Military Review

German coal and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet

62
German coal and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet
Coal in the port of Hamburg-Süd. 1938 year


Archival documents sometimes present such amazing finds that they force us to seriously think about some points. stories war. They are usually plain in appearance, but their content is amazing.

One of such documents, which is now kept in the RGVA, was drawn up on July 5, 1944 by the German ambassador to Finland, Vipert von Blucher. This was a certificate for the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the volumes of German supplies to Finland in 1942 and 1943 (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 8, d. 36, l. 4).


German Ambassador to Finland Wiepert von Blucher (right) greets Finnish General Axel Heinrichs (left)

The table listed the main positions of German merchandise exports to Finland in weight and value:



Only for those commodity items for which the weight of the cargo was indicated, in 1942, 1493 thousand tons were delivered to Finland, and in 1943 - 1925,6 thousand tons. In fact, somewhat more, as the weight of chemicals, iron and steel, machinery, vehicles and electrical equipment is not indicated. The consumption of iron and steel alone in 1937 was 350 thousand tons. But even in this form it is more than impressive.

We will not even remember about the intensive freight traffic between Sweden and Germany. Freight traffic from Germany to Finland, which required about a thousand flights, went almost under the nose of the Red Banner Baltic fleet and personally his commander, Admiral V.F. Tributsa.

There are two conclusions from this table. First, Finland fought almost exclusively thanks to trade with Germany, receiving from there all the resources necessary for the functioning of the economy and paying for them with their own supplies. At the end of the war, Germany had unpaid deliveries from Finland in the amount of 130 million Reichsmarks, there was no debt on clearing agreements to Finland. Trade, on the other hand, was provided almost exclusively by sea transport.

Secondly, the Baltic Fleet did not fulfill one of its main tasks, disrupting the enemy's sea traffic, at all. Merchant ships of various tonnages literally scurried in the western part of the Gulf of Finland. On average, three ships a day entered the bay and went to Finnish ports, and three ships left it and went to German ports. The Baltic Fleet could not oppose anything to this. There were reasons for this: a developed anti-submarine defense system, minefields and the famous network set between Nargen Island and Cape Porkkala-Udd. In their structure and defense, the enemy turned out to be stronger and achieved his goal. In 1943, the Baltic submariners were unable to sink a single vessel.

It mattered. The struggle for Leningrad was fought not only on land but also at sea. A good blow to communications could have led to Finland's withdrawal from the war at the beginning of 1942, since, as was evident from the previous article, its economy was already on the verge of exhaustion and starvation in 1941. Then the blockade of Leningrad from the north would have collapsed. Yes, the Germans had 1942 thousand troops in Finland in 150 and they could have arranged the occupation of a former ally, as they did with Hungary and Italy. However, a blocked supply would in any case put this group on the brink of defeat, and the German occupation of Finland would make a significant part of the Finns allies of the USSR. So the actions of the KBF were of strategic importance and could seriously change the situation. But they didn't.

All this is to the fact that in the literature on the history of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet as a whole, formations and individual ships during the war, the emphasis is on heroism. However, more than once I have come across examples when in books heroism, heroism, heroism, but in fact there was a failure, defeat and defeat. Here it is the same. Heroism covered the important circumstance that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was cornered, gave up in front of the obstacles, in my opinion, without showing the proper determination, pressure and ingenuity in breaking them, and went into the Baltic only when Finland, which had left the war, opened the fairways for him. Thus, the fleet did not contribute to the victory what it had to contribute.

Why this happened is a subject of special analysis. In the meantime, you can see the transportation of coal from Germany to Finland during the war in some detail. On coal transportation, due to their special importance, a whole puffy folder of correspondence between various departments and firms has been preserved.

Finland consumption and first deliveries


Before the war, that is, under relatively normal conditions, Finland consumed 1400-1600 thousand tons of coal and about 200-300 thousand tons of coke (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 8, d. 33, l. 39). Almost all of the coal was imported. In 1937, Finland imported 1892,7 thousand tons of coal, the maximum level for the entire pre-war period, of which 1443,8 thousand tons - British coal, 275,5 thousand tons - Polish coal and 173,3 thousand tons - German coal.

Since 1933, a Finnish-British agreement was in force that Finland buys 75% of coal imports and 60% of coke imports from Great Britain. In accordance with it, import quotas were established for importing firms.

Coal consumption in Finland was split across many industries. The leading industry was the production of pulp and paper - 600 thousand tons of coal per year (36,8%). Pulp and various papers, along with sawnwood and roundwood, were Finland's main exports. They were followed by: railways - 162 thousand tons, shipping - 110 thousand tons, gas plants - 110 thousand tons, heating - 100 thousand tons, cement production - 160 thousand tons and other industries.

Transport consumed 272 thousand tons of coal per year, or 16,7%. Thus, fuel imports were driving the Finnish economy. In Finland, the forest was very well protected and it was not customary to heat steam locomotives with wood. The German embassy in Finland reported on June 8, 1944 to Berlin that the deforestation from May 1, 1943 to April 30, 1944 amounted to 168,7 million cubic meters. feet, of which firewood - 16,3 million cubic meters. ft (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 8, d. 7, l. 8).

Therefore, the import of coal was everything for Finland: if there is no coal, the economy does not work. As soon as in September 1939, with the outbreak of war, the prospect of stopping the supply of coal from Great Britain became clear, Finnish businessmen and influential persons ran to the German embassy. On September 10, 1939, Ambassador von Blucher wrote to Berlin that different people came and asked for coal. Among them was the head of a gas plant in Helsinki, who asked for an urgent supply of 40 thousand tons of fat coal, since the reserves at his enterprise are only for two months (that is, until early December 1939) and it will not survive the winter. The Finns responded succinctly to the indications of the Finnish-British agreement: "Need does not know the commandments."

