Remember the unlucky Iwate in the Sea of ​​Japan?

    These ruins are almost a third of the cruiser's side the result of one single penetration of the casemate. (and detonation of shells inside). It remains only to regret the small number of hits by Russian shells in general. Confident penetration of Russian shells at short distances would have cost the Japanese dearly. Well, 12 "shells, as we saw from Chesme, also confidently pierce the casemates and towers and cabinets of Japanese battleships.

    It remains only to get.
    1. +2
      10 October 2020 13: 08
      Quote: Saxahorse
      I do not quite agree with your opinion about the uselessness of armor-piercing shells, including those for medium caliber 6 ". They showed several penetrations of the roof of casemates at Tskim distances, for example. And these are deadly hits for warships. Remember the unlucky Iwate in the Sea of ​​Japan?

      According to calculations "Eagle" in Tsushima spent 23 armor-piercing, 219 high-explosive, 4 segment 152-mm shells. Most likely, hits in the roofs of the casemates were land mines. And these roofs were made of cardboard: 25 mm shipbuilding steel.
      At the exit from Libava there were 1055 armor-piercing, 1123 high-explosive, 417 segmental, "about 100 cast iron".
      The number of armor-piercing and segment ones, in my opinion, is "off scale".
      1. +2
        10 October 2020 22: 21
        Quote: rytik32
        Most likely, hits in the roofs of the casemates were land mines. And the roofs were made of cardboard: 25 mm shipbuilding steel.

        There were not only roofs, but also the side and rear walls of the casemates were only 51 mm, i.e. confidently penetrated 6 "shells even at medium ranges of battle. In general, the question is precisely in the number of hits. At short distances, for example, in the case of a frontal attack of the first squad, all the battleships of Togo look very pale. About Nissin and Kassuga, we are completely silent, they are close combat with armadillos is extremely contraindicated.
        1. +3
          10 October 2020 22: 35
          Don't forget that the rest of the battleships, except for "Mikasa", had a harvey. And the 229-mm harvey in the belt of "Sikishima" or "Asahi" is even worse than the 178-mm krupp, which made their way quite well.
    2. +2
      11 October 2020 10: 43
      Quote: Saxahorse
      This is clearly a simplistic and erroneous representation. Yes, shimosa is more prone to detonation than black powder or pyroxylin, but this of course requires a very strong blow. A projectile weighing hundreds of kg should stop almost instantly to create an overload sufficient for detonation. It is extremely doubtful that this can be achieved by touching the rigging, this is definitely the work of the Japanese sensitive fuses. Well, do not forget, please, that the "thin walls" of high-explosive shells are very relative .. In real life, these are "thin" tens of centimeters of steel :)

      Iziuin's fuse is a typical conventional shock fuze. I do not have exact data on the delay for it, but fuses of a similar design of a later period had a delay of about 0,005 s. At a projectile speed of 500-600 m / s, this is 2,5-3 meters behind a thin barrier. In principle, these calculations correspond to the actual bursts of our shells with the Baranovsky tube, which is similar in principle to the Idzyuin tube.
      Therefore, the Japanese landmines exploded clearly not from the fuse. I can also assume that the shock caused vibration and microcavities with air formed in the shimose ...
      1. +1
        11 October 2020 21: 21
        Quote: rytik32
        I do not have exact data on the delay for it, but fuses of a similar design of a later period had a delay of about 0,005 s. At a projectile speed of 500-600 m / s, this is 2,5-3 meters behind a thin barrier.

        Judging by the photographs of most of the sidewall holes, their edges are still bent inward and not outward. And this means that the detonation occurred even before the projectile completely passed the side line. Almost instantly.
    3. +2
      11 October 2020 19: 51
      Well, please do not forget that the "thin walls" of high-explosive shells are very relative .. In real life, these are "thin" tens of centimeters of steel :)

      How many?
      Just "tens" in the plural, that's at least two. There are only three of them (tens of centimeters) in a 305mm projectile. And there are two walls ...
      I do not quite agree with your opinion about the uselessness of armor-piercing shells, including those for medium caliber 6 ". They showed several penetrations of the roof of casemates at Tskim distances, for example. And these are deadly hits for warships. Remember the unlucky Iwate in the Sea of ​​Japan?

      Don't you think that citing the consequences of being hit by an eight-inch shell as proof of the usefulness of a six-inch shell is a bit too much ... even for you :)))
      1. +1
        11 October 2020 21: 12
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Just "tens" in the plural, that's at least two.

        I agree. About tens of centimeters, I bent it slightly. wassat

        The wall thickness of a modern projectile is 0.1-0.3 caliber. This is from 30 to 90 mm. A hundred years ago, the steel was worse and the shell was at least two to three times thicker. Agree all the same, that 90 mm steel is far from a tin can. And from touching the rigging elements a couple of mm thick, such a projectile is unlikely to bend. laughing

        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Don't you think that citing the consequences of being hit by an eight-inch shell as proof of the usefulness of a six-inch shell is a bit too much ... even for you :)))

        And in my opinion the very thing! Do you think that an armor-piercing 6 "projectile will not penetrate a 51 mm thick wall? And there, behind this wall, there is so much tasty for him! laughing
        1. +1
          12 October 2020 19: 36
          Will hit from a distance of less than 22 cables.
        2. +1
          14 October 2020 19: 58
          Quote: Saxahorse
          About tens of centimeters, I bent it slightly

          Quote: Saxahorse
          And in my opinion the very thing!

          At first I thought that the Lord, in His inescapable mercy, showed a miracle - you began to admit mistakes :)))
          And then, I look, no, everything is fine :)))
          On the "Rurik" were still old 8 "1885, firing old shells, to which both the weight and content of explosives were almost three times higher than that of six-inch Kane.
          Then no. There will be no such effect.
          1. 0
            14 October 2020 22: 07
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            Then no. There will be no such effect.

            But some claim that Japanese shells bend and detonate on the rigging, and you consider a direct hit of a 6 "shell to be insufficient for detonation. lol
            1. +1
              14 October 2020 22: 15
              Quote: Saxahorse
              a direct hit of a 6 "projectile is considered insufficient for detonation

              And where did I write this?
              My comment sounded like this:
              Don't you think that citing the consequences of being hit by an eight-inch shell as proof of the usefulness of a six-inch shell is a bit too much ... even for you :)))

              1. -1
                14 October 2020 22: 26
                Something you are completely confused in your sarcasms. laughing

                On the "Rurik" were still old 8 "1885, firing old shells, to which both the weight and content of explosives were almost three times higher than that of six-inch Kane.

