Military Review

What modules do our ships need?


Article "Patrolling modules will not save" the problematic issues of our "modular ships" were rigidly identified. However, the question arises: what is the situation with the navies of foreign countries and is there any positive in the modular approach to shipbuilding? And most importantly: what kind of "modularity" does our the fleet?

Foreign experience

MESO program, Germany

The development of the MEKO concept was started by the West German company Blohm und Voss in 1969 for export ships of moderate displacement. The concept was based on the idea of ​​standardization in the form of functional modules of standard (different) sizes for the most common ship weapon systems. In this case, the ship's hull was considered in the form of a rigid load-bearing platform with cells, into which modules of shipborne weapon systems are inserted, aligned and fastened with bolted connections.

Standard container sizes weapons 2,66x4,0x4,7m (for ships of small displacement - 2,66x3,2x4,0 m). For the modules of electronic weapons, unambiguous restrictions on the height and width of 2,15x2,44 m and 4 options for the length of the container (3,0, 3,5, 4,0 and 4,5 m) were adopted. To accommodate the equipment of control and communication posts, standard pallet sizes of 2,0x2,0 m were adopted.

As of 1982, the Blohm und Voss line of proposals consisted of 8 types of ships (displacement from 200 to 4000 tons) and 209 types of modulated weapons systems for them and was further increased.

The cost of modernizing ships of the MEKO class was calculated as 35% of the construction cost (at 50% for a conventional ship) with a reduction in the time of work from 12 months to 8.

"Reverse side": the transition to the MEKO concept for frigates and corvettes reduces the mass of their weapon systems by at least 30%.

Nevertheless, the maximum consideration of customer requests allowed Blohm und Voss to receive large orders, for which more than 50 ships were built.

One of the latest MEKOs is the Algerian Navy's A200N project.

SEAMOD project VPS concept, USA

In 1972, the consultative group of the combat systems of the US Navy's logistics command proposed the concept of VPS (Variable Payload Ships, variable payload), that is, the concept of modules built into the structure of the ship, ensuring their rapid modernization (zone-modular design of ships).

The idea was accepted by the command of the US Navy with a detailed study in relation to the new ship of the 3rd generation (EM "Spruence" and frigates "O. Perry"). Since 1979, the US Navy has been implementing a large-scale program SSES (Ship Systems Engineering Standards), the key factor of which was the standardization of modules, subsystems, complexes in terms of installation dimensions, connection of supply media and other technical parameters.

The SEAMOD concept, adopted during the construction of the Spruance-class destroyers and the Nimitz aircraft carrier in the United States, provided for the optimization of large ship volumes in the areas (zones) of weapons devices, the production and maximum saturation of these volumes outside the slipway with increased requirements for the accuracy of joints, and, finally, assembling and fastening them for welding during the slipway period of the ship's construction. Weapon systems are installed and bolted on.

During the implementation of the program, there were both serious successes, first of all, the rapid equipping of the US Navy with vertical launch units (including through the modernization of previously built ships), and difficulties: in fact, SSES was in practice completed by no more than 50% of the planned ...

As a matter of fact, this is not surprising or bad for the US Navy, because common sense won out. Where the implementation of SSES had a tangible and real impact, it was done quickly and decisively. Where problems and doubts arose with the new, they did it according to the classics.

Zone-modular design of the Arlie Burke-class destroyer


In contrast to Germany and the USA, in order to reduce the cost of building and maintaining the combat capabilities of ships during their operation in the 80s in Denmark, the idea of ​​modular construction of ships on the principle of a LEGO children's toy designer was put forward: the SEAFRAME system of replaceable ship modules. SEAFRAME solutions were used in the implementation of the StandardFlex 300 program for the construction of 14 Danish corvettes of the Fluvefixen type (and further, in the 2000s, of large warships of the Absalon type).

SEAFRAME assumes mounting and bolting of replaceable weapon modules on the deck of a standard platform ship with common control, navigation and communication systems.

Modules (sonar and missile defense), loading the module onto the ship

Despite the fact that the task of significantly reducing operating costs was not achieved, the implementation of the StandardFlex 300 program can be considered successful: with a very moderate displacement (less than 400 tons), quite effective small multipurpose corvettes were obtained.

Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the Absalon project, figuratively speaking, the project of a powerful sea truck capable of performing a wide range of tasks up to the transportation of troops. In addition to the SEAFRAME program (modules), Absalon received an extremely interesting and promising solution in the form of a waist cargo deck, where not only modules, but also conventional inclined launchers on standard foundations can be placed.

What modules do our ships need?

Ships of the LCS program

A number of LCS problematic issues were discussed in the article "Combat systems of OVR corvettes".

The main idea, which was laid in the LCS ships, was to ensure combat stability due to the complex "low visibility + electronic warfare means + very high speed". At the same time, high speed (and high power of the power plant) received a noticeable priority in the load of the project over anti-aircraft fire weapons (ZOS).

All this, when applied in a complex manner in battle, theoretically made it possible, with good chances, to escape even from anti-ship missile attacks. This concept was quite real and in its most complete and perfect form was implemented on high-speed, low-signature air-cushioned Skeg RCA type "Skeld" (Norwegian Navy).

RCA type "Skeld" of the Norwegian Navy

However, the US Navy decided to attach to this quite working concept the solution of the tasks of anti-submarine and mine defense (PLO and AMO), which clearly required a significant speed limit when working with "sensors" for reconnaissance and lighting the situation. 20 years ago, the solution to this problem seemed to American developers "simple and logical": to put these sensors on small unmanned vehicles, thereby ensuring the high speed and maneuverability of the LCS themselves, which in this case remained the role of "high-speed and inconspicuous advanced" server "of the" network " deployed unmanned systems and sensors ”. In practice, too much did not work out ...

It should be emphasized here that the idea of ​​"modularity", embedded in the design of the LCS, has confirmed its promising capabilities (the availability of the necessary areas and volumes for the new payload), but also showed its flaws... One of the most pressing problems of the LCS was the lack of a vertical launch facility (UVP) for missiles, PLUR, and, in the future, anti-ship missiles. It is highly probable that the reason for this was the problem of precise positioning of the “modular UVPU” in the hull, taking into account clearances, hull deformations on the move in sea conditions, etc.

Note. Speaking of LCS, we should not forget about the "classic" (not modular) versions of the LCS, for example, the LCS-1 version, offered for Saudi Arabia, had a very powerful armament (which is not surprising given the rather large displacement of these ships).

