First article in the series: “The problem of increasing the effectiveness of air defense. Air defense of a single ship "... An explanation of the purpose of the series and responses to reader comments on the first article are provided in the appendix at the end of this article.
As an example, we will choose a group of ships, consisting of three frigates sailing in the open sea. The choice of frigates is explained by the fact that there are simply no modern destroyers in Russia, and corvettes operate in the near zone and are not required to provide serious air defense. To organize all-round defense, the ships are lined up in a triangle with sides of 1-2 km.
Next, we will consider the main methods of defense of the IBM.
1. Using a complex of electronic countermeasures (KREP)
Suppose that a reconnaissance plane is trying to locate the KUG and reveal its composition. To prevent the reconnaissance from opening the composition of the group, it is necessary to suppress its on-board radar (on-board radar) using KREP.
1.1. Suppression of the reconnaissance radar
If a single reconnaissance aircraft flies at an altitude of 7-10 km, then he comes out of the horizon at ranges of 350-400 km. If the ships do not turn on the interference, then the ship, in principle, can be detected at such ranges, if it is not made using stealth technology. On the other hand, the echo signal reflected from the target at such ranges is still so small that it is enough for ships to turn on even a small interference, the scout will not find the target and he will have to fly closer. However, due to the fact that the scout does not know the specific type of ships and the range of their air defense systems, he will not approach the ships at a distance of less than 150-200 km. At such ranges, the signal reflected from the target will increase significantly, and the ships will have to include a much more powerful jammer. Nevertheless, if all three ships turn on noise interference, then an angular sector 5-7 degrees wide will appear on the scout radar indicator, which will be clogged with interference. In these conditions, the reconnaissance officer will not be able to determine even the approximate range to the sources of interference. The only thing that the scout will be able to report to the command post is that there are enemy ships somewhere in this corner sector.
In wartime, a pair of fighter-bombers (IB) can act as scouts. They have an advantage over a specialized reconnaissance officer in that they can approach enemy ships at a shorter distance, since the probability of hitting a pair of information security is much less than a slow-moving aircraft. The most important advantage of a pair is that by observing interference sources from two different directions, they can locate each one separately. In this case, it becomes possible to determine the approximate distance to sources of interference. Therefore, a pair of IB can produce target designation for launching anti-ship missiles.
To counteract such a pair of KUG, first of all, with the help of a shipborne radar, it is necessary to determine that the IS can really track the KUG, that is, the distance between the IS along the front is at least 3-5 km. Further, the tactics of jamming must change. In order for the IS pair to be unable to count the number of ships, only one of them, usually the most powerful, should emit interference. If IS, like a single reconnaissance officer, do not approach a distance of less than 150 km, then the interference power is usually sufficient. But if IS fly further, then the result is determined by the visibility of the ships, which is measured by the effective reflecting surface (EOC). Ships of stealth technology with image intensifier tube 10-100 sq. M. will remain unnoticed, and Soviet-built ships with image intensifier tubes 1000-5000 sq. m. will be opened. Unfortunately, even in the project 20380 corvettes stealth technology was not used. In the following projects, it was introduced only partially. We never made it to the invisibility of the destroyer Zamvolt.
To hide ships of high visibility, one has to abandon the use of noise interference, although it is good in that it creates an illumination on the radar indicator at all ranges. Instead of noise, imitation interference is used, which concentrates the interference power only in separate points in space, that is, instead of continuous noise of average power, the enemy will receive separate high-power pulses at separate points along the range. These interference create false marks of targets, which will be located at the azimuth that coincides with the azimuth of the KREP, but the ranges to false marks will be the same as the KREP will emit them. The task of KREP is to hide the presence of other ships in the group, despite the fact that its own radar azimuth will reveal. If the KREP receives accurate data on the range from the IS to the protected ship, then it can emit a false mark at a range that coincides with the true range to this ship. Thus, the IS radar will simultaneously receive two marks: a true and a much more powerful false mark, located at an azimuth that coincides with the KREP azimuth. If the radar station receives many false marks, it will not be able to distinguish the mark of the protected ship among them.
