What led to the Crimean disaster of 1942

Almost simultaneously in May 1942, two disasters occurred on the Soviet-German front: the rout of the Soviet armies near Kharkov (Barvenkovsky Kotel) and the rout of the Crimean Front. If the first is described in detail, then they try not to recall the second, as if there was nothing terrible there.

Unsuccessful defense of Crimea in the fall of 1941

The forerunner of this disaster was not entirely successful events in the defense of the Crimea in the fall of 1941. For the defense of Crimea in August, the 51st army was formed under the command of General Kuznetsov, and the 11th German army opposed it on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, commanded by General Manstein.

The only place to invade Crimea was the Perekop Isthmus with a width of only 7 km. The offensive on it could be conducted only frontally. The isthmus was well equipped for defense with field-type structures. Over the entire width it was crossed by the ancient "Tatar moat" up to 15 m deep.

The 51st army consisted of eight rifle and three cavalry divisions. Four divisions were located on the coast to combat naval landings, three cavalry divisions in the center of the peninsula, to repel airborne assault forces and one in reserve. One division defended the Perekop Isthmus, one Chongar and the Arabat Spit, and one stretched out on the coast of the Sivash Bay. That is, more than half of the 51st army was not where the German offensive began. Manstein believed that given the terrain

"Even the stubborn defense of the three divisions was enough to prevent the invasion of the 54th Army Corps in Crimea."

The German forces that went on the offensive on September 9 went to the Chongarsky Bridge on September 16 and broke through the Soviet defenses on September 26, took Perekop and overcame the Tatar Moat. After that, they stopped the attack on the Crimea, as they had to transfer part of the troops to other sectors of the front. The Germans, having taken Perekop, had to overcome the even narrower Ishunsky isthmus (3-4 km wide).

On October 18, by the beginning of the second offensive, German troops totaled six divisions. They were opposed by 12 rifle and four cavalry divisions. These forces were quite enough for a solid defense of the Crimean isthmuses. The Soviet troops had an advantage in manpower and a significant number tanksThe Germans did not have one tank, but there was an advantage in artillery.

However, the command of the 51st Army scattered its forces throughout the peninsula. Three infantry and two cavalry divisions secured the coast, two infantry and one cavalry division were in reserve. Four rifle divisions were deployed in the same echelon to defend the isthmus at the Ishun positions, another division on the Chongar Peninsula.

On October 20, the Germans managed to take the Ishun fortifications, within three days of fierce battles, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops to its entire depth, enter the operational space and launch an attack on the Kerch Peninsula. Command and control of the troops was lost, General Kuznetsov was removed from command. As a result of the October offensive, the German divisions defeated the 51st Army superior to them, from which scattered and demoralized remnants of the troops remained retreating.

Approached parts of the Primorsky Army began to move south to the side of Sevastopol, the garrison of which at that time was very weak, and the remnants of the 51st Army to Kerch. Soviet troops in the Crimea were divided into two parts and lost general control.

Despite the sufficient forces, the command failed to organize the defense of the Kerch Peninsula, by November 16, the last units of the 51st Army were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula, part of the troops went to Adzhimushkaysky quarries and continued to fight there. According to modern data, the losses in the Crimean defensive operation amounted to 63 people, German sources say about the capture of about 860 thousand prisoners. As a result, the whole Crimea, except Sevastopol, was in the hands of the Germans, only part of the Soviet troops who lost all their heavy weapons managed to escape.

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation in December 1941

The loss of Crimea complicated the situation of the Soviet troops in the Kuban and the North Caucasus, as well as the defender in the ring of Sevastopol. In order to restore the situation, the Soviet command in December 1941 decided to carry out the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, using for this purpose the whole power of the Black Sea fleet. On December 26, a landing party landed near Kerch. On December 30, at the port of Feodosia, as well as on January 5, 1942, an airborne battalion was marched in the port of Yevpatoriya, but it was completely destroyed by the Germans. The troops were tasked with encircling and destroying the Kerch enemy grouping, then releasing Sevastopol and completely liberating the Crimea.

The 44th Army delivered the main blow in the region of Feodosia, and the 51st Army delivered an auxiliary blow in the Kerch area. The group consisted of 82 thousand people, 43 tanks, 198 guns, supported the landing of more than 700 aircraft. Three rifle and one cavalry divisions were in reserve on Taman. For landing, more than 200 vessels of the Black Sea Fleet were used. For 8 days of fighting, the Red Army advanced 100-110 km and liberated the entire Kerch Peninsula.

The commander of the 42nd German Corps General Shponek, fearing encirclement, ordered the troops to withdraw from the Kerch Peninsula, Manstein canceled the order, but he did not reach the troops. The German troops, having thrown heavy weapons, retreated, for this General Shponek was put on trial and sentenced to death.

Despite the success of the Soviet troops in this operation, General Manstein, however, wrote in his memoirs about the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet command. Instead of throwing the forces of the 44th Army, which has triple superiority, to destroy the communications of the 11th German Army, and the forces of the 51st Army - to seize the Simferopol-Dzhankoy railway, which could really lead to the defeat of the 11th Army, they acted indecisively and solved only the tactical task of encircling the Kerch group of Germans.

Taking advantage of this, the Germans, having transferred part of the troops from Sevastopol, launched a counterattack on January 15 in the area of ​​Vladislavovka and repelled Theodosius on January 18. Soviet troops retreated 15–20 km east and took up defense in the narrowest part of the peninsula at Ak-Monai positions.

It should be noted a special feature of individual Soviet formations. They were mainly formed from the inhabitants of Transcaucasia. The 63rd Mountain Division was officially Georgian, and the 396th Division was Azerbaijani. These formations were characterized by poor discipline, poor preparation, and low morale; in the 63rd division there were massive transitions to the German side and the assassination of commanders.

The 63rd division was deployed in the region of Feodosia and became famous for the mass surrender at all stages of the operation. Manstein in his memoirs gives an example of how in the camp for Soviet prisoners of war near Feodosia during the Soviet offensive, the camp guards fled, and prisoners in the amount of 8000 people in formation without guard went not towards Soviet positions, but to Germans in Simferopol.

In subsequent battles, the 63rd division was in the first echelon, and the 396th in the second. At the first approach of the Germans, they scattered, opened the front and surrendered, in May both divisions were defeated and then disbanded.

Unsuccessful actions of the Crimean Front in February — April 1942

To liberate the Crimea, at the end of January, the Crimean Front was formed under the command of General Kozlov and strengthened by the 47th Army. In order to strengthen the command of the Crimean Front, in March a representative of the General Headquarters appointed an army commissar of the 1st rank Mehlis, whose role in the defeat of the front was quite substantial. Arriving at the front, he immediately developed vigorous activity, ousted the chief of staff of the front, General Tolbukhin, and replaced him with General Eternal, who he had brought with him, and then began to sort things out with the front commander, the limp general Kozlov. Mehlis crushed the front command and actually replaced the front commander, intervened in command and control, not being an expert in military affairs.

Naturally, all this affected the combat readiness of the front. The troops of the front were seriously replenished and were constantly in intense readiness for the offensive, however, it was carried over and over again. At the same time, the command stubbornly did not want to give an order to strengthen the defense, for fear of lowering the “offensive spirit” and relaxing the soldiers. A nervous atmosphere and a feverish senseless fuss reigned both at headquarters and on the front line.

In February – April 1942, the Crimean Front made three offensive attempts, but achieved nothing and suffered heavy losses. On February XNUMXth, simultaneously with the advance of the troops of the Sevastopol Defensive Region, part of the Crimean Front, consisting of eight divisions and two tank battalions, with artillery support from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, they tried to break through the German defenses under Ak-Monay.

The German defense at the Yaila-Sivash line was dense, because of the narrow front, the attackers could not use their overwhelming numerical superiority. The losses were very large (only 32 thousand killed and missing). German dominated the sky aviationnot allowing the supply of troops. The spring thaw that had begun and the marshland were not allowed to develop the offensive. The troops advancing from Sevastopol also did not succeed. The March 19 offensive was halted.

The command of the front in the conditions of the mudslide refused to attempt to advance along the swamps along the coast of Sivash. On April 9, the offensive began on the southern front with the aim of capturing Koy-Assan, followed by access to Feodosia. This attack by the fleet was no longer supported and again brought no result. Since April 12, the troops of the Crimean Front stopped all active operations

The May Offensive of Manstein

By early May, the troops of the Crimean Front included seventeen rifle and two cavalry divisions, three rifle and four tank brigades with a total number of three hundred thousand people (with three hundred and fifty tanks). They were opposed by only seven infantry, one tank division and one cavalry brigade of the 11th army of General Manstein, numbering about one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers. Five divisions of the German army were left near Sevastopol.