The ambassador wrote to Berlin, in Berlin they entered the position of the Finns, the Reichsvereinigung Kohle (Imperial Coal Association, the Reich's main department for coal distribution) wrote to the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate. From there they telegraphed on September 30, 1939 that they had two vessels with a capacity of 6000 tons together under loading, one of them in Lubeck, and they were ready to deploy them to Helsinki (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 8, d. 33, l. 8 ). Subsequently, there were some delays, but in mid-October 1939, the coal carriers went to sea and on October 21-22, 1939 arrived in Helsinki. Here began an epic, described in a letter, unsigned, but apparently drawn up by the German trade attaché in Finland, Otto von Zwel. The ships were not allowed to unload because of the agreement with Britain. For several days, different people tried to persuade Finnish Foreign Minister Elyas Erkko, but in vain. This minister was not so easy to break; he was just the main opponent of any concessions to the USSR at the Moscow negotiations in October-November 1939. Finally, since downtime at the port costs money, on the morning of October 24, the attaché ordered the ships to go to Stockholm. When the Finns learned that the coveted coal was floating out from under their noses in the most literal sense of the word, they threw the most influential person at the minister - Dr. Bernhard Wuolle, a member of the Helsinki City Council and a professor at the Helsinki University of Technology. The professor shone with Finnish eloquence as never before, and what Molotov did not succeed, Dr. Vuolle did in an hour. He pushed through the uncompromising Erkko and got him permission to import coal, and without fulfilling the terms of the agreement with Britain and without acquiring a license (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 8, d. 33, l. 20).

War is the time to trade


The available documents do not clearly indicate whether there were coal supplies to Finland during the Soviet-Finnish war. Most likely, they were not there, since the KBF established a blockade zone in the Baltic Sea and Soviet submarines patrolled there. In any case, Finland received a quota for the shipment of coal only in the spring of 1940. From June 1, 1940 to March 31, 1941, 750 thousand tons of coal (including 100 thousand tons of coal dust) and 125 thousand tons of coke should be supplied (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 8, d. 33, p. 67).

The coal suppliers were the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (250 thousand tons of coal and 115 thousand tons of coke) and the Upper Silesian Coal Syndicate (500 thousand tons of coal and 10 thousand tons of coke). The Finnish company Kol och Koks Aktienbolag, back in November 1939, requested Silesian coal, which suited them better.

Now economics is a question. A coal supplier, for example, the Upper Silesian Coal Syndicate, sold fob Danzig coal at prices ranging from 20,4 to 21,4 Reichsmarks per ton, depending on the grade. Fob is a contract where the seller loads the goods onto the ship.

Freight rates were high. From Stettin and Danzig to Helsinki from 230 Reichsmarks per tonne for loading up to 1000 tons, up to 180 Reichsmarks for loading over 3000 tons. When transporting coke, a surcharge of 40 Reichsmarks per ton was added. At the same time, Frachtkontor GmbH in Hamburg, which executed freight contracts for Finnish deliveries, took its commission of 1,6%. When transporting coal by large coal carriers, for example, the Ingna vessel, which could hold 3500 tons of coal, the consignment cost was 73,5 thousand Reichsmarks, and the cost of transportation was 640,08 thousand Reichsmarks with a commission.

In the physical sense, coal from the mines was transported by rail to German ports either to the warehouses of coal syndicates or to the warehouses of logistics firms, for example, M. Stromeyer Lagerhausgesellschaft in Mannheim. From Danzig to Helsinki it took a coal carrier for two days, and at the same time the vessel was consuming coal - large, 30 tons per day. Transportation of 1 million tons of coal required the consumption of 18 thousand tons of coal. More loading and unloading. At that time, coal was loaded and unloaded by a crane with a grab, each vessel had its own indicators of loading and unloading operations, for medium coal carriers - 300-400 tons per day, for large ones - 1000-1200 tons per day.


Loading coal by grab at the Hamburg port of Altona. 1938 year

To bring in over a million tons of coal, an average of 7 ships stood unloading in Finnish ports every day. The vessel consumed 9 tons of coal in the port for loading and unloading operations: 2-3 days in the German port and the same in the Finnish one, up to 54 tons in total. For 1 million tons of coal, another 15,9 thousand tons of coal is consumed; In total, transportation and port operations required the consumption of 33,9 thousand tons of coal for the delivery of 1 million tons. Coal was delivered from Finnish ports either directly to consumers, if they bought large quantities, for example, Wasa Elektriska Aktienbolag, or to the warehouses of importing companies, from where the coal was sold and delivered to consumers.

Nothing illustrates the fairness of the saying: a heifer is a half over the sea, and a ruble is transported, like deliveries of German coal to Finland. At the freight rate for a large ship mentioned above, the total cost of Finns per ton of Silesian coal in the port of Helsinki was 203,8 Reichsmarks. Coal was ten times more expensive for them than in Danzig. But this is still the sparing conditions for a large carbohydrate and a large batch. There were few large transports, and coal was transported with every little thing, whoever agreed. Therefore, if we count according to Ambassador von Blucher, a ton of coal cost the Finns in 1942 698,2 Reichsmarks, and in 1943 - 717,1 Reichsmarks.

In general, the owners of the ships and the shipping company have “risen” well in transporting to Finland at such freight rates. But even under such conditions there were not enough ships for coal transportation and there was an undersupply of coal. For example, in March 1943 it was planned to deliver 120 thousand tons of coal and 20 thousand tons of coke, but actually 100,9 thousand tons of coal and 14,2 thousand tons of coke were delivered (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 8, d . 33, l. 187, 198). Another reason for the undersupply is the obvious lack of mining capacities of the Upper Silesian Coal Syndicate, which was responsible for supplying coal to the entire east of Germany, the Governor General for the occupied territories of Poland, the commissariats of Ostland and Ukraine, as well as the entire Eastern Front and the railways leading to it. The Imperial Coal Association was forced to divide coal between different consumers, although it tried to fulfill Finnish supplies as a priority.

KBF could only bite enemy shipping


Returning to the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, it is worth noting one interesting circumstance, in addition to the fact that it was driven behind a net that the fleet could not break through.