These algorithms are complex and require the coordination of radar and electronic warfare of several ships.
The fact that in Russia the ships are produced in units of pieces and are equipped with equipment from different manufacturers, casts doubt on the fact that such an agreement was made.
1.2. The use of KREP to repel the attack of the anti-ship missiles
The methods for suppressing the RGSN for various classes of anti-ship missiles are similar, therefore, further we will consider the disruption of the attack of a subsonic anti-ship missile (DPKR).
Suppose that the frigate's surveillance radar detected a salvo from 4-6 DPKR. The ammunition load of the frigate's long-range missiles is very limited and is designed to repel attacks from aircraft. Therefore, when the DPKR comes out from under the horizon at a distance of about 20 km with the radar homing head (RGSN) turned on, it is necessary to try to disrupt the RCC guidance by suppressing its RGSN.
1.2.1. RGSN design (special point for those interested)
The CWGS antenna should transmit and receive signals well in the direction where the target is intended. This angular sector is called the main lobe of the antenna and is usually 5-7 degrees wide. It is desirable that in all other directions of radiation and reception of signals and interference there would be no at all. But due to the design features of the antenna, a small level of radiation and reception remains. This area is called the sidelobe area. In this area, the received interference will be attenuated 50-100 times in comparison with the same interference received by the main lobe.
In order for the interference to suppress the target signal, it must have a power not less than the signal power. Therefore, if the interference and the target signal of the same power are in the main lobe, the signal will be suppressed by the interference, and if the interference is in the side lobes, the interference will be suppressed. Therefore, the jammer located in the side lobes must emit power 50-100 times greater than in the main lobe. The sum of the main and side lobes forms the antenna directional pattern (BOTTOM).
Anti-missile systems of previous generations had a mechanical beam scanning drive and formed the same main beam of the beam pattern for both transmission and reception. A target or obstacle can be tracked only if it is in the main lobe and not in the side lobes.
The newest RGSN DPKR "Harpoon" (USA) has an antenna with an active phased antenna array (AFAR). This antenna has one beam for radiation, but for reception, in addition to the main beam pattern, it can form 2 additional beam patterns, offset from the main beam pattern to the left and right. The main DND works for reception and transmission in the same way as the mechanical one, but has electronic scanning. Additional BOTTOMS are designed to suppress interference and work only for reception. As a result, if the interference acts in the region of the side lobes of the main beam pattern, it will be tracked by the additional beam pattern. In addition, the interference compensator built into the RGSN will suppress such interference by 20-30 times.
As a result, we find that the interference received along the side lobes in the mechanical antenna will be attenuated by 50-100 times due to the attenuation in the side lobes, and in the AFAR by the same 50-100 times and in the compensator by another 20-30 times, which significantly improves the noise immunity of the RGSN S AFAR.
Replacing the mechanical antenna with AFAR will require a complete rework of the RGSN. It is impossible to predict when this work will be done in Russia.
1.2.2. Group suppression of RGSN (special point for those interested)
Ships can detect the appearance of the DPKR immediately after its exit from the horizon using the KREP by the radiation of its RGSN. At ranges of about 15 km, the DPKR can also be detected using the radar, but only if the radar has a very narrow beam in elevation - less than 1 degree, or has a significant transmitter power reserve (see paragraph 2 of the annex). The antenna must be installed at a height of more than 20 m.
At ranges of the order of 20 km, the radiation of the main lobe of the RGSN will block the entire CUG. Then, to maximize the expansion of the interference zone, the noise interference is emitted by the two outer ships. If 2 interferences enter the main lobe of the RGSN simultaneously, then the RGSN is directed to the energy center between them. As you approach the KUG, at distances of 8-12 km, the ships begin to be detected separately. Then, in order for the RGSN not to be guided to one of the sources of interference, the CREP that falls into the zone of the side lobes of the RGSN begins to operate, and the others are turned off. At ranges of more than 8 km, the power of the KREP should be sufficient, but when approaching a distance of 3-4 km, the KREP switches from the emission of noise interference to the imitation one. For this, the KREP must receive from the radar the exact values of the range from the anti-ship missile system to both protected ships. Accordingly, false markings should be located at ranges that coincide with the ranges of ships. Then the RGSN, having received a more powerful signal from the side lobe, will not receive any signals from this range.
