But will extra money benefit the defense industry?
The first priority for the army is strategic deterrence forces that have at least two components: strategic nuclear forces (land, sea and air), as well as a missile attack warning system, missile defense and aerospace defense. The second priority is various types of high precision weaponsthe use of which is based on the use of information support from space (we add from ourselves - and from airplanes of distant radar reconnaissance, detection and guidance, unmanned aerial vehicles, other reconnaissance-information technology). And the third is automated command and control systems.
In the next two to three years, said First Deputy Defense Minister General of the Army Vladimir Popovkin, all the specific automated control systems will be linked into a unified management system, modernized so that it has an open architecture and allows you to increase opportunities in any direction.
SQUARE GROWTH NUMBERS
Another priority, according to Popovkin, is related to the size of the Armed Forces. With a million-strong army, we will not be able to keep "equal strength" (expression of the general) groupings in all strategic directions. And therefore it is important to have the means of transporting personnel and equipment. First of all, modern military transport Aviation. The Ministry of Defense may purchase about 20 An-124 Ruslan aircraft as part of the state arms program from 2011 to 2020, the production of which should resume in Ulyanovsk. Since this year, work has continued on the Russian-Ukrainian transporter An-70, on the Il-112, Il-476 aircraft and the modernized Il-76MD.
It is supposed to buy combat and transport helicopters. The Mi-26, which the Ministry of Defense is starting to acquire from next year, also falls into such a purchase. In addition, from 2013 to 2015, the military is planning to buy 10 fifth-generation T-50 advanced fighter aircraft (PAK FA). And with 2016, 60 is still such machines. There are plans for combat training Yak-130, which is already beginning to enter the troops. Together with the entire nomenclature of weapons for these aircraft.
In aviation, the financing of the purchase of 2010 fighters Su-60 / Su-35 / Su-30 (under the 27 contract of the year - for 2009 billion rubles), 80 of MiG-26К fighters (at least 29 billion, contract, not concluded) and 25 bomber Su-32 (contract 34, one car then cost more than 2008 billion rubles)
For fleet Expensive programs are planned, such as the construction of new nuclear submarines of projects 885 and 955 (and Bulava missiles for the latter), the renewal of the Black Sea Fleet by supplying three frigates of project 11356M and three diesel submarines of project 636. All this will cost several hundred billion rubles. The exact cost of spending on the fleet and missiles is impossible for him to assess; the prices of strategic weapons (for example, Bulava missiles) are secret.
Apparently, Vladimir Popovkin, First Deputy Defense Ordinary General of the Army, was not acquainted with industrial production indices for January-December 2009, which amounted to 89,2% by January-December 2008. Russian planning is simply not consistent with the capabilities of the defense industry. The website of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia contains data showing that in the military-industrial complex, the increase in civilian production in January-December 2009 was observed only in the shipbuilding industry. In other branches of the complex there was a drop in production.
In January-December, 2009 aircraft were delivered to customers of 48 aircraft, of which 14 medium and long-haul (TU-204 - 4 units, TU-214 - 3 units, IL-96-300 - 1 units, IL-96- 400 - 1 units, An-140 - 1 units, An-148 - 2 units, Be-200 - 2 units) and 141 helicopter (Mi-17-1В - 7 units, Mi-17-В5 - 41 units, Mi-8MTVB1 - 14 units, Mi-8MTVB5-1 - 9 units, Mi-26T - 1 units., Mi-172 - 2 units., Ansant-U - 6 units. 171 units, Ka-57 - 226 units). The production of aircraft engines has decreased: auxiliary gas turbine engines, turboprop engines for airplanes and helicopters, for mainline airplanes. In the conventional arms industry, the volume of civilian products declined by 4%, due to a decrease in civilian production at a number of enterprises in the industry.
The growth of civilian production is observed only at 11 enterprises of the industry. In the ammunition and special chemistry industry in 2009, civilian production declined by 28,2% compared to 2008.
