At the cutting edge of the underwater confrontation. Cold War Submarine
The Americans are sincerely convinced that the success of their submarines in the confrontation with the USSR Navy became the determining factor in the success of the US Navy as a whole, and the success of the US Navy contributed to the surrender of Gorbachev to the West. According to John Lehman, US Secretary of Navy at Reagan, during a meeting in Malta, Gorbachev upset Reagan:
Here you need to understand that, through foreign intelligence, the highest political and military leadership received real and objective information on the superiority of the submarine forces of the United States Navy.
What is the saddest thing? The situation was not hopeless, we could effectively counteract the Americans (if we mean purely military considerations, and not the economy, which was the main problem).
As a result, the underwater confrontation of the USSR was lost, replacing real achievements with propaganda completely divorced from reality (for example, the alleged success of the search operation “Atrina”). And outright lies, not even to society, but to the highest political leadership in Atrin by the command of the Soviet Navy, is a clear example of this.
The beginning of confrontation
In the early years of the underwater confrontation, diesel-electric submarines played a key role in it (including for the US Navy). While the “military atom” was making its way into the submarine, I had to “fight on batteries”.
The Americans, fearing that German technology entering the USSR would allow increasing the number and quality of the submarine fleet, from the forties actively experimented with various types of sonar equipment that would allow anti-submarine forces to be sent to the enemy boat. It was mainly about stationary hydrophones. In the late forties in the Navy, it became clear that submarines can also act as carriers of effective sonar stations and can be used in PLO. The case was also widely known when the English submarine HMS Venturer destroyed from a submerged position the German U-864 submarine, which was also going under water, on February 9, 1945. The result of the realization of these things was the project "Cayo" - a program to create a submarine that can fight with submarines.
The Barracuda submarines created as a result of this project were unsuccessful. But understanding the failure with the Barracudas gave rise to a type of submarine that became the legend of the American non-nuclear submarine - submarines of the Teng type.
It was the boats of this type that became the first that the Americans began to send en masse to Soviet territorial waters for reconnaissance. Prior to this, there were only one-time trips of the old Tenches without any arrogant antics.
While the atomic Nautilus was used in experimental exercises, the diesel-electric Tengi began to actively develop Soviet coastal waters. Sometimes this led to different incidents.
So, in August 1957, the USS Gudgeon, a boat of this type, was discovered by naval ships near Vladivostok. The result was a 30-hour chase with the use of real depth charges, the boat was not released: according to the results of the chase, she had to emerge.
In early 1958, a similar incident occurred with the USS Wahoo, which Soviet ships also forced to float.
It should be understood that there were much more cases when the Americans were undetected.
From the beginning of the forties to the time of the Caribbean crisis, the number of raids by American submarines to the shores of the USSR exceeded 2000. During one of them, the American diesel-electric submarine USS Harder, type “Teng”, entered Soviet tervodes in 1961, went unnoticed directly into Severomorsk harbor and completed photographing moorings and their ships. The boat went unnoticed.
In the early 60s, the atomic Skipjack entered the Severomorsk raid and half an hour later went unnoticed, and this was the decision of the boat commander, contrary to his orders (he simply “wanted to see” Severomorsk).
In 1975, during a hearing at the Intelligence Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, it was announced that over the years, American submarines had participated in 110 incidents such as clashes with Soviet submarines or in clashes with USSR anti-submarine forces. As you can see, the statistics are very eloquent.
In the 60s, when the Soviet Navy acquired nuclear submarines in significant quantities, the American experience in operations in our waters proved to be very useful for them already in a completely underwater confrontation.
By themselves, the Teng boats belonged to the high-priority Navy programs, including so that future American submariners could train in underwater combat against truly quiet, secretive and effective diesel-electric submarines.
Although the decision that in the future all American submarines will be only atomic, the then commander Arly Burke made back in 1956, the Tengi served for dozens of years after that.
Then, in the fifties, the high noise of the Nautilus compared to the American diesel-electric submarines made the Americans solve another important issue.
Since the USSR Navy expected the widespread use of diesel-electric submarines and since they obviously would have had (in those years) an advantage in stealth over American nuclear submarines, the first torpedo salvo would have been behind them with a high degree of probability. This meant that for the American submarine, the battle would begin with a sudden aimed salvo with torpedoes on it.