Problematic issues of modular approaches

From the article by L.P. Gavrilyuk, Doctor of Technical Sciences, JSC "TsTSS":

Loss of useful volumes in the ship's hull.
This problem is associated with the formation of specially allocated volumes of "assembly zones" for modules. Of the approximately 3000 tonnes of LCS displacement, only 400 tonnes account for the payload, and replaceable combat modules account for about 180 tonnes. ... fastening modules mechanically, in contrast to fastening by welding, requires special foundations with reinforcements.
Disabling the load-bearing structures of the modules from the ship's hull.
Modular Payload ships will have greater bending and elastic deformations afloat, since the load-bearing structures of the modules are practically cut off from the ship's equivalent beam, which leads to misalignment of the exact ship complexes during operation.
Content of the required excess of modules.
The implementation of the idea of ​​replaceable modules presupposes a certain excess of them. Infrastructure is required to maintain and replace modules. Currently, the Danish Navy, due to the high cost of operation, has refused to maintain replaceable weapon modules for ships of the Flyvefisken class under the StandardFlex program.
Positioning modules when replacing.
During the operation period, due to deformations of the ship's hull structures, there is a mismatch of the elements of the ship base system. Restoring the system of ship bases during the repair and modernization of ships, especially those afloat, requires the use of special equipment and a rather laborious methodology performed by highly qualified specialists. This makes it difficult to coordinate the exact ship complexes when replacing modules by the repair services of the Navy.
Difficulty of coordinating the cable and pipeline routes of the ship when replacing modules with another type or when receiving combat damage.

Modularity in the USSR

Another quote from an article by L.P. Gavrilyuk, Doctor of Technical Sciences, JSC "TsTSS":

In the 80s, Russia also developed the concept of modular ship construction. The concept of TsNIITS (TsTSS), presented in the sectoral document 74-0205-130-87, having an ideology similar to the above-described SEAMOD ideology, provides for the zonal design and construction of ships with modular principles for the installation of weapon systems for welding. The zonal units of the ships' weapons were unified by types, each of which has its own nodes and welding attachment technologies, which ensure the required mounting accuracy. The bearing structures of the zoned blocks can be the bearing structures of the weapons modules, which reduces the total mass of the weapon module. The joints of the zone blocks and modules are equipped with high-precision forced positioning systems, which are, in essence, a LEGO lock, which ensures unambiguous positioning of weapon modules during construction and during their replacement.

Thus, a transition was foreseen, first of all, to the zonal-modular design of ships with machine-building principles for the manufacture and assembly of their components and the inclusion of their supporting structures in the work of the hull.

Modularity in the domestic shipbuilding of recent years

Instead of analyzing and using foreign experience, research results of scientific and design organizations of the USSR and the Russian Federation, today we have managed to reduce modularity (implemented today in the Navy) to stuffing “everything and everyone” into 20- and 40-foot containers, in fact, a stupid warehouse principle.

It should be noted here that we have not only come to this ridiculous and erroneous path (in the sense of VIPs), we were well pushed to this during the visit to the United States of the current chief adviser to the president of the USC, and then the commander-in-chief of the Navy, V. Chirkov. At the same time, it is necessary to understand that by 2013 the US Navy fully realized the entire failure of the LCS program and the scale of the mistakes made ...

Those. we were deliberately pushed to make deliberately erroneous decisions that entailed grave consequences for the combat capability of the Navy.

"Father" of the modular patrol ship pr. 22160 V. Chirkov in the USA (2013)

Chirkov "left" the Navy in 2016, but domestic shipbuilding ended up in the hands of his protégé V. Tryapichnikov, and Chirkov himself eventually "surfaced" in the role of the chief adviser to the USC president.

The patrol ships of the project 22160 and the "promising" "corvette-frigates" of the project 20386 became the modular projects of the Navy.

Advertising tempting project 22160: missile containers

Section of a patrol ship of project 22160 with layouts of premises for various purposes (including ballast tanks)

Noteworthy is the placement of the "classic" RIB, later replaced (at the request of the Navy) by a low-seaworthy boat DShL. That is, the developer perfectly understood (including on his unsuccessful experience on the previous project 22460) all the limitations of the project 22160 slip, including its insufficient height ("slaughtered" for the sake of container modules), and in the original project this the height went to the seaworthiness of the RIB with a good deadrise angle. The fleet (Tryapichnikov) "wanted" the "armored turret" of the DSL, and its developers ("Trident") simply had no other options than the "flat-bottomed" (with a small dead-lift angle). At the same time, the Trident designers did their utmost to somehow fulfill the inadequate "wishes" of the Navy ...

However, it should be objectively said that there were other developers who refused to participate in this "project" and harshly raised the question of the inadequacy of the Navy's requirements. The author considers the latter approach to be correct both from the point of view of "professional ethics" and from the point of view of the interests of the country's defense capability.

In parallel with the project 22160, the "promising corvette-frigate" of the project 20386 "started", tough and critical publications on which were previously published on "VO": “Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam ».

At the same time, on the project 20386 with "modularity" they made a mistake so that a 40-foot container for "Calibers" stood up only instead of a helicopter, while two such containers stood up two times smaller than project 22160 together with a helicopter (the fact of which "on the sidelines "The developers of 22160 loved to emphasize).

Taking into account that the “modular theme” turned out to be “sweet” for the “development of budget” funds by a number of organizations (and “respected people”), despite the already committed catastrophic mistakes, it still continues to be promoted and advertised before the top military-political leadership ...

We have to admit that at the level of this leadership, the understanding of the falsity of these "sweet reports" is just beginning to come. You can compare the president's speeches after the demonstration of the Navy equipment in December 2019 in Sevastopol (including the project 20386 in a significantly modified form), where "modularity" sounded almost like a directive, and the latest decisions on the fleet, where it is tough (in the form instructions of the president), the question was raised about the mass series of classic ships (and in fact, the end was put on the series of "modular" 20386).

Lying in the reports of high-ranking officials is one of the most serious problems not only for the Navy and the armed forces, but also for the country. And here the role of the media in revealing and objectively describing the situation and opportunities is very important (individual media outlets that have been interestedly lobbying the topic of modularity all this time are the subject of a separate conversation).

What did the country and the navy need?
Instead of modularity for the sake of modularity, into which our shipbuilding began to slide, we needed programs for the rational modernization of ships in service, and it was there that the limited (only where necessary) use of modular technologies would find useful application.

Further, this issue will be considered solely on the basis of the interests of the country's defense capability and the high combat capability of the Navy (and not the development of budgetary funds for processes such as "either donkey or padishah").

Modernization of ships of combat strength

Mine action ships (minesweepers)

MTSH "Turbinist" passes the Bosphorus, following the military service

A visual photo: the Turbinist sea minesweeper (MTShch) goes into combat service in the Mediterranean Sea. The ship was built in 1973, the armament of which has not undergone any changes since then, i.e. for a long time this ship has practically lost all combat value and today is capable of exclusively displaying the flag (the topic of the effectiveness of displaying the flag with museum samples is a subject for a separate discussion).

The minesweepers of the Navy did not receive any, even the most minimal modernization, in fact, the anti-mine forces of the Navy have long lost all combat significance.

