Tsushima. Shell version. Projectile against armor

332
Continuing the series of articles about "Shell version" as the reason for the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima, in this article we will compare the effect of Russian and Japanese shells on those parts of the ships that were protected by armor: the side in the waterline area (belt), gun turrets, casemates, conning towers and armored decks.

The sources for the analysis will be damage schemes from "Top Secret stories», Analytical materials by Arseny Danilov (naval-manual.livejournal.com), monograph by V.Ya. Krestyaninov's "The Battle of Tsushima" and N.J.M. Campbell's article "The battle of Tsu-Shima" (translated by V. Feinberg). When mentioning the time of hitting the Japanese ships, Japanese time will be indicated first, and in brackets - Russian according to V. Ya. Krestyaninov.



Hits on an armored side


Action of Russian shells


In the Tsushima battle, Russian 12 ”shells twice pierced the 152-mm armor of the Mikasa's upper belt. The first incident occurred at 14:25 (14:07), a plug was knocked out in the armor, the floor of the casemate was pierced behind the armor.


The second incident occurred at 16:15 (15:57) with a full gap almost 3 meters behind the armor, making holes in the middle deck and bulkheads.

Tsushima. Shell version. Projectile against armor

In both cases, there was an inflow of seawater, but without serious consequences, since the holes were repaired in a timely manner.

In another case, at 14:40 (14:22), the 12 "shell did not penetrate the 152-mm armor of casemate No. 7 (apparently due to the encounter at an acute angle), but the plate cracked.

On the Sikisima at 14:30 (-) 6 ", the shell made a hole in the 102-mm armor of the stern belt with a size of 30x48 cm and caused some flooding. Campbell writes that there was no gap, but the size of the damage to the armor plate casts doubt on his words.

On the Nissin at 15:18 (14:48) a 10 "or 9" shell pierced the 152-mm armor of the main belt just below the waterline. The coal pit behind the impact site was flooded. The rupture injured 3 people in the casemate just above the hole.


Another 12 ”round (time unknown) hit the 152mm armor belt on the port side, but did not penetrate it.

At 12:14 (55:14) on "Azuma" 37 ”, the shell pierced the 152-mm armor of casemate No. 7 and exploded inside.

Action of Japanese shells


In Tsushima, only one indisputable penetration of the armor of Russian ships was recorded. The round (presumably 8 ”) passed the 127-mm steel-nickel plate of the upper belt of the Sisoy the Great at about 15:30, but did not explode, but got stuck in the coal pit.

Another hit in the tenth coal pit "Oslyabi" at about 14:30 causes controversy. According to one version, an 102 ”armor-piercing projectile pierced the 8-mm Garvey armor of the upper belt.

In addition, in the description of the damage to "Nicholas I", compiled by the Japanese after Tsushima, the penetration of the 76-mm steel-iron armor of the right bow casemate of the 9 ”gun was recorded. Unfortunately, we do not have any more information about this event, and even in the testimony of the ship's crew it is not mentioned.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, when hitting the armor, Japanese shells exploded either from the detonation of the fuse (remember, it worked without slowing down), or even earlier from the detonation of the shimosa on impact. In any case, the explosions occurred almost instantly, and even the armor-piercing shells simply did not have time to penetrate the defense of the Russian ships.

When the Eagle hit the Krupp armor (even the thinnest one, 76 mm thick), there were no penetrations.

Unfortunately, we do not have reliable data on the impact on the armor of most of the Russian ships that died in the Battle of Tsushima, therefore, to assess the likelihood of penetrating armor by them, we turn to the extensive statistics of the battle in the Yellow Sea. There were recorded more than 20 hits of Japanese shells in vertical armor, and only two of them had penetration. In the first case, a 12 ”projectile penetrated the 102-mm plate of the Pobeda's upper belt and exploded about 1,2 meters behind it. Here, apparently, there was a defect in the fuse. In the second case, a plug measuring approximately 36x41 cm was knocked out in the 229-mm plate of the Pobeda armor belt. In my opinion, the reason was a defect in the armor, since more similar damage was not observed in any of the battles of the Russo-Japanese War.

When Japanese shells hit the armor, weakening or even partial destruction of the armor fastening elements was repeatedly noticed. Only on "Orel" two such cases with the upper belt were recorded: in the first, a 152-mm plate was displaced, and in the second, a 102-mm sheet moved away from the side.

Similar effects were noted not only in Tsushima, and not only when hitting the belt armor. Therefore, on Russian ships drowned in Tsushima from artillery fire, a situation could well arise when, as a result of several successive hits, Japanese shells made a hole, tearing off the armor plate.

Conclusions


Japanese shells were only able to penetrate thick armor under very rare circumstances. In Tsushima, the Japanese used armor-piercing shells less often than in other battles. Consumption of 12 ”shells in August 1904 was 257 armor-piercing for 336 high-explosive, and in May 1905 31 armor-piercing for 424 high-explosive. 8 ”- in August 1904, 689 armor-piercing for 836 high-explosive, and in May 1905, 222 armor-piercing for 1173 high-explosive.

Therefore, it can be assumed that on the dead Russian ships, if the armor could be pierced, then only in isolated cases. In addition, it is impossible to exclude the possibility of a hole as a result of the separation of the armor plate due to the sequential impact of several shells on its fastening.

Russian shells of 12 ... 9 ”caliber in Tsushima in more than half of the cases pierced 152-mm armor (the maximum thickness of the armor, which turned out to be" in the teeth ", was recorded during the battle in the Yellow Sea: 178-mm group). It should be noted that, after breaking through the belt, the energy of the projectile and the force of the explosion were not enough to overcome the coal and the bevel of the deck. Thus, we can only talk about the possibility of flooding the premises protected up to 152… 178 mm Krupp, but not about causing damage to boilers, cars and cellars.

Unfortunately, we do not know for sure neither the types of Russian shells that hit the armor, nor the distance from which they were fired. Based on the prescription to use armor-piercing shells of the main caliber only at a distance of less than 20 cables (in Tsushima there were such distances only once, during the divergence on counter courses at about 14: 40-15: 00), it can be assumed that almost all hits in the armor were carried out by high-explosive shells. This is confirmed by the calculation of the consumption in battle of 12 ”shells of the“ Eagle ”(66 high-explosive and 2 armor-piercing).

Hit the towers


Action of Russian shells


In Tsushima, Japanese ships received three direct hits to the towers.

A 12 "shell at 14:50 (14:32) hit the right barrel of the Azuma's 8" stern gun, bent it, and exploded over the upper deck.


A 12 ”shell at 15:00 pierced the junction of the 152-mm frontal armor and the roof of the Fuji aft tower and exploded inside. Powder charges caught fire, the right gun was out of order, and the left one temporarily stopped firing. 8 people were killed, 9 were injured.


At 16:05 (15:47), a 10 "or 9" round hit the Nissin's nose turret at an acute angle, which exploded, but did not penetrate 152-mm armor.


The bow barbet "Mikasa" in Tsushima was tested by the enemy for strength three times. First, two 6 “shells hit him. In the first case, the rupture only damaged the upper deck, and in the second, the shell ricocheted overboard without an explosion. At 18:45 (18:27) 12 ", the shell pierced the upper deck and exploded in the infirmary right next to the bow barbette. And none of these hits affected the tower's performance in any way!

Action of Japanese shells


The Eagle's turrets received 11 direct hits, and only one weapon was out of action: the left barrel of the main battery's bow turret was torn off. In other cases, the penetration of fragments was observed, causing injuries to the artillerymen, and violations of the integrity of the fastening of the armor plates, sometimes leading to the limitation of the aiming angles of the guns.

Bow tower "Eagle" after Tsushima:


Close explosions were much more dangerous, especially under medium-caliber turrets. For this reason, 7 barrels of the "Eagle" were out of order, mainly due to the jamming of the Mamerins. In addition, there were numerous cases of shrapnel penetrating into the turrets through embrasures, roof caps, necks for throwing out 6 ”shells, as well as into the barrels of guns. Thus, close explosions knocked out the gunners and destroyed the sights and electrical equipment.

Damage to the left bow tower of the "Eagle":


The bow tower "Oslyabi" received 3 hits and was completely disabled. The barrel of one of the guns was broken, all three hoods on the roof were torn out, thick smoke was coming out of them, the tower commander and the servants were injured.

The projectile, estimated at 12 ”, hit the bow turret of the Sisoi the Great at about 15:00, but left only a dent in the armor and minor damage.

The shell, estimated at 12 ”, between 16:00 and 17:00, pierced the upper deck of the Nakhimov and exploded in the forward turret compartment. The tower was jammed, the anchor was dropped, a huge hole formed in the starboard side, and a fire broke out.

The bow tower of "Nicholas I", according to the Japanese report, received the following damage:
1. A projectile of at least 6 ", which arrived from the port side, exploded on the upper deck, its fragments slightly damaged the mother's boat and the forehead of the tower.
2. The left gun cracked as a result of a direct hit, the deck nearby was damaged by shrapnel.


The projectile, estimated at 8 ”, hit the aft tower of the Apraksin near the embrasure at about 15:45 and caused deformation of the armor plates. Shrapnel penetrated the tower: one gunman was killed, four were wounded.



A round of unknown caliber hit the aft turret of "Ushakov" at about 17:00, exploded, but left only a pothole in the armor. Neither the guns nor the crew were injured.

Conclusions


To compare the effectiveness of shells when impacting the towers, I will take the "Eagle" from the Russian side, for which the data are sufficiently complete for analysis. 11 enemy shells with a direct hit disabled only one of our barrel. While 3 of our shells, hitting the Japanese towers, disabled 2 guns. This statistic once again confirms the fact that the Russian shells were several times more effective than the Japanese when acting on the reserved objects.

In addition, it is striking that the 24 towers of the Japanese ships "took" much less shells than the 8 towers of the "Eagle" (and after all, only 5 of them can be turned on one side)! This once again makes you think about the ratio of the accuracy of firing.

However, the assessment of efficiency changes sharply to the opposite if we take into account the indirect impact on the towers from close ruptures.

I was thinking about what criterion could be used to compare the indirect impact, but I ran into an insoluble contradiction. The fact is that the towers on the Eagle are located so that almost any hit above the armored side can send a splinter into them. And on Japanese ships, the towers were only at the ends, and a shell that fell, for example, in a casemate or pipe, could not affect them in any way. But we will return to the question of assessing indirect impact later.

And now we can conclude: Russian shells caused damage to the towers by breaking through armor. The Japanese shells were ineffective with a direct hit, but more than successfully compensated for this disadvantage by indirect action with close explosions.

Hit the casemates


Action of Russian shells


In the outset of the Tsushima battle "Mikasa" received two consecutive hits with a gap in the roof of casemate No. 3. First, at 14:14 (13:56), a 12 ”round ignited 10 76mm rounds and injured 9 people. A minute later, the 6 ”shell killed two and wounded 7 people. But the 152 mm gun was not fatally damaged.


Another 6 ”shell at 14:20 (14:02) exploded on the armor of the lower part of casemate no. 5 without penetration. However, the shrapnel penetrated through the embrasure and 1 person was killed and 15 were wounded.

At 14:40 (14:22) 12 ", the shell exploded just below casemate # 7. The 152 mm slab cracked, was not punched. The sight was broken by shrapnel and 3 people were wounded.

At 14:55 (14:37) a shell (6… 12 ”) pierced the roof of casemate No. 11, killed two people, wounded 5, but again did not damage the gun!


At 16:15 (15:57) 12 ", the projectile pierced the upper belt and exploded under 152-mm gun # 7. A hole 2x1,7 meters in size was formed in the floor of the casemate, 2 people were killed and 4 people were wounded (according to the report of the ship commander). But the gun remained intact again!


It was only at 18:26 (18:07) that our 6 "shell with a direct hit through the embrasure finally destroyed the enemy gun in casemate No. 10. In addition, 1 was killed and 7 people were wounded.

At 15:20 (14:42 or about 15:00) the 12 "shell hit the unarmored side of the Sikishima on the middle deck just below the left aft casemate. 13 people were killed (including all those in the casemate) and 11 people were wounded, but the gun was not damaged.


At 14:55 (14:37) on the 12 ”Azuma, the shell pierced the 152-mm armor of casemate No. 7 near the upper edge and exploded inside. The roof of the casemate was torn apart, and the 76-mm cannon on it was thrown onto the deck. Shrapnel destroyed the machine of the 152mm gun. 7 people were killed, 10 were wounded.


Action of Japanese shells


On the "Eagle" in the casemates there was only mine-action artillery, but it also "got" enough to understand the mechanisms of action of the Japanese shells.

At about 14:00, the shell hit the embrasure of the bow casemate of 75-mm guns. 4 people were killed, 5 were wounded. Two of the four guns were out of order.

At about 14:30, a shell exploded at the embrasure of gun no. 6 of the left side battery, shrapnel penetrated inside, damaged one gun, killed two and wounded three more.

Between 14:40 and 16:00, two shells hit the aft casemate. The first tore off the 76-mm armor plate from the mounts, but did no more damage. The second hit the portico of the aft casemate, disabled one and damaged the second 75-mm gun. Three people were killed, several more were injured.

At the seventh hour, the shell pierced the battened-down half-port of the aft casemate of the starboard side and exploded on the machine of a 75-mm gun, which failed, and the neighboring one was damaged.

In addition, several hits were recorded in the casemates, which did not cause significant damage.

On the Sisoye Velikiy at about 15:15 a shell, estimated at 8 ”, flew into the battery through the embrasure of gun No. 5 and exploded from impact on the deck. A huge fire broke out, for the elimination of which the ship had to break down.

Conclusions


Russian shells did little harm to the casemate artillery, although they regularly knocked out the gunners. This paradox can be explained by one of their interesting features: the formed beam of fragments was rather narrow and propagated mainly in the direction of the projectile's flight. And in the case when the break point was behind the weapon (and you can check this by the diagrams), the fragments did not damage it. Thus, damage to casemate artillery was inflicted either when the side armor was penetrated, or when it hit the gun directly through the embrasure. When the casemates were hit through the roof, floor, or indirectly through the embrasure, the guns usually remained intact, but the servants suffered heavy losses.

The Japanese shells could successfully hit the casemate guns, protected by armor, both through open embrasures and breaking through closed porticos. But not every hit was effective, and even thin armor could withstand direct hits.

Concluding the topic of the impact of shells on enemy artillery, I still allow myself to conduct a comparative analysis. For 128 hits on Japanese ships of the battle line (according to the medical description), there were only 4 indisputable incidents of incapacitation of guns with a caliber of 6 "and more (6" Mikasa, 12 "Fuji, 8" and 6 "Azuma). I attributed 4 more cases to self-exploding shells in the barrels (three 8 "Nissin and one 6" Azuma), although according to Japanese data it was our shells. Anyone who wants to can do the calculation on their own, taking them into account. On 76 hits in the "Eagle" (according to Campbell) 8 barrels were out of order. Thus, the probability of knocking out one gun with a Japanese shell in Tsushima was 10,5%, and for a Russian - only 3,1%. However, if we leave only the main-caliber guns in the sample (2 Japanese and 1 Russian), then Russian shells will turn out to be slightly more effective (1,6% versus 1,3%), from which we can conclude that two factors strongly influenced the final performance :
1. Unsuccessful construction of Mamerins on domestic towers.
2. Weak fragmentation effect of Russian shells in the direction opposite to the direction of movement of the shell.

Hits in the conning tower


Action of Russian shells


In Tsushima, only one direct hit was recorded in the conning tower of the Japanese ship "Fuji". At 18:10 (17:52), the shell hit the roof and ricocheted without breaking. In the conning tower (apparently due to the breaking of the armor from the inside), the senior mine officer was seriously wounded, the senior navigator received minor injuries.

In two more cases, the Japanese inside the wheelhouse were hit by shells that exploded nearby.

On "Mikasa" shrapnel of a 12 ”shell, which hit the bow superstructure at 14:20 (14:02), injured 17 people, 4 of them in the conning tower, including a senior mine officer and a flag officer.


On the "Nissin" by fragments of a 9 ... 10 "shell, which exploded at 16:05 (15:47) when hitting the nose tower, 6 people were wounded, three of them in the conning tower. Vice Admiral Mitsu Sotaro was seriously injured, and the senior navigator and the helmsman were lightly wounded.




Action of Japanese shells


The presence in the conning tower of Russian ships that fell under intense fire in Tsushima was deadly.

On "Orel" three cases of people being hit in the conning tower were recorded, and several more ruptures below the embrasure did not have any consequences.

At about 14:40, a 6 ... 8 "shell hit the overhang of the conning tower roof. 2 people were seriously injured, light - all the others who were there. The shrapnel broke the rangefinder, battle indicators and part of the communication pipes. Centralized fire control was disrupted.

At about 15:40, the commander of the ship N.V. Jung was seriously wounded by fragments of a shell that exploded nearby, and his orderly was killed. Several more people in the control room were injured or concussed.

At about 16:00, a large shell hit the right front plate of the conning tower, causing the armor to shift. Several fragments penetrated inside, senior artilleryman F.P.Shamshev was wounded.

On "Prince Suvorov" the situation in the conning tower was even worse. The fragments very often flew inside. By 14:15, both rangefinders were destroyed. Numerous injuries were received by everyone who was there, including Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky. At about 15:00, due to the intensity of the Japanese fire, the conning tower was abandoned.

Reportedly, a picture similar to Suvorov was observed at Borodino. A large projectile inflicted huge losses on those in the conning tower, and control was transferred to the central post.

Conclusions


Despite the fact that we have data to assess the effectiveness of only three cases for both the Eagle and the Japanese battle line (this is a very small sample), we will try to make a comparative calculation. In "Eagle" for 3 cases of defeat in the conning tower there are 76 hits. For 12 Japanese ships - also three, but for 128 hits. Thus, the Japanese shells are almost 2 times more effective when indirectly. This is primarily due to the presence of delayed fuses on our projectiles, as a result of which the explosion often took place in the interior of the ship and the scattering of fragments was screened by decks and bulkheads.

Comparing the effect of Russian and Japanese shells on the conning towers, we can conclude that both were capable of hitting with shrapnel through the viewing slits inside. The likelihood of this event was directly proportional to the number of breaks in the immediate vicinity. Moreover, direct hits from Japanese shells were not always dangerous, and a significant part of Russian shells exploded inside the ship, unable to cause indirect damage.

Hits into armored decks


Cases of penetration of the deck armor, damage or even violation of the integrity of the fasteners were not recorded in any Japanese ship that participated in the Tsushima battle. The punched roofs and floors of the casemates were not armored.

On the "Orel", two cases of large fragments penetrating the 32-mm roof of the casemates were noted. The 51mm armor of the battery deck was not damaged even by the close explosions of 12 ”shells. On other Russian ships, the penetration of the armored deck was not recorded.

In the next article of the cycle, we will consider, systematize and compare the effect of Russian and Japanese shells on unarmored parts of the ship and summarize.
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332 comments
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  1. +4
    19 September 2020 05: 56
    Thank. The cycle continued to delight, only I did not quite understand the expression steel iron armor.
    If my memory serves me right, then steel is an alloy of iron and carbon. What then did the author mean by this?
    1. +22
      19 September 2020 06: 11
      In the 1870s, the British had the idea to combine the strength of steel and the toughness of iron in one slab. The result was compound armor. It consisted of a steel surface layer designed to destroy an enemy projectile and a soft iron backing that “absorbed” its debris. Thus, a piece of glass placed on sand resists impact much better than glass and sand separately. A seemingly simple idea demanded a complex technological design. The compound armor was made of two plates - thick iron and thin steel, between which a gap was left. Then the structure was sent to the furnace, heated red-hot and the free space was poured with molten steel. As a result, material homogeneity was achieved. In other words, this armor is called steel iron.
      1. +8
        19 September 2020 06: 30
        You can also cite Harvey armor and Krupp's cemented armor as an example.
        With a thickness of over 127 mm, Krupp's cemented armor was about 15% more effective than Harvey's - 11,9 inches of Krupp's armor corresponded to 13 inches of Harvey's armor. And 10 inches of Krupp's armor was already equivalent to 24 inches of iron armor.
        For the first time, this armor was used on German battleships of the Brandenburg class. Two ships of the series - "Elector Friedrich Wilhelm" and "Wörth" had a belt of 350 ... 400-mm compound armor. And on the other two ships - "Brandenburg" and "Weissenburg", the belt was made of Krupp armor and thanks to this, its thickness was reduced to 225 mm without deteriorating armor protection.
        Despite the complexity of the manufacturing process, Krupp armor, due to its excellent characteristics, ousted all other types of armor and for the next 25 years, most of the armor was precisely Krupp cemented armor.
        1. +11
          19 September 2020 06: 35
          Cemented Krupp Armor
          In 1894, the Krupp firm added chromium to nickel steel. The resulting armor received the designation "soft Krupp" or "Qualitat 420" and contained 0,35-0,4% carbon, 1,75-2,0% chromium and 3,0-3,5% nickel. A similar composition was applied back in 1889 by the Schneider company. But Krupp did not stop there. He implemented a process for cementing his armor. Unlike the Harvey process, he used gaseous hydrocarbons - a luminous gas (methane) was passed over the hot surface of the stove. Again, this was not a unique feature - this method was used in 1888 before the Harvey method at the American plant in Bethlehem and at the French plant Schneider-Creusot. The hardening method made Krupp's armor unique.
          The essence of hardening is heating the steel to a critical temperature - when the type of crystal lattice changes and austenite is formed. With a sharp cooling, the formation of martensite occurs - hard, strong, but more brittle than the original steel. In the Krupp method, one side of a steel plate and the ends were coated with alumina or immersed in wet sand. The slab was placed in an oven heated to a temperature above the critical one. The front side of the slab was heated to a temperature above the critical one and the phase transformation began. In this case, the back side had a temperature less than critical. The phase transformation zone began to shift from the front side into the depth of the slab. When the critical temperature reached 30-40% of the slab depth, it was pulled out of the oven and subjected to drop cooling. The result of this process was a slab with “falling surface hardening” - it had a high hardness to a depth of about 20%, the next 10-15% saw a sharp decline in hardness (the so-called ski slope), and the rest of the slab was not hardened and tough
      2. +9
        19 September 2020 14: 02
        The compound armor was made of two plates - thick iron and thin steel, between which a gap was left. Then the structure was sent to the furnace, heated red-hot and the free space was filled with molten steel. As a result, material homogeneity was achieved. In other words, this armor is called steel iron.
        This is the Ellis-Brown way. There was also a second method - Cammela - molten steel was poured onto the heated surface of a wrought iron slab.
        In both cases, this was followed by sheet rolling, after which the sheet thickness was halved.
      3. +2
        21 September 2020 00: 12
        Quote: rytik32
        ... The result was compound armor.

        If I am not mistaken, this technology was mastered in Russia.
        Battleship "Imperator Nikolaai 1", armor "compound": belt along the waterline 2,5 m (102-365 mm); casemate (51-76 mm); casemate traverses (152 mm); tower (254 mm); barbet (254 mm); armor deck (63 mm); conning tower (203 mm)
        The cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" Bronya "compound". Armor belt 2,2 m (114-152 mm),
        deck (12,7 mm),
        conning tower (152 mm),
        conning tower roof (51 mm)
        The battleship entered the fleet in 1891, and the cruiser in 1883. hi
    2. +9
      19 September 2020 06: 45
      Saasibo, rytik32, for the work done. Good article turned out.
      Basically, of course, for specialists, but even for such amateurs in this matter as me, it is easy and interesting to read
      1. -2
        19 September 2020 09: 08
        All this is purple for me for 300 years, but you +: I understood what cement armor is, otherwise I thought that the armor was smeared with cement
  2. -4
    19 September 2020 09: 03
    I got used from school that the Japanese used the newest shells in the RYAV, while ours used shells that were outdated 10-15 years ago.
    If they did not have an overwhelming superiority in shells, then how to explain such a defeat?
    In addition to the stupidity of Rozhdestvensky, but Andrei from Chelyabinsk doubts this, the cowardice of Nebogatov, what else?
    1. +10
      19 September 2020 09: 06
      The Japanese had an overwhelming advantage in the number of hits.
      1. +3
        19 September 2020 09: 42
        Quote: rytik32
        The Japanese had an overwhelming advantage in the number of hits.