The KBF, of course, sank something. In 1942, 47 ships with a total displacement of 124,5 thousand tons were sunk and 4 ships with a total displacement of 19,8 thousand tons were damaged. However, this had little impact on the enemy freight traffic.

Submarines of the KBF chased large ships. The average tonnage of the sunk ships was 2,6 thousand tons, that is, approximately 1,3 thousand tons of capacity. This is understandable, since it is easier to hit a large ship with torpedoes. The sinking of such a ship was considered a more significant victory. But the point is that the bulk of cargo was transported by small ships. It was easier and faster to load and unload them, both by cranes and by hand, they easily entered sea and river ports.

What kind of ships they were can be judged from the statistics of the transport of ore and coal between Germany and Sweden. The German-Swedish transport was enormous. Deliveries to Sweden: 1942 - 2,7 million tons of coal and 1 million tons of coke, 1943 - 3,7 million tons of coal and 1 million tons of coke. Ore supplies to Germany: 1942 - 8,6 million tons, 1943 - 10,2 million tons. 2569 ships operated on these shipments in 1942 and 3848 ships in 1943. Moreover, the Swedish fleet transported 99% of coal and 40% of ore in 1943.

So, in 1943, 3848 ships transported 14,9 million tons of coal and ore. Each ship carried 3872 tons of cargo per year. If the ship turned around in 8 days (two days there, two days back, and two days for loading and unloading) and made 45 voyages a year, then the average vessel capacity was 86 tons, or about 170 brt. Roughly the same was the case for shipments to Finland, although so far no more accurate data has been found. 170 brt is a very small steamer, which cannot be hit by a torpedo, and the cannon did not work very well either. "Shch-323" on December 11, 1939 sank the Estonian ship "Kassari" with a displacement of 379 brt, firing 160 shells at it. This is almost in range conditions, in the absence of enemy anti-submarine forces, which in 1941-1944 in the Gulf of Finland were very strong and active.


Here is an example of a small vessel: "Icon", built in Germany in 1937 (already renamed in the post-war photo), 344 brt, length 44,8 meters, width 7,6 meters, draft up to 2,3 meters

So, in addition to the fact that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was giving up in front of the German and Finnish anti-submarine defense and obstacles, it was still practically not ready to fight against shipping carried out by small vessels. As far as I know, the command of the fleet not only did not solve such a problem, but did not pose it. From this it follows that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was completely unable to destroy the sea communications in the Baltic Sea and to sink at least part of the about five thousand ships that worked on shipments to Sweden and Finland. Even if the fleet had a free fairway, all the same, its strength and capabilities would be enough only to slightly bite enemy shipping. He was not able to solve the strategic tasks of destroying the enemy's sea communications.
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  1. Mavrikiy
    Mavrikiy 17 August 2020 05: 42 New
    +4
    The KBF was cornered, gave up in front of the obstacles, in my opinion, without showing the proper determination, pressure and ingenuity in breaking them
    fool , sit, I'll open it myself. Look at the losses of the KBF.
    1. Civil
      Civil 17 August 2020 11: 53 New
      +3
      Why is KBF the only one to blame? Where is the Air Force?
      1. Dr. Frankenstucker
        Dr. Frankenstucker 17 August 2020 18: 02 New
        +2
        ... Where is the Air Force?

        VVS KBF in the sense?
  2. Comrade
    Comrade 17 August 2020 05: 58 New
    11
    The KBF gave up before the obstacles, in my opinion, without showing the proper determination, pressure and ingenuity in breaking them.

    Sitting in an easy chair in front of the monitor, it is easy to reproach the crews of the five Soviet submarines who died in 1943 while crossing the obstacles for the fact that they could not overcome these obstacles.
    In fact, this is a manifestation of disrespect for the memory of people who gave their lives while fulfilling their military duty to the Motherland.
    1. Andy
      Andy 17 August 2020 06: 26 New
      21
      in general, a reproach to the tribune, and not to the boat crews. mines were placed under his nose. and before the war, and ours saw it. somewhere at about. Hiiumaa. the headquarters of the fleet did not inform anyone. I can be mistaken, but Gorky was blown up in the wrong area? what about the Tallinn crossing? and the fact that the boats were going to die, alas, useless ...
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 17 August 2020 18: 29 New
        -1
        Quote: Andy
        in general, a reproach to the tribune, and not to the boat crews

        Ponder your words.
        It follows from them that the author allegedly reproaches Tributs that he, Tributs, did not react to the mine laying that was carried out before the war.
        And now carefully re-read the reproach, it says that the Baltic Fleet, read, submarines, did not show
        due determination, pressure and ingenuity

        when breaking through anti-submarine obstacles.
        Hence the question, who nevertheless forced the barriers, submarines or Tributs personally?
        1. Andy
          Andy 17 August 2020 20: 40 New
          +5
          That is, the fleet commanders are out of bounds and the planning of operations is solely on the conscience of the ship commanders? Forgive me this is not a fleet, some kind of cake ... how do you plan to link the actions of submarines and sweeping forces? It’s surprising to hear from you. So that the reproach was fair, for BF the tributs answered
    2. Andy
      Andy 17 August 2020 06: 29 New
      +6
      The night maneuvering of unknown ships and vessels discovered on the night of June 22 in the area of ​​Naissaar and on the Bengtsher-Tahkuna line could serve as a sign of the enemy laying minefields on the approaches to Tallinn and at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. Therefore, before starting the setting of positional minefields on the Hanko-Osmussaar line, it would be necessary to carry out a control trawling on the intended route of passage of the ships - mine planters, as well as in the area of ​​the upcoming maneuvering of the covering detachment, since it is in this area that our reconnaissance aircraft at 03- 30 June 22, discovered enemy ships, marching at a slow speed and, therefore, in all likelihood, laying mines. But this was not done. There was not enough ready-made sweeping forces. Although the patrol minesweeper "T-216" 22.06. at the place of future maneuvering of the covering detachment, he discovered a mine and reported it to the headquarters of the fleet.
      http://bgudkov.ru/%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BB-3-%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85-%D0%BA%D0%BE-2/3-1-%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%B8/
    3. Dr. Frankenstucker
      Dr. Frankenstucker 17 August 2020 18: 07 New
      +1
      ... But in fact, this is a manifestation of disrespect

      A universal reproach. So you can generally not touch on sensitive topics. Fanfare only about the sinking of Goya and Gustlov.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 August 2020 10: 25 New
        +1
        Quote: Dr. Frankenshtuzer
        A universal reproach.