Despite serious superiority, the position of the Soviet troops turned out to be rather shaky. The main shock group of the 47th and 51st armies concentrated in a ledge on the northern sector of the front. He was tasked with taking Koy-Assan and developing the offensive in two diverging directions: to Theodosia and Dzhankoy. The formations, having reached an unprecedented density of troops, were clustered on a narrow isthmus, the width of which in this place did not exceed 20 km.

The possibility of an advancing enemy front command was not considered at all. The troops were lined up in two echelons, however, they did not have a second echelon of defensive positions, the army leadership was preparing to enter it into battle immediately after the enemy’s defense broke through the first echelon divisions.

Three armies occupied bands of 8-10 km, the bulk of the troops of 12 rifle divisions were in the first defense zone. The defense section of the 44th Army was extremely weak; the second line of defense actually merged with the first. Front reserves were located at a distance of 15-20 km from the front edge. The first line of defense was poorly prepared and did not have a developed network of trenches. It consisted of separate rifle cells, trenches, dugouts, sometimes not even interconnected by communication paths, although an anti-tank moat was dug in front of part of the first defense line. Troop reserves were located as close to the front line as possible.

The rear defensive position of the front passed along the Turkish Wall - a chain of old fortifications located on the hills in the eastern, widest part of the peninsula. They were not equipped, no one was preparing for defense here at all. The command posts of the armies were located close to the front, there were no reserve command posts, and when the front broke through, command and control of the troops was immediately lost. The coastal anti-landing defense was not organized, and there was practically no masking of troops or command and observation posts. Despite the protests of the front commander Kozlov, Mehlis forbade to dig trenches in order to "not undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers." Turning to the defense, the front maintained an offensive force, 19 of 21,5 divisions were close to the front line.

The Black Sea Fleet did not take any part in the planned operation. He remained inactive all spring (until the last battle for Sevastopol). Meanwhile, in the depths of the enemy's defense there were many places convenient for landing, which could strike at the rear of the German defense and deep into the peninsula, the Germans simply did not have serious forces to strengthen these points. And the matter here was no longer in the Mehlis, commanders of all levels did not carry out their duties properly, the troops were almost doomed.

At dawn on May 8, the Germans went on the offensive, which was a complete surprise to the front command. As a result of artillery and air raids, the work of the headquarters was paralyzed, communications and command and control of the troops were disrupted. The main blow was inflicted in the south on the weak positions held by the 63rd Mountain Division of the 44th Army, and amphibious landing was unhindered in its rear. German aircraft dominated the battlefield, and Soviet aircraft almost did not appear.

Despite the fact that the German group was twice as inferior to the Soviet in people, 2 times in artillery, 1,8 times in tanks, and 1,2 times superior to the Soviet only in planes, Manstein decisively broke through the defense, command The front lost control, disorganized troops surrendered and fled towards Kerch.

The breakthrough included tanks, only briefly detained by the old anti-tank ditch. On the morning of May 10, the Stavka ordered the troops of the Crimean Front to withdraw to the Turkish Wall, but by this time the German units had turned north and reached the area of ​​deployment of Soviet reserves. The reserves were broken, and did not turn into battle formations, some of them hastily retreated to the east, and some were in close proximity on the coast of Sivash.

The fleet practically remained inactive. The enemy was advancing along the coast in close order, on which the fleet could easily inflict a massive artillery strike, but nothing was done. On the morning of May 13, the rear position was broken, the next day German troops reached the outskirts of Kerch.

A hasty evacuation of the city and the remaining troops through the strait to Taman began, which took place under the constant attacks of German aircraft. Kerch fell on May 15, the remnants of the Soviet troops retreated to the peninsula east of the city and on May 18 stopped resistance. The evacuation of the remnants of the troops from the peninsula lasted until May 20. Unable to evacuate units of about fifteen thousand people left for Adzhimushkaysky quarries.

The total losses of Soviet troops in May 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula amounted to about 180 thousand people killed and captured, as well as 258 tanks, 417 aircraft and 1133 guns. Until May 20, about 120 thousand troops were evacuated to the Taman Peninsula. According to German data, their losses amounted to 7588 people.

In terms of the total losses of the Soviet troops, this defeat was similar to the one that broke out a week later and the much more famous Kharkov catastrophe.

The defeat of the Kerch grouping of Soviet troops allowed the Germans to liberate troops for the final assault on Sevastopol, which fell in July, and for the summer offensive in the Caucasus.

The main culprit for the disaster on the Kerch Peninsula, Stalin announced Mehlis, the front commander of Kozlov and the chief of staff of the Eternal. They were demoted in ranks and posts. On June 4, 1942, the Stavka directive stated that they, as well as army commanders, "discovered a complete misunderstanding of the nature of modern warfare" and "tried to repel the attacks of enemy strike groups by linear construction of the defense - consolidation of the first-line troops by reducing the depth of the defense formations".

The inept actions of the Soviet command could not oppose anything to the well-calculated steps of one of the best generals of the Wehrmacht.

Comments

[Olgovich]

Defense of Crimea and Sevastopol is an example exceptional heroism of soldiers and officers (except for the Georgian "mountain shooters") and at the same time - an example of exceptional mediocrity, lack of will and cowardice of the military and political leadership.

And also an example of the endless post-war lie about the "overwhelming superior" forces of the Nazis there, covering up the monstrous blunders of the leaders that led to tragedies and terrible losses - I mean, first of all, the evacuation (or rather NOT evacuation) of the defenders of Sevastopol, the defeat of the Crimean front and the defense of the Adzhimushkai quarries. Although there every day of the defense of 1941-42 was like that ...

[Bar1]

the fact that the Caucasian units were ideologically unstable and mass surrenders took place, probably very upset Comrade Stalin, who himself was a Georgian. The Union of fraternal peoples clearly cracked.
Inadequate command of the troops, both in the 41st and 42 years, with a SIGNIFICANT superiority of troops in tanks in the western direction and manpower and tanks in Crimea, says that the army command system built at the beginning of the war was completely flawed. Non-initiating commanders awaiting orders from Moscow and acting only on orders from the Headquarters is essentially decapitation of command and control, and if the connection is cut, control is completely lost. If you add an ideological component to this type of control, such as the Red Army is not defending, but always attacks and fights the enemy’s land, this means that the political leadership of the countries completely lost touch with reality.
The commanders Pavlov, Kirponos in Crimea Kuznetsov and Kozlov - they can all be blamed for the lack of initiative, they were waiting for orders from Moscow, wasting precious time on decision-making.
The historian Martirosyan accuses the highest generals of the Red Army, Tymoshenko and Zhukov, of not directly fulfilling Stalin’s orders before the war to put the troops on alert. there was a conspiracy of generals.



It turned out that Stalin did not trust his generals and denied them the initiative, and the generals either perverted the reasonable orders of the political leadership, or simply did nothing and awaited orders from Moscow at a time when German troops were already on the attack. was at the beginning of the war.
Volumes of research have been written about the catastrophic beginning of the war, but what was going on inside the army, about the state of command of the districts, is much less, roughly speaking, the generals in the troops were simply frightened to the complete absence of their own measures.
That Pavlov, that Kirponos, that Kozlov were the red commanders and flesh of the flesh of the proletarian state built by Stalin, therefore I do not agree with Martirosyan, Stalin is also to blame for the failure of the outbreak of war, because he did not understand how to manage the generals and the army.

[cavl]

The opinion of the writer Martirosyan, who is completely unaware of pre-war events, is given. To know and understand why this happened is a different concept. And this science fiction writer is much to his ideas

[Bar1]

Quote: cavl

The opinion of the writer Martirosyan, who is completely unaware of pre-war events, is given. To know and understand why this happened is a different concept. And this science fiction writer is much to his ideas

it must be immediately belittled, not a historian, but a literary fiction writer.

For the information that Martirosov brought in, the face is generally beaten, if this is a lie, because Zhukov is a hero of the war. unearthed in the archives that the red packets for the commanders of districts and mechanized corps compiled by the chief of the general staff Zhukov on the movement of mechanized corps ALONG the frontier and the front line with a kilometer EXCEEDING the resource of our tanks is already Zhukov’s crime, because in fact it was not the fighting loss of tanks The Red Army was huge. Along the roads stood entire tanks without fuel and with small breakdowns. And this is noted by other historians.
for the battle of Dubnin, when Zhukov removed Kirponos from the command of the Communist Front and himself led the battle and lost it, in fact, no one could figure it out.
Martirosyan couldn’t say this from scratch, his story should be based on archival documents. Or if he lied, then official OI historians should challenge his opinion. But this is not, and your fine hairpin can be ignored.

