Supercavitating torpedo "Shkval": effective, but not effective
The phrase in the headline was spoken to the representatives of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" by the specialists of the WASS firm ("Whitehead") at one of the naval salons in 1999. The opposite point of view of a fashionable journalist (very poorly versed in the subject), a columnist for The National Interest of Kayla Mizokami:
How are things really?
History first
The first projects of rocket-propelled torpedoes appeared almost simultaneously with the "classic" torpedoes (here it should be noted that the underwater launch of missiles, at the time of the appearance of the Whitehead self-propelled mine, had already been implemented in 1838 on our submarine by engineer-general KA Schilder).
Serious practical work on rocket-propelled torpedoes began in the mid-30s. (applied to aviation carriers and torpedo boats). In 1941-1951. at NII-400 (the future Central Research Institute "Gidropribor"), an experimental prototype of the RT-45-2 rocket torpedo of 45 cm caliber with I. Isaev's liquid-propellant engine powered by nitric acid-kerosene vapor was developed. A speed of 70-75 knots was assumed for a distance of 1,5-2 km.
Due to the lack of safety of the torpedo and the short range, the work was closed. At the same time, it was she who gave impetus to subsequent work on supercavitation in the USSR, the starting point of which was a memorandum, later one of the key developers on the subject of Uvarov G.V., with an analysis of the complex of problems of RT-45, and the conclusion that their a solution is possible only on the basis of a transition to a supercavitating product.
The first rocket torpedo put into service was the aircraft RAT-2 (chief designer Dillon G. Ya.) Developed at the Research Institute-52 of the Minaviaprom, with a powder jet engine. The PAT-52 turned out to be an original breakthrough product in the domestic torpedo industry, where, in addition to the engine, for the first time such innovations as safety fuses, bank leveling, and a unified control system for the air and underwater sector appeared (which they later preferred to forget up to now!).
The most surprising thing is that the PAT-52 did not require complicated maintenance, it turned out to be very reliable, despite the fact that it was developed in an extremely short time (1947-1952). We have to regret very much that its chief designer quickly passed away and did not manage to teach the torpedoists everything.
In 1956, during the next reorganization, the aviation torpedo theme from the Research Mine and Torpedo Institute (NIMTI) of the Navy was transferred to the NII-15 Navy (later a branch of the Central Research Institute 30 of the Ministry of Defense), and NII-24 was first involved in the development of aircraft jet torpedoes. , and then a specially created Research Institute PGM (hereinafter NPO "Region"). But these were “classic” hydrodynamic torpedoes, only with a jet engine, and they should be the subject of a separate (and interesting) conversation. Let's go back to "supercavitation".
At the end of 1946, at NIO-12 TsAGI under the leadership of engineer-major G.V. Logvinovich, assigned from the Navy. applied research on the issues of cavitation of torpedo weapons began. The first running model was tested by G.V. Logvinovich. and Uvarov G.V. in December 1952 under the ice of the Pirogov reservoir near Moscow.
An experimental prototype of the torpedo was created at the Research Institute-1 of the Ministry of Agriculture The initial layout was proposed by G.V. Logvinovich: a disc, a profiled head part, a cylindrical part (with a fuel charge) and a converging aft part with torpedo-type stabilizers, rudders and a nozzle. The 1956 tests were unsuccessful. On the initiative of the chief engineer of NIMTI A.I. Larionov it was decided to install a "ropeway" and launch products "on a leash" And again failures and failures.
In 1957, the tests were stopped, but three enthusiastic stubborn people, P.I. Alferov, G.V. Uvarov. and IM Libinstein, after the analysis decided to return to launches in free motion (without the "cable car"), and success came, so far small - about 700 meters of rectilinear motion at a constant depth in just over 6 seconds. Additional tests followed, according to the results of which the development of the RKT-45 reactive cavitating torpedo for torpedo boats was set.
In 1960 Logvinovich G.V. prepared a report to the command of the Navy that achievements in the field of high-speed hydrodynamics in combination with a highly efficient ramjet jet engine, in principle, make it possible to create a unique high-speed cavitating submarine missile.
