Military Review

Two heroes. Why "Oslyabya" died in Tsushima, and "Peresvet" survived under Shantung

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In this article we will consider the damage sustained by the battleship Peresvet in the battle at Shantung, compare them with those that fell on the Oslyabi in Tsushima, and draw some conclusions.


How they shot at "Peresvet"


In total, during the battle in the Yellow Sea, 37 enemy shells hit Peresvet, including:
- 13 rounds of 305 mm caliber;
- 3 rounds of 203 mm caliber;
- 11 rounds of 152 mm caliber;
- 7 shells of unknown caliber (presumably 152 mm);
- 1 shell with a caliber of 75 mm;
- 2 shells with a caliber of 57 mm.

As you know, the battle in the Yellow Sea can be divided into two main phases. The first lasted from 12:20 - 12:25 to 14:50, that is, from the time of the opening of fire by the main forces and until the temporary cessation of the battle of the 1st Pacific Squadron with the battleships of H. Togo. The second phase began when the Japanese 1st Combat Detachment caught up with the departing Russian ships and the battle of the main forces resumed: this happened at 16:35.

According to available evidence, the Peresvet was not a priority target for the Japanese gunners before the start of Phase 2 of the Battle of Shantung: they only got two hits on the ship. At about 12:30, a 305 mm projectile hit 102 mm armor under the aft casemate of the 152 mm cannon. The armor was not pierced in this case, but shrapnel damaged the gun and injured three people. The exact time of the second hit, unfortunately, is unknown, sources indicate only that it happened before 16:30: a 305-mm projectile hit the foremast above the navigator's cabin and disabled the Barr and Stroud rangefinder. Of course, this loss had a negative impact on the ship's combat capability, but, of course, both hits did not threaten the buoyancy of the Peresvet.

However, then the second phase of the battle began. "Peresvet" was the fourth in the ranks of the Russian battleships. The Sevastopol followed him into the wake, and the Poltava, which was decently damaged by the Japanese fire, fell behind the formation a little because of the damage it had. At 2, Poltava began zeroing in with 16.35-mm guns, and the Japanese immediately responded. However, their distances were inaccurate and they did not cause serious damage to Poltava, especially since almost immediately the Japanese gunners transferred fire to the Peresvet.

Let's see the statistics. As mentioned above, two 305-mm hits took place before the 2nd phase, and two more 57-mm shells "Peresvet" received later, from Japanese destroyers. Consequently, in the 2nd phase of the battle "Peresvet" received 33 enemy shells, but, unfortunately, the time of hits was recorded only for 11 of them. However, all of the "recorded" 11 hits occurred between "about 16:40" and before 17:08, that is, within half an hour of the beginning of the 2nd phase. It can be assumed that a significant number of other hits, the time of which is unknown, took place in the same interval. This indicates that "Peresvet" in the first 30-40 minutes of the battle was under concentrated Japanese fire.

Why exactly "Peresvet"? Obviously, the flagship Russian ships were of particular interest to the Japanese. However, being in the role of catch-up, they did not have the opportunity to immediately concentrate fire on the leading "Tsarevich" VK Vitgeft. "Peresvet", sailing under the flag of the squadron's junior flagship, Prince Ukhtomsky, represented both a tasty and an accessible target for them. At the beginning of the battle, the distance between "Peresvet" and "Mikasa" was determined as 42 cables, while between the flagships H. Togo and V.K. Vitgeft was about 60 cables. In addition, the fact that it was Peresvet that was the main target of the Japanese gunners in the first half hour of the battle of the 2nd phase is perfectly confirmed by the statistics of hits on Russian ships.

As already mentioned above, in the period from 16:35 to 17:08, 11 hits were recorded in Peresvet. But the first hit to the "Tsarevich" is noted only at 17:00, while, probably, this Russian flagship came under concentrated fire later, closer to 17:40. The fact is that after the Japanese shell at 17:00, in the interval from 17:00 to 17:40, hits on the Tsarevich were not taken into account at all, but in the interval from 17:40 to 18:00 9 shells hit the ship. In the 2nd phase of the battle, Retvizan received its first shell at 17:20, Sevastopol - at 17.35. Of course, it can be assumed that the aforementioned Russian battleships in the period from 16:30 received hits, the time of which was not recorded. But there are those for the entire 2nd phase: the "Tsarevich" - 4, the "Retvizan" - 9, and the "Sevastopol" - 10. Therefore, even if we assume that all these unaccounted-for shells hit the Russian ships in the first half an hour, then in this case there are more hits in "Peresvet" only taken into account in time. But "Peresvet" received another 22 unaccounted-for hits ...


The view of "Peresvet" after the battle on July 28, 1904 speaks for itself

Unfortunately, no one kept such timing at Pobeda and Poltava in the 2nd phase. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the "Victory" in the 2nd phase of the battle did not interest the Japanese gunners too much - from 16:30 until the end of the battle, only 5 shells hit it. Another thing is the "Poltava", which received 17 hits in this phase of the battle, while the first of them, according to Lutonin's recollections, hit the ship shortly after the Japanese opened fire.

Accordingly, it would not be a mistake to assume that the Japanese fire was distributed as follows: from about 16:35 - 16:40 onwards, the head Japanese battleships fired mainly at the "Peresvet", and the end ones - at the "Poltava". Then, closer to 17:00, the transfer of fire to the lead ships of the Russian column began, but the shooting at the Peresvet remained intense, since the Japanese terminal were connected to it. Well, closer to 17:30 the fire on the "Peresvet" weakened and, as far as can be judged, by 18:00 mostly only armored cruisers, closing the line of H. Togo, were shooting at it. Subsequently, after the turn of the Russian squadron, "Peresvet" for some time again fell into the field of view of the Japanese battleships. This, of course, is not an absolutely accurate reconstruction: the Japanese regularly transferred fire from one Russian ship to another, so everything is very confusing here, but the general tendency seems to be exactly as described above.

Accordingly, we see that the "Peresvet" in the Yellow Sea, like the "Oslyabya" in Tsushima, came under concentrated fire from the Japanese squadron in the first 30-40 minutes of the battle. But for some reason, "Oslyabya" received fatal injuries and died, and "Peresvet" was able to survive the Japanese fire, participated in the further battle and managed to return to Port Arthur. Why did this happen?

About damage to "Peresvet"


As surprising as it may sound, the damage to the "Peresvet" and "Oslyabi" is simply frighteningly similar. Judge for yourself, dear readers. According to eyewitnesses, "Oslyabya" received 3 hits of heavy shells in the bow turret of the main caliber, which made the latter out of action. The first two 305-mm projectiles (or one 305-mm and one 254-mm), hitting the "Peresvet" at 16:40, hit ... the bow turret of the main caliber. The turret could still shoot, but could not rotate as it was jammed.

Russian reports report 2 hits of heavy shells in the area of ​​the Oslyabi waterline, in the unarmored bow and in the area of ​​the 10th coal pit. The Japanese believe that they achieved three hits and that two 305-mm shells hit the nose.


In total, 3 heavy shells hit the waterline area of ​​the "Peresvet", two of them hit the unarmored bow of the ship. One landed in front of the bow bulkhead in the electroforming workshop, the second in the living deck behind the bow bulkhead. As in the case of the Oslyabey, both shells made large holes in the unarmored side, which were filled with water, which flooded the living deck for a considerable length of it. As in the case of "Oslyabey", the location of the holes excluded the possibility of sealing them in combat conditions.

But the consequences of these hits, apparently, were completely different.

Let's consider the first hit in the waterline area of ​​"Peresvet". Judging by the descriptions and sketches, the Japanese shell hit almost exactly the same place where the Oslyabya got hit - at the waterline on the living deck, in the bow of the 1st bulkhead. The only difference was that "Peresvet" fought and received hits with the right side, and "Oslyabya" - with the left.

At the same time, the water inflow into "Peresvet" was remarkably localized. The bow bulkhead withstood and prevented the spread of water into the 2nd compartment of the ship, the reports of the officers indicate that the water did not go into the interior. Thus, it turns out that the bulkhead and the living deck remained tight, and the only consequence of this hit was the flooding of the living deck in the space of the first compartment by about 0,6 m.

The battleship Oslyabya is a different matter. His 1st bulkhead was damaged, so that the water spread over the living deck up to the armored beam. But even this was not bad, but the fact that this water immediately began to seep into the lower rooms, as evidenced by the mine-machine conductor V. Zavarin. Moreover, he indicates both the premises into which the water entered (the premises of underwater mine torpedo tubes (TA), the premises of dynamos, the turret compartment), and the paths of water intake (through the ventilation shafts).


The diagram shows: blue - water penetration into "Peresvet" and "Oslyabya", red - into "Oslyabya", dotted arrows indicate the compartments into which water in "Oslyabya" passed, according to V. Zavarin

Unfortunately, there is a nuance here: alas, the author is not at all sure that he was able to correctly determine the location of the 1st bulkhead on the living deck.

The second hit to the "Peresvet", judging by the description, had, though in the unarmored side, but above the main armor belt. The fact is that, according to eyewitnesses, the office was destroyed by the explosion of this shell. Only now there was no office on the living deck of "Peresvet", but there were as many as 2 offices on the starboard side on the battery deck. They were located behind the barbette of the bow tower, but up to the traverse, which makes it possible to determine the place of the second hit.


It is interesting that the presented scheme does not fully correspond to the drawings of the damage to the "Peresvet" made by eyewitnesses. However, it does not correspond too much to the descriptions of eyewitnesses. So, for example, in the area of ​​the first hit of the Japanese shell, we see not one large hole, but two. Could two such holes have been produced by a single shell hit? At the same time, the second hit, which destroyed one of the offices, is depicted as something completely indistinct. There are other inconsistencies in this figure, but we will not analyze them in detail.


In any case, it is reliably known that from the second hit in the nose, the "Peresvet" suffered much more inconvenience than from the first. The water spread along the living deck from the armored beam and up to ... according to Cherkasov, to the "third bulkhead ahead of the bow beam." Alas, from the drawings provided by V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov, it is in no way possible to make out where she was. But, apparently, it was located towards the nose of the main caliber turret. The fact is that, according to testimonies, the only way out of the turret compartment of the nasal 254-mm tower of "Peresvet" was the supply pipes, since there was water in the compartments above it. And this water could get there only by spilling over the living deck, and since the flow of water from the 1st hit was restrained by the bow bulkhead, then there are no other options.

Consequently, the Japanese 305-mm projectile, which destroyed the office, still led to flooding below the level of the living deck. The water went into the bomb and cartridge magazines (but it is unclear what weapons, probably, we are talking about the 152-mm cannons in the bow casemates), the turret compartment, the submarine TA and dynamo compartments. That is, the distribution of water in this case is very similar to that received by "Oslyabya": everything was drowned on it.


Only "Oslyabe" all these floods took on an uncontrollable character: despite attempts to stop the flow of water into the hull, she continued to arrive through the ventilation pipes. And on "Peresvet", although the dynamos were flooded so that people had to be taken out of there, the further spread of water was completely limited by battening down the waterproof hatches.

This fact raises many questions. It turns out that the watertight hatches below the waterline were not battened down on the Peresvet in the battle? This is, generally speaking, sloppiness, but it is beyond the scope of this article. According to the descriptions of eyewitnesses, the situation was like this: the hatch in the armored deck, which is also the exit from the TA compartment to the living deck, was opened, as, incidentally, happened on the Oslyab. Through this hatch, water flowed to the torpedo tubes and below, to the dynamo compartment, and from there - to the turret compartment of the bow 254-mm turret. But as soon as the hatches on the armored deck and in the turret compartment were closed, then the water flow into the compartments below the living deck (marked in the diagram above with dotted arrows) completely stopped. Ventilation pipes "Peresvet" did not "leak", accordingly, the compartments of the ship in the bow remained tight.

The author does not know the design of the ventilation system on ships of the "Peresvet" class. But common sense dictates that such a system poses a known danger to the survivability of the ship and that it is necessary to be able to prevent the spread of water through it. It was on Peresvet, but for some reason it did not work on Oslyab: it should be assumed that the quality of the ship's construction is to blame here.

Thus, the damage to Peresvet, caused by two 305-mm Japanese shells hitting the bow of the ship, was limited to flooding of the living deck from the stem to the armored traverse, and a relatively small amount of water that entered the dynamo compartment. It is also possible that water nevertheless penetrated into some spaces located between the living and armored deck. But in the reports there is not a single mention of flooding below the armored deck, except for the unfortunate section of dynamos.

The damage to the "Peresvet" and "Oslyabi" is similar in that there were holes at the level of their residential decks that could not be repaired. That is, the sea had completely free access to the living decks of both of these ships. But "Peresvet" did not have a trim on the nose, while "Oslyabya" received this trim.

Why?


Let's go, as they say, from the opposite.

The masses of water spilling over the living deck, by themselves, could not have caused a bow trim. The living deck was located in height at the level of the upper edge of the armor belt, in other words, even when the ship was overloaded, in which the belt completely went under the water, this deck turned out to be only centimeters below sea level. Of course, taking into account even a weak excitement, the forward movement of the ship, during which it seems to "capture" water into itself through a hole in the bow, a certain amount of water will certainly flow, even if the deck remains above sea level. What is interesting: and M.P. Sablin, and V.N. Cherkasov pointed out that the water on the residential decks of the battleships was about 60 cm (two feet), only M.P. Sablin said that the water subsequently arrived, and V.N. Cherkasov did not report anything of the kind.

But what is this 60 cm? On the scale of the ship - minuscule. Even if such a layer of water covered the entire living deck, with all the rooms on it and up to the fore armored beam, excluding only the flooding of the coal pits and the 254-mm tower feed pipe, then in this case the total water mass hardly exceeded 200 tons , and even distributed from the stem and almost to the 1st pipe. Such a load, of course, could not cause a significant trim on the nose. And in the case of "Peresvet" she did not call him.

But, perhaps, "Oslyabya" took more water onto the living deck due to the fact that it was overloaded more than "Peresvet"? Consider this version. The construction overload of "Peresvet" was 1 tons, "Oslyabi" - 136 tons. Accordingly, "Oslyabya" was roughly 1 tons heavier. Coal reserves at "Oslyab" in the morning of May 734, according to the data of the cruiser "Almaz", were 600 tons. Consumption per day on ships of the "Peresvet" type was 13-1 tons, and at Oslyabi "on the last passages - about 415 tons, so by the beginning of the battle the amount of coal on the ship was probably somewhere between 100 and 114 t. As for the "Peresvet", then, according to the testimony of the Investigative Commission of the inspector Lieutenant Tyrtov 100nd, the battleship went out to sea, having about 1250 tons of coal and by the beginning of the 1nd phase of the battle it was apparently even more than on "Oslyab". As for the rest of the scales, then, alas, nothing can be said for sure. It is possible, of course, that "Oslyabya" had some excess water reserves and so on. But there is no information about this, but it is known that some excess weights were on the "Peresvet" in the battle at Shantung. The same Tyrtov 300nd pointed out that "there was a three-month supply of provisions on the battleship."

Thus, it can be assumed that the difference in the weights of the "Peresvet" and "Oslyabi" in the battle at Shantung and in the Battle of Tsushima was no more than 500-600 tons. And taking into account the fact that the cargo of this type of ships increased by 20,55 tons. draft by 1 cm, the difference in draft between Peresvet and Oslyabi was 25-30 cm. That is, if the living deck was completely flooded under the conditions described above, Oslyabya would receive about 100 tons of water more than Peresvet, but rather everything, even less.

It turns out that the additional mass of water that could enter the Oslyabya due to the fact that this battleship sat in the water deeper than the Peresvet is measured in tens, well, maybe hundreds of tons. Such a difference, of course, could not at all become the reason for the appearance of a strong trim in the Oslyabi, if the Peresvet did not have it. So the overload version disappears.

Could any additional damage to the Oslyabi hull from Japanese 152-203 mm shells have led to an increase in the amount of water on the upper deck? No, they couldn't. No matter how many such shells hit the Oslyabi hull in the waterline area, all they could do was to open the way for water to the living deck. Well, after all, it was already open - through a hole from a 305-mm projectile.

Could it be that the Oslyabi's bow was trimmed as a result of another hit by a 305-mm projectile in the bow of the ship, which was observed from Fuji? The commander of "Navarin" Ozerov assumed that the battleship received a blow of such force that it had already lost its armor plates:

"I believe that the armor plates on the left side against the command bridge fell off on the Oslyab, since I clearly saw the burning side, and the list to the right formed quickly."

As can be seen from the quote, Ozerov himself did not see any fallen armor plates. He only assumed that this had happened, seeing the plight of the Oslyabi. In other words, we do not know whether this hit was or not, we do not know whether it caused the destruction or even falling off of the armor plate or did not. But we know for sure ... that Peresvet received a similar hit.


At about 16:45, a 305-mm Japanese shell hit the 229-mm armor belt along the waterline, in the area of ​​the 39th frame under the bow casemate. The shell did not pierce the armor, but gave a protracted rupture, as a result of which it managed to break off part of the armor plate (a triangle 1 m high and 0,8 m base point downwards). As a result, the battleship received flooding of 2 upper coal pits (20 tons of water each) and two lower ones (60 tons each), and a total of 160 tons of water entered the battleship's hull. At the same time, the bevels of the armored deck did not suffer: the water flowed down through the loosely closed necks. And this flooding, again, did not cause any trim, but only a roll, which was easily eliminated by counter-flooding of the compartments on the left side.

Accordingly, even if another 305-mm projectile from "Fuji" nevertheless hit the nose of the "Oslyabi" and damaged the armor belt (and on "Peresvet" this happened only thanks to an untimely detonated fuse), this should not have become the reason for the trim on the bow, which this battleship received in the Battle of Tsushima - after all, a similar hit to the "Peresvet" did not lead to anything like that.

Thus, the only reasonable explanation for the appearance of a trim on the bow is the gradual flooding of the bow compartments of the Oslyabi located below the waterline. It is likely that it spread most intensively through the ventilation pipes, but it is possible that there were other leaks - through the living or armored deck that was loosened from the explosion of an enemy shell, and simply through cracks, leaking joints of steel sheets.

On criticism of the version of flooding of the bow compartments


In the discussion of the previous material, the idea was expressed that such flooding of the Oslyabi could not cause a strong trim, since the volume of the bow compartments is too small to take in a sufficient amount of water. In order to understand how justified this opinion is, let's recall the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, namely, a torpedo hit on the battleship Retvizan. Which, by the way, in terms of normal displacement was even less than the Oslyabi.

The Japanese "self-propelled mine" hit ... just as deliberately, in about the same place as the Japanese 305-mm shell in "Oslyabyu". "Retvizan" was struck in the left bow of the hull, in the room of underwater mine vehicles (they were located in front of the barbette of the bow tower of the main caliber, and not behind). Of course, the extent of the damage was incomparable: the torpedo made a hole with an area of ​​160 square meters. feet, that is, about 15 sq. m, twelve-inch shells, even high-explosive, were not capable of this. But what happened next? Official historiography reports:

“Fearing the battleship sinking at a deep (9 fathoms) anchorage, the commander of the Retvizan, having asked for permission from the squadron chief to wean off the anchor ... went to the entrance to the inner roadstead: there were still three hours before full water, but the commander expected that even with this water will be able to pass safely ”.

But why was the Retvizan commander so sure that he could enter the internal raid? Here is a snippet of his report:

“The trimmer expected no more than 5 feet. due to the flooding of one compartment of the underwater mine vehicles with water, I thought that I would pass along the fairway ”.

That is, the battleship commander believed that the flooding of only one compartment of his ship could give a trim of up to 1,5 m. However, according to the report of E. N. Shchensnovich to the head of the Pacific squadron, this preliminary assessment of his turned out to be overly optimistic: in fact, “ Retvizan "were flooded not 1, but 3 compartments" with a capacity of about 500, 700 and 1000 tons. " That is, in total, the battleship took 2200 tons of water into the bow compartments. But where did E. N. Shchensnovich miscalculate, counting on the flooding of only one compartment? Official Russian historiography reads:

“His assumptions did not come true due to the imperfection of the wiring of the ventilation pipes on the battleship: the connections of the pipes of different compartments were made at a height close to the waterline, and the disconnection of the pipes was done using ball copper hollow floating valves, which did not press tightly when flooded. water, but crumpled and could not hold water; the latter came all the time, flooding the squads not damaged by the explosion, as a result of which the bow of the battleship sank lower and lower.

Thus, we can say that the problems of "Oslyabi" and "Retvizan" turned out to be extremely similar. Both ships received holes in the bow on the port side. On both battleships, there was an uncontrolled flow of water into the intact compartments through the ventilation system. Russian official historiography notes that at the Retvizan, water was also supplied through "mines and elevators, which were brought only to the residential deck on the Retvizan, and not higher", but it should be understood that there could have been others on the Oslyab. leaks ", except for ventilation. As a result, "Retvizan" ran aground, taking 2 tons of water into the bow compartments. The photo clearly shows that the bow of the ship sank to the level of the upper deck.


Noteworthy is the difference in the time of flooding. The fact is that the Retvizan ran aground with its nose a little less than 2 hours after being blown up by a mine, and Oslyabya went into the water “right up to the hawks” in just 25 minutes, counting from the moment the 305-mm projectile hit into its nasal end. But here, most likely, this was the case.

While the Retvizan remained at anchor, it was possible to set sail on its hole, which significantly limited the flow of water into the ship. Probably, that is why E. N. Shchensnovich, seeing that the trim was not too great, planned to go to the inner roadstead. If his battleship immediately sat down in the water on the upper deck, such an idea, of course, could not arise. But when the "Retvizan" set in motion, the flow of water through the fragile barrier intensified, and the trim on the bow began to grow rapidly, which led the battleship aground. In other words, it should be assumed that the mine explosion quickly flooded the premises located in the area of ​​the damaged side, but the further inflow of water was stopped by the wound sail: but it increased significantly when the battleship started moving.

Well, the Oslyabya was not at anchor at all, but was sailing on a rather fresh sea, despite the fact that its hole was not closed at all by anything. In addition, it is necessary to take into account that the Retvizan was divided into 15 watertight compartments, and the Oslyabya - only 10. The bow of the Oslyabi up to the boiler rooms was divided into 3 such compartments: the ram, the bow ammunition magazines and the turret bow, while the Retvizan had six watertight compartments in the nose, which could also affect the rate of flooding. And, of course, the Oslyabya did not land with its bow as much as the Retvizan - not to the level of the upper deck, but only to the haws, which corresponded to a trim within 3 m, perhaps a little more.

About getting into the area of ​​the 10th coal pit


It remains to consider getting into the area of ​​the 10th coal pit "Oslyabi". MP Sablin believed that this hit had broken through the armor. But was there? And if so, which one? A Japanese shell could break off a piece of armor by analogy with how it happened with the "Peresvet". He could simply loosen the 229-mm armor plate and thus cause water to flow into the Oslyabi hull. It is also possible that in fact the Japanese shell hit not the 229-mm, but the 102-mm plate and pierced / loosened / split it. The example of "Peresvet" shows that if such a hit on the "Oslyabya" occurred directly above the edge of the 229-mm armor plate, then the hole was "perfectly" filled with water.

It should be assumed that some gigantic hole did not happen there, especially since the surviving members of the Oslyabya crew speak only of the flooding of the 10th pit and the secondary pit-chamber located under it. It is unlikely that more water could have flowed into it than Peresvet received with its 2 lower and 2 submerged upper coal pits flooded. But attention is drawn to the fact that the counter-flooding on "Peresvet" quickly removed the roll to starboard, while on "Oslyab" for some reason it did not lead to success at all.

Other hits in "Peresvet"


Of these, only 3 hits are worthy of mention. Two shells of 152-254 mm caliber (more precisely, alas, it was not possible to determine) landed in a 178-mm armor belt below the waterline. The armor plates withstood the blow with honor: although the wooden and copper sheathing in the area of ​​the hits was destroyed, and the shirt, five frames and the bulkhead behind the armor were bent, water did not enter the hull. Another projectile of unknown caliber hit Peresvet at the waterline under the 75-mm gun # 17, that is, in the area of ​​the middle chimney, and also did not cause any noticeable harm.

Other hits in the hull, casemates, deckhouses and other parts of the ship could not have a significant effect on its unsinkability, as, incidentally, and similar hits in "Oslyabya", and therefore will not be considered by the author in this article. But there is one nuance that I would like to draw the attention of dear readers.

37 enemy shells hit "Peresvet", 35 of them - in the battle of the main forces. Only 6 of them hit the waterline area, including 4 in the armored belt. And only one large-caliber projectile, hitting the armor belt, managed to cause damage (flooding of coal pits).

These statistics should always be taken into account by those who believe that Oslyabya received a lot of damage in the waterline area with 152-203 mm ammunition. Even if Oslyabya was bombarded with enemy shells, even if (a very fantastic assumption) it received one and a half times more hits than Peresvet, this still statistically gives up to 9 hits in the waterline area, taking into account the hits of 305-mm shells with " Fuji ", of which up to two-thirds still had to be in the armored belt. And medium-caliber shells could not overpower the Oslyabi armor. And therefore it is extremely doubtful that the "hail of six- and eight-inch shells" will cause any noticeable damage to the ship's buoyancy.

Important factor


V.N. Cherkasov:

“At night, after a day's battle, the following phenomenon was observed: when, when an enemy destroyer appeared, they put the rudder on board and showed the destroyer the stern, the Peresvet slowly began to roll in the direction opposite to the turn; as a result, the water standing in the living deck began to roll from one side to the other and thereby increased the bank angle. The roll reached 7-8 degrees, the battleship remained in this position, and there was no urge to either straighten up or roll further until the rudder was pulled back; then the battleship began to roll in the opposite direction, and again reached 7-8 degrees of roll ”.

It must be said that the bank at Peresvet appeared even earlier: Lieutenant Tyrtov II noted that "a significant bank that prevented the correct aiming" appeared already during the battle of the main forces.

conclusions


According to the author's hypothesis, neither "Peresvet" nor "Oslyabya" suffered any damage, in which a well-built ship of this project had to sink. But the Baltiysky Zavod, which built Peresvet, managed to provide its brainchild with a quite decent quality of construction, as a result of which its protection, built according to the “English principle,” worked normally. Damage to the unarmored parts of the hull did not lead to flooding of the bow compartments located below the armored (rather, even below the residential) deck. The relatively small amount of water taken by the ship on the living deck did not cause a bow trim. And when the next enemy projectile damaged the armor belt, causing water to flow into the coal pits and the ship's roll, this roll was quickly parried by counter-flooding. Only later, when the ship to a certain extent used up part of the coal and ammunition, the list appeared again, but it did not threaten the ship with destruction.

"Oslyabya" is another matter. This ship was built at the shipyard of the New Admiralty, which at that time was inferior to the Baltic shipyard in all respects. The difference in construction overload has already been mentioned: "Oslyabya" turned out to be about 600 tons heavier. At the same time, while the "specialists" of the New Admiralty were building one ship ("Oslyabya"), the Baltic Shipyard actually built two: "Peresvet" and "Pobeda". There were also many complaints about the quality of the materials from which the "Oslyabya" was made, and the quality of the work itself ... The nasal compartments of the "Peresvet", located below the waterline, retained tightness, but the "Oslyabya" in the turret compartment and the compartments located behind it water was supplied through the ventilation.

All these are facts confirmed by sources, and then hypotheses follow. As mentioned earlier, the author assumes that water also penetrated into the other nasal compartments of the Oslyabi through all the same faulty ventilation, gradually flooding them. This caused the appearance of a bow trim, as a result of which the living deck gradually went lower and lower relative to sea level, and the mass of water on it increased. By the way, the increase in the mass of water on the living deck of the "Oslyabi" was noted by MP Sablin.

The result is a synergistic effect. The more the bow compartments were drowned, the more the trim increased and the more water entered the living deck. And the more water entered the living deck, the faster it flows through the ventilation system, cracks in the deck, etc. heated the bilge compartments. As a result, the trim on the bow quickly increased, and significantly more water entered the living deck of the Oslyabi than the Peresvet received.

When the second Japanese projectile caused flooding in the area of ​​the 10th coal pit, the Oslyabya was banked to the port side and exactly what VN Cherkasov described happened: the masses of water on the living deck overflowed to the left side and thereby significantly increased the roll ... That is, the flooding of the 10th coal pit and the spare pit-chamber played the role of "turning the rudder" of "Peresvet" as presented by VN Cherkasov.

The "Peresvet" on the living deck did not have so much water, and when "overflowing" it gave a roll of 7-8 degrees. But the "Oslyabi" had much more water on the living deck, which contributed to the increase in the roll up to 12 degrees by the time the ship was out of order of the squadron. The counterflooding could not help the Oslyaba, most likely because only the water that entered the 10th coal pit was taken into account, and the masses of overflowing water on the living deck were not taken into account. Or there were, but they simply did not have time to organize counterflooding of the corresponding scale.

In fact, only one question arises: the scale of the Oslyabi ventilation malfunctions. If it was impossible to restrict the spread of water through the compartments, then it should be considered that a single hit of a 305-mm projectile in the bow of the ship was a mortal wound for him. In this case, even if no more shells had hit the Oslyabya, the battleship would still be doomed. As in the case of the Retvizan, the water would gradually spread through the bow compartments of the battleship, and the Oslyabya sank with a large trim on the bow. This version looks the most realistic, also because the mine-machine conductor V. Zavarin did not find an opportunity to stop the flooding of the compartments through the ventilation, although he was clearly striving for this.

If, nevertheless, the spread of water could be stopped (which is doubtful), then the damaged artillery ports on the left side of the Oslyabi became the verdict for the ship. As mentioned in the previous article, after the Oslyabya landed with its bow on the haws, the port side gun ports were near the water, and, since the weather was fresh, they began to flood. Attempts to repair them were unsuccessful, water spread over the battery deck, which doomed the ship to death. But in both cases, the root cause of the death of the squadron battleship Oslyabya, according to the author, should be considered a malfunction in the ventilation system and, possibly, other flaws in the structure, due to which its nasal compartments lost their tightness and were flooded with water.

It is interesting that in the battle of July 28 at Shantung at the "Peresvet" gun ports also fell into disrepair. But due to the absence of any noticeable trim and the fact that the list of the ship did not exceed 7-8 degrees, this did not threaten the ship at all.