In order not only to survive in such a situation, but also to win, it was necessary to avoid defeat. To do this, in the USA, from the beginning of the 50s, studies of unprecedented proportions (we haven’t even done anything close) and experimental exercises with the massive use of various sonar counters were conducted. In general, the problem of the first volley of the United States was completely solved by the end of the 50s and still hold an overwhelming advantage in SRP means.
Note: the advantage in SSPDs that actually existed on ships and submarines, in general, were effective and very worthy of SSPDs in the USSR Navy (for example, the MG-44 self-propelled simulator (SIPL) and the MG-104 self-propelled torpedo launch device), but on the Navy’s carriers there was just a scanty amount, and statistics on their use during combat training was simply insignificant.
SIPL MG-104
By the time Skipjack nuclear-powered submarines appeared, with which the submarine forces of the US Navy had reached a qualitatively new level, the American submarine already had very serious experience in working against submarines and in operations in the areas of domination of Soviet anti-submarine forces.
Soviet sailors had a lot more difficult. For many years, those tasks that were already solved in the USA by atomic submarines, our fleet continued to solve diesel-electric ones. This even applied to nuclear deterrence tasks, which partially solved the Project 629 submarines and their modifications. The conditions in which the sailors of the Soviet missile diesel-electric submarines had to serve directly off the American coast were extremely difficult and very dangerous.
It was during such military service that the K-129 missile submarine that sunk off the Hawaiian Islands died.
Nevertheless, these “suicide bombers” of Project 629 made a very big contribution to strategic deterrence, and in those years when the USSR was an order of magnitude behind delivery vehicles, and the US Navy was perceived as a very serious threat.
History with the campaign of diesel submarines to Cuba during the Caribbean crisis, it is also widely known and does not require retelling, as are the conclusions from it.
But still, the main content of the underwater (submarine versus submarine) confrontation was the operation of atomic submarines. And in them, the United States also had an initial technical superiority, largely due to the personality of a single person.
Hyman Rickover and his nuclear fleet
Admiral Hyman Rickover actually became the creator of the US nuclear submarine fleet. Having extensive connections in the political establishment, he actually had powers close to "dictatorial" in "his" submarine fleet.
According to the memoirs, Rickover was very difficult in character. However, this happens often with prominent people.
Even President Nixon, in a speech delivered in 1973 when Rickover was awarded the fourth admiral star, said bluntly: “I'm not trying to say that he is devoid of contradictions. He says what he thinks. He has opponents who disagree with him. At times they are right, and he is the first to admit that he was wrong. But today's ceremony symbolizes the greatness of the American military system, and the Navy in particular, because this controversial person, this person implementing innovative ideas, was not drowned by bureaucracy; for if the bureaucracy drowns genius, the nation is doomed to mediocrity. "
Rickover hated mediocrity to such an extent that he thought: it is better for a mediocre person to die.
...
In the early 1980s, it was revealed that falsified reports on defects in hull welding led to a delay in launching almost finished submarines. They were built at the Electric Boat shipyard ... The shipyard, of course, tried to blame the fleet for all the gigantic cost and time overruns, but Rickover put his teeth, claws and ties in motion so that the shipyard itself and at its own expense would correct what it messed up.
However, nothing came of it ... Rickover was furious: in fact, the fleet was forced to pay for the incompetence and lies of the shipyard!
Reagan with the resignation of Rickover agreed, but wanted a personal meeting. In the presence of President and Minister of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Rickover turned around in all its glory: right in the Oval Office he called Minister Lehman “an arrogant ant” who “understands nothing in the fleet,” and, turning to Lehman, shouted: “You want to push me to ruin the whole program? Yes, he lies, he lies, because he serves the contractors, and they want to get rid of me, because in the government I alone do not allow them to rob taxpayers! ” Then the riotous admiral attacked the president with the question: “Are you a man? Can you make your own decisions? ”
So January 31, 1982 ended the 63-year naval career of the 80-year-old Hyman Rickover.
(Tatyana Danilova. "Raging Admiral H. Rickover, Father of the US Navy".)