The report hit the top ten, because the government has just issued a decree on the creation of an automated nuclear submarine project 705 (general scientific leadership: Aleksandrov A.P. and Trapeznikov V.A.). In addition, the American magazine "Missiles and Rocket" for 1958 published a program for the creation in the United States of new models of anti-submarine naval weapons, including data on the project of the EX-8 underwater missile, "equipped with a rocket or hydro-jet engine of the torpedo type , providing a speed of 150 knots and more ”.
On October 13, 1960, a Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers was issued on the creation of a domestic super-high-speed torpedo "Shkval". Work on the RKT-45 torpedo was discontinued. MS Merkulov was appointed the chief designer of the Shkval. (from "artillerymen", who at that time were massively transferred to "rocket men"), scientific guidance was provided by NIO-12 TsAGI (Lotov A.B., Logvinovich G.B.).
In addition, TsAGI began the design of a large-scale reusable rocket-laboratory - "model 205", in the layout of which (similar to the M-1, the first experimental model of the "Shkval") provided:
- rotary cavitator with a central opening for water intake into the main engine;
- direct-flow hydrojet engine designed by MS Merkulov;
- detachable autonomous booster solid rocket motor;
- system of blowing into the cavity using compressed air.
In 1961, model 205 launches began on the Moscow Sea. Initially, the launches were successful. "Knockout" happened with the beginning of the development of the main section, model 205 lost controllability and took off the air. The M-1 rocket launches were also unsuccessful.
Taking into account the entire burden of responsibility, the Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the discussion of the current situation were extremely sharp and not always scientific and technical. Representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade demanded the transfer of R&D to R&D (for the practical nuances of R&D and R&D, see the material "Torpedo SET-53: Soviet" totalitarian ", but real"), or even better, complete cessation of work. In contrast to it, a group from the USSR Academy of Sciences, consisting of leading specialists and academicians V.A. Trapeznikov, A.A. Mikulin, Kh.A. Rakhmatullin, acted.
But theoretical science could not help here, success came after TsAGI's experiments on the study of the processes of starting an engine in a cavitation cavity. It became clear that it was necessary to make fundamental changes to the 205 model and the M-1 product. This was done in the shortest possible time, right at the test site. The accelerating stage was combined with the main engine. The accelerating stage was now located in the sub-caliber part and connected to the combustion chamber of the main engine, a single supersonic nozzle was installed, which ensured a continuous flow of gases in the acceleration and march sections.
The test results were positive. The Shkval variant with this layout was designated M-3. In May 1963, regular launches began from the test stand at Lake Issyk-Kul.
4 years have passed since the start of work, but its complexity was such that there were still 13 years of work ahead (that is, the total duration of development (R&D) of Shkval was 17 years). Former Deputy Head of the Department of Anti-Submarine Weapons of the Navy, R.A. Gusev wrote:
In 1967, M.S. Merkulov was replaced by V.R. Serov, who soon (but not for long) became the head of the established Research Institute PGM (future "Region").
In 1969, the M4-1-M variant of the Shkval passed the full range for the first time in accordance with the TTZ (tactical and technical assignment of the ROC). SRI PGM was strengthened by missilemen with the change of Serov to A.I. Zarubin. (director of Research Institute PGM) and Rakova E.D. (chief designer of the ROC), which ensured the completion of the development of "Shkval". The Shkval anti-submarine complex with the M5 missile was adopted by the Navy on November 29, 1977.
Gusev R.A .:
- All three played a significant role in the creation of the underwater missile. But I would give the first place to M.S. Merkulov. Under him, the main scientific and technical problems were solved, the appearance of an underwater rocket was formed.
- And why was it replaced?