If the RGSN detects that there are no targets or sources of interference in the direction in which it is flying, it will switch to the target search mode and, scanning with a beam, will stumble upon the emitting CREP with its main lobe. At this moment, the RGSN will be able to track the KREP radiation. To prevent direction finding, this KREP is turned off, and the KREP of the ship that fell into the zone of the side lobes of the RGSN is turned on. With this tactic, the RGSN never receives either the target mark or the KREP bearing, and misses. As a result, it turns out that each anti-ship missile system KREPs of the KUG must be exposed to powerful interference acting on the side lobes of the RGSN, and according to an individual program associated with the current position of the RGSN beam. When no more than 2-3 anti-ship missiles are attacked, then such interaction can be organized, but when a dozen anti-ship missiles are attacked, failures will begin.
Conclusion: when detecting a massive attack, it is necessary to use disposable and decoy targets.
1.2.3. Using additional opportunities for disinformation RGSN
Disposable jamming transmitters can be used to protect stealthy ships. The task of these transmitters is to receive RGSN pulses and retransmit them back. Thus, the transmitter sends a false echo, reflected from a non-existent target. It is possible to ensure retargeting of the RCC to this target if you hide all true marks. To do this, at the moment when the anti-ship missile system flies to a distance of about 5 km, the transmitter is fired to the side of the ship at 400-600 m. Before the firing, the KREPs of all ships include noise interference. Then the RGSN gets a whole area clogged with interference, and is forced to start a new scan. At the edge of the jamming zone, it will find a false mark, which it will accept as true and retarget it. The disadvantage of this method is that the transmitter power is low and it will not be able to imitate old ships with high visibility.
More powerful interference can be emitted by placing the transmitter on the balloon, but the balloon is not positioned where required, but on the leeward side. This means you need something like a quadcopter.
Towed false reflectors on rafts are even more effective. 2-3 rafts with four 1 m corner reflectors installed on them will provide an imitation of a large ship with an image intensifier tube of thousands of square meters. The rafts can be located both in the center of the KUG and on the side. Hiding true targets in this situation is provided by KREPs.
All this confusion will have to be managed from the center of defense of the KUG, but something has not been heard about such works in Russia.
The volume of the article does not allow us to consider optical and IR GOS.
2. Destruction of anti-ship missiles by missiles
The task of using missiles, on the one hand, is easier than the task of using KREP, since the results of the launch immediately become clear. On the other hand, the small ammunition load of the anti-aircraft guided missiles forces them to take care of each of them. The mass, dimensions and cost of short-range missiles (MD) are significantly less than long-range missiles (DB). Therefore, it is advisable to use anti-missile missiles MD, provided that it is possible to ensure a high probability of hitting anti-ship missiles. Based on the capabilities of the radar to detect low-altitude targets, it is desirable to ensure the value of the far border of the MD SAM engagement zone of 12 km. This air defense tactic is also determined by the capabilities of the enemy. For example, Argentina in the Falklands War had only 6 anti-ship missiles and therefore they used anti-ship missiles one by one. The United States has 7 thousand Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and they can use volleys of more than 10 pieces.
2.1. Evaluation of the effectiveness of various air defense systems MD
The most advanced is the American shipborne SAM MD RAM, which is also supplied to the US allies. On the Arleigh Burke destroyers, RAM operates under the control of the Aegis air defense system radar, which ensures its all-weather use. The GOS SAM has 2 channels: a passive radio channel, guided by the radiation of the RGSN RCC, and infrared (IR), which is guided by the thermal radiation of the RCC. The air defense missile system is multi-channel, since each missile defense system is guided independently and may not use control from the radar. The launch range of 10 km is close to optimal. The maximum available overload of 50 g missiles allows you to intercept even intensively maneuvering anti-ship missiles.