The result of Rickover’s efforts (with all its extravagance and ambiguity) is not just massive US Navy submarines, but massive low-noise submarines. The situation with the ratio of the noise level of domestic and submarines of the US Navy graphically shows:
Note: this graph shows the broadband levels of the primary acoustic field, taking into account narrow-band levels (discrete situations), the situation was even worse for us.
Given the fact that the key tactical property of submarines is stealth, the US Navy submarines had a significant advantage over the Navy submarines.
But the Americans did not stop at having superiority in stealth. The second step to gaining absolute dominance underwater was their approach to target detection. And here they made a real revolution, again demonstrating a much higher level of R&D organization and the use of new submarine search means in the fleet than their adversary - we.
Initially, the search for the goal was based on the fact that, having some preliminary data on the location of the target or even conducting a search in a given area without preliminary information, the target had to be heard. Given the large number of false contacts and difficult background conditions, then a very difficult stage of contact classification began. But later, the Americans made a breakthrough in the use of sonar systems, actually putting the classification stage ahead of the detection stage.
This was due to the targeted search and accumulation of databases of "acoustic portraits" and the characteristic discrete submarines. Before this “data bank” was created, there was a difficult and risky process of accumulating the necessary data, an example of which was the long-term tracking of the Lapton submarine (USS Lapon, Sturgeon submarine) for Project 667 SSBN in the Atlantic.
From the book of D. Sontag "The history of underwater espionage against the USSR":
The Lepon arrived at the strait the next day and began to patrol ... off the coast of Iceland ... The Yankee noises were so weak that the hydroacoustics hardly heard them amid the noise of nearby fishing trawlers and swarming sea creatures ...
The Yankees appeared, but soon disappeared again ... Over the next few days, Lapon found and lost the Yankees more than once. ... Mack's disappointment was shared in Norfolk and in Washington by Capt. Bradley First Deputy Admiral Arnold Shade, still commander of the submarine forces in the Atlantic, and Admiral Murer, commander of the Navy in the North Atlantic. They were aware of the events, as Mack sent short messages on the course of the operation in the VHF band through the planes flying over him. In turn, the Navy timely informed the presidential aides, and Nixon was informed about the progress of the operation in real time.
Mack decided on a very risky maneuver. Inviting the navigators and other officers to the wardroom, he announced that ... we must try to guess where she went next to intercept her at her destination.
... after 12 hours, the Yankees appeared. This time, Mack was determined not to miss the Soviet boat ...
Mack began to map the area of operation of the Soviet boat, perhaps one of the most important intelligence that he could bring home. The Soviet boat settled in an area spanning about 200 thousand square miles. She patrolled 1500 and 2000 miles from the US coast ... checking to see if she was being watched.
... The fifth week has arrived ... By this time, the three Lapon officers on duty realized that their watches coincided with those on the Yankees. Each American could now identify his Soviet “partner” by its characteristic features when performing one or another maneuver. They even gave nicknames to their “partners”: among themselves, American watch officers even began to bet on who would better predict the next Yankee maneuver ...
The Lapon pursued the Yankees throughout the entire period of its patrol and then for some time, when the Soviet boat went home, for 47 days.
Commander SSN-661 Lapon Chester M. "Whitey" Mack
For a long time, the US Navy (and our Navy - now) worked according to the following scheme: detecting a target or something similar to it, then classification, that is, identifying signs that characterize a particular type of submarine. Frightened by Soviet activity in the ocean and faced with constant contact breaks, the Americans changed their approach. At first, for several decades, they tried to get as close as possible to Soviet submarines and record their acoustic parameters close by.
The wave of clashes that took place between our and American submarines in past years was caused by this: the Americans' attempts to get on our boats literally tens of meters and write off the noise. From 1968 to 2000, there were 25 clashes, 12 of which occurred near our shores: the Americans took risks to get the necessary information.
Then these data, as well as the records collected earlier (for example, the aforementioned story with tracking of the SSBN), were used to create the so-called “hydroacoustic portraits” - a set of acoustic spectra characteristic of one type or another of our submarines recorded in this format, in which the computational subsystems of the hydroacoustic complexes (SAC) of the submarines could identify them and compare them with the spectra of noise of the aquatic environment obtained from the antennas around the boat.