- I would say that he did not work well with the leadership of TsAGI. At that time, the head of TsAGI was V.M. Myasishchev, a well-known aircraft designer ... Myasishchev intuitively felt that the chief designer should interact more closely with TsAGI. After some time, V.R. Serov became the director of NII-24. Appointed for scale. He worked for V.P. Makeev, and it was rumored that their cooperation did not work out. Serov was the smartest man, focused on the future, but with a Napoleonic character. It seems to me that his character was ruined. After some time, the development of "Shkval" was continued by DE Rakov, and Serov took up the prospect: under him the Research Institute of PTM was created. Rakov made his creative contribution by creating another modification of the rocket, now M-5, under the banner of increasing reliability, manufacturability, etc. But our paths here decisively diverged. By this time, Logvinovich pushed me slightly aside as a possible competitor. But for you to know, I firmly adhere to the position that Rakov and Logvinovich have significantly increased the development period ...
Flurry Result
200 knots under water, and even 10 km, is an outstanding result. The only problem is where to put it.
Initially "Shkval" went to the 705 project, which had unique speed and maneuverability characteristics, moreover, as an example of high-speed underwater weapons, complementing the Vyuga anti-submarine missile (PLR) (actually "covering" its "dead zone"). It was as part of the combat complex 705 of the project, and "Blizzard" and "Shkval" were "a single whole", and were effectively provided with target designation of a powerful sonar tract of the SJSC "Ocean".
Here it must be borne in mind that in the US Navy since the mid-60s. in service was the Sabroc PLR (only with nuclear weapons - YABP). The war with the United States was then considered exclusively with the use of nuclear weapons.
However, the mass series 705 of the project did not go, and on all other projects the "bottlenecks" of the Shkval were acute, first of all, significant restrictions on the launch depth, the angle of the post-launch turn, and only the nuclear option. When, in the overwhelming majority of cases, for the same 671RTM, the battle will begin with an acoustician's report "Torpedo 90 Right !!!", "Shkval" (which in this situation is simply impossible to use) turns from a weapon into ballast, which simply takes ) torpedo tube (TA). And if there are two "Shkvalov" on the boat, then minus two TA (at the request of the relevant authorities, underwater weapons with nuclear warheads of the Navy were stored only in TA).
An attack on surface targets? However, the distance of 10 km left our submarines little chance of secretly reaching it against ships with good hydroacoustics.
High-speed submarine missiles (SPR) are fatally inferior to PLR in terms of range and ensuring the minimum delivery time of the warhead to the target.
The thesis of the “under-ice use” of the Shkval is not substantiated due to the very small marching depth of the Shkval and the unacceptably high probability of collision with ice. This problem was understood, and one of the directions of development of the missile defense system immediately became an increase in the marching depth, but this required a significant increase in speed, and therefore new energy requirements (which were already limiting for a 53-cm product, for example, "Shkval" had a mass of 2,7 , 65 t with a SET-1,7 torpedo mass of XNUMX t).
However, the most critical issue was that the effective firing ranges of Western torpedoes (telecontrolled) submarines were significantly greater than the full range of the Shkval. Those. US Navy submarines had the opportunity to shoot our submarines with torpedoes and "Shkvalami" with impunity from a safe distance for themselves (they were only afraid of submarines). Some possibilities would have been in the 65 cm SPR, but they never appeared, and today in the Navy "thick" TA is generally anathema.
Along with all this, "Shkval" has become a powerful PR factor, and even in the days of the USSR. The extremely difficult situation with the torpedoes of the USSR Navy was realized, incl. and above (in the Central Committee of the CPSU), and then the fleet, for a cheerful report, drew the argument: not everything is bad, here we have a "Shkval", but not in the USA.
Here it is appropriate to recall the espionage case of E. Pope (2000) about the alleged US attempts to seize the secrets of the "Shkval". In reality, at the time of 2000, the US “Flurry” was simply not interesting. There are good reasons to believe that the United States had not only documentation on it, but also samples ... At the same time, it would not be a bad thing for domestic specialists (and representatives of the relevant authorities) to figure out (for the good of the case) what really interested Pope (and in which corral the topic of these works, where we once were in the lead, eventually ended up with us).