A bit of an alternative


Let us imagine for a moment that in the ranks of Russian ships in the Battle of Tsushima, instead of the Oslyabi, it was Peresvet. What would happen in this case? Never mind! Having received a hole in the unarmored port side, the ship would have received a small amount of water on the living deck. And, since this water turned out to be relatively small, then getting into the area of ​​the 10th boiler pit would only lead to a short-term roll, which would soon be parried by counterflooding. In place of "Oslyabi" "Peresvet" not only would not have died, he would not even be out of order and would have continued to fight.

But what happened to the "Oslyaby", if he was in battle in the Yellow Sea? Yes, exactly the same as in the Tsushima battle. Having received three 305-mm projectiles at the waterline, the ship would also lose the tightness of the bow compartments and would land with its bow on the hawses. If we assume that the spread of water could still be limited, then, perhaps, he would have held out a little longer than was released to him in the Battle of Tsushima, due to the timely straightening of the bank from flooding in coal pits. But even then "Oslyabya" would still sooner or later get a roll to the left or right side, and even if the rudder was turned by analogy with the "Peresvet", after which its gun ports would be flooded with water and it would overturn. Well, if the author is right in the assumption that the spread of water through ventilation pipes and other "leaks" has become irreversible, then even the timely straightening of the roll would give the ship at most another 40-50 minutes of life, after which it would go to the bottom without any roll ...

Thus, according to the author, if suddenly, by a wave of a magic wand, a miracle happened, and "Peresvet" and "Oslyabya" changed places in their battles, then "Peresvet" would definitely survive the first hour of the battle of the main forces, and if died in the future, then only as a result of other hits, which "Oslyaba" no longer needed. But for "Oslyabi" the battle at Shantung would have become a death sentence, although, perhaps, not carried out as quickly as it happened in Tsushima.


"Peresvet" and "Victory". These ships could well have survived the fire of Japanese ships at the beginning of the Tsushima battle.

Some consequences


I have a good idea of ​​what they will write about this in the comments, but ... Taking this opportunity, let's consider the legality of a couple of accusations against the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron ZP Rozhestvensky, which have long become classics.

It is often argued that the reason for the death of the "Oslyabi" was the overload of the ship, which caused its armor belt to go under water. But in order to reduce the draft of "Oslyabi" to the level of "Peresvet", he should have reduced the supply of coal much lower than normal, to about 700 tons. And this was a crime: suffice it to recall that the coal pits of "Peresvet" when he returned from the battle at Shantung in Port Arthur, were almost empty, although he went into battle with 1 tons of coal. Obviously, "Oslyabya" with 500 tons of coal did not have a single chance to reach Vladivostok.

But suppose that ZP Rozhestvensky still ordered the Oslyabya to be unloaded in such a way as to achieve precipitation at the Peresvet level. What would he achieve with this? Let us recall that the shell that destroyed the office of Peresvet exploded over the main armor belt, and as a result of this the seemingly not overloaded ship received a massive flooding along the residential deck. That is, you need to understand that even the draft of "Peresvet" on July 28, 1904 did not guarantee the elevation of the main armor belt enough to prevent flooding through the holes received above the armor plates, even in the relatively calm sea of ​​the battle at Shantung. In the Tsushima battle, the excitement was more serious, and in order to have at least a shadow of hope that the holes on top of the Oslyabi's armor belt would not be overwhelmed by water, it was necessary to completely unload all coal supplies and lead the battleship into battle in tow ...

And further. The author never claimed that ZP Rozhdestvensky had ideally rebuilt his squadron before the battle of the main forces in Tsushima. Without a doubt, the Russian commander was mistaken, he calculated the maneuver incorrectly, as a result of which the Oryol did not have time to take a place in the ranks. This mistake was aggravated by the "inaction" of the commander of the Oslyabi Baer, ​​who, instead of somehow reacting to the mistake of his admiral (to reduce speed, to move to the left, etc.), simply walked forward until, in order to avoid a collision, had to slow down sharply, literally stopping the battleship. But in any case, it was ZP Rozhestvensky who created the prerequisites for the "clustering" of the Eagle and the lead ships of the 2nd armored detachment.

However, contrary to popular belief, this mistake did not cause the death of Oslyabi. If in place of "Oslyabi" by some miracle there were "Peresvet" or "Victory", then no tragedy with capsizing and sinking of the ship at 14.40:14 on May 1905, XNUMX would not have happened. The damage that "Oslyabya" received in the first half hour of the battle should not have led to the death of a ship of this type (subject to high-quality construction, of course).

And the last thing. When today they are discussing how to outplay Tsushima by separating squadron battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabyu type into a separate detachment, one must understand that the latter was a very conventional combat unit. According to the author's hypothesis, for a completely untimely death, Oslyaba needed only one (!) Successful hit of a 305-mm Japanese shell at the ship's waterline into the unarmored bow part of the hull. Thanks to the bunglers of the New Admiralty.

And you, dear readers, thank you for your attention!
Author:
Articles from this series:
"On the reasons for the death of the battleship Oslyabya"
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  1. Grossvater
    Grossvater 24 July 2020 06: 24 New
    22
    Interesting debriefing. But I don’t remember whose words, almost literally: "Oslyabya sank after two shells hit the waterline, forever hiding the consequences of construction under the water." They were said almost immediately after the RYAV.
    And yet, Retvizan had automatic ball valves in the ventilation system, the balls from the explosions were deformed and stopped blocking the ventilation pipes when flooded. Russian-built ships were equipped with much more reliable clinkets. Therefore, a direct comparison of the flooding of Retvizan and Oslyabi is not entirely correct.
    Well, in general, apart from the direct objective reasons for the defeat, in the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian fleet was simply mystically unlucky.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 06: 38 New
      +8
      Quote: Grossvater
      Russian-built ships were equipped with much more reliable clinkets. Therefore, a direct comparison of the flooding of Retvizan and Oslyabi is not entirely correct.

      How to say? The bottom line is that both here and there water flowed through the ventilation unrestrictedly. V. Zavarin points to this absolutely unequivocally
      1. vahpus
        vahpus 24 July 2020 14: 17 New
        -8
        Why "Oslyabya" died in Tsushima, and "Peresvet" survived under Shantung

        How many unnecessary words.
        And how many fictions, such as "the battle of Shantung".
        Shantung, this is a silk fabric. And Vitgeft gave battle to the Japanese in the Yellow Sea.
        As for the answer to the simple question asked at the very beginning, it is obvious and known for many, many years - Peresvet was in a combat position, and Oslyabya, like the entire Rozhdestvensky squadron, was in a transport position.
        Ships (and not only them) cannot fight in a transport position, since this is fraught with sad consequences for them. Which is exactly what happened to Oslyabya. In fact, he, like the entire Rozhdestvensky squadron, fighting in a transport position, was doomed to death IN ADVANCE. By the will of this very Rozhdestvensky.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 14: 35 New
          10
          Quote: vahpus
          As for the answer to the simple question asked at the very beginning, it is obvious and known for many, many years - Peresvet was in a combat position, and Oslyabya, like the entire Rozhdestvensky squadron, was in a transport position.

          My urgent advice to you is that you either teach materiel, or tie up changes in consciousness with heavy drugs.
          I won't even ask what the latest discovery is such a "combat ship in a transport position." Packed and ready for shipment by Russian Post? laughing
          1. vahpus
            vahpus 24 July 2020 15: 08 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I won't even ask what the latest discovery is such a "combat ship in a transport position."

            You have never served in the army. It is obvious.
            All military objects and subjects for combat are brought into a combat position. Starting from infantry soldiers and ending with ships. And they need very different time for this.
            The set of measures to bring an armored ship into a combat position also includes entering its draft within a strictly specified framework. Otherwise, his protection (armor) will not work as intended by the designers. Otherwise it won't work at all.
            This was not done with the ships of Rozhdestvensky. And they fought very heavily overloaded and sank into the water. Either without protection at the actual waterline at all, or with very much weakened protection. Therefore, they were simply doomed to failure.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Obviously, "Oslyabya" with 700 tons of coal did not have a single chance to reach Vladivostok.

            I agree with that. Oslyabya was hanging out in the Baltic because it was unsuitable for long-range operations. Because of the clumsy construction.
            The rest of the ships of Rozhestvensky's squadron were also clumsily built, with the exception of the old Navarin (of the large ones).
            Therefore, few of them would have reached Vladivostok in a combat position.
            But this does not mean at all that it was necessary to fight in a transport position. Since a fight in this position assumes, as a result, ONLY defeat.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              24 July 2020 15: 19 New
              +2
              Quote: vahpus
              This was not done with the ships of Rozhdestvensky. And they fought very heavily overloaded and sank into the water.

              Therefore, I am writing to you - learn the materiel. Rozhdestvensky's ships WERE NOT overloaded, having more than normal coal reserves, but significantly less than the maximum. That is, they had coal just for the battle + the road to Vladivostok.
              Quote: vahpus
              You have never served in the army. It is obvious.

              British admirals, too. Therefore, they always tried to take the full supply of coal. The Japanese also did not serve in the army, so they had a supply of coal close to full, and maybe even more.
              Quote: vahpus
              Either without protection at the actual waterline at all, or with very much weakened protection. Therefore, they were simply doomed to failure.

              But the available data does not allow us to assert that at least one Russian ship died for this reason in the battle on May 14.
              1. vahpus
                vahpus 24 July 2020 15: 40 New
                -1
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Rozhdestvensky's ships WERE NOT overloaded, having more than normal coal reserves, but significantly less than the maximum.

                You are incompetent in this matter. Absolutely.
                In addition, in addition to coal, ships carry a lot of other cargoes. Read how Rozhdestvensky's ships sailed to the Far East and how and what they were loaded with besides coal.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                That is, they had coal just for the battle + the road to Vladivostok.

                This is an accounting approach.
                And the approach of the LITTLE naval sailor is different.
                The payload of a ship (including coal) in a combat position is determined not by the tasks facing the ship, but by its actual tactical and technical characteristics. Those. its REAL possibilities. The desire to embrace the immense just leads to the consequences of the Tsushima type.
                It is IMPOSSIBLE to fight successfully in a transport position. Since the battleships have completely or partially lost one of their trump cards, protection.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                British admirals, too. Therefore, they always tried to take the full supply of coal.

                It depends on when.
                Before the hike, maybe. Moving in a transport position with some overload relative to the combat position is quite possible and not prohibited.
                Before the fight, never. Otherwise, they could very quickly cease to be admirals.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                The Japanese also did not serve in the army, so they had a supply of coal close to full, and maybe even more.

                I wrote above about British admirals. This also applies to the Japanese (and all other literate sailors).
                But the available data does not allow us to assert that at least one Russian ship died for this reason in the battle on May 14.

                Almost all of them died from him. Except for a few.
                And Oslyabya, it's just a classic death from overload. Textbook.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  24 July 2020 15: 48 New
                  +3
                  Quote: vahpus
                  You are incompetent in this matter. Absolutely.

                  You know, I won't waste time on your militant illiteracy
                  Quote: vahpus
                  In addition, in addition to coal, ships carry a lot of other cargoes. Read how Rozhdestvensky's ships sailed to the Far East and how and what they were loaded with besides coal.

                  Unlike you, I studied this question
                  Quote: vahpus
                  And the approach of the LITTLE naval sailor is different.

                  You have just enrolled in the illiterate H. Togo. And the admirals of Britain ALWAYS strived to take a full supply of fuel into battle. Even when the 305 mm belts of their dreadnoughts went under water.
                  Quote: vahpus
                  Almost all of them died from him.

                  Suvorov? Not. Oslyabya? Not. Alexander III? theoretically possible, but not proven. Borodino? Not.
                  Who else died in the daytime battle on May 14?
                  Quote: vahpus
                  It depends on when.
                  Before the hike, maybe.

                  Captain T. Jackson's Report May 25, 1905 (New Style)
                  “It was a dull day with fog over the sea. The Adzuma received 200 tons of coal, which covered the upper deck thoroughly. Several other ships also accepted coal, some for the second time in three days. At 17:00, Mikasa entered the harbor. He had a large amount of coal on the upper deck and sat very deep in the water, so that the heels of the poles of mine nets were completely submerged in the water. All fighters and destroyers had a load of coal on their decks. In the evening, steam and motor boats were sent from the shore to all ships and were No explanation has been received, but this is believed to be due to a possible Russian attempt to reach Vladivostok by the Tsugaru or La Perouse Straits, which would force the Japanese fleet to operate at some distance from its present base. "
                  1. vahpus
                    vahpus 24 July 2020 16: 15 New
                    -1
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    I will not waste time on your militant illiteracy

                    It is strange to see this phrase from a person who does not know that ships are in a combat and transport position. And these are different provisions.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Unlike you, I studied this question

                    Studied and studied, these are different things.
                    You may have studied. But they didn't.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And the admirals of Britain ALWAYS strived to take a full supply of fuel into battle. Even when the 305 mm belts of their dreadnoughts went under water.

                    An armored belt that has gone under water means that the battleship has completely or partially lost its waterline protection.
                    In a transport position (when a fight is not expected right now) this does not matter and is quite acceptable.
                    But in battle, trouble. Therefore, to conduct a battle, the ship is brought to a combat load. Those. to its strictly defined sediment in water. This is achieved either by unloading part of the load (thrown into the sea), or by filling ballast tanks (most often they are in the double bottom and inter-board spaces).
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Suvorov? Not. Oslyabya? Not. Alexander III? theoretically possible, but not proven. Borodino? Not.

                    Oslyabya - YES.
                    Alexander - YES.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    "Adzuma" received 200 tons of coal, which thoroughly filled up the upper deck. Several other ships also accepted coal, some for the second time in three days. At 17:00 "Mikasa" entered the harbor. He had a large amount of coal on the upper deck and sat very deep in the water, so that the heels of the poles of the mine nets were completely submerged in the water. All fighters and destroyers had a cargo of coal on their decks.

                    No, you obviously do not understand the difference between the transport and combat position of the ship.
                    And I will not explain to you further.
                    An intelligent person would understand this difference after my second message.
                    But you didn't get it. This is sad.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      24 July 2020 16: 52 New
                      +3
                      Quote: vahpus
                      It is strange to see this phrase from a person who does not know that ships are in a combat and transport position.

                      There is a lady in a position. Ships are in one or another displacement
                      Quote: vahpus
                      An armored belt that has gone under water means that the battleship has completely or partially lost its waterline protection.

                      Thanks, Cap. I repeat once again - almost all admirals of that era went for this.
                      Quote: vahpus
                      Oslyabya - YES.

                      Not. My two articles to help you
                      Quote: vahpus
                      Alexander - YES.

                      Have you personally dived and studied the nature of his damage?
                      No need to make statements that you are not able to confirm
                      Quote: vahpus
                      No, you obviously do not understand the difference between the transport and combat position of the ship.
                      And I will not explain to you further.

                      You'd better explain to yourself why Kh. Togo loaded coal as much on the upper deck to intercept the Russian ships, but for the Russian ships, well, you just can't have coal between the normal and full supply.
                      And explain something to me - your explanation has not matured yet
                      1. arturpraetor
                        arturpraetor 24 July 2020 17: 03 New
                        +7
                        Dear colleague, don't you think that Nikolay has visited us again? wassat Painfully, the manner of speech is similar. I am not claiming anything, but ...
                      2. Astra wild
                        Astra wild 24 July 2020 20: 00 New
                        +1
                        "Nikolai visited again", but he was banned, that he had to "change clothes"?
                      3. arturpraetor
                        arturpraetor 24 July 2020 20: 06 New
                        +4
                        To be honest, it's difficult to keep track of all Nikolai's accounts, as well as their bans. But when for 5 years (colleagues - up to 10 and more) have experience of communicating with this individual, then somehow the characteristic manner of communication and the ideas voiced are recognized very quickly ...
                    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      25 July 2020 08: 47 New
                      +1
                      Greetings, dear colleague! No, this is not Nikolai at all, I recognize that from the first sentence ... And, strange as it may sound, Nikolai is smarter.
                    3. arturpraetor
                      arturpraetor 25 July 2020 14: 09 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And, strange as it may sound, Nikolai is smarter.

                      Well, nina ... You, apparently, do not remember well how he offered coal in PMV to be transported from Zonguldak to Constantinople by car, in the absence of roads, and at the same time denied the "coal hunger" in the Turkish capital. From a smart person to see such statements - somehow ....)) And so, the manner of communication - well, very similar to his last appearances on this site.
                  2. Rakovor
                    Rakovor 25 July 2020 09: 57 New
                    0
                    Is this the one? The discoverer of new classes of warships, such as "squadron gunboats" and "coastal defense cruisers"?
                  3. arturpraetor
                    arturpraetor 25 July 2020 14: 09 New
                    0
                    If this is him, then yes, the same one.
                  4. Scaffold
                    Scaffold 26 July 2020 08: 24 New
                    0
                    And a strategic intelligence cruiser. lol
                2. Scaffold
                  Scaffold 26 July 2020 08: 23 New
                  0
                  Which is the "Intelligence cruiser"? hi
              2. vahpus
                vahpus 24 July 2020 17: 08 New
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                There is a lady in a position.

                It is a pity that the military do not know this and are issuing instructions, for example, how to transfer a gun from a transport position to a combat position. And back.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                I repeat once again - almost all admirals of that era went for this.

                Distort.
                The fact that the ships left the ports overloaded does not at all mean that they also fought overloaded, like the ships of Rozhdestvensky.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                My two articles to help you

                Yes, even 22. You do not know the topic. It means that your "articles" are not worth the price.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Have you personally dived and studied the nature of his damage?
                No need to make statements that you are not able to confirm

                Ships capsize for very few reasons. And all of them are associated with the flow of water into the ship, from one of the sides. Considering that Alexander's waterline defense was weakened by overload (the main belt went under the water), the conclusion is obvious.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                why H. Togo loaded coal as much on the upper deck to intercept Russian ships

                At the port of departure. But not under Tsushima. At Tsushima, Togo's ships were already in a combat position. As in the Yellow Sea.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                but for Russian ships, well, you just can't have coal between normal and full reserves.

                Should I explain to you the basics of shipbuilding?
                Go to a specialized university and learn it all there. If you can.
                Because you may not be able to. Because an ordinary person, as a rule, is able to understand that an armor belt drowned in water cannot fulfill its functions. And you are not able to understand this.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And explain something to me - your explanation has not matured yet

                I am afraid that she has not grown up at all for EVERYONE.
                And the reason is not all, the reason is you.
              3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                25 July 2020 08: 41 New
                +1
                Quote: vahpus
                Ships capsize for very few reasons. And all of them are associated with the flow of water into the ship, from one of the sides. Considering that Alexander's waterline defense was weakened by overload (the main belt went under the water), the conclusion is obvious.

                For a person who does not know the basics - perhaps. For a person who has at least a little knowledge of the material - no longer. But if you could not master the article and did not understand that, for example, the same Peresvet for some reason did not sink, having extensive holes along the waterline, then it is too difficult for you.
                Quote: vahpus
                Distort.
                The fact that the ships left the ports overloaded does not at all mean that they also fought overloaded, like the ships of Rozhdestvensky.

                Before you get into the discussion, you will learn how to add 2 + 2. If the Japanese overloaded the ships in the same Putu, so that they took over the full supply also on the deck, then they would take the battle at best in the same position as the Russian squadron. And that would be if the Russians went around Japan, and what if not? Or do you, naive, think that you can easily get rid of coal reserves on the eve of the battle?
                Quote: vahpus
                I am afraid that she has not grown up at all for EVERYONE.

                With your fears - to a psychoanalyst, please.
              4. vahpus
                vahpus 25 July 2020 09: 52 New
                +2
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                did not understand that, for example, the same Peresvet for some reason did not sink, having extensive holes in the waterline, then it is too difficult for you.

                Andrey, you are a very brave person.
                Unless you call it other terms.
                You absolutely don't understand:
                1. What is a citadel battleship and how was its survivability and buoyancy ensured.
                2. What is NADKarapasnoe space and how it worked.
                3. What is Podkarapasnoe space and how it worked.
                4. What is a citadel and how it worked.
                5. Why did the armored and semi-armored ships have a citadel of different lengths (and it was different) relative to the total length of the hull.
                Those. you don't know the basics. But at the same time you undertake to "write articles about the sea". Relying on their conclusions on the delirium of exactly the same silk workers, who also did not know the basics of maritime affairs. But "they wrote books about the sea."
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Or do you, naive, think that you can easily get rid of coal reserves on the eve of the battle?

                This is a common practice. In the case of coal, the surplus was simply thrown overboard. If necessary urgently, then immediately thrown out directly by the whole team. And even during the battle they were thrown out. Those who did not directly participate in the battle. Since the ship is overloaded in battle, this is a very serious danger for it.
                You just don't know foreign languages. Therefore, serious sources of information on this matter are not available to you. And in runet there are serious authors on this topic, one or two, but too many.
              5. rytik32
                rytik32 25 July 2020 15: 27 New
                +5
                Quote: vahpus
                This is a common practice. In the case of coal, the surplus was simply thrown overboard.

                I confirm that the Japanese did just that in front of Tsushima: the "extra" coal, stored in case of a trip to the Tsugaru Strait, was simply thrown overboard.
              6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                26 July 2020 01: 54 New
                0
                I'm afraid you are wrong again
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              25 July 2020 16: 50 New
              0
              Quote: vahpus
              You just don't know foreign languages. Therefore, serious sources of information on this matter are not available to you.

              Yes, no question - bring. Who, when and where, dumped this very coal, bringing the ship "from transport to combat". With links to the source. If I don’t know a foreign language, there’s prompt, and there are people who know it.
            3. rytik32
              rytik32 26 July 2020 00: 22 New
              +5
              Report of the commander of "Tokiwa" to help you. The coal was dumped immediately after leaving the port.
            4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 July 2020 01: 22 New
              +1
              Quote: rytik32
              Report of the commander of "Tokiwa" to help you.

              Quote.
            5. rytik32
              rytik32 26 July 2020 01: 28 New
              +4
              6 h. 48 min. According to the order from the flagship "Izumo" they raised the anchor. Our ship in the 2nd combat detachment is ship No. 3, behind the flagship Izumo, and behind the ship No. 2 "Azuma", follows in the direction north of Cape Karasaki of Tsushima Island. Dumped into the sea about 93 tons of coal, loaded on the upper deck in straw bags.
            6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 July 2020 01: 52 New
              +4
              Absolutely.
              Now think about what is written. The Japanese filled their ship with coal - they had a full supply. And they piled on top of the full supply on deck. So they threw coal from the deck, but inside the ship, as they had a full supply, they remained. And no one brought him back to normal, no one dragged hundreds of tons out of coal pits and threw them into the sea.
              In other words, there was no conversion "from marching to combat" by which my opponent understands bringing the weight of coal to normal, and what he proposed to our sailors to do.
            7. Andrey Shmelev
              Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 10: 34 New
              +3
              why was there a full supply below?
              it's also likely that some were left on deck to be simply dumped rather than suffering back and forth overload, isn't it?
            8. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 July 2020 11: 42 New
              +1
              Quote: Andrei Shmelev
              why was there a full supply below?

              Because
              Quote: vahpus
              At 17:00 "Mikasa" entered the harbor. He had a large amount of coal on the upper deck and sat very deep in the water, so that the heels of the poles of mine nets were completely submerged in the water.

              If there are places in the pits, the coal is placed in the pits, they will not be kept on the deck. And Mikasa's description clearly does not indicate a hundred other tons on deck + normal stock in pits
            9. Andrey Shmelev
              Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 12: 02 New
              +1
              returns to Tsushima in 2010 :) then it did not end with anything, since it is not clear at what mark the "heels" are set and in general the presence of a "over full" reserve after the fight is generally understandable difficult
              can a complete document be posted so that I can translate and interpret it?
            10. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 July 2020 12: 03 New
              0
              Quote: Andrei Shmelev
              can a complete document be posted so that I can translate and interpret it?

              Japanese? Not
            11. Andrey Shmelev
              Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 12: 12 New
              +1
              Japanese? Not

              well, how to say, if you want, you can search for a translator from Japanese :)
              and with European languages ​​I'm ready myself somehow
            12. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 July 2020 13: 12 New
              +1
              Quote: Andrei Shmelev
              well, how to say, if you want, you can search for a translator from Japanese :)

              I don't have a Japanese original - I use translations. By the way, even professional translators will have problems with the translation of Japanese reports - they need to know the maritime specifics + Japanese of those years, and not just the modern one. As for Jackson's report, it is in THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR in its original form. 1904-1905. Reports from naval attachés
            13. Andrey Shmelev
              Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 13: 40 New
              +1
              Spasio huge, and I missed that it was posted on the forums.
              I'll figure it out, I'll report it.
    2. rytik32
      rytik32 27 July 2020 00: 30 New
      +2
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      At 17:00 "Mikasa" entered the harbor. He had a large amount of coal on the upper deck and sat very deep in the water, so that the heels of the poles of mine nets were completely submerged in the water.

      It's up to Tsushima. I gave the photo above after. From the heels of the poles to the water somewhere 1,19 m (according to the calculations of http://alternathistory.com/k-voprosu-o-peregruzke-bronenostsev-v-russko-yaponskuyu-mikasa/
      And the difference in displacement is almost 3 thousand tons (calculations from the link above)
      Oh my God!!!! Mikasa burned so much coal in 2 days ?????
      Or thousands of tons of coal were on deck and thrown off ????
      Andrey, your version, unfortunately, is not confirmed.
      Mikasa thoroughly "lightened" the coal reserves before the battle and obviously not only at the expense of the deck.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      28 July 2020 13: 54 New
      0
      Quote: rytik32
      And the difference in displacement is almost 3 thousand tons (calculations from the link above)

      Yeah. 2975 t
      Quote: rytik32
      Oh my God!!!! Mikasa burned so much coal in 2 days ?????

      What confuses you? :))) A day and a half before the battle, Mikasa could well have lime 60-70 tons standing under steam or even more. 200 tons could be dumped from the deck. Throw another 200 tons for sailing on May 16-17, at least 100 tons for spent ammunition, take into account the consumption of the boiler room and other water and other goods, keep in mind that the photo might not have been taken immediately after returning to Sasebo, etc. etc. - and in the end you will come to the consumption of coal, which is not at all shocking for an battleship that was worn at 14-16 nodes
    4. rytik32
      rytik32 28 July 2020 15: 37 New
      +1
      Coal consumption data for Mikasa in Tsushima (new style dates):

      27 May
      05.00-08.00 - 15,12 t (from 76 to 96 revolutions, 12 ... 15 knots)
      08.00-12.00 - 35,36 t (80 ... 90 revolutions, 12 ... 15 knots)
      12.00-16.00 - 36,72 t (from 76 to 96 revolutions, 12 ... 15 knots)
      16.00-20.00 - 34,64 tons (90 rpm, 15 knots)
      20.00-24.00 - 35,76 tons (96 ... 100 revolutions, 15 knots)
      28 May
      00.00-04.00 - 36,56 t (96 ... 100 revolutions, 15 knots)
      04.00-08.00 - 29,84 tons (96 ... 100 revolutions, 15 knots)
      08.00-12.00 - 33,68 tons (80 ... 96 revolutions, 15 knots)
      Total: 257,68 t

      Coal consumption for "Tokiwa"

      14.00-20.00 May 27 - 55,8 t
      from going to sea on May 27 to 12.00 on May 28 - 234,72 t
    5. rytik32
      rytik32 28 July 2020 19: 30 New
      +1
      More data:
      "Sikishima" used 445 tons of coal from May 27 to 30
      "Nissin" 320,581 tons from May 27 to 30, 160 tons dropped before the battle at sea.
    6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 July 2020 07: 08 New
      0
      Alexey, I will answer later, I still can't
    7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 July 2020 17: 00 New
      0
      It seems to have figured it out. Alexey, here the thing is - Mikasa's photo, which was used by the esteemed Comrade, was not taken immediately after the Tsushima battle. Everything is simple here.
      Quote: rytik32
      From the heels of the poles to the water somewhere 1,19 m

      which gives us a difference of 2 tons. Let's say 975 tons of coal were dropped from the deck, another 200 tons were unloaded from the holds. You give the consumption of coal until 821:12 on May 00 - 15 tons, plus another consumption on May 258 and 16, well, let it be like Sikishima, that is, roughly 17 tons. And 450 tons for ammunition.
      In total, there were 1571 tons. Well, even if there were some expenses, the water boiled away the oil grew, well, another 100 tons, let's say. That is, according to your figures, at most 1700 tons are obtained. And the ship in the photo "felt better" by 2 tons! Thus, your assumption that the ship in the photo "felt better" as a result of reducing the coal supply to normal cannot be correct.
      Most likely in the photo - Mikasa, from which part of the cargo was unloaded
    8. rytik32
      rytik32 2 August 2020 01: 00 New
      0
      Well ... in your calculations you proceed from the fact that Mikasa did not collect coal in the premises that were not intended for this. And in fact?

      I will assume that there may be too many layouts:
      1. The coal was unloaded before May 14th.
      2. Jackson exaggerated.
      3. The position of the heels on May 12 was lower than after in the photo of Tsushima
      etc. There are no objective facts on any of these points.
      Now let's see what is objective we have?
      1. Togo counted on battles in 3 days and 2 nights. Taking into account even the road back, this would require about 1000 tons of coal for Mikasa. I consider this figure to be the minimum value of coal reserves at Mikas on the morning of May 14th. This is with a normal stock of 700 tons of coal and a full 1521 tons.
      2. Let's admit the consumption of coal at Mikasa 450 tons (as at Sikishima). Then, upon return, at least 550 tons of coal remain. And while in the photo "Mikasa" sits perfectly in the water.
      3. The Japanese removed 400 tons of coal from the Eagle (it turns out less than that of Mikasa!), While it was noticeably overloaded (slightly more than 15 thousand tons according to Campbell).
      4. Construction overload "Eagle" 635 tons, "Mikasa" 784 tons. Those. it's not her!
      Conclusion: not only coal played an important role in the operational overloading of Russian battleships! In principle, Kostenko has a schedule of how the Eagle was overloaded.
  2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    29 July 2020 07: 26 New
    0
    Quote: rytik32
    Data on coal consumption at Mikasa in Tsushima

    OK, let's go into more detail.
  3. rytik32
    rytik32 27 July 2020 00: 05 New
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    So they threw coal from the deck, but inside the ship, as they had a full supply, they remained

    Is this phrase possible to confirm? Or just guesswork?