At the same time, in other countries, even old minesweepers are being successfully modernized and are quite capable of solving modern problems.

Anti-mine underwater vehicles on old Soviet minesweepers of the Vietnamese and Polish navies

We had all the opportunities for this, a qualitative modernization of the MG-89 sonar was started (not completed, since the Navy was not interested in this work), a container modification of the mine action complex was created (successfully passed all tests and received the letter O1) Mayevka "with TNLA. The "container" "Mayevka" was even in the state defense order, but it turned out to be deleted from it and in fact was deliberately destroyed.

Preliminary tests of the container modification TNLA "Mayevka" (MTSH "Valentin Pikul")

Have we carried out work on modular PMO systems? Yes, but their level was, as they say, on the verge - both by their absolutely fantastic and obviously ineffective appearance, and by inadequate stuffing of all this in 20-foot containers, which simply could not be put on the minesweepers of the combat composition (only on 22160 and 20386 projects). Moreover, this topic in the Navy received a mockingly "compact" name.

Small anti-submarine ships OVR

Project 1124M MPK are excellent hunting ships for their time. However, the armament of the project of the 60s was objectively obsolete, and during the modernization of the ship, the reserves of displacement and stability were exhausted. Responsible persons said that the project 1124 can be given up.

However, the new weapon systems, as a rule, had significantly less weight than the old ones (especially those made on an electromechanical base), i.e., with modern modernization, the displacement and stability reserves would be restored! Moreover, the MPC successfully tested new digital electronic units for new hydroacoustics. That is, they were technically absolutely compatible with the old GAS. Take and upgrade! But not a single MPK has received such a full-fledged modernization, despite repeated appeals to the Navy by the designer (ZPKB) and its chief designer.

The Navy also showed absolute indifference to Okeanpribor's proposals to create a compact towed active-passive GAS (using the Barracuda design and development work backlog), suitable for equipping not only ships of size MRK project 22800, but also much less, including up to unmanned boats (BEC).

Instead of two-tube torpedo tubes DTA-53, a "Packet" normally stood on its foundations (with the possibility of using both torpedoes and anti-torpedoes).

Back in 2015, it was decided to replace the Osa-MA air defense missile system with the Tor-FM at one of the Black Sea Fleet MPK. Until now, nothing has been heard about the real start of work on this solution.

Storming the IPC project 1124M

After the issue with the afterburner of the power plant (Ukrainian turbine) was closed in 2014, the fleet actually gave up on the IPC.

Small missile ships (MRK) of project 12341

The modernization of these ships was planned back in the USSR, with the replacement of the Malachite missile weapon system (KRO) (6 anti-ship missiles) with the newest Onyx (12 anti-ship missiles). The KRO "Onyx" itself passed part of the tests at the RTO "Nakat".

MRK "Nakat" with KRO "Onyx"

The tests showed a large excess "top weight" of 12 "Onyxes" and significant restrictions on their use in stormy conditions from the project 12341. However, nothing prevented the reduction of the number of "Onyxes" or the supply of 12 lighter "Calibers".

Comparison of the "calibrated" RTOs of the old project 12341 shows its absolute superiority in performance characteristics over the "newest" RTOs of the Buyan-M project.

Yes, the design standards have changed and today it is simply legally impossible to repeat something like Project 1234 (the maximum that is technically possible is to watch Project 22800), but the ships were already in the Navy, for the most part had a sufficient resource. The modernization of the MRK project 12341 was the fastest and most effective version of the "calibrating" of the Navy, alas, lost today.

At the same time, instead of a series of unsuccessful MRK Buyan-M, the same Zelenodolsk plant could produce a series of new small OVR corvettes.

Frigates and patrol ships

Until now, the Black Sea Fleet has two Project 1135 TFRs in their "pristine" (from construction) form.

SKR "Ladny" project 1135 of the Black Sea Fleet

Is it okay to show a flag? And if there is a war? Which we almost got (with Turkey) in 2015?

And what about Turkey itself? And it modernizes its old ships: both frigates and old anti-mine ships (like, for example, minesweepers of the Searse type, the same age as the Turbinist). Specifically for frigates: the old ex-American "Perry" received new ones, including modern ones, radar and air defense systems (with UVP Mk41).

Frigate TCG Göksu (F497) Turkish Navy

Don't feel like messing with old ship hulls? There are simpler solutions.

We have safely forgotten that new missiles (Onyx, Caliber, Answer) are capable of launching from inclined launchers (PU). At the same time, this is well remembered, for example, in the Indian Navy, where there are both vertical and inclined launchers of new missiles. And where they normally modernize old ships, incl. domestic construction.

Destroyer of project 61ME with anti-ship missiles "Bramos" ("Indian Onyx") and P-20

Problems with the placement of the air defense missile system in the building? In a number of NATO countries, deck-mounted aircraft are successfully used.

Deck UVP SAM on the frigate "Karel Doorman" of the Netherlands Navy

They do not shun in the "Wild West" and "antique" manual reloading of missiles, as, for example, on the RAM / ASMD air defense system, which, however, can be put on almost everything - starting with small missile boats.

Manual reloading of SAM SAM RAM

Finally, almost sacrilege, something that was much talked about in the 90s and early 2000s (but they suddenly forgot, as soon as the question arose about the development of budgetary funds in a series by our huge defense industry concerns): unified modular consoles of complexes! Today we have a situation when they drag their own “computer” to almost every "fighting pencil". It is ordered to forget that there may be several (or even one) of these "computers".

Accordingly, when the question of the introduction of new weapons on old ships arises, objections of the type immediately begin: without a BIUS for 1,5 billion, this is allegedly impossible.

For example, "Packet" can be fired from a laptop. Moreover, its capabilities are wider than with a standard control rack. And there are no technical problems in integrating the “Packet” firing task, for example, into modern bridge systems of ships.

With this, the fleet will be a big plus in combat capabilities. But certain defense industry organizations are clearly a disadvantage. When the torpedo firing system starts to cost more than 300 million rubles. (as it turned out during the modernization of "Shaposhnikov"), "something needs to be urgently corrected at the conservatory."

And to begin with, make a strong-willed decision. Does the Navy exist for the country or does the Navy exist for the development of budgetary funds by certain organizations? ..

The main value of “modularity” is the solution to the problem of what to do with expensive new complexes after the decommissioning of old ships. The Navy's practice is to send all their weapons to scrap. Exceptions are rare and only confirm the general rule. The maximum that is being done (and then at the initiative of the personnel) is the replacement of faulty parts on ships of the combat strength with serviceable ones from the decommissioned one. In practice (90s - 2000s) it came to the rearrangement of the air defense system (!).

At the same time, we have a large fleet of new patrol ships as part of the FSB security guard, which have extremely weak weapons on a regular basis. There was a widespread opinion (including at the "top") that the fleet had its own tasks, and the SOBR had their own. At the same time, the fleet has an extreme shortage of ships, and the combat capabilities of the PSKR BOKHR unambiguously define them in the category of "game" in the event of any serious conflict.