And when that happened, a revolution happened. Now, from the acoustic chaos of the oceans, the computer singled out those “pieces” of the spectrum that were specific to the submarine. A computer could decompose a complex spectrum and find in it what was related specifically to the submarine and cut off everything else.
Now the situation has changed. It was no longer necessary to listen feverishly to the underwater world, now all the noise of the ocean was decomposed and analyzed automatically, and if the acoustics discovered that there were frequencies characteristic of the enemy submarine in the array of captured data, they determined (if possible) its type, and only then started to look for her. Classification and target detection now often changed places and at first from a great distance the American submarine detected specific discrete components of a particular submarine.
If the mutual detection ranges of domestic and American second-generation submarines were approximately 1,5: 2 in broadband levels, then when the acoustics of the U.S. Navy submarines were discrete, this ratio changed by almost an order of magnitude (not in our favor).
In this situation, success for our submariners could only be in unconventional decisive actions using the capabilities of their submarines (and their weapons) to "101% of the possible."
For a long time, our submariners were not able to use the same methods, both for reasons of greater noise and a long misunderstanding of its nature (in terms of discrete components), and for reasons of the outdated "ideology" of constructing hydroacoustic complexes, which did not have (up to “Skat-3”) standard means of narrow-band spectral analysis. “Efficiency” of full-time domestic SK74 spectral analyzers (attached to Rubikon and Skat) is characterized by the phrase: “Unsuitable for work on low-noise targets.”
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the tracking of our atomic submarines behind a "probable enemy" was undisguised, very often at high speeds, using active paths (sonar).
It is important to emphasize once again that one of the critical factors was the active use of sonar counters (SSA) of the US Navy submarine. Their efficiency, taking into account the low noise immunity of our analog SACs, was such that, under the conditions of the use of SRS, our SACs were practically “clogged with interference” and “did not see” just anything. Rescued high-frequency mine detection stations ("Radian", "Arfa" ...), which made it possible to efficiently classify GGPD and real targets and successfully maintain contact even at high speeds, ensuring accurate application weapons about the "probable enemy."
In fact, the “underwater fights” of the 70s often resembled the “dog fights” of World War II fighters. Moreover, the superiority in the speed and maneuverability of our submarines, before the appearance of the Mk48 torpedoes in the US Navy, gave us good chances of success in underwater combat. However, these conditions put very stringent requirements on the submarine commanders, which not all objectively complied with.
In a certain sense, all successful anti-submariners in our country were, let’s say, “hooligans”, “pirates” who acted skillfully, toughly and decisively. Knowing many of them, not one comes to mind who is “quiet”. Given the military-technical backlog, success in underwater battles could be wrested only by "violent" ones.
The discussion that has unfolded in the discussion of “some memoirs of retired Navy submarine commanders” on the Avtonomka website is indicative of this (subsequently, due to the severity of the discussion, this was deleted by the site owner, but saved in a copy). The bottom line is that the “polite and correct” ex-commander (nuclear submarines of projects 671B and 667BDR) told us what was “wrong” (and even wrote about the lag in low noise in the Central Committee of the CPSU), while personally not doing anything to to use his existing capabilities. During the discussion, he found out extremely poor knowledge of the characteristics and capabilities of his sonar and weapons (for example, active ASGs and a complex of remote control torpedoes), which he simply did not use, because allegedly "it did not work."
To the objection that “for some reason” all this (active search tools, telecontrol) successfully worked for other commanders of the 671B project of the same division with him and they toughly and skillfully “put in place” US Navy submarines, followed by “personal attacks” in against these commanders (in particular, A. Makarenko).
Yes, according to the story of colleagues, Makarenko was a very tough and “heavy” commander, not only for his subordinates, but also for his command. For example, after a serious conflict with the command of the squadron, he put on overalls and personally climbed into the sewer and shut off the heating (it was winter) and the hot water supply ... to the “admiral's house” (and so that the staffing department of the marine engineering service “could not solve the problem” , and the command had to "negotiate" with the commander).