In the 2010 year, the volume of industrial production produced by enterprises of the military-industrial complex in the first half of the year 2010, according to operational information, increased by 14,1% compared to the same period of the 2009 year. But these are only export quantities. Production of aircraft has increased by 6,7%. Two light mainline passenger An-148 aircraft were produced.
For January – June, 2010 units produced 54 units, of which 31 units. for export (Mi-17-1В - 2 unit (all for export), Mi-17-В5 - 22 unit (all for export); Mi-171 - 5 unit (all for export); Mi-8АМТ - 21 units, Mi-8AMT1 - 1 units, Ka-32 - 2 units (all for export), Ka-226.50 - 1 units). But not all 24 helicopters will enter Russian units. Ulan-Udinsky AZ still has a contract with UTair for the delivery of 40 Mi-8AMT and Mi-171 helicopters for three years, which was announced by 21 on February 2008 of the year. Deliveries of UTair started in October of the same year, and today the company has already received a 23 helicopter. Deliveries of the remaining 17 machines are scheduled to be completed by the end of 2010.
The Air Force ordered the 47 serial Mi-28H helicopters, which can go to combat units in the next few years by the Ulan-Uda Aviation Plant. In 2009, the company manufactured and transferred to the Russian Air Force ten Mi-28Н serial helicopters. The total needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Mi-28H are estimated at about three hundred cars. But on the site of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia, it appears that as of August 2010, the Air Force and Air Defense did not receive a single helicopter.
The 2009 data of the year speaks of the release of two heavy Mi-26T transport helicopters at Rostvertol, although it is reliably known only about one Mi-26TS, manufactured in Rostov last year and delivered to the customer in China in July. The Mi-26 will be acquired by the Defense Ministry only from the 2011 year.
At the same time, there is a decline in the production of agricultural machinery and equipment, products of chemical plants, electric motors, and road-building communal equipment. The repair of aviation technology and civil aviation services has decreased. This was to be expected, the procurement structure proposed by the Ministry of Defense is unprofitable in essence.
In the shipbuilding industry, in the first half of the year, the volume of production decreased by 15,1%. The Navy received only a self-propelled barge at the 176 shipyard (a branch of the CS Zvezdochka) and at the 5 shipyard the sea tug (after repair). It should be noted that the duration of the construction of ships depends on the allocated volumes of financing orders of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, which is the main customer.
DEBTS DO NOT RELEASE
At present, many defense companies are not yet ready for the mass production of high-tech weapons systems, as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov openly stated. The first deputy chairman of the military-industrial commission (MIC) of the Russian Federation, Vladislav Putilin, gave a no less severe assessment of the state of defense complex. According to him, only 36% of strategic enterprises are financially healthy, and 25% are on the verge of bankruptcy. The Russian defense-industrial complex includes 948 of strategic enterprises and organizations covered by the provisions of paragraph 5 of Chapter IX of the Federal Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)”, which provide for special rules of bankruptcy. Currently, bankruptcy proceedings have been instituted against 44. According to the Federal Tax Service of Russia, 170 strategic enterprises and organizations of the military-industrial complex have signs of bankruptcy. Moreover, in relation to 150 of strategic enterprises and organizations, the tax authorities have already issued orders for the recovery of debts from their property, which are aimed at enforcement by bailiffs.
At the same time, according to experts, subject to substantial modernization of the power of the military-industrial complex, it can, if necessary, produce approximately 100 front-line bombers, 55 – 60 attack aircraft, about 100 – 120 fighters, 100 – 110 combat and transport and combat helicopters, one RPLSN (in two years), one multipurpose submarine (in two years), one or two diesel submarines, 4 surface ships of the ocean and long-distance sea zone, up to 10 surface ships of the nearest sea zone, 7 – 8 of sea-launched missile aviation aircraft, 8 –10 e Dinits naval assault and naval fighter aircraft, to 15 aircraft and anti-submarine helicopters. And provided, of course, repayment of debts of enterprises and a significant increase in funding for research and development.