A good question: what would the PSKR Bokhr do in the Black Sea if hostilities with Turkey began in 2015? Would they have huddled in the base (holding up a banner "Please do not shoot at us, we are modest and weak FSB ships!")?

Obviously, one of the key issues here is financial. Who should pay for the mobilization readiness of the SOBR? And it is obvious that most of these costs should be borne by the Ministry of Defense. This is, first of all, a stock of combat systems (and their ammunition) for the PSKR BOKHR.

However, funds are not enough simply for new ships - and where in this situation can we get the "border guards"? The answer is modularity. Optimal modernization of old ships with new complexes should ensure their easy reinstallation on other ships (primarily PSKR BOKHR) and, if necessary, conservation for basic storage.

PSKR project 22460 (14 units as part of the BOKHR)

PSKR project 22100

It is appropriate here to recall the experience of the US security forces, which always provided for a mobilization military option for the use of patrol ships (with appropriate additional equipment).

The US Coast Guard patrol ship Melon launches the Harpoon anti-ship missile system in 1990.

At the same time, the enhancement of armament is also relevant for many ships of the Navy, for example, "disarmed" (in the course of finalizing the project) BDK project 11711 or ships of the combat strength of the main classes, in cases of emergency reinforcement of their weapons when the military-political situation in a specific theater of operations aggravates.

BDK project 11711, "lost" all weapons, except for 30-mm gun mounts

New ships

An extremely acute issue of domestic ships is their modernization and repair suitability (including after combat damage). The situation when it is easier to build a new one than to repair an old one is extremely acute for us, and here the application of zonal principles can be very useful.

And the last question: could the missile containers (with which the fleet was worn) come in handy? Yes, they could, in a situation where the INF Treaty was in force, but as a quick-change armament for carriers of the Dugong type DKA.

In this case, the use of missile containers should have been carried out in the "basic conditions" of minimum excitement.

War, a salvo is immediately fired at already assigned targets, and after half an hour or an hour the carriers are already unloaded from empty missile containers, and loaded, for example, with mines.

Such a scheme of application made sense, but today the INF Treaty has been canceled.


We need technical and organizational solutions (including in terms of modularity) that provide fast repair and modernization of combat personnel (including long service lives), the most effective and long-term use of expensive weapons of modern ships.

These measures require certain costs: financial, displacement reserves (and a reduction in the share of weapons), the assessment of which must be comprehensive, at the level of at least an interspecific grouping of forces in a theater of operations.

At the same time, the construction of deliberately flawed ships (22160 for us and LCS in the USA) for the sake of "new approaches to ship architecture" (a phrase from one of our documents) can not justify anything.
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. The leader of the Redskins
    The leader of the Redskins 22 September 2020 06: 45
    Thank you for the article. I am a land person, but even I understood the message of the author.
    1. Lexus
      Lexus 22 September 2020 10: 06
      hi Of course, I know that the first photo just shows the AU being transported by the Danish tug HDMS Alsin, but it still looks "harsh". laughing And in any business, the main thing is without fantasies. fellow

      Fragment from the cartoon "Treasure Island" (1988)
      1. The leader of the Redskins
        The leader of the Redskins 22 September 2020 10: 13
        I can't put it out, but it reminded me more of a picture from "Captain Wrangel", when "Trouble" got into the exercise zone, and there are a lot of bristling ships!)))
        1. Skay
          Skay 22 September 2020 10: 44
          but it reminded me more of a picture from "Captain Wrangel"

          And me Toyota Gan smile
      2. ares1988
        ares1988 22 September 2020 10: 35
        I just wanted to ask: what is this charming shorty with such a drin))
      3. Angestyr
        Angestyr 22 September 2020 13: 32

        more dynamic version
      4. Crimea26
        Crimea26 9 November 2020 22: 07
        The main thing is not to show this photo to Ukrainians. And then they will be imbued with the idea ... and the end of the Black Sea Fleet))))
    2. Kostya Lavinyukov
      Kostya Lavinyukov 22 September 2020 13: 50
      I am a sofa person, but under each article I do not remind about it.
  2. Free wind
    Free wind 22 September 2020 07: 43
    A strange drawing on a coast guard ship, it looks like a French flag.
  3. Alien From
    Alien From 22 September 2020 08: 52
    Thanks to the author, it's always interesting to read detailed articles! Now on VO it is a rarity.
  4. Ryaruav
    Ryaruav 22 September 2020 09: 49
    during full-scale hostilities, no one will change modules, and besides, Russia cries a cat, and depending on the threat, it is proposed to change modules for them every day?
    1. Skay
      Skay 22 September 2020 10: 42
      Modularity is good for field repairs. He took off the damaged weapons, put on a working one and again combat readiness. And the damaged weapons are sent to the repair depot for restoration.
      1. igor_sabadah
        igor_sabadah 25 October 2020 12: 08
        With combat damage, usually not only the module suffers, it will often no longer be digged out
    2. bayard
      bayard 23 September 2020 03: 45
      In the course of full-scale hostilities in the proposed modularity option, FSB patrol ships and a number of civilian ships will be armed / re-armed, as well as re-equip existing ships of the fleet.
      And this is reasonable, practical and proven by the practice of other fleets.
  5. alexmach
    alexmach 22 September 2020 11: 47
    What a handsome man in the first photo in the article :)
  6. Evgesh91
    Evgesh91 22 September 2020 13: 02
    Good evening everyone! Gentlemen, not on the topic, of course, but tell me, about Donskoy and others like him, is there any news? Something on Zen became frequent news stories about utilization, then about the modernization of Severstal ...
    1. Beregovic_1
      Beregovic_1 22 September 2020 15: 06
      Google the Zvezdochka download for repair and upgrade orders. Count the slipways, terms of contracts. In principle, you can calculate it using Wikipedia. And you will have a ringing clarity about the Typhoon modernization.
  7. prodi
    prodi 22 September 2020 15: 40
    I would like, nevertheless, to somehow make a start from the general concept of the Navy for Russia: And what do we, in fact, need at all and in what quantities? And then, so far, as before, only a very vague idea - that strategists are needed, diesel people are needed, but multipurpose ones are not very; minesweepers and patrol boats are needed; corvettes with missile weapons are needed for the Baltic and Black Seas; frigates are needed for the North and Pacific; we need some amphibious capabilities in the nearby waters ...
  8. The comment was deleted.
  9. ZEMCH
    ZEMCH 22 September 2020 17: 28
    Back in 2015, it was decided to replace the Osa-MA air defense missile system with the Tor-FM at one of the Black Sea Fleet MPK. Until now, nothing has been heard about the real start of work on this solution.