        In some ways you are right, the reproach can really be used out of place. But in this case, it is more than appropriate, since in order to reproach the KBF for something, it was necessary to first prove that the KBF had the opportunity to do better, but he did not. The author did not even set himself such a task - he bit the Baltic, and okay.
        1. Dr. Frankenstucker
          Dr. Frankenstucker 18 August 2020 13: 32 New
          0
          Well, maybe so.
  3. Olgovich
    Olgovich 17 August 2020 06: 42 New
    +6
    However, more than once I have come across examples when in books heroism, heroism, heroism, but in fact there was a failure, defeat and defeat.

    alas, "The heroism of some is, often, a consequence of the slackness and ichiotism of others" (c)
    then the KBF was completely unable to destroy the sea communications in the Baltic Sea

    Bitter, but fair conclusion .... The forces and means were. Abilities and skills are not.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 August 2020 10: 25 New
      +2
      Quote: Olgovich
      The forces and means were

      There was neither strength nor means
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 18 August 2020 10: 43 New
        -2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quote: Olgovich
        The forces and means were

        There was neither strength nor means

        there were both forces and means.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 August 2020 12: 03 New
          0
          Quote: Olgovich
          there were both forces and means.

          In your fantasies - certainly. In reality, Leningrad, for example, did not have sufficient fuel reserves to organize the same blockade in the western part of the Baltic, even if the fleet had sufficient strength and technical capability for such a blockade. But he had neither the one nor the other, nor the third.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 18 August 2020 14: 33 New
            -3
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But he didn't have neither one nor the other, nor the third.

            In your fantasies.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            the fleet would have a sufficient composition and technical capability

            What "composition" do you need? What is the "technical" feature?

            There was little fuel, but the 42 g oil pipeline was already working.
            And yes - where was "enough"?
            1. hohol95
              hohol95 18 August 2020 16: 55 New
              +1
              The Finns received coal from the German.
              And what about the fuel was the KBF ships?
              Some ships, such as the destroyer Lenin and the 3rd submarine division, stationed in Liepaja, ended up with empty tanks. A similar picture was observed with regard to the provision of anti-aircraft ammunition.
              Interesting. Combat ships and no fuel. And why?
              \ Yes, because, for example, in Tallinn there were no mobilization reserves of fuel oil, solar oil. There was only gasoline and coal ...
              In Riga there were no mobilization reserves at all for any type of ship fuel !!!
              The entire KBF had only four tankers and two Aquarius.
              And the main fuel supplies were carried out by rail!
              Railway tanks were often delayed on the way, or even simply returned back by the military communications and special departments of the Red Army, since it was difficult for them to understand: why transport such, by their standards, a huge amount of fuel to Tallinn, if there is an evacuation from Estonia? The lack of stocks is partly due to the lack of liquid fuel tanks in Tallinn, Riga, Hanko and the Moonsund Islands.
              Or do you propose to paddle?
  4. The leader of the Redskins
    The leader of the Redskins 17 August 2020 08: 02 New
    -1
    Thanks for the thoughtful article.
  5. Undecim
    Undecim 17 August 2020 08: 17 New
    16
    Honestly, the message of the article is not clear - what did the author want to show? To kick the Baltic Fleet again that it could not cope with the enemy's cargo transportation in the Baltic?
    Which one did it? If objectively, practically none. Even the submarine fleet of Germany, having until a certain time incomparably more favorable conditions, could not cope with the allied convoys. And in the Mediterranean, the allies cannot say that they won in this matter.
    And only the Americans in the Pacific managed to practically eliminate the Japanese merchant shipping, thanks to their complete domination at sea and in the air.
    Therefore, the article is a pure hype, a reason for another holivar.
    1. Dr. Frankenstucker
      Dr. Frankenstucker 17 August 2020 21: 42 New
      -2
      Quote: Undecim
      Which one did it? If objectively, practically none. Even the German submarine fleet

      Well, at least the Kriegsmarine tried. I'm not a fan of historical pop with twitchy quotations, so I'm not going to quote Vinnie C.'s quotes about the potency of Dönitz's guys. But the KBF submarine did not cover itself with "unfading glory". Goya and Gustlov - this is an impressive revenge on the corpses, of course. Some loser Shepka had to, damn it, hang out in the Atlantic for a month in order to get such a result in those fat years. Well, what is under the hinterland and the RAF is nonsense - what is it, Marinesco could, yeah.
      And no holivar and hype.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 17 August 2020 23: 26 New
        +2
        Please indicate in which area the German submariners had to force anti-submarine areas like those that they themselves created in the Baltic?
        And only then we will compare the number of depth charges and aircraft used to destroy them by the British and the Americans!
        And let's not forget the battles between German and British boats in the English Channel.
        The fighting continued until the end of the war. The last attack of the German "snell boats" was made on April 13, 1945!
        The Soviet Navy did not have the number of combat boats that the Allies supplied with industry throughout the war!
        The British had only 27 torpedo boats at the beginning of the war.
        And during the war they lost 115 units. There were also 28 artillery boats, as well as one gunboat of the SGB type.
        The Soviet fleet could not even dream of such a quantity!
        1. Dr. Frankenstucker
          Dr. Frankenstucker 18 August 2020 09: 23 New
          0
          Quote: hohol95
          The Soviet fleet could not even dream of such a quantity!