The air defense missile system was developed 40 years ago for the task of destroying the Soviet SPKR, and it is not obliged to work on the GPKR. The high speed of the GPCR allows it to make maneuvers with high intensity and with a large amplitude of lateral deviations without significant loss of speed. If such a maneuver begins after the missile defense has flown a significant distance, then the energy of the missile defense system may simply not be enough to approach the new trajectory of the GPCR. In this case, the air defense missile system will be forced to immediately launch a package of 4 missiles in 4 different directions (with a square around the trajectory of the GPCR). Then, for any GPCR maneuver, one of the missiles will intercept it.
Unfortunately, the Russian MD air defense systems cannot boast of such qualities. SAM "Kortik" was also developed 40 years ago, but under the concept of a cheap "headless" missile, directed by the command method. Its millimeter-wave radar does not provide guidance in adverse weather conditions, and the missile defense system has a range of only 8 km. Due to the use of a radar with a mechanical antenna, the air defense system is single-channel.
SAM "Broadsword" is a modernization of the SAM "Kortik", carried out due to the fact that the standard radar "Kortika" did not provide the required accuracy and targeting range. Replacing the radar with an IR sight increased the accuracy, but the detection range in adverse weather conditions even decreased.
SAM "Gibka" uses SAM "Igla" and detects the DPKR at too small ranges, and the SPKR cannot hit because of its high speed.
An acceptable range of destruction could have been provided by the Pantsir-ME air defense system, only fragmentary information has been published on it. The first copy of the air defense missile system this year was installed at the "Odintsovo" MRK.
Its advantages are the launch range increased to 20 km and multichannel: simultaneously 4 missiles are aimed at 4 targets. Unfortunately, some shortcomings of the "Kortik" remained. SAM remained headless. Apparently, the authority of General Designer Shepunov is so great that his statement half a century ago (“I don’t shoot with radars!”) Still prevails.
With command guidance, the radar measures the difference in angles to the target and to the missile defense system and corrects the direction of flight of the missile defense system. Radar Guidance has 2 ranges: high-precision millimeter and mid-range centimeter ranges. With the existing antenna sizes, the angular error should be 1 milliradian, that is, the lateral miss is equal to one thousandth of the range. This means that at a distance of 20 km, the miss will be 20 m. When firing at large aircraft, this accuracy may be enough, but when firing at anti-ship missiles, such an error is unacceptable. The situation will worsen even if the target maneuvers. To detect a maneuver, the radar must follow the trajectory for 1-2 seconds. During this time, the DPKR with an overload of 1 g will shift by 5-20 m. Only when the range is reduced to 3-5 km will the error decrease so much that the anti-ship missile can be intercepted. Millimeter-wave meteorological stability is very low. In fog or even light rain, the detection range drops significantly. The accuracy of the centimeter range will provide guidance at a distance of no more than 5-7 km. Modern electronics makes it possible to obtain small-sized GOS. Even an uncooled IR seeker could significantly improve the probability of interception.
2.2. The tactics of using the air defense missile system MD
In the KUG, the main (most protected) ship is selected, that is, the one on which there is the best MD air defense missile system with the largest stock of missiles or is in the safest situation. For example, located farther than others from the RCC. It is he who should emit RGSN interference. Thus, the main ship causes an attack on itself. For each attacking anti-ship missile, its own main ship can be assigned.
It is desirable that the ship is chosen as the main one, to which the anti-ship missile flies not from the side, but from the bow or stern. Then the probability of hitting the ship will decrease, and the effectiveness of the use of anti-aircraft guns will increase.
Other ships can support the main one, informing it about the flight altitude of the anti-ship missile system or even firing at it. For example, the air defense missile system "Gibka" can successfully hit the DPKR in pursuit.