        With the concentration of fire, probably too
        1. +10
          19 September 2020 10: 24
          I believe that even 76 hits in the “Eagle” by Campbell is clearly an underestimation, because all hits to the armor were not recorded. This can be seen very clearly from the casemates. Almost everything that is recorded is in the embrasure.
          1. +3
            19 September 2020 10: 47
            Quote: rytik32
            I believe that even 76 hits in the “Eagle” by Campbell is clearly an underestimation, because all hits to the armor were not recorded. This can be seen very clearly from the casemates. Almost everything that is recorded is in the embrasure.

            How many hits, in your opinion, were there in reality?
            1. +4
              19 September 2020 11: 07
              I estimate it at 70-80 hits from 152-mm shells and above. And only about 100.
              1. +4
                19 September 2020 11: 30
                Hmm ... Under Tsushima, the Japanese fired fewer shells than in the Yellow Sea. Are you saying that the accuracy of the Japanese canons has increased almost multiples?
                1. +8
                  19 September 2020 11: 51
                  Yes!
                  After all, the distance of the battle in Tsushima was much closer.
                  More experience, intense shooting practice ...
                  1. +3
                    19 September 2020 11: 57
                    Something I missed this moment. But after all, our gunners were trained specifically for shooting at close distances, maybe it's all the same in the control of the battle? Which in fact simply did not exist? By the way, about the fact that the towers 6 "will wedge from the fragments even during the completion of Borodintsev, it was said as a result, not only did placing the sc in the towers reduce its rate of fire by two, so there are still constant jams that require time to eliminate.
                    1. +10
                      19 September 2020 12: 15
                      I consider the Japanese tactical advantage to be very important.

                      Pay attention to the distances. Our "tail" objectively could not fire with the same accuracy as the Japanese. Yes, and the "head" beat from unfavorable distances.
                      1. +6
                        19 September 2020 12: 32
                        Well, to go into battle at 9 knots was an obvious insanity of Rozhdestvensky. Had he had the same stroke of 13-14 knots as 1TOE, he would not have been in such a deplorable situation. Well, here there is still not correct fire control, it is clear that hitting the head is useless, so it was necessary to fire at the most convenient targets, that is, at the second combat detachment.
                      2. +4
                        19 September 2020 12: 43
                        I completely agree with your post.
                      3. +2
                        20 September 2020 16: 25
                        I consider the Japanese tactical advantage to be very important.

                        Full professional unfitness of ZPR.
              2. +2
                19 September 2020 21: 09
                Quote: rytik32
                I estimate it at 70-80 hits from 152-mm shells and above. And only about 100.

                Judging by the last article by Valentin (Comrade), based on the number of shells fired and the approximate percentage of hits, each of the Borodintsy should have received more than 200 hits with medium and large caliber. Kostenko's figure is slightly lower.
      2. +1
        19 September 2020 11: 23
        Quote: rytik32
        The Japanese had an overwhelming advantage in the number of hits.

        In that case, our gunners are muffin?
        1. +11
          19 September 2020 11: 55
          Rather, the Japanese showed very high accuracy. Ours at the beginning of the battle fired well against the background of other battles of the RYAV. But then the damage from the Japanese fire made our fire weak and inaccurate.
          1. +3
            19 September 2020 21: 12
            Quote: rytik32
            But then the damage from the Japanese fire made our fire weak and inaccurate.

            It is also true, but I would assume that a rapid decrease in hits on the Japanese began as the first squad of Togo left the sectors of shelling of the first squad of the 2nd TOE RI. Please do not forget the general scheme of the battle. Almost all the time the enemy was far ahead.
      3. +1
        20 September 2020 07: 12
        That was caused by completely incorrect tactical guidelines of Rozhdestvensky.
        In fact, the Russian squadron moved at the speed of an artillery shield, allowing the Japanese to concentrate fire and consistently knock out the enemy's lead ships.
        At the same time, the Japanese did not have technical superiority in speed due to the really achievable speeds. The maximum speed of the first Japanese detachment was limited to the Fuji, which could not travel more than 15 knots. The speed of Kamimura's "underdogs" detachment was limited by "Azuma", which for a long time could not keep the course of more than 15 knots. Considering the huge fuel overload carried by all the Japanese ships of the line, the real speed of the Japanese squadron did not exceed 14 knots.
        A speed that is quite attainable by battleships like Borodino and Oslyabya with appropriate preparation for battle.
        1. +5
          20 September 2020 07: 16
          Let me disagree.
          Quote: ignoto
          The maximum speed of the first Japanese detachment was limited to the Fuji, which could not travel more than 15 knots. The speed of Kamimura's "underdogs" detachment was limited by "Azuma", which for a long time could not keep the course of more than 15 knots.

          In fact, Togo held 15 knots in battle, Kamimura - 17.
          Your information is, in principle, correct, but for the summer-autumn of 1904. Before Tsushima, the Japanese underwent repairs.
        2. +3
          20 September 2020 23: 12
          Quote: ignoto
          The speed of Kamimura's "underdogs" detachment was limited by "Azuma", which for a long time could not keep the course of more than 15 knots.

          In general, I agree, but about Asam you are overly pessimistic. Tales about the poor condition of German and French-built cruisers come from Packinham and are frankly biased. The Japanese designated the speed of their armored cruisers as 19 knots. This can be read from Polutov, but he can be trusted.
        3. +1
          21 September 2020 09: 33
          Quote: ignoto
          A speed that is quite attainable by battleships like Borodino and Oslyabya with appropriate preparation for battle.

          Are you really suggesting that the five of us fight against 12?
    2. +6
      19 September 2020 09: 44
      Except for the stupidity of Rozhdestvensky
      It is precisely the stupidity that is explained. Now you can pull some circumstances by the ears and try to whitewash him, but the totality of his decisions long before the campaign of the 2nd squadron, during the campaign and, of course, during the battle does not allow us to talk about his outstanding naval abilities. He was not Ushakov and Nakhimov. Even close
      1. +6
        19 September 2020 10: 36
        Quote: VENOM
        It is precisely the stupidity that is explained. Now you can pull some circumstances by the ears and try to whitewash him, but the totality of his decisions long before the campaign of the 2nd squadron, during the campaign and, of course, during the battle does not allow us to talk about his outstanding naval abilities. He was not Ushakov and Nakhimov. Even close

        Yes, he was clearly not a naval commander, but he was not stupid either. The manager who has no place at the helm of the squadron in battle
        1. +1
          19 September 2020 11: 26
          Vitgeft was also not a naval commander, which he himself stated more than once. Typical staff officer. But it was under him that the fleet achieved the greatest successes. Well, the battle in the Yellow Sea where he competently outplayed Togo until he died ...
          1. +4
            20 September 2020 16: 30
            [/ quote] Well, the battle in the Yellow Sea where he competently outplayed Togo until he died ... [quote]

            Witgeft has nothing to do with it, Togo outplayed himself there (being in an excellent position, I didn’t understand where I was and went past the cash register).
            1. -2
              20 September 2020 17: 14
              Well, yes, only Vitgeft took advantage of this and Togo had to catch up with him. So do not, unlike Rozhdestvensky Vitgeft used Togo's mistakes
              1. +5
                20 September 2020 17: 21
                Quote: Nehist
                Well, yes, only Vitgeft took advantage of this and Togo had to catch up with him. So do not, unlike Rozhdestvensky Vitgeft used Togo's mistakes

                THERE WAS SUCH A SITUATION IN ORDER NOT TO USE THE ERRORS OF THE ONE, WITGEFTU, WOULD HAVE TO TURN BACK TO Arthur.
                1. +3
                  20 September 2020 23: 15
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  THERE WAS SUCH A SITUATION IN ORDER NOT TO USE THE ERRORS OF THE ONE, WITGEFTU, WOULD HAVE TO TURN BACK TO Arthur.

                  Unfortunately, it must be recalled that after the death of Vitgeft, it was BACK, to certain death in Port Arthur, the squadron turned.
          2. +1
            21 September 2020 09: 39
            Quote: Nehist
            Vitgeft was also not a naval commander, which he himself stated more than once. Typical staff officer. But it was under him that the fleet achieved the greatest successes. Well, the battle in the Yellow Sea where he competently outplayed Togo until he died ...

            It seems that the situation with the mine setting has already been sorted out - our success that day consisted in ignoring Witgeft's order, so there is no merit there.
            And he failed the fight in WM with a bang, although it was our only chance in the whole war to really win at sea. Let me remind you that the enemy's fleet that day did not have a clear advantage in forces, and you have already been written about a lot of Togo's mistakes. So it is a huge "gratitude" to Vitgeft for not organizing any combat training from the word at all.
            1. +1
              21 September 2020 09: 42
              You should learn some history and especially the mentality of the RIF officers.
              1. 0
                21 September 2020 10: 20
                Quote: Nehist
                You should learn some history and especially the mentality of the RIF officers.

                OK. What exactly am I wrong?
                1. 0
                  21 September 2020 11: 34
                  Without a direct order from Vitgeft, mines would not have been set up. And yes, Vitgeft, by the way, was one of the prominent specialists in mine weapons and perfectly understood all the benefits. Since after receiving permission to place mines, they waited for suitable weather, this alone indicates that they were going to put them where they were installed, otherwise they could be placed even in broad daylight. About the fight in WM. If a 12 "projectile hits you, then you will also fail the battle with a bang, since you cannot influence it due to your death. First, in the first phase, I took advantage of Togo's mistake and fought on the counter course. As a result, the Japanese then 4 hours caught up with the Russian squadron, in the second phase he gave a reasonable order to hit the head, as a result, while Mikasa was overtaking our convoy, consistently received gifts from all ebr.
            2. +1
              23 September 2020 19: 45
              It seems that the situation with the mine setting has already been sorted out - our success that day consisted in ignoring Witgeft's order, so there is no merit there.


              There are coordinates of the top of the Golden Mountain:
              38°47'45"N 121°15'15"E
              There are no exact coordinates of the input alignment, take approximate
              38°47'30"N121°14'50"E
              There are coordinates of the place of detonation:
              38°36'22"N 121°16'56"E

              count - be sure to unsubscribe :)))
        2. +6
          19 September 2020 12: 53
          Victor, Sergei, let me argue with you. What was the sailor Z.P. Rozhdestvensky will be best answered by his awards and contemporaries
          Vice Admiral G.I.Butakov: "A terribly nervous person, but a brave and very good sailor"
          .
          Admiral S. S. Lesovsky: In July 1877, while on the steamer Vesta, Lieutenant Rozhestvensky took command in place of the killed Chernov and inflicted damage on the Turkish battleship Fethi-Bulend, forcing it to withdraw from the battle. For this battle, Rozhestvensky was promoted to lieutenant commander and awarded the Orders of St. Vladimir, 4th degree with swords and bow, and St. George, 4th degree.

          Admiral Makarov: reliable naval commander. Very literate and caring about his subordinates. In 1900 he gained all-Russian fame thanks to the exceptionally clear organization of work to rescue the battleship "General-Admiral Apraksin", which flew onto the stones near about. Gogland. It is noteworthy that when, after three months of work, the battleship returned to Kronstadt on its own, Rozhestvensky insisted on encouraging and rewarding the officers who distinguished themselves in the operation in strict accordance with the list presented to him.

          It is also not worth considering Rozhestvensky weakly broken in artillery - He graduated from the St. Petersburg Mikhailovsk Artillery Academy with a degree in naval artillery and was released in the first category. He occupied the post of Chief of Artillery of the Black Sea Fleet, Chief of the Main Naval Staff.
          Awards:
          Order of St. George 4 st.
          Order of St. Vladimir 3 and 4 Art.
          Order of St. Anne 2,3, 4 and XNUMX Art.
          Order of St. Stanislaus 2,3 and 4 Art.
          Order of the Red Eagle Prussia. Served as a reward for bravery in battle, outstanding command of troops or ships
          The Dannebrog Order is the second most important knightly order in Denmark.
          The Order of the Iron Crown - an order created by Napoleon on June 5, 1805 as the highest order of the Kingdom of Italy
          Order of the Crown of Romania
          The Order of the Sword is a state award of the Kingdom of Sweden
          The Order of St. Alexander is a state award of the Kingdom of Bulgaria.
          Legion of Honor
          1. +6
            19 September 2020 13: 09
            Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich. "Book of Memories", Chapter XIV:
            Rozhestvensky from the very beginning did not believe in the success of the campaign of the Baltic squadron. As a member of the commission of naval artillery experiments, he was extremely dissatisfied with our fire control systems of the Main Command and repeatedly informed Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich about this, who was nominally the head of the fleet, but achieved nothing.
            After the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, the admiral returned to Russia, where he was reinstated in his former position. In the "Full Service Record" dated January 16, 1906, signed by Rear Admiral A. G. Niedermiller, he is "Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adjutant General, Vice-Admiral." But soon the newspapers began to "persecute" the admiral. Initially, Rozhestvensky tried to make excuses. Then, in February 1906, he resigned from the post of chief of the Main Naval Staff. But the wave of criticism did not subside, and the admiral insisted on bringing himself to trial.
            At the trial, Rozhdestvensky tried with all his might to justify his subordinates, especially the sailors, and asked for the death penalty for himself. However, he was acquitted by the naval court.After the end of the trial, he lived as a recluse, practically did not leave his apartment and died in St. Petersburg of a heart attack on New Year's Eve 1909
            (RGAVMF, Fund 406, inventory 9, file 3560, sheet 1-13 rev.)
            1. 0
              19 September 2020 15: 19
              Wonderful song "Baltic Waves" by Mikhail Shcherbakov performed by Lydia Cheboksarova and Evgeny Bykov about sending off Rozhdestvensky's squadron
            2. 0
              19 September 2020 19: 18
              Yes, in Soviet times it was blackened perhaps excessively, it is enough to read "Tsushima". He was a fighting sailor and apparently a good one. But a good sailor is not yet a good admiral. The fact remains - in the squadron he possessed full power, and it was he who was responsible for the defeat first of all. Did almost nothing to train the teams. No reconnaissance, counterintelligence, pre-battle instructions, coal overload, low squadron speed, etc.
              1. +3
                21 September 2020 09: 54
                Quote: Kwas
                practically did nothing to train the teams. No reconnaissance, counterintelligence, instructions before the battle, coal overload, low squadron speed, etc.

                Excuse me, but he destroyed the chapel too?
                Didn't the teams train? really))))
                There were no instructions before the fight? really))))
                low squadron speed ... how do you imagine the picture of "increasing the squadron speed" in the presence of obviously slow-moving ships?
                the coal transshipment of the Japanese was even more significant than ours
                and to conduct reconnaissance in the presence of an overwhelming enemy superiority in light forces - just expose our cruisers to attack
                1. +3
                  21 September 2020 16: 41
                  Quote: Trapper7
                  How do you imagine the picture of "increasing the squadron speed" in the presence of obviously slow-moving ships?

                  The deliberately low-speed transports should have been launched as a separate caravan, or important cargo should be reloaded onto faster auxiliary cruisers.
                  And our warships could well hold at least 12 knots in battle - this is approximately the speed that Nebogatov actually kept after a day's battle.
                  Quote: Trapper7
                  the coal transshipment of the Japanese was even more significant than ours

                  Do you have numbers? In addition to coal, we had a lot of overloading. From crackers to all sorts of unnecessary pieces of iron, with the help of which they were going to load coal on the go.
                  Quote: Trapper7
                  and to conduct reconnaissance in the presence of an overwhelming enemy superiority in light forces - just expose our cruisers to attack

                  Our cruisers were faster than the Japanese, so they would not have caught up.
                2. 0
                  22 September 2020 07: 30
                  Quote: Trapper7
                  Didn't the teams train? really))))
                  There were no instructions before the fight? really))))
                  low squadron speed ... how do you imagine the picture of "increasing the squadron speed" in the presence of obviously slow-moving ships?

                  One attempt to shoot, indiscriminately, is no substitute for regular training.
                  The instructions before the fight, yes, I admit, were formally, but very stupid. Better, perhaps, it would not have been. He does not say anything to individual detachments, except that it distracts the cruiser from the battle by protecting the transports, gives an impracticable order (to shoot at the flagship) to individual ships, plus a stupid order of transfer of command.
                  Alexey has already said about the increase in speed, and I will add that the cruisers assigned to a separate detachment must have been given active missions.
                  1. +4
                    22 September 2020 08: 12
                    Dear Alexey and Konstantin. Even our little argument with you shows how many different options for action can be - try to keep all your forces in a single fist or try to act more decisively and agilely. But in any case - Rozhestvensky could not choose both tactics at once. He chose the one that he considered more appropriate. And he lost. How the battle would have gone if he had acted according to your scheme, we do not know. But personally, I have great doubts that this would lead to our victory. The Japanese had too great a superiority in forces.
                    1. +3
                      22 September 2020 18: 37
                      Quote: Trapper7
                      How the battle would have gone if he had acted according to your scheme, we do not know. But personally, I have great doubts that this would lead to our victory. The Japanese had too great a superiority in forces.

                      + + +
                      You can't argue that the superiority is great, but not so much in technology as in the training of sailors. From commander to sailors. Well, several other factors developed, including the general crisis of the empire. It's the same on land, please note that we did not win a single battle during that war!
                      1. 0
                        24 September 2020 11: 09
                        Quote: Kwas
                        You can't argue that the superiority is great, but not so much in technology as in the training of sailors. From commander to sailors. Well, several other factors developed, including the general crisis of the empire. It's the same on land, please note that we did not win a single battle during that war!

                        I agree.
                    2. +3
                      24 September 2020 15: 33
                      I can suggest a couple of tricks right off the bat to slip through the Tsushima Strait unnoticed.
                      1. Let the squadrons "Oleg", "Aurora" and pebbles go forward. So that they then return back to the squadron. The goal is to conduct reconnaissance and confuse the Japanese watch lines. Possibly to disable several XXX-maru.
                      2. Directly before the passage of the squadron, we launch several "birds with one stone" - auxiliary cruisers into Vladik, many of them had quite a decent course. The goal is to draw on as many Japanese cruisers and destroyers as possible. Let them leave their sentinel place and go in pursuit, burn coal ...
          2. -5
            19 September 2020 15: 43
            does not convince at all
          3. +3
            19 September 2020 20: 31
            Quote: Rich
            What was the sailor Z.P. Rozhdestvensky will be best answered by his awards and contemporaries

            You are partly right, of course. He had personal courage, but this was not the main thing for a naval commander, although an indispensable component of any military man. Orders of other states - rather thanks to the position. And during the campaign, he monitored the observance of the kilwalter formation, although it would be much more useful to train the rebuilds, which could help with a stronger, more experienced and trained fleet. And there was time for that, the squadron almost went around the world. The certified artilleryman did not check the rangefinders, only when they connected with Nebogatov and he, apparently, reported that he, Nebogatov, carried out the verification - so Rozhestvensky did too. Did you have to formulate the strategy and tactics? And there were no meetings on this matter, with anyone, not with the headquarters, or with the admirals. And Nebogatov developed a plan to bypass Japan and considered it feasible. I did not believe in success - well, there were reasons - so this is not a reason to indicate the course - nord-ost 23 and that's it. A real naval commander could try to do something, create an operating base in Vietnam and act from there, go around, create and train a strike group of high-speed battleships. And what about the "great" naval commander-order bearer? Faint of heart and did not come up with anything more than a course nord ost 23?
          4. +3
            22 September 2020 22: 48
            The excellent artilleryman could not convey to his subordinates that in a future artillery battle, the squadron's fire should be organized in detachments, and that the second and third detachments from the very beginning to the end of the battle should choose for concentrated shelling not the same target as the first detachment, but that one, which is closest to the ships of the squad at the current time.

            Unfortunately, Rozhestvensky did not cope with the organization of maneuvering of the squadron subordinate to him. I'm not even talking about the failure in the outset of the battle with rebuilding from two columns to one. Those overcomplicated multi-flag signals that were used to control the squadron's maneuvering caused only confusion.

            Dragging a caravan of transports into an inevitable artillery battle and sending all the first rank cruisers, including two armored ones (instead of placing them in the squadron line), to guard this caravan is another "successful" management decision of Rozhdestvensky.

            And how Rozhestvensky ordered to prepare the ships for the inevitable hail of enemy shells (in any way) you can not even remember. They did not even save the ships from the "tropical" cork plating of the ship premises, which then gave food to the fire, as well as boats and other boats, splinterproof "coal "and" bed "protection, did not get rid of excess technical and drinking water, excess food and any" useful in the economy "trash that before the campaign and during the campaign had time to drag onto the ships.

            Also noteworthy are the illuminated hospital ships pulled behind the squadron to Tsushima and the "cheerful" coloring with white superstructures and yellow pipes, which gave out the ships of the squadron on the night before the battle. Then, by these bright colors of the Japanese, it was easier to look for the squadron in the haze that limited visibility at sea in the Tsushima battle and it was easier for the Japanese gunners to aim. Well, yes, because the gray "spherical" color of the ships is not beautiful at first ...

            Rozhestvensky showed many, many naval "talents" in preparation for the inevitable battle of Tsushima and at the very beginning!
        3. -1
          19 September 2020 21: 15
          Quote: sevtrash
          Yes, he was clearly not a naval commander, but he was not stupid either. The manager who has no place at the helm of the squadron in battle

          It is stupid and in the worst sense of the word. This is, without any jokes, really an upstart courtier. He has never shone with anything except a loud voice and an imposing appearance. Moreover, there are serious suspicions of real mental disorders of this gentleman.
          1. +3
            20 September 2020 17: 12
            Oh my god, how categorically
            1. +3
              20 September 2020 23: 19
              Exactly. It’s unpleasant to read such a thing about your country, but the bad government ruined the empire in the end.
      2. 0
        19 September 2020 11: 43
        In fairness, we have those in the 20th century, something is not visible.
        Admiral Makarov died and did not have time to prove himself, Admiral Essen is a brave commander and that's it.
        Somehow I didn’t think about it, it was PURPLE to me, but thanks to my colleague Yura, I thought: in the era of the Soviet Union, we also had a shortage of capable naval commanders.
        Admirals: Kuznetsov, Gorshkov and all, but they are managers. Oktyabrsky and Tributs were out of place.
        R.
        S
        Perhaps I forgot someone, please understand: ALL THIS WAS PURPLE to me
        1. +2
          19 September 2020 11: 51
          But what about Golovko? Wash the only one who showed himself in the Second World War. Also by the way managers.
          Not without mistakes, of course, but with the limited forces that were at his disposal
        2. -2
          20 September 2020 16: 31
          Quote: Astra wild
          Oktyabrsky and Tributs were out of place.

          Yes, yes .... But Comrade Stalin probably did not know about this, did not know. And maybe he was strained with the personnel? That's easy to judge from the standpoint of the present day! stop
          1. +1
            22 September 2020 23: 11
            With personnel, the domestic navy had a flight that way under 150. Just as they did not dare to take active actions at sea against the Anglo-French forces in 1854, it was permanently strained with personnel.

            "At the end of July 1856, shortly after the conclusion of peace, Sir Charles Napier visited St. Petersburg and Kronstadt with the permission of the Russian government. He was received very kindly, was taken to all the Kronstadt fortifications, the fleet was shown, etc., and he later wrote that finally convinced of the invincible strength of these fortifications and the impossibility of taking Kronstadt.A conversation took place between him and the general-admiral of the Russian fleet, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, which Nepir literally set out in a letter to Lord Palmerston written in late autumn of the same 1856 (October 29 The complete accuracy of this conversation was attested by Constantine himself at the special request of Nepyr, in a letter from Constantine to Nepyr on November 13 (25), 1856. Two passages are of interest in this conversation. Konstantin fully recognized the almost absolute impossibility for Nepyr to successfully attack the fortifications of Kronstadt but he only allowed one exception: he did not understand why Nepyr did not attack the northern side of Kronstadt. when I, - writes Nepir, - told him that I did not have the means to do this, that I had neither gunboats, nor ships with mortars and hot-melt rockets, - he ceased to be surprised. "

            The second passage of this historically very interesting conversation between the two opponents refers to an equally important issue. “I asked His Highness,” Nepyr writes, “if he will allow me to speak directly to him. He agreed. Then I told him that if he met me at Keel with his entire fleet, then we had such a bad and poorly disciplined team (we were so ill-manned and ill-disciplined) that I don’t know what would be effects. He (Konstantin. - ET) replied that he found out about our condition too late, and added ...: “if I had screw steamers, I would have the honor to meet you” ”{22}. This conversation took place after Napier's personal acquaintance with the Kronstadt fleet. "


            And the shape is beautiful, yes.
  3. The comment was deleted.
  4. +5
    19 September 2020 10: 52
    Another solid work of this author.
  5. +2
    19 September 2020 11: 13
    [/ quote] 13 were killed (including all those in the casemate) [quote]

    Maybe it's still next to the casemate?
    1. +5
      19 September 2020 11: 47
      Everyone who was in the casemate died.
      1. +2
        20 September 2020 16: 22
        Quote: rytik32
        Everyone who was in the casemate died.