However, everything worked for Makarenko in the sea, including active paths of the SAC, remote-controlled torpedoes were induced, and the “probable enemy” submarine he simply “flogged”:
Subsequently, the above-mentioned commander (“opponent Makarenko”) was transferred from a multi-purpose nuclear submarine (project 671B) to a “strategist” (project 667BDR), and against his will ... With a high probability, the 45th division of multipurpose submarines simply got rid of the “passive” the commander, however, alas, he received the compound of the SSBN, with all the ensuing consequences in the event of war.
Another example is the commander of K-314 captain 1st rank V. Gontarev.
Commander K-314 Captain 1st Rank V. Gontarev
Captain 1st rank V.P. Gontarev, who was considered among the submariners of the division already a veteran of the submarine and had become a universal favorite by that time, intercepts the US Navy SSBN on its K-314 on the way to its deployment from the base on about. Guam and hard tracking forces her to stop deployment and return to base (the surfaced "adversary" was photographed in the water position through the periscope).
"The same picture in the periscope": 05:48 15.10.1976/XNUMX/XNUMX SSBN of the US Navy surfaced after a stiff pursuit of many hours
The indicated problem (the quality and conformity of command personnel: commanders "for peacetime" and "for war") is not unique to the Navy of the USSR and the Russian Federation. For those who are interested, Michael Abrasheff’s book “This is Your Ship” by the former USS Benfold destroyer commander (such as “Arly Burke”) of the US Navy, which brought its lagging ship to the best, is highly recommended. Despite the great successes achieved (and, in fact, precisely because of them), he did not become an admiral, had very "difficult" relations with some other commanders, and as a result was forced to leave the US Navy. Here is a fragment from his memoirs:
...
I called in my captain’s cabin the sailors serving the sonar installation, as well as the corresponding officers ... And I gave them the task to present my plan of action ...
To everyone’s surprise (and mine too), they developed such an ingenious plan that I had never met before. We left it to the discretion of the authorities, but both the commander and the commander of Gary rejected him ...
When I heard their decision, I could not restrain myself. Excitedly, almost insolently, I began to argue with them over the walkie-talkie connecting our ships. ... In unequivocal expressions, I was told that we will use the plan drawn up at Gary ... Tradition and obsolete orders won.
As a result, the boat destroyed all three ships, and her team did not even sweat!
By the beginning of the eighties, the USSR Navy also began to master the work with the analysis of acoustic spectra. And one of the most striking victories of the Soviet submarine during the Cold War belongs to those first attempts.
Raid K-492 to Bangor
With the advent of new, relatively low-noise submarines of Project 671RTM (and deliveries “from behind the curtain” of Western Bruhl & Kier Western civilian digital spectrum analyzers), the opportunity arose not only to change the tactics of our submarine, but already in a number of cases of anticipation in detection and long-term ( including covert) tracking, despite the continued lag in low noise and acoustics due to tactics and military cunning.
It should be noted that the effective use of these spectrum analyzers requires very high training of acoustics, commanders, watch officers and, given their single-channel nature, it was not “panoramic detection”, but a single narrow beam search for a controlled (manually) directivity pattern of the SAR submarine, to the listening path which was connected spectrum analyzer. Obviously, to search for a needle in a haystack (PLA in the ocean), such a “ray” needed to be very well able to use.
The most strikingly new tactics and capabilities were manifested by commander Dudko V. Ya., Who first worked out new tactical methods in defending his SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk:
Our command and we, as we were taught and driven into the head, believed that the PKK CH was invulnerable. In this mood, we entered combat service.
... For the first time in the fleet, together with the commander of the BS-5, we changed the configuration of the operation of noise sources, which radically changed the acoustic field of the submarine ...
As a result, during the next check, by their own methods of lack of tracking, they discovered an American submarine ... They installed tracking and, on command from the fleet headquarters, drove it across the Sea of Okhotsk for two days until it went into the ocean ...
Then he successfully applied the experience already on the Ohio SSBN, off the coast of a "probable enemy."
This story (with a number of defaults) is described in the book by V.Ya. Dudko (now Rear Rear Admiral) "Heroes of Bangor"freely available on the Internet. She deserves to retell her briefly.
During the provocative U.S. exercises NorPacFleetex Ops'82 in the fall of 1982, the Americans were able to replay Pacific Fleet reconnaissance, deploy an aircraft carrier strike force of more than a dozen ships near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, and work out a surprise attack on Kamchatka (with invasions of the Soviet airspace of the USSR over the Kuril Islands for several days later).
