Military Review

The defeat of the 3rd Soviet army in Belarus

44
The defeat of the 3rd Soviet army in Belarus

Prisoners of the Red Army


100 years ago, Polish troops defeated the 3rd Soviet Army in Belarus. On September 28-29, Soviet troops tried to recapture Lida. The assault followed the assault. As a result, Lazarevich's army suffered a complete defeat. Thousands of Red Army soldiers were killed, wounded or taken prisoner.

Bloody Bor


By the morning of September 25, 1920, the 3rd Soviet Army withdrew across the Neman, maintaining bridgeheads on its western bank. The Soviet command planned to create a new front in the direction of Druskeniki, occupied by the Poles. However, the Soviet divisions could not quickly make large transitions, and the enemy managed to go deep into the rear of the 3rd Army to Lida. Under these conditions, on the evening of September 25, Tukhachesky ordered the 3rd army to withdraw to Lida, and the troops of the 15th and 16th armies to the river. Ball.

On the northern flank of the front, the main forces of Lazarevich's army were retreating along the Grodno-Lida highway. The 21st Infantry Division withdrew to the northeast along the Grodno-Radun road, and the main forces of the army (2nd, 5th, 6th and 56th divisions) through Vasilishki. Meanwhile, the Poles were going to take Lida, an important communications center, in order to take the Reds into the encirclement ring. On the 27th, Polish troops launched an offensive against Lida from the north and west - from Radun and along the Grodno road. The 1st division of the legions entered from the east, the 1st Lithuanian-Belarusian division advanced from the north-west of Porechye, the 21st mountain and 22nd volunteer divisions moved from the Grodno region along the Grodno-Lida highway.

The 1st brigade of the Lithuanian-Belarusian division (Vilensky and Minsk regiments) moved from Porechye through Bakshty (near Vasilishki) to the crossings on the Lebeda River in order to capture them before the Red Army men approached. In Vasilishki, the Poles with a surprise attack forced the brigade of the 2nd rifle division to flee. The Minsk regiment went to the crossings on the Lebed. At the same time, the main forces of the Soviet army began to go to the river. Some of the forward units had already crossed the river and made camp on the east side. The Poles, coming out of the Krovavy Bor forest, ran into the Red Felixes who were resting near the village. The Red Army men, who did not set up guards and believed that they were in the deep rear, were easily dispersed. Polish troops reached the village of Lebeda, where the field headquarters of the 3rd Army was located. Lazarevich and his entourage managed to escape. The commander managed to order the 5th division to attack the crossing from the west. After that, the command of the 3rd Army fled to Lida in a roundabout way, having lost contact with the divisions. Since that time, the troops of the army acted independently, having lost contact with the command.

First, the forward battalion of the Minsk regiment was attacked by a brigade of the 6th division from the east and units of the 2nd and 5th divisions from the west. Under the pressure of the Red Army, the Poles retreated into the forest, where they gained a foothold and held out until the arrival of two more battalions of their regiment. After that, the Poles again went on the attack and began a battle for the villages of Felix and Lebeda. Towards evening, the retreating regiments of Soviet divisions again pushed the enemy back into the forest. At 19 o'clock the Vilensky regiment approached. Polish soldiers went on the offensive again and captured the crossings. At 20 o'clock the troops of the 56th rifle division reached the crossings along the highway, and at 21 o'clock several thousand Red Army men in dense columns attacked the enemy in a narrow sector. Despite heavy rifle and machine gun fire, the Russian infantry broke through to the positions of the Polish troops. Night fell and the battle continued in the dark. Indiscriminate shooting, bloody hand-to-hand combat with rifle butts and bayonets. They fought desperately, both sides did not take prisoners. At the same time, units of the 2nd and 6th divisions hit the enemy. The Polish regiments suffered heavy losses and on the night of the 28th retreated into the forest. Our troops occupied the crossings, and by morning the main forces of the 3rd Army had gone towards Lida.

Thus, the Polish troops were unable to stop the Russians on the river. Quinoa. However, the headquarters of the 3rd Army was disorganized and lost contact with the divisions. The troops retreated and fought on their own. The path to Molodechno was cut off, it was necessary to go to Baranovichi. The delay of the divisions of Lazarevich's army in the battle at Bloody Bor made it easier for the Poles to capture Lida and create an obstacle for the Red Army to retreat through Lida. The Red Army and the Poles suffered heavy losses in this battle: hundreds of killed, wounded, captured and missing on both sides.


Source: Kakurin N. The Civil War in Russia: The War with the White Poles. M :, 2002

Battle of Lida


The Polish command set the task of quickly capturing Lida. This made it possible to cut the lines of retreat of the 3rd Red Army. From the north-west, the Lithuanian-Belarusian division was advancing on the city, from the east - the 1st division of legions with the 4th cavalry brigade, from the west were the columns of the 21st mountain and 22nd volunteer divisions. Soviet troops also marched towards Lida, but slowly, with delays.