To defeat the DPKR at the far border of the launch zone, you can first launch one MD missile defense system, evaluate the results of the first launch and, if necessary, make a second. Only if a third is required, then a pair of missiles is launched.
To defeat the SPKR, missiles must be launched in pairs at once.
GPCR can only affect the RAM SAM. Due to the use of the command method of targeting the missiles, the Russian air defense missile systems MD cannot hit the GPCR, since the command method does not allow hitting the maneuvering target due to the long reaction delay.
2.3. Comparison of ZRKBD designs
In the 1960s, the United States declared the need to repel the massive attacks of the Soviet aviation, for which they will need to develop an air defense system, the radar of which could instantly switch the beam in any direction, that is, the radar must use a phased array antenna (PAR). The US Army developed the Patriot air defense system, but the sailors declared that they needed a much more powerful air defense system, and began to develop the Aegis. The basis of the air defense missile system was a multifunctional (MF) radar, which had 4 passive HEADLIGHTS, providing all-round visibility.
(Note. Radars with passive HEADLIGHTS have one powerful transmitter, the signal of which is routed to each point of the antenna strip and radiated through passive phase shifters installed at these points. By changing the phase of the phase shifters, you can almost instantly change the direction of the radar beam. Active HEADLIGHT has no common transmitter, and a micro-transmitter is installed at each point of the web.)
The MF radar tube transmitter had an exceptionally high pulse power and provided high noise immunity. The MF radar operated in a meteorological-resistant 10-cm wavelength range, while homing missiles used a semi-active RGSN that did not have their own transmitter. A separate 3-cm range radar was used to illuminate targets. The use of this range allows the RGSN to have a narrow beam and aim at the illuminated target with high accuracy, but the 3-cm range has a low meteorological resistance. In conditions of dense clouds, it provides a missile guidance range of up to 150 km, and even less in the rain.
MF radar provided an overview of space, and target tracking, and guidance of missiles and control units for radar illumination.
The upgraded version of the air defense missile system has both radars with active HEADLIGHTS: MF radar 10-cm and high-precision guidance radar 3-cm ranges, replacing the radar illumination. SAMs have active RGSN. For air defense, the Standard SM6 missile defense system is used with a launch range of 250 km, and for missile defense - SM3 with a range of 500 km. If it is necessary to launch missiles at such ranges in difficult weather conditions, then the MF radar is guided on the marching segment, and an active RGSN at the end.
AFARs have low visibility, which is important for stealth ships. The power of the AFAR MF radar is sufficient to detect ballistic missiles at very large distances.
In the USSR, they did not develop a special shipborne air defense system, but modified the S-300. The S-3f 300-cm range guidance radar, like the S-300, had only one passive HEADLIGHT, rotated to a given sector. The width of the electronic scanning sector was about 100 degrees, that is, the radar was intended only for tracking targets in this sector and targeting missiles. The central control center of this radar was issued by a surveillance radar with a mechanically rotated antenna. Surveillance radar is significantly inferior to the MF, since it scans the entire space evenly, and the MF selects the main directions and sends most of the energy there. The S-300f guidance radar transmitter had significantly less power than the Aegis. While the missiles had a launch range of up to 100 km, the power difference did not play a major role, but the emergence of a new generation of missiles with an increased range also increased the requirements for the radar.
The interference immunity of the guidance radar was provided due to a very narrow beam - less than 1 degree, and compensators for interference that came along the side lobes. The compensators worked poorly and in a difficult jamming environment they were simply not turned on.
SAM BD had a range of 100 km and weighed 1,8 tons.
The modernized S-350 air defense system has been significantly improved. Instead of one swivel headlamp, 4 fixed ones were installed and provided all-round visibility, but the range remained the same, 3 cm. The 9M96E2 SAM used has a range of up to 150 km, despite the fact that the mass has decreased to 500 kg. In adverse weather conditions, the ability to track a target at ranges over 150 km depends on the image intensifier of the target. According to the information security of the F-35, the power is clearly not enough. Then the target will have to be accompanied by a surveillance radar, which has both the worst accuracy and the worst noise immunity. The rest of the information was not published, but judging by the fact that a similar passive PAR was used, there were no significant changes.