In 1995, at the international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi, the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" was presented an export version of the SPR - "Shkval-E". The nuclear warhead was replaced by a conventional warhead with a TNT equivalent of slightly more than 200 kg to destroy surface targets. Given the absence of a homing system, the effective range of Shkval-E did not exceed 7 km.
Shkval development
The development of the MSS in the USSR continued continuously, and new variants went into operation even before the completion of the ROC "Shkval". At the same time, the main direction was increasing the speed up to more than 150 m / s (300 knots), increasing the depth (march and launch), expanding the conditions of use and the possibility of using a non-nuclear warhead (with homing). The search went through the widest range of options possible at times was on the verge of fantasy.
In the form of specific projects, work was carried out on the themes "Shkval-15" and "Shkval-15B" with the release of a new generation of SPR with dramatically improved performance characteristics. Work on "Shkval-15B" crippled the 1990s, and to our great regret, a lot of useful and useful things were missing. "Shkval-15B" has become the swan song of Uvarov G.V. People who worked with him noted his extremely objective view of the topic, an extremely critical attitude to "satisfying scientific curiosity at the expense of the state."
From the standpoint of today we have to regret that "Shkval-15B" was not completed, it was the maximum possible, but at a very reasonable cost. Moreover, the combat equipment for this missile defense system was extremely promising for a number of other topics of the Navy. But in the 90s, in order to survive, enterprises had to cut live. We chose the theme of anti-torpedoes (“Lasta”), which later became “Packet” and “Physicist”.
In the 2000s, when funding became more available, work on the topic continued, but with all the specifics of the new economic conditions. And in all the color and aroma it manifested itself in the Predator theme (more on this later).
From the passport of the innovative development program of Tactical Missile Armament Corporation for the period up to 2020:
For underwater high-speed missiles.
1. Combat equipment providing high efficiency of destruction of NK in the minimum permissible time.
2. Passing the distance to the target at a given depth with a high average trajectory speed in the developed cavitation mode.
3. Magnetometric guidance system, which allows with a high probability to determine the moment of passage in the target zone and give a command to separate the combat equipment.
During the military-technical forum "Army-2015" a round table "Marine underwater weapons (MPS): realities and prospects" was held, among the reports was the speech of the chief designer of JSC "State Scientific and Production Enterprise" Region "IV Garanin. "Prospects for the development of high-speed underwater objects." The report (as well as the whole topic of the round table) caused a heated discussion, incl. resonance in the media. The author's position was set out in the article “Russia's naval underwater weapons today and tomorrow. Will the breakthrough be made out of the torpedo crisis? ".
At the same time, for a long time we have underestimated the most interesting and promising direction for the development of supercavitational ammunition - the "small-caliber" one, in which the West worked successfully. From the positive in the reports of the round table "Army-15", it should be noted that the prospects of the "small-caliber direction" of the SMR are recognized by the leading domestic experts.
At the same round table, the report of the director of NPK Max, OJSC NPP Radar MMS, VV Averkiev, took place. “Magnetometric guidance systems for naval underwater weapons in conditions of massive hydraulic resistance. Theory and results ”. With a rather scandalous discussion. From the article “Russia's naval underwater weapons today and tomorrow. Will the breakthrough be made out of the torpedo crisis? " about magnetometric guidance system:
At the same time, there really is an area of effective application for this equipment, but instead, this equipment is prescribed for obviously non-optimal directions.
The article did not indicate the most scandalous moment of this discussion: the specialists of the Navy and Mr. Averkiev declared the alleged impossibility of countering such equipment by means of hydroacoustic counteraction (SGPD), and this was also cheerfully reported to the leadership. In fact, it was just a play on words: the GSPD, as a rule, were hydroacoustics means, and, accordingly, could not influence the magnetometric means.
The only problem was that a number of Western SRS (for example, the Mk30 simulator) have, in addition to acoustics, a magnetometric imitation channel (for practicing aviation on them). At the same time, the same Mr. Averkiev, during the round table, declared about "the need to create imitation tools" for working out his magnetometric channel, and this was done an hour after the statement about the "impossibility of this"! To the author's question as to how such opposite statements fit together, the answer was a painful silence. Actually, everything was clear to everyone.