The first to the city on the morning of September 28, 1920 was the 3rd brigade of the 1st division of the legions of Colonel Dombbernatsky. At 10 o'clock the Poles began a battle for the city. The offensive was carried out from the north. The Reds in the city had a large number, there was the headquarters of the 3rd Army, led by Lazarevich, but they were already discouraged due to previous events. Therefore, the Polish brigade captured Lida quite easily. The Red Army men ran after the army headquarters. The divisions of the army were left to fend for themselves. The regimental and divisional commanders, although poorly organized, attacked the enemy, trying to recapture the city and retreat to the east.

The Polish soldiers did not have time to gain a foothold, as Soviet troops appeared, which lingered in battles on the river. Quinoa. The first to attack Lida was the 5th Infantry Division, which suffered less losses in the battle at Bloody Bor than other divisions. The Red Army were able to carry out a surprise attack, recaptured the barracks, the railway station and broke into the city center. Fierce fighting ensued, in which both sides suffered heavy losses. The Polish batteries fired directly. After lunch, fresh battalions of legionnaires entered the battle. The counterattack of Polish reinforcements mixed the ranks of the Red Army, who were already rejoicing at the imminent victory. Having suffered serious losses, the 5th division retreated from Lida and began to withdraw south of the city. The advance brigade of the 5th Infantry Division, which was approaching from the west, also moved behind the units of the 56th division. Near the city, the Soviet brigade was ambushed and defeated by the Poles. At the same time, the Polish cavalry, bypassing the city from the east, attacked and defeated the units of the 6th Soviet division near the village of Dubrovna.

Late in the evening of September 28, units of the 21st Infantry Division reached the city. At about 22 o'clock, the Soviet infantry, with the support of artillery, launched a new assault on Lida. The fight was fierce, it came to hand-to-hand combat. At first, the Reds moved forward, occupied the barracks, but then the Poles launched a counterattack and threw the enemy back. The Soviet division, which had suffered more losses in the previous battles at Bloody Bor, retreated into the woodlands west of the city. By nightfall, the remnants of the Reds were driven out of the city. By the morning of the 29th the battle was over. The personnel of the 21st Infantry Division were angered by losses, setbacks and grueling marches. Ammunition and food supplies were running out. As a result, the soldiers mutinied, arrested the commissars who called for the battle to continue, and surrendered. On September 29, the Polish cavalry continued to pursue the enemy east of Lida, taking prisoners hundreds of Red Army men, several guns and dozens of machine guns.

Thus, Polish troops were able to keep Lida and defeat the enemy. However, the Polish divisions were unable to reach the city in time. In the battle for Lida, only the 1st division of legionnaires and a cavalry brigade took part. The rest of the units did not have time to approach Lida during the battle. The Polish troops in this sector were significantly inferior to the Reds in number. If the Soviet command had organized the attack of the 3rd Army divisions well, the enemy would have been defeated. Due to the mistakes of the Soviet command, the troops of the 3rd Army had to cede the city and change the route of retreat, opening the way for the enemy to the rear of the 15th and 16th armies of the Western Front. The divisions of the 3rd Army nearly hit the "cauldron". But some of the troops were captured (up to 10 thousand people). Polish soldiers seized dozens of guns and machine guns, army property.

This was a serious defeat for the Western Front under the command of Tukhachevsky. After the loss of Grodno and Lida, the northern wing of the Soviet front virtually disappeared. The 3rd Army narrowly escaped encirclement and complete destruction, for a while it lost its combat effectiveness. There was a threat of encirclement of the divisions of the 15th and 16th armies. Our troops continued to retreat to the east, while the Polish army developed an offensive.
Author:
Photos used:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/, http://militera.lib.ru/
Articles from this series:
Smoot. 1920 year