                But it turns out that you wrote off the destruction of Iwate on the "power of the" old 8 "shell, which has three times more explosives. I didn't even expect this from you .. wassat

                "how many wonderful discoveries for us, the spirit of enlightenment prepares!" (from)
                1. +1
                  14 October 2020 22: 45
                  Did you know that an eight-inch shell is more powerful than a six-inch one? And that the destruction comes from explosives?
                  I'm sorry.
                  By the way, there was also a reliable fuse. Why the shell sent by "Rurik" exploded a little (and not just knocked out the bottom). Why, in turn, the Japanese ammunition detonated. And if you remove any link from this chain of events, it will be interrupted.
                  And after all, the results of tests of six-inch shells carried out in Vladivostok by Jessen are known.
                  But how can a person know all this, sincerely sure that Almaz and Zhemchug had the same CMU?
                  1. 0
                    14 October 2020 22: 58
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    Did you know that an eight-inch shell is more powerful than a six-inch one? And that the destruction comes from explosives?

                    One can only sympathize with a person who is so firmly convinced that a Japanese high-explosive projectile will not explode from a direct hit from a six-inch projectile. Though it exploded, it didn't explode.

                    Try to think of some other sarcasm better, since you can't say anything on the topic at all. laughing
                    1. +1
                      15 October 2020 16: 52
                      Empathize with yourself. What makes you think that there was a direct hit of a projectile in the ammunition rack? It seems to be on the deck, but it is believed that the shell pierced the roof of the casemate.
                      See.
                      1) The heavy 8 "shell had enough energy and mass to penetrate the armor.
                      2) The fuse went off right away, and not at the opposite side.
                      3) The force of the explosion was enough to not only knock out the bottom of its projectile or fly a narrow beam of fragments along the trajectory of movement, but also detonate the Japanese ones.
                      Which of these three things does a lightweight six-inch shell have? Nothing!
                      Consequently, it is at least presumptuous to expect a similar effect.
                      Of course, a direct hit into the ammo rack would have detonated it. Perhaps even without the explosion of the projectile itself, simply from the force of the blow. Only for this, he needed to break through not the roof, but the frontal wall of 152 mm armor. But this possibility, I do not admit.
                      1. 0
                        15 October 2020 22: 23
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        that there was a direct hit of the projectile in the ammunition rack? She seems to be on the deck, but it is believed that the shell pierced the roof of the casemate.

                        This is just one of the assumptions. From the casemate, as you saw, nothing remained. Others suggest that this is a side wall. And nobody insists on the explosion of this shell. It exploded so that no one could find traces of the explosion of the Russian shell.

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Only for this, he did not need to break through the roof, but the frontal wall of 152 mm armor.

                        In the heat of your sarcasm, you have successfully skipped the text of the commentary that you so diligently criticize. I recalled that the thickness of the side and rear walls of the casemates is only 51 mm, which successfully breaks through at short combat distances. I was even told that it was less than 22 kbl. Yes, in some cases it will also be necessary to pierce the side or elements of the rigging, but just Russian shells were not noticed in the premature explosions. laughing

                        Well, in general, a normal armor-piercing projectile, but at a short distance, must penetrate armor equal to its caliber and even more.
                      2. 0
                        17 October 2020 09: 12
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        I recalled that the thickness of the side and rear walls of the casemates is only 51 mm, which successfully breaks through at short combat distances.

                        In this particular case, it was still a roof.
                        The side wall ... hardly, the Japanese was abeam. Back? Definitely not, otherwise the explosion would have been from the other side.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        I recalled that the thickness of the side and rear walls of the casemates is only 51 mm, which successfully breaks through at short distances.

                        Depends on the trajectory. At 6 "Kane it is more flat, so when hitting the same point, a ricochet is very likely. The shell is light.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        a normal armor-piercing projectile, but at a short distance, must penetrate armor equal to its caliber

                        So it's normal ... but what does the light model of 1891 have to do with it? There were no such feats behind him.
                      3. 0
                        17 October 2020 20: 51
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        In this particular case, it was still a roof.

                        How did you define it? Themselves write about a very flat trajectory .. At 2-5 degrees of fall, the probability of hitting the side wall is ten times more than hitting the roof. Moreover, there are no doubts about the possibility of penetrating 51 mm 8 "by a Russian shell!

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        So it's normal ... but what does the light model of 1891 have to do with it? There were no such feats behind him.

                        At a distance, zero formally breaks 156 mm. The numbers are greatly underestimated, as practice has shown, penetration at short distances is one and a half times better. By 5 Kbl armor in 6 "Russian 6" shell will definitely penetrate.

                        But this is not required, close combat is usually on sharp corners. Those. the probability of hitting the side walls is very high!
                      4. 0
                        18 October 2020 09: 56
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        You yourself write about a very flat trajectory.

                        For six-inch Kane.
                        And the 8 "mod. 1885 barrel length is 35 calibers. There it is much steeper (steeper not in the sense of" wow ":))
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        The numbers are greatly underestimated, as practice has shown, penetration at short distances is one and a half times better.

                        Would you mind giving a concrete example of this practice?
                        Because the cases known to me indicate exactly the opposite.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        close combat, he is usually on sharp corners. Those. the probability of hitting the side walls is very high!

                        i would say a little different from zero :)))
                        Take a closer look at the booking scheme. Before getting to the giblets of the asamoid, the projectile must overcome a 127mm traverse, which is also at an angle. There is nothing to catch here with a six-inch device at real combat distances.
                      5. 0
                        18 October 2020 21: 47
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Would you mind giving a concrete example of this practice?

                        The shelling of Chesma after the RYA during the construction of new battleships. "Suddenly" it became clear that the booking is completely insufficient for both large and medium calibers. The calculation tables did not justify themselves.

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Take a closer look at the booking scheme. Before getting to the giblets of the asamoid, the projectile must overcome the 127mm traverse, which is also located at an angle.

                        Counter wish. Look carefully at the booking scheme! wink

                        On what deck is this traverse? Does it bother you that it is one floor lower than the casemates? laughing
                      6. 0
                        20 October 2020 09: 19
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Shelling of Chesma after RYAV

                        Therefore, there are no examples. Since they were not shooting there with a six-inch model of 1891.
                        Not surprised. request
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Does it bother you that it is one floor lower than the casemates?

                        Doesn't it bother you that it is much larger in area and the probability of getting into it is much higher? That's why I wrote that it was "slightly different from zero", that the probability of hitting the side armor of the casemate, and even at an angle close to the normal (otherwise it just ricochets) is extremely small. Are you proposing to build a fight in the hope of Lakichots?
                      7. 0
                        20 October 2020 22: 50
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Are you proposing to build a fight in the hope of Lakichots?

                        At sharp corners, for longitudinal fire, these very side walls of the casemates will occupy two-thirds of the projection area of ​​the picture. There, almost any surface hit sooner or later rests on the side or back of the casemate. And what kind of "lachotes" are there for 10 kb? They will pierce these pitiful 51 mm one hundred percent even if they do not come along the normal!
                      8. 0
                        20 October 2020 23: 08
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        these same side walls of the casemates will occupy two-thirds of the projection area of ​​the picture.

                        In your fantasies - no doubt.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        And what kind of "lachotes" are there for 10 kb?