    There was such a project 1124K for testing the Kinzhal air defense system
  10. fomin
    fomin 22 September 2020 21: 48
    Maxim (he's a mine, he's a bomb, etc.), would you deign to answer the following questions?
    1)"Of the approximately 3000 tonnes of LCS displacement, only 400 tonnes account for the payload, while replaceable combat modules account for about 180 tonnes." How was the figure 180t determined, you are certainly not the author, but as long as you are quoting please be so kind as to "answer for the bazaar." And you will probably agree that if, for example, you exclude a pair of fuel tanks or a bow gun from the payload, then there will be more than 180 tons for combat modules.
    2) "since the load-bearing structures of the modules are practically cut off from the equivalent beam of the ship" How do you explain this heresy? And, how, for example, do other warships that do not have a module, or civilian ships sail? And in general, how can a 40-foot container located on the upper deck or in the hold of the ship "join the equivalent beam of the ship" and reduce its bends?
    3) "fastening modules mechanically, as opposed to fastening by welding, requires special foundations with reinforcements" Another heresy. Maxim, you probably won't argue that the weight of one combat aircraft located on the only Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser weighs no less than a 40-foot container with a module, but nevertheless it is fixed in the lower deck "mechanically without any additional foundations", and then the container mobile, it can be installed anywhere in the lower deck, on the upper deck i.e. in any place where the dimensions of the ship allow, and where there are slots for connecting modules, you that in this case will close up the entire ship with "special foundations with reinforcements."
    Whether someone likes it or not, modular ships are a matter of the near future, modularity opens up great prospects both in the rapid change in the "combat qualifications" of ships, and allows you to quickly increase the combat capabilities of the fleet in case of war by installing modules on mobilized civilian ships.
    1. Cympak
      Cympak 22 September 2020 23: 19
      That's just where the "mobilized civilian ships" have the necessary foundations that can withstand the kickback / launch of most of our modern systems (usually with a mortar launch). After 1-2 shots, it is banal to break the deck + the entire module will shift or completely fall into the hold.
      It raises doubts that civilian shipbuilders have provided for the wiring of electrical power (the required voltage, current and frequency), water and air, which are required for combat modules to function. And the connectors for the connection must match ....

      We would have to overcome our military-industrial feudalism (formed back in the days of the USSR), so that missiles from different manufacturers would fit into standard cells (and not only into individual ones for each type of missile), so that the connectors and power supply were standardized, so that the consoles were universal, and not specialized (you do not have a separate computer strictly for Word and the second strictly for Excel), so that the weapon and sensor modules are interfaced with the CIUS according to standardized protocols.
      For a start, we would build ships according to a concept similar to MEKO and VPS, i.e. so that standard volumes are highlighted and the appropriate piping and support systems are made, in which a module with a weapon or sensor can be installed. With which the ship will constantly serve until the planned modernization, in which the old module can be relatively easily removed and replaced with a new, more modern one. And only then to soar in empyrean and dream about replaceable modules. Although it has been written more than once that this concept breaks down on the practice of serving in the Navy.
      1. igor_sabadah
        igor_sabadah 25 October 2020 12: 10
        I don’t know how it is now, but earlier on the same passenger liners, all this was laid during construction ..
    2. bayard
      bayard 23 September 2020 04: 08
      Quote: fomin
      allows you to quickly increase the combat capabilities of the fleet in case of war by installing modules on mobilized civilian ships.

      This is what 40 'container modules really do.
      Everything else is heresy, refuted by practice.
      It is another matter if you choose several basic platforms for the fleet and combine the composition of weapons on them, depending on the needs of the fleet. For the sake of unification. Another reasonable "modularity" can be useful for more convenient dismantling of old equipment when carrying out repairs or upgrades.
      Everything else is expensive and useless.
      Quote: fomin
      Maxim (he's a mine, he's a bomb, etc.)

      But this is just rudeness.
      Moreover, it is not supported by its own competence.
      Even Putin got the whole depth of the nonsense with this "modularity". request
      And you still persist. No.
      It can be bad for your career. yes
      You need to be more attentive to changes in the vector of thought of the authorities. lol
      And be careful in words. bully

      And Maxim will not answer you now, he is still in the "bathhouse" ... unless Timokhin will react ... that's just worth it.
      1. fomin
        fomin 23 September 2020 21: 32
        Dear bayard by calling your nickname am I insulting you or not? Probably not, because you invented this nickname yourself and published, then the question is where did you see the "rudeness" in my listing of M. Klimov's nicknames with whom he appears on various resources. Judging by your passion, it is clear that you are a young simple-minded person, easily fall for any bullshit, the more you try to threaten "It can be bad for your career." unfamiliar people (and friends do not need to be threatened either) without thinking about the consequences. Here "Maxim" will get out of the bath or through the window with someone he will transmit the news, he will answer, and you better not meddle where you are not asked (good advice).
    3. timokhin-aa
      23 September 2020 12: 51
      Klimov asked to convey:

      Monsieur Fomin (aka Kosikhin, aka "Paravan", aka "Friend", and others, etc. YOUR "drove")!

      Such deceitful and illiterate liars and thieves (YOU were personally caught on absolutely blatant plagiarism) as YOU do not "answer" (because YOU are very bad even at the level of a school physics course), such as YOU are "lowered down the stairs" (which, in fact, made on "VO" "flush into the toilet" all YOUR foul-smelling "imperishable" previously posted here). In decent media, the road is also closed for YOU.

      Only one example of plagiarism is Fomin's "opus" (aka Kosikhin, aka Paravan, etc.) “Now the Minotaur will follow our ships. This OPUS represents 60% of the DEFINITELY STOPPED (out of 21992 signs of its own he has only 10448, in detail - the Forum Courage - Fleet - Hydroacoustics - page 13.) from other authors (Yatsenko, Damantsev, Traskovsky, Starodubtsev, Volozhinsky) text and 40% stupid and illiterate "conclusions" of the so-called "affluor" of sEmen Kosikhin-Fomin-Paravan. And the ignorance of this aFtora reaches the point that, stealing quotes from Stardubtsev about OUR BGAS "Agam", he sticks it into his stupid opus in the place where he writes about SOSUS!

      In terms of "modules", this aFFFtor has an opus in the "MIC" (from where he is also kicked out, and he is no longer printed there) "How to create a modern fleet of cubes", about a completely enchanting "level" of ABSOLUTE ignorance and misunderstanding, not that shipbuilding, but just a school physics course, they say the phrases of this "Fomina-Kosikhin" both in the article itself and in comets to it such as "that the Sudostroenie magazine, that the reference book, you still do not understand that you are reading otherwise you would not weave about 180 tons of water on modules.