          oh well, in the Baltic by the beginning of the war, the Kriegsmarine had three dozen TCs. Tributs had 67 of them.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 18 August 2020 16: 39 New
            0
            67 TCA on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX?
            I have seen other figures - 44 TKA for this date !!!
            17 MO-4, 15 boat minesweepers and 4 armored boats.
            That's all the boat forces of the KBF on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX!
            The Germans opposed - 28 TKA, 5 submarines, 10 minelayers, 3 flotillas of minesweepers of special construction, 7 flotillas of converted minesweepers and patrol boats.
            5 = I flotilla KATSCH, 1st, 2nd, 5th flotilla TKA (18 UNITS) and mine flotilla (6 minelayers) were to operate from Finnish territorial waters!
            And let's not forget about the Finnish Navy!
            Group A (skerry fleet) included: an armored flotilla (two coastal defense battleships); a security flotilla, which consisted of: the 1st semi-flotilla of gunboats (four units) and the 2nd semi-flotilla of patrol boats (6 units); mine flotilla (six surface minelayers); minesweeper flotilla consisting of: 1st and 2nd semi-flotillas (7 and 8 units). The skerry fleet also included a convoy detachment, which included: a convoy flotilla of patrol boats (5 units), the 1st and 2nd flotilla of icebreakers (four armed icebreakers each) and a mobile supply base (three floating bases and seven other ships). These forces, based on the Turku naval base, were supposed to operate in the operational direction of the Gulf of Bothnia - the northeastern part of the Baltic Sea. The command of the skerry fleet's combat operations was entrusted to the fleet commander, captain 1st rank E. Rakhol and his headquarters located in Turku; logistics - for the commander of the naval base Turku. The fleet commander was responsible for the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th coastal brigades, the 14th infantry regiment and the 14th light artillery battalion.
            Group B (a separate detachment of the fleet) included: 1st semi-flotilla of torpedo boats (5 units), 2nd semi-flotilla of patrol boats (5 units); submarine flotilla (5 units); group of surface minelayers (2 units); group of minesweepers (10 units); group of mine boats (4 units); group of patrol boats (4 units); a group of communications ships (2 units) and two floating bases. The commander of the Finnish Navy, Lieutenant General V. Valve, took over the leadership of the combat operations of a separate detachment of the fleet directly. The responsibility for combat training was assigned to the commander of the fleet. The ships were based at the Helsinki naval base and the ports of the Gulf of Finland, the supply was provided by the naval bases of Helsinki and Turku. The main tasks of a separate detachment of the fleet were the protection of skerry communication and the conduct of active operations on the communications of the Soviet fleet in the Gulf of Finland.
  6. parusnik
    parusnik 17 August 2020 08: 28 New
    +7
    Whoever dines on a girl dances her ... Germany dined on Finland and danced her. So the interline message is that if the USSR had not "squeezed" the Karelian Isthmus from the Finns and "attacked" Finland in 1941, Finland, remained neutral, groundless ...
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 17 August 2020 09: 27 New
      +3
      under the terrible Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, the Finns had to buy everything from us. refused. The influence of the Brita is still great.
      that's how long geopolitics has been growing from the depths of the centuries
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 17 August 2020 12: 59 New
        +2
        under the terrible Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, the Finns had to buy everything from us. refused.
        Don't tell jokes.
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 17 August 2020 14: 24 New
          +1
          the sphere of influence assumed - friendship on the terms of the USSR (like the Tribalts and Romanians) -
  7. antivirus
    antivirus 17 August 2020 09: 11 New
    +1
    In Finland, the forest was very well protected and it was not customary to heat steam locomotives with wood.

    The efficiency of firewood is lower - everything is calculated
  8. antivirus
    antivirus 17 August 2020 09: 21 New
    0
    loading and unloading, both by cranes and by hand, they easily entered the sea and river ports.

    - were Soviet prisoners of war loaded manually? - our tolorants
  9. Ham
    Ham 17 August 2020 10: 24 New
    +6
    sofa analyst decided to talk about the hostilities and speak out about the mediocrity and cowardice of the command of the KBF
    here is Verkhoturov Dima in place of the tribune - he would have shown these Hans !!!
    maybe the brilliant strategist Dima Verkhoturov will share his thoughts with us how the KBF in the current situation could destroy the enemy's communications ??? let him tell us how to break through anti-submarine positions correctly?
    For some reason, I am one hundred percent sure that in the command in 1942 (when Soviet submarines in attempts to break through to open water suffered the most terrible losses), there was also such a "verkhoturov" who, with his demagogy about "determination, pressure and ingenuity", initiated the failed operation ...
    the article is just some kind of MEKHLISOVSHCHINA
  10. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 17 August 2020 11: 39 New
    10
    More, to put it mildly, unserious material about the KBF did not have to be read.
    The fleet fought with the last forces to defend its bases and Leningrad and to supply Leningrad through Ladoga. He (KBF) had a decisive advantage that for the first time in Leningrad on the Eastern Front they turned a blitzkrieg into a positional war. He lacked the strength for this super task, and he is accused of not strangling Finland with a naval blockade in 1942-1943. During the summer, Finland waged a sort of "strange war" in 1942-43 and wasted on the resources of the Reich.
    If anyone made a strategic mistake in 1942, it's the Kriegsmarine. They did not concentrate all their forces on the Baltic Sea for the storming of Leningrad from the sea, which could have very grave consequences for the Red Army and for the course of the war as a whole.
    1. 41st region
      41st region 17 August 2020 12: 49 New
      15
      So-so article.
      You can have a few more pieces in the same style, I suggest themes:
      - "I counted here just now, the Germans quickly transported cargo by rail and I realized that the Russian partisans could not."
      - "I counted here just now, the Germans quickly transported cargo on horseback and I realized that the Russian wolves could not."
      - ... planes.
      - ... cars.
      - ...
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 17 August 2020 14: 59 New
      +7
      Quote: Kostadinov
      The fleet fought with the last forces to defend its bases and Leningrad and to supply Leningrad through Ladoga.