                        Who will let them in, on ten cables?
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Will pierce those pitiful 51mm

                        For some reason, they did not break through ... well, except for that one from "Rurik" ... an eight-inch one.
    4. 0
      28 December 2021 14: 53
      "and the impact on water is comparable to impact on steel or concrete."

      No.
  8. +1
    10 October 2020 03: 57
    I am deeply convinced that the only reason for our defeat was a general and complete inability to shoot.

    Let me be curious, dear Alexey, how do you think, how could he have known this?
    After all, Mikhail Sergeevich had neither statistics on the shells fired by Russian ships, nor statistics on the hits of Russian shells on Japanese ships, did he?
    By the way, Lieutenant Roschakovsky was in command of the bow tower of the "Admiral Senyavin", why does not he blame himself for not teaching his subordinates to shoot?
    1. +2
      10 October 2020 08: 40
      Valentine, good afternoon!
      Quote: Comrade
      How do you think, how could he have known this?

      I think he saw where our shells were flying. The entire battle on May 14, Lieutenant Roschakovsky spent, standing on the tower with binoculars in his hands and commanding its fire.
      Quote: Comrade
      why does he not blame himself for not teaching his subordinates to shoot?

      So he does not specifically blame anyone. Moreover, he was in the position of the tower commander by accident.
      And do not forget, Roschakovsky in the 1st TOE commanded the EM "Resolute" and heroically broke into the Chief with a report about the squadron's withdrawal.
      1. +2
        11 October 2020 04: 54
        Hello, Alexey!
        Quote: rytik32
        I think he saw where our shells were flying.

        In the direction of the enemy, where else.
        For obvious reasons, Roschakovsky did not see any visible damage, so he assumed in his hearts that this was a consequence of poor shooting.
        Whether the shooting was good or bad, he could not know, since he did not have information.

        Quote: rytik32
        he happened to be the tower commander by accident.

        He was offered, he did not refuse. In such cases, the saying "If you call yourself a load - get into the back" works.
        Quote: rytik32
        Roschakovsky in the 1st TOE commanded the EM "Resolute" and heroically broke into the Chief with a report about the squadron's exit

        Dear colleague, do not consider it a nit-picking, but not "heroically broke through", but secretly passed. The Japanese did not see him, so there was no breakthrough, no heroism.
        1. +3
          11 October 2020 10: 28
          Quote: Comrade
          For obvious reasons, Roschakovsky did not see any visible damage, so he assumed in his hearts that this was a consequence of poor shooting.

          But Roschakovsky could perfectly see the bursts from our shells. Here is a tablet from Goncharov

          Attention! it unloaded shells, i.e. without explosives.
          C 30 cab. (and this is quite a typical distance of Tsushima) even a 120-mm projectile raised a column of water by 12 meters! What can we say about the larger calibers?

          Why did our veterans of Tsushima complain about not seeing the splashes? I gave above the scheme of hits in "Mikasa" and made conclusions based on it.
          1. Because there were no hits at the tip, then with horizontal guidance there was complete order.
          2. Because Since most of the hits were above the level of the upper deck, then we can state a systemic error in determining the range, which caused flights.
          3. During flights and good horizontal guidance, bursts from own shells are not visible, because closed by the enemy ship. Here's your answer.
          1. +2
            11 October 2020 21: 55
            Quote: rytik32
            Why did our veterans of Tsushima complain about not seeing the splashes? I gave above the scheme of hits in "Mikasa" and made conclusions based on it.

            Wonderful sign! Thanks!

            And they complained about the duration of the burst. Look, 120 mm by 40 kb - the duration of the burst is 1 second! Moreover, the projectile flew at this distance for 20 seconds and the burst itself, although high, but thin. So try to see, separate from others, and guess whether it was a flight or a shortage.

            Compare with the splash from an exploded shell, such figures were in the book about the shelling of Chesma. From a 12 "projectile, the column of water and smoke stood for 20 seconds, and the height was more than the length of the vessel, i.e. 100 meters .. It is not surprising that before the PMA there were new ways to adjust the shooting, in 20 seconds it is quite realistic to measure the distance directly to the splash, and make adjustments for the actual drop of shells.
          2. 0
            13 October 2020 03: 05
            Quote: rytik32
            Why did our veterans of Tsushima complain about not seeing the splashes?

            They complained not that they had not seen the bursts, but that they could not distinguish "their" bursts from the "strangers".

            Quote: rytik32
            During flights and good horizontal guidance, bursts from our own shells are not visible, because closed by the enemy ship. Here is your answer.

            This answer begs the question, so, the Russians did not have any undershoots at all, all flights?
            If you admit that there were still shortages, the question is the same: how could Lieutenant Roschakovsky judge the accuracy of the firing of Russian ships, if he did not know either the number of shells hit, or the number of shells fired?

            Quote: rytik32
            Why, then, in your opinion, did the other 1TOE ships not even try to secretly break into Vladivostok at night?

            Novik tried. The rest were not allowed by certain circumstances.
            1. -1
              13 October 2020 08: 28
              Quote: Comrade
              They complained not that they had not seen the bursts, but that they could not distinguish "their" bursts from the "strangers"

              Quite right, they saw other people's bursts, and the enemy's ship covered their own.
              Quote: Comrade
              This answer begs the question, so, the Russians did not have any undershoots at all, all flights?

              A very strange conclusion ...
              Quote: Comrade
              the question is the same: how could Lieutenant Roschakovsky judge the accuracy of the firing of Russian ships if he did not know the number of shells hit, or the number of shells fired?

              I repeat once again, he could see that our shells were "bad". But
              the enemy fired at the lead ship, very often and accurately
              1. +1
                13 October 2020 15: 48
                Quote: rytik32
                they saw other people's splashes, and the enemy's ship closed their own.

                Not this way.
                The splashes do not say whose they are. Read an excerpt of Shamshev's testimony, it does not say that he saw only “alien” bursts, it says that he could not distinguish his own from others.
                Quote: rytik32
                I repeat once again, he could see that our shells were "bad". But
                the enemy fired at the lead ship, very often and accurately

                About "often", this is his personal subjective opinion, not confirmed by numbers.
                1. +1
                  13 October 2020 18: 31
                  Quote: Comrade
                  About "often", this is his personal subjective opinion, not supported by numbers.

                  Here, purely in his personal opinion, based on his own observations, the Japanese fire was accurate, but ours was not.
                  1. 0
                    14 October 2020 04: 36
                    Quote: rytik32
                    purely in his personal opinion, based on his own observations, the Japanese fire was accurate, but ours was not.