Battle of Rostov
The disaster of white Odessa
How Slashchev Crimea defended
Dono-Manych battle
The death of the Northern Army Miller
Why Western agent Kolchak is turned into a hero and martyr of Russia
The defeat of the army of Denikin in the battle of Tikhorets
How did the Ice Siberian campaign end
The fall of the White Kuban
Agony of White Novorossiysk
The death of the Kuban army
Denikin's resignation
Far Eastern Republic and the Japanese threat
Polish "liberation" campaign in Kiev
Baku “Blitzkrieg” of the Red Army
The battle for Belarus. May operation of the Red Army
War of the Russian Army Wrangel
The first victories of the Wrangel army
The defeat of the 13th Soviet Army in Northern Tavria
Our Kiev!
The battle for Rivne. How Budyonnovtsy smashed the Polish defense
Minsk is ours! The defeat of the Polish army in Belarus
Battle for Lviv. The failure of the Red Army in Galicia
The death of the cavalry group Rednecks
The fierce battle for the Kakhovsky bridgehead
The defeat of the landing group Ulagaya
"Miracle on the Vistula"
How Tukhachevsky destroyed his armies on the Vistula
Battle of Komarov. Defeat of the 1st Cavalry Army
Bukhara Blitzkrieg Frunze
"The danger of Wrangel is becoming enormous ..."
Battle on the Lower Dnieper
The last offensive of the Russian army
Battle of the Neman
Defeat of Tukhachevsky on the Neman
44 comments
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  1. Alexander Suvorov
    Alexander Suvorov 29 September 2020 06: 59
    +4
    N-daa messed up Tukhachevsky firewood. It was not for nothing that Stalin then pinched the personal belongings with the door, the Bonapartik unfinished. How many people have been ruined in vain.
    1. Sergey Oreshin
      Sergey Oreshin 29 September 2020 11: 33
      +5
      Well, you, of course, would have done much better in 20 and, without a doubt, you would have taken Warsaw, Berlin and Paris, and hoisted a red flag over Londongrad
      1. Alexander Suvorov
        Alexander Suvorov 29 September 2020 11: 39
        +3
        Did I mention my military talents somewhere in the commentary? No? Then what is your opus for?
        I just stated the well-known fact that from Tukhachevsky Bonaparte is like a candy from a known substance. There is a lot of ambition, but the exhaust is completely zero, that's all.
        Or do you have a personal dislike for me?
        1. Sergey Oreshin
          Sergey Oreshin 29 September 2020 11: 44
          +7
          Your comment is extremely dismissive and irrelevant.
          If we talk about Tukhachevsky, then on his account there were a lot of victories against the People's Army of KOMUCH in the 18th, Kolchak in the 19th, Denikin in the 20th, and the same Poles in the summer of 20th.
          Tukhachevsky made no attempts to raise a rebellion during the years of the Civil War and proclaim himself a dictator.
          Yes, he suffered a number of defeats in August-October 20th, but we must carefully analyze them, reveal the reasons, and then we will see that in addition to the mistakes of Tukhachevsky himself, there was inconsistency in the actions of the command of the South-Western Front (which was too carried away by the offensive in Galicia), and certain miscalculations of the High Command of the Red Army, and finally, the objective fact that the Poles had no other fronts besides the Soviet front, and significant Red forces were diverted to fight Wrangel.
          1. Alexander Suvorov
            Alexander Suvorov 29 September 2020 13: 56
            +7
            So I do not argue with this formulation of the question. The fact that the Red Army was in its infancy is a secret, well, only for the deaf-blind. Add to this the backwardness of the rear, the confusion in the command, confusion and vacillation in the units, and you get a complete picture. I agree that Tukhachevsky is not to blame for all this, but his fault is not small, you will also agree.
            1. Sergey Oreshin
              Sergey Oreshin 29 September 2020 14: 23
              0
              Of course, Tukhachevsky had guilt, however, rarely a commander could not tolerate defeat in his life.
            2. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
              Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 30 September 2020 22: 22
              0
              The fact that the Red Army was in its infancy is a secret, well, only for the deaf-blind

              A question from the All-Russian Society of the Deaf-Blind Mute: 'And how, his mother, this embryo fought in 1920?'
            3. MIG_2
              MIG_2 7 November 2020 12: 36
              -1
              there was Stalin's fault, who simply did not come to the aid of Tukhachevsky, I would not be surprised if Stalin leaked plans for this war to the Poles
              1. Alexander Suvorov
                Alexander Suvorov 7 November 2020 18: 45
                +9
                Well, what can I say fool the law is not written to the clever. Excuse me, but you don't see Stalin in your dreams? laughing
                1. The comment was deleted.
    2. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 29 September 2020 20: 04
      +2
      "It was not for nothing that Stalin then pinched his personal belongings with the door" ////
      -----
      Justify the Gestapo type of torture used by the NKVD,
      this is the whole user Alexander Suvorov, who dishonors his nickname and
      vile posts of the great Russian commander.
      1. Alexander Suvorov
        Alexander Suvorov 30 September 2020 06: 48
        +4
        It is not for you to talk about the methods of the NKVD to an idolater of the United States and Israel. In your beloved USA, torture is still in use and in a much more sophisticated form. Yes, and your tattered Israel is not distinguished by philanthropy. So do not open your mouth.
        And as for who and whom is shaming, and so personally you disgrace the Russian language by the very fact that you write in it. So forest ... forest ...
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 29 September 2020 08: 42
    -4
    Herewas the headquarters of the 3rd Army, headed by Lazarevich, but have already lost heart because of the previous events. Therefore, the Polish brigade captured Lida quite easily. The Red Army men ran after the army headquarters. The divisions of the army were left to fend for themselves. The regimental and divisional commanders, although poorly organized, attacked the enemy, trying to recapture the city and retreat to the east.