      Ummm ... Ladoga is not a KBF. This is the LF, specially created to remove from the KBF the tasks of supplying the city and evacuating the population. The basis of the flotilla were "Ladoga battleships" (armed mud scows), tugs and fishing vessels. For objective reasons, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (which became the front line of the Neva) could only help the flotilla with personnel.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      If anyone made a strategic mistake in 1942, it's the Kriegsmarine. They did not concentrate all their forces on the Baltic Sea for the storming of Leningrad from the sea, which could have very grave consequences for the Red Army and for the course of the war as a whole.

      Forts and wait will be only happy - they will finally have a chance to shoot at ships. And the submariners too: there is no need to go anywhere, the targets have come on their own, you can even use the "Babies". smile
      The Germans will never in their life drive their only LK and their only under-LK into the "dumpling soup" of the Gulf of Finland. The 10th EM flotilla was enough for them in the last war.
  11. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 17 August 2020 15: 21 New
    +3
    For objective reasons, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (which became the front line of the Neva) could only help the flotilla with personnel.

    We are talking about this. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet did not have enough forces to help the Ladoga Flotilla, and even more so cut off the supply of Finland.
    Quote: Alexey RA
    The Germans will never in their life drive their only LK and their only under-LK into the "dumpling soup" of the Gulf of Finland.

    Yes sir. Nobody promised the Germans a sweet life and an easy walk. But the Kriegsmarine had enough strength and resources, although they would feed themselves to help their ground forces in a decisive way on the decisive front:
    1. In addition to one superlinker, one battle cruiser, two old battleships and several heavy cruisers and destroyers near the Kriegsmarine, they beat a very good and large fleet of minesweepers, minesweepers, etc.
    2. The Germans had a very large fleet of very successful landing barges.
    3. In 1942, the Luftwaffe could still locally and for some period dominate the air.
    4. From the personnel of the Kriegsmarine, they could form at least an additional 2-3 naval divisions for the attack on Leningrad.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 17 August 2020 16: 46 New
      +4
      Quote: Kostadinov
      1. In addition to one superlinker, one battle cruiser, two old battleships and several heavy cruisers and destroyers near the Kriegsmarine, they beat a very good and large fleet of minesweepers, minesweepers, etc.

      Was. But they will have to trawl under fire from everything that gets to them - up to 10 ".
      Quote: Kostadinov
      3. In 1942, the Luftwaffe could still locally and for some period dominate the air.

      There is little hope for backlash in the air defense zone of Leningrad. In 1942 the Germans even failed to hit the ships frozen in the ice - Operation Aisstoss. "Kirov", of course, kicked, but ours were able to take him to a new place.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      4. From the personnel of the Kriegsmarine, they could form at least an additional 2-3 naval divisions for the attack on Leningrad.

      He is zisty, but what can he give him? © smile
      In the sense that the fleet will give ship personnel only when the enemy is completely at the gate. Because the victory over the USSR for the Reich is just a stage before the battle with Britain. Plus shots are needed for "Battle of the Atlantic".
      I would rather believe that Goering will form the "Baltic naval forces of the Luftwaffe" - in the image of the Ladoga lake flotilla of the Luftwaffe.
    2. Alex013
      Alex013 18 August 2020 12: 32 New
      0
      I agree! Moreover, in addition to barges, there were ferries of the Siebel type with a variety of weapons, ranging from 20mm machine guns to 88mm.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 18 August 2020 18: 30 New
        +2
        Quote: Alex013
        I agree! Moreover, in addition to barges, there were ferries of the Siebel type with a variety of weapons, ranging from 20mm machine guns to 88mm.

        It was from the Siebel that the backlashes were assembled on Ladoga. And they tried to land on Sukho - with a known result. Who knew that the depths in the disembarkation area should be studied before disembarkation according to maps, and not during disembarkation - by ferry hulls. smile
  12. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 17 August 2020 16: 22 New
    13
    Say thank you that the author does not reproach the KBF for not arranging the supply of besieged Leningrad from Sweden through the Baltic. And then after all oscilloscope arrow and I was honored for this ...
  13. Scharnhorst
    Scharnhorst 17 August 2020 16: 23 New
    -2
    Thanks to the author, for a long time nothing like this was on VO! Who really thinks that in the next war the DKBF will block the ports of Germany, Sweden or even Poland? ... Therefore, they are building RTOs with Caliber and naval aviation - something that can really damage the enemy. Otherwise, our "Symmetrical Patriots", modeled on the USMC, will reduce the T-72 from our marines - and how will we punch the Suvalkov corridor from Kaliningrad? The only submarine?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 17 August 2020 17: 02 New
      +3
      Quote: Scharnhorst
      Otherwise, our "Symmetrical Patriots", modeled on the USMC, will reduce the T-72 from our marines - and how will we punch the Suvalkov corridor from Kaliningrad?

      At the Marines, our "Symmetrical Patriots" can reduce the tanks as much as they want - the naval army corps will not be affected. Because these ex-groundmen do not belong to the marines, but to the coastal defense. smile
  14. Tests
    Tests 17 August 2020 17: 39 New
    +1
    Dear author! Civilian (Vadim), asked about the Air Force. He is right in many ways. But I will put the questions from a different angle. For some reason, you really have forgotten about the Baltic Fleet aviation. True, when analyzing the actions of the pilots, one will have to remember that there were concrete runways from which the pilots operated near Leningrad in 1941-1944 ... The bad weather for the aircraft of the USSR Air Force and KBF aircraft was not at all the same as it is now, as in the strength and direction of the wind , visibility at the ground by ... meters, the presence of fog, precipitation, soggy runway and taxiways. Very often we today try to analyze events, even 30 years ago, looking at the past through the eyes of the present. We forget that the technique was not at all the same as it is today, that the training of servicemen was not at all the same as it is today, and we often forget about the meals during the blockade of even the best rations. Although it seems that if in 1941 our bombers flew to Berlin, why didn't they bomb Helsinki in the Stone Age in 1942 ?! After all, the bombing of Helsinki by our Air Force in the summer of 1941 did not cause much damage to the port and city. And to Kemi, Oulu, Vaasa and Turku you just had to fly, and in Finland, oddly enough, had its own air force ...
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 17 August 2020 19: 04 New
      +3
      Quote: Tests
      But I will put the questions from a different angle. For some reason, you really have forgotten about the Baltic Fleet aviation.