    Iwate after Tsushima

    Mikasa after Tsushima.
    In both cases, the belt is above water.
  4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    27 July 2020 07: 22 New
    +1
    Quote: rytik32
    Is this phrase possible to confirm?

    And what else needs to be confirmed? For me, Jackson's report is sufficient.
    Quote: rytik32
    In both cases, the belt is above water.

    So he was supposed to be above the water - after Tsushima. The ships ran 15 knots for how long. Actually, I'm not sure that when fully loaded, it went under water, but here it is necessary to check.
  5. rytik32
    rytik32 27 July 2020 23: 32 New
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And what else needs to be confirmed? For me, Jackson's report is sufficient.

    Jackson's report on the situation two days before Tsushima, May 12 (25).
    Let me remind you that Togo was already going to go north (for this he was loading coal) but received information about Radlov's arrival in Shanghai, so he realized that Rozhdestvensky was going to Tsushima and postponed the exit. On this day, 13 (26) May, the Japanese ships had reason to unload the coal.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    The ships ran 15 knots for how long.

    So Togo was going to fight for three days and two nights and then go back. But in fact it turned out about twice as fast. So coal still had to remain in significant quantities.
  6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    28 July 2020 05: 41 New
    +1
    Quote: rytik32
    Jackson's report on the situation two days before Tsushima, May 12 (25).
    Let me remind you that Togo was already going to go north (for this he was loading coal) but received information about Radlov's arrival in Shanghai, so he realized that Rozhdestvensky was going to Tsushima and postponed the exit. On this day, 13 (26) May, the Japanese ships had reason to unload the coal.

    Alexei, the question is not that, but that Togo, being on the Japanese coast, to intercept the Russian squadron, going, as he thought, bypassing Japan, collected a lot more coal than was on the Russian ships
  7. rytik32
    rytik32 28 July 2020 12: 55 New
    +2
    Dear Andrey, no one argues with this.
    The question, as I understand it, is with what coal load the Japanese ships went to the Battle of Tsushima.
  8. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    28 July 2020 13: 09 New
    +1
    Quote: rytik32
    The question, as I understand it, is with what coal load the Japanese ships went to the Battle of Tsushima.

    Dear Alexey, I do not know this. But I am extremely, I emphasize, extremely doubtful that someone would unload coal. The problem is that loading coal is an extremely grueling procedure, and even unloading, when you need to pick coal out of holes, even more so. The maximum crew was usually involved in loading, and then, even before the battle, the ship should be cleaned. At the same time, Togo learned that the Russians were going through the Tsushima Strait only in the morning of the 14th, and almost immediately went to sea. Before that, he still had to prepare, if necessary, to go to La Perouse, and could not unload coal. And it’s easy for me to imagine that the Japanese dropped a hundred tons of coal from the upper deck when it became clear that the Russians were going tsushima, but before the battle they feverishly dragged hundreds of tons of coal from the pits and threw them into the sea - I highly doubt there is nothing known to me about this.
    Finally, if the Japanese, as you wrote earlier, unloaded coal on May 13, then why would Tokiwa dump it on the 14th from the deck?
  9. rytik32
    rytik32 28 July 2020 14: 13 New
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    At the same time, Togo learned that the Russians were going through the Tsushima Strait only in the morning of the 14th

    I’ll clarify.
    On the afternoon of May 12/25, a meeting of flagships and commanders took place on board the Mikasa, at which Togo announced that if there was no new information about the enemy's position by noon the next day, the Japanese fleet would sail north on the evening of May 13/26. Those present at the meeting were handed out sealed packages with an order containing a scheme for the passage. The steam boats that had been delivered earlier to the port returned to the ships, the crews started additional loading of coal.

    These loadings are reflected in Jackson.

    The crisis was resolved the next day. Shortly after midnight on May 13/26, the Japanese MGSH received a message about the appearance of Radlov's detachment in Shanghai. Togo interpreted this news as the movement of the Russians through the Tsushima Strait and did not go north, and in the afternoon of the same day, according to Corbett, the Japanese MGSH received a message that the Russian squadron had anchored near the Sedelny Islands the day before.

    Those. there was time for unloading, and even more so in the port it was possible to attract workers, and not just sailors.

    In any case, no one writes about the presence of coal on the decks of Japanese ships in Tsushima: neither the British observers nor ours when they were captured.
  10. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    28 July 2020 14: 56 New
    0
    Quote: rytik32
    Those. there was time for unloading, and even more so in the port it was possible to attract workers, and not just sailors.

    And why, after that, we read in the combat report of "Tokiwa" from May 14 - 6 hours 48 minutes. According to the order from the flagship "Izumo" they raised the anchor. Our ship in the 2nd combat detachment is ship No. 3, behind the flagship Izumo, and behind the ship No. 2 "Azuma", follows in the direction north of Cape Karasaki of Tsushima Island. Dumped into the sea about 93 tons of coal, loaded on the upper deck in straw bags.
  11. rytik32
    rytik32 28 July 2020 15: 04 New
    +1
    Maybe they left a reserve "just in case"?
    Moreover, 93 tons is not a great reserve even for Tokiwa.
  12. Comrade
    Comrade 26 July 2020 04: 02 New
    +3
    Quote: vahpus
    You just don't know foreign languages. Therefore, serious sources of information on this matter are not available to you.

    I have no problems with English and French, if I really need it, I hope they will help me with German.
    So let's get yours here
    Quote: vahpus
    serious sources of information

    Just don’t say they’re in Japanese, you don’t know Japanese.
  13. 27091965
    27091965 26 July 2020 05: 07 New
    +3
    Quote: Comrade
    I have no problem with English and French,


    ".... en même temps, on faisait une remarque intéressante: l'Orel n'était pas dans ses lignes d'eau normales. Par suite de l'énorme quantité de charbon accumulée à bord, la cuirasse de ceinture était en grande partie immergée .... "

    This is an excerpt from a report by French naval officers at the French Embassy in Japan, examining the battleship Eagle.
  14. Comrade
    Comrade 26 July 2020 06: 04 New
    0
    Quote: 27091965i
    Par suite de l'énorme quantité de charbon accumulée à bord

    Ceci est très émotionnel et pas du tout concret.
    Quote: 27091965i
    la cuirasse de ceinture était en grande partie immergée.

    Encore une fois, que des émotions et l'absence complète de chiffres.
    Malheuresement, la valeur de cette information est proche de zéro. Ce niveau d'écriture est celui d'un journaliste, mais pas un officier.
  15. 27091965
    27091965 26 July 2020 09: 29 New
    +3
    I exhibited a fragment of the original text not to test your knowledge. Knowing French makes it easier for you to read and understand the text from the original. This is another, from many sources, giving the opportunity to consider different points of view.
  16. Andrey Shmelev
    Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 10: 41 New
    +2
    Sorry, musyu, this is purcua
    proche de zéro

    if
    l'énorme quantité de charbon accumulée à bord

    unambiguously indicates that there was a LOT of coal
  17. rytik32
    rytik32 27 July 2020 00: 33 New
    +3
    In general, we can conclude that, according to numerous and independent sources, Orel would be heavily overloaded with coal.
  18. Catfish
    Catfish 24 July 2020 17: 26 New
    +5
    Andrey, thanks, brilliant article! good
    On the example of comparing two ships of the same type, at least something became clear to me from the Oslyabya.
    Don't argue with this ochlamon, it just got stuck in the "transport and combat position of the ship." Smells like an outspoken schizoid, sort of like our unforgettable Carbine with his obsession with Kiraly and his p / n. laughing
  19. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 08: 42 New
    +1
    Quote: Sea Cat
    Andrey, thanks, brilliant article!

    Thank you, Konstantin! hi
    Quote: Sea Cat
    Don't argue with this oohlamon

    That's it, I won't :)))))
  20. DrEng527
    DrEng527 24 July 2020 17: 52 New
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    There is a lady in a position. Ships come in one way or another

    Interestingly, in what displacement at Oslyab are the ports of the SK guns open? bully
  21. Astra wild
    Astra wild 24 July 2020 19: 16 New
    +4
    Andrey, you are a very good specialist in the history of the Fleet, you have a good style, but out of harm. Your expression is not entirely successful: "You personally dived." Vahpus will be able to tell you: "did you dive"? I repeat this purely out of harm
  22. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 08: 46 New
    +1
    Quote: Astra wild
    but out of harm.

    Well, why immediately out of harm?
    Quote: Astra wild
    Your expression is not entirely successful: "You personally dived." Vahpus will be able to tell you: "did you dive"?

    This is a perfectly fair question. But - he cannot :)))) The fact is that my opponent categorically claims that Alexander was drowning due to overload. I wrote
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Alexander III? theoretically possible, but not proven.

    That is, I admit that he could have died from overload, but there are other possible reasons for his death. And, since I do not presume to assert from which of them Alexander died, I do not need to dive to him. hi
  • Astra wild
    Astra wild 24 July 2020 19: 05 New
    0
    Colleague vahpus, I put it to you: the norms of the Russian language, and we Russians and on the Russian site must comply, it is envisaged to write "you" with a capital letter
  • Comrade
    Comrade 24 July 2020 16: 43 New
    +4
    Quote: vahpus
    You are incompetent in this matter. Absolutely.
    In addition, in addition to coal, ships carry a lot of other cargoes. Read how Rozhdestvensky's ships sailed to the Far East and how and what they were loaded with besides coal.

    The photo shows the sediment of the "Tsarevich" and "Eagle" after battle, she will tell us which of the two battleships was usedОgreater overload before fight.
    Can competently to explain why the "Eagle", which Rozhestvensky allegedly terribly overloaded, has less sediment in the photograph than the "Tsarevich"?
    1. vahpus
      vahpus 24 July 2020 16: 51 New
      -3
      Read more on this topic. The moment when the main belt of the Eagle emerged from under the water is documented. It happened the next morning AFTER Tsushima day.
      Your photos are not interesting at all. They show who knows what and when. With the same success you could have signed them Vasya and Petya.
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 24 July 2020 17: 12 New
        +5
        Quote: vahpus
        Read more on this topic.

        Better once увидетьthan hear a hundred times.
        Quote: vahpus
        Your photos are not interesting at all. They show what is unknown and when

        1) On the fragments of photographs, attention is drawn to the distance from the bow torpedo tubes to the water. Than less distance, the more draft.

        1) The photograph of "Tsarevich" was taken on July 29, 1904, on following day after the battle at Cape Shantung.
        2) The photograph of "Eagle" was taken on May 15, 1905, on following the day after the battle of Tsushima.
        3) On following after the battle, the day of the Eagle's draft was less than that of the Tsarevich on following after the fight a day.
        Output.
        On the eve of the battle at Cape Shantung and the Battle of Tsushima, the Tsarevich sat deeper in the water than the Eagle on the eve of the Tsushima battle.

        But the draft of the "Eagle" in Kronstadt, compare it with the draft of the "Eagle" on May 15, 1905.
        1. vahpus
          vahpus 24 July 2020 17: 27 New
          -2
          Quote: Comrade
          Output.

          I'm not interested in discussing Vasya and Petya.
          And somehow draw conclusions about them.
          Even if you call them something else.
          Quote: Comrade
          battle at Cape Shantung

          Are you a clone of Andrey from Chelyabinsk?
          Then again, shantung is a silk fabric.
          And Vitgeft gave battle to the Japanese in the Yellow Sea. There were no fabrics.
        2. The comment was deleted.
      2. rytik32
        rytik32 25 July 2020 00: 20 New
        +2
        Quote: Comrade
        Output.
        On the eve of the battle at Cape Shantung and the Battle of Tsushima, the Tsarevich sat deeper in the water than the Eagle on the eve of the Tsushima battle.

        The conclusion is not correct.
        "Tsarevich" took 153 tons of water through the hole and got a trim on the bow.
  • rytik32
    rytik32 28 July 2020 16: 09 New
    +1
    Quote: Comrade
    Can you competently explain why the "Eagle", which Rozhestvensky allegedly terribly overloaded, has less sediment in the photograph than the "Tsesarevich"?

    Valentine, I'll try to explain.
    Quote from Campbell:
    When the Eagle was brought to Maizuru, it had a draft of 27.5 feet in the bow and 29.3 feet in the stern.

    Those. "Eagle" had a trim aft.
  • Astra wild
    Astra wild 24 July 2020 18: 53 New
    +1
    "All other competent sailors" can we assume that you also consider yourself a "competent sailor"?
  • vahpus
    vahpus 25 July 2020 10: 48 New
    +5
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Rozhdestvensky's ships WERE NOT overloaded, having more than normal coal reserves, but significantly less than the maximum. That is, they had coal just for the battle + the road to Vladivostok.

    From Tsushima to Vladivostok 560 nautical miles.
    For ships of the Peresvet type, this is two days' journey and 200-230 tons of coal.
    Coal consumption could be reduced by slowing down the speed (measured at 12 knots).
    On board Oslyabi by the time of Tsushima there were about 1350 tons of coal.
    Guess if Oslyabya was overloaded with coal if it was built with the planned overload of 1734 tons, and the total supply of coal on board according to the project was 2058 tons?
    I'll even tell you a secret thing that you don't even know about - the full displacement of a military armored ship of that era, this is when it sits in the water exactly along the upper edge of the main armor belt. Not higher or lower.
    If the designers were not mistaken. And if you made a mistake, then this figure is then corrected after the fact. In the case of overexposures, they made a very slight mistake and this error can be neglected.
    And his normal displacement is when he sits in the water in the most optimal way for fighting. Not higher or lower.
    There was also a transport displacement (how much new will you learn, right?). It was more than full displacement and was used only for crossings, because was not suitable for battle at all.
    1. rytik32
      rytik32 2 August 2020 17: 50 New
      +1
      By the way, what are we just talking about overloading with coal? Nakhimov had 1000 tons of fresh water. What for???
      We went to Vladivostok or to the base on the Arabian Peninsula?
  • Andrey Shmelev
    Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 10: 33 New
    +2
    British admirals, too. Therefore, they always tried to take the full supply of coal. The Japanese also did not serve in the army, so they had a supply of coal close to full, and maybe even more.


    Didn't the brita deepen the belt by 2/3 of the maximum reserves?
  • Comrade
    Comrade 24 July 2020 16: 20 New
    +6
    Quote: vahpus
    Peresvet was in a combat position, and Oslyabya, like the entire Rozhdestvensky squadron, was in a transport position.

    Kolya, are you?
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor 24 July 2020 17: 04 New
      +2
      The 56th nickname went to the list laughing
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 24 July 2020 17: 20 New
        +2
        Quote: arturpraetor
        The 56th nickname went to the list

        Nice collection!
        It's been a long time since he was there, just remembering our Passer-by Nikolai the other day. Where did Kolya go, I think?
    2. Scaffold
      Scaffold 26 July 2020 08: 30 New
      +1
      He, he. Again he remembers foreign languages ​​and "Runet". As if he is the only one speaking English here. laughing
  • Jura 27
    Jura 27 24 July 2020 17: 53 New
    +8
    The author did not succeed in the analysis yet again, and from the word at all.
    The shells were to blame, and now the plant is to blame.
    In fact, as usual in that war, the complete incompetence of the command staff is to blame, it all started with Rudnev and went to the full (with rare exceptions).
    So, we got a trim on the bow - not holes should be repaired from 12 "land mines in not an armored side, but counter-flooding should be carried out in the stern. The same is with the elimination of the roll.
    And the main incompetence of Baer, ​​a sharp turn to the right, with an unaligned roll to the left side and large free surfaces of the flowing water. As a result, the rush of water at the turn to the port side, a sharp increase in heel, scooping up water by the open port of the 6 "bow gun of the battery deck (and also probably pouring water into the holes that were high enough before) and after a few minutes overkill.
    1. The reasons for the initial roll (before the turn) have not been analyzed in detail, because the flooding of the compartments only in the nose (a short distance from the DP) and in one UU with a spare cruise chamber, it is not explained. There was another, rather significant reason.
    2. Living and armored decks are one and the same deck, the author still cannot understand this.
    3. Where, what bulkheads were - the author does not know exactly. And for whom, then the drawings are laid out on the network?
    4. Due to construction overload and coal over the normal stock, the actual OHL passed along the upper edge of the GBP, i. E. "Oslyabya" was turned into "not an armored battleship".
    5. Peresvet, allegedly in a day (28/29 July), consumed almost 1500 tons of coal. Do you have any documents on this?
    1. vahpus
      vahpus 24 July 2020 19: 45 New
      +3
      Quote: Jura 27
      4. Due to construction overload and coal over the normal stock, the actual OHL passed along the upper edge of the GBP, i. E. "Oslyabya" was turned into "not an armored battleship".

      Into a semi-armored ship, to be more precise. With an armored belt 57 m long (44%) instead of 95 m.
      And 102 mm thick instead of 178-229 mm.
      And, as it were, WITHOUT the carapaces, since they were so submerged that they could not fulfill their function.
      Any Japanese armored cruiser could easily sink this SEMI-battleship.
      The same thing, to one degree or another, happened with other armored ships of Rozhdestvensky.
      Quote: Jura 27
      Peresvet, allegedly in a day (28/29 July), consumed almost 1500 tons of coal. Do you have any documents on this?

      Peresvet survived because he sat in the water normally, in a fighting way. You should not be too attentive to the author's figures - since the time of Makarov, each 1TOE ship has been determined (by loading ballast on flat water) its REAL combat (and marching) load. It was forbidden to exceed the combat load when meeting the enemy. I don’t think Witgeft canceled this order.
      With a coal reserve of about 1600 tons, the main belt of Peresvet was completely submerged in water.
      At Oslyabi, the same thing happened with a coal reserve of about 1000 tons. During Tsushima, there were about 1350 tons of coal on Oslyab. This means that its main belt was recessed by 25 cm. And it did not fulfill its functions.
      According to the project, the main belt on these ships was supposed to rise 91 cm above the waterline.
      1. Jura 27
        Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 07 New
        +2
        [/ quote] To a semi-armored ship, to be more precise. [quote]

        You can call it "non-armored battleship".
        1. vahpus
          vahpus 25 July 2020 17: 37 New
          +2
          You can, probably. But citadel armored ships with a citadel that did not provide the buoyancy of the battleship when the extremities were damaged were called semi-armored.
          Unlike armored citadel ships, the citadel of which provided such buoyancy.
    2. Comrade
      Comrade 24 July 2020 19: 52 New
      +3
      Quote: Jura 27
      Peresvet, allegedly in a day (28/29 July), consumed almost 1500 tons of coal. Do you have any documents on this?

      The stock before the battle ranged from 1 to 200 tons.
      In the book of E. Polomoshnov you can read the following (opens by clicking).
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 24 July 2020 21: 11 New
        +3
        And Krestyaninov and Molodtsov wrote that after the bank was rectified, the issue of moving to Vladivostok was seriously discussed.
        So who to believe?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 July 2020 08: 53 New
          +2
          Quote: rytik32
          And Krestyaninov and Molodtsov wrote that after the bank was rectified, the issue of moving to Vladivostok was seriously discussed.

          Naturally, it was discussed. Those discussing at that time did not know the state of the coal pits. But there is a report from the auditor that the ship went into battle with almost 1500 tons of coal and there is a report from Kuteinikov about the almost empty pits of Peresvet
      2. Jura 27
        Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 08 New
        +2
        [/ quote] The stock before the battle ranged from 1 to 200 tons. [quote]

        Either it was, or it was not, rumors of the OBS level.
    3. Astra wild
      Astra wild 24 July 2020 21: 10 New
      0
      Yura, glad to see you. As a consumer-reader, I am happy when an author meets with constructive criticism: this makes him take a responsible approach to his work. As a reader, I win. Don't be angry, but I like it to be interesting to me
      1. Jura 27
        Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 10 New
        0
        [/ quote] Yura, glad to see you. [quote]

        Mutually love ... My criticism is always constructive, even when I use foul language. wink
        1. Astra wild
          Astra wild 25 July 2020 19: 21 New
          0
          Try to get by without undue stress. However, I myself am not a Turgenev young lady, but a modern woman and sometimes I use
    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      25 July 2020 09: 11 New
      +1
      Yura, in your polemical intoxication you have completely lost all connection with reality
      Quote: Jura 27
      So, we got a trim on the bow - it is not the holes that need to be repaired from 12 "land mines in the non-armored side, but counter-flooding should be carried out in the stern.

      The ship sat down to the very haws - is it difficult to understand the scale of counter-flooding? You propose to drown the battleship. Holes, 12 dm by the way, no one repaired, if you did not know.
      Quote: Jura 27
      And the main incompetence of Baer, ​​a sharp turn to the right, with an unaligned roll

      Only now Shcherbachev 4th shows that the list on Oslyab was even before the turn
      About 2 hours. 20 minutes. "Oslyabya", with a completely ruined nose, battered left side, riddled pipes, fires in the rostrum and on the forward bridge, with almost silenced artillery, showered with enemy shells, pressing on us, began to fail to the right. The roll along it was up to 12 ° - 15 ° to the port side and with the bow he sat down on the haws

      Quote: Jura 27
      The reasons for the initial roll (before turning) have not been analyzed in detail, because the flooding of the compartments only in the nose (a short distance from the DP) and in the same UU with a spare cruise chamber, it is not explained.

      Explain, you just don't like it. Peresvet, not having serious internal flooding, received a roll up to 7-8 degrees. Victory, having probably taken 200-250 tons of water into the stoker almost amidships, received 6 degrees. And here we are talking about overflowing hundreds of tons of water in addition to a flooded stoker and a kryuyt chamber
      Quote: Jura 27
      The living and armored deck is one and the same deck, the author still cannot understand this.

      Do not smack nonsense, it hurts.


      Quote: Jura 27
      Where, what kind of bulkheads were - the author does not know exactly. And for whom, then the drawings are laid out on the network?

      Yes, Yura, for whom? :))))
      Quote: Jura 27
      Peresvet, allegedly in a day (28/29 July), consumed almost 1500 tons of coal. Do you have any documents on this?

      Auditor's report Peresvet and Kuteynikov's report
      1. Jura 27
        Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 20 New
        +2
        [/ quote] Yura, in your polemical frenzy you have completely lost all connection with reality [quote]

        This is what you write, don't understand what and don't understand what.
        1. Jura 27
          Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 22 New
          +2
          [/ quote] The ship sat down to the very hawks - is it difficult to understand the scale of counter-flooding? You propose to drown the battleship. [Quote]

          It is not difficult for a competent ship engineer, trim leveling is a completely routine procedure, without any sinking of the ship.
          1. Jura 27
            Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 24 New
            +4
            [/ quote] Explain, you just don't like it. Peresvet, not having serious internal flooding, received a roll up to 7-8 degrees. Victory, having probably taken 200-250 tons of water in the stoker almost amidships, received 6 degrees. [Quote]

            This is about overkill, feel the difference with the roll values ​​you give.
            1. Jura 27
              Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 35 New
              +5
              [/ quote] Don't talk nonsense, it hurts. [Quote]

              Finally, learn the materiel and then stop writing nonsense. What you have labeled as "Armored Deck" is the bevel of the armored (and living room at the same time) deck. What is labeled "living deck" is a horizontal planking over the bevel of the armored (and living at the same time) deck.
              What is under the number "22" is the nasal carapace (armored) and t. it is not directly a continuation of the armored (residential) deck (adjacent to the bow traverse), then it is strictly impossible to call it an armored (residential) deck (in fact, it is a platform).
              1. Jura 27
                Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 36 New
                +2
                [/ quote] Yes, Yura, for whom? [quote]

                Exactly what is not for you, tk. you don't know the location of the bulkheads.
                1. Jura 27
                  Jura 27 25 July 2020 17: 37 New
                  +3
                  [/ quote] The report of the auditor Peresvet and the report of Kuteinikov [quote]

                  In more detail.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    26 July 2020 01: 32 New
                    0
                    Quote: Jura 27
                    In more detail.

                    Read the reports for more details.
                  2. Jura 27
                    Jura 27 26 July 2020 16: 36 New
                    0
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Quote: Jura 27
                    In more detail.

                    Read the reports for more details.

                    Quote.
            2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 July 2020 01: 32 New
              +1
              Quote: Jura 27
              What is under the number "22" is the nasal carapace (armored) and t. it is not directly a continuation of the armored (residential) deck (adjacent to the bow traverse), then it is strictly impossible to call it an armored (residential) deck (in fact, it is a platform).

              Yura, turn on your head before you write, even a little. Your statement alone testifies to the fact that the armored deck and the living deck are not synonymous, since the living deck extends over the "carapaces".
              Quote: Jura 27
              The living and armored deck is one and the same deck, the author still cannot understand this.

              I have already commented on the rest; as usual, there are no objections to the merits.
              1. Jura 27
                Jura 27 26 July 2020 16: 50 New
                +3
                [/ quote] Yura, turn on your head before you write, even a little. Your statement alone testifies to the fact that the armored deck and the living deck are not synonymous, since the living deck continues above the "carapace". [Quote]

                Learn the materiel before sprinkling stupid opuses.
                The armored and living deck are one and the same deck. Its exact name in that time, - "living (armored) deck". Look, finally, attentively drawing of that time, you laid out a piece of it in the comments. The fact that the living (armored) deck was not armored at the extremities above the carapace does not mean that there is another deck. This means that the living (armored) deck was not armored at the extremities above the carapaces.
                The exact name of the armored carapaces of time, - "lower deck" (although, in fact, carapaces, were platforms (upper) at overexposures).
                1. Jura 27
                  Jura 27 26 July 2020 16: 53 New
                  +2
                  [/ quote] The rest I have already commented, there are no objections to the merits, as usual. [quote]

                  "Everything is fine, beautiful marquise, except for", .... the fact that you absolutely incorrectly indicated the reasons for overkil and did not investigate the reasons for the strong initial roll (before the turn), "everything is fine, everything is fine ..."
        2. shkiper83
          shkiper83 15 October 2020 08: 01 New
          0
          There is always a point of no return, when there is already nothing to straighten. Any amount of accepted ballast increases the average draft, it is another matter if you overpay the ballast from another ballast tank. But the battleship is still not a tanker.
    5. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 29 July 2020 22: 20 New
      +2
      So that's where the dog rummaged! And I'm racking my brains, what kind of nonsense are you writing .. Our dear friend from Chelyabinsk, you messed up the decks! wassat
  • Elturisto
    Elturisto 25 July 2020 20: 58 New
    +2
    Well done rolled out the author-dropout ... everything is correct ...
  • Andrey Shmelev
    Andrey Shmelev 25 July 2020 20: 49 New
    +1
    How to say?

    In the cycle about "Varyag" AiCh clearly knew the difference about the ventilation of brothers and KRump ships, for example, the classic:
    The same desire to simplify and reduce the cost of work was at the heart of the design of the ball valves of the ventilation system valves (instead of more labor-intensive clinkets). When the pipeline flooded, a hollow ball floated out of the branch pipe and, pressed by the water pressure, blocked the pipe section. But, as the experience of "Retvizan" showed, these balls deformed at the very first explosions and freely passed water. The valves had to be closed tightly and thus completely deprive the ship of ventilation on the very first day of the war.

    Even stories about the analogy with "Retvizan" smell like lies, which is becoming a trend for AiCh. In my humble opinion, at least.

    I am delighted:
    The damage that Oslyabya received in the first half hour of the battle should not have led to the death of a ship of this type (provided that it was built of high quality, of course).

    For such a categorical statement, I would like to see a detailed diagram of those.

    Thanks to the bunglers of the New Admiralty.

    The author is obviously not familiar with the list of damage control measures.
    Well, since a version is being put forward that the ventilation pipes provided LONGITUDINAL flooding, I really look forward to the corresponding axonometry :)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      26 July 2020 01: 34 New
      +2
      Quote: Andrei Shmelev
      Well, since a version is being put forward that the ventilation pipes provided LONGITUDINAL flooding, I really look forward to the corresponding axonometry :)

      Andrey, I have posted my theses. Hunt to refute - please. If you want to prove that the situation with Retvizan and Oslyabey are not equivalent - the keyboard is in your hands
      Quote: Andrei Shmelev
      Even stories about the analogy with "Retvizan" smell like lies, which is becoming a trend for AiCh.

      Something your arguments have finally moved to "vyfsevreti"
      1. Andrey Shmelev
        Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 10: 26 New
        +2
        That is:
        "Oslyabya" damage scheme no
        perspective view of ventilation and its devices too

        "vyfsevreti"
  • Mavrikiy
    Mavrikiy 24 July 2020 06: 53 New
    +3
    Baltic Shipyard in 1894 became the property of the Naval Ministry

    In 1893, the Novoadmiralteisky Shipbuilding Plant (NASZ) was transformed into the Society of State Commercial Entrepreneurship (OKKP). This made it possible to attract foreign capital and technologies to the plant. In particular, NASZ became interested in Vickers. In 1893, the "deal of the century" took place, Vickers acquired 35% of the shares of NASZ.
    Do private traders build better quality than state ones?
    The Baltic plant, which built Peresvet, managed to provide its brainchild with quite a decent quality of construction. "Oslyabya" is another matter. This ship was built at the shipyard of the New Admiralty. There were also many complaints about the quality of the materials from which Oslyabya was made, and the quality of the work itself
    1. Narak-zempo
      Narak-zempo 24 July 2020 13: 30 New
      +1
      Quote: Mavrikiy
      Do private traders build better quality than state ones?

      I would venture to suggest that a familiar scheme took place in our time - a rollback for a government order, which then they tried to recapture by "optimizing" production.
      A private trader acts as it is more profitable for him. Somewhere it is more profitable to "keep the brand", and somewhere - to skimp.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 24 July 2020 14: 12 New
      -1
      Quote: Mavrikiy
      Do private traders build better quality than state ones?

      The private owner has an incentive - without any quality, there will be no orders. And the breech is built according to the principle "take what you give." The battleship "Gangut" can be considered the symbol of the New Admiralty of that time.