                    If we talk about coastal defense battleships, then certainly.
                    The consumption of shells of the main caliber there was serious ("General-Admiral Apraksin" - 130, "Admiral Senyavin" - 170 and "Admiral Ushakov" - 200), but if we look at the "Chronology of hits on Japanese ships" from a well-known website, then we find that the fire of these three ships was really not accurate.
                    However, judging by the data of the same "Chronology of hits on Japanese ships", there is no reason to extrapolate the firing accuracy of these three coastal defense battleships to squadron battleships, they never dreamed of such a consumption of 12 "shells. Nevertheless, at the outset of the battle, they demonstrated good accuracy, which they could only dream of on the battleships of the coastal defense.
                    1. +1
                      14 October 2020 18: 13
                      Dear Valentine, of course it is very difficult to judge whose shell hit the Japanese. But there are a couple of points that make you think:
                      1. Kamimura's squad received almost the same number of shells as Togo's squad.
                      2. The direction of arrival of shells, even from Kamimura's cruisers, is very often "strongly behind". You can even use some of the schemes from the current article.
                      1. 0
                        14 October 2020 21: 16
                        The course of your thoughts is clear, I think they are reasonable.
        2. +1
          11 October 2020 11: 32
          Why, then, in your opinion, did the other 1TOE ships not even try to secretly break into Vladivostok at night?
          Indeed, in theory, this gave a head start half a day before Togo. Those. there would have been no battle before the Korean Strait.
          1. 0
            12 October 2020 19: 42
            They were afraid of the destroyers. Vitgeft wanted to move away from Arthur, so that class 2 and 3 destroyers from Dalny could not follow the squadron.
  9. +3
    10 October 2020 09: 56
    Hi Aleksey!
    Great article and perfectly correct resume.
    If they knew how to shoot, no one would have remembered about the tubes or the low explosiveness of the shells.
    1. 0
      28 December 2021 16: 12
      the shell of the Russian battleships (armor-piercing) had a chance to go through the superstructure without causing any damage. The land mine of the Japanese systematically destroyed the ability to conduct aimed fire. Determine the distance by eye? With the destruction of rangefinders and means of transmitting instructions? No, in such conditions "being able to shoot" should be equal to "being able to determine the distance in a separate tower / plutong".

      The RYAV turned out to be unique in that a high-explosive weapon could "disarm" a powerful ship, depriving it of communications and the ability to control the battle. In WWI they have already begun to "protect" rangefinders, and even to allocate their personal ones to the towers. And then, the destruction of rangefinder posts in WWI significantly reduced the effectiveness of the shooting. It cannot be said that the Russian artillerymen were of the 1st grade, but even with excellent marksmen in shooting without distance or the ability to aim, the results will be deplorable.

      If Togo had fired with armor-piercing, perhaps the first hours of the battle would have been more effective for us, which would have transferred the party to the endgame of a night battle with destroyers. Perhaps the first detachment would have received a couple of heavy hits with a breakdown at the waterline in the first detachment, maybe the battleship "honestly" sunk like Oslyabi would have lost, and at night 2-3 more ships on torpedoes from the destroyers, but the main part of the squadron would have passed. It was on this option that Zinovy ​​was counting, and this is exactly how it would have been if Togo had conducted mainly armor-piercing fire, for my taste.
  10. +1
    10 October 2020 10: 03
    Quote: Kwas
    I heard on the radio (voices of the enemy, 90s) that on our ships the aiming strips did not match the ballistics of the new armor-piercing shells, and those, accordingly, gave undershoots. Has anyone heard anything on this topic?

    This is what was discovered during the war that the firing tables were not correct. That is, the tabular elevation angle of the barrel did not match the tabular range. Besides, if my memory serves me, the shooting tables were compiled only up to 40 kbl.
  11. 0
    10 October 2020 11: 40
    Quote: rytik32
    Segment projectiles - remove. It was already clear that they were ineffective.

    Alexey, do you have any data on the firing of segmented projectiles in RYAV?
    1. +1
      10 October 2020 12: 08
      Hi Andrew!
      There is information that the "Eagle" in the afternoon of May 14 fired 2 305-mm and 4 152-mm segment projectiles at the Japanese destroyers attacking "Suvorov".
      1. 0
        10 October 2020 14: 07
        Have you observed the results? Is there anything else about the use of segment?
        1. 0
          10 October 2020 22: 29
          Cherkasov was dissatisfied with them, for example:
          According to the adopted instructions for the control and action of the ship's artillery in battle, the tubes for segment projectiles should be set for 1 seconds, which corresponds to 5 cable for 10-inch, and 5 cable for 6-inch. Taking into account a combustion ratio of 6, 1, the tubes were set for 1, 1 seconds. But the reflection of the very first attack indicated the incorrectness of such an installation, since expensive, capable of causing a lot of damage and well-directed shells exploded completely uselessly in the air at a distance of 7-5 cables, while the destroyers were 6-14 cables.

          Shoot with segmental projectiles only in rare cases, making preference for high-explosive, and always start shooting with their installation on impact and switch to remote installation only after a certain distance

          Those. even at the maximum delay, the segment projectile exploded closer than the maximum torpedo launch distance by Japanese EMs.
        2. +1
          10 October 2020 23: 56
          According to the report of the Swede
          The destroyers, unable to withstand the fire, retreated
  12. +1
    10 October 2020 11: 50
    Quote: ignoto
    In some monographs dedicated to the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, there is a mention of the fact that some of the shells were of German production. What do you know about this?

    The shells were secretly ordered from Germany and France, despite their neutrality. The shells were rated worse than the Russians
    1. 0
      10 October 2020 22: 30
      Quote: Andrey152
      The shells were secretly ordered from Germany and France, despite their neutrality. The shells were rated worse than the Russians

      There, the destroyers ordered under the guise of yachts :) Unfortunately, as usual, the bureaucracy did not allow them to be delivered on time, before the departure of Nebogatov's third squadron.
  13. +4
    10 October 2020 11: 57
    The respected author did a gigantic job and tried to prove that the Russian shells, if they were worse than the Japanese ones, were not at all at times. In my uninitiated opinion, it is very convincing. I look forward to an article from the respected AiCh with a refutation. Probably, he is the only one who has a "shell version" that is potentially capable of challenging this work. Let's see if it works out.
    1. +2
      10 October 2020 17: 11
      Well, yes. Russian shells contained several times less explosives, which were often many times weaker (smokeless gunpowder) and were supplied with fuses that gave an off-scale percentage of explosives, but were NOT at times worse. And how much were worse, by 5-10 percent?

      I do not remember who wrote that if under Tsushima Russian ships fired shells of the 1907 model, then at the very beginning of the Tsushima battle, after two shells exploded on the Mikasa spardek, Admiral Togo would have been dead (though he would have been dead in the battle in Yellow most likely did not survive the sea). And so it is certainly worse, but only "a little on the bottom."