    Polish troops in this area were significantly inferior to the Reds in number. If the Soviet command organized the attack of the 3rd Army divisions well, then the enemy would be defeated. Due to the mistakes of the Soviet command the troops of the 3rd Army had to cede the city and change the route of retreat, opening the way for the enemy to the rear of the 15th and 16th armies of the Western Front. D


    Well, what could one expect from the MANUFACTURER of GUGSH (the last place of service in the real army) Lazarevich, a Bolshevik volunteer who decided to make a career with them?

    ruined the army, people, so what? Ah ... nothing! District commander, head ... of the Academy.

    But the betrayal and pursuit of the stars in 1918 were adequately appreciated by those to whom he faithfully served.a bullet in 1938.

    Whom it is infinitely sorry for, so these are the soldiers who have fought already ... for the SIXTH year because of the stupid actions of the leaders since 1917 ...
  3. Lewww
    Lewww 29 September 2020 09: 35
    -5
    "By the morning of September 25, 1920 3rd Soviet Army"= = = = the eye cuts, rightly the 3rd Army of the Red Army or the 3rd Army of the Zapf.

    "As a result, Lazarevich's army suffered complete defeat. "= = = is there really an incomplete defeat?

    "At the same time, the main forces of the Soviet army began to go to the river." = = = Red Army, it became Soviet after the Second World War.

    "If the Soviet command had organized the attack of the 3rd Army divisions well, the enemy would have been defeated." = = = if not frost, then my oats would have grown to heaven laughing
    For some reason, when describing events, the authors lose sight of the fact that in the early 20s. The Red Army was a guerrilla army, poorly trained, poorly disciplined, and often with elected commanders who did not have sufficient military command experience and did not always obey the orders of the headquarters. That is, there is a multi-thousand poorly trained and hardly controlled army.
    And this army fought with the regular Polish army.
    The bottom line is clear

    It is for them to beat non-whites, winning battles by means of multiple superiority in forces and means
    1. Ryazan87
      Ryazan87 29 September 2020 11: 43
      +8
      One should not exaggerate the level of training and, in the language of the 18th century, the "regularity" of the Polish army. In essence, this is the same militia-type army deployed in a very short time. The level of training varied greatly, the personnel were capable of an impulse, but at the same time they were unstable, prone to panic in difficult situations. Among the officers there are a large number of "promoted" ones who do not have proper combat experience and theoretical training. Despite the tangible help from the Entente, the armament and equipment were also on the "pine-tree-forest" principle. A typical army of the post-imperial space.
      Actually, the Red Army is exactly the same: these are, of course, not amorphous detachments of the 1918 model, but an outwardly almost regular army, numerous, but very heterogeneous in composition, training and weapons.
      Even the mistakes of the command are similar: a passion for an openly adventurous strategy of an unrestrained offensive, an addiction to occupying well-known geographical points (Poles - Kiev, Reds - Warsaw and Lvov) instead of destroying enemy forces, underestimating the enemy, and finally, at a certain stage - loss of command and control and defeat.
      By the way, the white "Moscow directive" in this sense is partly similar to the red offensive on Warsaw. A successful counterattack, a rapid advance with absolutely unsettled communications, a stake on mobile cavalry forces, the constant use and exhaustion of its shock and most combat-ready units. At some point, the shock fist is crushed, the high command completely loses control of the troops, situational reactions to emerging crises - as a result, defeat.
  4. Sergey Oreshin
    Sergey Oreshin 29 September 2020 11: 32
    +8
    Quote: Lewww
    3rd Soviet Army "= = = = eye cuts, right 3rd Army of the Red Army

    There is no contradiction, in the years of the Civil War the red units were often called "Soviet troops", "Soviet detachments", etc. In the sense that they fought for Soviet power
    Quote: Lewww
    Is there really an incomplete defeat?

    It happens that in June-July 20, the Poles suffered a series of defeats, but were not defeated, were able to recover and launch a successful counteroffensive.
    Quote: Lewww
    and often with elected commanders

    In fact, the election of the command personnel was officially abolished in the Red Army as early as April 18, on some fronts it remained until the 1st half of the 19th, but in the 20th there was no more election of commanders, everyone was appointed from above
    Quote: Lewww
    poorly trained

    A significant part of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army are non-commissioned officers and officers (and sometimes generals) of the Imperial Army, who had experience of WWI (and some of them even RYA).

    Quote: Lewww
    And this army fought with the regular Polish army.