      In addition, the breech depends to a much greater extent on the whims of the "Spitz" with his MTK, who adored making a lot of changes not just at the construction stage, but in the already mounted structures of ships. That further aggravated the already existing design and production shortcomings.
      1. Mavrikiy
        Mavrikiy 26 July 2020 04: 58 New
        +2
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The private owner has an incentive - without any quality, there will be no orders.
        Alas. request
        When you say Ivan Vasilyevich the impression is that you .......
        repeat
        The opposite is true when working on government orders. A private trader has kickbacks, kickbacks, kickbacks. Read "My Memories" by A.N. Krylov. hi
  • Mavrikiy
    Mavrikiy 24 July 2020 06: 55 New
    +3
    As always, interesting and informative (+).
    Baltic Shipyard in 1894 became the property of the Naval Ministry

    In 1893, the Novoadmiralteisky Shipbuilding Plant (NASZ) was transformed into the Society of State Commercial Entrepreneurship (OKKP). This made it possible to attract foreign capital and technologies to the plant. In particular, NASZ became interested in Vickers. In 1893, the "deal of the century" took place, Vickers acquired 35% of the shares of NASZ.
    Now they argue that private traders build better quality than state-owned
    The Baltic plant, which built Peresvet, managed to provide its brainchild with quite a decent quality of construction. "Oslyabya" is another matter. This ship was built at the shipyard of the New Admiralty. There were also many complaints about the quality of the materials from which Oslyabya was made, and the quality of the work itself
  • Comrade
    Comrade 24 July 2020 07: 01 New
    15
    Dear Andrey, bravo!
    A solid, mature work that has put a lot in its place.

    It remains to consider getting into the area of ​​the 10th coal pit "Oslyabi". MP Sablin believed that this hit had broken through the armor. But was there? And if so, which one? A Japanese shell could break off a piece of armor by analogy with how it happened with the "Peresvet".

    It could have been as it happened on the "Tsarevich", which received a 12 '' shell hit on the starboard side in the area of ​​the front stoker. "Suitcase", hitting the armor belt, slipped under the water and exploded a meter below the belt armor in the area of ​​the 29th frame. As a result, the flora and stringers were crumpled, a dent with an arrow deflection of up to 60 cm was formed.Two upper and two lower side corridors between frames 23 and 37 were flooded through the holes from the knocked out rivets and through the open seams between the sheets.

    Or it could be a close underwater rupture.

    I well imagine what they will write about this in the comments

    We address this ancient saying to them :-)
    Feci, quod potui, faciant meliora potentes (I did everything I could; let who can do better).
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 07: 45 New
      +8
      Quote: Comrade
      A solid, mature work that has put a lot in its place.

      Thank you! hi
      Quote: Comrade
      It could be as it happened on the "Tsarevich"

      Without a doubt, dear colleague. The scale of flooding in the area of ​​impact does not indicate any total destruction, but it is quite typical for the examples you have given.
      1. kalibr
        kalibr 24 July 2020 11: 06 New
        +6
        Always liked similar articles of your "production". Alas, he is not capable of such an analysis himself.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 11: 13 New
          +8
          It is very pleasant to hear such an assessment, dear Vyacheslav! hi
          In my opinion, you slander yourself :)
          1. kalibr
            kalibr 24 July 2020 12: 03 New
            +8
            No, I just see that I do not have the ability to systematics, but you do. A very valuable quality. But I can write emotionally ... but since you - I can't! But your example prompted me to write an article about a naval battle. I won't say which one yet, but it will be soon. I'm working on it ...
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              24 July 2020 13: 03 New
              +5
              I wish you good luck with the article, I will be glad to see it on the main page!
              1. kalibr
                kalibr 24 July 2020 13: 34 New
                +5
                You write more. An interesting, unusual perspective, serious, evidentiary motivations, a good knowledge of the historiography of the issue - this is what other VO authors should be guided by when preparing articles of this kind.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  24 July 2020 15: 20 New
                  +5
                  Quote: kalibr
                  You write more.

                  Thanks, I am trying!
        2. VIP
          VIP 24 July 2020 21: 22 New
          +7
          Guys, no offense, but I remembered Krylov, he has one fable on this topic
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            25 July 2020 09: 13 New
            0
            Quote: VIP
            but I remembered Krylov

            It doesn't bother me at all :) I communicate with those with whom I consider it necessary and in the way that I consider necessary.
            1. VIP
              VIP 25 July 2020 13: 08 New
              +1
              My daughter often quoted Krylov, but I remembered.
            2. Astra wild
              Astra wild 25 July 2020 13: 18 New
              0
              I think that the VIP colleague could have forgotten Krylov and just pointed his finger at the sky.
              Please don't forget us
  • Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 24 July 2020 07: 01 New
    11
    As always interesting, logical, thoughtful. Plusy for "salvation" for me IN its albeit rare, but appearance laughing drinks
    I agree that the quality of construction still affects the unsinkability of the ship. The devil is said to be in the details. By the way, the sinking of "St. Stephen" from the same opera. winked
    And once again I would like to note that when analyzing any case of a ship's destruction, all both objective and subjective reasons are considered. Because often the overlap of all factors leads to tragedy. This is for commentators.
    Thank you for the interesting material and we are waiting for you, namesake, more often, especially on the topics of the history of the Navy hi smile
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 07: 45 New
      +6
      Greetings, dear Rurikovich! Thanks for your kind words drinks
      1. saigon
        saigon 24 July 2020 08: 16 New
        0
        One question always haunts me, but what would happen if everything suddenly turned 180 degrees away from the Japanese and the front was pulled out? What then was left of Togo with the loss of time to complete the maneuver?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 08: 22 New
          +7
          Quote: saigon
          One question always haunts me, but what would happen if everything suddenly turned from the Japanese by 180 degrees and the front was pulled out?

          Sorry, I did not understand. Before rebuilding, ours went in two wake columns, before the battle rebuilt into one. How can a 180 turn give a front formation?
          In general ... Losing time in this way was completely not in our interests. If the Russians retreated, Togo could not chase them at all, maintain contact until the evening, attack with torpedo boats at night, and in the morning, join the battle, having well-slept sailors on his EBR and BRKR, against the exhausted sleepless night and suffered losses of the Russian squadron. This is not to mention the fact that there was not so much coal on the Russian squadron ...
        2. Doctor
          Doctor 24 July 2020 10: 53 New
          -1
          One question always haunts me, but what would happen if everything suddenly turned 180 degrees away from the Japanese and the front was pulled out? What then was left of Togo with the loss of time to complete the maneuver?

          Any other action would be better.
          For example, a simple turn of the columns to the right or left to pass along the line of the Japanese battleships along or against their course. In this case, the ships, of course, would also receive damage, but they themselves would begin to work with stern and side guns, while the enemy fire would already be dispersed across all ships of our lines.
          The turn was made, but late, by this time the lead ships had already received critical damage.

          Rozhdestvensky did just an astounding stupidity, continuing to follow the same course and allowing the Japanese column, crossing across, to consistently and concentratedly hit our lead ships from all side. At the same time, for the Japanese artillerymen, the target rolled from the traverse in the longitudinal direction. which greatly facilitated the corrections when firing, and ours needed to hit a target moving across the course, and even only from the bow guns.

          And then Togo turned around and did the same thing again, but from the other side.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            24 July 2020 10: 59 New
            +2
            Quote: Arzt
            Any other action would be better.

            One of the most common mistakes.
            Quote: Arzt
            Rozhdestvensky did just an amazing stupidity, continuing to go the same course

            And allowing our gunners to fully realize the consequences of the erroneous "Loop of Togo"
            1. Doctor
              Doctor 24 July 2020 11: 19 New
              0
              One of the most common mistakes.

              That is, Rozhdestvensky chose the best tactics. laughing Oh well.
              Even if he gave the command: "Save yourself, who can!" would be better. 30 percent would break through to Vladik.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                24 July 2020 11: 52 New
                +7
                Quote: Arzt
                That is, Rozhdestvensky chose the best tactics.

                In general, if not the best, then very close to this. The movement in two columns resulted in Togo abandoning the T crossing and deciding to break the weak left column. Rebuilding into a single wake column, although it was not executed as intended (an error that caused Oslyabi to stop) led to the need for Togo to turn around consistently under Russian fire. The course of the Russian ships provided them with the best shooting position possible. By the way, the analysis of Mikasa's damage suggests that if the Russian squadron had shells of the 1907 g sample (lightweight, but with TNT instead of gunpowder), then most likely Mikasa would be knocked out of action, and Togo would be killed in the first 15 minutes of the battle.
                After the Japanese completed their maneuver, Rozhestvensky turned away "along the inner circle" avoiding crossing T. Well, and later - a wound in the head that the Japanese did not dare to remove the fragments of the skull for 2 months and that was all - the command was over.
                So yes, practically the best.
                Quote: Arzt
                Even if he gave the command: "Save yourself, who can!" would be better.

                Sorry, but the amount of your knowledge on this topic is extremely difficult to underestimate yes
                Apparently you have not gone beyond the "Tsushima" Novikov-Priboy.
                1. Doctor
                  Doctor 24 July 2020 13: 17 New
                  +2
                  In general, if not the best, then very close to this.

                  You are a competent fleet analyst, you like this business and you succeed.
                  But in this case, you will not be able to convince me that the actions of the admiral who commanded the most losing and shameful naval battle in Russia were correct.
                  And I do not understand why you are trying to do this, not in the first publication.
                  Do you want to imagine the situation of Rozhdestvensky as hopeless? This is not true.

                  Sorry, but the amount of your knowledge on this topic is extremely difficult to underestimate

                  Andrei I'm exaggerating, of course, but I think if Rozhdestvensky gave the command to break through on their own to everyone, there would be fewer losses. Just because there is nowhere else.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    24 July 2020 13: 41 New
                    11
                    Quote: Arzt
                    But in this case, you will not be able to convince me that the actions of the admiral who commanded the most losing and shameful naval battle in Russia were correct.

                    I know. Both for you and for many people this is a matter of faith, not knowledge. I do not reproach you for anything, if you do not want to check the postulates of your confidence with facts, then this is your right.
                    Quote: Arzt
                    And I do not understand why you are trying to do this, not in the first publication.

                    Because what I write is true.
                    At one time, I was also sure that if it were not for the "talentless tyrant" Rozhdestvensky, then the Russian squadron, well, if it had not won the battle, then at least it had not lost with such a devastating score. Then, I began to study how this could be done - an alternative history, which is already there. Esteemed Valentin helped me a lot in this, here he writes under the nickname "Comrade". Valentin, without convincing me of anything, simply presented me with some sources and facts that I had not seen before. And which ran counter to the classic history of the RYAV. Everyone knew that 1TOE, staffed with real sailors, barely barely broke through to Vladivostok, and 2TOE was recruited from a pine forest ... And suddenly - it turns out that 2TOE ships fired almost an order of magnitude better, and this - a fact confirmed by both the Japanese and British observers ... And then it began, after one fact - another, third, fourth ... For a long time I clung to the classical vision and to Rozhestvensky's mediocrity, but plunging deeper and deeper I found more and more materials, testifying otherwise.
                    It was not easy for me both to understand and to admit that my vision of RYaV, largely based on Surf, Kostenko, etc., was deeply mistaken. But the facts are unforgiving, and lying to yourself is the last thing. I managed to step over the dogma of official history, although it was difficult, now I help others to do the same. Perhaps someday you will want to take a similar step.
                    In essence, I am trying to restore historical justice with my publications - and nothing more.
                    1. Doctor
                      Doctor 24 July 2020 13: 54 New
                      +5
                      At one time, I was also sure that if it were not for the "talentless tyrant"

                      It's not even petty tyranny.

                      1. There was no normal briefing of the ship commanders before the battle and in general before approaching the strait. Various options for action in a changing environment were not analyzed, including the loss of control of the flagship.

                      2. Stupid construction of a marching order, crowded movement of ships of different classes and speeds, the absence of a normal vanguard, rear guard, lateral security, a maneuverable high-speed group, the lack of clear instructions for actions when they meet the enemy.

                      3. Passive tactics when meeting with Japanese intelligence, no attempts to drive away and pursue them, continuing to follow the previous course.

                      4. Passive tactics when meeting with the main forces, blunt straight forward movement with an active Togo maneuver.

                      5. Finally, tyranny, which suppressed the initiative of the commanders of the ships before the battle, and turned the battle into a beating with the loss of control of the flagship.

                      This is so, offhand.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        24 July 2020 14: 18 New
                        10
                        Quote: Arzt
                        There was no normal briefing of the ship commanders before the battle and in general before approaching the strait.

                        Excuse me, you probably studied the instructions that Kh. Togo gave to his subordinates, and Rozhestvensky's instructions, and on the basis of this study made such a conclusion?
                        Quote: Arzt
                        Various options for action in a changing environment were not analyzed, including the loss of control of the flagship.

                        It was just directly said that if the flagship is out of order, then the next ship is leading the squadron.
                        Quote: Arzt
                        The stupid construction of a marching order, the crowded movement of ships of different classes and speeds, the absence of a normal vanguard, rearguard, lateral security, a maneuverable speed group, the lack of clear instructions for action when they meet the enemy.

                        I'm sorry, but these are common words. I don't know why you don't like the travel order. I do not see that you are not satisfied with the disposition of the main forces with a cruising patrol in front, transports - separately, covered by the rest of the cruisers.
                        In the vanguard of the battle formation was the main striking force of the squadron - the 1st armored detachment, in the rearguard - the ships of Nebogatov, which poorly maneuvered as part of the 2TOE. There was no maneuverable high-speed group due to the lack of high-speed ships. Rebuilding instructions (drawn up in advance) were available.
                        What are you unhappy with?
                        Quote: Arzt
                        Passive tactics when meeting with Japanese intelligence, no attempts to drive away and pursue them, continuing to follow the previous course.

                        How to drive away? In reality, it was only possible to send the cruiser Enquist to chase Izumi. But - with extremely unimportant prospects, since in order to reach a distance of effective fire from 152 mm (25-30 cables), the same Oleg and Aurora had to chase at least an hour.
                        And in the future, the cruising forces of the Japanese, who followed the squadron, were much stronger than what Rozhdestvensky could send them towards
                        Quote: Arzt
                        Finally, tyranny, which suppressed the initiative of the commanders of the ships before the battle, and turned the battle into a beating with the loss of control of the flagship.

                        After Rozhestvensky is out of action, and Oslyabya dies, Bukhvostov, the commander of Alexander III, undertakes, I’m not afraid of this word, an excellent maneuver - he, seeing that Togo went too far ahead due to the difference in speed, attacks the Japanese formation, turning sequentially ... The Japanese are forced to turn everything all of a sudden and flee with the front line.
                        That is, in fact, Alexander seemed to be willingly substituted for the crossing T - but in conditions when the 1st combat Togo was too far away, and his fire pretty much lost its effectiveness. But this maneuver made it possible, sacrificing Alexander, to gain an advantage in position - he brought the Russian ships to a short distance from Kamimura's ballistic missile systems and Nissin and Kasuga, and if he could cut through the Japanese system, he would have set crossing the Japanese himself. The Japanese did not allow this, but there was a rapprochement, and the Japanese were forced to show a relatively vulnerable stern. It was during this period that Fuji received his hit and Asama was knocked out of action.
                        From a chess standpoint, Alexander's commander sacrificed a piece to gain a positional advantage. Moreover, this figure was himself. And you talk about THIS as about "suppressed initiative" and "beating"?
                      2. DrEng527
                        DrEng527 24 July 2020 15: 29 New
                        +1
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And you talk about THIS as about "suppressed initiative" and "beating"?

                        1) this is just an example - how a reasonable commander controls ... not a ZPR
                        2) 2TOE had 6 high-speed EBRs, much more than Togo laughing
                        3) ZPR dragged TR with him into battle - he just didn’t go on, but guarded the convoy ... crying
                        4) ZPR did nothing to deceive the enemy, having 5 VKR and a bunch of TR
                      3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        24 July 2020 15: 37 New
                        +3
                        Sergei, you are now writing the absolute platitudes, which I have already refuted 100500 times. And you cannot object to anything, you only repeat the same thing.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        this is just an example - how a reasonable commander controls ... not a ZPR

                        Above, I explained why the ZPR managed wisely. Are there any arguments against? Not.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        2TOE had 6 high-speed EBRs, much more than Togo

                        And after what bottle did you see the sixth? :))))
                        Five. But these five were inferior in speed to the Japanese ships, and decently.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        ZPR dragged TR with him into battle - he just didn’t go on, but guarded the convoy ..

                        And the transports did not bind him in any way in combat maneuvering.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        ZPR did nothing to deceive the enemy, having 5 VKR and a bunch of TR

                        He's not a fool to think that Togo will buy cheap pranks.
                      4. DrEng527
                        DrEng527 24 July 2020 16: 44 New
                        +2
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And you cannot object to anything, you only repeat the same thing.

                        I see no reason to change the argumentation - I am setting out the facts, you are a "new vision" hi
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        why ZPR managed wisely. Are there any arguments against? Not.

                        Just for you, the ZPR managed reasonably ... request
                        You don't hear arguments:
                        1) 2 columns in the pre-battle order - stupidity! Especially for those not fired upon!
                        2) a bunch of
                        3) the best option - how the VKV operated - turnover and consumption by counter courses! Let him catch up later ...

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And after what bottle did you see the sixth? :))))

                        1) Are you rude? This is from your lack of culture ... bully Count the EDR of Togo sober - be surprised - and only 4 ... At the same time, Fuji is poorly armored and not fast ...
                        2) Sisoy had 15 knots, more than enough
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        and decently.

                        Not at all - see the Materials ... the testimony is not the ZPR, but the mechanics
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And the transports did not bind him in any way in combat maneuvering.

                        Eka you suffered then - and the CDs were not allocated for their protection?
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        He's not a fool to think that Togo will buy cheap pranks.

                        Fools do not take all possible measures to misinform the enemy! And Togo was sitting on his suitcases - the 2TOE breakthrough through the Sangarsky was seriously considered by him and the corresponding orders were given.
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        24 July 2020 16: 55 New
                        +1
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        I see no reason to change the argument

                        Even after she was smashed into the trash.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        1) 2 columns in the pre-battle order - stupidity! Especially for those not fired upon!

                        Why? There is a FACT - as a result of this formation, Togo went to attack the left lane (we read the official history of Japan) and the crossing T fell through, and Togo was doomed to a noose.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        the best option is how the VKV functioned - turnover and consumption by countercourses!

                        What twist? :)))) Where? :))))
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        Are you rude? This is from your lack of culture ...

                        Just the beads are over
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        Not at all - see the Materials ... the testimony is not the ZPR, but the mechanics

                        Unlike you, I read them
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        Eka you suffered then - and the CDs were not allocated for their protection?

                        And you are going to use them in the battle of the main forces? Ingenious
                      6. DrEng527
                        DrEng527 24 July 2020 17: 27 New
                        +1
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Even after she was smashed into the trash.

                        only in your dreams
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        There is a FACT - as a result of this construction, Togo went to attack l

                        1) do not trust historians absolutely, especially eastern
                        2) Togo had enough development
                        joint forces to open the battle formation
                        3) Togo simply did not calculate the maneuver, hence the turn - look at the map - it's far from 2BO Russians, it's bad to shoot, and the crossing itself is a few minutes

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        What twist? :)))) Where? :))))

                        depends on the moment, and the turnaround on the counter courses ...
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Just the beads are over

                        1) lack of culture in the discussion is like Cain's seal ... hi
                        2) you have no arguments, but conjectures ... the constructions are flimsy, hence the aggression hi
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Unlike you, I read them

                        then the numbers only from the ZPR are remembered bully and what I read you do not know ... hi
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And you are going to use them in the battle of the main forces? Ingenious

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And the transports did not bind him in any way in combat maneuvering.

                        you already write one thing ... bully Or are CDs not needed in battle? He then collected everything in the battle area ... but did not bring TR
                      7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        25 July 2020 09: 15 New
                        0
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        do not trust historians absolutely, especially eastern

                        This is the report of Togo, if anything.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        you have no arguments, but conjectures ...

                        How many do not say "halva" ...
                      8. DrEng527
                        DrEng527 25 July 2020 18: 04 New
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        then the report of the One, if that.

                        So what? this is the report of a winner who must defeat a strong opponent ...
                      9. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        26 July 2020 01: 36 New
                        0
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        So what? this is the report of a winner who must defeat a strong opponent ...

                        And why was it blurted out?
                      10. DrEng527
                        DrEng527 26 July 2020 09: 11 New
                        -4
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And why was it blurted out?

                        I know that you live in a city with a bad environment, and this affects ... bully
            2. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 24 July 2020 17: 01 New
              +1
              Quote: DrEng527
              Only for you, the ZPR managed reasonably.

              Dear, the author in his Tsushima cycle perfectly described why the ZPR acted this way and not otherwise. Read it, you will be interested wink
            3. DrEng527
              DrEng527 24 July 2020 17: 30 New
              -3
              Quote: Rurikovich
              Dear, the author in his Tsushima cycle perfectly described why the ZPR acted this way and not otherwise

              only for laymen ... trivial knowledge of the battle makes the author's speculations flimsy ...
              Quote: Rurikovich
              Read it, you will be interested

              thanks for the advice, it characterizes you badly enough ... hi
          2. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 24 July 2020 19: 16 New
            +1
            Quote: DrEng527
            Sisoy had 15 knots

            On trials in 1896?
          3. DrEng527
            DrEng527 24 July 2020 21: 37 New
            0
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            On trials in 1896?

            on trials he gave more, and in 1905 it fully provided 13,5 knots ... not super, but against 15 Togo quite! and 4 * 12/40 is very good ...
          4. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 24 July 2020 21: 45 New
            +3
            Quote: DrEng527
            and in 1905 it provided 13,5

            That is, "Sisoy" according to your high-speed EBR, and
            Fuji is poorly armored and not fast ...

            In fact, Vitgeft was walking at a speed of 13 knots and Togo quite calmly caught up with him and crushed him with fire, despite the fact that there were actually six battleships in the PTE.
            However, after your definition of "fast battleship" questions have disappeared by themselves.
          5. Comrade
            Comrade 25 July 2020 00: 44 New
            +2
            Ivan, I have a strong feeling that our old "friend" is performing here under two "nicknames" at once.
            I wouldn't be surprised if one soon supports the other.
          6. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 25 July 2020 09: 56 New
            0
            I'm not sure, but that thought came to my mind too.
          7. DrEng527
            DrEng527 25 July 2020 17: 49 New
            +1
            Quote: Comrade
            if one soon supports the other.

            you are wrong ... but the vector got it ... bully
        3. DrEng527
          DrEng527 25 July 2020 17: 48 New
          -1
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          However, after your definition of "fast battleship" questions have disappeared by themselves.

          unlike you, I'm specific bully
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          Vitgeft was walking at a speed of 13 knots and Togo quite calmly caught up with him and crushed him with fire

          1) 2 hours is it calm? request If Mikasa had also been exposed to the fire of the Borodino people, as in ZhM, she would have been at the bottom hi This is both the role of speed and the difference between 9 and 13 knots ...
          2) I recommend reading the author - he showed quite well that 2 TOE fired much better, but the ZPR did not give her a chance to apply the skill ...
        4. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 25 July 2020 18: 22 New
          +1
          Quote: DrEng527
          unlike you, I'm specific

          Uh-huh. This particular supporter of double standards.
          Quote: DrEng527
          I recommend reading the author

          I have read both the author and the mechanics you refer to, and therefore I see when they are lying or distorting.
          Quote: DrEng527
          2 hours is quiet

          Yes.
        5. DrEng527
          DrEng527 25 July 2020 18: 26 New
          0
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          and therefore I see when they lie directly or distort.

          so prove with a quote, if you are able, but not only in words
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          Uh-huh. This particular supporter of double standards.

          Quote: Senior Sailor
          Yes.

          if you know the arithmetic, then you can estimate the number of hits during this time in Mikasu - roughly twice as much as in ZhM ... will it withstand?
        6. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 26 July 2020 12: 06 New
          +2
          Quote: DrEng527
          so prove with a quote, if you are able, but not only in words

          Sorry, you made a statement, you need to prove it.
          It's just that there are a lot of "rude" ones, leading the discussion in style: - Look there, and when you quote from the testimony of the person to whom he referred, and from which the opposite follows, pretends that he has nothing to do with it.
          But in order not to be completely unfounded, I will refer to the testimony of the flagship mechanic Obnorsky, who bluntly stated that "the parade speed of Navarin and Sisoya did not exceed 12 knots" and on evolutions during anchorage in Madagascar, the 2nd squad was always behind 1st.
          I can also mention Shvede, who believed that the "Eagle" could develop 16 knots ... with a fresh change of stokers and a good angle.
        7. DrEng527
          DrEng527 26 July 2020 15: 27 New
          0
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          Sorry, you made a statement, you need to prove it.

          I don’t need to prove it to myself, I don’t see the point - you declared knowledge about something else, but you don’t want to prove it or you cannot? wink

          Quote: Senior Sailor
          the parade speed of "Navarina" and "Sisoi" did not exceed 12 knots "and

          thanks for the specifics, but the data on Sisoi's 13,5 knots from the testimony of his commanders, now I'm on vacation, so I can't write in more detail - not my own PC request
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          I can also mention the Swede, who believed that the "Eagle" could develop 16 knots

          as long as I remember. one, like Borodino, had problems - he had no more than 15 ...

          In any case, there are 5 EBRs with a detachment move of 14uz, IN1 on tests after repairs more than 15uz, so there were options for the formation of a more or less fast detachment to counter Togo ... so the reason was not in technology
        8. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 26 July 2020 15: 42 New
          0
          Quote: DrEng527
          I don't need to prove it to myself, I see no point in you - you declared knowledge about something else

          You twist. you claimed that there were "six fast battleships", doubted.
          Quote: DrEng527
          or can not?

          That is, you did not notice a quote from Obnorsky's testimony?
          Quote: DrEng527
          thanks for the specifics, but the data on Sisoy's 13,5 knots from the testimony of his commanders

          And they referred to the mechanics. Colonel Obnorsky is the flagship mechanic.
          Quote: DrEng527
          I'm on vacation now, so I can't write in more detail - not my native PC

          No problems. I suppose this is not the last time we meet on the topic of Tsushima. She is eternal :))
          Quote: DrEng527
          In any case, there are 5 EBRs with a detachment move of 14uz

          It's not six. And then bread :)))
          Quote: DrEng527
          IN1 on tests after repair more than 15uz

          By the way, I myself would like to remind you of him as a candidate for "speedboats" :)))
        9. DrEng527
          DrEng527 26 July 2020 15: 56 New
          +3
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          "six fast battleships," he doubted.

          Let me remind you that I indicated the speed criterion - 13,5 knots, and I did not take it from the ceiling - Togo has no more than 15 knots, so the difference is less than 2 knots, which is not enough for confident maneuvering ...
          for example, overtaking Suvorov and concentrating fire on it, the EBR took about 6 minutes with a difference in the course of 15uz, and at 1,5 knots it would take an hour ... Mikasa would have withstood, and in 15 minutes it did not get enough ... ...
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          That is, you did not notice a quote from Obnorsky's testimony?

          just answering along the way .... below I have corrected ... hi
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          Colonel Obnorsky is the flagship mechanic.

          and the mechanics are not commanders?
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          I suppose this is not the last time we meet on the topic of Tsushima. She is eternal :))

          yes, but it is a pity that Tsushima is not considered as a battle, with stages request
          I tried to steer the discussion - alas, hits and knots are all important ... bully
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          I myself would like to remind you of him as a candidate for "speedboats"

          and he is the sixth bully
        10. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 26 July 2020 16: 25 New
          0
          Quote: DrEng527
          and he is the sixth

          Yes, yes, and "Fuji" in comparison with him, slow and weakly armored :)))
          The question is, did "Nikolay" show such speed anywhere else besides the measured mile?
          For example, ensign Shamie, who served on it, directly writes that when they were surrounded by the Japanese, their battleship could barely give 11.2 miles per hour (this is a quote), and even then the Apraksin lagged behind ...
        11. DrEng527
          DrEng527 27 July 2020 15: 50 New
          0
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          and "Fuji" in comparison with him, slow and weakly armored :)))

          Is this your thesis? bully

          Quote: Senior Sailor
          could barely give 11.2 mph

          This is after the fight ....
        12. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 27 July 2020 15: 59 New
          0
          Quote: DrEng527
          Is this your thesis?

          No, yours. in the comment from 24.7.20 16-44 you wrote
          At the same time, Fuji is poorly armored and not fast ...
        13. DrEng527
          DrEng527 27 July 2020 16: 23 New
          0
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          At the same time, Fuji is poorly armored and not fast ...

          regarding Borodino
        14. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 28 July 2020 08: 10 New
          +1
          Quote: DrEng527
          regarding Borodino

          is it?
          You wrote:
          At the same time, Fuji is poorly armored and not fast ...
          2) Sisoy had 15 knots, more than enough
        15. DrEng527
          DrEng527 28 July 2020 11: 10 New
          -2
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          is it?

          if you describe everything in detail, then the messages will turn into Talmuds ... request
          the Japanese have 3 strong quality EBRs and 1 medium, we have 4 strong (Borodino), 2 medium (Oslyabya, Sisoy), 2 conditionally fit (Navarin, IN1). Moreover, the last two are quite suitable against Kamimura's BRKR, like Nakhimov. A serious mistake ZPR is not a call to the VOK squadron
        16. anzar
          anzar 28 July 2020 15: 33 New
          +1
          2 conditionally suitable (Navarin, IN1) ...