It was impossible to leave this unanswered, and the command of the Pacific Fleet decided on a return "courtesy visit" directly to the Americans home in Seattle.
By that time, the activity of the USSR Navy, on the one hand, and a sharp jump in the range of American SLBMs, on the other, allowed the Pacific SSBNs to be relocated to the United States, to Seattle, to the Bangor naval base. There, deep in the Gulf of Juan de Fuca, the exit from which was covered by numerous anti-submarine forces, they were completely safe until the moment they went out into the open ocean, but even there they could count on help.
The Pacific Fleet command considered it necessary to show the Americans that their defense was not at all impenetrable and that, if necessary, Soviet submarines would be able to arrange a US Navy “slaughter” right at their bases.
This was done, and the details of that operation are very well described in The Heroes of Bangor. K-492 with a modified sonar portrait, which the American computers "did not see" ("missed"), slipped through the SOSUS system unnoticed and took a position off the coast of the United States. There she “took” the Ohio SSBN.
If there were a war, and its raid would cost the Americans a lot, and the destroyed SSBNs are just one line on this list of potential losses (including the launch of a “dagger” missile strike on the US Navy SSBN itself).
K-492 left this operation almost unnoticed, although the Americans fished for it desperately and repeatedly had contact with it.
Moreover, our attitude to everything new was, to put it mildly, “ambiguous”. Rear Admiral Dudko V.Ya .:
... the flotilla had only two spectral analysis instruments. One was always at headquarters, and the second I took ...
An interesting comment by an officer of the anti-submarine warfare department of the Kamchatka flotilla A. Semenov:
Some details on the "Mustachioed Tit" are in the memoirs of Veryuzhsky N.: “The story of one photograph, or the fictional events of the period of the Cold War.”
The experience of Dudko was developed by other commanders. Quote from one of the submariners:
And this is the comment of the crew member of the mentioned submarine:
It is especially necessary to emphasize here: you must be a master of your craft and not be afraid to violate the governing documents.
The guiding documents of the naval submarine forces are long outdated, to the extent that, as written in them, it is simply impossible to carry out: in battle it will be suicide. In practice, it comes to examples on the verge of idiocy when non-standard and successful actions of our submarines, including against the latest US Navy submarines, they are not researched or transferred as experience “simply because” because they are “castrated” in reporting documents to “fit” for provisions and paragraphs of long-outdated guidance documents ...
Nevertheless, initiative officers and commanders of the Navy did everything that was possible and that was impossible in an underwater confrontation.
Part of the work card of the officer of the anti-submarine warfare department of the Kamchatka flotilla A. Semenov with episodes of U.S. Navy submarine detection. Map source
Foreign submarine blue. Inside - who discovered. If on the tracking check for SSBNs, the SSBN red sign is drawn next to it. And the "ray" of tracking. If in a yellow circle - probably we watched secretly. NS - not hidden tracking. The circle crossed out inside is the use of GPA by the enemy. Maneuvers of a foreign boat during tracking (evasion). Well, the whole map behind is full of thoughts, options, assumptions and forecast of enemy actions. And the conclusions - how to detect in the future ...
Someone may grin when they see how many times covert surveillance of the enemy was carried out, but here is what the Chicago Tribune wrote in electronic form in 1991 based on information from veterans of the US Navy and the Intelligence Committee of the House of Representatives. Available on the Daily Press website):
In general, that was the result. The confrontation under water was not a one-goal game, and it was especially acute in the 80s in the Pacific Ocean, where in many cases the “game” was on the verge (or beyond) of a foul.
The map and what is depicted on it clearly shows that with non-standard and creative approaches to solving the assigned combat missions, it was possible to successfully detect foreign submarines even with our equipment. Yes, and now sometimes it turns out. Tactics and the ability to fight compensated (in part, at least) for the gap in technical capabilities, which was and remains significant. But a departure from the traditional principles of anti-submarine warfare, formally fixed, was necessary for success. And success was only there and only when and when the initiative defeated blindly following the letter of the charter.
However, this was not always the case. Often had to "freeze" and act literally on the brink of disaster.