[AsmyppoL]

What kind of people appeared. I will take the liberty of answering an old "friend". I used to know Arsen Benikovich Martirosyan under the nickname MsAr. He appeared during the discussion of the 26th part of the series "Unexpected War ..." and could not give any counterarguments ... He disappeared for a long time, and now it turns out that he lived on the forum and under the nickname BAR1.

If the cook does not know how to cook soup, then any visitor who tried his brew can tell him about it in the eye. I do not need to be a historian to prove that the writer Martirosyan distorts historical events or, in other words, falsifies our history.

Specific example. In his book "Soviet Intelligence on the Eve of the War" A.B. Martirosyan writes: “... The Wehrmacht’s military transportation schedule was put into maximum consolidation of echelon movements on May 22, 1941, and on May 24, 1941, Stalin convened a secret meeting of members of the Politburo with the participation of the high military command. And at that meeting he directly stated that in the very near future, apparently, the USSR could be subjected to a surprise attack from Germany! That is, he knew about the transfer of this schedule to a different regime in advance, and, apparently, as early as the beginning of May, at the latest, since on May 13 he personally authorized the nomination of all the troops planned for this to the western borders, about which Zhukov and Tymoshenko and gave the appropriate directive ... "

This text directly shows that the writer Martirosyan did not even take the trouble to read and analyze intelligence reports. He took from the Internet the date of the actual increase in the speed of transportation of German troops and chose a suitable date from the journal of visits to Stalin. And then he simply came up with the conclusion that Stalin knew everything in advance. And is it not the ability of a science fiction writer?

[AsmyppoL]

How to show that this is not true? Simple enough. Take the summary of the Intelligence Agency (RU) from 4.4.41: «Special communication of the RU General Staff on strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border with the USSR... The total number of German troops on the border with the USSR to Slovakia is expressed: infantry divisions - 61, motorized divisions - 6, tank divisions - 6-7. Total: 72 - 73 divisions... »

We have a mark on the number of German divisions at our border on April 4. We look at the following summary from 26.4.41 g .: «Special communication of the General Staff of the General Staff of the CA on the distribution of the armed forces of Germany among the theaters and fronts of military operations as of April 25.04.41, XNUMX ... The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) - 95 – 100 divisions... »

From April 4 to 25, the number of German troops at our border increased by 23-27 divisions, which gives an average speed of concentration of German troops at the border 1,1 ... 1,29 divisions / day.

The following summary of May 15th: «Special communication RU GSh KA On the distribution of armed forces in theaters and fronts of military operations as of 15.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX ... The total number of German troops against the USSR reaches 114 — 119 Divisions... »

From April 26 to May 15, the number of German divisions at our border increased by 19, which is the concentration rate - 1,27 divisions / day. Comparable to speed in the previous time section. The following report is dated May 31, which refers to the concentration “against the USSR - 120–122 divisions... "From May 16 to May 31, there is an increase in German troops at our border by 3-6 divisions, which gives a speed of concentration 0,19 ... 0,38 divisions / day.

So after May 15th the concentration rate decreased by 3,3 ... 6,7 times, and Arsen Benikovich writes about an increase in the schedule for the delivery of German troops. In fact, the speed actually increased, only our intelligence did not find it. How could Stalin find out about this ?? But Martirosyan just came up with this bunch ...

The most interesting thing is that according to intelligence, the speed of delivery of German troops from June 1 to 19 is also at the level of 0,3 divisions / day. Thus, our intelligence was not able to detect a sharp increase in the number of German troops at the border. Scouts saw heavy traffic, but could not connect them with an increase in the number of divisions ... So in books provide invented events...

[AsmyppoL]

The following example of the incompetence of this science fiction writer. Many read an article on the redeployment of the 16th Army (https://topwar.ru/172586-1941-sosredotochenie-otdelnyh-armij-k-juzhnoj-gosgranice.html). The reason for its writing was the discussion of historians of events on the eve of the war (link to discussion http://zhistory.org.ua/nikifrov.htm). The question of the redeployment of the 16th Army was also raised there. To the question: “Where did the 16th Army go?” nor A.B. Martirosyan, nor O.Yu. Kozinkin could not give a clear answer. And this is one of the most important events that occurred on the eve of the war. Historians asked, and two writers were stubbornly silent ... This is an example of the incompetence of these people.

[AsmyppoL]

The third example. Again, two different events are taken and connected by an imaginary connection. Everything is possible for science fiction ...
In his book, a writer A.B. Martirosyan writes: “And now do not consider it a burdensome work to ponder deeply the essence of what Stalin and Beria actually did. Indeed, before you is a brilliant description of lightning-fast aerial reconnaissance along the entire border line of the ZAPOVO! And not just aerial reconnaissance, but carried out in real time. Because every 30-50 km Zakharov landed a plane and wrote an urgent report, while the border guards who knew about the arrival of such an aircraft silently accepted and sent Zakharov’s report to the destination. Furthermore. In real time, but during one daylight hours, integrated intelligence information was collected on Wehrmacht military preparations for an attack on the USSR in the most dangerous direction from the point of view of the Soviet leadership - Belorussky! On a scale across the border

It only remains to add that from 0.45 to 1.50 17 (as stated in the “Journal of Stalin’s Cabinet Visits”, in fact, it’s already 18) on June 1941 of Stalin at the reception was the commander of the RKKA Air Force Zhigarev, who received instructions to immediately organize such aerial reconnaissance. Well, Beria immediately organized his eagles - border guards. This is how Stalin took the intelligence information reported to him on June 17. He demanded to recheck all the data in an unconventional way, but in real time and only in an integral way. And on the most dangerous and most important direction - on Byelorussian, on the scale of the entire line of the border of the Western Special Military District.

As a result of the actions taken, all intelligence information about the impending attack was completely and unequivocally verified, and Stalin had a completely clear picture that did not allow double interpretations of what was happening. And that is precisely why, without waiting for the third call, on the same day, June 18, 1941, Stalin ordered that all commanders of the Western military districts be sent a directive to bring the troops entrusted to them in full combat readiness ... Simply put, Stalin used every opportunity in order to verify with absolute accuracy the inevitability of war in the very near future. Indeed, the future of the state depended on the validity of his actions. And when he received 100% validity, a directive followed. ”” In detail, this falsified event is exposed by Victoria in her article (https://topwar.ru/123513-povtorenie-proydennogo.html).

I’ll add on my own that our intelligence did not find the supply of tank units of the Wehrmacht to the border. Most of the discovered tank units remained in the same places of deployment, where they were as of May 31. And this can be documented when I get the move on these materials ...

[AsmyppoL]

Last example. A new book A.B. Martirosyan. The author used the same trick. I took one option out of three and presented it in a profitable version. Although two other options refute the presented, allegedly, the main one. This episode is considered in detail in the article.
https://topwar.ru/165815-chto-znala-nasha-razvedka-o-nemeckih-krupnyh-shtabah.html

[Bar1]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I’ll add on my own that our intelligence did not find the supply of tank units of the Wehrmacht to the border

but I can’t believe in your conclusion, it’s not possible to HIDE such a number of tanks. Here I believe Martirosyan more.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Bar1

but I can’t believe in your conclusion, it’s not possible to HIDE such a number of tanks. Here I believe Martirosyan more.

It is enough to concentrate the transported mechanical connections at the turn of 60-100 km from the border and begin their advance to the initial 2-4 days before the offensive.
Here is how it was in the 3rd Panzerdivisia:

13.06.41 Divisions report arrival in a new area of ​​concentration ... Parts in forest camps are persistently complaining about the torment of mosquitoes ...
14.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX A thorough camouflage is prescribed east of the prohibition line ...
20.6.41 Departing from the Radzyn region [64 km from the border], in accordance with the order of the division commander, they leave ... for the region of their initial positions ...
21.6.41 In the 23-30, parts report on the readiness and occupation of the last starting positions ...

And here is the 57th MK:

14.6.41 Tracked vehicles 12-th TD arrived at the point of temporary deployment. The first parts of the 19 th TD are unloaded and follow the march to the designated point of temporary deployment.
16.6.41 Wheel equipment 18-md arrived at the point of temporary deployment.
17.6.41 ... All parts of 19 td arrived at the point of temporary deployment.
18.6.41 Half 18 md leaves the temporary dislocation point and marches to halt at Ekersberg (Okartovo). The rearguard is located there 19.6 to 4-00 ...
20.6.41 12 td occupies the prescribed starting position ... 29-th TP division, along with other parts of the 16-00 resumes movement along the established route. 19 td moves along the route from the former point of temporary dislocation with a halt on both sides of the route of movement of tanks ...