      I explain to you and everyone like that, nastythat the number of modules is determined not by 180 tons, but by the number of slots. to connect modules, we can use the amount of displacement until the waterline disappears under the water. "

      Note: word "nasty" it was not written by me, but is a literal quote from Monsieur Fomin-Paravan-Kosikhin-Druzhka himself ...
      1. timokhin-aa
        23 September 2020 13: 05
        This is a quote from Fomin (if anyone did not understand):

        “That the magazine Sudostroenie, that the reference book, you still don’t understand what you are reading otherwise you wouldn’t weave about 180 tons of water. on modules.

        I explain to you and everyone like that, nasty, that the number of modules is determined not by 180 tons, but by the number of slots. to connect modules, we can use the amount of displacement until the waterline disappears under the water. "
        1. fomin
          fomin 24 September 2020 20: 59
          Dear MODERATORS of this resource, on what basis did you delete my comment that did not contain a single offensive, abusive word i.e. did not violate the rules that you yourself established? But the most interesting thing is that they left an insulting opus addressed to me by the one who is "in the bath" and who, on his behalf, splashes out this dirt. It would be desirable to receive a clear answer to this question from you.
        2. fomin
          fomin 25 September 2020 18: 13
          Because I have not received an answer to my appeal to the moderators of the resource, I consider it necessary to respond to the vile accusations of M. Klimov and others like him. Maxim about the VO where, according to you, I was "lowered down the stairs" as far as you know, I am leading my blog to Mill Press (formerly the Central Naval Portal) where Maxim, politely not allowed, despite all your attempts, to get there, for during my cooperation with this resource, I brought him tens of thousands (!) of new readers, and I hope significant additional funds, if I published in VO, then these readers and funds could end up in VO, but you can see there are very rich people here who abandoned everything in order to listen, your Maxim, tongue-tied verbiage and be able to contemplate your eagle profile. This is their choice, although I do not understand it, I respect it. The conflict occurred over a far-fetched reason, over the sources used, as you can see, almost all VO authors use various sources, and this "is not considered a crime", but claims were made against me regarding the use of different sources, this is an outright mockery that I was not going to tolerate and since For my work, I did not receive here not only money, but even an elementary "thank you", I calmly ended the relationship with this resource, saying to myself with a grin "Oh, what a ridiculous loss. How many such losses will be!" I made a comment here. this article is a little revised and supplemented by "excerpts from the journal Sudostroenie (!)" by my article published on the pages of "Military-Industrial Courier" and earlier this article of mine was published here on VO and practically unchanged under the signature of a completely different "author" , I have already said that I am not sorry, especially since you Maxim do not shun plagiarism by rewriting anything, even articles from Wikipedia (I hope you will not deny it) and I would not have made a comment if you "wrote" mine article is better than me, unfortunately you completely perverted the idea of ​​modularity of ships relying on a clearly incompetent article from the journal Sudostroenie and from some other journals (180 tons). And, on their thin knowledge (concepts) in this area. By the way, of the allegedly listed by you my nicknames half have nothing to do with me, I understand that these are nicknames of people who gave you a worthy rebuff, but nevertheless I do not need someone else's glory.
          1. Fizik M
            Fizik M 1 October 2020 20: 42
            Quote: fomin
            Maxim about VO where, according to your words, I was "lowered down the stairs"

            sEmEnka, you are completely lying, even if you wrote down for yourself lol
            Here is who wrote it? and myself! -
            Quote: fomin
            The conflict took place on a far-fetched occasion, over the sources used, as you can see, almost all VO authors use various sources, and this "is not considered a crime", but claims were made against me regarding the use of different sources, this is outright mockery

            and there was not only plagiarism, but also impudent nonsense and slander (against Miroslav Morozov)
            Quote: fomin
            log to Mill Press (formerly the Central Naval Portal) where Maxim was, they were politely not allowed, despite all your attempts, to get through there

            see you have a "very bo-bo" lol
            I was registered there as it is
            and as for your rotten opuses on this "resource", then exhaustively on it -
            By the way, Monsieur "guardian" for Novorossiya, does it bother YOU to write on a frankly Probander resource? Ask there question - WHERE have informational messages from Donbass gone (especially "golden" ones), which are "delta" between the number announced in Kiev by your boss and actually published? My opinion is that they were received by "sponsor-inagents"... How is this called you will figure it out, or poke YOU?
            Quote: fomin
            I made a comment here. this article is slightly revised and supplemented by "excerpts from the journal Sudostroenie (!)" by my article published on the pages of "Military Industrial Courier" and earlier this article of mine was published here on VO

            shortly - TO THE DOCTOR
            1. fomin
              fomin 9 October 2020 20: 27
              Dear Masyanya! I see you again showed your ability to crawl through all the cracks, changing your nickname, like a sub-snake skin! But as soon as you gave your angry opus "to the mountain", let's try to answer it.
              Regarding the first part, Masyanya, if you want to find a plagiarist, look in the mirror, he's there!
              Further, what is completely new - it turns out that I offended M. Morozov, and I was blocked for this, well, if because of this, mail for the honor! Did not know.
              I wrote several reviews of M. Morozov's articles, which I sent personally to him so that he could give a clear answer, published in my blog, and in the project "The Great Slandered War", unfortunately, I did not receive a clear, reasoned answer from M. Morozov, since he limited himself to one obscene language, in principle, I understand him, you cannot argue against facts, you can only swear.
              As for your registration for milpress, many people are registered there, but not all are published there, you are in the category of reader and rewriter of other people's articles, a flag in your hands and a drum around your neck!
              As for the end of your opus, here I can say one thing, while writing it, something happened to you that is sung in the proletarian anthem: Our indignant mind is boiling! ", Otherwise you will not name your cries about my alleged cooperation with Ukrainian nationalists, again you are Masyanya me with someone beguiled-glitches.
              Although I touched upon the topic of the Dombass war in my article, in my blog, "Callsign" Merry ",
              Well, and the fact that you are Masyanya, you brazenly deny when you are caught plagiarizing (not the first time), these will not surprise me.
              1. Fizik M
                Fizik M 7 November 2020 19: 03
                Quote: fomin
                unfortunately I did not receive a clear, reasoned answer from M. Morozov

                Monsieur, YOU are nobody and there is no way to call YOU
                so, petty vovrovovik, CAPTURED BY THE HAND (plagiarism), unlike your nonsense
                so what is where YOU M.E. sent - there and download
  11. mmaxx
    mmaxx 23 September 2020 02: 54
    In general, a strange desire to fit weapons under a standard container. If it works, okay. It is easier for the fleet to develop its own standards for deck modules. Only it is necessary to think about it.
    In general, modularity, in my civilized opinion, should provide for the possibility of installing weapons in the same cells, unified by the types of control systems for them and provide for quick and convenient replacement / interchangeability of cables. And this is all with some addition of combat capabilities in operation, if necessary, or to unify the hulls during construction.
    And so, the campaign, with the ideas of the admirals in any way. But they are not used to asking.
  12. Alexandra
    Alexandra 23 September 2020 14: 33
    Quote: fomin
    Of the approximately 3000 tonnes of LCS displacement, only 400 tonnes account for the payload, and the share of replaceable combat modules accounts for about 180 tonnes. "How the figure of 180t was determined, you are certainly not the author, but as soon as you quote, please" answer for the bazaar. "

    "For frigates like" Freedom "(LCS-1) and" Independence "(LCS-2), three variants of payload modules are being developed: mine, anti-submarine and a module for dealing with high-speed small surface targets. According to the requirements imposed on them, the mass included in composition of each module of systems and equipment necessary for their operation should not exceed 180 t, including directly the system itself 105 tons, and the number of personnel serving the module should not exceed 35 people. "

    2) "since the load-bearing structures of the modules are practically cut off from the equivalent beam of the ship" How do you explain this heresy?