        Look at your drawing: where is the explosion, where is the casemate; between them 2 "armor.
        1. +3
          20 September 2020 16: 28
          Let me explain. The casemate where everyone died is not shown in this diagram. It is above the explosion site. The fragments went through the floor.
          1. +3
            20 September 2020 17: 04
            The fragments went through the floor.

            There it is, Mikhalych! (C) The killed were in the upper casemate, which means that not all the fragments flew forward, but a significant part and sideways.
            1. 0
              20 September 2020 22: 08
              Look how it is, Mikhalych! (C)


              it is logical to assume that you just need to add the vectors forward and from the center of the projectile

              another thing is that the vectors can be very different: it is one thing when a low-power charge can only split the body into large fragments, then the picture of their dispersal is one, and when a powerful charge, the picture is different

              in general, for a 152 mm TNT projectile of a field gun, as I read, about 70 percent of the mass of its body flies sideways
              1. +2
                21 September 2020 14: 38
                Everything is more complicated there https://yadi.sk/i/HAYsIzDHoLQn8w
                Detailed diagrams on pages 295-297
                The projectile hit exactly the end of the deck (see section YX), and then ricocheted down and exploded. Why the middle deck remained intact is not clear. But a hole formed in the floor of the casemate. It seems that the shell exploded upside down ...
            2. +1
              21 September 2020 16: 58
              I replied in the next message
  6. +3
    19 September 2020 11: 43
    Maybe I didn't understand something, but ...

    Photo caption:
    The bow barbet "Mikasa" in Tsushima was tested by the enemy for strength three times. First, two 6 “shells hit him. In the first case, the rupture only damaged the upper deck, and in the second, the shell ricocheted overboard without an explosion. At 18:45 (18:27) 12 ", the shell pierced the upper deck and exploded in the infirmary right next to the bow barbette. And none of these hits affected the tower's performance in any way!
    Perhaps someone will explain which ship's guns are sticking out of this tower.
    1. +8
      19 September 2020 11: 49
      This is Nissin. Descriptions of photos above. Gun explosions are discussed in the previous article.
      1. +6
        19 September 2020 11: 58
        Thank you Alex hi , sorry for the inattention. And the article is good, I just read it to the end. good drinks
  7. +3
    19 September 2020 12: 40
    In Tsushima, only one indisputable penetration of the armor of Russian ships was recorded. The round (presumably 8 ”) passed the 127-mm steel-nickel plate of the upper belt of the Sisoy the Great at about 15:30, but did not explode, but got stuck in the coal pit.

    Another hit in the tenth coal pit "Oslyabi" at about 14:30 causes controversy. According to one version, an 102 ”armor-piercing projectile pierced the 8-mm Garvey armor of the upper belt.


    It is possible that it was an 8-inch (heavy) armor-piercing projectile. When W. D. Armstrong proposed the use of the 8-inch gun in the Navy, one of the Admiralty's requirements was to develop a heavy projectile for it to fire at armored targets from an initial distance of 6000 yards, its weight should be 260 pounds. So, it is possible that these two damage to the armor were produced by these shells.
    1. +3
      20 September 2020 22: 27
      Quote: 27091965i
      When W. D. Armstrong proposed the use of an 8-inch gun in the navy, one of the requirements of the Admiralty was to develop a heavy projectile for it, for firing at armored targets

      In Royal Nevi, Armstrong's eight-inch guns were not in service.
      1. +2
        20 September 2020 23: 30
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        In Royal Nevi, Armstrong's eight-inch guns were not in service.


        Dear Ivan. During the development of "The Tactics of the New Armored Cruisers", the controller of the fleet (inspector of the Navy) and W. D. Armstrong proposed to equip the armored cruisers being created with 8 inch guns. Several meetings were held, discussion of the issue of armament was mainly reduced to a proposal to adopt an 8-inch cannon, and since it was difficult to quickly create a new design, he (the controller of the fleet) proposed to accept the Armstrong design in its current form.
        As a result, this gun was not accepted, the Admiralty had its own views on this, but a heavy projectile for an 8-inch gun was created, such as the Admiralty wanted it to be. The Fleet Controller at the time was Vice Admiral Sir John Fisher.
        1. +1
          21 September 2020 09: 23
          Thanks Igor. An interesting nuance.
          EMNIP heavy shells were on "Garibaldians", although when stacked in the tower, purely theoretically, they could be on other "Asamoids".
          1. +3
            21 September 2020 19: 13
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            EMNIP heavy shells were on "Garibaldians", although when stacked in the tower, purely theoretically, they could be on other "Asamoids".


            I came across several reference books on the Japanese fleet of that time, here I have one "Japanese Imperial Navy", F .. T. Jane, 1904, the table presented in it indicates two types of shells.


            But it does not indicate the ships, in a similar book published in Russia, in my opinion in 1904, the ammunition for the ships was indicated. But there, in the ammunition load of the armored cruisers "Nissin" and "Kasuga", only ordinary shells were indicated. Therefore, it seems to me that it is impossible to answer this question in the affirmative.
  8. +5
    19 September 2020 13: 41
    The round (presumably 8 ”) passed the 127-mm steel-nickel plate of the upper belt of the Sisoy the Great at about 15:30, but did not explode, but got stuck in the coal pit.
    A question to the author - where does the information about the "steel-nickel armor" on the "Sisoy the Great" come from?
    1. +8
      19 September 2020 14: 46
      The issue is really controversial. Some sources say that there was steel iron everywhere. But where the information is more detailed, they write about steel. For example http://alternathistory.com/bronya-russkih-bronenostsev-v-kontse-19-nachale-20vv/
      1. +2
        19 September 2020 19: 04
        The source contradicts itself. He writes that the production of nickel steel in the Ingush Republic was mastered in 1898, and immediately writes that it was used to arm a ship launched in 1894, four years before it began to be produced.
        The production of nickel steel began on an industrial scale not earlier than 1890. The battleship was laid down in 1891. I did not find any data on the supply of armor for it from abroad.
        1. +5
          19 September 2020 22: 42
          Quote: Undecim
          The source contradicts itself. He writes that the production of nickel steel in the Ingush Republic was mastered in 1898, and immediately writes that it was used to arm a ship launched in 1894, four years before it began to be produced.




          A total of 20 slabs 10 "thick and 36 slabs 12" thick were made for the battleships "Navarin", "Sisoy Veliky" and "Poltava".
          1. 0
            20 September 2020 10: 36
            A link to the source - no way?
            1. +11
              20 September 2020 11: 09
              Quote: Undecim
              A link to the source - no way?


              "The history of the Obukhov steel plant in connection with the progress of artillery technology" 1903, this book is available on the Internet. If you are interested in this topic, you can see the book "The development of armor, its role and its attack" by Arthur F. Curtis 1893, it contains references to the tests of armor plates at the Okhta proving ground in 1890 and the conclusion of a contract, according to the test results, for the supply of steel-nickel armor plates with the firm "Wickers". There are many books on this topic, but most of them are in English.
              1. 0
                20 September 2020 12: 04
                There are many books on this topic, but most of them are in English.
                This is not a problem, so I would be very grateful for links, if any.
                1. +1
                  22 September 2020 19: 55
                  Quote: Undecim
                  This is not a problem, so I would be very grateful for links, if any.

                  Dear Undecim, could you write me your mail.
        2. +4
          22 September 2020 15: 29
          Found.
          If we turn to the armor of the Sisoy the Great, then on the basis of an outline of the history of the Obukhov plant, it will be shown that at least part of the armor of this battleship, 254 and 305 mm thick, produced by the named enterprise, was made of steel. Slabs of this thickness were installed on towers, barbets and at the ends of the belt along the waterline of this ship. But as regards the thickest armor of the middle part of the belt, it makes sense to turn again to the data of N.A. Pakhomov.
          According to the information given by this author, after the manufacture of the side steel-iron armor of the cruiser "Rurik" by mid-May 1893, the manager of the Naval Ministry N.M. Chikhachev issued the following order: "The finished plates of" Rurik "should not be sent to the landfill, but sent when they roll 10- inch [254-mm - author's note] from a burst 16-in. [406-mm - author's note] plate [of the battleship "Sisoy the Great"] ".
          Taking into account this indication, as well as the obvious impossibility of rolling a new slab of lesser thickness from a collapsed thicker one, whether it is made of two layers of armor material of different properties (as is the case with steel-iron plates), slabs of the central part of the belt along the waterline on "Sisoy Velikiy" were definitely steel-nickel. As well as, obviously, its traverse armoring, as well as the protection of both casemates and the conning tower, the need for which and, accordingly, the required manufacturing time and readiness of the corresponding plates came after the installation of the belt armor and its traverses.
          An additional confirmation of this author's point of view is also the indication that MABogdanov had that armor for "Sisoy the Great" was ordered from the Admiralty Izhora Plants from the blanks of the Obukhov Plant. " And armored production at the Obukhov plant, as will be shown below, in principle began with the production of steel and steel-nickel, but not steel-iron plates.
          http://samlib.ru/m/matweenko_a_g/proizwodstwobronidljanuzhdflotawrossijskojimperii.shtml
          1. +1
            22 September 2020 18: 11
            Thank you, I also got to the material you indicated, since the question interested me. I do not consider it closed yet, because if I dig something up, I will definitely inform you.
      2. The comment was deleted.
  9. +3
    19 September 2020 13: 47
    In the overwhelming majority of cases, when hitting the armor, Japanese shells exploded either from the detonation of the fuse (remember, it worked without slowing down), or even earlier from the detonation of the shimosa on impact.
    A question to the author - how, when a projectile explodes at the moment of hitting the armor, determine whether it exploded from the action of the fuse or from detonation?
    1. +9
      19 September 2020 14: 51
      For a land mine it is very difficult. An armor-piercing one with normal operation should theoretically leave some potholes. Well, indirect signs. Yellow smoke and yellow traces - these are unexploded shimosa, i.e. abnormal operation.
      1. +2
        19 September 2020 16: 27
        For a land mine it is very difficult. An armor-piercing one with normal operation should theoretically leave some potholes.


        if we take Izuin's fuse, then, I think, taking into account the time of its operation, we will not notice the difference
        but in general, a land mine can also slow down :)
    2. +5
      19 September 2020 21: 21
      Quote: Undecim
      A question to the author - how, when a projectile explodes at the moment of hitting the armor, determine whether it exploded from the action of the fuse or from detonation?

      I found some interesting materials on this topic from the Americans in LJ. They actually carried out tests on this topic, explosive detonation upon penetration. Below I will try to lay out the plate in the comments. And the source is here "https://alex-cat-1975.livejournal.com/7687.html?utm_source=3userpost"
      1. +2
        22 September 2020 23: 36
        Maximit is picric acid phlegmatized with mononitronaphthalene.
  10. +3
    19 September 2020 15: 48
    Thank you very much for the great article!
  11. +3
    19 September 2020 16: 16
    Looking ahead, I will ask a couple of questions:

    Hits on an armored side
    "Mikasa" at 14:25 (14:07) - 152-mm - did not pierce, did not explode
    "Mikasa" at 14:40 (14:22) - 152-mm - did not pierce, did not explode
    "Mikasa" at 16:15 (15:57) - 152-mm - struck, with a full gap
    "Nissin" (time unknown) - 152 mm - punched, with a full gap
    "Azuma" at 14:55 (14:37) - 152 mm - did not pierce, did not explode

    Hit the towers
    "Fuji" at 15:00 - 152 mm - struck, with a full gap

    Hit the casemates
    "Mikasa" at 14:14 (13:56) - punched into the roof of the casemate, with a full gap
    "Mikasa" at 14:40 (14:22) - 152-mm - did not pierce, exploded
    "Mikasa" at 16:15 (15:57) - 152-mm - did not pierce, exploded
    "Mikasa" at 14:55 (14:37) - 152 mm shot, with a full gap

    1.It turns out that the Brink pipe in 12 '' shells worked perfectly when hitting armor with its penetration
    2.Regular non-penetration of even 152-mm armor makes one highly doubt the armor-piercing qualities of the 12 inch shells themselves, that is, in general, their practical applicability
    1. +5
      19 September 2020 16: 27
      You have asked a very interesting question.
      The fact is that 12 "shells had a Baranovsky tube. And it is not armor-piercing at all))) So you should not expect miracles.
      And the latest information. Most likely, Cherkasov was right, and 1 TOE also had 12 "shells with smokeless powder and a Baranovsky tube. Therefore, the% of explosives of 1TOE and 2 TOEs for 203+ mm shells is the same. And 152-mm shells have a higher percentage of non-explosives (both in Tsushima and in LM) due to the Brink tube.
      1. +2
        19 September 2020 16: 29
        1 TOE also had 12 "shells with smokeless powder and a Baranovsky tube.


        is that exactly so, I beg your pardon?
        1. +3
          19 September 2020 16: 32
          Previously so. Andrey Tameev will say more precisely. Information from him.
          The fact is that when studying the archives, they did not find confirmation of purchases of charging cases for 12 "shells in 1900-04. And without them, you cannot equip with pyroxylin.
          1. +2
            19 September 2020 17: 16
            The fact is that when studying the archives, they did not find confirmation of purchases of charging cases for 12 "shells in 1900-04. And without them, you cannot equip with pyroxylin.


            the logic is clear, but these covers could have been bought earlier, in addition, "did not find" and "did not buy" - somewhat different things

            let's try to go from the opposite: is there a drawing of such a projectile and a detailed description of the tube? - it will be possible to compare their constructive action with what happened in fact and estimate
            1. +5
              19 September 2020 17: 25
              I have no drawing. I posted a description of the tube here.

              This is the head one, but the bottom one has the same principle.
              By the way, the Idziuin tube works exactly the same (the firing pin hits the "capsule" by inertia), there is only a difference in the safety mechanism.
              In fact, our shells exploded up to 3 m behind 152 mm armor. I think this is a lot for a shock tube without slowing down. But the Japanese were not enough to pierce the armor. And I have only one conclusion: they detonated from the deformation of the projectile, not the fuse. The principle itself is well described by Horst. During deformation, microcavities with air are formed in the explosive, in which local overheating occurs. From this explosive detonates.
              1. +2
                19 September 2020 17: 30
                In fact, our shells exploded up to 3 m behind 152 mm armor. I think this is a lot for a shock tube without slowing down.


                so I mean it :)

                but
                "Mikasa" at 14:40 (14:22) - 152-mm - did not pierce, exploded

                very similar to just such a projectile and is completely unusual for the Brink tube

                perhaps there were both types after all?
                or, for example, "land mines" had an instant tube? - otherwise their difference from armor-piercing becomes completely unclear

                And I have only one conclusion: they detonated from the deformation of the projectile, not the fuse. The principle itself is well described by Horst. During deformation, microcavities with air are formed in the explosive, in which local overheating occurs. From this explosive detonates.


                by the way, Rdutlovsky also has an indication of this.
                1. +3
                  19 September 2020 17: 57
                  Quote: Andrey Shmelev
                  by the way, Rdutlovsky also has an indication of this.

                  But some on the Tsushima forums do not believe that the Japanese shells could have detonated on impact and not from a detonator.
                  1. +2
                    19 September 2020 19: 12
                    Quote: rytik32
                    so I mean it :)

                    Then the option that it was a 10 "shell with a BBO. The delay and the size of the gap in the floor of the casemate seem to hint ...
            2. +3
              21 September 2020 14: 40
              Found a picture of Baranovsky's bottom tube
    2. +2
      20 September 2020 16: 40
      [/quote ]2. Regular non-penetration of even 152-mm armor makes one highly doubt the armor-piercing qualities of the 12 inch shells themselves [quote]

      So they were not BBS, for the most part our FSs were shooting (or commons according to the world classification).
      1. 0
        20 September 2020 16: 53
        but this is a very interesting topic

        I suggest thinking like this:
        the body of all shells (both BBS and FS) corresponded in wall thickness to BBS
        BB (even pyroxylin, even gunpowder) of all shells (both BBS and FS) corresponded in durability to BBS
        accordingly, the difference in the purpose of the projectile is determined by the tube
        or Brink's tube = BBS (no matter how it was called from the statement)

        or handset arr. 1883 (?)




        = bad "Common" (no matter how it was called from the statement)

        the problem is that all those who describe Tsushima are talking about Brink's pipe, so I'm still waiting for convincing proofs about the arr. 1883 or something like that on a 12-inch BBS in the first detachment of 2 TOE

        1. +3
          20 September 2020 17: 00
          [/ quote] the problem is that everyone who describes Tsushima is talking about the Brink pipe, [quote]

          So it was, in the Russian 12 "FS (commone) there was a Brink pipe.
          But the wall thickness in the FS was less than in the BBS.
          1. +2
            20 September 2020 17: 03
            the fact of the matter is that many write that in 12 inch there was neither a Brink tube nor pyroxylin,

            And the latest information. Most likely, Cherkasov was right, and 1 TOE also had 12 "shells with smokeless powder and a Baranovsky tube. Therefore, the% of explosives of 1TOE and 2 TOEs for 203+ mm shells is the same. And 152-mm shells have a higher percentage of non-explosives (both in Tsushima and in LM) due to the Brink tube.



            for example, this is how I understood Alexey

            in Russian 12 "FS (commone) there was a Brink pipe.
            But the wall thickness in the FS was less than in the BBS.

            and with this configuration, I can not classify it otherwise than BBS
            1. +2
              20 September 2020 17: 07
              [/ quote] and with this configuration I cannot classify it otherwise than BBS [quote]

              PBBS or common, did not reach the BBS due to the small thickness of the walls.
              1. +2
                20 September 2020 17: 13
                did not reach the BBS due to the small thickness of the walls


                and they were definitely thinner than that of BBS arr. 1907 and arr. 1911?
                1. +3
                  20 September 2020 17: 18
                  Quote: Andrei Shmelev
                  did not reach the BBS due to the small thickness of the walls


                  and they were definitely thinner than that of BBS arr. 1907 and arr. 1911?

                  They were exactly thinner than the 1894 BBS.
                  1. +2
                    20 September 2020 17: 20
                    This is clear :) but in itself does not deny the classification of the BBS
                    1. +1
                      20 September 2020 17: 24
                      Quote: Andrei Shmelev
                      This is clear :) but in itself does not deny the classification of the BBS

                      Unfortunately, it completely rejects (see their pic. In section).
                      1. +2
                        20 September 2020 17: 44
                        Unfortunately, it completely rejects (see their pic. In section).

                        I would be grateful if you share the source :)
                      2. +1
                        21 September 2020 16: 27
                        Quote: Andrei Shmelev
                        Unfortunately, it completely rejects (see their pic. In section).

                        I would be grateful if you share the source :)

                        Shirokorad, "Ship artillery of the Russian fleet 1867-1922".
                      3. +1
                        21 September 2020 19: 23
                        Shirokorad, "Ship artillery of the Russian fleet 1867-1922".


                        I already laid out almost this drawing earlier (only black and white)



                        I was told that I was stupid, since fig. 3 shows an armor-piercing tip that never existed, and I started looking further

                        + for 6 kg, it seems to me, the cavity is too big - was there a wooden stopper inserted into the nose?

                        or am I dull?
                      4. +2
                        22 September 2020 16: 32
                        [/ quote] I was told that I was stupid, since fig. 3 shows an armor-piercing tip, [quote]

                        They are stupid, the armor-piercing tip of the fig. 5, in FIG. 3, - ballistic (which did not exist at the time of the RYAV).
                        Well, the discussed FS / common - Fig. 4; and since The pyroxylin blocks are round, then there was some kind of filler in the tapering part - perhaps a tree, as in the cuts already given, of supposedly cast-iron shells (there they are closer to the bottom).
                      5. 0
                        22 September 2020 16: 33
                        look at the psta branch at the very bottom, your opinion is interesting
                      6. +2
                        22 September 2020 16: 34
                        Quote: Andrei Shmelev
                        look at the psta branch at the very bottom, your opinion is interesting

                        I'll look at it.
                      7. +1
                        21 September 2020 20: 01
                        looked at the previous thread of the discussion, there they wrote to me that there was no tip (in the form of display, it is still a ballistic tip in all variants of the drawing)
            2. +3
              20 September 2020 17: 17
              [/ quote] the fact of the matter is that many write that in 12 inch there was neither a Brink tube nor pyroxylin, [quote]

              Yes, MTC wrote this after the war, but really all 12 "FSs were equipped with gunpowder and a shock tube in 1894, were there really no pyroxylin with Brink at all?
              Then the option was that the penetration was 12 "BBS and 10" BBS and FS. But the distance is more than 20 kbt, the BBS should have barely fired.
              1. +2
                20 September 2020 17: 18
                Yes, MTK wrote this after the war


                I would be grateful if you share the source
                1. +3
                  20 September 2020 17: 22
                  Quote: Andrei Shmelev
                  Yes, MTK wrote this after the war


                  I would be grateful if you share the source

                  https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005079885#?page=192
                  1. +1
                    20 September 2020 17: 40
                    See the following quotes:

                    “In the absence of a strong blasting action and, consequently, the ability to deploy a hole in the side, there was no reason to assign a particularly sensitive tube to these shells and they were equipped double shock tubes»
                    "This kind of shells and prepared for the supply of ships, later entering the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Ocean."
                    “In 1895 and 1896, an attempt was made in the following direction: having in mind the possibility of increasing the weight of the explosive charge with the same projectile drawing, replacing pyroxylin with melenite ... "

                    at first glance, it follows that high-explosive shells 1 and 2 of the TOE had:
                    Melenite and Brink pipe (double shock pipe), no?
                    1. +3
                      21 September 2020 16: 32
                      [/ quote] at first glance, it follows that high-explosive shells 1 and 2 TOE had:
                      Melenite and Brink pipe (double shock pipe), isn't it? [Quote]

                      Melenite was thrown back immediately, because did not know the French secret (phlegmatizer), and when equipping 2TOE, there was not enough pyroxylin for the FS (well, the Brink pipes, probably). The only question is whether the 12 "FSs with pyroxylin and Brink were completely absent, or, nevertheless, there were some of them.
                      1. +2
                        21 September 2020 19: 26
                        Melenite was thrown back at once


                        I'm sorry, a mistake, I wanted to write "pyroxylin"
                  2. +1
                    20 September 2020 18: 30
                    look:

                    "The only way out was to sacrifice the qualities of steel and, so that the shells would not break in the gun, to thicken their walls, reducing the explosive charge. On this basis, the Committee designed high-explosive shells with an explosive charge of 7,7% of the total weight of the shell. metal shells required an elastic limit of 3800 atmospheres with an elongation of 20%.
                    But even this requirement was beyond the strength of our factories, which declared extremely high prices and uncertainty about the possibility of making shells without a big marriage. Therefore, the blueprints for the projectiles were reworked to reduce the weight of the explosive charge to 3½% and a decrease in the elastic limit of the metal to 2700 atm., with an elongation of 8%. Shells of this kind were prepared for supplying ships, and subsequently entered the 2nd Pacific Squadron. "

                    and here
                    https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005079885#?page=192
                    the high-explosive projectile had only 1,8% of the explosive content,

                    for comparison BBS arr. 1907 = 1,6%, BBS arr. 1911 = 2,7%


                    so the obvious source is:
                    "High-explosive projectiles 6 in., 8 in. And 10 in. Calibers were equipped with pyroxylin, having double shock pyroxylin tubes, and 12 in. High-explosive projectiles, due to the unavailability of pyroxylin charges, were equipped with smokeless powder with ordinary shock tubes of the 1894 model." ...

                    needs further clarification,

                    I suggest thinking about this:
                    density of pyroxylin about 1,4
                    against the density of pyroxylin powder from 0,6 (minimum for grained) to 1,6 maximum for pressed
                    everything can coincide, if we assume that inside the 12 inch FS there was a cavity of 3,5% of the weight of pyroskiline, where 1,8% of granulated powder climbed,

                    this can be checked by drawing
                  3. +2
                    20 September 2020 19: 01
                    is this drawing correct?



                    if yes, and this is exactly the standard Russian FS,
                    then the configuration of the walls is closer to the Common (here you are right),
                    and the gunpowder could well have been grained with a low density
                    (although such gunpowder is absurd as BB)
                    1. +2
                      21 September 2020 10: 02
                      This is cast iron with black powder inside
                      1. +2
                        21 September 2020 10: 15
                        1.
                        about cast iron, I can't be sure for the following reason:
                        cavity diameter about 150 mm, with a cavity length of about 500 mm,
                        this gives about 7 cubic dm for placement of explosives,
                        which corresponds to about 10 kg of pyroxylin + case = about 3,5 percent
                        (a bit too much for cast iron, but just for FS)
                        2.
                        so a little dishonest;)))
                        first stated that we would only discuss 12 inches
                        then we discussed pyroxylin for a month
                        and then it turns out that it was necessary to discuss gunpowder as BB
                        and also the Baranovsky pipe
                        save-help, I'm not ready for discussion at all =
                        give drawings of Russian shells in 12 inches, which under Tsushima were
                    2. +3
                      21 September 2020 16: 41
                      [/ quote] is this drawing correct? [quote]

                      It is very close to the steel FS sample 1892. Despite the fact that some argue that it is exclusively cast iron. That is, they are very similar in section to each other, only if pyroxylin was in round blocks, then it was less (in length), due to the narrowing of the cavity towards the nose.
            3. +1
              22 September 2020 23: 54
              Quote: Andrey Shmelev
              and with this configuration, I can not classify it otherwise than BBS

              The 12 "high-explosive projectile had an explosive charge of smokeless gunpowder and a Baranovsky tube as a fuse.
              1. 0
                22 September 2020 23: 58
                The 12 "high-explosive projectile had an explosive charge of smokeless gunpowder and a Baranovsky tube as a fuse.


                yes, thanks, figured it out)
                but there are a bunch of questions to it (see the very end of the branch)
          2. +1
            21 September 2020 14: 52
            High-explosive shells 6 in., 8 in. and 10 dm. calibers were equipped with pyroxylin, having double shock pyroxylin tubes, and 12 dm. high-explosive shells, due to the unavailability of pyroxylin charges, were equipped with smokeless gunpowder with ordinary shock tubes of the 1894 model.