From the above, it is clear that Aegis outperforms the S-300f in all respects, but its cost ($ 300 million) cannot suit us. We will offer alternative solutions.
2.4. The tactics of using the air defense missile system DB [/ h3]
[h5] 2.4.1. Tactics of using ZURBD to defeat RCC
SAM BD should be used only for firing at the most important targets: supersonic and hypersonic anti-ship missiles (SPKR and GPKR) and also information security. The DPKR must be hit by the MD SAM. SPKR can be struck on the march section, at ranges of 100-150 km. For this, the surveillance radar must detect the SPKR at ranges of 250-300 km. Not every radar is capable of detecting a small target at such ranges. Therefore, it is often necessary to conduct a joint scan with all three radars. If a 9M96E2 missile defense system is launched by the command method at a distance of 10-20 km from the SPKR, then it will most likely aim at the SPKR.
When flying on a marching section with an altitude of 40-50 km, the GPCR cannot be affected, but with a decrease to an altitude of 20-30 km, the probability of targeting missiles sharply increases. At lower altitudes, the GPCR can begin to maneuver, and the likelihood of defeat will somewhat decrease. Consequently, the first meeting of the GPKR and the missile defense missile system should occur at a distance of 40-70 km. If the first missile defense system does not hit the GPKR, then another pair is launched.
2.4.2. The tactics of attacking the enemy's KUG by the IS group
The defeat of IB is a more difficult task, since they operate under the cover of interference. SAM "Aegis" is in a preferable situation, since the Soviet IS of the Su-27 family had an image intensifier twice as large as that of their prototype F-15. Therefore, the Su-27, flying at a cruising altitude of 10 km, will be detected immediately after leaving the horizon at a distance of 400 km. To prevent Aegis from detecting targets, our information security must apply CREP. Since Russia has no jammers, it will be necessary to use individual IS KREPs. Given the low power of the KREP, it will be dangerous to approach closer than 200 km. To launch the anti-ship missile system on the external control center, you can also use such a border, believing that the anti-ship missiles will figure it out on the spot, but to open the composition of the KUG you will have to fly further. The destroyers "Arleigh Burke" are equipped with CREPs of record capacity, so you need to fly 50 km to the KUG. It is easiest to start descending before leaving the horizon, dropping all the time below the horizon to a height of 40-50 m.
The IS pilots realize that a maximum of 15 seconds after the exit on them will be the first launch of the missile defense system. To disrupt a missile defense attack, it is necessary to have a pair of IS, the distance between which does not exceed 1 km.
If, at a distance of 50 km, IS radars are suppressed by interference, then it is necessary with the help of KREP to reconnoiter the coordinates of the working ship radars. For an accurate determination, it is necessary that the distance between KREPs be at least 5-10 km, which means that a second pair of ISs will be needed.
To launch the anti-ship missile system, the target distribution of the explored sources of interference and radar is carried out, and after the launch of the anti-ship missile system, the information security systems intensively deploy and go beyond the horizon.
For launching from ranges of about 50 km, the launch of a pair of SPKR X-31, one with an active one, and the other with an anti-radar RGSN, is especially effective.
2.4.3. The tactics of using the air defense missile system of the DB to defeat the IB F-35
The concept of using IS against the KUG does not at all provide for the entry of IS into the zone of coverage of the MD SAM system, and at ranges of more than 20 km, the outcome of the confrontation is determined by the ability of the SAM radar to overcome interference. Jammers operating from safe zones cannot effectively hide the attacking IS, since the director's duty zone is far - beyond the radius of destruction of the air defense missile system. There are no directors operating in the IS systems even in the USA. Therefore, the secrecy of the IS is determined by the ratio of the power of the KREP and the image intensifier of the target. The IB F-15 has an image intensifier tube = 3-4 square meters, and the image intensifier tube F-35 is classified and cannot be measured using the radar, since additional reflectors are installed on the F-35 in peacetime, increasing the image intensifier tube several times. Most experts estimate the IIT = 0,1 sq. M.