Our intelligence before the war was able to find only part of the stationary airfields in the adjacent territory - what can we say about mechanical connections.

[Bar1]

Quote: Alexey RA

our intelligence before the war was able to find only part of the stationary airfields in the adjacent territory - what can we say about mechanical connections.

I don’t understand the logic of your answer. I’m telling you that it’s impossible to hide the masses of tanks and troops concentrated along the borders, and in return you show me the arrival schedules of 2 x tank and rifle divisions, and then say that intelligence could not .. .
At the time of Zakharov’s aerial reconnaissance on July 18, basically the entire mass of German troops was located along the border.
The reality is that of those years that of other years it says one thing. Intelligence of the front, political and other types of intelligence revealed one MASS TRANSFER OF TROOPS to the Soviet borders. This is unambiguous. Therefore, the conclusions must be unambiguous, it is necessary to bring the troops to full combat readiness.
But this was not done. Martirosyan accuses Tymoshenko and Zhukov of not fulfilling the order, and this conclusion is apparently correct. The fact that the army was not made at the beginning of the war could have involved either the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff or political leadership - Stalin. It seems that the generals sabotaged execution of orders.
In addition, given that Napolen invaded Russia on the SUMMER SOLAR CONSTITUTION on July 22, it is quite possible to assume that Hitler also ordered an invasion for the same period.
I think so.

[Liam]

Quote: Bar1

In addition, given that Napolen invaded Russia on the SUMMER SOLAR CONSTITUTION on July 22, it is quite possible to assume that Hitler also ordered an invasion for the same period.

You have any problems with STAND
The summer solstice is the moment when the Sun, in its movement along the ecliptic, falls to its northernmost point (the summer solstice in the Northern Hemisphere, in the XXI century, falls on June 20 or 21.
And Napoleon:
After midnight on June 12 (24), 1812, the crossing of the French troops across the border Neman began along the four bridges built above Kovno. At 6 a.m. on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered the Russian fortress of Kovno

[Bar1]

Quote: Liam

Quote: Bar1

In addition, given that Napolen invaded Russia on the SUMMER SOLAR CONSTITUTION on July 22, it is quite possible to assume that Hitler also ordered an invasion for the same period.

You have any problems with STAND
The summer solstice is the moment when the Sun, in its movement along the ecliptic, falls to its northernmost point (the summer solstice in the Northern Hemisphere, in the XXI century, falls on June 20 or 21.
And Napoleon:
After midnight on June 12 (24), 1812, the crossing of the French troops across the border Neman began along the four bridges built above Kovno. At 6 a.m. on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered the Russian fortress of Kovno

the meaning of finding a forum chatterbox in the circle of discussion is the constant search for discrepancies and minor discrepancies. Napoleon said that the war began precisely on June 22.
In general, the dude who had all the blood from his head on standing and as a result found a blackout in his head, and even when using the source of last resort on Wikipedia, which is a sign of amateurism, of course, it is unaware that the astronomical time, which is called "point" in Wikipedia stretches for SEVERAL DAYS, sunrise for THREE DAYS, but the midpoint is just the date of June 22 and even more sunset.
The meaning of such a forum stuffing, as usual, to obscure the discussion and close the true meaning of what is happening.

[Liam]

Quote: Bar1

a dude whose head blew all his blood

Quote: Bar1

Napoleon said that the war started on June 22

Quote: Bar1

stretches for SEVERAL DAYS, sunrise for THREE DAYS, the middle point is just the date of June 22

Napolen invaded Russia at SUMMER SOLAR CONSTANT July 22

You have a state of calendar-astronomical STATUS. Simply put, multi-spelling chaos

[Bar1]

Quote: Liam

You have a state of calendar-astronomical STATUS. Simply put, multi-spelling chaos

Well, what else can you say?

[AsmyppoL]

Bar1's manner of communication is the same as that of MrAr (Martirosyan Arsen). Even the pictures are the same ... Martirosyan himself also speaks roughly under his own name.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Bar1's manner of communication is the same as that of MrAr (Martirosyan Arsen). Even the pictures are the same ...

You are generally a pitiful anonymous person, and it is not for you to judge about Martirosyan's "pictures", especially since several authors of this forum have repeatedly caught you in a lie. Why don't you give links when you are carrying another nonsense that you simply copied from a foreign site of unknown origin and are afraid to point it out?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Bar1

I don’t understand the logic of your answer. I’m telling you that it’s impossible to hide the masses of tanks and troops concentrated along the borders, and in return you show me the arrival schedules of 2 x tank and rifle divisions, and then say that intelligence could not .. .

And where do you see the concentration of troops along the borders? Until June 18–20, the mechanical units were located in waiting areas located 60–100 km from the border.

Quote: Bar1

At the time of Zakharov’s aerial reconnaissance on July 18, basically the entire mass of German troops was located along the border.

Really? Well, what kind of vision needed to be possessed in order to see 3 etc. from its airspace (as of June 18.06.1941, 64, it was deployed in the Radzyn region, 18 km from the borders). Or 18.06.1941 md (as of June 45, 1939, it was deployed in the days of the march from the Okartovo region, which itself is located XNUMX km from the XNUMX border).

Quote: Bar1

The reality is that of those years that of other years speaks of one thing. Intelligence of the front, political and other types of intelligence revealed one MASS TRANSFER OF TROOPS to the Soviet borders.

against England (on all fronts) 122–126 divisions,
against the USSR - 120–122 divisions,
reserves - 44–48 divisions

© F.I. Golikov, 31.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX
That is, from the intelligence data it is clear that at the beginning of June 1941 the Reich is clearly preparing to carry out the "Sea Lion", fencing off the USSR with a fence of 120 divisions. ICH, these divisions actually built defenses until the summer of 1941, and even the local population was involved in the work.
By the way, note that the Wehrmacht, according to our intelligence, in 1941, 280-300 divisions were deployed. So even the concentration of 170-180 divisions on the border with the USSR is not a reason to take emergency measures.

[Bar1]

Quote: Alexey RA

F.I. Golikov, 31.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX

but you must understand that this cannot be so. If Germany was going to fight the USSR, then almost ALL troops should be concentrated near the borders of the USSR. So this info from the GRU is a fake and moreover strategic.

[ccsr]

Quote: Bar1

but you must understand that this cannot be so. If Germany was going to fight the USSR, then almost ALL troops should be concentrated near the borders of the USSR

Why should all German troops be concentrated near the border with the USSR, if since 1939 Germany had been at war with England? Moreover, it is necessary to have reserve and training units in Germany, at least from the point of view of saving money on their maintenance and training.

Quote: Bar1

So this infa from the GRU is a fake and moreover strategic.

Doesn't the GRU "expert" take on much? Can you prove with facts that it was false? And then there is one bouncer on intelligence reports of the GRU, hiding under the nickname "Eugene", and you seem to have decided to repeat his path of a dreamer and a liar.

[Bar1]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Bar1

but you must understand that this cannot be so. If Germany was going to fight the USSR, then almost ALL troops should be concentrated near the borders of the USSR

Why should all German troops be concentrated near the border with the USSR, if since 1939 Germany had been at war with England? Moreover, it is necessary to have reserve and training units in Germany, at least from the point of view of saving money on their maintenance and training.

Quote: Bar1

So this infa from the GRU is a fake and moreover strategic.

Doesn't the GRU "expert" take on much? Can you prove with facts that it was false? And then there is one bouncer on intelligence reports of the GRU, hiding under the nickname "Eugene", and you seem to have decided to repeat his path of a dreamer and a liar.

The catastrophe of the outbreak of war must have an explanation, therefore.
there is a premise according to Marterosyan - a conspiracy of generals.
the goal is the falsification of the true picture of the location of German divisions before the war in the eyes of Stalin.
therefore, a report from the GRU can be falsified - this is a very likely picture of those years.
However, I didn’t see this report or the report myself, because in the form of a brief quote I gave Alexey Ra. It’s necessary to cite not the report of their report, but the whole report. Link to the studio.
Well, you have advice not to get confused in the three pines.

[ccsr]

Quote: Bar1

The catastrophe of the outbreak of war must have an explanation, therefore.