          I am interested in your opinion on how suitable it was for battles at increased distances of 30-40 cab. (and more) was Navarin? After all, the rotation of its unbalanced turrets led to a strong roll (5gr.? At a traverse position) And this angle is different with the changing azimuth of the target, so it is very difficult to make corrections in the sight (according to the inclinometer readings?) In fresh weather. It seems he never got anywhere ... He died in vain.
          Moreover, the last 2 are quite suitable against Kamimura's BRKR

          In general, yes, one by one, no. They will shoot at them 8 "from 50kab. And that's it (as with Ushakov)
          A serious mistake ZPR is not a call to the VOK squadron

          Yes, but the FOC has already "burned" on such a call)))
        17. DrEng527
          DrEng527 28 July 2020 16: 34 New
          -1
          Quote: anzar
          After all, turning its unbalanced turrets led to a strong roll.

          so strong? bully roll is a constant component, easily compensated ...
          Quote: anzar
          was already suitable for fighting at increased distances of 30-40 cab. (and more) was Navarin?

          at 15 degrees 12/35 had a range of more than 10 km, a shot in 2 minutes 20 seconds

          Quote: anzar
          Yes, but the FOC has already "burned" on such a call)))

          and what - not to fight? it is impossible to catch 2 ballistic missiles with 18uz in the sea without radars ...
        18. Kayuk
          Kayuk 28 July 2020 19: 54 New
          +3
          What are the 2 BRKRs? On May 14 in Vladivostok, only "Russia" was ready for battle. And "Thunderbolt" with "Bogatyr" exchanged a dock after the first was blown up by a mine on May 11.
        19. DrEng527
          DrEng527 28 July 2020 23: 54 New
          -1
          Quote: Kayuk
          What are the 2 BRKRs? On May 14 in Vladivostok

          in order to meet with 2TOE, the VOK had to leave in advance, around the end of April - beginning of May .... the rendezvous point had to be set by the ZPR when starting from Madagascar, the best place is Cam Ranh ...
        20. Kayuk
          Kayuk 29 July 2020 01: 29 New
          +2
          This is already an alternative history. The cruiser "Thunderbolt" after the completion of repairs in February 1905 (ran aground in September 1904 (October 13 N.S.)) conducted tests and was most likely incapable of combat. Only "Russia" remained. And who would give permission to expose Vladivostok on the doorstep of the arrival of 2 TOE? And leave the "Bogatyr" alone, standing unarmed in the dock! And the commanders there before that were not particularly eager for battle, especially since the positions of the commander of the fleet and the 1st squadron had been vacant since December 1904 !!! An exception to this list is the commander of the cruiser squadron in the Pacific, Rear Admiral Jessen K.P. (An interesting character in history and a real aggressive commander: - August 14, 1904 - commanded a squadron of cruisers in a battle with the Japanese squadron of Kamimura. For this battle he was awarded the Order of St. George IV degree and enlisted in the imperial retinue (11.8.1904/24/1905). November 8, 1906 - April XNUMX XNUMX - at the head of the detachment made the transition from the Far East to the Baltic.
          1906 - was reprimanded as a result of the inspection.
          On November 2, 1906, he was promoted to the rank of vice admiral, for the difference in cases against the enemy, with dismissal from service due to illness with a uniform and a pension) Based on the experience of his battle on August 1, 1904, the ZPR and decided to break through the Tsushima Strait "with the loss of some ships ". For the entire Far East in Russia in 1905, there remained 2 admirals - K.P. Jessen and N.R. Greve is the commander of the Vladivostok port. All.
        21. DrEng527
          DrEng527 29 July 2020 17: 01 New
          -1
          Quote: Kayuk
          This is already an alternative history.

          of course
          Quote: Kayuk
          and was most likely incapable of combat.

          from what? the repair is finished, the team is skillful ...
          Quote: Kayuk
          And who would give permission to expose Vladivostok in the doorway to the arrival of 2 TOE? And leave the "Bogatyr" alone, standing unarmed in the dock!

          so, for reference - Vladik fortress with Coastal art ...
          Quote: Kayuk
          2 admirals remained there - K.P. Jessen

          one is enough, and the desire to fight gives the order
        22. Kayuk
          Kayuk 29 July 2020 20: 59 New
          +1
          in order to meet with 2TOE, the VOK had to leave in advance, around the end of April - beginning of May .... the rendezvous point had to be set by the ZPR when starting from Madagascar, the best place is Cam Ranh ...


          from what? the repair is finished, the team is skillful ...


          Let's not forget that Vladivostok is a freezing port. In 1905, the bays were ice-free by the beginning of April. "Russia" in the winter of 1904-1905 - It was used as a floating fort with the aim of flanking the coast of the Amur Bay during a possible attack of Vladivostok on the ice, for which it was frozen into the ice at the entrance to Novik Bay. On April 3, 1905, after repairs and modernizations, Rossiya conducted firing and testing of balloons. Note, only "Russia". "Thunderbolt", most likely, was not allowed to do this yet (Six months without combat training). From 25 to 28 April, during a march to the Japanese shores, "Russia" and "Thunderbolt" destroyed four Japanese schooners. This is the first combat exit since August 1904, and then, for 3 days ... And you - Cam Ranh right away ... And don't forget July 1904, when Thunderbolt had enough coal to reach Tokyo Bay ... of course good, but imagine yourself there, in their place .... At the military comrade-in-arms Z.P. Rozhdestvensky -
          senior flag - officer in the headquarters of the 2nd Pacific Fleet Squadron (consider - special officer) Lieutenant Sventorzhetsky E.V. there is a letter on the Internet addressed to P.M. Vavilov, staff captain for the Admiralty, junior clerk of the Main Naval Staff, colleague of E .IN. Sventorzhetskiy in the scientific department. http://tsushima.org.ru/ru/ru-pohod/ru-pohod-mail/
          It explains everything. As well as the fact that a young, promising lieutenant, a staff officer, and not an ordinary one, is not mentioned by anyone or anywhere during the Tsushima battle. There is a version that he threw himself overboard on the night before the battle.

          so, for reference - Vladik fortress with Coastal art ...


          At the dawn of the 3th century, the Vladivostok fortress included 9 forts, 20 field fortifications (lunettes, redoubts, etc.), 23 land batteries and XNUMX coastal batteries. But by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, far from all the fortifications were completely ready, and there were not enough guns. The garrison of the fortress, not counting the artillerymen, consisted of two infantry regiments - one in the city, the second on the Russky Island.
          By the summer of 1905, the number of the Vladivostok garrison increased fivefold, many new field fortifications in case of continuing battles with the Japanese.
          https://dv.land/history/vladivostokskaya-krepost
          On February 22, 1904 at 13:30 a Japanese squadron consisting of five battleships and two cruisers approached a distance of about 8 km to the Basargin peninsula and began shelling the Vladivostok fortress and the eastern part of the city. Their reconnaissance also worked and reported our weaknesses in the defense. Within 50 minutes, the Japanese fired about 200 shells. And although the result was negligible (the destruction of the city and the fortress was minimal, and the ships of the squadron were not hit at all), our moral damage was enormous. The fortress did not respond to the shelling of the Japanese with a single shot. From the fire of the guns of the Novosiltsevsk coastal battery on the Russky Island and the Peter and Paul coastal battery, capable of hitting Japanese ships, they were blocked by the Basargin Peninsula. And the forts of Linevich and Suvorov, which were subjected to the main blow, were equipped with outdated guns. In addition, some of the guns by that time were sent by rail to the fortification of Port Arthur.
          In December 1904, Port Arthur fell, and Vladivostok became the only stronghold of the empire in the Far East. The fortress began to be completed in a hurry. In 1904 - 1905, the chief of engineers and builder of the Vladivostok fortress, Colonel Vatslav Ignatievich Zhigalkovsky, moved the main defense line 5-7 km ahead from the old long-term bypass of the 1899 project to the heights of the southern side of the Sedanka river valley. This decision was related to the need to ensure the safety of the port from possible bombing from the land side. In wartime conditions, the project was implemented by means of field fortification. As a result, after the Russo-Japanese war, Vladivostok did not have a single long-term fortification on the main line of defense, and its fortifications of the earlier second line became obsolete.
          https://turbina.ru/guide/Vladivostok-Rossiya-87549/Zametki/Uroki-istorii-Vladivostokskaya-krepost-80860/

          one is enough, and the desire to fight gives the order


          What order? Whom?
          Fleet Commander in the Pacific Ocean: Vice Admiral Nikolai Illarionovich Skrydlov - 01.04.1904/09.05.1904/20.12.1904 appointed; (took office in Vladivostok on 20.12.1904/08.05.1905/XNUMX) - XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX (withdrawn after the sinking of ships in Port Arthur); XNUMX-XNUMX - vacant;
          The squadron in Port Arthur: Vice-Admiral Pyotr Alekseevich Bezobrazov 19.04.1904 (commanded from Vladivostok) - 27.09.1904; Rear Admiral Karl Petrovich Jessen: 27.09.1904/09.11.1904/03.10.1904 (according to other sources from 02.01.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX; took office on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX in Vladivostok) - XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.
          All were dumped under the "Spitz" after the battle in the Yellow Sea! And this is on the eve of the arrival of the 2nd TOE! And probably at the same time they were threatening Jessen with a finger, saying: "Don't risk it! Take care of the last ships!" And there, under the "spitz", everyone had no time for the war. Everyone fell into despondency and apathy. After all, not a single battle won, whether at sea or on land in a year of war! It was not without reason that they said that after Mukden, only Z.P. Rozhdestvensky ....
          Thank! I hope everything is clear.
        23. DrEng527
          DrEng527 29 July 2020 21: 38 New
          -1
          Quote: Kayuk
          Thank! I hope everything is clear.

          of course - there are always many reasons and problems not to fight - that's why they lost ... request
          Quote: Kayuk
          From 25 to 28 April, during a march to the Japanese shores, "Russia" and "Thunderbolt" destroyed four Japanese schooners. This is the first combat exit since August 1904, and then, for 3 days ...

          in other words, 2 ballistic missiles are combat-ready by the required date ...
          Quote: Kayuk
          And you - Cam Ranh at once .... And do not forget July 1904, when the "Thunderbolt" had enough coal to reach Tokyo Bay ...

          is there a difference? Or do you think you sent a faulty Cr on a campaign? bully
          and coal miners could be framed in Shanghai and sent to rendezvous points ... a banality
          Quote: Kayuk
          and its fortifications of the earlier second line became obsolete.

          VOK did not change anything fundamentally - on the contrary, the only chance to break through 2TOE!
          The banality of the strategy is the concentration of forces at the right point ...
          Quote: Kayuk
          What order? Whom?

          the tsar gave the ZPR authority - refusal to carry out his order is a shame, but there was no order ... request
          Quote: Kayuk
          Everyone fell into despondency and apathy.

          it was necessary to broadcast - Peter was not ... as he was on shafts near Azov ...
          Quote: Kayuk
          There is a version that he threw himself overboard on the night before the battle.

          a schoolgirl, not an officer ...
        24. Kayuk
          Kayuk 29 July 2020 22: 40 New
          0
          of course - there are always many reasons and problems not to fight - that's why they lost ...

          On the sofa we are all Nelsons and Macedonian ...

          in other words, 2 ballistic missiles are combat-ready by the required date ...

          Walk to Japan and back - yes!

          is there a difference? Or do you think you sent a faulty Cr on a campaign? bully
          and coal miners could be framed in Shanghai and sent to rendezvous points ... a banality

          Where did I write that "Thunderbolt" was out of order in July?
          And Japan is just watching as transports leave Shanghai under the flag of a belligerent country and head to your rendezvous point?

          VOK did not change anything fundamentally - on the contrary, the only chance to break through 2TOE!

          So did he or did he not?

          the tsar gave the ZPR authority - refusal to carry out his order is a shame, but there was no order ...

          What does the ZPR have to do with it? He had a completely different order. The comment was about WOK.

          it was necessary to broadcast - Peter was not ... as he was on shafts near Azov ...

          I partially agree with you, but not with your spelling mistakes.

          a schoolgirl, not an officer ...

          Have you read the letter? You would be in his place. So it's not for us to judge him!
        25. DrEng527
          DrEng527 29 July 2020 23: 29 New
          -1
          Quote: Kayuk
          On the sofa we are all Nelsons and Macedonian ...

          write for yourself bully
          Quote: Kayuk
          And Japan is just watching as transports leave Shanghai under the flag of a belligerent country and head to your rendezvous point?

          let him jump wink
          by the way, it's good to learn to understand the text - I wrote about several ...
          Quote: Kayuk
          He had a completely different order. The comment was about WOK.

          trite - FOC is an increase of 2 TOE ... you have bad understanding ...
          Quote: Kayuk
          oh not with your misspellings.

          amused by grammanatsi complexes ... bully
          Quote: Kayuk
          You would be in his place. So it's not for us to judge him!

          I survived the 90s in my place ... an officer must fight before a battle, and not whine and desert ...
          VKV led the 1TOE into battle, not believing in success and suffering from dysentery, honestly fought back and died in battle ...
        26. Kayuk
          Kayuk 30 July 2020 00: 51 New
          0
          of course - there are always many reasons and problems not to fight - that's why they lost ...
          On the sofa we are all Nelsons and Macedonian ...
          write for yourself bully

          So the people are trying to understand these reasons for losing. And boltology is useless here ...

          And Japan is just watching as transports leave Shanghai under the flag of a belligerent country and head to your rendezvous point?
          let the wink jump
          by the way, it's good to learn to understand the text - I wrote about several ...

          So do I. It is the "transports leaving". You don't have to find fault with one word. But how they come out is a question. At the muzzle of a small gunboat waiting for them, or maybe a detachment of auxiliary cruisers? You don't need to jump a lot. In general, not a test.

          and its fortifications of the earlier second line became obsolete.
          VOK did not change anything fundamentally - on the contrary, the only chance to break through 2TOE!
          The banality of a strategy is the concentration of forces at the right point .... The banality of the strategy is the concentration of forces at the right point ...
          VOK did not change anything fundamentally - on the contrary, the only chance to break through 2TOE!
          So did he or did he not?
          trite - FOC is an increase of 2 TOE ... you have bad understanding ...

          Of course, I apologize wildly .... The question was about the fortress, then about the fact that the FOC does not change anything, then suddenly it suddenly becomes the only chance of breaking through the 2TOE, and then it sharply increases the 2TOE. I don’t even presume to judge your "tricky" and alternative question!

          amused by grammanatsi complexes ...

          Well, they taught me that in the USSR. Thank you very much to EF Khrestina, teacher of Russian language and literature.

          2 admirals remained there - K.P. Jessen
          What order? Whom?
          the tsar gave the ZPR authority - refusal to carry out his order is a shame, but there was no order ...
          What does the ZPR have to do with it? He had a completely different order. The comment was about WOK.
          trite - FOC is an increase of 2 TOE ... you have bad understanding ...

          What are the ZPR's powers? Yes, it’s bad for you with understanding and with the work on my laid out text. If you do not understand the text, I write in simple language. The position of the Fleet Commander in the Pacific Ocean is VACANTNA. K.P. Jessen - Chief of the Cruiser Detachment in the Pacific Ocean. Z.P. Rozhestvensky is the head of the Second Pacific Squadron of the Russian Imperial Fleet or, as it was called in official documents, the 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Jessen Rozhdestvensky does not obey in any way, from the word - at all. It's the same as that in a battalion, in the absence of a battalion commander, a company commander will try to command a communications platoon. It's clearer ...
          P.S. 08.05.1905/XNUMX/XNUMX Vice Admiral Aleksey Alekseevich Birilev was appointed commander of the fleet in the Pacific Ocean. But he did not even have time to put his suitcases (recalled after Tsushima).

          You would be in his place. So it's not for us to judge him!
          I survived the 90s in my place ... an officer must fight before a battle, and not whine and desert ...
          VKV led the 1TOE into battle, not believing in success and suffering from dysentery, honestly fought back and died in battle ...

          I repeat, We were not there, it is not for us to judge them!
        27. The comment was deleted.
    2. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 31 July 2020 08: 28 New
      0
      Quote: Kayuk
      And Japan is just watching as transports leave Shanghai under the flag of a belligerent country and head to your rendezvous point?

      I apologize for interfering. Your opponent, of course, wets the bark, but you too .... why are chartered steamers happy to sail under the Russian flag?
      Simply, ships chartered by Ginzburg broke through to Arthur under their own flags. German coal miners supplying VTE with coal went under their ...
    3. Kayuk
      Kayuk 11 August 2020 16: 44 New
      0
      Sorry for late answer. I meant a detachment of transports of Caperang Radlov in Shanghai. As for the rented steamers - there were none and could not be. And no one else was going to support the squadron beyond Saigon, including selling us coal. Even the Germans. This is one of the reasons for the almost forced march of the 2nd TOE from Annam to Tsushima. (Testimony of the former Commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Vice-Admiral, retired Rozhestvensky. Questions 4 and 20) And for WOK there would be no coal at all. Either carry the transport with you, or on yourself.
  • Kayuk
    Kayuk 29 July 2020 23: 22 New
    0
    [quote] [quote = sim232] [quote = Kayuk] For this battle he was awarded the Order of St. George IV degree and enlisted in the imperial retinue [/ quote]
    And I should have hung it on the yard. There was something for that, do not hesitate. [/ Quote]
    [quote] Controversial and controversial statement. At least he accomplished a deadly task for him and the detachment, breaking out of the mousetrap to Vladivostok. But Kamimura is not. [/ Quote]

    Here yesterday was this comment by sim232 and my answer. But today it’s all gone! What is it like?
  • anzar
    anzar 28 July 2020 20: 49 New
    +1
    so strong?

    yes, strong! (5-3gr), especially important not exactly compensated (by sight)) part of this roll ... an error of 0,2 g. VN for 12-15 kab (the standard distance at the time of its construction) is one thing, the trajectory is even flatter with the same target height, and at 35-40 kab the error in range will be completely different (very large).
    ... easily compensated ....

    It's easy in the harbor)), in the dynamics of the battle, when the angle of rotation of the towers (to the target) refers. DP is constantly changing, this is not the case (especially in fresh weather). The only thing that comes to my mind is to have compensation done in advance. tables .... But I do not know if there were such. Can you describe how you did it "easily"??
    at 15 degrees 12/35 had a range of more than 10 km, a shot in 2 minutes 20 seconds

    The question is not in the range of the projectile, but in the accuracy at long distances. And famous tabular data the guns- this is one thing, but what will be the accuracy towers (in the described situation) - unknown. But I think very small, maybe that's why Rozhd. called Navarin ".... with music"
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 28 July 2020 23: 58 New
    -2
    Quote: anzar
    yes, strong! (5-3gr),

    would you share a source of wisdom? bully the difference in the mass of guns 12/30 and 12/35 cannot give such a roll ...
    Quote: anzar
    it is not so (especially in fresh weather)

    1) looks like a Bulgarian ...
    2) ships shoot on an even keel ... read a little ...
    Quote: anzar
    , but what the accuracy of the tower will be (in the described situation) is unknown.

    you are funny - the conditions are the same for all sides, war is not a doctrine ...
    Quote: anzar
    But I think very small, maybe that's why Rozhd. called Navarin ".... with music"

    he called Aurora indecent, so what? bully
  • anzar
    anzar 29 July 2020 01: 28 New
    +1
    the difference in the mass of guns 12/30 and 12/35 cannot give such a roll ...

    ???? What does she have to do with it? It's about imbalance towers, and their weight and other things include (for example, armor)) By the way, on Nikolay1, the tower is unbalanced (but there is only one))
    2) ships shoot on an even keel ... read a little ...

    Yeah, they wanted a gyroscopic heading laughing ... Or at least the inclinometer, which could be rolling ...
    They shot like this LATER. But since you "read a lot"tell
    1. HOW determines this moment ("flat keel") tower on Navarino? Prompt, looked through the sight))) And even in WWI they did it.
    2. The VN angle was introduced into the sight acc. shooting tables and was correct precisely for the "even keel" If there was any roll, it must be taken into account additionally. But one thing is a constant roll (or a standing ship, a tilted "Glory" in Moonsund) And quite another, changing at each turn of the towers at a slightly different angle to the DP.
    war is not a teaching ...

    Understood correctly)) Ie. identical tabular the range for, say, two different guns in a "vacuum" (outside the machines, turrets, charges, etc. - still does not say anything ...
    But it was about your opinion about the military value of Navarin during the RYAV-during the battle at long ranges. I understand that you think that Navarin has problems only with the gunners))
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 29 July 2020 16: 58 New
    -1
    Quote: anzar
    What does she have to do with it? We are talking about the imbalance of the towers, and their weight and other things include (e.g. armor))

    Despite the fact that this arose due to the notice of guns 12/30 to 12/35
    Quote: anzar
    Yeah, they wanted a gyroscopic heading

    why - it's easier! normal inclinometer, long rolling period ...
    Quote: anzar
    And it is completely different - the towers changing at each turn at a slightly different angle to the DP.

    to listen to you, so the Russian artillerymen did not know how to shoot ... but they did get hit ... hi
    Quote: anzar
    But it was about your opinion about the military value of Navarin during the RYAV-during the battle at long ranges.

    he shot at 50 cabs, long distances in those years were not effective, as for the value - see above - conditionally suitable ... like IN1 ... I note that the abused EBRs hit well, IN1 broke through the tower, and Sisoy sent a shell to the stoker ...
    The problem is not in weapons, but in their use
    Quote: anzar
    I understand that you think that Navarin has problems only with the gunners))

    a finger to the sky - he has problems with the admiral ...
  • Andrey Shmelev
    Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 11: 03 New
    +1
    the speed of 13 knots was Witgeft and Togo

    "Tsushima crossing" never delivered to him
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 27 July 2020 14: 13 New
    -1
    And no one thought that a detachment catching up with another detachment in a parallel course was substituted under the head coverage? Crossing over t as a phrase will not be used. This is for the sailing fleets.
  • rytik32
    rytik32 24 July 2020 21: 25 New
    +3
    Quote: DrEng527
    3) the best option - how the VKV operated - turnover and consumption by counter courses! Let him catch up later ...

    I will support. The most correct option. We are going "under the tail" of Togo, consistently leaving the zone of action of the bow, and then part of the enemy's onboard guns. At the same time, the Nissin and Kasuga are put under fire, in which the 80-mm belt in the stern is permeable for 152-mm guns, and 120-mm traverses for 305-mm. And even if "Mikasa" received in the first 15 minutes of the hit divided between "Nissin" and "Kasuga", it will be very serious for them!
    In total, all the chances of winning the outset of the battle: inflicting damage on 2 BRK and at the same time avoiding the concentrated fire of the enemy ourselves.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 24 July 2020 21: 39 New
    -1
    Quote: rytik32
    We are going under the tail of the One

    Namely, and if you turn it a little more, then Kamimura departs and their interaction with Togo is disrupted ... as it happened later ...
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    26 July 2020 01: 38 New
    0
    Quote: rytik32
    The most correct option. We are going "under the tail" of Togo, consistently leaving the zone of action of the bow, and then part of the enemy's onboard guns.

    I figured it out 100500 times. As a result - the failure of their own shooting and crossing from Kamimura, and then the 1st squad and go to the head. krants
  • Andrey Shmelev
    Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 11: 05 New
    +2
    I figured it out 100500 times.

    I remember here
    As a result - the failure of their own shooting

    I don't remember here
    and crossing from Kamimura, and then the 1st detachment goes to the head and. krants

    I don't remember here either.
    Link please?
  • rytik32
    rytik32 27 July 2020 00: 50 New
    +3
    Kamimura will not dare to cross Borodino one on one with their excellent angles of fire in the nose. His cruisers are too weak. And Togo will turn to the countercourse, as in ZhM, and will disperse.
  • Alexandra
    Alexandra 24 July 2020 23: 23 New
    +5
    Five


    What move could "Admiral Nakhimov" give? Not more than 10 knots?

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Five. But these five were inferior in speed to the Japanese ships, and decently.


    And for this, it was necessary to attach a "weight" of 10 junction transports to the squadron going into battle?

    And the transports did not bind him in any way in combat maneuvering.


    The transports reduced the speed of the entire squadron to 10 knots and tied them up with the task of escorting the cruiser "Enquist". If it were not for the transports, the Enquist could be assigned the task of biting the tail of cruiser Kamimura or biting the head of Togo's battleships with the super task of ensuring the withdrawal of the 1st and 2nd destroyer detachments into a torpedo attack on the Japanese line.

    Rozhdestvensky's ships WERE NOT overloaded, having more than normal coal reserves, but significantly less than the maximum.


    Anti-splinter protection made of charcoal sacks - it's congenial! It is strange that you only notice coal.

    "Overloading with variable overweight cargo is characterized by the following figures in tons: coal - 370 (1150 instead of 780); boiler water - 240 (all was accepted for overload); water for ship's needs - 40; drinking water - 35 (100 instead of 65); oil - 55 (65 instead of 10); provisions - 110 (205 instead of 95); shells and charges - 91 (20% over the set); materials, tools, luggage and small items - 184; boiler grates - 25 (not included in the load) Total 1150 t.

    The composition of the construction overload of the battleship "Eagle" in tons: additional equipment for living quarters - 185; adaptation to swimming conditions in the tropics - 135; transshipment of boats, lifeboats, rostrum and devices for launching boats - 50,5; reinforcement of masts - 29,3; additional armament: network barrier - 33; rangefinders and optical sights - 14; the cabin of the wireless telegraph - 6; plasters Makarov - 2,5; trawls, buoys and countermines - 4,5; additional devices along the body: middle transition bridge - 15; device for transition from slices to yut - 28; sealing of aft deadwood cutouts - 14; racks of cellars, arsenals and shchipersky storerooms - 17; additional devices for systems and pipelines - 90. Total 635.

    A significant overload in residential facilities was caused by an increase in the number of the team by 140 people and officers by 8 people in connection with the introduction of the combat schedule.

    Improved mine and steam boats with an overload of 23 tons were released on the battleships. This caused the reinforcement of arrows, winches, rostrum, and then the reinforcement of the masts. The network fence in the project was first deleted, and its weight was used to arm the chimneys. After the detonation of ships on the Arthur [508] roadstead, the networks were restored, but the armor of the smoke canopies remained.

    A noticeable overload has arisen in connection with the adaptation of living quarters and fellings to sailing conditions in the tropics. Wooden insulation, light boards along the side, coating the sides with cork chips, linoleum and metlakh tiles required an additional weight of 135 g. The ventilation of the living quarters and machinery had to be significantly increased. All ship supplies were taken in an increased amount for a four-month voyage.

    Additional bags, shovels, gloves, boards for platforms and fences were taken for coal loading, which also amounted to more than a dozen tons. The mechanics took the bulkhead reinforcement bars, sheet and angle steel, rivets, bolts, cement, brick, sand, tallow, charcoal, paint, canvas, tools, cables, and additional spare parts.

    The gunners additionally accepted up to 5 tons of tow for wiping off the guns. The bilge men brought in additional caps for the throats, portholes, spare hoses, plumbing and copper pipes, additional tools, and filled the upper corridor behind the armor with their supplies. The senior boatswain brought additional handrails, cradles, cables, stumps of wood, covers for companions from the shore. Any stale defect of the factory storerooms was taken as material for future work. According to my calculations, there were up to 150 g of these additional weights.

    With an overload of 1785 tons, the Eagle entered the Tsushima battle, so that its draft, waterline armor protection and initial stability were close to those values ​​that I recorded during my first stay at Langeland Island. "
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 09: 27 New
    +1
    Quote: AlexanderA
    What move could "Admiral Nakhimov" give? Not more than 10 knots?

    My opponent wrote about 6 fast EBRs. Since when did Nakhimov become an EBR?
    Quote: AlexanderA
    And for this, it was necessary to attach a "weight" of 10 junction transports to the squadron going into battle?

    It was not a weight.
    Quote: AlexanderA
    The transports reduced the speed of the entire squadron to 10 knots and tied them up with the task of escorting the cruiser "Enquist".

    The transports did not limit the combat progress of the squadron. Because in battle, the squadron maneuvers, and does not go in a straight line, the transports could go at a distance (as prescribed) and would have kept up, even if the Russian EBRs were going on the same 13 ties (which they could not do, but still) And they didn't bind Enquist
    Quote: AlexanderA
    If it were not for the transports, the Enquist could be assigned the task of biting the tail of cruiser Kamimura or biting the head of Togo's battleships with the super task of ensuring the withdrawal of the 1st and 2nd destroyer detachments into a torpedo attack on the Japanese line.

    Uh-huh. And 16 Japanese ships in cruising squads would have admired it from afar :)))))) In fact, the transport squad did not allow the Japanese light forces to participate in the battle of the main forces - it gave them a target according to their abilities. In fact, several Russian cruisers tied up the enemy's many times superior light forces in battle and thus facilitated the position of their main forces.
    Quote: AlexanderA
    Total 1150 t.

    In the testimony of the Investigative Commission, Kostenko gave 1090 tons of such an overload :))) But the question is that his weights are largely wrong. I recommend reading here http://alternathistory.com/k-voprosu-o-peregruzke-bronenostsev-v-russko-yaponskuyu-orel/
  • rytik32
    rytik32 25 July 2020 16: 08 New
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I recommend reading here http://alternathistory.com/k-voprosu-o-peregruzke-bronenostsev-v-russko-yaponskuyu-orel/

    I read it.
    Good attempt, but there are errors in key numbers:
    1. Coal stored in premises not intended for this, so-called. "coal protection". If this coal is subtracted from the figures in the Almaz signal book, then it will approximately go with the figures of Kostenko.
    2. The consumption of coal in the battle is strangely calculated. There are many factors that could increase the consumption of coal: from keeping boilers under steam to be ready to go full speed to pipe damage.
    3. There is no calculation based on the amount of coal accepted by the Japanese. Very strange. When calculating shells, similar data are used.
    4. There was an error in the number of 305-mm shells taken by the Eagle. Apparently, the excess cast iron shells for shooting practice were not taken into account. "Eagle" took them noticeably more than the rest of Borodino.
    Because of this, it is impossible to consider this article as proof of the lack of overload of the "Eagle".
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 16: 42 New
    +1
    Quote: rytik32
    The number of 305-mm shells taken by the Eagle is an error. Apparently, the excess cast iron shells for shooting practice were not taken into account. "Eagle" took them noticeably more than the rest of Borodino.

    And I wasted everything on the march
    Quote: rytik32
    Coal stored in rooms not intended for this, the so-called "coal protection"

    Which one and where?
  • rytik32
    rytik32 25 July 2020 17: 25 New
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And I wasted everything on the march

    But in that article it is not described by type which shells the Japanese took - and in vain! There is also the answer to your question.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Which one and where?

    I quote:
    "160 tons remained distributed in various ship rooms and as coal protection. Of these, 45 tons were in the wardroom, 20 tons in the buffet, 80 tons in the bathrooms and aisles, 10 tons in the chief engineer's cabin. Total 105 tons in the battery deck. , 5 tons remained on the spardeck in bed nets, 30 tons on the living deck in the laundry room "
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 17: 33 New
    +1
    Quote: rytik32
    But in that article it is not described by type which shells the Japanese took - and in vain!