From the article “Russia's naval underwater weapons today and tomorrow. Will the breakthrough come from the "torpedo crisis?"
One of these intrigues was the Predator OCD. Alas, instead of the maximum possible from the technically real, which was in the "Shkval-15B", the "Predator" initially had maximum opportunities for the development of budgetary funds by the right people (here is a magnetometric system pulled by the ears, behind which protruded the ears of a significant number of people with shoulder straps and without, prepared to master the sweet budget pie).
A tough and negative attitude towards the "Predator" was formed by the author during the period of work on the projects of the concept of naval underwater weapons at Admiral Suchkov. Lobbyists of this topic tried to justify "their own", up to the almost complete replacement of torpedoes and submarine missiles by "Predators".
Moreover, the Predator ROC opened in 2009 turned out to be not only terribly expensive, but, in fact, the only serious ROC on the subject of underwater weapons at that moment. At the same time, we had a catastrophic situation with torpedoes, not only in terms of their military-technical backwardness, but also simply by their presence ... At that time, it came to the point that our submarines went to combat services, having only a few torpedoes in ammunition. And in this situation, the "Predator" was nothing more than a feast during the plague.
Yes, in this situation, they tried to put some very necessary and correct things and developments into it ... But for some reason they were “lost” in the process, despite the fact that without them the possibility of the “Predator” to work as intended raises serious questions.
In 2016, the title of the topic "Predator" was "lit up" in the media. JSC "KB" Electropribor "(Saratov) presented application presentation to participate in the competition "Aircraft Builder of the Year", based on the results of 2015, held by the Union of Aircraft Manufacturers of Russia.
At the end of 2016, it is planned to carry out preliminary tests of the submarine missile component, including sea trials of the apparatus, according to the results of which the design documentation of the submarine missile component of the letter "O" will be assigned.
Our popular media did not lose face. Headlines like: "Predator" - the perfect killer of aircraft carriers. The Shkval is being replaced by an even more powerful rocket torpedo "...
What is the bottom line? Especially taking into account the fact that it is 2020, and the letter "O" (that is, the completion of preliminary tests and the transition to the state stage) were promised by the accomplices of this process back in 2016? As a result, today arbitration.
For example, the case No. A57-15277 / 2019.
According to clause 1.1 of the contract, the Contractor undertakes to fulfill and timely deliver to the Customer in accordance with the requirements and terms of the contract and the Execution List, and the Customer undertakes to accept and pay for the component part of the work "Predator-OKP" defense order and agreement of 411, No. 12.11.2009/253/08 / K / 8-0013 for the work of the Predator, concluded between the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and JSC GNPP Region (Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 09 No. 29.12.2009-1036, dated 55, No. 12.08.2009-658).
All this is very sad, and not only because huge funds were "devoured" (and at the moment when they were critically lacking for torpedoes), but also because the chief designer of the "Predator" is an outstanding and promising specialist and leader ... Unfortunately, we have very few queens, but there are too many of those about whom they say “the product is afraid of water, because its chief designer is afraid of water” (in this particular case, sea tests were meant).
At the same time, you need to understand that queens do not grow on trees, and their inclinations can only be revealed as a result of thoughtful, reasonable and hard work to create a new one. Young Korolev S.P. was a completely different person (sometimes with very ambiguous actions and decisions) than the world-famous “chief” Korolev.
Alas, Predator OCD is not a topic that shapes queens.
What to do with her now? Finish. And not in the form of "third grade is not a marriage", as they are trying to do today, but starting with an objective disclosure of all problems and their objective assessment, removal of all "cutting" points from the requirements for the product, but the unconditional fulfillment (and real confirmation!) Of those which are key in combat.
There is some usefulness of such products, and not only in the Arctic. The same Sea of Okhotsk in winter is covered with ice cover over a significant part of the area. However, it is necessary to clearly and fundamentally realize that the 53 cm SPR, due to the significant lag in the range of use from torpedoes, can only be considered as an auxiliary means in battle.