The trouble is that the causes of this disaster are politicized by some scammers from history. You personally whose version of this catastrophe you adhere to - Rezun, Solonin, Gareev or Spitsyna, for example?

Quote: Bar1

there is a premise according to Marterosyan - a conspiracy of generals.

I am not a connoisseur of his work, and I am very cool about some of his statements, considering him incompetent in understanding the psychology of military leaders of that time. It would be better if he was looking for the reasons for the failure of the NKVD to liquidate German agents in the pre-war period - this is closer to him by profession, and they are still afraid to raise this gloomy story. Apparently, the NKVD did not have enough strength for this - so zealously they were looking for conspiracies in the Red Army.

Quote: Bar1

therefore, a report from the GRU can be falsified - this is a very likely picture of those years.

This is complete nonsense, I will not even explain why. You just think about why F. Golikov was appointed by Stalin for negotiations on the supply of weapons to England and the United States, if this position is equated to the rank of People's Commissar on special assignments, and he from the chiefs of the General Staff Directorate immediately stood on the same level with Tymoshenko in the then hierarchy. And then, Stalin never blamed or punished him, because Golikov allegedly reported something wrong on the eve of the war.

Quote: Bar1

Well, you have advice not to get confused in the three pines.

You have never seen the "pine" in your eyes, but you are already recommending me what I should do with them - well, well ...

Quote: Bar1

However, I myself have not seen this report or report,

This is your level of argument.

[Bar1]

Quote: ccsr

I am not a connoisseur of his work, and I am very cool about some of his statements, considering him incompetent in understanding the psychology of military leaders of that time

I like Mukhin and Marterosyan.


but in my opinion Nitsche so sets out ...

Quote: ccsr

This is your level of argument.

and of course you read everything?
after many years and drawing on the research of a large number of historians, it is already possible to draw conclusions, in fact I have already talked about this.
You can look for a glitch in the program either with Stalin or with the top generals.
Martirosyan says that the general’s plot with 37g was not completely suppressed. Most likely this is so.
And I also see it so that Stalin himself could not reveal the betrayal in the army, and yet just could not effectively manage the upper command of the army. The intimidation of the generals had the opposite effect, the generals simply threw the reins of control.
Reconnaissance data at the time the war began was quite sufficient to put the troops on alert, and not, for example, bored planes at the same airfields.
In general, of course, it’s amazing, it’s just a striking example of how transcendental severity and even cruelty of power can not affect the obviously treacherous activities of the generals, although of course this can only be a matter of time.

[ccsr]

Quote: Bar1

I like Mukhin and Marterosyan.

Both of them are not military professionals, that’s why they should be trusted with great care, like all those who think they understand the situation on the eve of the war on the basis of books by these authors or the like.

Quote: Bar1

And I also see it so that Stalin himself could not reveal the betrayal in the army, and yet just could not effectively manage the upper command of the army. The intimidation of the generals had the opposite effect, the generals simply threw the reins of control.

This is how you see it, but the fact that Zakharov demonstrated brilliant results in the first days of the war, so according to your logic, this was his "opposite effect". Or Admiral Kuznetsov, who did not allow a single loss of a warship - is this also a "reverse effect"?

Quote: Bar1

In general, of course, it is surprising that it is simply a striking example of how transcendental severity and even cruelty of power cannot affect the obviously treacherous activity of the generals.

Nonsense - not a single traitor to the general in the highest echelon of the People’s Commissariat of Defense for the entire time of the war was revealed by the NKVD and the NKGB. There were cowards and traitors who, in a fighting situation at the front, proved to be worthless leaders, but the vast majority of generals either fought to the end, or died or if they were captured, they refused to cooperate with the enemy.

[Bar1]

Quote: ccsr

Both of them are not military professionals, that’s why they should be trusted with great care, like all those who think they understand the situation on the eve of the war on the basis of books by these authors or the like.

in order to understand where the lie and where the truth does not need to be, some sort of military specialist, but you just need to be a smart and honest person.

[ccsr]

Quote: Bar1

in order to understand where the lie and where the truth does not need to be, some sort of military specialist, but you just need to be a smart and honest person.

I realized that you are one of those who know better than football coaches how the national team should play, and you know better than midwives about having children, because you are a "smart and honest person."

[Murrr 27]

Well, you are one of those who measure the combat readiness of the army ONLY AND ONLY by the degree of woundedness of the boots of soldiers and the width of the snouts and belly of generals - in short, from the gold-driven cohort of parasites, who in peacetime ate three throats, and in wartime - heroically defended as part of the 16 Ukrainian front Tashkent, to the last drop of brandy and the last shish kebab.
Among the military there are very worthy people - at least remember our underground from Safonych's "War" - 43 years old, two "floats", KMS (5 pieces, as a specialist for you - KMS, unlike MS, the title confirmed annually or every two years), and on the block - "sand" well occupied a fifth. When he said: "Believe it or not, I was on the territory of South Africa," I believed - the GRU is the GRU. But there are few of them, and most are unable to understand that it is impossible to fight without a working industry. And that the tasks there are also very difficult.
And the heirs of our gold-running mediocrities and criminals are still pissing that their deeds, after the trial, will be judged according to their merits, and all descendants will be put to the wall according to Russian laws.
My grandfather and uncle died in Belarus in the fall of 43, immediately after the end of the Smolensk operation, and how they drove to MG-shki the newly drafted, not even uniform or armed, "you will get weapons in battle" - I KNOW both from documents and stories of those who were lucky to return alive.
There the entire headquarters under the leadership of Mr. Sokolov left for many months, and only yelled at the phone "Forward" ... when they sober up at least a little. So for this, after the trial, all descendants are needed ... no, not to the wall - but to life in solitary confinement.
And you protect them from corporate = parasitic reasons.
However - probably there are personal reasons.
And if you read the reports of the same Mehlis, then Mr. Kozlov did not carry out any work on command and control of the troops. As for me, this is a betrayal with all that it implies.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Bar1

but you must understand that this cannot be so. If Germany was going to fight the USSR, then almost ALL troops should be concentrated near the borders of the USSR. So this info from the GRU is a fake and moreover strategic.

If the data does not confirm the theory - to hell with them, with the data. ©
This is just our intelligence. Which persistently reported that until the final solution of the British question, the Germans would not fight the USSR. So in this picture, the division of the Wehrmacht into two parts fits well.
In order to dispel the illusions about the omnipotence of our intelligence, it is enough to look at what it gave out on the Panzervaff.

[Bar1]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Bar1

but you must understand that this cannot be so. If Germany was going to fight the USSR, then almost ALL troops should be concentrated near the borders of the USSR. So this info from the GRU is a fake and moreover strategic.

If the data does not confirm the theory - to hell with them, with the data. ©
This is just our intelligence. Which persistently reported that until the final solution of the British question, the Germans would not fight the USSR. So in this picture, the division of the Wehrmacht into two parts fits well.
In order to dispel the illusions about the omnipotence of our intelligence, it is enough to look at what it gave out on the Panzervaff.

Well so show this data.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Bar1

Well so show this data.

On the Panzerwaffe there is a wonderful document - "Report of the head of the GABTU KA on the organization, armament and means of combat of the BT and MV KA and foreign armies." Lies in litl-bro's documents.
There are German heavy tank divisions, and Wehrmacht serial heavy tanks with 100 mm armor and 105 mm guns, manufactured at factories in Czechoslovakia and France, and tank divisions with up to 500 armored vehicles. Oh yes, the Wehrmacht’s linear panzerdivisia according to the data in the named document still has two tank regiments.
Actually. after reading this report the question "why the USSR formed 29 MK on 1000 tanks"disappears right away - after such a horror story, I want to form 40 MK. But another question arises - what did the intelligence service that brought the initial information for this document smoke?

[ccsr]

Quote: Alexey RA

On the Panzerwaffe there is a wonderful document - "Report of the head of the GABTU KA on the organization, armament and means of combat of the BT and MV KA and foreign armies."

What does this have to do with the RU General Staff, which gave more balanced estimates of German armored vehicles:

Quote: Alexey RA

Actually. after reading this report, the question "why did the USSR form 29 MK with 1000 tanks" disappears immediately - after such a horror story, I want to form 40 MK.

So you directly and say that the GABTU lobbied for huge orders of armored vehicles, and intelligence simply did not want to take into account in order to receive funding. The same thing happened in the Navy, where they also lobbied for the construction of battleships on the eve of the war, and which did not play any special role in the war.

[ccsr]

Quote: Alexey RA

Which persistently reported that until the final solution of the British question, the Germans would not fight the USSR.