      PS During the entire war, the Russian fleet did not win a single artillery battle.
      1. -1
        10 October 2020 21: 41
        Quote: AlexanderA
        Russian shells contained several times less explosives

        Right
        Quote: AlexanderA
        Which was often much weaker (smokeless gunpowder)

        Wrong. Smokeless gunpowder and pyroxylin are almost equal in combustion energy

        Quote: AlexanderA
        were supplied with fuses that gave an off-scale percentage of non-breaks

        Compare. As many as 6 bursts of Russian shells of 203 mm and above and 5 bursts of barrels of Japanese guns 203 mm and above. But these are two sides of the same coin. The Brink fuse guaranteed the uninterrupted projectile in the barrel. So here the Japanese shells are clearly worse.
        Quote: AlexanderA
        but they were NOT worse at times

        So the Japanese shells made a hole 4,3x3,4 meters somewhere? Or can only Russian shells, which are "many times weaker", are capable of this?
        1. +4
          10 October 2020 22: 39
          Quote: rytik32
          Wrong. Smokeless gunpowder and pyroxylin are almost equal in combustion energy

          Definitely wrong! Pyroxylin is a blasting explosive and smokeless powder is gunpowder! Good gunpowder should burn slowly. The difference in power is two or three times at least!
        2. 0
          3 December 2020 20: 14
          Quote: rytik32
          Wrong. Smokeless gunpowder and pyroxylin are almost equal in combustion energy

          If it were only the energy of combustion, and not how quickly the energy is released, then the world would never be interested in blasting explosives. :)
          https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Тротиловый_эквивалент
          "TNT equivalent of explosives is a coefficient that indicates how many times stronger or weaker a given substance is compared to TNT [4] [5] (occasionally a similar comparative coefficient may be introduced with respect to other commonly used substances)

          TNT - 1,0
          Tritonal - 1,53
          Hexogen - up to 1,3-1,6
          TEN - 1,39
          Ammonal - 0,99
          Gunpowder - 0,55-0,66 "
          Quote: rytik32
          Compare. As many as 6 bursts of Russian shells of 203 mm and above and 5 bursts of barrels of Japanese guns 203 mm and above. But these are two sides of the same coin. The Brink fuse guaranteed the uninterrupted projectile in the barrel. So here the Japanese shells are clearly worse.

          Rdultovskiy gave an exhaustive description of the design and technological problems of the Brink fuse. The Japanese shells prematurely detonated in the barrel not Ijuin's fuses, but picrates. When exploded from fuses, they would not explode, often damaging the barrel quite easily, but always detonated, with guaranteed complete destruction of the barrel.
          Quote: rytik32
          So the Japanese shells somewhere made a hole 4,3x3,4 meters?

          Remind, on which Japanese ship such a single breach happened. The average diameter of the hole, which, as a rule, was left in the unarmored side of a Japanese high-explosive projectile is 2,13-2,44 m.
          “The Japanese high-explosive shells, when bursting, made the following holes in the sides and decks.
          12-inch TV the projectile made a hole 7 - 8 feet. dia.
          8-inch TV - 5 ft.
          6-in. - 3 - 3 ½ ft.
          Cladding thickness 3/8 inch.
          In all cases of side holes, the vertical dimension was greater than the horizontal one.
          The ratio is approximately 4: 3.
          12-inch TV the projectile, exploding at the side, in all cases also broke through the underlying
          deck. 2-inch covered decks only. armor, could fully withstand its destructive power.
          Armored deck in 1 1/16 inch. in 2 places it was pierced by 12-inch shrapnel. shell when it bursts at the overlying deck. In one place, this deck, along with the beams, was bent 6 inches. The pillers bent into an arc.
          12-inch TV the projectile inside the ship sweeps away light bulkheads and objects with a radius of approximately 10 feet. from the center of the explosion. Such was the destruction in the lion's upper deck. nose. b. and the admiral's cabins from the starboard side, where the bulkheads between the cabins were knocked down along with all the racks. "
          1. 0
            7 December 2020 22: 12
            Quote: AlexanderA
            Remind, on which Japanese ship there was such a single breach. The average diameter of the hole, which, as a rule, was left in the unarmored side of a Japanese high-explosive projectile 2,13-2,44 m

            Mikasa. This article describes the hit.
            What about the average diameter? I was not too lazy and calculated the arithmetic average of 12 hits in the "Eagle", which the Japanese estimated at 12 ". It turned out 1,8x1,7 meters.
            And he did the same operation on 7 hits on Japanese ships described in this article. It turned out 2,5x1,8 meters.

            Interesting, huh?
    2. +1
      10 October 2020 22: 35
      Quote: MooH
      I look forward to an article from the respected AiCh with a refutation. Probably, he is the only one who has a "shell version" that is potentially capable of challenging this work.

      I don't share your enthusiasm in the least. Our mutual friend, Andrey from Chelyabinsk, is too predictable. At the beginning, he sets a goal to whitewash Admiral Rozhestvensky and his god, Nicholas II, as much as possible, and only then, for this goal, our mutual friend begins to select, and often come up with arguments .. negative
  14. +2
    10 October 2020 16: 45
    Many thanks to the author for this series of articles and the work he has done!

    For the last 10-15 years, there has been a discussion in the Russian-speaking space about the reasons for the small damage that the Japanese suffered in the Battle of Tsushima, regarding the damage of the Russians? Two versions are fighting each other:
    1. The Russians shot badly and hit too few.
    2. The Russians fired well, hit the Japanese enough, but they had ineffective shells.

    In my opinion, you dear Alexei, voicing that you are a supporter of the version about the poor accuracy of the Russian artillerymen in Tsushima, in a series of your articles convincingly proved that the Russians had ineffective shells, which Andrei from Chelyabinsk pointed out to you. We expect a response article from the esteemed Andrey from Chelyabinsk in defense and updating on the new material of the version of the low effectiveness of Russian shells and quite acceptable accuracy of the gunners of the Second Pacific Squadron.
  15. +1
    10 October 2020 16: 49
    Quote: rytik32
    I wrote in the article what was the superiority of our shells, and what - the Japanese.
    And please note that the HE shell did not become the main one anywhere.


    The fact that in the Russian Navy a decade later 2/3 of the standard 12 "ammunition of the battleships of the" Sevastopol "and" Empress Maria "type consisted of high-explosive shells of the 1911 model, is it possible to throw into the piggy bank of arguments NOT in favor of" HE shell never became the main one " , or not?

    However, more than a quarter of a century later they were. "On June 22, 1941, the fleets and warehouses of the Navy for 12/52-inch guns had shells: high-explosive model 1911 - 9670 pcs., Armor-piercing model 1911 - 4108 pcs., Long-range model 1928 - 1440 pcs. And shrapnel - 411 pcs. "

    Or the high-explosive shells of the 1911 model were not high-explosive enough? With an explosive mass of more than 10 percent of the total mass of the projectile?
    1. +1
      10 October 2020 21: 53
      Quote: AlexanderA
      The fact that in the Russian Navy a decade later 2/3 of the standard 12 "ammunition of the battleships of the" Sevastopol "and" Empress Maria "type consisted of high-explosive shells of the 1911 model, is it possible to throw into the piggy bank of arguments NOT in favor of" HE shell never became the main one " , or not?