            Those. no Brink!
  12. +1
    19 September 2020 16: 25
    and, perhaps, the third question I will express with a comment about "half an hour for Russian guns"

    "Mikasa" at 14:25 (14:07) - 152-mm - did not pierce, did not explode
    "Mikasa" at 14:40 (14:22) - 152-mm - did not pierce, did not explode
    "Mikasa" at 14:14 (13:56) - punched into the roof of the casemate, with a full gap
    "Mikasa" at 14:40 (14:22) - 152-mm - did not pierce, exploded

    completely insufficient to talk about how the ZPR beat the Japanese, and indeed about the chances in the outset of the battle
    1. +4
      19 September 2020 16: 29
      I fully support you. Moreover, the list of "19 shells, and there are 5 12" should be cut. There, a pair of 12 pounds (76 mm) was credited by Campbell as 12 "
  13. +7
    19 September 2020 16: 48
    I noticed that Togo kept his distance very competently.
    No more than 40 cables, because the accuracy of 6 "guns sharply decreased, and in them the Japanese had a great advantage.
    And no closer than 20 cables, tk. Russian shells began to penetrate the Japanese. 6 "shells - 102 mm in the limbs, 10 ... 12" even the main belt.
  14. +1
    19 September 2020 19: 25
    Quite a long time ago, about 20 years ago, I heard on the radio a version that in our fleet the aiming strips were designed for a different type of shells, as a result of which we had massive undershoots. Either a sabotage, or an oversight. Who heard about it?
  15. -4
    19 September 2020 21: 14
    Quote: "Author"
    76 mm rounds

    These are not sickly cartridges, but will they get into Makarov? good
  16. +6
    19 September 2020 21: 53
    Many thanks to the author for continuing this interesting topic!

    But since this part touched on penetrations and damage in battle, I would like to supplement the author's material with references to American studies of the armor-piercing properties of explosives known at that time. I note right away that this is not my personal research, I found it not so long ago on LJ, the author: "https://alex-cat-1975.livejournal.com/7687.html?utm_source=3userpost"

    "Summary of explosive tests at the US maritime test site in 1901"

    Explanations for the plate: used the cheapest projectile, 57mm (about 2 inches), used plates 1, 1,5, 2 inches thick (1.0 T, 1,5 T, 2.0 T) -Armor steel. Plus - Structural Mild Steel - 3 '' Thick (3.0M)

    The tests are simple (and cheap) but very informative. From them it is possible to understand at what thickness of armor in calibers from the projectile (remember that 57mm is 2 ") detonates the explosive charge placed in the projectile. If anyone does not understand, these projectiles did not have a fuse. The first projectiles filled with sand are designed to test the strength of the projectile itself in as a reference.

    It is easy to see that the worst result was shown by pure picric acid (trinitrophenol). Such shells are guaranteed to explode immediately upon hitting the armor. (which is unusual, because ideally pure trinitrophenol, on the contrary, is listed as the most resistant to detonation from explosives)

    The second place from the bottom was taken by black powder (which was equipped with a considerable number of armor-piercing shells of that time, including Japanese). Curiously, the shells with black powder did not explode immediately, but approximately 2-4 feet after penetration. This explains well the nature of many of the damages mentioned in the article.

    Well, the third place from the bottom was taken by pyroxylin, which is expected to be more resistant than black powder, but not strong enough to recommend it as an armor-piercing explosive. We can see that the armor the size of the caliber slows it down enough to detonate immediately upon penetration.

    Well, the first place in the American trials of 1901 was taken by theirs maximite, consisting of a mixture of trinitrophenol and 10-25% phlegmatizer. This once again confirms the high detonation resistance of picric acid in the absence of destabilizing impurities. (I would like to remind once again that at the end of 1890 both France, America and Russia were actively working on the search for optimal phlegmatizers for picric acid. It is difficult to agree with the opinion that Japan allegedly ignored this moment).

    Well, once again I want to thank the author for an interesting review of the results of the artillery duel of the squadrons at Tsushima. drinks
    1. +2
      20 September 2020 02: 48
      Quote: Saxahorse
      It is difficult to agree with the opinion that Japan allegedly ignored this moment)

      The Japanese raised the issue of using explosives in armor-piercing shells in the early 20s. When they fired at the Satsuma as a target, they made sure that the shimoza explodes when the shell passes through the armor, and switched to another explosive. This confirms once again that the shimosa could not, in principle, penetrate the armor without an explosion (two cases in the entire RYV as an exception).
      1. +2
        20 September 2020 22: 54
        Quote: rytik32
        The Japanese raised the issue of using explosives in armor-piercing shells in the early 20s.

        The Japanese raised the issue of blasting explosives immediately after the invention of melinite in 1885. I want to remind you that they began their own work only after receiving a refusal from France to sell a recipe for a new explosive.

        I would like to see some evidence that shimose is precisely pure picric acid. Masachiki Shimose could not call the pure trinitrophenol just discovered by the French as "shimose powder". Firstly, it is indecent to appropriate someone else's invention. And in Japan at that time about "losing face" was strict. And secondly, why "gunpowder"? Gunpowder is a mixture, and pure trinitrophenol cannot be called a mixture. Already from the name it follows that Masachiki Shimose mixed something there. Other sources say aluminum.

        In my opinion, the main problem of shimose, like picric acid in general, was the insufficient quality of the raw materials. Chemists unequivocally state that pure trinitrophenol is very resistant to detonation, but the presence of impurities in the reagents inevitably leads to the appearance of picrates (salts) in the final material. Even a microscopic crystal is enough to detonate. If you recall the article you posted on the history of shimosa, the Japanese have sharply reduced the quality requirements for raw materials in the production process at the request of the reagent manufacturers. Which led to a naturally sad result. Aluminum as a phlegmatizer could not help due to the large amount of impurities in the starting reagents.
        1. +2
          21 September 2020 10: 06
          Quote: Saxahorse
          I would like to see some evidence that shimose is precisely pure picric acid.

          As shown by studies of the contents of high-explosive shells of field artillery, taken from the Japanese at Putilovskaya Sopka, as well as shells that fell into Russian military ships and did not explode, and caught Japanese mines, the so-called. In terms of its chemical composition, shimosa is no more, no less than fused picric acid and, next, in this respect, and therefore, in its strength, it is identical with melinite and liddite. The impurities of foreign substances found in it during the analysis, apparently and especially in view of their negligible amount, are of a random nature and are easily explained by the use of less pure varieties of phenol for the preparation of picric acid. Although it is similar in composition to melinite, nevertheless, shimosa differs from it in the physical structure of its mass, especially shimosa from field high-explosive garnets. Namely, the mass of the latter is fine-crystalline and very dense (up to 1,68), which is achieved, as shown by the corresponding experiments, with the help of a special casting technique, which is practically very convenient and simple. The mass of shimose from other shells is coarsely crystalline, but unlike melinite, the location of the crystals in it is wrong.
          https://slovar.cc/enc/brokhauz-efron/1686213.html
          1. +2
            21 September 2020 23: 41
            Under this name, the explosive became famous very elongated, thin-walled, with a relatively very large charging chamber and some other design features. The very name of Sh. Is borrowed from the name of the officer of the Japanese artillery who developed this new Japanese equipment.], So much sensationalized during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

            With all due respect to Brockhaus and Efron, you see that the compilers of the encyclopedia did not have intelligible information and retold in general terms the ideas of that time. The mention of impurities as you can see is, but how insignificant they are is difficult to say. They were noticed with far from ideal equipment of that time. Mendeleev spent three years dealing with the composition of French smokeless powder. And still he made it according to his recipe, because he could not accurately determine all the components of the sample. Who there in Port Arthur could do spectral analysis?

            In general, the old encyclopedia is certainly good, but there are no convincing details. More like a newspaper retelling of rumors.
  17. -1
    19 September 2020 21: 59
    That's interesting: Japanese shells did not penetrate the armor of our ships, the number of hits was about the same on both sides, only for some reason the best Russian battleships (with the exception of the "Eagle") gurgled into the waters of the Tsushima Strait like irons, and the Japanese all (!! !) stayed afloat! And then what to say about the "equal" effectiveness of the artillery fire of the Russians and the Japanese ??? The picture does not add up !!!
    1. +1
      20 September 2020 01: 38
      the number of hits is approximately the same on both sides


      Are you seriously?
    2. +5
      20 September 2020 02: 23
      Quote: nnz226
      the number of hits is approximately the same on both sides

      The number of hits is very different.
      Here "Eagle" got about 100 hits, according to my estimate.
      "Suvorov", judging by the condition of the sides, pipes, masts and artillery - 2-3 times more.
      “Alexander” and “Borodino” - at least on the level of “Eagle”, and most likely a little more.
      And Mikasa received only 40 shells. Any other Japanese ship is much smaller. So compare.
      1. -1
        20 September 2020 03: 29
        Um ... This means that the Japanese were shooting with 80 percent accuracy, which, in principle, cannot be
        1. +3
          20 September 2020 04: 32
          According to Campbell, the Togo squad fired 446 12 ", 50 10", 284 8 ", 5748 6" and 4046 3 ". Kamimura's squad 915 8", 3716 6 "(excluding the battle with Ushakov) and 3480 3". I got a final accuracy of 3-5%

          But you gave me an interesting idea. Most likely, the number of hits in “Suvorov” was not so great. The effect was achieved at the expense of quality. It should have had much more 12 "hits than the others. And the Eagle was more often shot at by the cruiser.
          1. +2
            20 September 2020 06: 54
            I'll try to estimate the number of hits by Japanese 10 ... 12 "shells.
            We proceed from the fact that the Oryol received 11-14 shells, and the Oryol was under fire twice: the battle on the counter courses (Mikasa and Fuji) and in the final phase, where the main target was Borodino.
            Most of the time "Alexander" was under fire of cruisers: while it was following "Suvorov" and before sinking. The battleships hit him during the attempt to break through "under the tail" and, possibly, in several episodes later, but he was no longer the main target. The number of 12 "shells hit should be estimated approximately as in" Eagle ".
            "Suvorov" received a lot of "suitcases" when he was leading the squadron. A large number of hits were noted from Mikasa. He also got a lot when he was between the squadrons. The distance to it was less than 10 cab. So he should have gotten much more than the Eagle. Let it be 20-25.
            "Borodino". He led the squadron the longest and was the main target for the battleships of Togo. I think I got something like "Suvorov".
            "Oslyabya" 2-4 shells.
            The rest ("Sisoy", "Nikolay", "Navarin", "Nakhimov") received no more than 10 for all.
            The total is about 70-90 10 ... 12 "shells hit our ships. That gives the accuracy of Japanese fire 14-19%. And this is quite likely not true.
            If anyone else has any ideas, join us.
            1. +2
              20 September 2020 11: 45
              My comment may look like I don't want to do anything and check myself. I really don't want to). I don't like Tsushima that much)
              If you just twist your conclusions in your head.
              What gives the accuracy of Japanese fire 14-19%... And this is quite likely not the truth.

              Smells like a sensation, doesn't it? ... This needs to be justified as reasonably as possible
              According to Campbell, the Togo squad released

              Does it fight Japanese sources?
              What do the Japanese say about the distribution of fire on targets in different phases of the battle?
              Here they laid out the Japanese shooting scheme in the outset of the battle. Even there were many questions, including the same Fuji, who seemed to shoot anomalously rarely, but terribly accurate (from memory)

              By the way, consideration of the impact of shells implies consideration of the reasons for the drowning of two residents of Borodino and the non-drowning of the other two. Will this issue be addressed based on new knowledge about projectiles and damage?
              1. +3
                20 September 2020 12: 16
                Quote: Engineer
                Smells like a sensation, doesn't it?

                I do not consider this a sensation. This is about 1,5 times higher than in FM, which is easily explained by a number of factors:
                shorter distance;
                experience;
                enhanced workouts.
                Moreover, there was a precedent for very accurate shooting of "Asama" in Chemulpo.
                Quote: Engineer
                Does it fight Japanese sources?

                So Campbell took the data from there. I have not tested it, but there should be no significant discrepancies.
                Quote: Engineer
                What do the Japanese say about the distribution of fire on targets in different phases of the battle?

                In some places they say very dimly (according to the data that I have), for example, "a ship like Borodino".
                Quote: Engineer
                By the way, consideration of the impact of shells implies consideration of the reasons for the drowning of two residents of Borodino and the non-drowning of the other two. Will this issue be addressed based on new knowledge about projectiles and damage?

                I am not going to write separately, I will answer here.
                The mechanism of death of "Alexander" and "Borodino" was launched when the ship on the circulation scooped water with porticoes and holes. Then the roll and overturn increased. Increasing roll on circulation is common. When there was a lot of water on the decks, the roll increased more. This effect was noticeable on "Peresvet" and "Eagle".
                Why didn't the "Suvorov" shells sink - most likely there were no sharp turns and there were officers who watched the ship. On "Eagle" they took measures in time: they closed the porticoes, removed the water from the decks. But on "Borodino" all the officers were killed or wounded before their death. There was no one to fight for survivability.
                1. +2
                  20 September 2020 12: 38
                  Thank you for your opinion
                  I do not consider this a sensation.

                  Well, you are almost the most maximalist in assessing the accuracy of the Japanese. I remember the figures of 3-5 percent to estimate the number of their hits.
                  The mechanism of death of "Alexander" and "Borodino" was launched when the ship on the circulation scooped water with porticoes and holes.

                  Not strong in the question, but did these Borodino people make a circulation in the last minutes?
                  According to eyewitnesses, Aleksadr already had a huge tilt. Maybe the stability margin is simply exhausted?
                  1. +1
                    20 September 2020 12: 43
                    So a big roll - this is already water flowing like a river. And the ship can no longer be saved, although 15 minutes before overkil may still pass.
                    1. +2
                      20 September 2020 12: 47
                      so he scooped it up on the circulation or maybe just systematically recruited when hitting the unarmored parts of the side. ???
                      1. +1
                        20 September 2020 15: 15
                        So the belt is fully armored, so that the unarmored part sinks into the water, a large roll is needed. I say that I drew on the circulation, and then - everything, the water ran, you can't return the roll back.
                      2. +3
                        20 September 2020 15: 31
                        The belt is solid, yeah
                        Here again the problem of overloading arises, for which so many spears have been broken that any village can be provided with firewood for the winter. Initial roll is not necessary if the belt is actually submerged.
                        I got your point anyway
                      3. +2
                        20 September 2020 15: 34
                        The overload theme is not canceled. The closer to the design displacement, the more roll is needed in order to scoop.
                      4. +2
                        20 September 2020 23: 54
                        Quote: rytik32
                        So the belt is fully armored, so that the unarmored part sinks into the water, a large roll is needed. I say that I drew on the circulation, and then - everything, the water ran, you can't return the roll back.

                        Let me remind you that the main armor belt of Borodintsev was initially below the waterline. Through the efforts of Rozhdestvensky (do not be remembered for the night ..). However, Borodintsy also had an upper armor belt along the entire length of the side with a thickness of 100-152 mm. It was this belt that held the Japanese land mines! They did not even pierce 100 mm, there is only one mention of a plate that fell off in the nose.

                        In fact, all Borodino residents were flooded with water through the top. Fountains from explosions and water for extinguishing fires are the main reason for the appearance of hundreds of tons of water on the battery deck. Plus an overload due to which waves 1.2-1.7 meters high swept into holes over the upper armored belt.

                        Worth noticing that the Eagle, whose armor belt came out of the water on the morning of May 15, was still an extremely difficult target for the Japanese. I think that the next day's battle would not be as simple and easy for the Japanese as the supporters of the surrendered admirals are trying to portray.
                  2. +2
                    20 September 2020 13: 01
                    Well, you are almost the most maximalist in assessing the accuracy of the Japanese. I remember the figures of 3-5 percent to estimate the number of their hits.


                    1. How exactly are the numbers "3-5 percent" obtained?
                    2. What are the objective factors that prevent the Japanese from reaching the figure of up to 25% at the beginning of the battle, for example?

                    I see no problem for "Shikishima", which knocked out 75% accuracy during the April exercises, to issue 25% at Tsushima at the beginning of the battle.
                  3. +1
                    21 September 2020 14: 56
                    Quote: Engineer
                    Well, you are almost the most maximalist in assessing the accuracy of the Japanese. I remember the figures of 3-5 percent to estimate the number of their hits

                    Gribovsky estimates the accuracy of the Japanese at 3,2%. So everything is within ...
            2. +3
              20 September 2020 23: 40
              Quote: rytik32
              I'll try to estimate the number of hits by Japanese 10 ... 12 "shells.
              We proceed from the fact that the Eagle received 11-14 shells, and the Eagle was under fire twice: the battle on the counter courses (Mikasa and Fuji) and in the final phase, where the main target was Borodino. ...

              Looks like you are back to Valentine's article (Comrade) :)

              I would not distinguish between medium and large caliber hits in this fight. Judging by the fact that the Japanese, in principle, did not pierce our armor, there is not much difference with what they huddled Borodintsev, 12 or 6 inches. It makes sense to simply divide all 12 thousand shells equally, based on a rough estimate of accuracy. Remembering Valentine, we can assume that in the first stage of the battle Borodintsy received about 200 hits of medium and large caliber. The eagle is obviously the smallest.
          2. +1
            20 September 2020 23: 43
            Quote: rytik32
            According to Campbell, the Togo squad fired 446 12 ", 50 10", 284 8 ", 5748 6" and 4046 3 ".

            Once again, I want to remind you that Packingham mysteriously does not match the number of spent shells and the number of shots fired. For example, Fuji allegedly spent 106 rounds but fired 117-127 shots .. Well, or there were some big problems with the bow tower, which were not mentioned either by the Japanese or by Pekingham.
            1. +2
              21 September 2020 15: 07
              Maybe Packinham took into account the charges burned in the aft tower?
              1. +2
                21 September 2020 23: 44
                The Japanese held the shells in the tower, and the charges below. But for some reason he really could not take these shells into account.
        2. 0
          20 September 2020 13: 09
          which, in principle, cannot be


          On May 26, 1899, "Scylla" won the prize for the best shooting during a drill, to which three independent judges were invited. Six 4,7-d guns fired seventy volleys and made 56 hits (80%).

          okay, just kidding, that's a shield from 1 yards

          but seriously:




          nevertheless, if we compare the difficulty of hitting the shield from 1000 yards, the island from 3000 yards and the stationary battleship "Oslyabya" from 6000 - 8000 yards, then the accuracy of 25% for the main battery would be quite a reasonable figure
          1. +2
            20 September 2020 23: 58
            Quote: Andrey Shmelev
            hitting the shield from 1000 yards, an island from 3000 yards and the stationary battleship "Oslyabya" from 6000 - 8000 yards, then an accuracy of 25% for the main battery would be quite a reasonable figure

            It can be recalled that at the beginning of the battle, Togo approached 4500-4700 meters. the hit percentage in this episode should definitely be high.
  18. The comment was deleted.
  19. +5
    20 September 2020 05: 16
    Dear Alexey,
    Thank you for another opportunity to talk about an interesting topic.
    With your permission, a few criticisms.

    the maximum thickness of the armor, which turned out to be "in the teeth", was recorded during the battle in the Yellow Sea: 178-mm krupp

    I'm afraid this is an incorrect wording, since there are no cases of hitting thicker armor, which Russian shells could not penetrate. In other words, how thick the armor turned out to be
    "Tough"?

    In Tsushima, Japanese ships received three direct hits to the towers. 12 "shell at 14:50 (14:32) hit the right barrel of the 8" stern gun "Azuma"

    And here the eye hurt. So where did the shell hit, the turret or the gun? With the same success, we can say that if a shell hit the casemate gun, it means that it hit the casemate.
    In "Eagle" for 3 cases of defeat in the conning tower there are 76 hits. For 12 Japanese ships - also three, but for 128 hits.

    For impartial When comparing the number of hits, here it would be necessary to take into account the constructive disadvantage of felling on Russian ships.
    The photo shows the conning tower of the battleship "Mikasa", where we obviously do not see a "visor" that caught the fragments and reflected them into the wheelhouse.

    Who knows how many Japanese would have suffered in the felling, had the last roofs, similar to the Russians?
    To compare the effectiveness of shells when impacting the towers, I will take the "Eagle" from the Russian side, for which the data are sufficiently complete for analysis. 11 enemy shells with a direct hit disabled only one of our barrel. While 3 of our shells, hitting the Japanese towers, disabled 2 guns

    Offhand.
    An 8 '' shell hit the Eagle's left forward turret. The turret jammed, smashed the frame of the left gun.
    Or do you have information that the left gun still continued to fire?
    1. +3
      20 September 2020 06: 23
      Valentine, I greet you!
      Quote: Comrade
      there are no cases of hitting thicker armor, which Russian shells could not penetrate

      Alas, in ZhM only hitting the tower of the Mikasy Group of Companies is questionable. All other hits in 152 ... 178 mm armor maximum.
      Quote: Comrade
      So where did the shell hit, the turret or the gun?

      Hitting the gun. But are we comparing the effect? If the weapon is out of order, there is an effect!
      Quote: Comrade
      here it would be necessary to take into account the constructive drawback of felling on Russian ships

      Before this "disadvantage" can be taken into account, it must be proved. And from the available data, I cannot conclude that this deficiency manifested itself. On the contrary, the “Eagle” had several hits under the embrasure without losses. Here is an oil painting for the mothers!
      Quote: Comrade
      Or do you have information that the left gun still continued to fire

      No information available. I counted this tower completely out of action by an indirect hit.
      1. +2
        20 September 2020 12: 26
        Before this "disadvantage" can be taken into account, it must be proved.