It’s just a distortion of the facts, because in the intelligence report of March 20, several options for the actions of the Wehrmacht against the USSR, and not against England, are directly indicated.

At the end of the page, it is indicated that other sources may attack the USSR after defeating England, but this is not the main condition for starting a war. So be careful to comment on what intelligence reported at that time if you yourself did not understand the documents.

Quote: Alexey RA

In order to dispel the illusions about the omnipotence of our intelligence, it is enough to look at what it gave out on the Panzervaff.

In fact, intelligence almost completely indicated 95-97% of the exact grouping of German troops and their allies before the attack on the USSR, and you will tell about the "Panzerwaffe" to unintelligent people - professionals estimate the number of formations and their staffing, and not which formations they are part of ... There are narrow-minded people here who may believe you, but those who know the essence of the matter will simply laugh at you.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

And where do you see the concentration of troops along the borders? Until June 18-20, the mechanized units were located in waiting areas located 60-100 km from the border

This is along the border.
Or how much is it: 2-3 meters?

The speed of the Germans with BATTLES is 70 km per day,

Quote: Alexey RA

© F.I. Golikov, 31.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX

TASS statement dated 13.06.41 Mr. Golikova:

recent the transfer of German troops freed from operations in the Balkans, in the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany с

Quote: Alexey RA

By the way, note that the Wehrmacht, according to our intelligence, in 1941, 280-300 divisions were deployed. So even the concentration of 170-180 divisions on the border with the USSR - eno reason for emergency measures.

And how much and what’s the occasion? Did you expect a glove from Hitler?

Not a reason, and grief leaders got the worst military disaster in history

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

This is along the border.
Or how much is it: 2-3 meters?

Initially, it was a question of the fact that the flight of Zakharov on June 18, 1941 revealed the Germans' preparations for attacking the USSR.

In real time, but during one daylight hours, integrated intelligence information was collected on Wehrmacht military preparations for an attack on the USSR in the most dangerous direction from the point of view of the Soviet leadership - Belorussky! On a scale across the border

And it was alleged that it was impossible to hide the approach of so many tanks to the border.
I just clarified. that on June 18, 1941 there were no German tanks in the visual detection zone by air reconnaissance - they were 60-100 km from the border. Therefore, Zakharov could not find them. Yes, and border guards with their contacts on the adjacent side - too.

Quote: Olgovich

And how much and what’s the occasion? Did you expect a glove from Hitler?

It was believed that to attack the USSR, the Germans should concentrate most of their forces.
Whatever they did in real life. Here are just most of the forces from 200 divisions and most of the forces from 300 divisions - these are still slightly different numbers.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

I just clarified. that on June 18, 1941 German tanks in the visual detection zone there was no air reconnaissance - they were located 60-100 km from the border.

This is understandable, but you wrote:

Quote: Alexey RA
And where do you see the concentration of troops along the borders?

And it was, albeit at a distance of 60-100 km, which is along

[Bar1]

Quote: AsmyppoL

To the question: “Where did the 16th Army go?” nor A.B. Martirosyan, nor O.Yu. Kozinkin could not give a clear answer.

what I saw with Martirosyan is logical. If he confirms his words with documents, then his search direction is correct. And about where the 16th army moved he might not know, because he did not deal with this issue, so this is not an example.

[Bar1]

Quote: AsmyppoL

That is, he knew about the transfer of this schedule to a different regime in advance, and, apparently, as early as the beginning of May, at the latest, since on May 13 he personally authorized the nomination of all the troops planned for this to the western borders, about which Zhukov and Tymoshenko and gave the appropriate directive ... "

Actually, I’m not Marterosyan, he just answers my questions and my vision of the war. The rest do not answer.

As for your quote, I did not understand anything at all, write some nonsense plainly, what kind of "other regime" and what is the directive?

[AsmyppoL]

The text of their books should be known. What you wrote, I quoted.

[Bar1]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The text of their books should be known. What you wrote, I quoted.

you would not insist on stupid things ...

[AsmyppoL]

It's so obvious that all your excuses are ridiculous

[ccsr]

Quote: Bar1

As for your quote, I did not understand anything at all, write some nonsense plainly, what kind of "other regime" and what is the directive?

Do not be surprised - this anonymous author, unlike Martirosyan, often carries such nonsense that sometimes you doubt his adequacy. And at the same time he often lies, and when he is caught by the hand, he avoids answering. For example, he twisted four articles about the 16th Army, as if it was intended for a war with Iran, although in fact there was a May General Staff Directive on its transfer from the Siberian Military District to KOVO and no one canceled this directive. It is from such fabulous statements of this figure that his inferences are built, which is why you will not be able to understand the course of his "global thoughts".

[aglet]

"Zhukov is a hero of the war. That fact noted, ie, unearthed in the archives, that the red packages for the commanders of the districts and mechanized corps, drawn up by the chief of the general staff Zhukov about the movements of mechanized corps ALONG the border and the front line with a mileage EXCEEDING the resource of our tanks, is already a crime Zhukov, after all, in fact, it was not the battle losses of the Red Army tanks were huge. Along the roads there were whole tanks without fuel and with minor breakdowns. And this is noted by other historians.
for the Battle of Dubninsk, when Zhukov removed Kirponos from the command of the front commander and himself led the battle and lost it. Nobody understood this fact. "
beetles, war hero? judging by June-July 1941, with his heroic command, he inflicted damage on the Red Army, as if not more than a Goth and Guderian. and later, especially under the rust, was different

[andrew42]

It is hard for many to admit that in 1941 G.K. Zhukov, as a "corps commander" in terms of military science, remained so. Of course, he quickly progressed, and by 1943 he had fully risen to the level of a real Marshal. And this is, in fact, the best of the best senior cadres of the Red Army! What can we say about Kirponos, Pavlov, Kozlov, etc. There are people who do not learn anything at all, even from their terrible mistakes. Zhukov was at least trained, for which many thanks to him.

[aglet]

"to the level of a real Marshal by 1943, it has completely risen."
what did he do, in 1943, at the level of a marshal?

[Shiden]

The problem in the leadership of the Red Army was the one who was closer to Stalin that he could blame all the responsibility on the lower-ranking bosses.

[SIT]

Zhukov at the beginning of the war was the chief of the general staff. He was given a full analysis of the Gelb operation (defeat of France), prepared by the former chief of staff of the French headquarters. In this analysis, the practical embodiment of the blitzkrieg doctrine, developed by the way back in 1911, was fully shown. How were the features of the blitzkrieg taken into account in the operational plans of the western districts? Now we cannot say this, because these documents are still secret. Only border cover plans are declassified. But we can judge by the results, and they are such that it is clear to anyone - Zhukov and Tymoshenko did NOT develop ANYTHING in opposition to the German strategy. Accordingly, blaming everything on the divisional commanders and commanders is incorrect. Soviet military science could not oppose the German lead in deployment. And if there is no intelligible strategy, then defeat is inevitable, as 1941 showed.

[ccsr]

Quote: SIT

How were the features of the blitzkrieg taken into account in the operational plans of the western districts? Now we cannot say this, because these documents are still secret.

Who told you that? Now openly available are the May directives of the People’s Commissar and the General Staff on the revision of district plans to cover the border districts with a deadline of June 1, 1941. All this work was technically completed in the districts by the deadline - plans were posted on the network. There was a delay with their approval by the People's Commissar, but the old plans worked and they formed the basis of the new ones. In addition, the mobilization plan is the second most important in the districts - they were in the districts by the beginning of the war. There are several more district plans of the second level (the annual plan for the construction and deployment of troops, etc.), but these two main plans were in the districts.
What "operational plans of the western districts" are you talking about then? What are they called - do you even know that?

[SIT]

Directive No. 503859 / ss / s of the USSR NATIONAL COMMON DEFENSE COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUED TO BE DEVELOPED BY THE COMMISSION OF DEFENSE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE UNDERGROUND OPERATED OPPORTUNITIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COSTS OF THE WEST SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COVERAGE PLAN OF May 14, 1941 503920, we are talking about plans to cover the borders for the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops. And then what? What tasks did the districts face after the deployment of troops? Did you see the final official typewritten text approved by Stalin and most importantly the draft card itself, dated 14, written by Vasilevsky? Well, at least the card itself?

[ccsr]

Quote: SIT

And then what?

And what will happen next will be decided in the government of the country and in the People’s Commissariat of Defense, because in order to take any action it is necessary to understand and evaluate the extent of what happened. That's why the district cover plans were developed, which should be carried out at least for the first 10-15 days, regardless of what the General Staff plans during this time - this is the ABC of military science.