      It's just that everything is bad with the KBF Air Force. Fighter aviation is occupied by the air defense of Kronstadt and Ladoga. And to work on the "distant approaches" she has only Lavensaari, on which many planes cannot be crammed. Plus the traditional problems with materiel - the same regiment in which Golubev served, until 1943 flew on the I-16. Even when the "one hundred and nineties" have already appeared on the other side.
      Mine torpedo aviation, EMNIP, generally sat on The big earth - outside the blockade ring.
      Well, do not forget that the KBF Air Force worked at the request of the army.
  15. 3x3zsave
    3x3zsave 17 August 2020 18: 19 New
    +4
    Mmmdy! If we remove the author's unsubstantiated claims to the KBF, we would get a very worthy article on the military economy and logistics, and so ... negative
  16. mvbmvbmvb
    mvbmvbmvb 17 August 2020 21: 55 New
    +2
    And the Black Sea? "Large ships" were banned from going to sea "due to possible losses." With a sufficiently large, but "weak" Air Force. YES - 1-2 departures per MONTH !!! Like Terkin's "Aviation and that ...". The whole burden of the war is on the ground. The combat readiness of the fleet was UPALA by the end of the war. For this, the naval command was removed.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 18 August 2020 08: 43 New
      +2
      Quote: mvbmvbmvb
      And the Black Sea? "Large ships" were banned from going to sea "due to possible losses."

      Possible it is better to replace it with inevitable... "Verp" is an example of this - backlashes quietly sunk the LD and 2 EMs, and the last target was finished off already within the radius of our fighter aircraft.
      Quote: mvbmvbmvb
      The combat readiness of the fleet fell by the end of the war.

      Amazing, right? To drive the fleet into small ports, to deprive it of all pre-war bases and shipbuilding with ship repairs, to get the best personnel from large ships to Arkhangelsk with Murmansk — and why would the fleet's combat readiness fall? wink
  17. Tests
    Tests 17 August 2020 22: 47 New
    0
    Alexey RA (Alexey), dear, I have to correct you. From April 1, 1942, 6 DB-3 1 of the Guards MTAP were based at the Uglovo airfield (near the Uglovo village on the "Road of Life" in the Vsevolozhsk district of the Leningrad region between the village of Romanovka and the village of Proba), 5 SB and 1 Ar-2 at the Grazhdanka airfield in Leningrad itself. At the end of May, the regiment had: 10 DB-3 and 1 Il-4 - to the air. Corner, 5 SB - to the air. Citizen. On January 1, 1943, the regiment used the Uglovo airfield.
    On August 20, 1943, the 1st and 2nd AE regiments on the Bostons began night mine-laying flights from the Kamenka airfield in Leningrad. On September 29, the A-20 torpedo bomber left the airfield for its first combat sortie. On January 1, 1944, in the combat composition of the regiment based on the aer. Kamenka, there were 9 Il-4, 3 DB-3b and 13 A-20G.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 18 August 2020 09: 04 New
      +2
      Quote: Tests
      Alexey RA (Alexey), dear, I have to correct you. From April 1, 1942, 6 DB-3 1 of the Guards MTAP were based at the Uglovo airfield (near the Uglovo village on the "Road of Life" in the Vsevolozhsk district of the Leningrad region between the village of Romanovka and the village of Proba), 5 SB and 1 Ar-2 at the Grazhdanka airfield in Leningrad itself.

      Yes you are right. I was wrong - 1 mtap was based inside the ring: Kamenka, Uglovo, Citizen. The regiment was completely on the mainland only in the fall of 1941, and in 1942 there was only the forming 1st squadron, which at the end of April 1942 also flew to the Uglovo airfield.
      March 23rd. Our squadron flew near Leningrad, to a new airfield. Now the regiment is based in three places: the first squadron is being formed and trained at the rear airfield in the Vologda region, the second squadron, equipped with SB aircraft, is based in Leningrad, the third - near Leningrad ...
      © Presnyakov A.V. Above the waves of the Baltic.
      Quote: Tests
      5 SB and 1 Ar-2 at the Grazhdanka airfield in Leningrad itself

      On the question of the materiel of naval aviation. Moreover, these aircraft in the 2nd squadron were collected from all over the KBF.
  18. aglet
    aglet 18 August 2020 08: 43 New
    0
    I have long been talking about the complete uselessness of the fleet, including the KBF, during the war
  19. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 18 August 2020 11: 03 New
    +1
    Was. But they will have to trawl under fire from everything that gets to them - up to 10 ".

    It will not be easy, there will be losses, it may not be in time. But for whom is it easy in a war and if they are afraid of failure it is better not to start a war? And what will the heavy artillery ships of the Kriegsmarine do?
    There is little hope for backlash in the air defense zone of Leningrad. In 1942 the Germans even failed to hit the ships frozen in the ice - Operation Aisstoss. "Kirov", of course, kicked, but ours were able to take him to a new place.

    And from the Luftwaffe, I do not expect that they will drown the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, but just will not allow the aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to drown their large ships.
    He’s a fiend, but who’s it? © smile
    In the sense that the fleet will give ship personnel only when the enemy is completely at the gate. Because the victory over the USSR for the Reich is just a stage before the battle with Britain. Plus shots are needed for "Battle of the Atlantic".

    This is another strategic decision. Use people where the war is being decided at the moment. Tie first defeat the USSR and then think about Britain.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 18 August 2020 19: 25 New
      +1
      Quote: Kostadinov
      And what will the heavy artillery ships of the Kriegsmarine do?