        Let's decide whether we are talking about the disadvantages of felling in general or in comparison with the Japanese specifically?
        1.
        "The Suvorov's cabin was immediately severely damaged. Everyone was killed or wounded in it, including the squadron commander. All fire control devices, rudders and mechanisms were destroyed."
        Well, ok, it looks like that.
        2.
        "On" Borodino "a 12-inch shell hit the rear, in the entrance gap. Everyone was killed, and control was transferred to the central post."
        As we can see, Mikasa would have received exactly the same consequences.
        3.
        “On the Orel, three 6-inch and two 8-inch shells hit the wheelhouse. The wheelhouse was badly damaged, but by a lucky chance the steering wheel survived ... On the Orel, the starboard visor was torn off by an explosion of an 8-inch shell and thrown inside wheelhouse, and knocked down the suspended rangefinder and destroyed the board with all the communication pipes. "
        Here the choice clearly follows: OR "The mushroom-shaped overhang of the roof caught the fragments reflected from below and directed them into the cabin." OR "Additional one-inch thick horizontal canopies applied to the end of the vertical slabs reflected small debris, but were ripped off when shells burst below the gaps."

        The shortcomings of felling generally showed themselves in each of these cases.
        Disadvantages of felling in comparison with Mikasa in two cases out of three.

        Do not forget:
        "3)" Tsarevich "was hit by a 12-d shell between the upper and lower bridges, which killed Admiral Vitgeft, the flagship navigator and wounded the chief of staff and the battleship commander. These officers were outside the conning tower. Soon after, the second 12-d shell hit the conning tower and exploded.The debris was deflected by the roof, went through a gap 16-d deep, killed or wounded everyone inside, including the helmsman, who fell on the steering wheel and turned it hard to starboard, so that the ship abruptly went out of line, leading the fleet was confused. These two shells decided the outcome of the battle ";


        4
        Are there any exact data on "Oslyabya"? It is well known that two shells hit the wheelhouse and the fragments penetrated inside. Perhaps this case will be decisive for comparison with the Japanese.
        1. +3
          20 September 2020 15: 12
          I have no details about Oslyaba.
          Here's what I mean. There is a cut-out. And if a splinter flies into it, it's in the wheelhouse. The mushroom overhang catches "additional" fragments (those that would not have flown into the gap) only if they fly along a very complex trajectory with one or two ricochets. And there will be few such fragments.
          And the case with "Tsarevich" is generally fantastic, you can't even imagine how it happened. The shell ricochets from the water, an explosion on the bridge and a double ricochet into the wheelhouse.
          1. +2
            20 September 2020 15: 24
            The mushroom overhang catches "additional" fragments (those that would not have flown into the gap) only if they fly along a very complex trajectory with one or two ricochets.


            it seems to me that you can draw like this:




            and then that's a really big problem
            1. +1
              20 September 2020 15: 31

              "Tsesarevich" Here, in reality, the overhang of the fungus is not so great, given that the roof is thick.
              If the projectile explodes under the embrasure, then most of the fragments will go to the lower edge of the fungus, and from it outward.
              1. +2
                20 September 2020 15: 37
                in my opinion, the height of the slot is about a foot, the mushroom also protrudes by about a foot, which is a lot compared to the slots of the Mikasa

                the difference is that from the conning tower "Mikasa" your ship is almost invisible, which means that almost nowhere there will be a splinter that will penetrate directly into the wheelhouse, but narrow slots with a large metal thickness oblige to draw a system of ricochets inside the slot, which is possible but difficult

                from the cabin of Russian battleships, your ship is clearly visible, which means that there are a lot of places from where the splinter will penetrate directly into the wheelhouse, and the visor significantly expands such places
                -as due to the width of the slot
                -so due to the protrusion
                although, nevertheless, it is first worth talking about too wide gaps
                1. +3
                  20 September 2020 15: 40
                  For our fragments, ship tin is not a problem.
                  For example (this is from the next article) the opposite side of the Asama hit. The shards went right through. Here is a sieve. The holes are marked and even the sizes are readable - pay attention to them!
                  1. +1
                    20 September 2020 15: 42
                    For our fragments, ship tin is not a problem.


                    this is clear, but how exactly does this relate to the problem of felling protection?
                    1. +6
                      20 September 2020 15: 45
                      I agree that our felling has more gaps than the Japanese.
                      This is how the wheelhouse should be)))


                      Derflinger
      2. +1
        22 September 2020 02: 41
        Hello, Alexey!
        Quote: rytik32
        in ZhM only hitting the tower of the Mikasy Group of Companies - and that is questionable. All other hits in 152 ... 178 mm armor maximum

        That's it, dear colleague. We do not know what the maximum thickness of armor could be penetrated by Russian 12 '' shells.

        Quote: rytik32
        Hitting the gun. But are we comparing the effect? If the weapon is out of order, there is an effect!

        Then it was necessary to mention the "Oslyaby", there, as a result of one hit at once, 2 main-caliber guns lost the ability to fire. Yes, the guns themselves remained serviceable, but you credited the gun to "Fuji", which, as you know,
        was hit by shrapnel, and on this basis they no longer fired from it, although later the arsenal in Kure found it serviceable.

        Quote: rytik32
        Before this "disadvantage" can be taken into account, it must be proved.

        We read from Kostenko:

        This drawback of conning houses was known, and on the Slava one can clearly see an artisanal reflective visor designed to eliminate or minimize the problem.


        Quote: rytik32
        I counted this tower completely out of action by an indirect hit.

        The hit was direct, into the tower. Same as with Fuji.
        1. +1
          22 September 2020 03: 52
          Quote: Comrade
          That's it, dear colleague. We do not know what the maximum thickness of armor could penetrate the Russian 12 '' shells.

          I agree.
          Quote: Comrade
          Then it was necessary to mention "Oslyaby"

          I wrote about this in the article. As far as there is information, the first round interrupted the electrical wires. And then 2 more shells destroyed the tower.
          Quote: Comrade
          This lack of conning tower was known

          Perhaps I agree with you. The effect can be explained by the structure of the felling. Then the advantage of Japanese shells when operating at the wheelhouse will become unobvious.
          Quote: Comrade
          The hit was direct, into the tower.

          I doubt that the shell was able to hit the tower. And the "niche" behind the tower is an unambiguous design flaw.
          1. +1
            22 September 2020 04: 15
            Quote: rytik32
            Doubt the shell was able to hit the tower

            Why
            1. +1
              22 September 2020 04: 54
              Pay attention to which way the pieces of wood are broken

              If the explosion was on the turret armor, they would be broken in the opposite direction.
              1. +1
                22 September 2020 05: 03
                Quote: rytik32
                If the explosion was on the armor of the tower

                Where did the shell explode, in your opinion?
                1. +1
                  22 September 2020 05: 20
                  It’s hard to judge.
                  1. +2
                    23 September 2020 01: 03
                    In order to leave a dent in the vertical armor of the tower, as well as furrows from large fragments, the projectile must explode on the armor.
                2. +1
                  22 September 2020 15: 57
                  Re-read Kostenko:
                  Following this, a 12-inch projectile, hitting the vertical armor of the rotating part a little higher than the mamerin, shifted the plate, tore it off all the bolts connecting it to the turret hull, lifted the roof, cleaned off the caps from the roof, broke the frame of the left gun and, distorting the turret on the rollers , jammed her. The tower is completely unusable. All servants are out of action. The gunman, who came into contact with the armor at the moment of the impact of the projectile, instantly died from concussion without visible external damage.

                  I admit that you are right!
                  1. +1
                    23 September 2020 03: 06
                    Quote: rytik32
                    12-inch shell ... cleaned the hoods from the roof

                    I wonder what Kostenko had in mind. The photographs show that the caps remained in place.

                    1. +2
                      23 September 2020 05: 04
                      Quote: Comrade
                      I wonder what Kostenko had in mind.

                      Oh, this Kostenko ...
                      I also doubted how the shock wave could go around the tower and affect the domes.

                      In general, the assessment of the direct impact of Japanese shells on turret artillery should be raised.
                      On the other hand, with the casemates, it should be reduced, taking into account the design features of our deckhouses.
        2. +1
          22 September 2020 13: 34
          We do not know what the maximum thickness of armor could be penetrated by Russian 12 '' shells.


          with K de Marr at 2400, it is calculated that the BBS is not more than 200 mm Krupp with 30 kb (if you're lucky)
          taking into account the influence of the heading angle on the resulting one, then 152-mm penetration at Tsushima for BBS is good luck

          Penetration FS (it is, in fact, a bad PBS) wang no more than 120-152 mm Krupp, depending on the course angle and luck
          1. +2
            22 September 2020 16: 44
            [/ quote] taking into account the influence of the heading angle on the resultant, then 152-mm penetration at Tsushima for BBS is good luck

            Penetration FS (it is in fact a bad PBS) wang no more than 120-152 mm Krupp, depending on the course angle and luck [quote]

            I will assume that for 6 "armor, the armor penetration of the PBBS and BBS is almost equal, ie our FS / common could penetrate it from the 25 kbt area.
            1. +1
              22 September 2020 18: 00
              6 "armor, the armor penetration of PBBS and BBS is almost equal


              why? wouldn't such a FS be very fragile? OU = 8%!
              and his firmness is obviously not very

              in addition, the Baranovsky pipe will prevent him from penetrating the slab, and a weak explosive will not significantly increase the penetrating ability, will it?
              1. +1
                23 September 2020 01: 11
                The quality of armor on Japanese ships raises questions. It didn't seem to shine. Could the British at their factories "for export" select armor plates of the worst quality? I admit this possibility. And then the Japanese did not have so many ships with armor plates dressed according to the Krupp method.
                1. 0
                  23 September 2020 04: 49
                  the Japanese did not have many ships with armor plates made according to the Krupp method


                  we discussed specifically getting into Mikasa

                  It didn't seem to shine.


                  what is the source of the information?
    2. +2
      20 September 2020 11: 59
      The photo shows the conning tower of the battleship "Mikasa", where we obviously do not see a "visor" that caught the fragments and reflected them into the wheelhouse.


      in the photo we see a full roof



      which runs under the bridge structures



      and the thickness of the viewing slots there is completely different

      BUT:
      For an impartial comparison of the number of hits, here it would be necessary to take into account


      number of victims in felling
  20. +3
    20 September 2020 10: 31
    In the second case, a cork measuring approximately 36x41 cm was knocked out in the 229-mm plate of the Pobeda armored belt. In my opinion, the reason was a defect in the armor, since more similar damage was not observed in any of the battles of the Russo-Japanese War.

    Hi Aleksey!
    As always, very interesting!
    In this case, apparently, there was a defect in the fuse
    1. 0
      20 September 2020 12: 03
      Good morning Andrey, why exactly do you think so ?:

      In this case, apparently, there was a defect in the fuse
  21. +1
    20 September 2020 22: 41
    The shell, estimated at 12 ”, between 16:00 and 17:00, pierced the upper deck of the Nakhimov and exploded in the forward turret compartment. The tower was jammed

    Hmm, I somehow did not delve into the design of the Nakhimov barbets, but it seems that the Russian barbet installations did not have a turret compartment? Or was it?
    1. +4
      21 September 2020 15: 24
      Looked at the diagram - you are right!

      What then does the senior artillery officer write about?
      The most significant are the following: in the nasal turret (without armor) compartment; the consequence of this hit was that the bow tower stopped rotating, damage was found, and therefore it was not possible to fix it until the very end of the cruiser's existence

      and in other descriptions:
      Starboard.
      13. In the bow of 12 ". The right anchor was shot down. The bow turret was brought out. Fire. Huge hole.

      At 5 o'clock in the evening, a 12 "shell, as can be seen in the drawing *), jammed the bow 8" turret, knocking it out of action, and the same shell, during its further flight, hit the right anchor pad, dropped the right anchor, which hung on the rope, jammed in the hawse. The same projectile, having pierced the upper deck, penetrated the very bow of the battery deck, setting off a fire in the command latrines there and burning all the tree there. The fire was soon extinguished and prevented from spreading. In addition, in general, the greatest damage was noticed in the bow, which in the battery and living decks was positively riddled with either small shells or fragments of large shells.
      1. +2
        21 September 2020 20: 14
        Thanks for the detailed answer.
  22. +4
    21 September 2020 00: 09
    After reading the comments, I involuntarily wanted to add a few words about the comparison of hits in the conning tower of Russian and Japanese ships. In the photo below, in the center, is the conning tower of the battleship Sisoy the Great. All Russian ships had just such cabin.

    Do you see any embrasures at this cabin? There are none at all! The deckhouse shines through!

    In fact, this is not a room, but a parapet approximately chest-high above which a fungus of the roof is held on several racks. To beat down the one who came up with this design !! It is even impossible to understand what place they thought when "this one" was made a standard wheelhouse in the Russian fleet. In the days of cast-iron cannonballs, such a design may have worked, but a high-explosive projectile hitting this parapet was guaranteed to endure everyone who was hiding behind it. Will not kill so concussion.

    It is not surprising that in almost all the battles of the RYA, from the Varyag to Tsushima, Russian ships faced a loss of control in battle. Alas and ah. Again we see the complete absence of elementary common sense.
    1. +2
      21 September 2020 06: 54
      Again we see a complete lack of elementary common sense


      but it's cheaper :)

      just like with shells - the same story
  23. 0
    21 September 2020 06: 05
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    1.It turns out that the Brink pipe in 12 '' shells worked perfectly when hitting armor with its penetration
    2.Regular non-penetration of even 152-mm armor makes one highly doubt the armor-piercing qualities of the 12 inch shells themselves, that is, in general, their practical applicability

    No, it turns out quite different!
    Almost the entire battle, our squadron fired high-explosive shells, and 12-inch were equipped with smokeless powder with a tube mod. 1894 g.
    And it turns out that all the penetration of armor in 152-178 mm was given by our high-explosive shells, acting as armor-piercing because of their thick walls with a small explosive charge. So they didn't count on such an action at all!
    It’s surprising not that the shells didn’t penetrate the armor, but that they did!
    1. +1
      21 September 2020 06: 29
      It’s surprising not that the shells didn’t penetrate the armor, but that they did!


      Well, actually, if a shell explodes at the right moment when the armor plate passes, then the armor penetration increases, doesn't it?
      1. +1
        21 September 2020 15: 35
        Of all the penetrations, only two cases of rupture far beyond the armor: "Mikasa" 16:15 and "Fuji" in the tower. A flight of several meters behind the pierced armor suggests that these were shells with a Brink tube, i.e. 10 ". In other cases, most likely, there was a gap during the passage of the armor.
        1. +1
          21 September 2020 15: 57
          A flight of several meters behind the pierced armor suggests that these were shells with a Brink tube, i.e. ten".


          or someone nevertheless shot armor-piercing, contrary to the instructions of the ZPR, since
          -something from BBO we want a lot of feats
          -shooting with armor-piercing at medium distance is also more logical than such FS, maybe who thought the same

          there was a gap while passing through the armor.


          I was thinking about a gap during the passage of armor, which adds up to a quarter of the caliber of armor penetration to a good common (in our case it is called FS), but in our particular case
          -spectacular tube too fast
          -VB very weak
          here, as I understand it, there is no need to wait for a significant increase

          in general, this is extremely interesting: the reason for the ineffectiveness of artillery is the bad steel of the FS and their use instead of the BBS
          1. +1
            21 September 2020 16: 49
            Quote: Andrey Shmelev
            -something from BBO we want a lot of feats

            The Japanese almost did not shoot at them, so they could aim well.
            Quote: Andrey Shmelev
            BB very weak

            Wait for the next article - let's compare the size of the holes. To break the 25-mm floor of the casemate 2x1,7 m to hit Mikasa 16:15 - I think it's not bad!
            1. +2
              21 September 2020 23: 57
              Quote: rytik32
              The Japanese almost did not shoot at them, so they could aim well.

              Nebogatov's squad was the only one who trained in long-distance shooting, more than 30 kbl. In Djibouti they had a couple of teachings I think. Nebogatov also discovered the problems with rangefinders and figured out how to deal with it, and if the first shooting was completely failed, then at the second exercises something will already work out. ZPR, however, seems to be limited to the standard three rounds of 5 KBL. Perhaps this is why the hits from the BBO are unusually high.
            2. 0
              22 September 2020 08: 42
              everything would be fine, but for 254/45 with an initial speed of 693 m / s (on the armor penetration diagram you have given, the initial speed of 777 m / s), to overcome 152 mm Krupp, you need a distance of 30 kb, a zero heading angle and a little luck, as I understand it

              is it for sure that the BBO at 16:15 to "Mikas" had a distance of 30 kb and a zero heading angle?
              1. +1
                22 September 2020 08: 46
                I can hardly guess the distance, maybe who owns the data better than me?
                But the angle there is about 45 degrees, judging by the diagram)))
                Does Apraksin have a 777 m / s gun?
                Or is it 12 "armor piercing from Suvorov" with a double shock tube?
                1. +1
                  22 September 2020 08: 55
                  But the angle there is about 45 degrees, judging by the diagram)))
                  Does Apraksin have a 777 m / s gun?


                  tady will master to knock out the plug ... with 20 cables;)
                  which is also very doubtful, given that at such corners the BBS of that time did not work at all
                  well, and that the projectile will crack on impact, I have no doubt
                  1. +1
                    22 September 2020 09: 16
                    Then what was it? A 1911 shell from a 52-caliber cannon?
                    1. +1
                      22 September 2020 09: 17
                      305 BBS: pyroxylin + Brink detected :)
                      1. +1
                        22 September 2020 09: 18
                        Now to clarify who it could be? "Suvorov"?
                      2. 0
                        22 September 2020 09: 20
                        let's look at the diagram at 16:15 together, you are definitely better prepared for Tsushima than me, ready to accept any of your
                      3. +1
                        22 September 2020 09: 31
                        I am now in the Far East (+6 hours from Moscow time), so the working day will end in a few hours. In the evening I will look for Japanese schemes.
                      4. +1
                        22 September 2020 09: 41
                        Вот схема походящая https://radikal.ru/fp/afe2afc1d5a140ccaa5d642e44fe1d16

                        Obviously, the projectile arrived before the turn at 16:15
                      5. 0
                        22 September 2020 10: 01
                        Obviously, the projectile arrived before the turn at 16:15


                        I completely agree, then I don’t see any reasons why Borodino is not an ideal candidate for this hit
                        and the BBO heading angle is generally very sharp.
                      6. 0
                        22 September 2020 16: 54
                        Unfortunately, I only have a working laptop, so there are no graphic editors. But if from "Mikasa" at 16:15 we draw a vector at 45 degrees to the stern, then there will be no one else except "Suvorov".
                      7. 0
                        22 September 2020 16: 56
                        why? Wasn't Mikasa in the shooting zone of Borodino, etc.?
                      8. 0
                        22 September 2020 17: 00
                        Yes, I was in the zone, but the shell came from the stern at an angle of about 45 degrees.
                      9. 0
                        22 September 2020 17: 05
                        the situation is slightly paradoxical, is the trajectory angle correct?
                      10. 0
                        22 September 2020 17: 20
                        See where you hit the side: closer to the stern of the gun

                        and where he punched a hole in the floor: closer to the nose of the gun

                        And the hole is stretched out just along the trajectory
                      11. +1
                        22 September 2020 17: 28
                        hmm) well, if not "Sisoy", then the paradox is just some
                        but BBO I would brush aside right away
                      12. +2
                        23 September 2020 05: 31
                        but the question of a possible marriage of Japanese armor has not yet been considered, for example:

                        "254-mm armor-piercing shell from a great distance pierced the 178-mm armor plate of the main belt in the bow of the left side, slightly ahead of the second round of the mine action network; the dimensions of the triangular hole in the armor were 1,1x1,1x1,2 m. "
                      13. +1
                        23 September 2020 06: 17
                        Yes, the size of the rift is impressive. Given the shape of the fault, this is an unambiguous marriage of the armor.
                      14. 0
                        23 September 2020 07: 23
                        as I understood by Goncharov, the criterion for the quality of the armor is the presence of a break of no more than 1 square meter with an armor thickness of 1/4 caliber and no more than 0,5 square meters with a thickness of 1/2
                        that is, there really is a marriage

                        are there any similar cases in memory?
                      15. +1
                        23 September 2020 08: 38
                        I also took the materials of Arseny Danilov and got this:

                        MARRIAGE ARMOR
                        Mikasa, battle at Shantung July 28 / August 10, 1904
                        On the flagship battleship of the United Fleet in the battle at Shantung, the main armor belt was pierced, between the bow tower and bow casemates, just below the waterline (Fig. 1). Armor - 178 mm, Krupp armor. Distance at the moment of hitting ~ 8 m (000 cables). The projectile is most likely a 43-mm high-explosive shell, fired from a 305/305-mm gun.
                        The head of the projectile was found behind the armor plate, the fragments hit the tank # 2, but the inner bulkhead of the tank remained intact, and this made it possible to avoid serious flooding.

                        OK
                        "Nissin", Battle of Tsushima, May 14/27, 1905
                        "Nissin" got a hole in the main armor belt - 152 mm, krupp. The distance at the time of the hit was, apparently, 3 ... 000 m (3 ... 500 cab). Projectile - 16 mm or 20 mm, fired from a 254/229 mm or 254/45 mm gun.
                        The shell exploded on impact, its head was stuck in the center of the coal pit, and the coal pit itself was flooded.

                        OK
                        "Azuma", Battle of Tsushima, May 14/27, 1905
                        On the armored cruiser Azuma, the 152-mm Krupp armor of the casemate of 152-mm gun No. 7, the aft casemate on the upper deck was pierced. The time of hit, according to the report of the captain of the ship - 14.55, according to the report of the British observer Jackson on board - 14.37. Accordingly, the distance at the time of the hit could be 3 ... 200 m (4 ... 500 cab). Projectile - 17 mm, high-explosive or armor-piercing, fired from a 24/305 mm, 305/40 mm or 305/35 mm gun.

                        OK
                        Mikasa, battle at Shantung, July 28 / August 10, 1904
                        In the same battle, the upper belt, 152 mm, Krupp's armor was pierced on the Mikasa. Since the time of this hit is not fixed exactly, what kind of projectile caused the damage and at what distance can be judged only approximately ... hit from a distance of at least 5 m (500 cab), more likely - 30 ... 7 m (000 ... 8 cab).
                        In addition, it can be seen that the inner side was not pierced, but only bent, the 123rd frame was also bent at the point of impact.


                        ANY QUESTIONS
                        Mikasa, Battle of Tsushima, May 14/27, 1905
                        The upper 152-mm belt made of Krupp armor was pierced by ... a 305-mm shell fired from a 305/40-mm gun from a distance of about 5 m (400 cab).
                        At 14.25:5, when the distance from Mikas to Suvorov was 400 m, a 305-mm projectile hit the upper armored belt, in the stern of the casemate of 152-mm gun No. 1, at 63 frames, at a height of approximately 6'6 " from the design waterline. A conical "plug" was knocked out of the armor belt,

                        OK
                        Mikasa, Battle of Tsushima, May 14/27, 1905
                        In the second part of the battle, the 152-mm upper belt of the Mikasa was again pierced by a Russian 305-mm projectile ... fired from a distance of 4 ... 000 m (5 ... 000 cab).
                        This case was described as follows:
                        At 16.15 a 305-mm projectile pierced the upper belt under the casemate of gun No. 7, just below the middle deck, at the 89th frame. The size of the hole in the armor was approximately 3 '× 1'. The shell exploded upon hitting the bulkhead between the coal pits on frame 88, a 5'6 "× 6'6" hole was formed in the middle deck deck above the explosion site, the center of the hole was approximately 8'9 "from the side and about 9 ' from the place where the shell hit. The longitudinal bulkhead between the lower and middle decks was also pierced. The bottom edge of the hole was 7'4 ”from the design waterline. As in the case of hitting under casemate # 1, waves overwhelmed the hole, but it was timely repaired and significant flooding was avoided.

                        OK
                        "Fuji", Battle of Tsushima, May 14/27, 1905
                        On the battleship "Fuji" the armor of the stern turret was pierced - 152 mm, harvey. The distance at the time of the hit was 4 ... 500 m (5 ... 500 cables). the shell, most likely, was a 25-mm high-explosive, fired from a 30/305-mm gun.