    The Polish army (as well as independent Poland) appeared only at the end of the 18th, so I would not call the Poles downright mega-professional fighters.
    Although yes, Soviet memoirists admitted that in terms of combat training and motivation, the Poles were superior to whites and it was more difficult to fight them.
    Quote: Lewww
    poorly disciplined

    All the warring armies had discipline problems during the years of the Civil War, especially those who were defeated
  5. Sergey Oreshin
    Sergey Oreshin 29 September 2020 11: 36
    +5
    Quote: Olgovich
    Well, what could be expected from the MANUFACTURER GUGSH (the last place of service in the real army) Lazarevich

    In 19, commanding the 4th Army, Lazarevich fought well on the Eastern Front against the White Cossacks, thwarting the attempts of Dutov and Tolstov to break through to the Volga and unite with Denikin.
    In the summer of the 20th, the 3rd Army successfully advanced in Belarus and inflicted a number of defeats on the Poles.
    In October-November of the 20th, Lazarevich's 4th Army successfully fought against the Wrangelites.
    And if, after each defeat, you shoot the army commanders, then you won't get enough of the commanders.
    1. Lewww
      Lewww 29 September 2020 13: 45
      -4
      It happens that in June-July 20, the Poles suffered a series of defeats, but were not defeated
      I did not understand anything at all, which Poles, which incomplete, if you write "Lazarevich's army suffered a complete defeat." Army this is a military unit, it can win or be defeated in a battle. And I have no idea how she can win an incomplete victory or suffer an incomplete defeat.
      However, you can consider this as my IMHO
      There is no contradiction, during the years of the Civil War the red units were often called "Soviet troops"
      Who was she called? In document parts, or by contemporary historians?
      In fact, the electiveness of the command staff was officially abolished in the Red Army already in April 18th, on some fronts it remained until the 1st half of the 19th
      Abolished, but the previously elected commanders remained and the free spirit of partisanism was preserved.
      To be convinced of this, it is enough to read Babel's Cavalry, there are just enough truthful descriptions of the actions of Kr. Army in Poland and the spirit of freemen reigning in it. For which later Babel had a lot of trouble
      A significant part of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army are non-commissioned officers and officers (and sometimes generals) of the Imperial Army, who had experience of WWI (and some of them even RYA).
      This is interesting news. Significant is how much in percentage terms? Will you get at least 10% of the total? winked
      1. Ryazan87
        Ryazan87 29 September 2020 15: 49
        +5
        This is interesting news. Significant is how much in percentage terms? Will you get at least 10% of the total?

        As regards the senior commanders of the Red Army, please:
        "... Of the 20 persons who held the positions of front commanders during the Civil War, 17 people, or 85%, were career officers of the old army.
        The positions of chiefs of staff of the fronts were occupied by 25 people - all former personnel officers, 22 general staff officers and 3 colonels of the old army.
        Of the 100 army commanders, 82 were military specialists, of which 62 were personnel.
        There were 93 chiefs of staffs of the armies, of which 77 were former career officers (83%), including 49 general staff officers. "
        "Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets 1917-1920."
        Kavtoradze A.G., publishing house "Science", 1988
  6. Sergey Oreshin
    Sergey Oreshin 29 September 2020 11: 38
    +5
    I wonder why Samsonov writes only about Tukhachevsky's defeat in September 20th, but does not write anything about Yegorov's defeats in the same month?
    Although, I think I know: there are still no articles on Wikipedia about the battles of the South-Western Front with the Poles at the final stage of the Soviet-Polish war, so our "unfortunate author" has nothing to copy and paste))))
  7. Lewww
    Lewww 29 September 2020 14: 35
    +2
    And I would also advise the author to provide links to the materials that he used, and even more so not to misinterpret them.
    In particular, the text
    "Polish troops reached the village of Lebeda, where the field headquarters of the 3rd Army was located. Lazarevich surrounded managed to escape... The commander managed to order the 5th division to attack the crossing from the west. After that, the command of the 3rd Army fled to Lida in a roundabout wayhaving lost contact with the divisions. From that time on, the troops of the army acted independently, having lost contact with the command. "

    in the work of A.P. Gritskevich Western Front of the RSFSR 1918-1920. Fight between Russia and Poland for Belarus put it a little differently:
    Polish soldiers marched to the village of Lebeda (near the crossing of the river of the same name) and forced the field headquarters of the 3rd Army to urgently leave the village. Before leaving, Army Commander Lazarevich gave the order to the 5th SD to advance from the west to the crossing in order to recapture it from the Poles. Then the headquarters of the 3rd army by the ring road under the fire of the Polish infantry went to Lida ...

    Those. in the original, there is no escape.
    Well, then there is actually a retelling of the text of A.P. Gritskevich, but in his own words and with distortions, i.e. the article is a retelling of the book Western Front of the RSFSR 1918-1920. Fight between Russia and Poland for Belarus.