One of these cases is described in one of the books of the American submariner, now a fighter writer Michael DeMercurio, and reflects his real official experience on a U.S. Navy submarine tracking our Project 671 submarine:
The helmsman at that time wanted to cross his legs and touched the speed task device. The needle moved from the “forward 1/3” mark to the “full forward” mark. “Full forward” means 100% of the reactor’s power, speed of more than 30 knots and an automatic order to start the pumps at full power.
I was a shift engineer in the turbine compartment of the submarine that night. We "hung" on the tail of the Russians, and therefore were tense. And suddenly a bell with the order "full speed ahead."
Oh my God! Ivan rushes at us, or he fired a torpedo, or he heard us and turns around to ram us. It was an emergency. I jumped up and stood behind the reactor operator, who was about to switch the second cooling pump to high speed. The pump doubled in speed, causing the 30-centimeter non-return valve to shut off with a clatter to prevent backflow from the other pump. Hit! The non-return valve closed, the sound rang out in the surrounding water. A split second later, the reactor operator launched the third pump at high speed. Another hit! Pump 4, then 5, two more hits ...
The officer on duty, the navigator, hears the 4 check valves closing and he feels the deck shudder. He sees how the speed increases on the indicator. The helmsman was still not in the know.
The officer in charge grabs the phone to scream at me, just in time to hear my report: “Management, the reactor control team, all the main cooling pumps are working at full power!”
“Stop it all! - shouts the watch officer. “Switch the pumps to low speed!”
And then hell opens. The captain comes running from his cabin, the assistant captain appears, and we almost ram Ivan into the steering wheel from behind.
"5 degrees right steering!" - the officer in charge shouts, trying to prevent our submarine from flying onto the screw of the Victor submarine. We were side by side with a Victor submarine after closing 4 check valves and making a lot of noise due to the pumps running at full capacity. The next ten minutes were full of panic, expectations. We did not know if "Victor" had heard us.
The Russians have a terrible habit of turning around and ramming the submarines chasing them in order to scare them away. But Ivan added gas, not paying any attention. “Thank God that Dmitry was on guard!” - later said the officer on board the vessel. The officers on board the vessel gave each Russian officer on duty, knowing their habits and behavior. “If Sergey were on guard, then we would have sailed home with a Soviet torpedo in the ass.”
"A terrible habit" or, as the US Navy called it - "Crazy Ivan," - the Americans called a maneuver allowing "inspect" the aft sector, which the submarine's SAC did not listen to. The Americans, however, were convinced that this was such a crazy Russian maneuver to avoid tracking. From their side, it really looked like a ram. And it was experienced accordingly.
Many episodes have been and remain connected with torpedoes. And not everything is so simple with them.
Torpedoes on the "probable enemy"
Rear Admiral Lutsky A.N. in his memoirs, “For the Strength of a Durable Casing,” he wrote:
- Your torpedo hit someone. The lower part of the practical charging compartment of the torpedo is damaged, caught some black pieces of unknown material, on the body of the battery compartment of the corrugation. The torpedo will have to write off. But the recorder worked, homing. There you go!
Considering that American submarines constantly patrolled near our bases in the naval training ranges, there are significant statistics not only of their detection, but of the use of practical weapons on them (with registrars instead of the warhead). However, there is nothing to be proud of, because there are good reasons to believe that the submarines of the so-called partners (as they began to be called in recent years) deliberately "took" our volleys of practical torpedoes for the purpose of reconnaissance.
And such examples, alas, are more than enough, for example, in the mid-90s, not far from Kamchatka, the “partner” submarine was between the “leopard” and the tactical group of the SSBN with the multi-purpose project 671RTM nuclear submarine under guard, “taking over” 3 two-torpedo volleys (most of the torpedoes were raised with guidance).
Rear Admiral Lutsky A.N.
It is worth noting that A.N. Lutsky is one of those submariners whose boat, at one time, "undetected passed through SOSUS," and he should be taken seriously.
RPKSN combat patrol under the command of A.N. Lutsk - on the site "Military Review".
One of the authors of the article had the experience of performing a combat exercise with the bilateral use of practical torpedoes (“leopards” against the BDR), and the torpedo with the BDR was aimed first at the “escaping” PLA of the “partners”, and in the secondary search - already at our “leopard” ( that is, the distances between the three submarines were “pistol”).