Quote: SIT

What tasks did the districts face after the deployment of troops?

Fight to the end and prevent the penetration of the main enemy forces into our territory.

Quote: SIT

Did you see the final official typewritten text approved by Stalin and most importantly the draft card itself, dated 15.05.41, written by Vasilevsky?

What is the name of this document? Tell me first, so that later there are no different interpretations. And in general, keep in mind that drafts are not approved - they put a concordant signature on them, if the person to whom it was submitted FULLY agrees with what is stated there.

Quote: SIT

Well, at least the card itself?

And you give the link so that it is clear who signed it and who approved it, otherwise it’s all empty.
So you still did not answer the question - what other "operational plans of the western districts" were supposed to be in the districts. Can you at least indicate their name?

[SIT]

Fighting to the end is a cool plan)))) It’s the pinnacle of military art))) Do you understand that the presence of even these plans for covering the borders indicates a FULL UNDERSTANDING by the General Staff of the Red Army of the Blitzkrieg doctrine itself? Such a cover makes sense when, with the outbreak of war, the enemy attacks with advanced units, and at this time he is mobilizing, concentrating and deploying the main forces. But in the blitzkrieg, none of this exists! These parts of the cover immediately fell under the blow of the shock groups already fully deployed in the wartime states focused on the directions of the main strikes. Even theoretically, the cover units had NO chances to hold such a blow, and, consequently, the western districts also did not have time to mobilize, concentrate and deploy. An alternative option was set out in "Considerations of the General Staff of the Red Army on the Strategic Deployment Plan for the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" written by A.M. Vasilevsky, edited by N.F. Vatutin and signed S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov. A map of scale 1: 1000000 was attached to this document. So I asked you if there is nothing secret for you personally, is there an official version of this document approved by Stalin and have you seen this map? Were any changes made to the directives to the western districts after the adoption of this strategy? You read this draft. I have scans of the first pages, but they are not attached. When you read it, you will understand why, if this document was officially approved by all, neither he himself nor the directives to the constituencies based on it will be declassified for a very long time.

[ccsr]

Quote: SIT

Fight to the end is a cool plan))))

It is the duty of the regiments and cover units according to the cover plan - you seem to have fallen from the moon, if you do not know this.

Quote: SIT

Do you understand that the presence of even these plans for covering the borders speaks of COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING by the General Staff of the Red Army of the very doctrine of the blitzkrieg?

It’s complete nonsense, because no matter what the blitzkrieg is planned for, but if the advanced units of the enemy get stuck on the state border due to the stubborn resistance of the cover units and are not allowed to turn around after the marching troops, then the entire blitzkrieg will be covered with a copper basin - you don’t know this alphabet either. And this was on the Southern Front near Zakharov, for example.

Quote: SIT

Even theoretically, there were NO chances to hold such a blow to the cover units,

Nonsense is complete, because all the trouble was that our parts of the cover were often defeated not in positions according to the cover plan, but when moving towards them. Some border outposts fought until 11 a.m. on June 22 and did not arrive at them to reinforce part of the border formations to which this was prescribed. Do you even study the cover plan itself, so as not to make a heresy:

X. Border support
To support the border guard units until the field troops reach the border in case of violation of the latter by armed detachments or gangs, the following are allocated to border guard commanders:
a) for the 86th border detachment - p. bat-n from 345 cn 27 sd;
b) for the 87th - 48th cav. regiment from b cd
c) for the 88th - p. bat-n from 679 cn 113 cd;
d) for the 89th - pp. bat-n from 333 cn 6 sd;
The standby time for the assigned units is 45 minutes from the moment the alarm is announced.

Quote: SIT

An alternative option was set out in "Considerations of the General Staff of the Red Army on the Strategic Deployment Plan for the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" written by A.M. Vasilevsky, edited by N.F. Vatutin and signed S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov.

Do not blabber the question - an "alternative" plan (by the way, where is not an "alternative" plan?) This was not approved, and it has nothing to do with the operational planning of military operations in the districts. Do you at least understand how operational documents differ from mobilization documents, or do you have a mess in your head from an excess of information?

Quote: SIT

You read this draft.

They don’t fight in the army in drafts - only according to approved and signed documents, try to understand this so that the professionals do not laugh at you.

Quote: SIT

When you read, you will understand

You yourself don’t understand a damn thing about this and are still trying to teach someone - finally, smile, it’s funny to listen to you.

[SIT]

Your online cliches about heresy, bullshit, etc. I am lowering. I do not like these youthful show-offs and I never use them myself. I suggest you read what you quoted about cover plans:
"To support units of the border guard before reaching the border of field troops in case of violation of the latter by armed detachments or gangs, at the disposal of the commanders of the border detachments"
From this text, you, as a cool professional, should understand that parts of the cover intended for defense from armed units and gangs could not, by definition, become an obstacle for army groups North, Center and South. The outposts that held together fought in complete surroundings and could not radically affect the entire course of events. Such strike groups could not have been tied up in battles with 48 caves. regiment of the 6th Cavalry Division, assigned to 87 frontier detachments, but only in deeply echeloned defense as on the Kursk Bulge.

[ccsr]

Quote: SIT

From this text, you, as a cool professional, should understand that parts of the cover intended for defense from armed units and gangs could not, by definition, become an obstacle for army groups North, Center and South. The outposts that held together fought in complete surroundings and could not radically affect the entire course of events.

Why, then, could not do rifle regiments with artillery, if border guards with rifles and machine guns detained German units for several hours? Do you even understand that it’s not so easy to destroy an entrenched soldier if he is at least a little prepared and knows his job. It seems that you yourself did not serve a day in the army, since you believe that they were not capable of anything, and you were obliged to flee from positions or surrender.

Quote: SIT

Such strike groups could not have been tied up in battles with 48 caves. regiment of the 6th Cavalry Division, assigned to 87 frontier detachments, but only in deeply echeloned defense as on the Kursk Bulge.

Do not smack nonsense - what other defense in depth could have been in 1941, even if you didn’t have time to finish building a new line of URs, and a large number of formations in the border districts required additional manning within 3-15 days. Do you even understand how wartime differs from peacetime in order to compare the Battle of Kursk from June 22? It seems you do not even have basic knowledge of military affairs.

[SIT]

You’re just like a political officer broadcasting confidently and assertively. OK! Again we turn to your quote from cover plans. You there didn’t very successfully list the border guards located on the Bialystok ledge. Now, as a deep connoisseur of military affairs, put in front of you this quote from you and the composition of only the 3rd Panzer Group of Gott and the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian, even without taking into account the 4th and 9th armies of the Wehrmacht. The main thing to note is that these parts of the Wehrmacht were fully prepared for military operations - the troops were deployed in the field, deployed in marching columns in the starting areas, the arrows, artillery, tanks had ammunition in their possession, communications and control were organized and operate in the field, interaction was organized, clearly goals are identified, explored and calculated; material support means are raised to the wheels. What there could cover the frontier detachment of 2250 people. reinforced by a rifle battalion or cavalry regiment !? Was it in a battle with them that hundreds of tanks of Goth and Guderian should be stuck? And the blitzkrieg does not give time to deploy the 2nd echelon - after 5 days, battles for Minsk were already going on.

[ccsr]

Quote: SIT

You’re just like a political officer broadcasting confidently and assertively. OK!

To do this, you do not need to be a political officer, but you must be a professional in military affairs. You are not, that’s why you think that other people should be at your level. Where does such confidence come from?

Quote: SIT

You there didn’t very successfully list the border guards located on the Bialystok ledge.

Do not be clever - this is listed by the commander of ZAPOVO Pavlov.

Quote: SIT

What there could cover the frontier detachment of 2250 people.

The border guards were obliged to inform the commanders of the regiments of cover that the enemy crossed the border and to organize the destruction of border violators before the approach of the units of the spacecraft. They had no other tasks. Or did you want the border detachments to replace the cover units in repelling the Wehrmacht attack?

Quote: SIT

Was it in a battle with them that hundreds of tanks of Goth and Guderian should be stuck?

Before launching the tanks, the Germans first conducted shelling, then there was infantry, which was supported by the tanks. Even this takes time to suppress entrenched border guards, and it should have been enough according to the then standards so that the first battalions of cover regiments came to their aid. But if all the shelves of defense had taken up defense on June 22 until 04.00:XNUMX, then the Germans would have had to be tight at all - the blitzkrieg would immediately begin to fail.

Quote: SIT

And the blitzkrieg does not give time to deploy the 2nd echelon - after 5 days, battles for Minsk were already going on.