    By the way, Gritskevich does not call 3 A Soviet troops, he writes "Russian troops"
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 29 September 2020 15: 18
      +1
      Quote: Lewww
      By the way, Gritskevich does not call 3 A Soviet troops, he writes "Russian troops"

      Similarly, with Samsonov, Soviet troops sometimes turn into Russians: smile
      Despite strong rifle and machine-gun fire, the Russian infantry broke through to the positions of the Polish troops.

      Thus, the Polish troops were unable to stop the Russians on the river. Quinoa.
      1. Lewww
        Lewww 29 September 2020 17: 51
        +4
        So Samsonov's Soviet troops sometimes turn into Russians
        this is the case when he rewrites the text of Gritskevich's book verbatim
        When distorted, the Russian troops are transformed into Soviet wink
  8. Sergey Oreshin
    Sergey Oreshin 29 September 2020 14: 42
    +1
    Quote: Lewww
    In document parts

    Part documents usually indicated the part number.
    In Soviet historiography, references are made to "Soviet units," "revolutionary units," "Red Army units," etc.
    So I don't see a contradiction, you can call the 3rd Red Army, the 3rd Soviet Army, and the 3rd Army of the ZF
    Quote: Lewww
    previously selected commanders remained

    Not always and not everywhere. Many were removed, shot, someone died, etc.
    Quote: Lewww
    the free spirit of partisanism was preserved.

    This is typical for all armies of the GW period. Although I must say that in the 20th year there was less partisanship in the Red Army than in the 18th. the main command tried to fight her
    Quote: Lewww
    Will you get at least 10% of the total?

    And even with interest. In the 18th year, former officers and generals made up about 75% of the command staff of the Red Army and the RKKF, in the 20th their number dropped to 42%.
    In total, 75 thousand former officers of the RIA served in the Red Army during the years of the Civil War.
    For example, here is the data for the 3rd Army, but the Eastern Front (late 1918). Of the 61 people in the command staff, there were 3 former colonels, 10 captains, captains and captains, 34 lieutenants, second lieutenants and warrant officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 3 soldiers, 1 non-military.

    As for the rank-and-file soldiers of the Red Army, directives were repeatedly sent from the Center to the local military registration and enlistment offices, the meaning of which was that first of all it was necessary to row into the army of former NCOs and soldiers who had passed WWI, i.e. having combat experience
    1. Lewww
      Lewww 29 September 2020 17: 49
      0
      In the 18th year, former officers and generals amounted to about 75% of the command staff of the RKKA and RKKF, in the 20th their number dropped to 42%.
      Can you give a source of information?
      And by the way, you wrote:
      Substantial part fighters and commanders Red Army - non-commissioned officers and officers (and sometimes generals) of the Imperial Army,
      and not a significant part of the commanders
  9. demo
    demo 29 September 2020 16: 29
    -2
    100 years ago, Polish troops defeated the 3rd Soviet Army in Belarus.

    There was no Soviet army. There was the Red Army. Created in 18.
    The USSR was created in 24.
    Soviets are a form of people's government in the RSFSR.
    Writer 2.
    1. Ryazan87
      Ryazan87 29 September 2020 17: 20
      +3
      The USSR was created in 24.

      December 29, 1922 at the conference of delegations from the congresses of the Soviets of the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR and ZSFSR was
      the Treaty on the formation of the USSR was signed. This document was approved on December 30, 1922 by the XNUMXst All-Union Congress of Soviets and signed by the heads of delegations.
      So it's more accurate with estimates.
      1. demo
        demo 29 September 2020 18: 53
        -1
        A clerk. But there was not and could not be 100 years ago Soviet 3rd Army in Belarus.
  10. Sergey Oreshin
    Sergey Oreshin 29 September 2020 20: 27
    0
    Quote: Lewww
    Can you give a source of information?

    Already mentioned here A.G. Kavtaradze + "History of the Civil War in the USSR in 2 volumes. Vol. 1."
    Quote: Lewww
    and not a significant part of the commanders

    Well, kmk everything is logical: officers were mainly put in command positions, and among ordinary soldiers - non-commissioned officers are the same
    1. Lewww
      Lewww 29 September 2020 21: 10
      0
      And you are not bothered by the sheer absurdity of the data that
      In the 18th year, former officers and generals made up about 75% of the command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army,
      ??

      In other words 75% of the command staff ONLY THAT formed by the army and navy of the Bolsheviks were FORMER officers of the tsarist army belay
      Will give ist fantastish

      Didn't you confuse anything? Can you cite the link leading to the source page, where the data you voiced are posted?
      1. Ryazan87
        Ryazan87 29 September 2020 22: 52
        +3
        Well, since I mentioned Kavtaradze, I will allow myself to answer.
        "Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets 1917-1920."
        Kavtoradze A.G., publishing house "Science", 1988
        pp. 198, 208, 210.
        However, it is possible and a fresher book - "Russian officer corps during the Civil War. Confrontation of command personnel 1917-1922", A.V. Ganin, Moscow, from Tsentrpoligraf ", 2019.
        Ganin is now perhaps the leading expert on this issue.