    There is evidence from our officers that the oversized ones shot all 305-mm, and about 2/3 of the remaining calibers
    Quote: rytik32
    160 tons remained distributed in various ship spaces and as

    Kostenko again :))))))
  • rytik32
    rytik32 25 July 2020 21: 42 New
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    There is evidence from our officers that the oversized ones shot all 305-mm, and about 2/3 of the remaining calibers

    Here either ours by mistake fired live shells during the exercises, or the Japanese made a mistake when accepting ...
    but this does not negate the fact of the incorrect indication in the article of the number of both received and used shells in battle.
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Kostenko again :))))))

    So the article around Kostenko is written. What's wrong?
    It just turns out that Kostenko did not lie either with coal or with shells.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Alexandra
    Alexandra 26 July 2020 20: 15 New
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    My opponent wrote about 6 fast EBRs. Since when did Nakhimov become an EBR?


    If you are so attentive to detail ... then there were only four EBRs in the Japanese line.

    It was not a weight.


    And what was this caravan of transports with their 10 junction speed and these two hospital ships, the running lights of one of which brought the Shinano-Maru to Rozhdestvensky's squadron?

    The transports did not limit the combat progress of the squadron. Because in battle, the squadron maneuvers, and does not go in a straight line, the transports could go at a distance (as prescribed) and would have kept up, even if the Russian EBRs were going on the same 13 ties (which they could not do, but still) And they didn't bind Enquist


    "According to the Japanese pads, in 5 hours 25 minutes (13:55 - 19:20) the main forces of the Russians covered 56,23 miles at a speed of 7,49 to 12,66 knots., and with maximum speed they walked at the end of the battle."

    In battle, the squadron was supposed to go on the shortest course NO23 to Vladivostok. Rozhestvensky did not know that the Japanese would not allow this to be done before the battle. The squadron's cruisers were assigned two tasks in battle: 1 - protection of transports; 2 - rendering assistance to the main forces. Two different tasks. Do you know the saying "chase two hares ..."?

    And 16 Japanese ships in cruising squads would have admired this from afar :))))))


    In the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th combat units of the Japanese there were 15 cruisers (let's be exact, in the end, it was not a cruiser of the 5th combat unit "Chin-Yen") of which 8 of the second class and 7 of the third class, with each of the squads of the cruiser Enquist could enter into battle alternately and on their own initiative, if they were not associated with the task of protecting the transports. And if the Japanese cruiser of the 2nd class is the maximum level of "Svetlana", then the level of the Japanese cruisers of the 3rd class is even lower.

    If Rozhestvensky wanted so much to drag targets into battle, then he could have stopped at those that could at least shoot back - the auxiliary cruisers Terek, Kuban, Rion and Dnepr. In this case, 15 Russian cruisers of the 2st rank (of which two were armored), 3 cruisers of the 14nd rank and 5 auxiliary cruisers, for a total of 1 cruisers.

    In the testimony of the Investigative Commission, Kostenko gave 1090 tons of such an overload :))) But the question is that his weights are largely wrong. I recommend reading here


    In any case, it was unwise to go into battle on ships with construction overload with operational overload of excess water, provisions, engine oil, boats and boats (which would still be destroyed by enemy shells).
  • Kayuk
    Kayuk 30 July 2020 02: 22 New
    +1
    "According to the Japanese pads, in 5 hours 25 minutes (13:55 - 19:20) the main forces of the Russians covered 56,23 miles at a speed of 7,49 to 12,66 knots, and with maximum speed they went at the end of the battle. "

    And according to the standard scheme of the outbreak of the Tsushima battle, "Suvorov", from 02:05 to failure at 02:26, ​​covered more than 5 miles, which indicates that he was leading the 2nd TOE at a speed of 15 knots !!!! G.B. drew attention to this. Aleksandrovsky in his "Tsushima battle" in note 3.
    And you're talking about 12-13 knots. hi
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 24 July 2020 17: 20 New
    +2
    Quote: DrEng527
    2TOE had 6 high-speed EBRs, much more than Togo

    How many?
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 24 July 2020 17: 34 New
    -1
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    6

    to count with a stroke of 13,5 knots or more?
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 24 July 2020 18: 50 New
    +1
    Do me a favor
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 24 July 2020 21: 44 New
    0
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    Do me a favor

    Borodino, except for one, held 16, like Oslyabya, Sisoy 13,5, so that a squadron move of 13 knots is possible, and Sisy will start to lag by 14, like Poltava in Shatung - not scary ... Now compare the resulting 20 * 12 / 40 + 4 * 10/45 versus 16 * 12/40 and 1 * 10dm for Togo ... well, as a bonus - the Japanese will not stand a high rate of fire according to the experience of Shatung ... The ZPR had everything it needed to win, besides knowledge ... request
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 24 July 2020 22: 03 New
    +4
    1) "Sisoy" never "Poltava". Neither the quality of the armor nor the weapons.
    2)
    Now compare the resulting

    approximately, as in FM. So what?
    3) ZPR and could not know about the failure of the Japanese main guns, so counting on this is a little silly.
    4) It is absolutely not clear what kind of "victory" you are talking about. The allocation of "high-speed battleships" to a separate detachment (which is not a fig not high-speed) will not add explosives to Russian shells and the fuses will not work better. It's just that Togo will first be eaten by this detachment, then will deal with the slow-moving.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 25 July 2020 17: 57 New
    +4
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    Neither the quality of the armor nor the weapons.

    and what you 406 steel bad? or 12/40 were others on Sisoy? bully
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    approximately, as in FM. So what?

    much better in the ZPR, instead of 15 * 12/40, as much as 20 ... but you don't care, you are oriented towards VIL work bully
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    3) ZPR and could not know about the failure of the Japanese main guns, so counting on this is a little silly.

    it is foolish to underestimate Russian intelligence ... but the main thing is different - the ZPR had MORE than 12 dm guns ... reread how the author relates to hits of 6 or 8 dm shells - I agree with him ... Yes, and Asam knocked out 1 hit of 12 dm, the tower / Fuji's barbet did not hit 6dm ...
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    It's just that Togo will first be eaten by this detachment, then will deal with the slow-moving.

    sure, you have a question of faith ... request
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 25 July 2020 18: 40 New
    0
    Quote: DrEng527
    and what you 406 steel bad?

    A counter question, why do you need 457mm of the same armor from "Fuji"?
    Quote: DrEng527
    or 12/40 were others on Sisoy?

    The guns are the same. But the towers were different. The elevation angle is smaller, and there are a number of differences. Well, 12 "the battleship's armament was not limited.
    Yes, and Asamu knocked out 1 hit 12dm

    But not from Sisoya.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 26 July 2020 00: 07 New
    +4
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    A counter question, why do you need 457mm of the same armor from "Fuji"?

    and the thickness of the barbet is 6dm and it was pierced in battle ... so your thesis is a bit ... bully
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    The elevation angle is smaller, and there are a number of differences. Well, 12 "the battleship's armament was not limited.

    1) did it interfere with fighting at RYAV distances? bully
    2) I repeat - read the author - he neglected the impact of 6dm shells and reasonably ...
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    But not from Sisoya.

    but from the 12/30 gun bully But neither Sisoy nor Oslyabya were able to use the guns properly - they did not give the ZPR request
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 26 July 2020 12: 18 New
    +2
    Quote: DrEng527
    so your thesis bit

    No, since this did not prevent him from continuing the battle and destroying Borodino with a successful hit.
    Quote: DrEng527
    but from the 12/30 gun

    1) Another projectile, another explosive, another fuse ...
    2) There is an opinion that it could be one of the BBOs.
    3) There is not too much damage actually. "Asama" took longer to catch up with its column than to be repaired.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 26 July 2020 15: 33 New
    +2
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    No, since this did not stop him from continuing to fight and

    those. is the damage to the 12dm gun a trifle? 25% HK ....
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    and destroy Borodino with a successful hit.

    fortune in RYAV was on the side of the Japanese - they are lucky many times, although they are stubborn ...
    However, this does not negate the main thing - the Russian shell pierced the main battery turret, but the Japanese one did not ...
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    There is not too much damage actually. "Asama" took longer to catch up with its column than to be repaired.

    This approach looks ridiculous ... the BRKR went out of line, lost formation, and the damage is ridiculous for you ... I note that the Japanese made a whole concept from this hit firing on undershoots ... hi
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 26 July 2020 16: 08 New
    0
    No, not a trifle. But also not fatal damage.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 26 July 2020 16: 37 New
    +1
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    But also not fatal damage.

    it is well known that fatal hits are a derivative of the total number - with a competent maneuver, the ZPR 2TOE would have achieved more (the simplest thing is that it does not slow down 1BO when rebuilding, but gives 13 knots and approaches sharply - then light BB shells would have played),% of hits they have was not bad ... and if he had thought over the choice of targets for fire - shoot at a convenient one, then who knows ...
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 26 July 2020 17: 31 New
    +1
    Quote: DrEng527
    and if he had thought over the choice of targets, shoot at a convenient target, then he knows ..

    Wasn't it so?
    The order to shoot at the head concerned only the first detachment, and it was not forbidden to transfer fire to a convenient target, which is confirmed by the hit statistics. In the first 15 minutes, 22 hits of them 19 in the "Mikasa", in the next 15 - 17 hits of them only three in the "Mikasa".
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 27 July 2020 15: 51 New
    -1
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    The order to shoot at the head concerned only the first squad,

    in the confusion everyone was shooting ...
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 09: 28 New
    +3
    Quote: DrEng527
    Borodino, except for one, kept 16,

    In your fantasies - certainly
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 25 July 2020 17: 58 New
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In your fantasies - certainly

    you are very well-reasoned, I see it as a tantrum bully
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    26 July 2020 01: 41 New
    0
    Quote: DrEng527
    you are very well-reasoned, I see it as a hysterical

    Yes, whatever you like :)))) When there are a lot of reports about how much Borodino residents could really go, and your boorish opponent is talking nonsense about 16 knots, what am I going to post all these reports for the eleventh time? No, I won't, the beads are over. On Tsushima, in the 2TOE section, everything is there
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 26 July 2020 09: 13 New
    +2
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    and your boorish opponent

    look in the mirror! hi
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    On Tsushima, in the 2TOE section, everything is

    you would go to the archives, or read books ...
  • Doctor
    Doctor 24 July 2020 15: 35 New
    +5
    It was just directly said that if the flagship is out of order, then the next ship is leading the squadron.

    And that's it? Not much.
    I don't know why you don't like the travel order. I do not see that you are not satisfied with the disposition of the main forces with a cruising patrol in front, transports - separately, covered by the rest of the cruisers.

    A normal marching order for a long time provided for the vanguard, in the form of light high-speed forces with the tasks of reconnaissance and the initiation of the battle, the main forces (corps de battalion), and the rear guard with the tasks of covering from the rear.
    For example, in the battle of Fidonisi, Hassan Pasha is first forced to attack the frigates of Ushakov's vanguard, and the main forces of the Russian squadron, meanwhile, choose a convenient position for attack.

    There was no maneuverable high-speed group due to the lack of high-speed ships.

    They don't have to be fast, it's a reserve. The same Ushakov learned to distinguish it in the battle at Cape Tendra (three frigates - "John the Warrior", "Jerome" and "Protection of the Virgin" to provide a maneuverable reserve in case of a change in the wind and a possible enemy attack from two sides).

    Consider for yourself whether a reserve was needed in the Tsushima battle.

    In the vanguard of the battle formation was the main striking force of the squadron - the 1st armored detachment, in the rearguard - the ships of Nebogatov, which poorly maneuvered as part of the 2TOE.

    And imagine that the squadron is commanded not by your clever and brave Rozhdestvensky, but by the "cowardly" Nebogatov, and he will put the ships the other way around, but he himself is behind on "Suvorov"?
    While the Japanese will smash the trash, you look something and come up with.

    What are you unhappy with?

    The fact that Rozhdestvensky exposed the head of the main forces without reconnaissance to a linear attack.

    Can you imagine that an aircraft carrier rushing at the head of the AUG?
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    24 July 2020 17: 00 New
    0
    Quote: Arzt
    And that's it?

    Do I need you to quote all the documents?
    Quote: Arzt
    A normal marching order for a long time provided for the vanguard, in the form of light high-speed forces with the tasks of reconnaissance and the initiation of the battle, the main forces (corps de battalion), and the rear guard with the tasks of covering from the rear.

    let's not impose the tactics of sailing fleets on steam ones. It doesn't work, or rather it works, but only partially.
    Quote: Arzt
    For example, in the battle of Fidonisi, Hassan Pasha is first forced to attack the frigates of Ushakov's vanguard, and the main forces of the Russian squadron, meanwhile, choose a convenient position for attack.

    You do not take into account one simple thing - the speed of sailing ships of those times was comparable. In Tsushima, no.
    Quote: Arzt
    And imagine that the squadron is commanded not by your clever and brave Rozhdestvensky, but by the "cowardly" Nebogatov, and he will put the ships the other way around, but he himself is behind on "Suvorov"?

    Well, in half an hour the 3rd detachment will go to the bottom, and then what?
    Quote: Arzt
    The fact that Rozhdestvensky exposed the head of the main forces without reconnaissance to a linear attack.

    He did not put his head under the blow, but on the contrary, he let his head strike :)))
  • Doctor
    Doctor 24 July 2020 17: 17 New
    +5
    let's not impose the tactics of sailing fleets on steam ones. It doesn't work, or rather it works, but only partially.

    Works anytime, anywhere, even on land and in the air.
    In the transport convoy of equipment and even just in the reconnaissance group, a head patrol is allocated, the sky for the strike group of aircraft is cleared by the fighters of the outbreak of the battle.

    In the Battle of Jutland, the Germans have the vanguard ahead: the 1st reconnaissance group of the High Seas Fleet battlecruisers Lutzow, Derflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann + 2nd reconnaissance group - light cruisers Frankfurt "," Wiesbaden "," Pillau "," Elbing "), + 2nd, 6th and 9th destroyer flotillas.

    Surviving in Tsushima "Almaz" while catching "Geben" in the battle at Cape Sarych walked 3,5 miles ahead of the main group of battleships, "Memory of Mercury" and "Cahul" in lateral patrols.
    Learned.
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 24 July 2020 19: 01 New
    +1
    Quote: Arzt
    In the Battle of Jutland, the Germans have the vanguard ahead: the 1st Reconnaissance Group of the High Seas Fleet battlecruisers "Lutzow", "Derflinger", "Seydlitz", "Moltke" and "Von der Tann"

    A small question, who will we appoint "Luttsov" in VTE?
  • Doctor
    Doctor 24 July 2020 19: 26 New
    +2
    A small question, who will we appoint "Luttsov" in VTE?

    Details. Basically: a couple of cruisers forward, within sight and fire support ?, one on the right to the left. They saw, reported, thought, maneuvered.
    Forewarned - armed.
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 24 July 2020 20: 55 New
    +1
    Quote: Arzt
    Details.

    In other words, you have no candidates.
    Quote: Arzt
    Basically: a couple of cruisers forward, within sight and fire support?

    And what would it give?
    By the way, are you pretty sure that Hipper was walking the quote "within sight and fire support?"
  • Doctor
    Doctor 24 July 2020 21: 14 New
    +4
    And what would it give?

    Dispute incomprehensible to me. It would be fine to explain to the grandmothers in the market, but here it seems like a military forum.
    Being under the supervision of the enemy, bring the squadron to a dangerous place and not expose a firebrand? Come on. Elementary rules of war.
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 24 July 2020 21: 31 New
    0
    Sorry, but for any action, you need: a) a clear task b) the necessary tools. Neither one nor the other can be seen here.
    In principle, the presence of an avant-garde would give Rozhdestvensky a few tens of minutes, an opportunity to think and rebuild.

    Yes, he, as it were, had time.
    Simply, if ZPR had built the line in advance, Togo, taking advantage of the speed advantage, would have calmly crossed for him. And then he attacked a weak column and suddenly found himself in front of a formation of battleships.
    In principle, on common sense, ZPR in vain abandoned close reconnaissance, but one should not expect great success from it, let alone consider it a panacea.
    The maximum would be to drive off the Izumi and slightly increase the morale of the squadron. Themselves would run at full speed ...
    True, it is quite likely that after all this on the "Izumrud" (or whoever you propose there) the cars would have died in front of the Japanese and the surrendering Nebogatov. sad
  • Doctor
    Doctor 25 July 2020 11: 51 New
    +4
    True, it is quite likely that after all this on the "Izumrud" (or whoever you propose there) the cars would have died in front of the Japanese and the surrendering Nebogatov.

    Rozhdestvensky actually put on something like an avant-garde.
    The armored cruiser of the 2st rank "Svetlana", the armored cruiser of the XNUMXnd rank "Almaz", and the auxiliary cruiser "Ural" (converted from the liner).
    The first contact was with the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru, converted from a commercial vessel.
    "Svetlana" and "Almaz" have a maximum speed of 19 knots, and "Shinano-Maru" - 15.
    So they could well drive him.

    But our gallant admiral moved the reconnaissance detachment back, to cover the tails (for he did not take care of the rearguard in time), and flopped forward, blindfolded.
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 25 July 2020 12: 35 New
    0
    Quote: Arzt
    "Svetlana" and "Almaz" have a maximum speed of 19 knots, and "Shinano-Maru" - 15.
    So they could well drive him.

    "Svetlana", perhaps, that she could. "Almaz" with its purely symbolic weapons is unlikely. But there is no special meaning in this heroic deed. The Russian squadron has already been found.
    That is, this, in itself, is not bad, but this is not the straw that should have been grabbed.
  • Doctor
    Doctor 25 July 2020 15: 43 New
    +5
    "Svetlana", perhaps, that she could. "Almaz" with its purely symbolic weapons is unlikely. But there is no special meaning in this heroic deed. The Russian squadron has already been found.
    That is, this, in itself, is not bad, but this is not the straw that should have been grabbed.

    This is passive tactics.

    I have already written below, in the Hull incident, thousands of miles from the shores of Japan, we are fighting the mythical Japanese, we drown the fishermen, we begin to wet each other, we almost send Aurora to the bottom, mortally wound her priest.

    And here, off the coast of Japan, some kind of laiba appears, wanders along the formation, almost looking into the wardroom, starts intensive radio traffic and even makes no attempts to establish it.

    And really, why? It's all pointless ...
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 25 July 2020 16: 00 New
    0
    Do not exaggerate.
    We almost send Aurora to the bottom

    Five shells, of which only one exploded, would not have drowned even the "Shinono-maru"
    Quote: Arzt
    And here, off the coast of Japan, some kind of laiba appears wandering along the line, almost looking into the wardroom

    Oh, don't drive! Six miles? This is almost on the verge of the action of the then artillery.
  • anzar
    anzar 25 July 2020 19: 03 New
    0
    From five shells, of which only one exploded.

    And this fact did not impress anyone ...?!
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 26 July 2020 12: 53 New
    +1
    Here I agree!
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 27 July 2020 14: 31 New
    0
    What a garbage: 5 shells. Forgive our admirals such a trifle. Just think, 5 blanks.
  • anzar
    anzar 25 July 2020 18: 59 New
    0
    in the Hull incident, thousands of miles from the shores of Japan, we are fighting the mythical Japanese, drowning fishermen ... And here, off the coast of Japan, some kind of laiba appears ... and even no attempts to install it.
    And really, why? It's all pointless.

    ++laughing very good notes of all these "excuses" from the post-knowledge position
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 27 July 2020 14: 29 New
    0
    ZPR did not even try to allocate any tasks to someone.
    No need to shield him. Complete organizational unsuitability and that's it.
  • Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 24 July 2020 21: 02 New
    +4
    Quote: Arzt
    Details.

    Yes, not details ... No need to impose the example of the Germans under Jutland on Tsushima! Even fundamentally different examples with different class performers.
    With an advantage in light cruisers, it is unwise to keep the Japanese ahead. Time. Two. Even the use of high-speed "pebbles" gave practically nothing, because the a priori lower speed of the 2TE did not give any tactical advantages in the earlier detection of the Japanese. The Japanese in any case, due to the advantage in speed, would choose the place and time of the strike. But the close reconnaissance cruisers could be under enemy fire before their own.
    Three. Don't confuse God's gift with scrambled eggs. The battle cruisers of the Germans were created for fighting with their own kind and could even withstand the fire of battleships. This applies to light cruisers of the RYAV period ??? Under Jutland, the task of Hipper's battlecruisers was to bind and direct a PART of the British fleet to their main forces. What they did great. Were the Russian cruisers capable of carrying out such "reconnaissance"? negative
    Surviving in Tsushima "Almaz" while catching "Geben" in the battle at Cape Sarych walked 3,5 miles ahead of the main group of battleships, "Memory of Mercury" and "Cahul" in lateral patrols.

    Well guys, learn history! Upon detection of smoke, both "Almaz" and "Cahul" with "Memory ..." were piled, by order of sin, beyond the line of the Russian EBR, and in the future there was benefit from such reconnaissance as from a goat of milk. An unconvincing example again no
  • Doctor
    Doctor 24 July 2020 21: 07 New
    +3
    Yes, not details ... No need to impose the example of the Germans under Jutland on Tsushima! Even fundamentally different examples with different class performers.

    In principle, the presence of an avant-garde would give Rozhdestvensky a few tens of minutes, an opportunity to think and rebuild.

    Upon detection of smoke, both "Almaz" and "Cahul" with "Memory ..." were piled up by order

    Did you have time to semaphore? The order and the appointment were fulfilled.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 09: 35 New
    -1
    Quote: Arzt
    In principle, the presence of an avant-garde would give Rozhdestvensky a few tens of minutes, an opportunity to think and rebuild.

    Not given. Because any of his rearrangements before the meeting of the main forces would have been seen by Togo, after which a counter-maneuver would have followed.
    The fact of the matter is that it made sense for Rozhdestvensky to rebuild immediately before the start of the battle of the main forces. This alone gave him any chance. And - it worked, Togo Loop
  • Doctor
    Doctor 25 July 2020 11: 17 New
    +6
    In principle, the presence of an avant-garde would give Rozhdestvensky a few tens of minutes, an opportunity to think and rebuild.

    Not given. Because any of his rearrangements before the meeting of the main forces would have been seen by Togo, after which a counter-maneuver would have followed.
    The fact of the matter is that it made sense for Rozhdestvensky to rebuild immediately before the start of the battle of the main forces. This alone gave him any chance. And - it worked, Togo Loop


    You have Togo some kind of genius of foresight and maneuver, for any Rozhdestvensky's action he has a reaction.
    And Rozhdestvensky is a super genius, he knows that Togo is a genius, so he does nothing.

    Battle guard? Why, the vanguard will drown him anyway.
    Drive off the Japanese scouts? And why? That cruiser is faster anyway.
    Start a parallel course maneuver in advance? And why, Togo has foreseen everything, he also maneuvers. (Though later it worked - Togo's loop).

    In fact, Togo is a mediocre admiral, fought a little on the Kasuga, then studied with the British, went around the world, 4 years on a gunboat, a year on a cruiser, then commanded bases, and immediately the Fleet.
    For all the time I personally drowned one steamer - "Cushing".

    As for Rozhdestvensky, he was already in the Hull incident, after which the British press called our squadron "a fleet of madmen", showed how he knows how to organize a marching order.
    If the tsar had listened to the British and, as they suggested, had returned the VTE back to Kronstadt and had brought Admiral Rozhdestvensky to court, there would have been more sense. And the ships are more intact.

    P.S. Although I'm not sure about the Aurora, it was necessary to finish it off ourselves, you see, there would be no revolution. laughing
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 16: 53 New
    0
    Quote: Arzt
    You have Togo some kind of genius of foresight and maneuver, for any Rozhdestvensky's action he has a reaction.

    Togo has eyes. And there is superior speed. If he sees the Russian system 8-10 miles away from him, and it makes sense to start a battle about four miles away, then why would he have the gift of foresight? He can assess the position of the Russian squadron and react accordingly. It was in Jutland that such numbers did not pass, since there the detection distance was almost equal to the firing distance.
    The same is true for Rozhdestvensky.
  • Operator
    Operator 27 July 2020 02: 10 New
    0
    Andrey from Chelyabinsk is a humanist, the concept of "logic" is not familiar to him: he is a free artist, as he sees Tsushima in the astral, he paints the same oil painting every year laughing
  • anzar
    anzar 25 July 2020 19: 35 New
    +3
    It made sense for Rozhdestvensky to rebuild immediately before the start of the battle of the main forces. This alone gave him any chance

    This is not true. Let's call this "myth" of yours "Rozhdestvensky's trick" laughing In fact, it happened by chance - Togo wanted to fight on a leeward side (because of the fresh weather and ...), and Rozhd. - one column (rebuilding began earlier than Togo ...)
    But there were still chances with competent maneuvering ..)) Not worse without a loop. But yes, the other factors for defeat aren't going anywhere.
  • rytik32
    rytik32 24 July 2020 22: 23 New
    +1
    Quote: Rurikovich
    With an advantage in light cruisers, it is unwise to keep the Japanese ahead. Time. Two. Even the use of high-speed "pebbles" gave practically nothing, because the a priori lower speed of the 2TE did not give any tactical advantages in the earlier detection of the Japanese. The Japanese in any case, due to the advantage in speed, would choose the place and time of the strike.

    Vanguard and rearguard are relevant for the scenario of passage through the strait in the morning. Then the Japanese discover the squadron, but cannot catch up with it before dark. And here a rearguard is already needed to hide the main forces from the scouts. And even more so, the vanguard and rearguard are needed the next morning to disperse those ships (even fishermen or neutrals) that will be on the way.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    25 July 2020 09: 33 New
    -1
    Quote: Arzt
    Works anytime, anywhere, even on land and in the air.

    Unfortunately no. And I've written a lot about this.
    Quote: Arzt
    In the Battle of Jutland, the Germans have the vanguard ahead: the 1st reconnaissance group of the High Seas Fleet battlecruisers Lutzow, Derflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann + 2nd reconnaissance group - light cruisers Frankfurt "," Wiesbaden "," Pillau "," Elbing "), + 2nd, 6th and 9th destroyer flotillas.

    And where is it here
    Quote: Arzt
    vanguard, in the form of light high-speed forces with tasks of reconnaissance and the outbreak of battle, the main forces (corps de battalion), and a rearguard with tasks of covering from the rear.

    There is intelligence and there are main forces. All. And the battles of the dotsushima battleships differed from the PMA in that the visual detection distance significantly exceeded the effective fire distance. That is what you write below
    Quote: Arzt
    They saw, reported, thought, maneuvered.
    Forewarned - armed.

    does not make much sense, because you can see, think, and maneuver without resorting to the help of scouts. That scouts were needed in order to know the place of the Russian squadron, Rozhestvensky did not need this. At the same time, Togo made maneuvers for better introduction of the main forces into battle in view of our main forces.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 27 July 2020 14: 38 New
    0
    In bad weather at sea, not so "saw everything". Togo, even according to intelligence, did not go directly to 2TOE. But he calmly walked almost across and turned from the wind. That's it, the battle is won. ZPR left Togo no chance
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 27 July 2020 14: 07 New
    +2
    Judging by the fact that the detachments of Togo and Kamimura operated separately, but with the same purpose there were instructions and training. When turning everything suddenly 180 degrees. you also need to be able to manage. In maneuvering, the Japanese surpassed Rozhdestvensky by two heads. And our commanders knew only that they had to trudge in the front. And Nebogatov did not know anything at all more than the commanders.
    And Rozhestvensky did not maneuver anything at all. After his maneuvers, Oslyabi and, in fact, Suvorov died. And then he didn't manage anything at all. And without him the squadron kept under fire anyway longer. Precisely because it was not headed by the ZPR.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 24 July 2020 15: 22 New
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In essence, I am trying to restore historical justice with my publications - and nothing more.

    in essence you are creating a new fairy tale ... request
    ZPR made the main mistakes before the battle, and then during the battle gave the initiative to Togo! Only the change of the flagship led further to more or less meaningful maneuvering ... request
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 15: 38 New
      -4
      Quote: DrEng527
      ZPR made the main mistakes before the battle, and then during the battle gave the initiative to Togo!

      Object to the merits, please, and do not repeat the "truths"
    2. DrEng527
      DrEng527 24 July 2020 16: 49 New
      +4
      I am writing in essence - ZPR failed the preparation for the battle, the outset of the battle was a consequence of the defeat .. I saved the IA1 from complete and quick defeat by competent maneuvering ...
  • Doctor
    Doctor 24 July 2020 13: 38 New
    +2
    The course of the Russian ships provided them with the best shooting position possible.

    Andrey, you know that this crossing T was invented in the era of the sailing fleet. To strike from all over the side at the enemy, located bow or stern to you, is the pink dream of any captain of a sailing ship. Remember Captain Blood at Sabatini:

    ... The sight of a huge red ship with a gilded sculpture on the bow and open ports turning sideways towards the French had a stunning effect on de Rivarol, who had just rejoiced on the occasion of victory. But even before he could budge to give the order, or even figure out what order to give, a deadly barrage of fire and metal from the corsairs' side salvo swept everything from the Victorieuse's deck.

    Hence, in fact, linear tactics and the concept of "battleship" appeared. Rozhdestvensky simply could not help but know.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 13: 50 New
      +2
      Quote: Arzt
      Andrey, you know that this crossing T was invented in the era of the sailing fleet.

      Конечно.
      Quote: Arzt
      Hence, in fact, linear tactics and the concept of "battleship" appeared. Rozhdestvensky simply could not help but know.

      Rozhestvensky knew this, and his maneuvering just did not allow the Japanese to put this very crossing T.
      1. Doctor
        Doctor 24 July 2020 13: 59 New
        +2
        Rozhestvensky knew this, and his maneuvering just did not allow the Japanese to put this very crossing T.

        I tried. But it's too late. Even if it is indistinct, as in the pictures in theory, the Japanese managed to build a column in such a way that several ships with a side salvo would work on the longitudinal leading heads of the Russian Fleet.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 14: 28 New
          +3
          Quote: Arzt
          Even if it is indistinct, as in the pictures in theory, the Japanese managed to build a column in such a way that several ships with a side salvo would work on the longitudinal leading heads of the Russian Fleet.