The defense industry also created additional problems with the delay in transferring funds for state defense orders. As an example, we will analyze the enterprises of the aircraft industry and armored engineering. In recent years, the defense industry managed to make very large debts in the aviation industry: RSK MiG - 44 billion rubles., MMP named after V.V. Chernysheva - 22 billion, NPK Irkut, Sukhoi - about 30 billion. And in armored engineering - for example, FSUE Omsk Transport Engineering Plant Tanks T-80U and T-80UK. The accounts payable of the company is 1,5 billion rubles. In 2008, a three-year contract was signed between the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and OJSC NPK Uralvagonzavod for the purchase of 189 tanks (63 tanks per year). In 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense planned to acquire 261 new T-90 tanks, which are produced by OAO NPK Uralvagonzavod. If the order for the purchase of tanks is 18 billion rubles. still realized, then the plant will have a chance to pay off its debt - 61 billion rubles.
R & D CANNOT BE REDUCED
Despite the fact that in recent years, Russia has managed to partially regain lost ground in the world arms trade, success cannot be overestimated. After all, the basis of crisis phenomena in the field of military-technical cooperation is not only and not so much the imperfection of public administration (although this is also important), as the problems of the manufacturers of military hardware. For many military technologies, Russia is still at the level of the 1970 – 1980s. The state of defense enterprises and their substantial technological dependence on foreign suppliers remain critical. Thus, compared with the 1992 year, the production of military aircraft decreased by 17 times, military helicopters - by 5, aircraft missiles - by 23, and ammunition - by more than 100 times.
The decline in the quality of military products (MPPs) is alarming. The cost of eliminating defects in the course of production, testing and operation of security products reaches 50% of the total cost of its manufacture. While in economically developed countries, this figure does not exceed 20%. The main reason is the deterioration of the main equipment, which has reached 75%, and an extremely low level of re-equipment: the rate of equipment renewal is no more than 1% per year with the minimum required need of 8 – 10%. In recent years, the decline in the quality of drug products and the increasing incidence of non-compliance with contractual obligations by Russian military-technical cooperation subjects, combined with an unjustified increase in the price of military equipment, have become noticeably reflected in relations in the military-technical cooperation field with traditional Russian buyers of military equipment (primarily with India and China) and, a consequence, on the volumes of deliveries.
The enterprises of the defense industry complex do not fully cope with the fulfillment of the concluded contracts. Some foreign customers have to stand in line for Russian weapons. However, it is not yet entirely clear how to keep the price of 2011 of the year for the entire range of military equipment that the military are going to buy from industry, up to 2020 of the year. For some reason, the deflators included in the budget always turn out to be less than the real increase in inflation and the increase in the cost of materials and components for the final product. As a result, after five years, all weapons programs are unbalanced, and the amount of money received and, consequently, equipment that has not been received by the troops, reaches 30 – 50%.
Comparison of sales of defense products to export with purchases of defense products in the interests of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation showed that for many years, sales of weapons and military equipment (CWT) to foreign countries exceeded domestic purchases and only in recent years there has been a tendency to increase domestic demand. And while in 2000 – 2003, Russia's military spending was of the order of 30 – 32% of the MPP export volume, then in 2004 – 2005 years they became comparable, and with 2006, they exceeded export volumes, making 2006% in 114,6, in 2007, 132,6%. These data reflect not only the improvement in the economic situation in the country observed in the last five to six years, but also a change in the attitude of the state to the state of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, requiring re-equipment and modernization. The federal budget for 2009 – 2011 has provided for a substantial increase in the volume of purchases of defense products, despite the financial crisis.
The degradation of the science and technology complex has led to the fact that, despite the growth of the defense state order, the production of a new generation of weapons is in no way possible to start. The current situation poses a threat to Russia's national security. According to Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences, leading Western countries have R & D expenditures at 2 – 3% of GDP, including at the USA 2,7%, and at countries such as Japan, Sweden, Israel reach 3,5– 4,5% of GDP. Expenditures on research and development in China (1,7% of GDP) are increasing at a very high rate. In the next decade, China is expected to catch up with the United States in terms of expenditure on science. R & D spending in India is also rising rapidly. By 2012, they will reach 2% of GDP. The European Union has set a goal to increase R & D expenditures to 3% of GDP. The share of Russian spending on defense R & D is 0,6% of GDP, and civil science is 0,4%.