        Let's take a look at that same 3rd Army of the Red Army (3rd formation):
        Commanders:
        Lazarevich V.S. (June 12 - October 18, 1920) - Lieutenant Colonel of the RIA;
        Beloy A.S. (interim, October 18-24, 1920) - Colonel of the RIA;
        Kakurin N.E. (October 24 - December 31, 1920) - Colonel of the RIA.
        Chiefs of staff:
        Roshkovsky A.I. (interim, June 12 - July 4, 1920) -?
        Lisovsky N.V. (July 4 - October 20, 1920) - captain of the RIA;
        Taranovskiy A.D. (interim, October 20 - November 2, 1920) - Lieutenant Colonel of the RIA.
        1. Lewww
          Lewww 30 September 2020 08: 39
          -2
          Colleague, I ooooooooooooo very much I doubt the reliability of the information that
          In the 18th year, former officers and generals made up about 75% of the command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army,
          This would mean that in the newly created army of workers and peasants 3/4 of the command positions were occupied by the ROYAL OFFICERS - this cannot be, because this cannot be in principle.

          The following can be analyzed to analyze the plausibility of this information.
          According to https://istmat.info/node/21724, they came to serve in the Red Army in 1918 8 000 former officers of the tsarist army.
          To understand how many% they were in the total number of the commander's corps, you need to know how many commanders there were in the Red Army in 1918.
          I do not have this data.
          But I think it would not be a big mistake if the percentage is calculated by analogy with the Polish army of the same period.
          Gritskevich writes: "In total, in 1918-20 the Polish army had about 49 thousands officers. "
          "As a result, by the beginning of the 1920 campaign, the army had reached 700 thousand people".
          One can suggestthat if the numerical strength of the Red Army by the end of 1918 was also about 700000 people, then the number of command personnel in it was about 49 posts.
          Accordingly, 8 former tsarist officers would include 16%, which is perfectly acceptable for national security and political reasons.
          Do not forget that, according to the ideas of those years, the former officer was a class alien element and a potential traitor.

          I recommend that you be very careful about the data of Soviet statistics, very often they are unreliable and completely unbelievable
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 30 September 2020 09: 29
            +1
            Quote: Lewww
            The following can be analyzed to analyze the plausibility of this information.
            According to https://istmat.info/node/21724, 1918 former officers of the tsarist army came to serve in the Red Army in 8.

            These are only those who came voluntarily.
            But there was also a call. According to your link:
            According to the information of the Mobilization Directorate of the Vseroglavshtab, in the period from July 29, when the first (partial) conscription of former generals and officers was announced by the decree of the Council of People's Commissars, up to November 15, 1918, 20 former generals were admitted to the Red Army in six military districts of the European part of the RSFSR and officers, and by the end of 488 - 1918.

            Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army: more than 22 former officers and generals in 000 alone. smile

            And further on your link:
            As a result of all the calls from June 12 (at the initiative of the commander of the 1st Army M.N. Tukhachevsky, the private conscription of former officers began on June 12, 1918, that is, a month and a half before the decree of the Council of People's Commissars. - A.K. ) on August 15, 1920 was taken into the ranks of the Red Army: b. officers - 48 409 ...

            Then there was the "Brusilov call" to the war with Poland - To all former officers, wherever they are.
            As a result, as of December 1920, the number of "former" members of the Red Army is estimated at about 73 people.
            Thus, military specialists accounted for about 130% of 914 56 people, that is, 73 311 people, or roughly 75 thousand former generals and officers.

            And this is also on your link.

            A typical portrait of a red commander: smile
            1. Lewww
              Lewww 30 September 2020 09: 38
              0
              "Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army: more than 22 former officers and generals in 000 alone"
              here you are right - overlooked.
              OK, we accept: 22 + 000 = 8.
              As a result, as of December 1920, the number of "former" members of the Red Army is estimated at about 73 people.
              we are trying to determine the number of officers in 1918, and that 1920?

              Do you have data on the number of command personnel of the Red Army at the end of 1918?
              1. Lewww
                Lewww 30 September 2020 10: 38
                -1
                I will correct: for 1918: 8 voluntarily + 000 for mobilization = 28 488 former officers of the tsarist army
  11. Sergey Oreshin
    Sergey Oreshin 30 September 2020 12: 12
    +1
    Quote: Lewww
    this cannot be, because such cannot be in principle.