The power of our surveillance radars is much inferior to the Aegis MF radar, so even without interference it will hardly be possible to detect the F-35 further than 100 km. When KREP is turned on, the F-35 mark is not detected at all, but only the direction to the source of interference is visible. Then you will have to transmit the target detection to the guidance radar, directing its beam for 1-3 seconds in the direction of the interference. If the raid is massive, then it will not be possible to serve all directions of interference in this mode.
There is also a more expensive method for determining the range of the source of interference: the missile defense missile system is launched to a great height in the direction of the interference, and the RGSN from above receives the interference signal and retransmits it to the radar. The radar beam is also directed at the interference and receives it. Reception of one signal from two points and its direction finding allows you to determine the position of the interference. But not every SAM is capable of relaying the signal.
If 2-3 interference is simultaneously hitting the beams of the RGSN and the radar, then they will be tracked each separately.
For the first time, the retransmission line was used in the Patriot air defense system. In the USSR, the task was simplified and only a single source of interference began to be found. If there were several sources in the beam, then it was not possible to determine their number and coordinates.
So, the main problem when aiming the S-350 missile defense system on the F-35 will be the ability of the 9M96E2 missile defense system to relay the signal. Information about this is not published. The small size of the diameter of the body of the missile defense system makes the RGSN beam wide, and several interference is very likely to hit it.
The effectiveness of a group AA defense is significantly higher than that of a single ship.
To organize all-round defense, the KUG must have at least three ships.
The effectiveness of the group air defense is determined by the algorithms for the interaction of the KREP radar and the perfection of the missile defense system.
The high-quality organization of air defense and the sufficiency of ammunition ensure the defeat of all types of anti-ship missiles.
The most pressing problems of the Russian Navy:
- the lack of destroyers does not make it possible to provide the KUG and the main ship with sufficient ammunition and powerful KREP;
- the lack of frigates of the "Admiral Gorshkov" type does not allow to operate in the ocean;
- the shortcomings of the short-range air defense system does not allow to reliably reflect the salvo of many anti-ship missiles;
- the lack of unmanned helicopters with a sea surface survey radar capable of giving target designation for launching their own anti-ship missiles;
- the lack of a unified concept of the Navy, allowing the formation of a unified range of radars for ships of various classes;
- the lack of powerful MF radars that solve the problems of air defense and missile defense;
- insufficient implementation of stealth technology.
Explanation of questions on the first article.
On the purpose of publishing the series.
The author believes that the position of the Navy has reached such a critical level that it is necessary to conduct a broad exchange of views on this issue. The VO website has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the GPV 2011-2020 program has been disrupted. For example, frigates 22350 instead of 8 were built 2, the destroyer was never designed - it seems that there is no engine. Someone offers to buy an engine from the Chinese. The figures for the ships built over the year look beautiful, but nowhere is it indicated that there are almost no large ships among them. Soon we will start reporting on the launch of another motor boat, but there is no reaction to this on the website.
The question arises: if we have not provided the quantity, then is it time to think about quality? To stay ahead of the competition, you need to get rid of defects. Specific proposals are required. The brainstorming method suggests not to reject any ideas out of the box. Even the project of a long-range combat sailing ship proposed by someone, although cheerful, can be discussed.
The author does not claim to be broad in his horizons and to the inviolability of his statements. Most of the given quantitative estimates are his personal opinion. But if you do not expose yourself to criticism, then the boredom on the site will not be overcome.
The comments on the article showed that this approach is justified: the discussion was active.