          I have not found confirmation of this point of view. The analysis of maneuvering, which I conducted myself, shows that there was no such moment in the first hour of the battle.
        2. Sergey Oberemko
          Sergey Oberemko 26 July 2020 15: 32 New
          0
          The ideal wand is the Mobidik of naval commanders and flotophiles, and there is not much sense in it. naval-manual in connection with Tsushima and the battle on August 1, the calculations laid out that the fire of 2 ships on one target gives a coefficient of 1,6-1,8 (I can't vouch for the numbers, I don't remember exactly), and then worse. So the effect of superiority is only that the enemy does not shoot at you, and the consumption of ammunition is hellish.
          He had two errors:
          - it wasn’t necessary to climb into the wheelhouse at short distances, it’s too painful for everything to go to hell from the side.
          -that the rest of the ships participated in the crowd, and this is his main mistake as a commander. The end units of the 2nd and 3rd detachments did not shoot at the outset of the battle because of the distance and because of the coursework. Excluding them from combat is his biggest mistake.
          Rozhestvensky, as for me, was a good commander of the 1st detachment, but in this sense Jessen was both more careful and wiser than he should have been appointed to the post, though there would have been more sense.

          I didn't really understand that Suvorov (Peresvet, Oslyabi and Tsarevich) was enough for 30 minutes, that the shells had to be removed from the fenders, he poured water into the boats. About coal in Novikov-Surf is in the description that it was lying in the aft battery, there was someone who fell, this is a fact and not Silych's value judgment.
          All this in no way diminishes the merits of your work, with the conclusions of which one cannot but agree.
          For which a separate respect.
  • Andrey Shmelev
    Andrey Shmelev 26 July 2020 11: 01 New
    +3
    we visualize the ingenious tactics of ZPR with one picture:


    1. Sergey Oberemko
      Sergey Oberemko 26 July 2020 14: 33 New
      0
      The scheme is controversial, in Rozhestvensky's memoirs they say that they turned a little forward from to the traverse of Suvorov
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 July 2020 07: 26 New
      +1
      Quote: Andrei Shmelev
      we visualize the ingenious tactics of ZPR with one picture:

      Also wrong, besides
  • rytik32
    rytik32 27 July 2020 00: 45 New
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    By the way, the analysis of Mikasa's damage suggests that if the Russian squadron had shells of the 1907 g sample (lightweight, but with TNT instead of gunpowder), then most likely Mikasa would be knocked out of action, and Togo would be killed in the first 15 minutes of the battle.

    Where can you read this analysis?
    So I watched the damage to "Mikasa" at the beginning of Arseniy Danilov - nothing serious happened there.
    1. Andrey Shmelev
      Andrey Shmelev 27 July 2020 19: 41 New
      +2
      there is no way something serious turns out there.


      Yes sir

      and if the Japanese were the same as arr. 1907, maybe everything would be over in an hour, wouldn't it?
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 24 July 2020 15: 16 New
    +4
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And allowing our gunners to fully realize the consequences of the erroneous "Loop of Togo"

    it was especially convenient to shoot 2 BO in a heap ... bully
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 15: 34 New
      +1
      Quote: DrEng527
      it was especially convenient to shoot 2 BP in a heap.

      No, not really. But this is nonsense compared to the inconvenience that Togo experienced and complete nonsense compared to if the Japanese would immediately go to the crossing.
      1. DrEng527
        DrEng527 24 July 2020 16: 58 New
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        complete nonsense compared to the fact that the Japanese would immediately go to the crossing.

        it is impossible to do it with a competent admiral - see the battle in the Yellow Sea ... you have the absolutization of one maneuver ... and for each maneuver, there is a counter-maneuver
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 July 2020 09: 36 New
          0
          Quote: DrEng527
          this cannot be done with a competent admiral - see the battle in the Yellow Sea ...

          Where the Japanese did not even try to cross, but danced at a great distance. Why the counter-maneuver succeeded
          1. DrEng527
            DrEng527 25 July 2020 18: 08 New
            +2
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Why the counter-maneuver succeeded

            always amused by the trend that VKV did everything wrong, and if something worked out, then his merit is not in this ... bully If you didn’t drop the speed of your detachment and turn slightly to the right, Togo got serious problems - the Borodino people would have shot him with a turning EBR with 25 cabs, but the maneuver could not be stopped ... request
            This is the role of the admiral's personality in battle ...
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              26 July 2020 01: 42 New
              0
              Quote: DrEng527
              The trend is always amusing that VKV did everything wrong, and if something worked out, then his merit is not in it ..

              Look at the distance at which Togo did the crossings. You write too much about trends, with near-zero knowledge of the material
            2. DrEng527
              DrEng527 26 July 2020 09: 14 New
              +1
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Look at the distance at which Togo did the crossings.

              learn to read and understand the text - see above for me about distance ...
        2. rytik32
          rytik32 27 July 2020 01: 03 New
          +2

          We tried to cross and how!
          All according to the instructions http://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_18/page_20/bibl-jap-port-artur-doc/japonskije-bojevyje-instrukcii/
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            27 July 2020 07: 28 New
            0
            Quote: rytik32
            We tried to cross and how!

            Sp-sto-i-no-e! :))))))) And look less at the schemes, and more at the descriptions of the battle
          2. rytik32
            rytik32 27 July 2020 23: 15 New
            +1
            Here are the Japanese themselves in Meiji admit that they put the crossing T

            And here is the distance

            In both cases, the distance was about 40 cables. Only in Tsushima, at the moment Togo turned to the loop, Rozhestvensky could not turn to the counter course, because on the left there was another column of its own. So Rozhestvensky went further to approach and opened fire from 32 cables.
          3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            28 July 2020 05: 51 New
            +1
            Quote: rytik32
            And here is the distance

            And here is a more or less reliable reconstruction of maneuvering in FM, compiled on the basis of a mass of evidence
            https://topwar.ru/102165-boy-v-zheltom-more-28-iyulya-1904-g-chast-7-udivitelnye-manevry-yaponskogo-admirala.html
            75-80 cables per fight. And there were 40 cables there when Togo regained control over the squadron and this maneuver "pulled out" to crossing T only for officialdom - it was necessary to somehow explain his crazy shy
  • Sergey Oberemko
    Sergey Oberemko 26 July 2020 14: 34 New
    +1
    In a heap - not in a heap, a moot point, but the fact that they did not reach and the aft towers were not in action is a fact.
    1. DrEng527
      DrEng527 26 July 2020 15: 46 New
      +3
      and comfortable shooting conditions provide a maneuver .... what can we talk about at 9uz?
      1. Sergey Oberemko
        Sergey Oberemko 26 July 2020 15: 53 New
        +2
        Well, I also don't understand why it was necessary to drop the speed right away, I could last another 5 minutes, but I wrote about the same to Andrey a little higher. On the face of the official inconsistency. Rozhdestvensky's outlook was closed by the boundaries of the 1st detachment. But it wasn't better.
  • Bashkirkhan
    Bashkirkhan 24 July 2020 08: 11 New
    +2
    Good publication, I liked it. The author's conclusions that, in addition to Rozhdestvensky's mistakes, the quality of construction of the Oslyabi also manifested itself in battle, are interesting. If I am not mistaken under Tsushima, Togo ordered to take care of the shells, hoping to conduct a battle for destruction after the night attacks of destroyers. With such a quality of RIF ships, the Japanese could really save the shells.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 08: 24 New
      +3
      Greetings, dear Bashkirkhan!
      Quote: Bashkirkhan
      If I am not mistaken under Tsushima, Togo ordered to take care of the shells, hoping to conduct a battle for destruction after the night attacks of the destroyers.

      I haven't heard that. Of course, the Japanese fired their main caliber in Tsushima less often than in the Yellow Sea, but this is more a question of the weather. In addition, Togo might not want to get 5 barrel ruptures again, as in Shantung.
      1. Bashkirkhan
        Bashkirkhan 24 July 2020 09: 33 New
        +2
        Now I don’t remember, I read literature at one time. The training of the Japanese gunners was of course excellent. Thanks for the excellent publication, you are not letting the site sink to the level of Yandex Zen.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 10: 18 New
          +3
          Quote: Bashkirkhan
          Now I don’t remember, I read literature at one time.

          It's a pity:)
          Quote: Bashkirkhan
          Thanks for the great posting,

          Always welcome, come again! hi
        2. Harry cuper
          Harry cuper 24 July 2020 12: 05 New
          +4
          Yes, dear Bashkirkhan. The rare appearances of Andrey Nikolayevich and a couple of other authors are bright spots on the site of the Zen level and mediocre propaganda. But there was a decent resource ... (
      2. Non-fighter
        Non-fighter 24 July 2020 10: 19 New
        +1
        And how many trunks did he have in stock in the warehouses? On the shore in the sense. Otherwise, a situation is possible when there will be nothing to shoot from :(
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 10: 28 New
          +4
          Quote: Not the fighter
          And how many trunks did he have in stock in the warehouses? On the shore in the sense.

          The Japanese EBRs, while blocking the 1TOE, were based on the Elliots, and there were no stocks of trunks, as well as the possibility of replacing them - for this it was necessary to go to Japan. But how many was in Japan - alas, I cannot say.
          1. rytik32
            rytik32 24 July 2020 22: 27 New
            +1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Quote: Not the fighter
            And how many trunks did he have in stock in the warehouses? On the shore in the sense.

            The Japanese EBRs, while blocking the 1TOE, were based on the Elliots, and there were no stocks of trunks, as well as the possibility of replacing them - for this it was necessary to go to Japan. But how many was in Japan - alas, I cannot say.

            16 barrels 305-mm, I think I read Krestyaninov
  • kapitan281271
    kapitan281271 24 July 2020 08: 59 New
    +4
    Well, pancake, well, as always, BRILLIANT, "ANDREY IZ CHELYABINSK" is already a brand.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 09: 17 New
      +4
      Quote: kapitan281271
      Well damn, well, as always,

      Thank you very much, Konstantin :)))
  • The comment was deleted.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 09: 18 New
      +5
      Quote: kapitan281271
      I will download World of Warships now, I will buy a "donkey" and I will hammer "mikaza" until it turns blue

      Alas, it will not work - Oslyabi is not there, and on Mikasa during the day with fire in the random house you will not find an enemy. But I was lucky once - I drowned him playing on the "Varyag" laughing
      1. kapitan281271
        kapitan281271 24 July 2020 09: 56 New
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Alas, it will not work - Oslyabi is not there, and on Mikasa during the day with fire in the random house you will not find an enemy. But I was lucky once - I drowned him playing on the "Varyag"

        Symbolically! Congratulations!
  • unknown
    unknown 24 July 2020 09: 56 New
    +4
    Yes, a lot of work has been done.
    But, as Ogurtsov said in "Carnival Night": "This will not work."
    The quality of the work may have influenced, but ... OVERLOADING KINDED "Oslyabya".
    All battleships of the series had a construction overload.
    The author compares "Oslyabya" with "Peresvet".
    It is logical. It was these battleships of the series that were the closest in terms of design.
    It is known that having taken a full supply of fuel "Peresvet" sank so much that the upper edge of its main armor belt went under water by 30 cm. That is, in this case, its waterline was protected by a short and thin (102mm) belt.
    In the battle in the Yellow Sea "Peresvet" did not have a full supply of fuel. The question is, what protected his waterline.
    The total supply of coal on battleships of this type is 2058 tons. If there were 1500 tons of coal in the coal pits of "Peresvet", then the upper edge of its main belt was about 5,5 cm below the waterline.
    If by the morning of May 13 "Oslyabya" had 1415 tons of coal, then with a daily consumption of 114 tons for battleships of this type, by the beginning of the battle 1300 tons remained in its coal pits. Less than that of "Peresvet". But ..., the construction overload of "Oslyabi" is 598 tons more than that of "Peresvet". If you add two numbers, that is, perform a simple arithmetic operation, then the resulting amount - 1898 tons will be very close to the full supply of fuel.
    In the presence of which the upper edge of the main armor belt "Peresvet" was 30 cm (11, 8 inches) below the waterline. The difference of 60 tons is a difference of 1,15 inches, since changing the displacement on ships of this type by 52 tons changed the draft by 1 inch.
    As they say, feel the difference. Karapas "Oslyabi" was in such a position that it could not fulfill its function at all.
    No wonder, Makarov ordered not to accept more than two-thirds of the total supply of coal on battleships of this type. That, for "Peresvet" in the battle in the Yellow Sea was done. But for "Oslyabi", given its large construction overload, no. In order for the upper edge of its main armor belt to be at least at the level of the waterline in battle, its coal supply had to be reduced by another 550-600 tons.
    At least at the level of the waterline, since according to the project, the upper edge of battleships of this type was supposed to be 91 cm above the waterline, which in the case of the Oslyabey was a completely unattainable dream.
    Then the question arises whether the Oslyabya should have been unloaded in this way, because in this case, it will most likely not be able to reach Vladivostok, taking into account the possible damage to pipes and an increase in draft.
    The answer, oddly enough, is simple.
    It was worth it. Before reaching Vladivostok, the battleship had to take a fight. And it is better to do this in the most favorable conditions for yourself. Even if then only in tow. You need to share problems.
    Tactical and strategic. Rozhestvensky outplayed himself. And after all, not to say that he was a stupid person. On the contrary. The Year of the Monkey is considered the most intelligent in the East. This year is good in war. Suffice it to recall Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Kozhedub. Yes, and Togo was born in the year of this sign.
    But, there is a nuance.
    The mystical type of thinking, the most difficult.
    As they say, woe to the mind.
    Great victories, but also great defeats.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 10: 16 New
      +4
      Quote: ignoto
      The total supply of coal on battleships of this type is 2058 tons. If there were 1500 tons of coal in the coal pits of "Peresvet", then the upper edge of its main belt was about 5,5 cm below the waterline.

      It depends on how you count. The fact is that here Krestyaninov and Molodtsov indicate impossible numbers. They write that at normal displacement the armor belt rose by 40 cm, and at full displacement it went under water by 30 cm.Total difference of 70 cm * 20,55 tons = 1 tons. But the total supply of coal differed from the normal one by only 438,5 tons. So, alas, the authors have a mistake.
      If we assume that it is exactly 40 cm above the water with a normal displacement, it turns out that an increase of about 400 tons of coal gave 19,5 cm of precipitation and Peresvet's armor belt rose 20,5 cm above the water
      Quote: ignoto
      Karapas "Oslyabi" was in such a position that it could not fulfill its function at all.

      The Karapas deck is designed to protect the compartments above which it is located from flooding. Thus, the protective functions of the carapace do not depend in any way on the draft of the ship.
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 24 July 2020 23: 57 New
        +3
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The total difference is 70 cm * 20,55 tons = 1 tons. But the total supply of coal differed from the normal one by only 438,5 tons. So, alas, the authors have a mistake.

        So the total displacement from normal not only differs in the amount of coal!
        There is a large supply of boiler water, lubricants, etc.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 July 2020 09: 37 New
          0
          Quote: rytik32
          There is a large supply of boiler water, lubricants, etc.

          Alexey, look at any reference books :)))))
  • Alexander Morozov
    Alexander Morozov 24 July 2020 10: 01 New
    +3
    Thank you for another interesting series of articles. Are there any plans for a detailed comparison of the EBRs of Russia and Japan, similar to the cycle about battle cruisers in Germany and Great Britain?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 10: 05 New
      +4
      Quote: Alexander Morozov
      Thanks for another interesting series of articles.

      You're welcome!
      Quote: Alexander Morozov
      Are there any plans for a detailed comparison of the EBRs of Russia and Japan, similar to the cycle about battle cruisers in Germany and Great Britain?

      There is. And for a very long time, by the way. But hands will never reach
  • Non-fighter
    Non-fighter 24 July 2020 10: 17 New
    +1
    Correct a couple of points in the article:
    1.
    One landed in front of the bow bulkhead in the electroplating workshop, the second in the living deck behind the bow bulkhead
    ... Why does a battleship need electroforming? The galvanic (electrical) workshop is yes, it is needed, but there is no sense in it in battle, and it is moved away to the extremities so as not to interfere.
    2. A little further down the text. It refers to the placement of the offices at the AFT tower and the drawing refers to the bow of the ship. Correct pliz.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 10: 23 New
      +2
      Quote: Not the fighter
      Why does a battleship need electroforming?

      I do not know. But in the report of the artillery officer "Peresvet" VN Cherkasov it is written just like that.
      Quote: Not the fighter
      It refers to the placement of the offices at the AFT tower and the drawing refers to the bow of the ship.

      Yes thank you. Of course, we are talking about the bow tower
  • Victor Leningradets
    Victor Leningradets 24 July 2020 10: 27 New
    +3
    Thank you so much for the article, Andrew!
    I must apologize to H. Togo for criticizing his actions under Tsushima. It turns out that "Oslyabya" was not a priority target, but simply died due to the lack of watertightness of the compartments. Then there is a question for Rozhdestvensky: why, knowing about the condition of the ships, he did not divide the squadron into victims and a breakout squad. After all, the formation before the battle hinted at this. Act the first squadron with a couple of cruisers at maximum speed regardless of the squadron - it could have survived and break through.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 10: 46 New
      +5
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      It turns out that "Oslyabya" was not a priority target

      Why not? They shot at him, the Japanese directly write that they were focusing on the flagships - Suvorov and Oslyab. But Togo's battleships still mostly fired at Suvorov, so Oslyabya would not have received fatal injuries if he had been built normally.
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      Then there is a question for Rozhdestvensky: why, knowing about the state of the ships

      That he was poorly built - yes, he probably knew, but how could he know HOW bad?
      Quote: Victor Leningradets
      did not divide the squadron into victims and a breakout squad.

      He received orders to destroy the Japanese fleet. He had no right to abandon a part of the squadron and go into a breakthrough with the rest. Well, Rozhestvensky himself answered this question.
      "If four or five of our battleships, having developed their maximum speed, separated from their weak comrades, then the Japanese battleships, being able to develop a speed greater than our best walkers, would have kept their mode of action and, only in a shorter period of time, overcame with concentrated forces the color of our squadron, in order, then, jokingly, to catch up and overcome the abandoned.
      The only correct tactic of the second squadron to inflict any sensible harm on the Japanese main forces was the combined action of our armored detachments, perhaps a close formation and only the entry, as needed, of the end detachment for action from the front or bearing, even if it was wrong, along the tail, running into our head, the Japanese armored squadron. But this approaching flank was not supposed to break away from other vessels of the line. So, so, in order for our squadron to be able to maintain a close formation with a persistent good desire and so that the end, forcing the move, could perform the approach without breaking the formation, the head of this formation would have to have no more than 10 knots. "
      1. Nehist
        Nehist 24 July 2020 14: 00 New
        +4
        He received orders to destroy the Japanese fleet. Throw part of the squadron and go into a breakthrough with the rest was not allowed (c)
        Dear Andrey! After the fall of Arthur, Rozhestvensky received an order to break through to Vladivostok and not destroy the Japanese squadron, otherwise his actions would have been different.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 14: 25 New
          +6
          Quote: Nehist
          Dear Andrey! After the fall of Arthur, Rozhestvensky received an order to break through to Vladivostok and not destroy the Japanese squadron

          He was ordered to "restore the dominant position at sea"
      2. DrEng527
        DrEng527 24 July 2020 15: 35 New
        -2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        o Japanese battleships, being able to develop a speed greater than our best walkers,

        aren't you ashamed to quote this nonsense? The progress of the detachment of their Borodino and Oslyabya was no worse than the Japanese, and the strength of this detachment was higher than that of Togo ... hi
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 24 July 2020 18: 55 New
          +1
          Quote: DrEng527
          The progress of the detachment of their Borodinians and Oslyabya was no worse than the Japanese, and the strength of this detachment was higher than the Togo detachment

          aren't you ashamed to quote this nonsense?

          And you?
          1. DrEng527
            DrEng527 24 July 2020 21: 47 New
            0
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            And you?

            you are very informative only in your dreams ... just curious - how is any Borodiner worse than Mikasa / Sikishima? Weapon or speed?
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 24 July 2020 22: 15 New
              0
              Quote: DrEng527
              just curious - how is any Borodiner worse than Mikasa / Sikishima? Weapon or speed?

              On both counts.
              Plus, the state after a long hike.
              1. DrEng527
                DrEng527 25 July 2020 18: 01 New
                0
                Quote: Senior Sailor
                Plus, the state after a long hike.

                by no means - the teams were rafting, the equipment was checked ...
                As for speed, the Borodinians held 16z, the Japanese did not break out of the belt - see the death of Suvorov ... our 12 dm regularly killed more by one hit ...
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 25 July 2020 18: 28 New
                  0
                  Quote: DrEng527
                  the teams rafted, the technique was checked ...

                  Yeah, and we were convinced of its quality.
                  Quote: DrEng527
                  Borodinians kept 16uz

                  Unless in your fevered fantasy. But "Mikasa" still held.
                  Quote: DrEng527
                  our 12 dm regularly killed more by one hit ...

                  As for me - a rather controversial statement. The counting mechanism is not clear, so-so criterion.
                  It is a fact that the Japanese guns fired more often, had a heavier projectile, equipped with more explosives.
                  1. DrEng527
                    DrEng527 25 July 2020 23: 57 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    Yeah, and we were convinced of its quality.

                    I'm waiting for your data on the poor quality of Borodino residents or their GK - 12/40 ...
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    Unless in your fevered fantasy.

                    you are badly brought up and ignorant - I recommend Gribovsky's book on Borodino residents ...

                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    It is a fact that the Japanese guns fired more often, had a heavier projectile, equipped with more explosives.

                    1) British guns (the Japanese did not know how to do 12 dm guns then - so, for information wink) were destroyed during intense shooting ... during a battle in ZhM 5 guns - 1/4 part ...
                    2) Japanese shells did not penetrate the belt of Borodino, our shell pierced Mikasa's armor from a long distance
                    3) even 12/30 broke through the tower / barbet of Fuji, the towers of the main battery of the Russian EBR did not break through ...
                    further to write too lazy - learn ...
                    1. Senior seaman
                      Senior seaman 26 July 2020 12: 24 New
                      +1
                      Quote: DrEng527
                      during the fight in WM 5

                      We're talking like Tsushima ... but there isn't one in it.
                      Quote: DrEng527
                      Japanese shells did not penetrate the belt of Borodino, our shell pierced Mikasa's armor from a long distance

                      Sorry, but armor penetration is only one of the criteria and, judging by the results of the RYA, by no means the main one. It should come with a bullet-proof action, but this is really bad.
                      1. DrEng527
                        DrEng527 26 July 2020 15: 40 New
                        +2
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        We're talking like Tsushima ... but there isn't one in it.

                        we discuss the quality of the ships, and the ships are built for the guns request the Japanese understood the maximum rate of fire and did not violate it, for Russian guns this problem was not ... I can imagine whining if a Russian gun tore apart ... hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        excuse me, but armor penetration is only one of the criteria and, judging by the results of the RYA, by no means the main one.

                        and that is why the Americans had only BB in BC after the analysis of the WWII and WW1?
                        if the projectile did not penetrate the armor, then it cannot inflict fatal damage by itself, but with multiple hits there will be synergy! So the ZPR provided this synergetics with illiterate maneuvering ... angry
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        It should come with a bullet-proof action, but this is really bad.

                        I repeat - Russian shells killed MORE! on hit ... see losses in FM
                      2. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 26 July 2020 16: 05 New
                        0
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        for Russian guns this problem was not ...

                        Some who spoke a little higher about a different problem with Russian guns :)))
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        and that is why the Americans had only BB in BC after the analysis of the WWII and WW1?

                        Excuse me, were there about three kg of pyroxylin in the American BB shells?
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        I repeat - Russian shells killed MORE! on hit ... see losses in FM

                        On the one hand, yes. 168 from 150 hits, and something over 200 from 32-33 ...
                        On the other hand, with similar HP losses, the Japanese battleships practically did not suffer, and the main damage was 5 main battery barrels from their own fire. Among the Russians, only Victory was slightly damaged, and the rest were beaten very seriously.
                        In general, it would be good to figure it out, and who were these victims of the VUS? Signalers? Boatswain team? That is, people, by virtue of their official duties, fall under the distribution in any case ...
                        I say right away that I have no answer to this question. But the question is definitely there.
                      3. DrEng527
                        DrEng527 26 July 2020 16: 31 New
                        +3
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        oh who, just above talked about a different problem with Russian guns :)))

                        But is 6dm a GK? bully
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Excuse me, were there about three kg of pyroxylin in the American BB shells?

                        but large fragments, Angles and in WW1 were equipped with black powder ...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Japanese battleships were practically unharmed

                        That is why Togo gave the signal to exit the battle ... bully
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Russians, only "Victory" was slightly affected,

                        maybe the Japanese were just better at hiding their problems, and not moaning at every corner?
                        It is impossible to hide this killed - they have parents, but the damage is no problem ...
                        it is a pity that estimates for repairs are not available ...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        That is, people, due to their official duties, fall under the distribution in any case ...

                        and on Russian ships these are not? bully double standards are not even amusing already ...
                      4. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 26 July 2020 17: 44 New
                        0
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        Angles and in WW1 were equipped with black powder ..

                        The question is not so much about the type of BB as its quantity.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        and on Russian ships these are not?

                        Why such a conclusion? There are, and the number of "add" I told you them. And note, the number of victims is close enough. 168 and over 200. And those and others for six first-rank ships.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        double standards are not even amusing already ...

                        That's who would say :)))
                      5. DrEng527
                        DrEng527 27 July 2020 15: 57 New
                        0
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        how much in its quantity.

                        this is a consequence of light shells, the artilleryman's ZPR - was obliged to know the advantageous distance of the battle ...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Why such a conclusion? there is

                        then why raise this topic? parties on an equal footing ...

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        the number of victims is close enough. 168 and over 200.

                        20%, and the Russians "less" got ... witchcraft ... bully
                      6. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 27 July 2020 16: 07 New
                        0
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        this is a consequence of light projectiles

                        Model 1907 shells had the same mass, with a higher explosive content.
                        Quote: DrEng527
                        witchcraft

                        There is no witchcraft.
                        But as I already wrote:
                        In general, it would be good to figure it out, and who were these victims of the VUS? Signalers? Boatswain team? That is, people, by virtue of their official duties, fall under the distribution in any case ...
                  2. Alexandra
                    Alexandra 26 July 2020 23: 15 New
                    +1
                    Quote: DrEng527
                    but large fragments, Angles and in WW1 were equipped with black powder ...


                    And then "shellite", since black powder gave a weak armor effect, and shells with liddite generally exploded in the process of breaking through the armor.

                    But such an armored action, even before the RYAV, was given by an American projectile equipped with a "maximit":



                    The point is not in the "size" of the fragments, but in their quantity and their energy. Powder charges did not give either one or the other. And the detonator in the Russian 12 "was also normal, not slow-acting, that is, the projectile was torn either in the process of breaking through the armor plate, or immediately behind it.

                    With such shells it was impossible to win against normal high-explosive shells. The whole conversation is only about whether Rozhdestvensky could lose less epic
                  3. DrEng527
                    DrEng527 27 July 2020 16: 00 New
                    +1
                    Quote: AlexanderA
                    The point is not in the "size" of the fragments, but in their quantity and their energy.

                    according to the laws of physics, the energy depends on the mass of the fragment ... as well as the damaging effect ... very small fragments simply do not damage the structure
                  4. Alexandra
                    Alexandra 27 July 2020 23: 36 New
                    0
                    According to the laws of physics, the relative sizes of the fragments determine the limiting thickness hetc. obstacles pierced by a fragment in the form of an expression:

                    where qi is the mass, vi is the speed of i - the fragment, E1 is the specific deformation energy of the obstacle, Ф * = 1,08Ф (α, β) is the shape of the real fragment.

                    "The value of the thickness of the penetrated obstacle, other things being equal, is determined by the cross-sectional area of ​​the fragment at the moment of impact on the obstacle."

                    But that's all other things being equal.

                    Large, but slowly flying fragments do not penetrate steel bulkheads, because their energy is distributed over a significant area of ​​the obstacle. And here are more compact, but much faster fragments, steel bulkheads pierce.

                    A simple example: a 50 gram fragment flying at a speed of 1200 m / s has an energy of 36000 Joules. At the same time, a 300 gram fragment, which is six times larger than it in mass, flying at a speed of 300 m / s, has an energy of 13500 Joules, 2,67 times less, moreover, it is "smeared" over a much larger cross-sectional area when hitting an obstacle.
                  5. DrEng527
                    DrEng527 28 July 2020 00: 29 New
                    -1
                    everything is beautiful, but the Angles in WW1 used even gunpowder as explosives for equipment, and the reason was large fragments. request
                  6. Senior seaman
                    Senior seaman 28 July 2020 08: 05 New
                    -1
                    Quote: DrEng527
                    but the Angles in WW1 used even powder

                    And also credit :))) But, seriously, not in WWI, but at the beginning of WWI.
                    Quote: DrEng527
                    the reason is large fragments

                    The reason is inertness of thinking.
                  7. DrEng527
                    DrEng527 28 July 2020 11: 03 New
                    0
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    The reason is inertness of thinking.

                    perhaps, but I voiced one of the reasonable views request
                2. Alexandra
                  Alexandra 29 July 2020 10: 34 New
                  0
                  Look at the reasons why the Angles switched from black powder to the high explosive shellite in armor-piercing shells and thereby reduced the size of the fragments.

                  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shellite_(explosive)

                  I would like to note that the Americans switched to the high explosive “Maximit” and “Dunnit” (Explosive D) in armor-piercing shells back in 1901. And in 1906, only one "Dunnite" was finally chosen for all types of shells.
  • rytik32
    rytik32 27 July 2020 23: 50 New
    +1
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    We're talking like Tsushima ... but there isn't one in it.