    "Cutting out the load-bearing structures of the modules from the ship's hull. Ships built according to the Modular Payload ideology will inevitably have, in addition to excess displacement, greater bending and elastic deformations afloat, since the load-bearing structures of the modules are practically cut off from the equivalent ship's beam. Large hull deformations after launching. in turn, lead to a mismatch of the exact ship complexes during operation. "

    3) "fastening modules mechanically, as opposed to fastening by welding, requires special foundations with reinforcements" Another heresy.

    "Loss of useful volumes in the ship's hull. This problem, firstly, is associated with the formation of specially allocated volumes of" assembly zones "for modules. Of the approximately 3000 tonnes of LBC displacement, only 400 tonnes account for the payload, and replaceable combat modules account for about 180 tons. Secondly, mechanical fastening of modules, in contrast to fastening by welding, requires special foundations or platforms with reinforcements, which complicates the layout of the ship. This problem is especially relevant for ships of small displacement. "

    You can move from criticizing the author to criticizing his sources.

    I will only note one thing, you are not in the subject, the author is in the subject. And the form in which you put on your questions (the proposal "to answer for the bazaar", "another heresy", etc.) provoke not only the author who is not very restrained in the language of the author, but also any other person who is at least a little versed in the topic (to like me) just send you to a well-known address than try to explain anything to you.

    However, I believe that you formulated your questions not at all in order to get smart answers to them. But I could be wrong, right? Therefore, above are useful links to the articles "Freedom and Independence Frigates" ("Foreign Military Review" No. 2, 4, 5 of 2017) and "Modular principles of building warships. Basic principles of technology" (Rational Enterprise Management No. 5 2012 g.).

    PS The more people read, the better they understand what they read.
    1. fomin
      fomin 23 September 2020 21: 25
      Dear Alexander, what good can I say to you so as not to offend much, you reminded me of the policemen with your "answers", you address them with one statement, and they give a completely incomprehensible official answer that has nothing to do with the topic of your statement. Before being clever and threatening me that supposedly someone can send me somewhere (see yourself there before me, you better read the questions I asked (on the topic of the published article), let me remind you for the inattentive: 1) where did the figure 180 tons come from . how it was defined, 2) how the absence (presence) of a container (in fact, a large box) can negatively affect the ship's hull, and how, in this case, do non-modular ships float? 3) regarding the notorious "foundations", you can see what "foundations" are there or not on the RTOs, and if we plan to launch missiles directly from a container, from any type of carriers (dry cargo ship, railway platform, etc., then what I will remind you of your own statement: PS The more people read, the better they understand what they read.Before writing about something angrily, first read the topic of the question carefully.
      1. Alexandra
        Alexandra 24 September 2020 09: 56
        You see, I don’t know about your father, but if you read the article "Freedom and Independence-type frigates" in the issues of the journal "Foreign Military Review" No. 2, 4, 5 of 2017 and still did not understand that 180 tons, this the maximum mass of a modular load LCS specified by the US Navy in the design assignment for this load. If you have read "Modular principles for the construction of warships. Basic principles of technology" published in the Rational Enterprise Management magazine No. 5 2012, but did not understand that the installation on the foundations of modules made in the dimensions of standard sea containers in specially designated areas of the ship's hull reduces strength the hull of the ship, since on a "non-modular ship" in these zones in the hull there are bulkheads ensuring this strength:

        "A ship is a complex engineering structure and, in order to fulfill its purpose, it must have a number of qualities. One of these qualities is its strength. During construction, operation and repair, the ship experiences the action of various forces of a static and dynamic nature: the weight of the hull and the mechanisms in it, cargo ; forces of water pressure, inertia during rolling, shock of waves, reaction of keelblocks and support devices during construction, launching and lifting of a ship, reaction of the soil during grounding, ice pressure forces when sailing in ice conditions, periodically changing forces arising from the operation of mechanisms, shafts, screws, etc.
        In relation to the specified forces, the ship's hull must have sufficient strength as a whole and in its individual parts.
        In structural mechanics, the ship's hull is represented in the form of a thin-walled box-shaped beam of variable cross-section, consisting of sheets of the outer skin, flooring of the second bottom, decks, bulkheads, reinforced by an internal transverse longitudinal set. The ship's hull, like a box-shaped girder, must have sufficient overall strength, i.e. should not be destroyed during its general buckling and torsion by external forces.
        In addition, individual parts of the hull (bottom, deck, sides, bulkheads, plates, beams and
        etc.), which are under the direct influence of forces, experience the so-called local bending between the rigid connections of the body, which are the supports for these structures.
        The general strength of the vessel and the strength of its elements are usually estimated by the values ​​of the design and allowable stresses. "

        And for this you do not understand why the transformation of a warship into a "modular" carrier of standard sea containers leads to an increase in the mass of its hull, as a result to an increase in displacement in comparison with a non-modular one.

        "The MEKO concept of Blohm + Voss GmbH (Germany) considers the ship's hull in the form of a rigid load-bearing platform with cells into which modules of naval weapon systems are inserted, aligned and bolted. the payload is reduced accordingly. "

        Then just understand that you lack a) knowledge on the topic under discussion b) desire or ability to quickly fill the lack of knowledge by reading and understanding what is written by professionals.

        Let me remind you of your own statement: PS The more people read, the better they understand what they read. Before you write about something angrily, first carefully read the topic of the question.