Very characteristic in that situation was the very fast Los Angeles Improved output at maximum power and acceleration - with a water reactor! Briefly: “Los (improved)” “escaped” from the 40-node torpedo SET-65.
And here one can’t get around another very “painful” and acute question: the facts of the use of “torpedoes” by our submarines of torpedoes (usually in a practical version) or simulators (with the noise of torpedoes). Such actions were undertaken by the US Navy submarine with the aim of revealing the tactics of the actions of our submarines, evaluating specific officers and commanders for actions in a critical situation, and developing tactics and organizing the sudden and secretive "shooting" of our submarines in the threatened period (immediately before the outbreak of hostilities).
One of the possible examples of such actions is the disruption by the Americans (a submarine of the type "Los Angeles") of the combat service of the SSBN K-500 Pacific Fleet.
This is something to tell us more.
In 1984, the submarine of project 667B K-500 from the 21st DIPL, 4th FLPL under the command of the captain of the 1st rank E.B. Kopeikin was tasked with patrolling in the area near the Aleutian Islands - this was due to the insufficient range of ballistic missiles with which the boat was armed.
During the combat service, the boat was discovered by the US anti-submarine forces, two Los Angeles-type submarines, guided by the base patrol, were sent to its area of location aviation.
Subsequently, the "Los Angeles" conducted dangerous maneuvers near the SSBN, and then one of the American boats launched a pair of practical torpedoes or their simulators indistinguishable from real torpedoes.
A combat alert was announced on the K-500, the personnel put on individual life-saving equipment, the warhead-3 loaded torpedo tubes in readiness to counterattack an American boat.
To inform the General Staff about what was happening, the K-500 surfaced and transmitted a signal that it had been attacked and was accepting the battle.
However, an immediate order came from the General Staff to not counterattack.
After the loss of secrecy, the continuation of the military service turned out to be meaningless, and the boat returned home.
There is, however, a version that the K-500 ended up in the combat service area of the American SSBNs, which take place in the Gulf of Alaska near the Aleutian Islands. And that the "Los Angeles" simply guarded "their" strategist, forcing the uninvited guest from the area of their military service.
We are unlikely to find out the truth soon.
There really were quite a few such episodes, even today, after many years, the Internet is replete with photographs of Soviet atomic submarines taken through American periscopes.
Photo of the Soviet submarine in the periscope of the American nuclear submarine Haddo
Unfortunately, today the level of training of personnel from the "hot" times of confrontation has fallen significantly. The main thing is that the attitude to the matter has changed significantly ...
The film “The Battle of Submarine Fighters: Who Will Win the War” shows the “training element” of “working out evasion” from an enemy torpedo attack by the crew of the multipurpose nuclear submarine Cheetah.
Moment in time 30:22
Frankly speaking, he takes a rash from what he saw! The “consilium” of officers built in the central post (instead of their combat posts) instead of quick actions, completely ineffective methods of evasion (from long-outdated guidance documents) ...
The four-torpedo salvo shown in the film in this situation is just a dumb “dumping ammunition in the sea” ...
At the same time, the Cheetah guard commander in the film bravely declares his “readiness and ability to defeat Virginia in the battle ...”
I would like to ask: what ?! USET-80 torpedoes, the homing system of which is “reproduced on a domestic base” from the American46 Mk1961 torpedo?
In reality (according to the actual report of the acoustics about the dashboard) everything looks, to put it mildly, completely different. In the last case known to the author (the actual use of the US Navy’s PLA “something very similar to a torpedo”), the commander of the BS-5 was the first to leave the shock (!), The rest of the GKP “woke up” and began to control after the first “fur” commands ...
It is very important to understand that the issues of marine underwater weapons and countermeasures are the "spearhead" of underwater confrontation. And if the enemy, figuratively, has colt (and the necessary means of detection), and we have a rubber shot, then even excellent hand-to-hand training will be useless in a combat situation: the sad ending is predetermined.
But the importance of torpedoes in the confrontations between the times of the Cold War and after is a topic for a separate material.
- Maxim Klimov, Alexander Timokhin
- Robert Stern's "Hunter Hunted" book cover
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