                        If we exclude the mantra "Most likely high-explosive" that he repeats all the time (the respected author does not give an answer to the question about the mechanism of armor penetration of this miracle), then we have only one case of armor marriage that has been precisely recorded

                        and a slightly different look at a number of hits, including at 16:15
                      16. +2
                        23 September 2020 08: 55
                        And more like this:

                        OK
                        Mikasa, battle at Shantung, July 28 / August 10, 1904
                        In the battle at Shantung, the flagship of Togo was hit by a 305-mm high-explosive projectile fired from a 305/40-mm cannon into the 229-mm Krupp armor plate of the aft tower of the main caliber. The distance at the time of impact exceeded 8 m (000 cab).

                        OK or GOOD
                        Mikasa, battle at Shantung, July 28 / August 10, 1904
                        Another hit occurred in the 152-mm Krupp armor of casemate No. 14, the aft casemate of the starboard side on the main deck. The distance at the time of the hit, apparently, exceeded 7 m (000 cab). Projectile ... 38 mm or 305 mm, fired from a 254/305 mm or 40/254 mm gun.

                        OK
                        Mikasa, Battle of Tsushima, May 14/27, 1905
                        In the Tsushima battle, Mikasa also got hit in the 152-mm battery armor without breaking through the armor. The distance at the time of the hit was at least 5 m (700 cab). The projectile is a 31-mm high-explosive, fired from a 305/305-mm gun.
                        At 14.40, when the distance from Mikas to Suvorov was 5 m, a 700-mm projectile hit 305-mm armor under the embrasure of 152-mm gun No. 152. The armor plate cracked at the point of impact, but was not pierced, which is evidently explained by the relatively sharp heading angle of the Mikas, which by that time had far outstripped the head Russian battleships. Shell fragments damaged the telescopic sight of 7-mm gun # 152; the barrel of the 7-mm gun # 47 and the machine of the 3-mm gun # 47, located above the impact site on the boat deck.

                        OK
                        "Nissin", Battle of Tsushima, May 14/27, 1905
                        The ship of the junior flagship of the 1st combat detachment was hit in the armor of the nose turret - 152 mm, Krupp's. Projectile ... 229 mm or 254 mm, fired from a 229/35 mm or 254/45 mm gun, from a distance of at least 6 m (000 cab).

                        OK
                        "Nissin", Battle of Tsushima, May 14/27, 1905
                        Also, Japanese documents mention that a 305-mm projectile hit the 152-mm Nissin belt armor on the port side, but the time of the hit is unknown.

                        Deeds conclusion:
                        if you throw out the word "high-explosive" where it is not necessary, then the Japanese armor showed itself as a whole as it should have shown, therefore abnormal penetrations are possible, but as a rule, one should not count on them
  24. +1
    21 September 2020 06: 13
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    tube arr. 1883 (?)

    This is a land pipe.
    The navy used a tube mod. 1894, it was also called the Baranovsky tube, the image is given by Alexey above.
  25. +2
    21 September 2020 06: 16
    Quote: Jura 27
    So it was, in the Russian 12 "FS (commone) there was a Brink pipe.
    But the wall thickness in the FS was less than in the BBS.

    No, for 2 and 3 TOE 12-dm high-explosive shells were equipped with smokeless powder and a tube mod. 1894 Read the materials of the commission of inquiry.
    1. 0
      21 September 2020 06: 27
      yes, thanks, I figured it out, I was confused all the time by the weight of the explosive at 1,8% with the 3,5% indicated in the same place and I could not correlate this with the English drawing
  26. +1
    21 September 2020 06: 29
    Quote: Saxahorse
    This once again confirms the high detonation resistance of picric acid in the absence of destabilizing impurities. (I want to remind you once again that at the end of 1890 both France, America and Russia were actively working on the search for optimal phlegmatizers for picric acid.

    In 1907, experiments were carried out in Russia to select a new explosive instead of pyroxylin. Shimosa, elephantite (pyroxylin with a density of 1,56) and TNT were compared. For high-explosive shells, we first settled on an elephant, then on TNT. For the armor-piercing equipment, they left the equipment with pyroxylin, since all 3 new explosives detonated when they hit the armor. It was only later that phlegmatized TNT was developed.
    1. +1
      21 September 2020 15: 36
      Andrey, where can you read about them? ;)
      1. +1
        21 September 2020 17: 07
        In my future book
        1. +1
          21 September 2020 17: 10
          Register me in line for a book
  27. +2
    21 September 2020 07: 16
    Quote: rytik32
    Before this "disadvantage" can be taken into account, it must be proved. And from the available data, I cannot conclude that this deficiency manifested itself.

    He showed quite a lot of evidence about the reflection of fragments from the mushroom-shaped roof into the tower.
    However, it is worth noting that before the 2 TOE campaign, one-inch plates were issued to the ships, which during the campaign were attached to the top of the conning tower walls perpendicular to them, so that they had to reflect the fragments of shells exploding on the conning tower walls
    1. +2
      22 September 2020 00: 03
      Quote: Andrey152
      However, it is worth noting that before the 2 TOE march, one-inch plates were issued to the ships, which were attached to the top of the conning tower during the march

      And there were cases when these plates, after the explosion, flew into the wheelhouse along with fragments. It is not so easy to attach them to the armor firmly enough with artisanal methods on a campaign.
  28. +1
    21 September 2020 08: 12
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    Good morning Andrey, why exactly do you think so ?:

    Since in the opposite case there would be a burn on the armor with a small notch and that's it
  29. +1
    21 September 2020 13: 34
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    Well, actually, if a shell explodes at the right moment when the armor plate passes, then the armor penetration increases, doesn't it?

    No, the projectile must, as a whole, pierce the plate, and preferably also the bevel and burst inside the ship to cause maximum damage
    1. 0
      22 September 2020 07: 50
      No, the projectile must, as a whole, pierce the plate


      this is understandable, but there is this:



      and such:




      so we have to state the fact that theoretically

      if the projectile explodes at the right moment when the armor plate passes, then the armor penetration increases


      the only question is how much the Baranovsky tube in combination with gunpowder increased the penetration of the FS, which, I agree with Yura 27, in this configuration are bad PBS
    2. +2
      22 September 2020 08: 07
      the projectile should, as a whole, pierce the plate, and preferably also the bevel and burst inside the ship to cause maximum damage


      it is quite obvious that at a distance of 30 cab Kvalitet 420 with a thickness of 229 mm (the main belt of "Mikas") perfectly protects against BBS from 305/40,



      Please note that this graph is for a zero heading angle, which was not at all under Tsushima, therefore, mentally add at least 10 percent to the effect of the resulting angle

      it is also obvious that "decisive damage" is impossible, since, counting a meter of coal per inch of Quality 420, + bevel we will get complete invulnerability of vital parts even for 152-178 mm of Quality 420

      thus, it made sense to fire the BBS from 305/40 in the hope of hitting only the outer layer of armor no thicker than 152 mm of Quality 420

      but the question of the expediency of shooting FS (which in fact are bad PBS), but still have to break through about three-quarters of the BBS norm, will be answered by the following article by a respected author (I hope)

      Shl. Thanks for helping me figure out the range of 2 TOE shells!
      1. +1
        22 September 2020 16: 56
        Only Mikasa has this 229-mm narrow strip between the masts
        1. +2
          22 September 2020 17: 00
          and 178 mm + coal + bevel = completely invulnerable for BBS, + do not forget the heading angle, which can save even from 152 mm

          here is 102 mm in the stern for the BBS = nice thing, especially since the heading angle partially compensates for the bend of the hull
      2. 0
        23 September 2020 00: 05
        Quote: Andrey Shmelev
        it is quite obvious that at a distance of 30 cab Kvalitet 420 with a thickness of 229 mm (the main belt of "Mikas") perfectly protects against BBS from 305/40,

        Yes, but before the WWI they fired at the Chesme from the same cannons, the same shells. And as they say, 229 mm was not enough even at long distances. Calculations are good, but practice does not always confirm them.
        1. 0
          23 September 2020 00: 14
          Yes, but before the WWI they fired at the Chesme from the same cannons, the same shells.


          the shells were Model 1911, and imitated the speed of 305/52, and their specific load was 32% higher,
          + he has BBN + has questions about the steel of shells arr. 1892
          1. 0
            23 September 2020 00: 19
            Quote: Andrey Shmelev
            the shells were Model 1911, and imitated the speed of 305/52, and their specific load was 32% higher,

            As far as I remember there were three tests. The first day tested the armor and used conventional shells. But the second test is what you said, you tested new elongated shells about. 1911 year. They write that the armor did not pass the first test.
            1. +2
              23 September 2020 01: 02
              https://yadi.sk/i/_pSUG6JbgGDVv
              1. +1
                24 September 2020 00: 10
                Very interesting! I was looking for this book but for the first time I saw it in full. Thank you very much! good
                To my surprise, during the tests, old and new shells were fired in a mixture. Well at least they tried to carefully record it. The result is not so bad, we see that both the old armor-piercing shell and the old 12 "land mine armor of the wheelhouse of 250 mm pierced confidently. It is interesting that the 6" old shell with 25 kbl confidently penetrates 75 mm armor. The Japanese had such gun shields on the side walls of casemates of 50 mm each.

                Well, in general, you can remember that there were such penetrations in the RYA. For example, Mikasa, in addition to penetrating the 178 mm GP, received a destroyed frontal plate of the tower, in the same 250 mm. Well, they broke off the corner of the armor plate for Peresvet, either 178 mm or 229 mm, and Pobeda received a clear penetration with a 12 "shell in the GP, there it has 229 mm.
    3. 0
      22 September 2020 08: 21
      let's take the given graph and compare it with the data 305/40:

      distance 5,490 meters, trajectory angle 4.53, speed 507 m / s, armor penetration 190-200 mm
      we get K de Marra about 2400, which indicates a clear superiority of the quality of armor over the quality of the projectile
      because in addition to Quality 420 then there was only spoiled Quality 420 (in fact), as I understand it
      we conclude that the BBS was not made of the best steel, and therefore its poor quality lowered the bar of expectations for all artillery
      in general, all this FS hobby went from the absence of a normal BBS
  30. 0
    22 September 2020 09: 43
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    distance 5,490 meters, trajectory angle 4.53, speed 507 m / s, armor penetration 190-200 mm

    Did our people shoot armor-piercing shells at such distances at Tsushima? According to the instructions, no more than 20 cab = 3,6 km.
    1. 0
      22 September 2020 10: 12
      1.so I'm just about the reasonableness of the instructions and think
      the same "Eagle" turns out to save the only effective shells (released by 18 per gun) until the decisive moment of the battle at a short distance, which never came
      2. it seems like the above preliminary it turns out that hitting Mikasa at 16:15 can only be associated with 305 BBS (pyroxylin + Brink), released from a distance of much more than 20 cables, that is, with direct violation of this instruction
      3.but the so-called FS, with penetration under the same conditions, exactly no more than 152 mm, are generally more similar to IDB - they are ineffective against armor
      but the question of the expediency of shooting FS (which in fact are bad PBS), but still have to break through about three-quarters of the BBS norm, will be answered by the following article by a respected author (I hope)
    2. 0
      22 September 2020 10: 38
      taking this opportunity, I want to ask you as a connoisseur of that time:

      There is an indication of the SK:
      "The only way out was to sacrifice the qualities of steel and, so that the shells would not break in the gun, to thicken their walls, reducing the explosive charge. On this basis, the Committee designed high-explosive shells with an explosive charge of 7,7% of the total weight of the shell. metal shells required an elastic limit of 3800 atmospheres with an elongation of 20%.
      But even this requirement was beyond the power of our factories, which declared extremely high prices and uncertainty about the possibility of making shells without a big marriage. Therefore, the plans for the projectiles were reworked, with a decrease in the weight of the explosive charge to 3½% and a decrease metal elastic limit up to 2700 atm., with an elongation of 8%... Shells of this kind were prepared for supplying ships, and subsequently entered the 2nd Pacific Squadron. "

      385 N / mm2 at 20% elongation = type 30 steel (non-alloy special)
      273 N / mm2 at a relative elongation of 8% = ??? such a ratio of characteristics is typical of malleable cast iron

      Am I missing something or were the FS cast iron?
      1. 0
        22 September 2020 11: 07
        I am not a metallurgist, but the high-explosive shells were definitely steel by all documents.
        By the way, what is an IBD?
        1. +1
          22 September 2020 11: 27
          but the high-explosive shells were unambiguously steel according to all documents.


          I am not a metallurgist either, but I cannot find steel with the characteristics "273 N / mm2 at a relative elongation of 8%", now I will consult

          but for now the questions:



          Did I understand correctly that armor-piercing is three times more expensive?
          then why?
          (the option of pyroxylin and Brink does not roll, the 254 mm has the same price dependence)
          1. +1
            22 September 2020 17: 04
            [/ quote] Did I understand correctly that armor-piercing is three times more expensive?
            then why? [quote]

            The BBS consisted of expensive chromium-nickel steel, plus an expensive quenching / tempering procedure.
            1. 0
              22 September 2020 17: 26
              The BBS used expensive chromium-nickel steel


              38n2n2m in Moscow 110 thousand rubles
              steel 45 in Moscow - 60 thous.
              theoretically, the price difference can be met, but what to do with DU = 8%?

              and also, I suspect that the BBS was used steel of the type "40x2n3g" (typical Krupp recipe) or something like that, but how exactly can we know for sure?
              To de Marra about 2400 somehow hints, but this is an indirect sign
            2. +1
              22 September 2020 21: 41
              I apologize for the obsession, but here's what I think

              expensive chromium-nickel steel, plus an expensive hardening / tempering procedure


              the respected Stvolar in relation to the Krupp armor writes:
              the average cost of one metric ton of hardened armor produced by the Izhora factories was:
              in 1897-1899 - 271,06 + 340,66 + 437,11 = 1048,83 rubles;
              in 1900-1902 - 184,37 + 245,42 + 441,78 = 871,57 rubles.


              http://alternathistory.com/proizvodstvo-broni-dlya-nuzhd-flota-v-rossijskoj-imperii/

              thus, 360 kg of Krupp armor (casting for turning) cost about 310 rubles (on average)

              I was promised to perfectly grind, grind and drill from 360 kg of castings from about "40x2n2g" with a hardness of 270 MPa 305-mm BBS of that drawing + a threaded base for 100 thousand rubles (there was a condition without CNC), BUT modern machines and Sandwick cutters

              in addition, the expensive hardening / tempering procedure does not make anyone happy at all + you also need a BB and a pipe

              taking into account the technologies of that time, we can cost 535 rubles and not meet

              but in the cost of FS of 167 rubles we fit only with cast iron 30-6 with a hardness of about 160 MPa, but steel 58 with a hardness of 250 MPa and steel 45 with a hardness of 230 MPa is no longer there

              Shl. I will be grateful for a reasoned refutation)
            3. 0
              23 September 2020 16: 19
              sorry, I misinformed you

              since the respected Stvolyar writes:

              http://alternathistory.com/proizvodstvo-broni-dlya-nuzhd-flota-v-rossijskoj-imperii/

              in 1900-1902, the average cost of armor produced (obviously, steel-nickel and chromium-nickel) was 184 rubles 37 kopecks per metric ton
              the average cost of hardening was additionally ... 245 rubles 42 kopecks per metric ton
              The productivity of the armored workshops of the Izhora factories, engaged in cutting and bending the manufactured plates, fitting them according to templates and making the necessary holes in them, was:
              - in 1900-1902 - ... 441 rubles 78 kopecks per metric ton of armor.


              the cost of treated Krupp steel for 12 dm shell will be about 300 rubles, and I put the treatment on top, yes, you are right - we can get out of the cost of 12 dm BBS steel 40x2n2

              but then a different kind of problem arises: "the head is pulled out, the tail is stuck":
              if the cost of casting 40x2n2 for 12 dm FS is no more than 70 rubles,
              what will prevent making a FS out of it for 200 rubles and a penny, just not tempering (processing is much easier), was it really just lazy?
        2. +1
          22 September 2020 12: 25
          By the way, what is an IBD?
          = alas, imitation of violent activity

          look at common industrial steels http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200114294



          look at common industrial alloy steels http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200005485



          look at cast iron http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200011539



          offhand, if there was hardening, then the characteristics of 385 x 20 can be obtained from steel 20G, but 273x8 is almost 100% cast iron

          the grandfather of the professor of metallurgy will organize me, if I say something smart, I will unsubscribe
        3. +1
          22 September 2020 13: 06
          look at high strength steels http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200113779



          choose any for the BBS projectile



          now we look at FS, it gives one option



          check



          and we come to the conclusion that no steel is suitable

          and back to the problem again

          Am I missing something or were the FS cast iron?
          1. +2
            22 September 2020 15: 08
            This is the number! Is cast iron produced in terms of cost and characteristics?
            1. +1
              22 September 2020 15: 21
              Yes sir!
              and also, if we compare the drawings and other images of 12 inch shells, then I personally do not see a significant difference between cast iron and a land mine, well, or I missed something
              1. +1
                22 September 2020 17: 07
                [/ quote] that's right! [quote]

                No, somewhere there is a mistake. Steel (ordinary carbon steel) with an elastic limit of 12 atm was used for the production of 2700 "guns.
                1. 0
                  22 September 2020 17: 13
                  the error can only be in this characteristic:

                  with an elongation of 8%.


                  I thought maybe a typo is necessary

                  when lengthening 18%.
                  ?

                  but 270 x 18 steel is also not matched in any way
                  she is 270 x 23

                  why is there such confidence that
                  steel (ordinary carbon) with an elastic limit of 2700 atm
                  ?

                  I personally consider an error in TWO characteristics to be excluded

                  and, pay attention to the vocabulary:

                  But even this requirement was beyond the strength of our factories, which declared extremely high prices and uncertainty about the possibility of making shells without a big marriage. Therefore, the drawings of the projectiles were reworked, with a decrease in the weight of the explosive charge to 3½% and a decrease in the elastic limit metal up to 2700 atm., with an elongation of 8%.

                  why not write easier - become? :)


                  1. +3
                    22 September 2020 22: 15
                    For information:
                    In 1889, the Land Department's high-explosive shells were made of the best forged steel with an elastic limit of 3800 atm with an elongation of 20%. Experienced high-explosive shells of the Rudnitsky plant were made of steel with similar characteristics, the thickness of their walls was only 0,08 klb, and the explosive charge was 18% of the weight of the shell. The cost of Permian 12-inch high-explosive bombs made of forged steel was 265 rubles, and of cast steel - 100 rubles, however, the elastic limit of such steel was only 2700 atm with an elongation of up to 8%. Such projectiles had walls 0,245 clb thick, and an explosive charge about 3,5 times the weight of the projectile.
                    The British firm Gutfield offered high-explosive shells of cast steel comparable in price, but its characteristics were significantly lower: the elastic limit of 2100 atm with an elongation of 5,7%.

                    For comparison: armor-piercing 12-inch shells made of chromium steel cost about 1886 rubles in 500. per piece, 12-inch shells of ordinary cast iron 71-80 rubles. per piece (wall thickness about 0,2 clb).
                    1. 0
                      22 September 2020 22: 33
                      thank! let's figure it out:

                      armor-piercing 12-inch shells made of chromium steel cost about 1886 rubles in 500. a piece


                      the purchasing power of the ruble has fallen since that time from a third to a half, because, as I wrote to Yura 27 for technological reasons, we will not fit in 535 rubles for a 305 mm BBS, which means that the production of BBS in 1900 from "40x2n2g" or something like that is doubtful , where it is more likely just "steel 58" or "steel 45"

                      12-inch shells of ordinary cast iron 71-80 rubles. per piece (wall thickness about 0,2 clb).


                      on the wall - this roughly corresponds to the FS and ES drawings considered (about 0,245 caliber), the thickening is quite consistent with the new weapon
                      for the price - taking into account the thickening and complication of the shape - beats well

                      from cast steel - 100 rubles, however, the elastic limit of such steel was only 2700 atm with an elongation of up to 8%.


                      cast iron with such characteristics - nowhere to go, cast steel - I can not find yet, maybe someone will help;)

                      Such projectiles had walls 0,245 clb thick, and an explosive charge about 3,5 times the weight of the projectile.


                      I have to repeat:

                      and here
                      https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005079885#?page=192
                      the high-explosive projectile had only 1,8% of the explosive content,
                      for comparison BBS arr. 1907 = 1,6%, BBS arr. 1911 = 2,7%
                      so the obvious source is:
                      "High-explosive projectiles 6 in., 8 in. And 10 in. Calibers were equipped with pyroxylin, having double shock pyroxylin tubes, and 12 in. High-explosive projectiles, due to the unavailability of pyroxylin charges, were equipped with smokeless powder with ordinary shock tubes of the 1894 model." ...
                      needs further clarification,
                      I suggest thinking about this:
                      density of pyroxylin about 1,4
                      against the density of pyroxylin powder from 0,6 (minimum for grained) to 1,6 maximum for pressed
                      everything can coincide, if we assume that inside the 12 inch FS there was a cavity of 3,5% of the weight of pyroskiline, where 1,8% of granulated powder climbed,
                      this can be checked by drawing


                      The cost of Permian 12-inch high-explosive bombs made of forged steel was 265 rubles, and of cast steel - 100 rubles,


                      here the steel grade is not clear + in the UK it costs 157 rubles, which does not fight with either this or that
                    2. +1
                      22 September 2020 22: 43
                      The British firm Gutfield offered high-explosive shells of cast steel comparable in price, but its characteristics were significantly lower: the elastic limit of 2100 atm with an elongation of 5,7%.


                      but this does not happen, IMHO, it's cast iron
                      or, malleable cast iron was then called steel

                      In 1889, the Land Department's high-explosive shells were made of the best forged steel with an elastic limit of 3800 atm with an elongation of 20%. Experienced high-explosive shells of the Rudnitsky plant were made of steel with similar characteristics, the thickness of their walls was only 0,08 klb, and the explosive charge was 18% of the weight of the shell.


                      forging can give up to plus 20% strength compared to casting, I believe
                      1. +1
                        23 September 2020 00: 16
                        Quote: Andrey Shmelev
                        but this does not happen, IMHO, it's cast iron
                        or, malleable iron was then called steel

                        Why are you only looking at strength and tensile strength? After all, metal differs in other characteristics. What I mean is that "steel 45" today and "steel 45" in 1890 are not the same thing. There were no oxygen converters and electric furnaces at that time, and open-hearth furnace and Bessemer converter gave a lot of impurities. For nitrogen, for example.
                      2. +1
                        23 September 2020 00: 23
                        Why are you only looking at strength and tensile strength?


                        the UK did not give other data :(

                        What I mean is that "steel 45" today and "steel 45" in 1890 are not the same thing.


                        that is why any old steel, even Wotan, even Qualitet 420, is translated into modern concepts in chemical composition and modern characteristics are assigned to it as limiting

                        There were no oxygen converters and electric furnaces at that time, and open-hearth furnace and Bessemer converter gave a lot of impurities. For nitrogen, for example.


                        I agree, but it is still difficult to obtain OU = 8% at PT = 270 MPa for steel, even with a correction for hardening, if only to introduce harmful impurities on purpose;) IMHO
                      3. +1
                        23 September 2020 22: 28
                        Quote: Andrey Shmelev
                        that is why any old steel, even Wotan, even Qualitet 420, is translated into modern concepts in chemical composition and modern characteristics are assigned to it as limiting

                        I did not understand this. Or missed something :)

                        Who translates and how? The name "Steel 45" reflects only the percentage of carbon in steel, and what else has accidentally been mixed in there during the production process, this should be looked at locally, at specific factory specifications. The permissible percentage of harmful impurities is even different in general, not to mention the possible details.
                      4. +1
                        23 September 2020 22: 45
                        look at specific factory specifications


                        there are detailed GOST on the steel, below gave examples
                        factory TU is a very framework thing and I would not abuse them,
                        but those maps, rebounds and summary analysis of the protocols they will not give

                        The permissible percentage of harmful impurities is even different in general, not to mention the possible details.


                        the stump is clear, before there were more harmful impurities, because the characteristics of old casting are lower than those of modern steels
                        if there is no detailed information, no one bothers to record Krupp armor of the type
                        40x2n2g or something like that, go into the directories, pick up the closest analogue and replace "at least" with "if you're lucky, it will be so"

                        this is far from an accurate method, but still no better
                        well, except to dive for samples
          2. +1
            27 September 2020 17: 39
            Quote: Andrey Shmelev
            and we come to the conclusion that no steel is suitable


            Dear Andrey, you have raised a very interesting question, but if you want to get answers to it, you need to find the works of Captain Krylov for 1901-1903, and also return to the documents on testing and production of shells in 1892-1893. In these documents, this applies not only to the RIF, but also to other fleets, you can see why, unexpectedly, in all the fleets of the world, "steel ordinary" shells suddenly pressed against armor-piercing shells.
  31. +3
    22 September 2020 22: 16
    Quote: Trapper7
    Are you really suggesting that the five of us fight against 12?