        I am absolutely sure that you have not read (let alone read thoughtfully) the journal articles offered to you. "The best education is self-education." But there are people who need any information to be chewed up by tutors in the style of teachers trying to explain to Fonvizin's "Minor" elementary things:

        "Pravdin: Door, for example, what is the name: a noun or an adjective?"
        Mitrofan. A door? Which door?
        Pravdin. Which door! This one.
        Mitrofan. This? Adjective.
        Pravdin. Why?
        Mitrofan. Because it is attached to its place. There, at the closet of the pole, the door has not been hung for a week: so that is still a noun.
        Starodum. So is that why you have an adjective because it is applied to a stupid person?
        Mitrofan. And it is known. "

        Success in self-education!
        1. fomin
          fomin 24 September 2020 20: 52
          Dear Alexander, if you have mastered the reading of the articles you mentioned, this does not mean at all that you can "from the top of your self-education" accuse someone of not knowing something. You were offered specific questions, and I received a more or less intelligible answer to the first question about 180 tons, "This is how the American specialists calculated for their ships." Note for "friends" i.e. there is no need to take this figure as a dogma, because: firstly, this figure may change depending on the increase or decrease in the volume of the payload, and secondly, for each possible type of modular ship this figure will be its own, different from others, incl. from 180 tons. Further, when you enter into a conversation about modules and the fortress of the ship's hull, you have no idea what a module is! This is an architecturally finished structure that does not need additional foundations and it is not necessary (not at all necessary) to be located in the places of the "hull attachment" if you and your other partner have read an insufficiently "thoughtful" article, then you do not need to wave these "hasty" conclusions like a flag accusing me of not being competent. Regarding the dialogue you have cited from the school textbook (it is very good that you do not break away from school knowledge), I would advise you to read Griboyedov's play "Woe from Wit", it will be just about you, it seems as if it is not stupid, and the school educational program is respected. .e. smart, but does not receive respect and understanding from opponents and interlocutors, one grief from such a mind.
          1. Fizik M
            Fizik M 3 October 2020 11: 38
            Quote: fomin
            about 180 tons "this is how the American specialists calculated for their ships." Note for "friends" i.e. there is no need to take this figure as a dogma, because: firstly, this figure may change depending on the increase or decrease in the volume of the payload, and secondly, for each possible type of modular ship this figure will be its own, different from others, incl. from 180 t.


            Quote: fomin
            to talk about modules and fortress

            Quote: fomin
            have no idea what a module is! it an architecturally finished structure that does not need additional foundations

            1. fomin
              fomin 9 October 2020 20: 36
              The paradox is that usually when people read scientific articles, in particular in the journal "Shipbuilding", they seem to be getting smarter from the knowledge gained, ie there must be progress, in the case of M. Klimov we see that the reading of scientific articles in no way positively affected him - regression. Conclusion: even when reading scientific articles, you need to think, analyze and draw the right conclusions. And, without acting as a parrot, repeat the wrong conclusions and conclusions of others.
              1. Fizik M
                Fizik M 7 November 2020 19: 00
                Quote: fomin
                even when reading scientific articles, you need to think

                take it easy
                YOU, Monsieur PLAGIATOR, are incapable of this
  13. The comment was deleted.
  14. alexmach
    alexmach 23 September 2020 21: 52
    Thank you for the article,
    I have one question. Is there any point in modernizing Albatrosses now? On the one hand, there is a hole in the PLO, on the other hand, there is absolutely nothing to plug it with. On the one hand, there seems to be everything that is needed for such a modernization, on the other hand, the ships are already old and the engines are no longer available for them.
  15. rusboris
    rusboris 24 September 2020 00: 01
    Devastation is not in the closets, devastation in the heads. Under Nicholas, the fleet was not built adequate and funds for armor rivets were spent on the jewelry of mistresses. And under Stalin I.V. "large battalions" of 360 mm caliber fought ineptly. The admirals sank the battleship Novorossiysk together with the sailors in peacetime. Maybe someone can explain this paradox. How could Admiral Golovko with insignificant forces organize a good naval war in the north? Each problem has a last name, first name and patronymic. Colleagues, I ask you to address your criticism more precisely. And more often to name the authors of fantastic projects of the budget cut.
    1. Alexandra
      Alexandra 24 September 2020 10: 09
      The Russian Navy is an example of no less than 150 years of tradition of negative selection of personnel in a hierarchical structure.
      1. rusboris
        rusboris 24 September 2020 10: 15
        So, what is it not possible to select personnel for the fleet without the Petrovskaya stick? But after all, I.V. Stalin and Hitler had the same big problems with the admirals. How are the Anglo-Saxons with personnel there now? What can you say now about the admirals of a potential enemy?
        1. Alexandra
          Alexandra 24 September 2020 12: 24
          The Anglo-Saxons have a shitty staffing too. This is reported by the failures in the military-technical construction of the US and British navies (all these LCS, Zamvolts, the unworkable Gerald R. Ford, the America's UDC without a docking camera, rumbling "like a box with wrenches" and audible to submarines for 100 miles destroyers of the "Daring" class without anti-ship missiles, scandals in the British submarine fleet, etc.)

          It turns out that only "revolutions from above".

          The armies of the great powers now and then fight in local wars. At least somehow the mechanisms for raising people who have shown themselves in real combat conditions work. The fleets, however, without being tested by combat operations at sea, are transformed into fleets of "parquet admirals" The Russian Navy has a very long history of the "parquet" existence.
          1. rusboris
            rusboris 24 September 2020 15: 45
            If you start escorting Iranian or Venezuelan oil convoys, will it be a combat experience? From each convoy, 50 tons of oil products, in barter. Or declare sanctions on Libya and block sea shipments of sanctioned products. Maybe you can tell me other options for gaining combat experience.
  16. APASUS
    APASUS 25 September 2020 15: 17

    Transporter of stanflex modules for patrol boats "Flyvefisken"
  17. Alexandra
    Alexandra 25 September 2020 16: 29
    Quote: rusboris
    If you start escorting Iranian or Venezuelan oil convoys, will it be a combat experience?

    This will be a sailing experience in remote ocean areas. There is also a certain benefit. But combat experience can only be gained in battle with the enemy fleet. Therefore, today in the fleets of the great powers, in fact, they very vaguely understand what it is, a modern war with an equal enemy. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, it is possible that some already deployed or deployed weapons systems, say the DF-21D PKBM, or autonomous subsonic subsonic anti-ship missiles LRASM, will "shoot" no worse than torpedo bombers at Taranto and in the battle at Kuantan, or deck dive bombers at Pearl Harbor and during the Battle of Midway. Or maybe not.
    1. rusboris
      rusboris 26 September 2020 12: 56
      Do aircraft carriers and URO cruisers have prospects?
      1. Alexandra
        Alexandra 26 September 2020 21: 57
        There is no place to build yet. The Baltic shipyard needs to be modernized.
  18. Diverter
    Diverter 25 September 2020 22: 02
    the first photo is just amazing!))))
  19. evgen1221
    evgen1221 27 September 2020 20: 49
    As for me, the calibers in containers should exist on land in the PCR version (in Iran, it seems to be masked). Well, even on a coastal punt, as in the last figure, something else can work out. And such a container on something else is garbage (it's easier to put a cell like on berks.)
  20. Pavel57
    Pavel57 30 November 2020 14: 36
    A lot of rhetorical questions, when the answer lies in the plane - you want to eat well, without regard to the combat readiness of the fleet.