      The same as always, Pinky ... They will try to conquer the world! smile
      The convoys on the Iceland - USSR, Iceland - Britain and Britain - USSR routes will continue to scare. Distracting the Home Fleet and the Yankee ships training before entering service.
      The problem is that the participation of the fleet in the storming of Leningrad buries all plans for a further naval war with the Allies in the event of a victory over the USSR. Because the surface fleet after that can be put on repairs for two years - at best. And at worst, it will be like with "Gnei", which came out of modernization only for flooding.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      And from the Luftwaffe, I do not expect that they will drown the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, but just will not allow the aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to drown their large ships.

      No backlash is needed for this. Aviation KBF at that time simply did not have enough strength to drown anything larger than MM. Composition of 1 mtap for 1941-1943 given above - in 1942, even SB and AR were collected from all over the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, so that the 2nd squadron could at least fly on something.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      This is another strategic decision. Use people where the war is being decided at the moment.

      In those parts, a full-fledged infantry army with heavy artillery did not help. What's the fleet to do there?
      Moreover, as I already wrote, near its base the KBF can use all forces, including the "babies".
  20. Dedok
    Dedok 18 August 2020 11: 20 New
    +1
    Good article.
    Critical.
    Which poses many questions about the relationship between commanders and, for example, the General Staff
    Who should count? What orders should be given according to the calculations, what will be the main and what will be secondary?
    But even then, the main thing in the life of the leaders was - "breakthrough", "victory", "relational", etc.
    Sorrow ...
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 18 August 2020 17: 06 New
      -1
      For the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the fight against enemy shipping was a purely proactive measure!
      A similar task was set by the Military Council of the KBF.
      The Northern Fleet set a similar task by the People's Commissar of the Navy !!!
  21. Icovo
    Icovo 18 August 2020 22: 20 New
    +1
    I think the article has raised an important issue, but it is incorrectly formulated. The KBF ceased to exist after the breakthrough from Tallinn to Kronstadt. In 1942, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet's submarine forces were killed in an attempt to cross the Gulf of Finland. After that, they abandoned the idea of ​​acting on the enemy's communications. A large group of surface ships must be used to clear mine and net barriers in the Gulf of Finland. In the current situation at that time it was impossible.
  22. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 19 August 2020 11: 09 New
    +1
    The convoys on the Iceland - USSR, Iceland - Britain and Britain - USSR routes will continue to scare. Distracting the Home Fleet and the Yankee ships training before entering service.

    This is what they did in real life and it all ended in a well-known operation in December 1942 and Hitler's quite justified decision that heavy surface ships are useless and should be disarmed.
    The problem is that the participation of the fleet in the storming of Leningrad buries all plans for a further naval war with the Allies in the event of a victory over the USSR. Because the surface fleet after that can be put on repairs for two years - at best. And at worst, it will be like with "Gnei", which came out of modernization only for flooding.

    One cannot agree with this. I do not believe in the victory of Germany over the USSR, and I think that it was impossible, but for a separative peace in the East in 1942 and early 1943 I think there was still a chance. Of course, Germany should at least leave the entire occupation of the territory of the USSR, date political guarantees (the new government is like in Finland in 1944) and under some form will pay reparations (for example, surface ships could have transferred all the heaviness to the USSR), but that's another matter.
    In a naval war against the allies, the German surface fleet was already useless, and after a separative peace in the East, the Kriegsmarine would have an ideal opportunity in 1943-44 to deploy the modernization of the submarine fleet with new electric boats and date a decisive battle in the Atlantic.
    In those parts, a full-fledged infantry army with heavy artillery did not help. What's the fleet to do there?

    A strike from the sea directly to the city is a completely different matter - there are no defensive structures and forces must be attracted from other sectors of the front. What should the fleet be doing? The artillery of the fleet (105-380 mm), does what the artillery of the ground forces and aviation do.
    Moreover, as I already wrote, near its base the KBF can use all forces, including the "babies".

    There is no doubt about this. And babies and boats, everything will be involved. If necessary, there will be a battle in the city itself. So the chance for German success is no more than 50%. But still there is a chance. And in real life, there was no chance.
  23. kamakama
    kamakama 26 August 2020 11: 21 New
    0
    It is very difficult to judge by the fleet without knowing the general situation. So why Leningrad could not be surrendered as easily as Kiev or Minsk. 1) By itself, he pinned down in the siege grouping a huge number of Wehrmacht troops, which could be transferred to other parts of the front, which worsened the situation for the USSR as a whole. 2) There were physically huge enterprises in the city (Kirovsky, Obukhovsky factories, many others) that worked for the defense of the city (see p1) and for the defense of the country and which could not be evacuated for various reasons (there is no time for removal, there is no time for deployment , volume of cargo evacuation, continuous production cycle and much more). Stopping them undermined the country's defenses. As a result, these factories had to be supplied - with metal, consumables, fuel for energy, food - for workers.
    With these 2 factors in mind, let's look at the fleet. By the way, the surrender of Leningrad automatically put an end to the KBF - they would simply be drowned right at the pier, except for small boats that tried to break through the Neva to Ladoga. By the way, why? Leningrad fell, the Germans are advancing along the Neva-Svir line from the south, the Finns are already there from the north. On Lake Ladoga, where there are no bases left, there is no longer much to hide, and on the rivers they are generally just a target for conventional artillery and aviation. What can the fleet do when the command of the city's defense clearly understands that all resources, both internal and supplied from outside, are needed for land defense? The fleet needs fuel, which is not enough to operate the factories, it needs shells and torpedoes, which can theoretically be made on the same Obukhov, but ship shells do not fit conventional guns. This means reducing the production of conventional shells, making or bringing equipment from the mainland. Or they can be transported from the mainland ready-made, but this is again a burden on logistics. The efficiency of the fleet is a big question - you have to choose between the PROBABLE breakthrough into the main reach of the Baltic and the PROBABLE sinking of something that will harm the Finns and the Germans in the DISTANT future or fight for the base right here and now, otherwise the fleet will simply not exist. The command obviously chose the second path, writing off the crews to the infantry, and using the ships as floating air defense and artillery batteries
  24. lelik613
    lelik613 11 October 2020 19: 04 New
    0
    The legendary naval commanders were too legendary ...