“I worked on a ship's radar, and on it the low-flying target (NLC) is not visible. You find it in the last seconds. A radar is an expensive toy. Only optics can save you. "
Explanation. The NLC problem is the main one for shipborne radars. The reader did not indicate which of the radars did not cope with the task, and in fact not every radar is obliged to do this. Only radar stations with a very narrow beam, no more than 0,5 degrees, are able to detect the NLC immediately after leaving the horizon. Radars S300f and "Kortik" are the closest to this requirement. The difficulty of detection is that the NLC appears from the horizon at very small elevation angles - hundredths of a degree. At such angles, the sea surface becomes mirror-like, and two echoes arrive at the radar receiver at once - from the true target and from its mirror image. The mirror signal comes in antiphase to the main one and thus extinguishes the main signal. As a result, the received power can decrease 10-100 times. If the radar beam is narrow, then by raising it above the horizon by a fraction of the beam width, it is possible to significantly weaken the mirror signal, and it will cease to extinguish the main signal. If the radar beam is wider than 1 degree, then it can detect the NLC only due to the large power reserve of the transmitter, when the signal can be received even after cancellation.
Optical systems are good only in good weather conditions, they do not work in rain and fog. If there is no radar station on the ship, then the enemy will happily wait for fog.
Opinion on the state-owned enterprise "Zircon"
"Why" Zircon "can not be started up in NLC mode? If you pass the marching section at subsonic sound and accelerate to 70 M at a distance of 8 km, then you can approach the target at an altitude of 3-5 m. "
Explanation. Only those anti-ship missiles that have a ramjet engine should be called hyper- or supersonic. Its advantages: simple, cheap, lightweight and economical. The absence of a turbine leads to the fact that air is supplied to the combustion chamber by air intakes, which work well only in a narrow range of speeds. The ramjet should not fly at either 8 M or 2 M, and there is nothing to say about subsonic.
Even in the USSR, they developed two-stage anti-ship missiles, for example, the Moskit, but did not get good results. The same is with the "Caliber", the subsonic 3M14 flies 2500 km, and the two-stage 3M54 - 280. The two-stage "Zircon" will be even heavier.
The GPKR will not be able to fly at a height of 5 m, since the shock wave will raise a cloud of spray, which can be easily detected by the radar, and the sound - by sonar. The altitude will have to be increased to 15 m, and the radar detection range will increase to 30-35 km.
"It is possible to direct the Zircon GPCR from satellites, optics or a laser locator."
Explanation. You cannot place a multi-ton telescope or laser on a satellite, so we will not talk about observation from a geostationary orbit. Low-altitude satellites from an altitude of 200-300 km can detect something in good weather. But the satellites themselves in wartime can be destroyed, the SM3 SAM must cope with this. In addition, the United States developed a special projectile (it seems, ASAD), launched from the F-15 IS to destroy low-altitude satellites, and the X-37 anti-satellite has already been tested.
The optics can be masked with fumes or aerosols. Even at such altitudes, the satellites gradually slow down and burn out. It is too expensive to have many satellites, and with the available number, the surface is surveyed once every few hours.
Over-the-horizon radars also do not provide a control center, since their accuracy is low, and in wartime they can be suppressed by interference.
A-50 AWACS aircraft could issue a control center, but they will only fly accompanied by a pair of IS, that is, no further than 1000 km from the airfield. They will not fly closer than 250 km to Aegis, and at such long ranges the radar will be jammed.
Conclusion: the control center problem has not yet been resolved.
"When the precise guidance of the Zircons on the AUG cannot be ensured, then it is best to use a special charge of 50 kt, which is quite enough to leave only fragments of the AUG."
Explanation of the author. Here the question is no longer a military one, but a psychological one. I would like to pull the tiger's mustache. The goat Timur butted the tiger Cupid and survived. He was treated at the veterinary hospital. Well, we ... Want to admire the vitrified desert in the place of Moscow? A nuclear strike on such a strategic target as the AUG will mean only one thing for the Americans: the third (and last) world war has begun.
Let's play further in conventional wars, let the lovers of special charges talk on special sites.
The issue of combating AUG is central to our Navy. The third article will be devoted to him.