      Since when is the 1911 land mine considered NOT? Well this is a common commonplace! He calmly pierced armor of medium thickness and exploded behind it.
    2. 0
      3 December 2020 20: 35
      Do you know why the 12 "semi-armor-piercing projectile of 1911 began to be considered high-explosive? Because it contained 61,5 kilograms of TNT, while in the high-explosive model 1911 only 58,8 kg. Therefore, it was he who became the main one , although it cost more than armor-piercing when purchasing, it did not penetrate heavy belt armor.A cheaper projectile made of relatively low quality steel with 58,8 kg of explosives was simply not purchased.They had the same fuses.
  16. 0
    10 October 2020 19: 29
    In Zen I came across a link to the book by Boris Galenin "Tsushima - a sign of the end of Russian history". Basically a rare delirium, the author is clearly an apologist for autocracy and Orthodoxy. Writes what before
    Tsushima, the Japanese re-equipped the battleships and armored cruisers with new shells with explosives invented by some Peruvian. He allegedly wanted to sell the explosives to the Russians, but ours were not interested and then sold them to the Japanese. It is argued that it was this explosive that decided the outcome of the battle, speaks of "liquid fire" like napalm. Also, referring to one of the participants in the battle, he claims that the Japanese, thanks to these explosives and a higher rate of fire, had an advantage in the power of artillery fire 300 (three hundred) times.
    1. +1
      10 October 2020 21: 57
      All this is nonsense.
      The Japanese had almost pure trinitrophenol in their shells - a very common explosive. And no miracles.
      1. +1
        10 October 2020 22: 43
        Quote: rytik32
        The Japanese had almost pure trinitrophenol in their shells - a very common explosive. And no miracles.

        I like that you don't forget the word "almost" :) But fairy tales about some kind of "Peruvians" are, of course, quite hard nonsense wassat

        A well-known Frenchman is enough for all of us to get confused in this matter :)
  17. +2
    10 October 2020 20: 10
    Quote: AlexanderA
    Or the high-explosive shells of the 1911 model were not high-explosive enough? With an explosive mass of more than 10 percent of the total mass of the projectile?

    High-explosive shells mod. 1911 were not high-explosive enough, but more than enough armor-piercing. As we remember, when the Chesma was shot, they pierced 225 mm waist armor. With a break behind the slab.
    Not for nothing in 1942 they were reclassified as semi-armor-piercing. And they had an armor-piercing tip.
    1. 0
      3 December 2020 21: 09
      Well, excuse me, by design they were semi-armor-piercing, but by mass of explosives they were superior to high-explosive ones, and were considered high-explosive. Let's say shells for a promising 16 "/ 45 gun:



      Which one is high-explosive in your opinion? The one on the left? But by design, it is semi-armor-piercing. These were the high-explosive shells that ceased after Tsushima to save on the quality of shells of the Russian Imperial Navy, more expensive than armor-piercing.

      It is interesting that today there are quite literate authors trying to assert that under Tsushima everything was fine with the quality of the shells (and fuses) of the artillery of the Russian Imperial Navy. To assert - despite the very problematic two-capsule delayed-action fuse Brink with an initiating charge of dry pyroxylin, despite the outdated bottom shock tube of the normal action of Baranovsky, despite the extremely small explosive charges of obsolete explosives (yes, yes, not only smokeless powder, but also curved pyroxylin in zinc cases of "neat work" by 1904-1905 was already outdated), despite the low quality of the shell steel.
  18. +3
    10 October 2020 21: 21
    The author is well done.
    Currently, out of more or less regularly writing on VO, it is in the top 4 as for me.
    Personal wish - let him write about Jutland with the same thoroughness.
    Just a wish.
    1. +3
      10 October 2020 22: 23
      The main thing is that the topic is original and rare on VO
      1. +6
        10 October 2020 22: 55
        Tsushima -Stalin-Aircraft carriers
        el classico on VO
        Of these three, let Tsushima be better.
        And in terms of working with the reader, Alexey is one of the best
        1. +2
          10 October 2020 23: 20
          For a more balanced assessment, let's wait for some other topics from the author. Tsushima-niche for one and a half fans of the topic
          1. +6
            10 October 2020 23: 28
            Tsushima-nisha for one and a half fans theme

            The niche is definitely fertile. I looked, the author has seven articles about Tsushima. Three articles have 300+ comments.
            The author gives out quite high quality content. And against the background of the general bottom of any sections of the VO except for the historical one, this is generally space.

            For a more balanced assessment, we will wait for some other topics from the author

            I suggested Jutland to consolidate the success
            1. +2
              10 October 2020 23: 44
              Quote: Engineer
              ... Three articles have 300+ comments.

              Tsushima fans are real fans. They will give 300 comments on the topic ... The rusty bolt of the left oar of Prince Suvorov's lifeboat took off at 14.15 or 14.16 pm.
              Quote: Engineer
              Jutland

              It would be great if)
              1. +2
                10 October 2020 23: 52
                Do not consider it a collision.
                Did you like any material on VO?
                It feels like your being on VO is either a session of refined masochism or an extended testing of the d'Artagnan regime.
                1. +4
                  11 October 2020 00: 07
                  )))
                  Of course, there are things that I like. Timokhin / Klimov has a lot of interesting things. Until they get into geopolitics). The other day there is good material about AUG Bongo air defense on air defense. The professor is not tired yet. Shpakovsky often has interesting things. There are good and interesting commentators. You , Undechim, Cherry Nine, Avior. Another with an English nickname in the nautical theme.
                  1. +1
                    11 October 2020 00: 12
                    Another one with an English nickname on a marine theme.

                    Macsen_Wledig?
                    OK. Thank you for your opinion
                    1. +1
                      11 October 2020 00: 16
                      He is.
                      This author is not bad, but if he sticks to Tsushima, he will remain in this niche and read by those one and a half fans. And it will be of little use to him and the readers and the site as a whole.
    2. +1
      11 October 2020 21: 01
      Thank you!
      But I don't plan to write any more. It takes too long.
      Jutland is interesting, but it seems to me that the topic has already been sorted out. The most pressing question is who won. Tsushima in this regard provides much more reason for discussion.
      1. +1
        11 October 2020 21: 04
        Jutland is interesting, but it seems to me that the topic has already been sorted out.

        The opposition of armor and projectile. Like here
  19. +1
    12 October 2020 06: 01
    Quote: rytik32
    Those. even at the maximum delay, the segment projectile exploded closer than the maximum torpedo launch distance by Japanese EMs.