    Do you think that the remaining 9 (including "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Vladimir Monomakh") could not move more than 10 knots?

    Togo had eight armored cruisers in line and only four squadron battleships. Rozhestvensky had to foresee a maneuver for his detachment by turning "all of a sudden" 15 nodal throw in the front line on the "tail" of the enemy wake formation consisting of cruisers in the outset of the battle. The battleships of the "Borodino" type with their turret artillery of the SK have strong fire on the forward course corners. If at the moment of such a throw it was possible to damage the cars or the steering of at least one cruiser, the entire Russian squadron could take part in finishing off the "wounded" who has lost mobility from the pistol distance. Kamimura would most likely break the distance with a lapel "all of a sudden" and escape into the fog from crazy russians for a long time. And Togo, with his four squadron battleships and two cruisers, would have stayed alone for a long time against fourteen Russian armored ships. But Rozhestvensky's vision provided for a passive "ainu column of marches" at enemy fire at a rate of NO23 at 10 knots, and no attempt to intercept the initiative.
  32. +2
    23 September 2020 00: 35
    Quote: Saxahorse
    In general, the old encyclopedia is certainly good, but there are no convincing details. More like a newspaper retelling of rumors.


    Actually, Rdultovsky was quoted, "Historical sketch of the development of tubes and fuses from the beginning of their use until the end of World War 1914-1918"
    http://rufort.info/library/rdultovsky/index.html

    I cannot now give a link to the translation of an article by a Japanese author about shimose, I forgot where I saw it, but
    that Rdultovsky, that a modern Japanese author testify: shimosa is pure picric acid, without any attempts to phlegmatize.

    The most adequate and disruptive were American lone inventors Hudson Maxim and Beverly W. Dunn. American experiments at the turn of the 1906th century with equipping armor-piercing projectiles, respectively, with "maximite" (picric acid + mononitronaphthalene) and "dunnit" (ammonium picrate) passed by both the Russians, the Japanese, and the British specialists in this area, but ended with the adoption of shells with data of explosives (since XNUMX, "dunnit" finally replaced "maximit" as the main explosives of American naval artillery shells and remained so until the end of World War II).

    Russian experiments at the end of the 60th with armor-piercing shells equipped with French "cresilite" (40% picric acid and 1905% trinitrocresol) ended in a successful puff, the explosives were not put into production. These experiments were remembered only towards the end of XNUMX, when "the kidneys had already fallen off."

    By the time of the RYAV, the British did not even have normal head fuses for liddite projectiles (almost 100% incomplete detonations) and won the First World War without a normal blasting explosive in armor-piercing projectiles. The British came to "shellite" (a mixture of 70% picric acid and 30% dinitrophenol) only after the end of the First World War.

    Do not expect a truly scientific approach from the then ammunition science.
    1. 0
      24 September 2020 00: 40
      Quote: AlexanderA
      that Rdultovsky, that a modern Japanese author testify: shimosa is pure picric acid, without any attempts to phlegmatize.

      I looked through the book you offered with interest. However, I want to note that Rdulovsky did not formulate his conclusion so clearly:
      The explosive used to equip the projectiles was called 'shimose', after the Japanese chemist who proposed it. According to the research of prof. AV Sapozhnikov, it was almost pure picric acid. Microscopic examination by Dr. Pulfrich at the Zeiss factory of a sample delivered by the author of this work, all crystals deposited from an alcohol solution on a glass slide had the same shape and shape. Some of the crystals did not transmit ultraviolet light and appeared black in it, while the other part was completely transparent. Apparently, the explosive was an alloy of picric acid isomers that were difficult to separate.

      As you can see the phrase "almost pure" picric acid is present here. And under the microscope, he saw two kinds of crystals. By the way, he uses the expression "picrine preparations" later in the text to describe the equipment of Japanese shells.

      In general, there is no unequivocal confirmation of the absence of additional components in shimose. hi
      1. +1
        24 September 2020 10: 38
        Quote: Saxahorse
        As you can see the phrase "almost pure" picric acid is present here. And under the microscope, he saw crystals of two kinds.


        At the beginning of the XNUMXth century, there were industrial technology for the production of high-purity organic substances? Crystals of a different kind are isomers. There are six isomers according to the position of the substituents - nitro groups: 2,3,4-trinitrophenol, 2,3,5-trinitrophenol, 2,3,6-trinitrophenol, 2,4,5-trinitrophenol, 2,4,6-trinitrophenol, 3,4,5 , 2,4,6-trinitrophenol. There were no industrial technologies for the production of pure XNUMX-trinitrophenol. Do you suppose if the sample contained several percent of another organic substance, a phlegmatizer: beeswax, mononitronaphthalene, trinitrocresol, etc., then Sapozhnikov would not have found it? You have too low an opinion about the professional organic chemists of the early XNUMXth century.
        1. +1
          24 September 2020 22: 23
          Quote: AlexanderA
          Do you suppose if the sample contained several percent of another organic substance, a phlegmatizer: beeswax, mononitronaphthalene, trinitrocresol, etc., then Sapozhnikov would not have found it? You have too low an opinion about the professional organic chemists of the early XNUMXth century.

          I believe that they did not perform spectral analysis and did not have a complete list of elements. And a qualitative chemical analysis works the other way around, they check by brute force the presence of a particular substance in the composition. You remembered organic chemists, but did they accurately test shimose for the presence of aluminum salts?

          I do not insist on the version with aluminum, although it is just mentioned several times, moreover, IMHO, I believe that too dirty reagents have become the main problem of shimosa. But the story of "gunpowder Shimoz" still contains some mystery. It is unlikely that the Japanese adopted explosives into service without comprehensive testing. Even RI, very inclined to rely on chance, tested both melinitis and phlegmatizers to him. The Japanese had to face ruptured barrels during the tests, as well as the RI. However, the shimosa passed the test.
          1. +2
            25 September 2020 13: 21
            Quote: Saxahorse
            I believe that they did not perform spectral analysis and did not have a complete list of elements. A qualitative chemical analysis works the other way around, they check by brute force the presence of one or another substance in the composition. You remembered organic chemists, but did they accurately test shimose for the presence of aluminum salts? I do not insist on the version with aluminum, although it is just mentioned several times


            Look for information on the impact sensitivity of aluminum picrate.

            You read the scan of Koigke Shigeki's article "The Russo-Japanese War and the" Shimose System "in A. Martynov's translation, courtesy of Alexey (rytik32), posted by Alexey (rytikXNUMX)? There is also about the tests, in particular, the only test of an armor-piercing projectile:

            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565564_1.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565544_2.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565563_3.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565489_4.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565522_5.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565546_6.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565564_7.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565584_8.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597776057_9.jpg
            https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2020-08/1597565606_9.jpg

            How many other good sources do you need to agree that shimose was picric acid (with traces of industrial impurities) without the addition of any other active / phlegmatizing ingredient?
            1. +1
              25 September 2020 14: 29
              Most importantly, there is not a single "normal" source confirming the presence of aluminum and / or phlegmatizers in shimose.
              1. 0
                25 September 2020 22: 50
                Worse yet, everywhere they write about "picric acid with impurities", but they are embarrassed to indicate with which ones.
                1. +1
                  28 September 2020 18: 42
                  Why then? In that article, these impurities are fully spelled out in the norms: ash, sulfuric acid ...
                  And now a little about A.V. Sapozhnikov, who researched shimosa. I read a little about him. He was one of our largest explosives experts at the time.
                  And so his work was found http://gpntb.dlibrary.org/ru/nodes/2311-sapozhnikov-a-issledovanie-piroksilina-i-piroksilinovyh-bezdymnyh-porohov-spb-1899#mode/inspect/page/1/ zoom / 4
                  So there is no need to doubt his competence.
                  Here I found another example of how BB was studied then:
                  Soon after my invitation to the commission, I was assigned to investigate a new explosive that Gelfreich obtained from naphthalene. The commission could not decide whether it would be worthwhile to experiment with the equipment of shells with the substance proposed by Gelfreich, which he called "eckerdite" in memory of his visit to an explosives factory in France at Eskerd. I carried out a complete analysis of the substance in my laboratory and found that it is a mixture of various nitro compounds of naphthalene, and it is dominated by dinitro compounds, which I was able to separate into isomers by skillful selection of solvents. There was very little trinitronaphthalene in this explosive. This study showed that due to insufficient nitration of naphthalene, the product obtained from it will not develop sufficient explosive force and therefore is not of interest for testing in projectiles.

                  https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=590212&p=49
                  1. +1
                    28 September 2020 21: 59
                    Quote: rytik32
                    So there is no need to doubt his competence.

                    There is no doubt about the competence of Sapozhnikov, but he is a nitrite specialist. And he probably did his research in the same context, especially since the creation of phlegmatizers based on nitrites of organic substances like naphthalene, creosol, etc. was the mainstream at the time. He saw some kind of impurities, but did not deserve attention. The ones mentioned in the Japanese article refer to reagents and not shimose as the final product.

                    I don't like the version with pure picric acid because it raises questions as much as it explains. I repeat that in France and Russia, pure picric acid as an explosive did not pass the test. Remember Captain Maksimov who died while testing a mortar shell? Mortars Karl! Mortars have initial speeds 5-8 times lower than those of naval guns, but it detonated.

                    Why didn't the Japanese see these problems? Or did they see it but deliberately went on an adventure !? And the scale of the adventure is impressive, out of the four Japanese battleships at Tsushima with whole towers, one Asahi remained turns out? I find it hard to believe that they deliberately took such a risk.
                    1. 0
                      28 September 2020 22: 45
                      Based on the article, it turns out that the Japanese deliberately took the risk, tk. they had no other technology. They did not even dream of a projectile that could pierce the armor and explode behind it.
                      1. 0
                        28 September 2020 23: 37
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Based on the article, it turns out that the Japanese deliberately took risks, because they had no other technology.

                        They had black powder shells, like the British. And there was an option to equip the shells with smokeless powder, as the Russians did. They saw the epic with melinite in France and had to realize that they were at risk of being left without guns.
            2. 0
              25 September 2020 23: 04
              Quote: AlexanderA
              How many more good sources are needed to agree that shimose was picric acid (with traces of industrial impurities) without adding

              Of course, I read Koigke Shigeki's article with interest, since I had read it before. :)

              From the curious points, it can be pointed out that melinite was adopted by France only after the addition of a phlegmatizer. The second curious moment is that Shimose Masachika received a sample from Turpen exactly the second, already with a phlegmatizer. The third curious moment, the journalist at the very beginning points out that the "Imitation theory" cannot be called sufficiently grounded .. (c)

              Yes, in the text of the article, journalist Koigke Shigeki expounds the version that Masachika Shimose deliberately refused to use phlegmatizers in order to increase power. However, he also points to the possibly considerable tension of these assumptions.

              The article is curious, but it is not based on any special Japanese documents, but is a continuation of some old Japanese polemics about the same mysterious shimosa. laughing

              There is no evidence for the purity of shimose as trinitrophenol in this article. And I will remind you that the main mystery of shimosa IMHO is that it passed the shooting tests .. But neither in France nor in Russia, pure picric acid has definitely not passed such tests.
  33. +2
    23 September 2020 01: 20
    Quote: Andrey152
    And it turns out that all the penetration of armor in 152-178 mm was given by our high-explosive shells, acting as armor-piercing because of their thick walls with a small explosive charge.


    And it turns out that justifying the low weight of the explosive charge by the poor quality of the projectile steel is just an excuse. It is banal that they continued to fire shells according to drawings from the early 1890s, while the quality of shell steel by the end of the decade, the first years of the XNUMXth century, had increased significantly.

    At the same time - correct me, the warhead of these high-explosive shells that pierced the 6-7 "armor of Japanese ships was not even tempered to acquire high hardness, as the warhead of armor-piercing shells was tempered.
  34. +1
    23 September 2020 01: 31
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    -VB very weak


    Western comrades estimate the TNT equivalent of smokeless pyroxylin powder at about - 0,5. Black powder - 0,33-0,5.

    http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/Gun_Data_p2.php

    Bursting Charge Power - The following approximations of explosive power may be used using TNT = 1.00 as a reference point.
    Before and during World War II
    Black powder = 0.33 to 0.50
    Guncotton = 0.50
    Picric Acid = about 1.05 to 1.10
    USA Explosive D = 0.95

    The filling factor of the explosive was certainly too small for a projectile that was considered high-explosive and was equipped with an ordinary fuse. The experts understood that he was small. It's just that the imperial bureaucracy was in no hurry to launch production of high-explosive shells with a large explosive filling ratio.
    1. +1
      23 September 2020 16: 10
      Western comrades estimate the TNT equivalent of smokeless pyroxylin powder at about - 0,5. Black powder - 0,33-0,5. http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/Gun_Data_p2.php


      it depends on the grain and the density of pressing, I think we are talking about extremely pressed
      and in the shells it was most likely grained, which, like explosives, is much worse, as I understand it
      1. +2
        23 September 2020 17: 31
        No, in the shells the gunpowder was definitely not grains. Most likely noodles.
        1. 0
          23 September 2020 19: 11
          No, in the shells the gunpowder was definitely not grains. Most likely noodles.


          in the materials of the UK, "gunpowder" and gunpowder for loading guns are clearly separated, while it is clearly indicated:
          "Shotgun smokeless powder 212 poods 22 pounds could be used exclusively for equipping shells."
          I have not seen cartridge 7,62 produced around 1900, I have not found the exact characteristics of gunpowder in manuals and manuals on the three-line

          but during the Second World War they look like this:



          1) Blunt bullet mod. 1891
          2) a cartridge with a light bullet L
          3) a cartridge with a heavy (long-range) bullet D
          4) cartridge with armor-piercing bullet B-30
          5) a cartridge with an armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32
          6) a cartridge with a tracer bullet T-30
          7) a cartridge with an armor-piercing incendiary-tracer bullet BZT
          8) a cartridge with an incendiary armor-piercing bullet ZB-46
          9) cartridge with a sighting-incendiary bullet PZ
          10) cartridge with B-32m armor-piercing incendiary bullet
          11) cartridge with sniper bullet Sn 7n1
          12) cartridge with a light bullet LPS with a steel core


          Shl. and why noodles in a shell?
        2. +2
          23 September 2020 21: 07
          The gunpowder was a smokeless rifle, which means plate.

          "Rifle pyroxylin smokeless powder, designated by brand B and adopted for a 3-line rifle of the 1891 model, in the form of rectangular plates 1,7-1,8 mm long, 1,2-1,7 mm wide and 0,36-thick 0,38 mm with a charge of 2,40 g was supposed to impart a bullet (blunt-headed) weighing 13,75 g with an initial velocity of 615 ± 5 m / s with an average pressure of powder gases of 2500 atm. After pressing and drying, this powder was not subjected to any additional treatments and had a yellow color, characteristic of pyroxylin powder. In 1908, a new variety of rifle pyroxylin smokeless powder was developed in Russia, designated by the brand VL. "

          Bulk density think ~ 0,75 g / cm3

          For example, here are the charges for 10 "steel armor-piercing and high-explosive shells of the War Department:

          http://ava.telenet.dn.ua/history/10in_coast_gun/desc_1905/gl_03.html
          "Prior to the development of the equipment of steel armor-piercing bombs with pyroxylin, it is allowed, according to the journal of the Commission of 1904 No. 316 on the use of explosives to equip projectiles, to equip armor-piercing bombs with smokeless gunpowder when the bottom screws of these bombs are supplied with the bottom tube of the drawing of the order for artillery of 1896 No. 209

          [...]

          THE MAJOR NUMERICAL DATA RELATING TO THE STEEL ARMOR-PROTECTION BOMB.
          Pyroxylin Burst Charge Weight 7,5 lb.
          Brass Case Weight 2,1 lb.
          Smokeless Powder Bursting Charge Weight 5 lb.

          [...]

          Instead of pyroxylin, the bomb can be filled with smokeless gunpowder and a bottom shock tube of the 1896 model.
          THE MAJOR NUMERICAL DATA RELATING TO THE STEEL BOMB.

          [...]

          Smokeless powder bursting charge weight 9 lbs. PLN 51
          The weight of a pyroxylin charge with a case is about 20 lb.
          1. +1
            23 September 2020 21: 33
            http://ava.telenet.dn.ua/history/10in_coast_gun/desc_1905/gl_03.html


            Cool! Thank you

            Bulk density think ~ 0,75 g / cm3


            which exactly agrees with my assumption of replacing 3,5% of the weight of pyroxylin with 1,8% of the weight of gunpowder in 305 mm shells without changing the drawing

            but further interesting:

            Cast iron FS:
            To equip the bomb, 3 parts by weight of coarse-grained and 1 part of new-gun powder, polished with graphite, are used. The weight of an unloaded bomb is about 526 lbs. Bursting charge weight approx. 31,4 fnl. Shock tube weight arr. 1884 0,6 fn. The weight of the loaded bomb is about 558 lbs.

            Steel FS:
            Instead of pyroxylin, the bomb can be loaded with smokeless gunpowder and a bottom shock tube of the 1896 model. The weight of an unloaded bomb without tube and sleeve is about 525 lbs. Bursting charge smokeless powder weight 9 lb. PLN 51 The weight of a pyroxylin charge with a case is about 20 lbs. Fuze Weight 3,75 lbs. Shock tube weight gen. Brinka 2 fn. PLN 22 The weight of the bottom shock tube sample 1896 66 gold. The weight of the bomb loaded with pyroxylin is about 549 lbs. The weight of a bomb filled with smokeless powder is about 535 lbs.

            BBS steel:
            Prior to the development of the equipment of steel armor-piercing bombs with pyroxylin, it is allowed, according to the journal of the Commission of 1904 No. 316 on the use of explosives to equip projectiles, to equip armor-piercing bombs with smokeless gunpowder when supplying the bottom screws of these bombs with the bottom tube of the drawing of the order for artillery of 1896 No. 209 ...
            The weight of an unloaded bomb without a tube is about 538 lbs. Bursting charge weight of pyroxylin 7,5 lbs.
            Weight of brass case 2,1 lbs. Weight of the bottom shock tube gen. Brinka 2 fn. PLN 22 Fuze Weight 3,75 lbs. The weight of a bomb loaded with pyroxylin is about 550 lbs. Bursting charge weight of smokeless powder 5 lbs. The weight of the bottom shock tube arr. 1896 PLN 66 The weight of a bomb filled with smokeless powder is about 544 lbs.

            Steel BNBS:
            According to the magazine of the Artillery Committee of 1903, No. 402, armor-piercing bombs with a tip were manufactured (sheet XXXV, fig. 4). The armor-piercing ability of tipped bombs increases by an average of 12% against a bomb without a tipping point. (*) An armor-piercing bomb with a tip differs from an armor-piercing bomb without a tip mainly in the tip, which is attached to the ogival part and is held on the latter by means of a screw thread

            It turns out that the cast iron FS contains 31,3 pounds of gunpowder, and the steel FS contains only 9 pounds 51 spools + 3,75 pounds of fuse weight. That is, the quality of the cast iron FS is higher than the "steel" FS?
  35. +2
    23 September 2020 01: 55
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    Am I missing something or were the FS cast iron?


    Most likely, the "only way out" was voiced to justify the fact that in the early 1900s the production of "high-explosive" shells was continued according to the drawings from the early 1890s. In fact, according to the fact of penetrations, the real quality of steel was clearly significantly higher than the declared 2700 atm with an elongation of 8%.

    But the quality of the armor plates, which the British industry "sold" together with the ships to the Japanese, raises questions. It is quite possible that the "Asians" were banally fused with a manufacturing defect previously rejected during the acceptance of products for the Royal Navy.
    1. +1
      23 September 2020 16: 05
      It is quite possible that the "Asians" were banally fused with a manufacturing defect previously rejected during the acceptance of products for the Royal Navy.


      1.I think private companies are sensitive to customers
      2.Does the layout of the Japanese slabs match those of the previously built British? I'm not really sure

      in fact, according to the fact of penetrations, the real quality of steel was clearly significantly higher than the declared 2700 atm with an elongation of 8%.


      "- It cannot be. You were deceived. You were given much better fur. These are Shanghai leopards. Well, yes! I recognize them by their shade. You see how the fur plays in the sun. Emerald! Emerald!" (from)

      sounds completely implausible
  36. 0
    23 September 2020 01: 57
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    Did I understand correctly that armor-piercing is three times more expensive?
    then why?


    Because they were confusedly hardened the head part to high hardness.
    1. +1
      23 September 2020 16: 03
      dear Stvolyar writes:

      http://alternathistory.com/proizvodstvo-broni-dlya-nuzhd-flota-v-rossijskoj-imperii/

      in 1900-1902, the average cost of armor produced (obviously, steel-nickel and chromium-nickel) was 184 rubles 37 kopecks per metric ton
      the average cost of hardening was additionally ... 245 rubles 42 kopecks per metric ton
      The productivity of the armored workshops of the Izhora factories, engaged in cutting and bending the manufactured plates, fitting them according to templates and making the necessary holes in them, was:
      - in 1900-1902 - ... 441 rubles 78 kopecks per metric ton of armor.

      extrapolating this projectile data, we find that the cost of hardening is no more than a third of the cost of the hull
  37. +1
    23 September 2020 06: 09
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    why? wouldn't such a FS be very fragile? OU = 8%!
    and his firmness is obviously not very

    in addition, the Baranovsky pipe will prevent him from penetrating the slab, and a weak explosive will not significantly increase the penetrating ability, will it?

    But what about the penetration of 152-178 mm Japanese armor then? Then they shot our high-explosive shells
    1. +1
      23 September 2020 14: 46
      Then they shot our high-explosive shells


      I agree that there is an indication of the ZPR and confirmation of its implementation "Eagle"

      But what about the penetration of 152-178 mm Japanese armor then?


      somehow the mechanical properties of metal FS with the concept of armor penetration are difficult for me to combine,
      but if you count these hits as BBS, then it will coincide almost perfectly (except for one in FM)
      and this "almost perfect" confuses me a lot
  38. +2
    23 September 2020 06: 18
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    this does not happen, IMHO, it's cast iron
    or, malleable iron was then called steel

    Then it would be logical to look not the modern reference books of the metallurgist, but the end of the 1890s. In those days, technology was much worse, but it developed rapidly. So, in 1889, with the introduction of high-explosive shells, the cost of khoposhi steel for them was so high and so few people could do it that they had to thicken the walls of the shells and leave cast iron shells in the ammunition load. After 10 years, the cost of such steel dropped significantly, so MTK decided to abandon cast-iron shells in favor of high-explosive shells.
    1. +2
      23 September 2020 14: 20
      MTK decided to abandon cast-iron shells in favor of high-explosive shells.


      but the wall thickness of 0,245 caliber and 270 MPa x 8% remained like cast iron;)

      not modern reference books of a metallurgist, but the late 1890s


      looking for )
      there is an option that was voiced by the respected Saxahorse: harmful impurities were stuffed into the steel without measure
      (sulfur, phosphorus, nitrogen) is also an option, but I don't believe in such a big impact
  39. +1
    23 September 2020 06: 24
    Quote: AlexanderA
    At the same time - correct me, the head part of these high-explosive shells that pierced 6-7 "armor of Japanese ships was not even hardened to acquire high hardness, as the head part of armor-piercing shells was hardened.


    Until 1894, our high-explosive projectiles had a head tube, and later the head of the projectile began to be made solid. But they began to heat her up only after RYAV.
  40. +1
    23 September 2020 13: 19
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    what is the source of the information?


    The nature of the combat damage of the Mikasa slabs. When hitting 6 "armor plate at an angle of ~ 45 degrees, apparently an armor-piercing 12" shell NOT exploding in the process of breaking through the plate breaks out a piece of 0,9 mx 0,3 m in it, and when hit from a distance of ~ 8000 m into 7 "armor plate, apparently A high-explosive 12 "projectile knocks out a cone-shaped plug in it with an inner diameter of a cone of 0,85 m, an outer diameter of 0,35 m, penetrating with its head part behind the armor, I don't know about you, I believe that the armor plates showed fragility, which is anomalous for Krupp armor.