    Like no one ???
    Why write what you don't know about?
    Please read http://battleships.spb.ru/Tsusima/Tsusima3.html
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 28 July 2020 08: 06 New
    +1
    I admit, here I got a little excited :))) repeat
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 25 July 2020 23: 58 New
    +2
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    The counting mechanism is not clear, so-so criterion.

    banal - see the number of wounded / killed in battles and the number of hits ... this is a figure, not demagoguery ... if you have not met, then you have read little on the topic .. request
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 26 July 2020 12: 51 New
      0
      Well, why haven't I met ... this statement is well known to me, but it’s not very clear on what figures the author was based. It seems to me that he played hard with statistics, but I can't say anything concrete here.
      But you have repeatedly referred to the work of the author of the article. Can I do that too? :))
      In one of them, Andrei proposed a different criterion, namely the ability of shells to disable enemy artillery. And it turned out that Russian shells only with a direct hit disabled the enemy weapon. But the Japanese, even with a close break. As for me, this is a more objective criterion.
      1. DrEng527
        DrEng527 26 July 2020 15: 44 New
        +2
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        And it turned out that Russian shells only with a direct hit disabled the enemy weapon.

        the criterion is controversial - it depends on the design of the tools, but people are the same ... request
        For example, 6dm guns on the WOK failed due to structural defects or vibration at large angles - how to divide with hits?
      2. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 26 July 2020 15: 51 New
        0
        Quote: DrEng527
        but people are the same ...

        That, yes, only that people, even from the gun servant, can be replaced by mine artillery crews or non-firing sides, but if the gun is broken, that's it!

        Quote: DrEng527
        For example, 6dm guns on the WOK failed due to structural defects or vibration at large angles - how to divide with hits?

        Do as with Japanese / British, bursting from their own shots ... Write down the shortcomings of artillery :)))
        As for me, no problem. if the cannon is destroyed by an enemy shell, that's one thing. Out of order from her own shooting is different.
      3. rytik32
        rytik32 27 July 2020 01: 22 New
        +1
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        but if the gun is broken - that's it

        I do not agree.
        There were many cases when damaged guns were repaired during the battle (examples of "Fuji" and "Eagle" immediately came to mind)
  • rytik32
    rytik32 27 July 2020 01: 13 New
    0
    Quote: Senior Sailor
    As for me - a rather controversial statement. The counting mechanism is not clear, so-so criterion.

    I will give Polomoshnov about the fight in WM:
    On average, it turns out that one Japanese shell killed and wounded 3-4
    Russian sailors, and a Russian shell - up to 6 Japanese. From this we can conclude that if
    if the Russian and Japanese ships would have achieved an equal number of hits, then losses and
    damage to the Japanese side would be significantly greater

    Take, for example, hitting the Sikishima in Tsushima at 15.20 - a 305-mm shell exploded on the middle deck, under the left aft casemate of the upper deck. This shell killed 11 and injured 13 people.
    Are there similar Japanese shells hitting victims?
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 27 July 2020 09: 06 New
      0
      Quote: rytik32
      Are there similar Japanese shells hitting victims?

      Fuji's last shot in the day's battle. Of the entire crew of the Borodino, only the sailor Semyon Yushchin survived.
      Tell me, colleague, how did this hit (in "Sikishima") affect the combat capability of the latter? Yes, sobsno, no way.
      But what if the shell hadn't killed anyone at all, but interrupted the steering? Or jammed the main battery turret? Here everyone is alive, but participation in the battle comes down to the fact that they twist the blows to the enemy from the embrasures!
      In general, everything is relative.
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 27 July 2020 22: 52 New
        +1
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Fuji's last shot in the day's battle.

        The version that "Borodino" died from detonation in the cellars has been around for a long time, but it is now relevant. First, it contradicts the testimony of Semyon Yushchina. Secondly, "Fuji" did not fire armor-piercing 305-mm shells, therefore, even theoretically, it could not cause detonation.
  • vahpus
    vahpus 24 July 2020 22: 15 New
    +1
    Quote: DrEng527
    than any Borodino citizen is worse than Mikasa / Sikishima?

    In short, EVERYONE.
    It's like Beetle and Constipation. Roughly the same proportions.
    Not a single Russian esc. battleship to the level of even Asahi did not reach decently. Even Retvizan lost to them, although his project was no worse than British projects.
    1. DrEng527
      DrEng527 25 July 2020 18: 02 New
      0
      Quote: vahpus
      the way Beetle and Constipation. Roughly the same proportions.

      I recommend reading about the electrical equipment of the Borodino people and the Japanese ... maybe you will understand ...
      1. vahpus
        vahpus 25 July 2020 18: 19 New
        -1
        Quote: DrEng527
        I recommend reading about the electrical equipment of the Borodino people and the Japanese ... maybe you will understand ...

        Respected.
        Borodino residents were made in Russia. Those. a semi-finished product made on the knee. Which ITSELF did not drown on the way, and that's already good.
        To match this "technique" was the "service personnel".
        The Japanese were armed with high-quality British (mostly) equipment. There is no point in comparing British and Russian equipment, the conclusion is obvious even before the comparison. But, apparently, not for you.
        1. DrEng527
          DrEng527 25 July 2020 18: 27 New
          -1
          Quote: vahpus
          To match this "technique" was the "service personnel".

          everything is clear with you, you are an amateur and are prone to groveling, it is funny to convince you .......
          1. vahpus
            vahpus 25 July 2020 18: 48 New
            +1
            Quote: DrEng527
            you are a dilettante and prone to groveling

            Yes, I am full of terrible flaws. Which you are deprived of.
            Probably I also invented a story about Tsushima?
            Wasn't it?
            1. DrEng527
              DrEng527 26 July 2020 00: 01 New
              +1
              Quote: vahpus
              Yes, I am full of terrible flaws. Which you are deprived of.

              so, to confirm the "high quality" of English 12dm guns and bad Russian 12dm guns, I ask you to give the number of Russian cannons destroyed when firing, English ones in battle in ZhM as much as 5 ... hi
            2. vahpus
              vahpus 26 July 2020 00: 05 New
              +1
              And the guns have something to do with it?
              It was the Japanese who experimented with shells. More precisely, with their filling. Do you have a gun here?
              As for the Russian cannons, apart from 10 "cannons (they were from the land GAU), there were no more good cannons in the Russian fleet. GIMA (naval GAU) raved about poor and of little use light cannons.
              And the ships were crappy. Moreover, almost everything.
            3. DrEng527
              DrEng527 26 July 2020 00: 12 New
              +1
              Quote: vahpus
              There is no point in comparing British and Russian equipment, the conclusion is obvious even before the comparison. But, apparently, not for you.

              Quote: vahpus
              And the guns have something to do with it?

              do you have a self-prop bully wire cannons, the technology is backward, hence the destruction under thermal loads ... bully
              Quote: vahpus
              It was the Japanese who experimented with shells. More precisely, with their filling.

              these experiments ended with Mikasa's explosion, alas, after the end of the RYAV ...
            4. vahpus
              vahpus 26 July 2020 00: 16 New
              +1
              Quote: DrEng527
              wire ears, the technology is backward, hence the destruction under heat loads ...

              That's nonsense.
              You don't even know that the Japanese ships had British guns, but not the same ones that were on the ships of the British fleet, but others.
            5. DrEng527
              DrEng527 26 July 2020 09: 10 New
              0
              Quote: vahpus
              not the same ones that were on the ships of the British fleet, but others.

              Seriously? and Britain has mastered a different technology? bully
      2. rytik32
        rytik32 27 July 2020 01: 26 New
        +1
        And in Tsushima 305-mm Mikasa 1, Sikishima 1, 203-mm Nissin 3 barrels were torn apart
  • vahpus
    vahpus 24 July 2020 22: 21 New
    +1
    Quote: DrEng527
    The progress of the detachment of their Borodino and Oslyabya was no worse than the Japanese, and the strength of this detachment was higher than that of Togo.

    Horror.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 27 July 2020 14: 48 New
    -1
    Rozhdestvensky wrote. And what came of it? But nothing. At all. The Japanese paid almost no attention to the 2nd squad. And the 1st, bound by troughs, went simply to the slaughter. A good tactic, you won’t say anything. And most importantly, after all, this was the only way it was possible!))) In these words, all the limitations of the ZPR.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 24 July 2020 17: 45 New
    -1
    sarcastic, but essentially ... laughing
  • anzar
    anzar 24 July 2020 11: 48 New
    +5
    +++ uv. Andrei, not only convincingly, but as if the only possible. What are the nasal compartments of Oslaby under carapace flooded, few argue, the whole question is as it happened, and why so quickly ... Apparently, when accepting, the compartments must be soaked by pouring not only from below, but also from above)))
    Your conclusions will debunk another "myth" about the death of Oslyaba - about the supposedly frantic luck of the Japanese (in this case), about a "golden hit" ... It turns out that hits near the waterline (2-3) against the background of their total number are not "golden" , but quite regular. And then, that Peresvet is good, then Oslyaba is death ...))))
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 11: 54 New
      +5
      Quote: anzar
      And then, that Peresvet is good, then Oslyaba is death ...))))

      It couldn't be better, dear colleague!
    2. rytik32
      rytik32 26 July 2020 01: 20 New
      +1
      Quote: anzar
      Few people argue that the nasal compartments of Oslaby under the carapace were flooded, the whole question is how it happened, and why so quickly ...

      There is a good analogy for "Sisoy". He also had holes in his nose and did not hold the bulkheads. But "Sisoy" held out until morning and received a torpedo "to help", and "Oslyabya" did not last an hour.
      Quote: anzar
      It turns out that hits near the waterline (2-3) against the background of their total number are not "golden", but quite regular.

      I will give an estimate of the number of hits in "Oslyabya".
      Gribovsky - 40 rounds in total.
      Arseny Danilov (realswat) - 2-3 305 mm, 1 mm, 254-7 8 mm and about 203 25 mm shells by 152 hours 14 minutes.
      SDA (from Tsushima forums) - 2 305 mm, 16 203 mm, 37 152 mm in total.
      My estimate is 4 305-254 mm, 8 203 mm, 18 152 mm at least by 14 hours 20 minutes. And most likely 40-50 shells.
  • Harry cuper
    Harry cuper 24 July 2020 11: 55 New
    +3
    Thank you very much, dear Andrey! WAIT 13 days for the 2nd part. Indeed, only you and a couple of other authors keep VO from the Zen level.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 13: 05 New
      +3
      Quote: Harry Cuper
      Thank you very much, dear Andrey! WAIT 13 days for the 2nd part.

      You are always welcome, very glad you liked it!
  • Undecim
    Undecim 24 July 2020 12: 01 New
    +3
    Very interesting and full of facts narration. True from a technical point of view - fortune telling on coffee grounds. The author sometimes operates with numbers, but out of touch with reality.
    For example.
    Thus, it can be assumed that the difference in the weights of the "Peresvet" and "Oslyabi" in the battle at Shantung and in the Battle of Tsushima was no more than 500-600 tons. And taking into account the fact that the cargo of this type of ships increased by 20,55 tons. draft by 1 cm, the difference in draft between Peresvet and Oslyabi was 25-30 cm. That is, if the living deck was completely flooded under the conditions described above, Oslyabya would receive about 100 tons of water more than Peresvet, but rather everything, even less.

    Where the author got the figure of 100 tons of water from is a mystery.
    Let's try to count. Suppose that both battleships got hit by a 305 mm projectile in the unarmored bow end, but the Oslyabi had it 30 cm lower.
    We take the size of the hole according to Kostenko, who is so unloved by the author, since there is no reason not to trust him. Kostenko gives the size of the hole in the skin 3/8 "thick from a 12" shell - 8x8 feet, 2,43 by 2,43 meters, or 6 square meters.
    Let's say half of the hole is above the water. We do not take into account hydrodynamics.
    Then the flow of water per minute will be 523 tons. Now "lower" the bottom edge of the hole by 30 cm.
    Now 585 tons of water will enter the hole per minute. The difference is due to, albeit a slight, but increase in hydrostatic head. So, the difference in water inflow through a hole of the same size, but with a difference of 30 cm in depth, is 52 tons of water per minute. And if there are two holes? And with the increase in the roll, the water flow will increase.
    It is convenient to estimate the practically unsinkability of a surface ship by the number of watertight compartments, when flooded, it remains afloat. According to modern criteria for warships, this is about 17%. It is unlikely that during the RJAV they were larger. That is, theoretically, "Oslyabya" could remain afloat when two compartments were flooded. But this is theoretical. In practice, for the assessment it is necessary to know exactly the values ​​of the parameters that determine the stability of the ship.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 13: 10 New
      +4
      Quote: Undecim
      Where the author got the figure of 100 tons of water from is a mystery.

      We estimate the area of ​​the living deck, where the water was poured, and multiply by 0,6 m laughing True, I did not strive for absolute accuracy, and I got a little over 150 tons, took 200 with a margin. Accordingly, if Oslyabya sat 30 cm deeper, then a maximum of 100 tons is obtained.
      Quote: Undecim
      Let's say half of the hole is above the water. We do not take into account hydrodynamics.
      Then the flow of water per minute will be 523 tons. Now "lower" the bottom edge

      Considering that the living deck of both ships, most likely, was above the water (Peresvet - for sure), the value of your calculations ... well, such a
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 26 July 2020 16: 26 New
        +1
        the value of your calculations ... well, such a
        You see, my calculation is based on a well-known formula. Your conclusions are on the ceiling.
        I do not want to offend you, but the person who writes that: And taking into account the fact that the ships of this type have a load of 20,55 tons increased the draft by 1 cm, can hardly judge the value of the opponent's calculations.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          27 July 2020 07: 40 New
          +1
          Quote: Undecim
          You see, my calculation is based on a well-known formula. Your conclusions are on the ceiling.

          Your calculation is based on a formula, which in this case does not apply at all. Both 523 and 585 tons are based on some kind of absolute abstraction in a vacuum, which does not take into account either the capacity of the living deck, or its position in space relative to sea level, or the rate of "leaks" below it, or the trim of the ship to the bow, at which the hole gradually turned from semi-surface to underwater, nor hydrodynamics, without which such calculations do not make sense at all.
          Quote: Undecim
          I don’t want to offend you, but the person who writes that: And given the fact that ships of this type have a cargo of 20,55 tons increasing the draft by 1 cm, he can hardly judge the value of the opponent's calculations.

          Tell me, when you go through the door, you still do not touch the top with your nose? I do not pretend to know the theory of shipbuilding, but nevertheless I have some mathematical and physical minimum, and even I understand that the calculation you gave is completely unprofessional
          1. Undecim
            Undecim 27 July 2020 07: 45 New
            0
            and even I understand that the calculation you gave is completely unprofessional
            Alas, your mathematical and physical minima, Andrei, are completely insufficient even to understand the blunders in your own articles: "And taking into account the fact that the cargo of this type of ships of 20,55 tons increased the draft by 1 cm."
  • Trilobite Master
    Trilobite Master 24 July 2020 12: 29 New
    +4
    Great stuff, interesting, convincing, and helpful. It seems to me that this is exactly how you need to approach research - first raise a question, then collect and analyze the available information, and only then draw conclusions. Unlike many authors, Andrey from Chelyabinsk knows how to adhere to this technique, which significantly increases the level of his materials, both in terms of objectivity and in terms of cognition. Even if the author is mistaken in something, I admit it, in a deliberate manipulation of facts, and you definitely cannot blame him. And the one who does nothing is not mistaken.
    In general, many thanks to the author. 30 years ago, when I finished my acquaintance with the works of Novikov-Pryboy and Stepanov and began to smoothly move on to Rafail Melnikov, I would very much like Andrei from Chelyabinsk to the court. smile
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 14: 23 New
      +6
      Quote: Trilobite Master
      Even if the author is wrong about something, I admit it

      Undoubtedly. Fortunately, from time to time my mistakes are found and reported to me by respected commentators. Reading this is unpleasant (and who likes to be wrong?), But informative :)))) hi
      1. Trilobite Master
        Trilobite Master 24 July 2020 15: 44 New
        +3
        If the mistake is just a typo or in the style of "thought one thing - wrote another", nothing unpleasant. It simply means that your work is read, studied carefully, and by literate people. For example, I have absolutely no idea who was the commander of Sisoy the Great, and who was Navarin, and people know. smile It is much more offensive if the article is praised, but such a mistake is not found - it means that it is not thoughtful and attentive people who praise, but simply what are called "likes", such as girls on Instagram. smile
        However, I myself, even if I notice a technical error or a mistake, do not always react in the comments - only if it seems to me that it can accidentally mislead someone less savvy in a particular issue. smile
        But when the very concept of the article is attacked and facts are given as arguments that you, as an author, did not know or did not attach due importance to - this is already a serious matter, it can really be "unpleasant". Personally, this is what hurts me most.
        However, this hardly applies to you - your concepts are always sufficiently substantiated, reasoned and are never overly categorical, which makes them weakly vulnerable to criticism.
      2. Andy
        Andy 25 July 2020 10: 27 New
        0
        I think that errors are not reported as a reproach to the author. Anyone can make a mistake, especially when it comes to a simple slip of the tongue. Moreover, it is possible to supplement the article material in the comments
    2. VIP
      VIP 24 July 2020 20: 30 New
      0
      The owner, I know Novikov-Priboi, I read Stepanov, but I don't remember Melnikov
      1. Trilobite Master
        Trilobite Master 24 July 2020 21: 56 New
        +1
        Quote: VIP
        I don't remember Melnikov

        This is no longer fiction. Rafail Mikhailovich (in my opinion) Melnikov is the author of quite a scientific and, in my opinion, a good and objective book about the cruiser "Varyag" and other books on the naval theme. Although now the book about "Varyag" is probably already hopelessly outdated ... sad
        1. VIP
          VIP 25 July 2020 12: 47 New
          +1
          For me, quality work cannot become outdated. Perhaps the preface and in the text bow to the next congress of the party is now an anachronism
          1. Trilobite Master
            Trilobite Master 25 July 2020 16: 33 New
            +1
            And quality work becomes obsolete. New sources appear, new documents are introduced into scientific circulation, in the case of Melnikov's book about "Varyag", these can be documents of Japanese or Americans, for example, on the firm "Crump and Co". I do not know the topic sufficiently to judge whether Melnikov's works are outdated or not at the moment, especially since I read this author thirty years ago, he could have republished something, but the fact that scientific works, even the best , become obsolete over time - for sure. Otherwise, we would have to admit that science stands still and does not develop.
  • rytik32
    rytik32 24 July 2020 12: 51 New
    +3

    This is March 31, 1904, the battleship "Pobeda" (of the same type with "Oslyabey" and "Peresvet") returns to Port Arthur. Soon after the death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk" by a mine, "Pobeda" was also blown up by a mine at 10.10. The explosion occurred at the starboard side in the area of ​​the bow coal pits. The skin between frames 54 and 58 was destroyed; the size of the hole was 8 × 5,3 m, and its center was 5 m below the waterline. Water flooded coal pits No. 6 and 7 (between frames 49, 54 and 58) and two sections of the lower side corridor; its further spread was stopped by watertight bulkheads. The ship stalled and having taken 550 tons of water, he banked 6 °
    Question. How much water "Oslyabya" had to take to get a roll of 12-15 degrees?
    The version with flooding only the bow compartments is thus not confirmed.
    The only option in which large floods are obtained is a hole in the unarmored side in the area of ​​the bow bridge (where Ozerov saw it) and the flow of water through it down into the coal pits and stokers.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 13: 15 New
      +3
      Quote: rytik32
      The ship stalled and, having received 550 tons of water, heeled 6 °

      Well, Peresvet, not having such floods, had a roll up to 7-8 degrees. Apparently, eyewitnesses lied to us terribly ...
      By the way, you forgot something. Victory DID NOT TAKE 550 tons of water.
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 24 July 2020 22: 38 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, Peresvet, not having such floods, had a roll up to 7-8 degrees. Apparently, eyewitnesses lied to us terribly ...

        The difference is which compartments were flooded. The higher the flood, the more the roll will be. And the farther from the longitudinal axis of the ship the flooding, the greater the roll.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        By the way, you forgot something. Victory DID NOT TAKE 550 tons of water.

        I took data from Krestyaninov and Molodtsov. Where did you get the data?
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          25 July 2020 10: 03 New
          0
          Quote: rytik32
          The difference is which compartments were flooded. The higher the flood, the more the roll will be.

          At the same time, at Oslyabi and Peresvet, the living deck was located above the flooded sections of Victory
          Quote: rytik32
          I took data from Krestyaninov and Molodtsov. Where did you get the data?

          From the source, of course. Then I will make a screen (today the RSL does not open, for some reason), but the point is that at Pobeda the volume of the flooded premises was 550 cubic meters. And in the coal pits there was a mass of coal, so the commander of the ship (or Ukhtomsky? I don't remember) wrote in a report somehow that "the capacity of the flooded premises is 550 tons of water, water came minus the coal available in the premises"
          And Pobeda, by order of Makarov, was supposed to have up to 1500 tons of coal, that is, its coal pits should be approximately 3/4 filled. Accordingly, the water was much less than 550 tons.
      2. rytik32
        rytik32 27 July 2020 01: 39 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, Peresvet, not having such floods, had a roll up to 7-8 degrees. Apparently, eyewitnesses lied to us terribly ...

        So how much water did Peresvet take in the ZhM?
    2. vahpus
      vahpus 25 July 2020 19: 49 New
      +1
      Quote: rytik32
      battleship "Victory" (of the same type with "Oslyabey" and "Peresvet")

      Battleship Victory, this is not overexposure at all.
      Yes, Pobeda was made on the basis of overexposures, but this is a ship of a completely different class.
      The body was slightly different.
      The guns were different.
      The armor was different.
      A lot of things were different on the little things.
  • rytik32
    rytik32 24 July 2020 12: 56 New
    0

    For clarity.
    This is a diagram of the flooding of the "Peresvet" after the battle in the ZhM from Evgeny Polomoshnov.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 13: 13 New
      +3
      Quote: rytik32
      For clarity.
      This is a diagram of the flooding of the "Peresvet" after the battle in the ZhM from Evgeny Polomoshnov.

      Alas, the scheme is wrong. eyewitnesses report that a compartment of dynamo machines is flooded at Peresvet - at Polomoshnov there is also a compartment of torpedo tubes. The second hole is not at all where it should be. Apparently, Eugene did not check where the offices of Peresvet are located, but simply used the famous drawing from Krestyaninov and Molodtsov
      1. Sergey Oberemko
        Sergey Oberemko 24 July 2020 13: 31 New
        +2
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Apparently, Eugene did not check where the offices of Peresvet are located, but simply used the famous drawing from Krestyaninov and Molodtsov

        Chronologically, Polomoshnov's book appeared before the books of Krestyaninov and Molodtsov, at that time Cherkasov's Schemes, and the layouts of the internal premises, were not yet in the publicly accessible information space. There was general information. before the first bulkhead, behind the first bulkhead, etc.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 13: 46 New
          0
          Quote: Sergey Oberemko
          Chronologically, Polomoshnov's book appeared before the books of Krestyaninov and Molodtsov

          Thanks, I didn't know. But generally speaking, Krestyaninov and Molodtsov gave a drawing of the damage to the battleship made by eyewitnesses, and, of course, Polomoshnov could find it before this drawing was published in the book of Krestyaninov and Molodtsov.
          However, this does not make the diagram shown by him correct. With all due respect to E. Polomoshnov
          1. Sergey Oberemko
            Sergey Oberemko 24 July 2020 15: 26 New
            +4
            At the time of the publication of Polomoshev's monograph, according to overexposures, there was a slightly early version of the monograph by Krestyaninov and Molodtsov in the Marine collection where the diagrams were a general view of the cross section of the hold and the battery deck were all from the authors, and Cherkasov's diagrams were not publicly available.
            They appeared already in the zero years, if my memory serves me
      2. rytik32
        rytik32 25 July 2020 00: 06 New
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Polomoshnov also has a department of torpedo tubes

        There are reasons for this:
        "2) In the console:
        Projectile 12 "- the effect is the same. The water went about two feet above the deck, hit the turret, bomb cellars, and the submarine compartment. The latter had to be battened down."
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 24 July 2020 13: 55 New
    +1
    At the same time, while the "specialists" of the New Admiralty were building one ship ("Oslyabya"), the Baltic Shipyard actually built two: "Peresvet" and "Pobeda".

    In fact, it's even worse. Built at the "semi-designated" Baltzavod (accepted into the treasury with permission to preserve the old order at the plant) "Peresvet" and "Pobeda" were built, accepted by the fleet and sent to the Far East even before the war. "Peresvet" came to MOT in 1902, "Victory" - in 1903.
    And "Oslyabya", laid down on the same day with "Peresvet", did not have time to start the war in the Far East. sad
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 14: 21 New
      +3
      Quote: Alexey RA
      And "Oslyabya", laid down on the same day with "Peresvet", did not have time to start the war in the Far East

      Well, nevertheless, strictly speaking, this is the fault of the shallow that Oslyaba turned up. Otherwise I would have had time. hi
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 24 July 2020 16: 02 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, nevertheless, strictly speaking, this is the fault of the shallow that Oslyaba turned up. Otherwise I would have had time.

        Very tightly. In any case, the second Baltzavodovsky "peresvetych" - "Pobeda" - entered service in October 1902, and the first Novoadmiralteisky "peresvetych" - Oslyabya - only in the summer of 1903.
        One EBR at a state-owned plant was built six months longer than two of the same type EBR at a former private one. belay
  • Romka47
    Romka47 24 July 2020 14: 46 New
    +4
    The article is great! True, for my brain, which is still weak in this direction (I have only recently begun to study ships and everything connected with them), it is too heavy, but I managed nothing, I seemed to understand everything. On Sunday, my father's favorite holiday, I will go to his grave and tell him what I have learned! Thanks author, be sure to continue !!
  • Andy
    Andy 24 July 2020 14: 55 New
    +3
    Commander "Navarina" Ozerov
    ---
    Andrey, if memory does not fail, then Fitingof commanded Navarin, and Ozerov - Sisoi. maybe I'm confusing. thanks to the sn article.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 15: 22 New
      +2
      Quote: Andy
      Commander "Navarina" Ozerov

      I'm sorry, a mistake
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 24 July 2020 14: 56 New
    +1
    The description and comparison of ship damage is interesting. The message about the poor quality of Oslyaby's construction is banal hi As for the actions of Admiral Rozhestvensky, who is allegedly not to blame for the death of Oslyabi, the author mixes warm and soft! Oslyabya died not only because of the heap, but more because he carried the flagship flag and came under the concentrated blow of the Japanese! Without the flag of the deceased flagship, there would be no point in knocking it out in the first place ... So the ZPR made several mistakes:
    1) incorrectly formed combat units and assigned the flagship 2BO, and even putting a half-battleship in the flagships is complete stupidity request And this is not after knowledge - focusing fire on the flagship - common place then!
    2) he did not maneuver correctly - hence a lot! It is difficult to demand something from Baer - he did not have experience in commanding a detachment, and also did not know the ZPR plan for the battle
    3) if Oslyabya had stood in 1BO behind the Eagle, then he would not have fired at almost at the beginning of the battle (like Eagle), maybe he could have been able to shoot at the enemy - and the gunners had prize money ... Yes, and maneuvering 2 units is easier than 3m .. ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      24 July 2020 15: 32 New
      +4
      Quote: DrEng527
      Oslyabya died not only because of the heap, but more because he carried the flagship flag and came under the concentrated blow of the Japanese!

      I killed two articles in order to explain by examples that the concentrated fire of the Japanese did not cause damage sufficient for the death of Oslyabi - if not for the quality of its construction, of course. But then you came and in one phrase revealed the Truth to me laughing How wrong I was! laughing
      Quote: DrEng527
      incorrectly formed combat units and appointed 2BO flagships, and even putting a semi-battleship in the flagships is complete nonsense

      Well, okay, you're smart. Who would you put in Oslyabi's place? To the death of Sisoya, overloaded with construction overload? Or the old man - Navarina? Or maybe Nakhimov, who is generally an armored cruiser? Is it okay that any of these ships were protected even worse than Oslyabi?
      Quote: DrEng527
      If Oslyabya stood in 1BO behind the Eagle, then he would not have fired at almost at the beginning of the battle (like Eagle), maybe he could have been able to shoot at the enemy - and the gunners had prize money ...

      In this case, the Japanese could well focus their fire on Oslyab, not because he is the flagship, but because it is easier to knock him out of action and he is closer to the Japanese ships. I'm not even talking about the fact that changing places in the ranks is a much more complicated process than you think
      Quote: DrEng527
      And it's easier for 2 units to maneuver than 3m ...

      Commanding one squad of 8 ships is more difficult if you propose to combine the 1st and 2nd armored squads.
      1. DrEng527
        DrEng527 24 July 2020 16: 28 New
        +6
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        if not for the quality of its construction, of course.

        1) the absolutization of one factor is typical for amateurs, but you have been drinking for a long time and sometimes very well ... request
        2) Both Peresvet and Oslyabya fell under the distribution due to mistakes by the admiral - in the first case, the VKV could make a ledge and not allow to knock out the weakly armored EBR, and in the second, the ZPR is even more stupid to make this wounded flagship ...
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, okay, you're smart. Who would you put in Oslyabi's place?

        1) I am smart, but I don’t stick it out, but I can express it more sharply hi your thoughts, when you go further to the personality from you ...
        2) Everything is trite - the flagship is IN1, respectively, the detachments: Borodino, Oslyabya, Sisoy and IN1, Navarin, Nakhimov, BBO
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        but because it is easier to knock it out of action and it is closer to Japanese ships.

        1) the Japanese were focusing fire on the flagships, if you don't know ... request
        2) As for closer - these are the features of the maneuvering of the ZPR ...

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        that changing places in the ranks is a much more complicated process than you think

        before the fight - a banal bureaucratic process ... but for this the ZPR and its flags had to think, and not look for a super solution ...
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        commanding one squad of 8 ships is more difficult

        ZPR had experience in battles 1TOE, the Japanese had units of 6 ships - why have 3 units of 4 ships? Especially for 2 admirals? The obvious stupidity of the decision of the ZPR and the fact that the distance between units is greater than between matelots, hence the enemy received a gain on geometry ...
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          24 July 2020 17: 02 New
          +1
          I'll answer later
          1. Harry cuper
            Harry cuper 24 July 2020 22: 56 New
            +1
            Do not. Action makes no sense
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              25 July 2020 10: 04 New
              +1
              Yes, perhaps you are right drinks
              1. DrEng527
                DrEng527 25 July 2020 18: 16