    Well, the same Kavtaradze, Ganin, Shishov and the authors of the collective monograph "History of the Civil War in the USSR. Volume 1" give just such figures.
    Do scientific research and disprove them if you don't believe them at all
    1. Lewww
      Lewww 30 September 2020 12: 44
      -1
      Colleague, if you take the astonishing data on faith:
      In the 18th year, former officers and generals made up about 75% of the command staff of the Red Army and the Red Army.
      then you have to admit that backbone of the commanding staff formed Bolshevik army and navy were former tsarist officers.
      I have never met such a conclusion, have you?

      In addition, the very statement of the phrase "75% of the command staff RKKA and RKKF"vague, it is not clear from it exactly in what quantity these 75% are allocated - meaning the command staff of the Red Army together with the RKKF, or both there and there 75%.

      In short, I expressed my opinion: these statistics seem to me doubtful, like many other data of Soviet statistics

      And I will repeat the question:
      Do you have data on the number of command personnel of the Red Army at the end of 1918?
  12. Sergey Oreshin
    Sergey Oreshin 30 September 2020 12: 50
    0
    Quote: Lewww
    the backbone of the commanders of the newly formed Bolshevik army and navy consisted of former tsarist officers.

    I do not see a contradiction here, because who else could have formed the backbone of the command corps of the Red Army if not the former officers and generals of the RIA who had war experience?
    It is logical that they commanded the army under the supervision of commissars, essno, but already in the 21st year, the "former" made up only a third of the command staff, tk. Soviet commanders were trained "from the people"
    1. Lewww
      Lewww 30 September 2020 13: 37
      0
      Who else could have made up the backbone of the command corps of the Red Army, if not the former officers and generals of the RIA, who had war experience?
      Well, since the army of workers and peasants, then the overwhelming number of commanders must come from this environment.

      And for the third time I will repeat the same question:
      Do you have data on the number of command personnel of the Red Army at the end of 1918?
  13. Sergey Oreshin
    Sergey Oreshin 30 September 2020 17: 53
    0
    Quote: Lewww
    Well, since the army of workers and peasants, then the overwhelming number of commanders must come from this environment.

    Initially, this was planned, but very soon they realized that the elected commanders of the workers and peasants are being defeated by regular white officers and generals, and one cannot do without military experts.
    Quote: Lewww
    Do you have data on the number of command personnel of the Red Army at the end of 1918?

    The question is very interesting. I have no such data now. It will be necessary to dig, of course, more thoroughly.
    Here's what I have dug up so far: by the end of 1918, over 1487000 privates and former non-commissioned officers, more than 34600 former officers and military officials, 21000 medical and veterinary workers were called up to the Red Army.
    A certain Yu.P. Petrov in the monograph "The CPSU - the leader and educator of the Red Army 91918-1920" on page 273 also mentions this figure - over 75%.
    It is quoted by the authors of the 1st volume of "History of Civil War in the USSR" (Voenizdat, 1980) on p. 174.

    In general, we need to figure it out, but I still don't see a contradiction. Officers served the tsar, then the VP, then the Council of People's Commissars, received a salary, did what they knew how - they trained soldiers and fought
    1. Lewww
      Lewww 1 October 2020 08: 37
      0
      A certain Yu.P. Petrov in the monograph "The CPSU - the leader and educator of the Red Army 91918-1920" on page 273 also mentions this figure - over 75%.
      75% where exactly: in the Red Army, RKKF, or 75% both there and there? winked
      1. Sergey Oreshin
        Sergey Oreshin 1 October 2020 10: 20
        0
        This is also a good question. As a rule, they all write "in the army", "in the armed forces", etc., without breakdown by the Red Army and the RKKF.
        1. Lewww
          Lewww 1 October 2020 12: 03
          0
          Here I am: I strongly doubt that in 1918, when the country was in ruin, someone was seriously engaged in collecting statistical information throughout the country.
          Here's what I have dug up so far: by the end of 1918, over 1487000 privates and former non-commissioned officers had been drafted into the Red Army,
          even more fantastic data, 1487000 people are 117 rifle divisions, this number was not even in 1919
          1. Lewww
            Lewww 1 October 2020 12: 31
            0
            Although here I probably counted incorrectly: there is information that in November 18 the division had more than 58 people. https://su-army.livejournal.com/000.html
            Then 1487000: 58 = 000 divisions, but now this is too few.

            Until November, the number was 26972, then 55 divisions will turn out, which is too many.
            You can take the arithmetic mean, then you get 18 cd by the end of 40 g, which is more plausible.
            The situation is even more complicated by the fact that the composition of the SD has never been brought to full staff.

            In short, all this is fortune-telling on the coffee grounds
          2. Sergey Oreshin
            Sergey Oreshin 1 October 2020 14: 46
            0
            It should also be borne in mind that not all conscripts were sent directly to active units at the front; some of them soon deserted, etc.