    A high-quality armor plate made by the Krupp method with a plate thickness of more than half the caliber of the projectile should not penetrate even with a normal high-explosive projectile in any case, especially since it should not be penetrated from a long distance by a projectile with such a weak explosive charge, which was the Russian 12 "high-explosive projectile of that time.
    1. +2
      23 September 2020 14: 10
      I am not yet ready to accept Arseniy Danilov's statement that all the shells 10-12 inches that hit the Japanese were exactly FS,

      therefore
      showed anomalous fragility for Krupp armor.


      I think, once in the whole war, above in the comments I analyzed all the serious hits in the Japanese for both battles, in all other cases the armor showed itself normally, as I understand it
      (if Arseny Danilov is right, then yes, Japanese armor is not impressive)
      1. +1
        23 September 2020 14: 58
        Quote: Andrey Shmelev
        I am not yet ready to accept Arseny Danilov's statement that all the shells 10-12 inches hit by the Japanese were exactly FS


        I am also not ready to accept this statement of Arseny Danilov. The 12th "projectile that pierced the 6th" belt armor of Mikasa at Tsushima and exploded 3 meters behind the armor plate was most likely armor-piercing, with a Brink tube. But this assumption will forever remain unconfirmed. The main thing in this episode is that simply by hitting the body, the shell broke a piece of armor plate 0,9 mx 0,3 m. There is a fragile destruction of the armor plate.

        I believe once in the whole war


        Knocking out from 8000 m from 7 "armor plate by explosion when passing a conical plug with an inner diameter of 0,85 m - the second time.

        What else? Shattered main battery turret armor plate:


        Isn't there too much brittle destruction for proper quality armor plates?
        1. +2
          23 September 2020 19: 30
          There are two options:
          1.Almost all FS hits, then the armor is bad at all
          2.Almost all hits of BBS, then the armor is decent

          Arsenei Danilov equates the armor penetration of the Russian BBS and FS (as I understood him),
          what can I say (sigh heavily)
          I went to write an article on the theoretical comparison of armor penetration of Russian BBS and FS,
          since the topic drags on for a whole cycle, I hope they will publish

          Shl. whether my theories will be confirmed in the course of writing, I do not know yet
          1. 0
            7 October 2020 22: 07
            When to expect an article? I will read it with pleasure ...
  41. +2
    23 September 2020 16: 27
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    1.I think private companies are sensitive to customers


    https://humus.livejournal.com/2400436.html
    "A batch of armor plates manufactured by the French plant Creusot was also rejected, but only four of the 12 batches of hull armor were rejected, and two of the four batches for the towers manufactured by the Saint-Chamond factory were two: they did not pass the firing tests."

    It remains to find out whether the Japanese tested and rejected the batches of armor plates by shooting, or took the British masters at their word.
    sounds completely implausible


    Do you think the quality of shell steel at domestic factories has not changed in any way from the early 1890s to the early 1900s?
    1. +1
      23 September 2020 19: 16
      https://humus.livejournal.com/2400436.html


      thanks, very interesting, convinces

      Do you think the quality of shell steel at domestic factories has not changed in any way from the early 1890s to the early 1900s?


      in 1889 it was better, I think :)
  42. +2
    23 September 2020 16: 48
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    extrapolating this projectile data, we find that the cost of hardening is no more than a third of the cost of the hull


    It is you, taking into account the fact that the weight of the shell castings was approximately 2,5 times the weight of the finished product, you counted?

    The armor-piercing shells were not made of chromium-nickel, but of pure chrome steel, which lent itself well to the carburizing process and gave greater hardness after quenching. The heat treatment process for armor-piercing projectiles was clearly more complicated than for armor plates, it was carried out in several stages so that individual parts of the body of the future projectile acquired different hardness and strength with a very hard head part and relatively elastic walls.
    1. +1
      23 September 2020 17: 34
      Knowing the story about the cheapening of landmines, I strongly doubt that they bother so much with armor-piercing shells.
    2. +1
      23 September 2020 19: 24
      the weight of the shells' castings was approximately 2,5 times the weight of the finished product.


      armor was 184 per metric ton / 3 = 61
      hardening 245 rubles per metric ton / 3,3 = 75
      lining 441 rubles per metric ton / 3,3 = 134
      total: 270 rubles
      75/270 = 28%

      but we have a different sequence of operations and a different composition
      for 70 rubles of commercials (taking into account large allowances)
      the lining is MUCH larger, but it is simpler, since the steel is unhardened,
      but more precisely, since the quality is higher
      hardening remains the same for 75 rubles
  43. +2
    23 September 2020 17: 43
    I read this article and the previous ones with interest. It's just class! Thanks to the author. The material is solid, the comments are interesting. Even the polemic in relation to the squadron commander (which is always present in the articles about Tsushima) did not spoil the impression of what I read ... The comments are tactful and interesting, I will even say more, not comments, but sound reasoning of people versed in this matter trying to find the truth. According to the author's answers, it is clear that he is aware of this topic and prepared impeccably. With such baggage, you can safely defend your thesis. There are several questions, but these are in the final article. I'm waiting, like everyone else, to continue hi
  44. +2
    23 September 2020 20: 31
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    thanks, very interesting, convinces


    There was, of course, a specific story. The contract for the "Tsesarevich" included armor according to the Krupp method, which the French did not know how to produce at that time. Well, not wanting to buy the actual armor from Krupp, they bought the technology ... and started chasing the marriage. There are always technological nuances, the understanding of which only comes with experience. The story is described in the book by V.I. Kolchak "History of the Obukhov Steel Plant in Connection with the Progress of Artillery Technology" published in 1903 on pages 327-331 with reference to an article in March 1902 in the German journal "Stahl und Eisen".

    in 1889 it was better, I think :)


    I specially looked through the book by V.I. Kolchak to understand what was there with the domestic shell steel at that time. Unfortunately, then the Obukhov plant mass-produced shells of small and medium (up to 6 ") caliber. 12" and 10 "armor-piercing shells except for the Paris exhibition. So yes, even in the late 1880s at the Obukhov plant, shell steel was much better than" lowering the elastic limit of the metal to 2700 atm., with an elongation of 8%. "Yes, and the Tsushima high-explosive shells were clearly not of this kind of steel. They would have been of this kind, they would not have pierced any armor at all.
    1. +2
      23 September 2020 21: 47
      And the Tsushima high-explosive shells were clearly not of that kind of steel. If they were like that, they wouldn't have pierced any armor at all.


      It's not just that I doubted the Naval Manual's information about the penetration by land mines - I'm already going to write an article)
      1. +1
        24 September 2020 17: 13
        I will support your initiative! I am ready to provide all possible help.
    2. +1
      24 September 2020 16: 26
      according to the report of the Managing Director of the Marine Ministry of the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding and Supply in the Department of Structures of February 20, 1904, it was supposed to order:
      The Main Directorate would consider:
      a) give the order now:
      Obukhovsky plant:
      12 dm. armor-piercing ..... 500
      10 dm. "..... -
      8 dm. "..... 270
      6 dm. "..... 2500
      120 mm. "..... 2700
      75 mm. "..... 20000
      Putilovsky plant:
      10 dm. armor-piercing ..... 100 ***)
      6 dm. "..... 2000 ****)
      75 mm. "..... 10000 *****)
  45. +1
    24 September 2020 06: 18
    Quote: AlexanderA
    THE MAJOR NUMERICAL DATA RELATING TO THE STEEL ARMOR-PROTECTION BOMB.
    Pyroxylin Burst Charge Weight 7,5 lb.
    Brass Case Weight 2,1 lb.
    Smokeless Powder Bursting Charge Weight 5 lb.

    As far as I remember, the weight of 10-in. Land and sea shells was adopted the same. Were the drawings the same or different? Cavities in shells? Number of explosives?
    1. +2
      24 September 2020 11: 42
      The weight was taken the same, but the drawings of the shells of the Military and Naval departments seem to be different.

      The 10-inch high-explosive projectile of the Naval Department had a "bursting charge weight with a cover without metal tube parts" 19,81 pounds (3,6% of the total weight of the projectile). The actual explosive weight is 16,39 pounds (2,9% of the total weight of the projectile).


      In general, the logic of "temporary acceptance" of "high-explosive" shells with such a small explosive charge and a Brink tube was of course impressive:

      "... Admiral Chikhachev ordered to attend to the cheapening of shells and decided to order the required high quality shells exclusively from state-owned factories. Until private ones lower prices.
      The only way out was to sacrifice the qualities of steel and, so that the shells would not break in the gun, to thicken their walls, reducing the explosive charge. On this basis, the Committee designed high-explosive projectiles with an explosive charge of 7,7% of the total weight of the projectile, while the metal of the projectiles required an elastic limit of 3800 atmospheres with an elongation of 20%.
      But even this requirement turned out to be beyond the strength of our factories, which declared extremely high prices and uncertainty about the possibility of making shells without a big marriage. Therefore, the drawings of the projectiles were again revised, with a decrease in the weight of the explosive charge to 3½% and a decrease in the elastic limit of the metal to 2700 atm., With an elongation of 8%. Shells of this kind were prepared for the supply of ships, later arriving at the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Ocean.
      In its 1894 journal No. 86, with the introduction of such projectiles, the Committee reported to the Governing Ministry that it considered it possible to approve these drawings only temporarily, that such projectiles would certainly be worse in high-explosive action than those previously designed, although they would be better than cast iron can be equipped not with simple gunpowder, but with pyroxylin.
      In the absence of a strong blasting action and, consequently, the ability to deploy a hole in the side, there was no reason to assign a particularly sensitive tube to these projectiles, and they were equipped with double shock tubes that ensure the burst of the projectile after passing the light side to inflict damage by fragments inside the ship.
      Then, believing that the first urgent need of the fleet for high-explosive shells, to replace the old cast-iron shells, can be considered to a certain extent satisfied, in 1896 it was planned, according to the head of the Ministry, Adjutant General Chikhachev, to carry out extensive experiments in the presence of admirals, flagships and other representatives of the fleet, over all kinds of shells accepted in our country, including high-explosive ones, to determine their destructive action and clarify the question: is it possible to reduce the variety of types of shells, and before that - to conduct preliminary experiments of this kind on the Okhtensky field.
      The program of preliminary experiments was presented by the journal of the Artillery Committee on March 4, 1897, No. 24, to the Managing Director of the Naval Ministry, Vice-Admiral Tyrtov, who issued a resolution: “I agree, but in accordance with the funds available for this. Report to the Main Directorate. "


      High-explosive projectiles designed in the early 1890s based on 7,7% of the weight of the explosive charge did not go into production only because the factories "declared extremely high prices and uncertainty about the possibility of making projectiles without a large scrap." Due to these prices and the "uncertainty" of the factories, the plans for the shells were redesigned, and the tube was changed from a normal action tube to a delayed one. With this approach, perhaps the then Spaniards at sea to win.
      1. 0
        5 November 2020 10: 58
        I suspect it wasn't just steel. The high-explosive 12 "projectile was still equipped with gunpowder. That is, they also saved pyroxylin. And all the same, by the beginning of the RYAW war, up to a quarter of the ammunition load were cast iron shells with gunpowder.
        Morved simply did not have tubes of "normal" action for projectiles loaded with pyroxliline. The old tubes of pyroxylin, if they would blow up, then with an incomplete rupture. In general, armor-piercing and high-explosive pyroxylin shells had the same fuse. They also saved on this. And there were reasons for this. Even by the 1st MV, there was no large production of fuses in Russia. How much deceleration there was in the Brink fuse is a separate question.
  46. +3
    24 September 2020 06: 29
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    The weight of the bomb loaded with pyroxylin is approximately 550 lb. Smokeless Powder Bursting Charge Weight 5 lb. The weight of the bottom shock tube arr. 1896 PLN 66 The weight of the bomb equipped with a smokeless powder is approximately 544 lb.

    Interestingly, the bomb has a nominal weight of 550 pounds when loaded with pyroxylin. But when equipped with smokeless powder, its weight is reduced to 544 pounds. It is logical, but not clear: did they shoot using the same shooting table or was it different for a different weight?
    A similar question arises for our 12-inch high-explosive shells. They obviously, when equipped with gunpowder, should have had a weight less than the standard, but I have not seen any mention of this anywhere. Again, what kind of shooter tables did you use?
    Somewhere I saw mentions that our sailors had complaints about the accuracy of the firing tables in the RYA. Maybe the problem was due to the non-standard weight of the shells?
    1. +3
      24 September 2020 11: 58
      With different equipment, a different firing table was clearly required. Let me remind you that, unlike the Naval Department, the Military Department, before the start of the Russian-Japanese war, did not have a steel high-explosive 10-inch projectile at all, only a cast iron one, which could not be fired with a full charge. And the 10-inch steel armor-piercing projectile (as well as the 6-inch steel armor-piercing shell of Kane's coastal cannon) had no explosive charge, inert equipment was placed in the cavity.
      1. +1
        24 September 2020 21: 05
        Different equipment clearly required a different firing table.


        Why?

        for the accuracy of measuring the distance and heading angle of that time - 10 fn does not significantly affect accuracy

        against the background of the then accuracy of sights and mechanization of aiming - too

        against the background of the influence of the barrel temperature and the charge temperature, which, as I understand it, then no one took into account, IMHO, 10 fn is also not the main problem

        and further. projectile length errors gave plus or minus 1 kg (0,2 in), outer wall errors minus 1 kg,
        with such errors, I wang that the errors of the shape gave at least plus or minus 2 kg (plus the errors of aerodynamics), and the errors of the inner walls were plus or minus 1 kg

        in general, I am not at all sure that 10 lb was considered critical against the background of these errors
  47. +2
    24 September 2020 12: 27
    Quote: AlexanderA
    The 10-inch high-explosive projectile of the Naval Department had a "bursting charge weight with a cover without metal tube parts" 19,81 pounds (3,6% of the total weight of the projectile). The actual explosive weight is 16,39 pounds (2,9% of the total weight of the projectile).

    And this is from what source the tablet?
    From the commission's report?

    By the way, in vain you are erring about the decision of the ITC to accept shells with thick walls. I read documents from those years, the problem was serious. And the cost of high-explosive shells was originally similar to the cost of armor-piercing shells. Another question is that metallurgy did not stand still, and MTK was frozen ...
    1. +1
      24 September 2020 20: 36
      Use three grades of steel in the construction:
      a) ordinary mild shipbuilding steel with an ultimate resistance of about 42 kg / sq.mm and an elongation of at least 20%;
      b) steel with increased resistance up to 63 kg / mm18 and elongation not less than XNUMX% and
      c) steel of high resistance up to 72 kg / sq. mm and elongation not less than 16%.

      ... for ordinary steel under variable load (ship pitching), allow an operating voltage of no more than 11 kg / sq.mm, for high resistance steel - 16 kg / sq.mm, for high resistance steel when docked - 23 kg / sq. mm .mm.

      As far as I remember, he stated approximately the following prices per pood:
      ordinary steel 3 r 25 k;
      steel of increased resistance 4 p 75 k - 5 p 10 k;
      high resistance steel 7 p 50 k - 7 p 75 k.
      I drew his attention to the fact that these prices are approximately 25% higher than the rates of our state-owned metallurgical plants.

      That is, the limiting resistance
      ordinary 412 N / sq mm with an OU of at least 20% = steel 20 GOST 1050 fits exactly (fences, for example, are good from it)

      increased resistance 618 N / sq mm with an OU not less than 18% = approximately axial steel GOST 4728
      (this is high-quality steel by modern standards, better than structural 40GR or 40G1R according to GOST 4543. about 440 class)
      high resistance 706 N / sq mm with an op amp of at least 16% = these are serious and currently characteristics, you can check it yourself http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200122434
      "GOST R 52927-2015 Rolled steel for shipbuilding of normal, increased and high strength steel. Specifications (with Amendment)"

      Now let's compare steel for hull structures (marked in red) and steel for BBS shells (marked in blue)



      source:
      GOST 19281-2014 High-strength rolled products. General specifications (with Amendment N 1) http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1200113779


      well, or somewhere a mistake
      1. 0
        4 October 2020 23: 45
        Found proof that the land mines were steel: "steel high-explosive bombs"
        https://istmat.info/node/25051
  48. +5
    25 September 2020 06: 59
    Excellent work! Sorry I missed the article
  49. +1
    25 September 2020 15: 37
    Quote: Andrey Shmelev
    Why?


    In the shooting tables of the 1908 edition:

    http://ava.telenet.dn.ua/history/10in_coast_gun/tables_1908/index.html

    With the same weight of a steel armor-piercing bomb and a steel (high-explosive) bomb of 550 lbs and their initial velocity of 2550 fps, the main firing tables are different.

    Additional tables of corrections for crosswind and air density (atmospheric pressure) are also provided. Taking into account the fact that the correction for the deviation of the charge temperature is higher than the atmospheric pressure (I think it makes no sense to talk about firing from 10-inch cannons in the mountains), it apparently was also taken into account, although this was not mentioned here.
  50. +2
    25 September 2020 16: 16
    Quote: Andrey152
    And this is from what source the tablet?
    From the commission's report?


    Well yes. From the well-known explanations of the ITC to the chairman of the commission of inquiry:

    http://alternathistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/00-525x768.jpeg

    By the way, in vain you are making jokes about the decision of the ITC to accept shells with thick walls. I read documents from those years, the problem was serious. And the cost of high-explosive shells was originally similar to the cost of armor-piercing shells.


    I will say more, the cost of 305 mm shells arr. 1911 was higher than the cost of armor-piercing:

    https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=36892012

    "Initially, when factories were issued orders and orders for 12-inch shells in December 1911, their cost, after lengthy approvals from the calculations submitted by contractors, was determined at 964 rubles for an armor-piercing shell and 1265 rubles for a high-explosive shell (unloaded - without an explosive charge and without a fuse) 18. For one dreadnought with 300 armor-piercing and 1265 high-explosive shells, this amounted to an impressive amount of 1 rubles (with the cost of the entire battleship about 427 million rubles). The entire program for the production of 700-inch shells of the 30 model was estimated at 12 rubles, or ⅔ of the cost However, after the adoption of the program of strengthening the Black Sea Fleet by the fourth dreadnought battleship (June 1911), three private manufacturers - Russian Society, Putilovsky and Bryansk plants, were invited by the Ministry of the Navy to tender for the supply of 21-inch shells for it. - having drawn up a syndicate, they declared an almost identical price, which was increased by almost 327% in comparison with the price of 442: er, the manufacturers wanted to get 1914 rubles for a high-explosive projectile, 12 rubles for an armor-piercing projectile, and this, provided that equipment and technologies were already well-functioning.50 ... government, was a reliable counterbalance to the ambitions of private producers, whose appetites often overstepped imaginable boundaries. "

    But realizing why the Tsushima disaster happened, they stopped saving on the quality of the shells.
  51. +3
    26 September 2020 01: 04
    Quote: Saxahorse
    As an interesting point, it can be pointed out that melinite was adopted by France only after the addition of a phlegmatizer

    Which one? In 1887 the French government adopted a mixture of picric acid and guncotton with the name Melinite. Pyroxylin certainly reduced the power of the explosion, but it cannot be considered a phlegmatizer.

    The second curious point is that Shimose Masachika received from Turpin the second sample, already with a phlegmatizer.

    Shimose Masachika excluded from his explosives a component that reduces the power of the explosion, that is, pyroxylin. Standard No. 1 and standard No. 2 of shimose are indicated in the article; this is almost pure picric acid. Standard No. 1 allowed no more than 0,05% water, no more than 0,02% ash, no less than 18% nitrogen, minimally noticeable traces of inorganic acids, organic compounds and lead. The proportion of sulfuric acid was allowed no more than 0,01%. Appearance of the substance: pale yellow needle-shaped crystals without impurities. In standard No. 2, the purity requirements are slightly weakened: water no more than 0,1%, ash 0,05%, sulfuric acid no more than 0,04%.

    The last one, standard No. 6, adopted in early 1931, is also known (from Japanese Wikipedia):
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%8B%E7%80%AC%E7%81%AB%E8%96%AC
    According to the Shimose explosives production standard of February 1931 (Showa 6), Shimose explosives are pure picric acid.

    There is no evidence in this article for the purity of shimosa as a trinitrophenol.

    Sorry, but the article indicates the permissible limits for the content of impurities in shimose of standards No. 1 and No. 2. The increase in the content of impurities such as water, ash and sulfuric acid in shimose standard No. 2 is associated only with production difficulties.

    But neither in France nor in Russia, pure picric acid definitely did not pass such tests.


    I note that a 76 mm grenade with a picric acid explosive charge was developed by Rdultovsky and adopted by the Russian army in 1905. 122 mm and 152 mm shells with a phlegmatized composition were developed later.

    And yes, I will quote the opinion from the Anglo-Saxon comrades:
    http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNJAP_projectiles.php
    "...the following description is adapted from the book Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War by Eric Lacroix and Linton Wells II:

    Shimosa, a picric acid explosive roughly equivalent to British lyddite, was adopted before the Russo-Japanese War. As with other explosives made from picric acid, the Japanese discovered that projectiles using this substance tended to explode prematurely.

    After the end of the First World War, the Japanese received a number of German armor-piercing shells, which used a bursting charge of a mixture of TNT and beeswax (Fülpulver C/02), enclosed in a "cellulose" shell as a damper with a wooden plug at the top of the cavity for the explosive substance that acted as a shock buffer. Based on this knowledge, the Japanese developed a similar body from hardened stone gypsum and paraffin, and replaced the explosive charge with a mixture of wax and shimosa. This development was at an advanced stage by 1922, when the Japanese purchased some armor-piercing shells from the British arms firm Hadfields, Ltd., Sheffield, to study the latest British improvements.

    Lessons learned from this research and live-fire experiments were applied to new shell designs, finalized in June 1925 and adopted as the 5 Gô hibo tekkodan (APC Model 1925). These shells still had some frequency of premature detonations or incomplete detonations, and in 1928 they were replaced by the improved Type 88 (APC Model 1928), which, among other modifications, had an improved fuze container. A few years later, in 1931, the Japanese adopted TNA (trinitroanisole) explosive, which was a more stable explosive than shimosa."

    As you can see, English-speaking comrades believe that the Japanese phlegmatized picric acid with wax only after becoming acquainted with German armor-piercing shells during the First World War. At the same time, the work dragged on until the beginning of the 1920s and my acquaintance with the design of British armor-piercing shells (apparently with a shellite explosive charge) led to the adoption of armor-piercing shells of a new type only in 1925.
  52. 0
    26 October 2020 07: 53
    A very interesting and complete overview of armor production in Russia
    http://samlib.ru/editors/m/matweenko_a_g/proizwodstwobronidljanuzhdflotawrossijskojimperii.shtml
  53. The comment was deleted.
  54. 0
    17 December 2020 20: 54
    Who will “raise” the topic?

    According to family legend, one of our fellow villagers from the village of Antonovo Moscow Region took part in the Battle of Tsushima on what appears to be a destroyer. During the battle, the ship was damaged and escaped from the pursuit of Japanese ships not to Vladivostok, like the main part of the squadron, but to the north, to the shores of China. During the transition, the ship ran out of fresh water and coal for the steam engine, it lost speed and radio contact with other ships of the fleet, but remained afloat and stable. The sailors installed homemade sails on the destroyer's masts and drifted on it across the China Sea. Then, the drifting destroyer was discovered by the ship and rescued. I don’t know what the name of the ship is.
    This fellow villager was then awarded for saving the sailors and the ship with a personalized award revolver from the command of the Pacific Fleet.
    1. 0
      14 February 2024 14: 03
      Probably:
      The destroyer "Bodriy" headed to Shanghai to replenish coal reserves with a view to subsequent passage to Vladivostok. They sailed in stormy conditions, dodging all oncoming ships, as they suspected the Japanese of them. However, the coal ran out at sea by 12:00 on May 16, and for four days the team drifted 90 miles from the coast, trying to use tidal currents. Supplies of fresh water and provisions are almost gone. On May 20, the passing English steamer Quaylin took the destroyer in tow and brought it to Shanghai, where Bodry was interned by the Chinese authorities until the end of the war. During the battle, 1 person was killed on the destroyer and 9 were wounded.

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