Here it would be appropriate to quote the phrase of a major Russian specialist in the subject, said at the beginning of 2010:
And the interesting thing is the possibility of all-depth movement (and not the constant and extremely shallow depth of the "monsters"), active maneuvering, installation of homing systems. However, this was possible only on products of a significantly smaller caliber than 53 cm. There was a certain backlog in this part - these were aviation anti-submarine missiles, which in some cases went into "semi-cavitation mode". However, we did not take decisive steps towards full-scale work in this direction ...
Supercavitation with so-called partners. West and East
From Jane's International Defense Review, December 2001:
Unlike our "monsters", R&D on the subject of supercavitation in the United States went in the direction of the most effective subject. The situation was similar in the Federal Republic of Germany, which conducted similar studies. Taking this factor into account, at a certain stage, the work in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany was merged, but so far they are being conducted only at the level of experiments and the development of scientific groundwork.
Given the sufficient effectiveness of small-sized torpedoes, there is no need for supercavitating weapons yet. So far ... But the development of torpedo defenses significantly changes this alignment. Today, an attacking small-sized torpedo is very likely to be destroyed by the M15 anti-torpedo, but it can hit an object at a speed of over 200 knots. impossible.
Accordingly, Western countries form the necessary scientific and technical groundwork in order to translate it into real ROC at the right time.
Work on this topic is being carried out in China, as evidenced by some extremely fragmentary information from the "Chinese Internet".
At the same time, it is necessary to objectively understand that China both "semi-officially" and through the channels of the special services received a very large amount of information on the "Shkval" from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (the media mentioned the delivery of 40 Shkval missiles by Kazakhstan).
As for the "Iranian supercavitating torpedo", it will be enough just to give its photo:
The fact is obvious.
Ultra small calibers
From the article "High-speed submarine missiles of submarines" E. S. Shakhidzhanov and Yu. V. Suslov:
Gusev R.A:
An echo of those works:
Those. at the turn of the beginning of the 90s. we were definitely and significantly ahead of everyone else.
And now? And now we are chasing "monsters" (more precisely, abundant use of budgetary funds for "monsters".
At the same time in the USA and a number of other countries (for example, Norway, DSG company):
Slightly and slightly the author touched on this topic in 2015 in the article "Each torpedo has a shell".
Separately, it is necessary to touch upon the allegedly US Navy's anti-mine system RAMICS with a laser radar station supposedly detecting mines and destroying them with supercavitating shells.
The problem is that, according to the assessment of competent domestic experts, the RAMICS laser station by its design features is primarily an anti-submarine means of detecting the "trace" of submarines. Accordingly, our specialists have good reason to think hard about the real (and not declared) purposes of the RAMICS gun.
Why is this question posed in a public article? But because these questions were raised many times before those "who are supposed to". With a near-zero result ...
A conversation with "modern specialists" of the Russian Navy at the Army 2020 forum on this topic provoked an interesting reaction:
- Actually, it was, and with huge statistics of work, only now it managed to be covered with a thick layer of dust (although, most likely, it is still a worker), waiting for the attention of the customer (who was reported about this many times).
Conclusions
If at the beginning of the 90s. Since we were certainly and significantly in the lead in the subject of supercavitation, today we are objectively and significantly outstripped by foreign competitors.
Today, three main areas of work have been identified:
- large-sized items of 53 cm caliber ("Shkval", "Predator"), capable only of straight-line movement at shallow depths with the possibility of equipping with "passengers" such as nuclear warheads or ordinary small-sized torpedoes (which is what we focus on);
- small-sized all-deep maneuverable products with homing systems (which is the focus in the West);
- ultra-small items of the "cannon projectile" type (where we were in the lead for a long time, but today we have completely given this topic to the West).
The key reason for the emerging and already significant lag is the unreasonable bet on "monsters" of 53 cm caliber, despite the fact that they are deliberately flawed and lose to torpedoes and anti-submarine missiles in most tactical situations, up to the fact that our submarine with "Predators" the enemy can shoot torpedoes from a safe distance with absolutely impunity.
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