    In fact, the tubes were 12 seconds long, so there is still a long way to the maximum delay.
  20. +1
    12 October 2020 18: 08
    I read this article and the previous ones with interest. It's just class! Thanks to the author. The material is solid, the comments are interesting. Even the polemic in relation to the squadron commander (which is always present in the articles about Tsushima) did not spoil the impression of what I read ... The comments are tactful and interesting, I will even say more, not comments, but sound reasoning of people versed in this matter trying to find the truth. According to the author's answers, it is clear that he is aware of this topic and prepared impeccably. With such baggage, you can safely defend your thesis. There are several questions, but these are in the final article. I'm waiting, like everyone else, to continue

    Greetings, Alex!
    This is my comment in your previous article. For a series of articles and analysis is undoubtedly a plus!
    But, as I wrote above, there are a few questions!
    You yourself wrote in the first article that - The opinion of numerous veterans of Tsushima about the weakness of the action of domestic shells was supported by the results of tests of landmines, which were carried out by Rear Admiral K.P. Jessen. However, the attentive reader may immediately be alerted by the fact that “shell version "appeared after Tsushima... But Tsushima was preceded by several major naval battles, in which both Russians and Japanese used the same shells!
    It seems that we can agree with you here. So the senior officer of Poltava, which in the battle in the Yellow Sea fell behind due to problems with the machine, and was under fire from the entire Japanese fleet for several hours, writes with pride: "The first squadron knew how to fight."
    But what about the opinion, or rather not the disguised confusion at the beginning of the Tsushima battle of the fired officer, Captain 2nd Rank V.I. Semenov, who was simply shocked by what he saw - "No! THIS was completely unlike on July 28th. There was the impression that two opponents met, that both of them were fighting with EQUAL weapon, that it was a battle. And here it is not a battle, but some kind of BATTLE! .." "No! THIS it was not that July 28th ... IT was SOMETHING ALL NEW! "
    You write - Thus, the "shell version" was finally formed, explaining Tsushima by the huge superiority of the Japanese shells over the Russians. Our fleet could not oppose anything to "flying mines" and "liquid fire".
    And here, as it were, we can agree with you. Why the first Russian dreadnoughts were FULLY booked. But! After the battle in the Yellow Sea, it never occurred to anyone to book the ENTIRE HULL of the ship.
    But at the end you conclude: - Now we can summarize. Russian shells can hardly be called the cause of the Tsushima defeat.
    But this conclusion is already obvious! Since the cause of the pogrom were JAPANESE SHELLS. But why exactly they and how, I did not find the answer in your article!
    Let's take an excerpt from "Tsushima" by A.S. Novikov-Surf: "Yushchin went to the stern, but it was not so easy to get there. At every step there was destruction, pieces of iron were scattered, overturned and torn to pieces by the bulkhead. There were breaks not only in the sides, but also in the deck. All internal equipment turned into a heap of wreckage. In the midst of this chaos, mutilated corpses were lying around. Yushchin rushed on, but the ruins of the officers' cabins and the raging flames blocked his path. The eyes blazed with heat and eaten away with smoke. Everything around him had changed so much that Yushchin could not even understand where he was. He stopped in front of the hatch. with a broken ladder and saw a battery deck under him. I wanted to go down, but did not dare. There was not a single living person around him, and no one extinguished the fires. Obviously, panic drove people into the lower rooms. But he imagined that he was only one survived on the whole ship, which was going forward, no one knew where, not controlled by anyone ... p some other ships " Question: Where is the crew of the battleship Borodino?
    There was no such thing on "Poltava" in the Yellow Sea! And then the "Eagle" is all in smoke. I will be told that in the First Squadron, all combustible materials (furniture, wood trim) were removed from the ships! So on "Eagle", according to the memoirs of V.P. Kostenko, they also threw everything overboard.
    So did the Japanese have new shells of unheard-of destructive power, because the Japanese fleet had shot most of the ammunition in the battles with the Port Arthur squadron? After all, there was such a telegram from the Japanese envoy Gayashi, intercepted by Russian intelligence: "London, October 13, 1904 ... the war shells ordered in June will also be ready no later than November 18 and, together with other orders, will be sent by ships."
    And so you get one-sided: "Particular displeasure they cause readers doubts about the" genius "of the Japanese commander-in-chief, in the" ordinariness of Japanese shells "and in the" skill of Japanese artillerymen "who" easily "drowned the enemy.
    This is the first.
    And secondly, there is a rather curious article by Igor Franchuk: "The last convincing argument of Admiral Togo" https://proza.ru/2013/04/20/1893
    There is just about double-action fuses, about which there were comments here and about somersaults of shells like a stick thrown in the game towns (According to V.I.Semenov) I would like to hear your opinion on this hypothesis.
    Thank you!
    1. -2
      12 October 2020 23: 30
      Quote: Kayuk
      But what about the opinion, or rather not the disguised confusion at the beginning of the Tsushima battle of the fired combat officer, Captain 2nd Rank V.I. Semenov,

      Semyonov is a windbag and a dreamer, who will not be called a military officer. An energetic careerist, yes. One of the active organizers of the surrender of Admiral Rozhesvensky and his staff. Read his testimony at the trial, there he still does not like that. And he managed to get away with it! I put my colleagues under execution and myself in the bushes ..

      It is not surprising that he had to hastily invent "objective" reasons for such an enchanting drain. From there, even from Japanese captivity, from Rozhdestvensky and his people, fairy tales about "bad battleships" and shells "of the wrong system" began.
      1. +2
        13 October 2020 00: 14
        One of the active organizers of the surrender of Admiral Rozhesvensky and his staff.

        Greetings! Please provide a link to this statement ...
        1. 0
          13 October 2020 22: 49
          Quote: Kayuk
          Please provide a link to this statement ...

          Please: E. V. Dubrovsky
          Cases about the surrender to the Japanese 1) the destroyer "Bedovy" and 2) the squadron of Nebogatov.
          1. 0
            13 October 2020 22: 52
            Thank you, I will read it, I will answer. I still have other information. But all this later ...
      2. +1
        13 October 2020 13: 49
        From there, even from Japanese captivity, from Rozhdestvensky and his people, fairy tales about "bad battleships" and shells "of the wrong system" began.

        "Tales" came from those who surrendered from Nebogatov's detachment, and from him in the first place ...
        1. 0
          14 October 2020 04: 45
          Quote: Kayuk
          "Tales" came from those who surrendered from Nebogatov's detachment, and from him in the first place

          That's right.
    2. +1
      12 October 2020 23: 46
      Andrei, good afternoon!
      1. "Diana" got three hits in FM. That is why there was such a contrast for Semyonov in Tsushima.
      2. About the Japanese miracle shells, I really did not develop the topic. But my opinion is that the shells were ordinary NOT, there were just a lot of hits, mainly SC. This is the main difference between Tsushima and other battles of the RNP. And the Japanese had one fuse (the second was also, but not for those shells that we are discussing).
      3. The ricochets of Japanese shells were indeed noted back in the PA, but armor-piercing shells! And in Tsushima, these were used to a limited extent. Landmines exploded from hitting the water.
      4. I read a lot about somersaults too. This only confirms my version that the Japanese landmines exploded not from the fuse, but from the impact.
      5. On the "Eagle" not all the tree was thrown away, they had no right to throw out something without the admiral's order.
      1. 0
        13 October 2020 00: 08
        3. The ricochets of Japanese shells were indeed noted in the PA, but armor-piercing shells!