For comparison: in the last years of the USSR, total R & D expenditures amounted to 3,6 – 4,7% of GDP. Unfortunately, in Russia, the share of total expenditure on basic research is only 0,16% of GDP. In developed countries, the cost of basic research is 0,5 – 0,6% of GDP.
In countries - the leaders of world science science policy has two sides. On the one hand, the state directly funds research, and on the other hand, it stimulates research and development expenditures on the private sector through tax measures. In Russia, according to the OECD, the tax system does not encourage, but infringe upon research and development expenses. The cost of Russian business in R & D is 7 – 10 times less than in developed countries. Only three Russian companies are among the largest 1000 companies in the world in terms of R & D costs.
The surprise is that the satisfaction of the requests of Rosoboronexport takes precedence over the needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In Russia there is an acute question: what is more important for the state - orders of the Ministry of Defense or Rosoboronexport? It seems that Rosoboronexport contracts are more important because domestic prices are inferior to export ones. That is why Uralvagonzavod cannot start production of the new T-95 tank and the tank support combat vehicle (BMPT).
LAW NEEDS CORRECTION
Autonomy remains the main element of the Russian defense doctrine. One of the main goals of the implementation of the new policy for the defense industrial complex is to “prevent the critical dependence of the activities of the defense-industrial complex on the supply of components and materials of foreign manufacture”. The aspirations of the heads of defense enterprises are fully reflected: the state will facilitate the acquisition of unique equipment and its leasing to Russian defense industry specialists. Problems of development of the domestic electronic component base, as well as radio electronics, special metallurgy and low-tonnage chemistry, will be solved within the framework of federal target programs and private-state partnership. The defense management system in Russia has already been reviewed six times. As a result, the level of this administration fell from the deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation to the head of the department of the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation.
The activities of various structures involved in the development of various types of military products are not coordinated with the Federal Law No. 26-ФЗ “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)” of 2002 September 127. This law softened the requirements for strategic defense enterprises in terms of signs of insolvency and established an enlarged list of measures aimed at preventing their bankruptcy. However, this law also requires a number of changes. This particularly applies to the procedure for granting state guarantees for the obligations of strategic enterprises during their financial recovery, limiting the rights of creditors to dispose of the debtor’s property, the rights of the owner of mobilization (reserve) production facilities. It is proposed that the amended law spells out the right to initiate bankruptcy of a strategic enterprise only to the Government of the Russian Federation or to initiate a bankruptcy case after the strategic status has been removed from the enterprise.
An unsuccessful policy has also developed in the field of pricing for defense products. Now the prices for military products are approved by the customer in accordance with departmental standards based on cost calculations submitted by the lead executor of the order. Often, the approved prices for OPK products do not correspond to the growth of tariffs of natural monopolies. As a result, prices for military products are constantly growing. Therefore, despite the annual increase in spending on the state defense order, there is not enough money to buy new modern weapons. There is still no solution to such a major problem for the defense industry as taxation. Land tax, property tax, and other types of taxes that strategic defense enterprises today are obliged to pay, have become one of the main brakes on its reform. For many years, managers of defense enterprises have been striving to abolish value-added tax from advance payments, which are carried out under contracts within the framework of the state defense order, according to the profits of defense enterprises.
Now it is necessary to revise the goals and objectives of the weapons complex. It is necessary to clearly understand with whom we are going to fight, what types of weapons are needed for this and what kind of state defense order should be accordingly. If there is no imputed defense order, then there will be no defense industry. Industry cannot be mothballed and left until better times. The equipment will become obsolete morally and physically, it will be taken away, there will be no specialists. Therefore, restoring a preserved food is much more expensive than building a new one at a new place. While this understanding is not, the situation will only worsen.