        Excuse me, Alexey, I can't agree with you here ... Is that how armor-piercing shells explode?
        "... the 8-inch projectile RICOCHETED from the water, hitting the overhang of the deckhouse roof on the left side and exploding near the gap." (Ship engineer V.P. Kostenko battleship "Eagle")
        "I could no longer stay at the operational point, and without thinking, I climbed onto the upper deck, tired and indifferent to danger ... At that moment, a shell fell into the sea near the ship, slid on its surface, scattered spray and RICOCHETS again rose into the air, long and black like a dolphin. With a twenty-pound weight, he collapsed onto the deck. At the site of the explosion, a liquid flame shot up and spilled out, enclosed by a spreading ring of brown smoke. " (Non-commissioned officer A.S. Novikov battleship "Eagle", aka the famous writer Novikov-Priboy)
        "The enemy immediately opened fire and focused it on" Oslyab ", while flights and RICOCHETS lay down near" Borodino "and" Eagle "..." (Lieutenant Durnovo P.P. - commander of the destroyer "Bravy")

        This is all from this article ....
        1. 0
          13 October 2020 00: 13
          Quote: Kayuk
          Is that how armor-piercing shells explode?

          I sincerely cannot understand what confuses you?
          1. 0
            13 October 2020 00: 17
            he crashed onto the deck. At the site of the explosion, a liquid flame shot up and spilled,

            Well, at least this! Is this armor-piercing?
            1. 0
              13 October 2020 00: 25
              Japanese armor-piercing is not at all armor-piercing against fuses and explosives. It differs from its land mine only in slightly thicker walls, shorter length and less explosives.
              And the liquid flame - the shimosa, which had not completely detonated, burned out on the deck.
              1. 0
                13 October 2020 00: 48
                And detonates on impact on the deck? (The flame shot up, that is, it went up) Or from a blow to the overhang of the conning tower roof? But Lutonin writes that in the Yellow Sea, Japanese shells bounced (ricocheted) off the armor, leaving a trace of radiance on the armor. Those. they did not have time to weigh! And as I understood from your article and the commentary to it, armor-piercing was mainly used there. It turns out in Tsushima they (armor-piercing) learned to explode like high-explosive, from impact. Moreover, the second. (The first blow goes to the water) And the direction of the explosion is not along the trajectory of the projectile, but up and to the sides? But this is a pure blast of a land mine, or like V.I. Semenova - MINES!
                1. +1
                  13 October 2020 08: 19
                  Quote: Kayuk
                  And detonates on impact on the deck?

                  Even ours detonated from hitting the deck.
                  Quote: Kayuk
                  Lutonin writes that in the Yellow Sea, Japanese shells bounced (ricocheted) off the armor, leaving a trace of radiance on the armor.

                  Does Lutonin write like that?
                  Quote: Kayuk
                  there were mainly used armor-piercing

                  In LM, armor piercing accounted for just under half of the shells fired.
                  Quote: Kayuk
                  It turns out in Tsushima they (armor-piercing) learned to explode like high-explosive, from impact. Moreover, the second. (The first hit is on the water)

                  Anything can happen. And why do you think that when hitting the deck, the fuse could not have worked?
                  Quote: Kayuk
                  And the direction of the explosion is not along the trajectory of the projectile, but up and to the sides?

                  The direction of the blast wave is uniform in all directions. Shards are another matter.
                  1. 0
                    13 October 2020 11: 19
                    Does Lutonin write like that?

                    Three 12-inch rounds hitting the lower armor made only radiant prints, but the armor remained intact. Yes, I got excited with a ricochet from the armor ... Although the glow could have been from him ... Yes
                    1. +1
                      13 October 2020 22: 59
                      Quote: Kayuk
                      Although the radiance could have come from him ...

                      "Shine" is the result of the shock wave work. How can it appear from a ricochet?
      2. 0
        13 October 2020 13: 42
        there were just a lot of hits, mainly SK.

        That is, as I understand you, the main difference between Tsushima and other battles of the RNP is mainly the numerous hits of the Japanese NC. And this is the main reason for the fires on the lead ships, the destruction of control systems, fire extinguishing and firing systems, fear, doom or panic, which drove the crews of the ships under the armored deck (Numerous evidences, including those given here by S. Yushchina), poor preparation emergency parties (According to NJ Campbell) and as a result - their (lead ships) subsequent death ... ????.
        1. 0
          13 October 2020 15: 55
          Yes, my opinion is about the same
          1. +2
            13 October 2020 17: 24
            Then it turns out that the British made the wrong conclusions from this battle, hastily laying down the "Dreadnought" with a single main battery of 305mm, followed by a faster-firing SK 152-203mm? And why then "Poltava" successfully resisted 2-4 ships for 7 hours, extinguished fires (Moreover, the beds did not catch fire, but only began to smolder, the fire hoses did not wet from the explosions), the artillery, except, in my opinion, 2 152mm guns were intact etc. etc. What, the Japanese gunners learned to shoot ???? And how then to relate to the words of the same Lutonin: “I will not talk about the 6-inch shells that hit the Poltava and what hit above the upper deck. It was sheer destruction, but there are no vital parts at the top - and the combat power of the battleship from such damage is not reduced to zero. " sad
            1. +2
              13 October 2020 18: 28
              Quote: Kayuk
              the British made the wrong conclusions

              The British made the right conclusion. They not only made a single main engine, but also a speed of 21 knots. A ship with a strong SC would simply not be able to come within the effective range of its fire)))
              Quote: Kayuk
              And why then “Poltava” successfully resisted 2-4 ships for 7 hours

              And you look at the distance;)
              Quote: Kayuk
              Japanese gunners learned to shoot ????

              And that too.
              Quote: Kayuk
              And how then to relate to the words of the same Lutonin

              Still, "Poltava" received much fewer shells than "Eagle".
              1. The comment was deleted.
  21. +2
    13 October 2020 21: 41
    Quote: Kayuk
    But in the winter of 1904-1905, the Japanese seem to have received from the British a batch of new milled shell hulls of a large 5-5,5 caliber elongation with a charging chamber that allows the mass of explosives in the projectile to be increased to 12,5. % of the total mass of the projectile. And these were really no longer classic high-explosive shells, but in fact thin-walled mines with a huge charge of high-explosive explosives at that time - shimosa

    Do not drag links here to do not understand what!
    Well, there is data from the SSI, from British observers, normal articles ... The only thing is that the weight of the explosives in the shells floats ...
    1. 0
      13 October 2020 22: 17
      I agree with you. The link is not very ... But what can you say about the description by Lutonin against V.I. Semenov, etc ....? In one, specifically, bunks and suitcases moistened with water smolder, in the other, plentifully watered with water, instantly flare up with a bright fire.
      1. 0
        13 October 2020 23: 24
        I have read not only these two, so I rather believe Lutonin. Even Kostenko is closer to Lutonin.
  22. 0
    14 October 2020 19: 48
    Quote: rytik32
    Right! And even the Japanese were then interested in what we cover the bottom.

    In Polenov's book, to which you referred just now, exactly the opposite is written about Oleg.
  23. +1
    16 October 2020 21: 43
    Many thanks to the author for the loop. A lot of factual material. Please write more! hi

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"