You confuse cause and effect - it was precisely the unsuccessful actions of the cover units at the border that caused the fighting for Minsk after 5 days. However, I’m afraid that you simply won’t understand how smart you would consider yourself.

[SIT]

You yourself quoted a plan for covering the border. The average number of frontier detachments is 2200 people. Even if they were given a cavalry regiment or a rifle battalion, and even if they were in positions of full combat readiness. You want to tell me that with such forces it was possible to stop the 39th motorized corps of the Wehrmacht, which included the 7th and 20th tank divisions, the 14th and 20th motorized divisions, and another 57 motorized corps as part of the 12th, 19th tank divisions and 18th motorized. Plus, the 5th and 6th Army Corps, with 2 infantry divisions in each. And this is only the 3rd Gott tank group, which was advancing from the north to the Bialystok ledge, and after all, the 9th Army was still advancing there. Are you kidding ??? Or are you still a political officer and speak seriously ??

[ccsr]

Quote: SIT

You want to tell me that with such forces it was possible to stop the 39th motorized corps of the Wehrmacht, which included the 7th and 20th tank divisions, the 14th and 20th motorized divisions, and another 57 motorized corps as part of the 12th, 19th tank divisions and 18th motorized.

You do not bring everything down to a heap, if only because even a compound in a breakthrough section of several kilometers cannot line up all its regiments in order to advance simultaneously - this is just for information. Moreover, a characteristic feature of the Soviet Western TVD is a large number of natural obstacles in the form of rivers, swamps, reservoirs, thickets of forests and mountains (Transcarpathia), where tank units cannot advance along the entire front at the same time. For this, our command takes into account tank-hazardous areas and specifically prepares ambushes for them, using mining, barrage structures or cannon artillery - this is all the ABC of military science, about which you have wild ideas, because all your "knowledge" is gleaned from the media, and not from military textbooks.
In this case, the question is not in the strength of the German tank divisions, but in the fact that bringing the western districts to full combat readiness, which was provided for with the introduction of the cover plan with a short order, was thwarted for several reasons, and this is a separate conversation. This is exactly what was the "hole" that destroyed the entire "dam" of the defense. Nobody says that the Germans could not have broken through in some sections of the border, but the scale of their breakthrough suggests that not all of our troops took up positions in advance according to the cover plan.

Quote: SIT

Are you kidding ???

Not at all - you just tired me with your dilentantism in military matters, that's why I'm trying to explain "on my fingers" what you have a minimum of knowledge about.
By the way, you cleverly evaded my question -

What "operational plans of the western districts" are you talking about then? What are they called - do you even know that?

[SIT]

I do not need to quote your watered information about wise command and ambushes. I brought you the composition of a specific German group - the 3rd Goth tank group. You brought the composition of 4 x frontier detachments and parts of their amplification. So show me if you’re a military man, HOW should you stop this 3rd tank group + 9th army, as listed by you. If you can find at least some real option, go teach at the Academy of the General Staff. But do not particularly insist there, otherwise the orderlies will be called.

[strannik1985]

So show, if you are so military, HOW to stop the 3rd Panzer Group + 9th Army, as listed by you.

Of course, I am not "such a military man", but I can also say - in any way, actions under the cover plans are not intended to repel the aggression of all the armed forces of the 3rd Reich and its allies, only a preventive attack in order to disrupt mobilization. We considered it possible to determine the preparation of an attack and have time to transfer the districts to full combat readiness by intelligence.

[strannik1985]

Soviet military science could not oppose the German lead in deployment.

The experience was analyzed, on May 27, 1940, long before Zhukov, Stalin and Molotov (chairman of the Council of People's Commissars) Timoshenko, and Shaposhnikov presented a note on the organization of a tank, motorized division, and tank corps.
It was the mechanized corps that was used to organize counterattacks in the Border Battle.
Unfortunately, the experience of using MK seemed negative and military science turned to the idea of ​​permanent mobilization. Yes, the continuous formation of new compounds has a lot of disadvantages, but the method worked.
Think you have better ideas?

[SIT]

Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side (C). Of course, I’m now broadcasting as such a strategist, having before my eyes the maps of those battles and I can propose something with my back mind. The continuous formation of new compounds is a massive supply of cannon fodder. They are ground and replaced with new ones. In the presence of an inexhaustible mob reserve, such a way to realize a lot of mind is not necessary. Blitzkrieg had an Achilles heel, which was very relevant at that time in the USSR. These are extended communications. The units advancing at such a pace simply devour the entire supply supply without measure and must be managed to be transported. As you know from the phrase classic road, we have this 2nd problem after the fools. If all the same, resort to the subjunctive mood, which in history does not happen, then we can offer the following. Do not destroy 1937-38 previously created partisan bases and do not repress personnel trained for guerrilla warfare. After mobilization, the main concentration and deployment of troops of the western districts should be organized on the lines of the old URs and the Wehrmacht armies, already battered in border battles, would have rested on the main military forces of the districts mobilized by the wartime state and deployed in military formations, which would have been organized as fronts. At the same time, partisan formations left in the rear of the enemy (and, in fact, Special Forces) destroy, according to a previously developed plan, all communications of the enemy, again prepared in advance for undermining. Engaged in battles with the main forces of the Red Army, standing in pre-prepared positions, units of the Wehrmacht remain without supplies. And then carry out counterattacks with coverage and surroundings in the boilers.

[strannik1985]

These are extended communications.

Grosstransportraum (RGC car parts with our money) can deliver 6 thousand tons of cargo over a distance of 10 km with a 600-day turnover. The distance to the old border is not a problem for the Wehrmacht.

Do not destroy 1937-38 previously created partisan bases

In the rear of the army to interrupt the supply on the roads? Kill.

After mobilization, the main concentration and deployment of troops of the western districts should be organized on the line of the old SD

Minsk is the old border, the distance from Brest is 328 km in a straight line, the Germans reached the city on June 28, they will leave earlier without any battles. What will they give you 3-4 days if the district is fully ready 30 days after the start of mobilization?

[SIT]

Suddenly, overnight, not a single bridge remains from the border itself, landmines operate on roads, and railway stations fly into the air. Engineering preparation is carried out in advance and you just need to turn the knob or even send a radio signal, as I.G. did Starinov in Kharkov. Naturally, the border cover is not outposts with cavalry regiments attached, but mechanized units deployed in battle formations, which, when maneuvering, cause maximum damage. Aviation is also not at the very border, but on the line of URs, and 300 km fly to its airfields. Obviously have time to meet. As a result, there is no dominance in the air. In this situation, these 300km would have to go for 3 days. Of course, it’s easy to talk now, but Zhukov and Tymoshenko were not ordinary inhabitants in their posts. Why did Zhukov not attach importance to the French analysis of the Gelb operation? Poland, France, it was already possible to understand the laws and draw the corresponding conclusions that there would be no border battle to prevent mobilization, but a full-fledged blow deployed in battle formations by all forces. By the way, the draft I mentioned, written by Vasilevsky’s hand, is also an option. A preemptive strike on the German troops prepared for the offensive, and not on the defensive, would be a very unpleasant surprise for them. But then there would have been a completely different story of the 2nd World War.

[strannik1985]

Suddenly, not a single bridge remains intact from the border itself

The Germans had enough means of overcoming water barriers, in particular 2 TGr crossed independently (EMNIP, except for one of the regiments and a motorcycle battalion) north and south of Brest, the mobile troops do not care about the railway, they advance along the panzerstrasse - a hard-surfaced road specially for motorized cases.

and mechanized units deployed in battle formations

To "in advance" need to know the location and direction of the strikes, as well as to cancel the events of February 1941 - the formation of an additional 21st mechanized corps. Those. marches on potentially hostile (in / in Ukraine, part of the 8th MK was fired upon while moving through Grodno, there were uprisings in the Baltic States) territories, 100-200-300 km each, under bombing, with inevitable mistakes, like the counterstrike of KMG Boldin.

Aviation is also not near the border, but near the line of URs

1. The combat radius of I-16, the main fighter of the KVS Air Force is 150 ~ 170 km, from airfields beyond the old border they will not be able to organize air defense of mechanized units and escort bombers.
2. To place airfields so far from the new border, the Air Force CAD must be removed from subordination of combined arms armies.

Why Zhukov did not betray the importance of the French analysis of the Gelb operation?

Gave, even more than necessary. He tried to bring all the tanks into mobile troops, the formation of an additional 21st MK in February - March 1941 was his idea. It turned out to be doubly wrong - the infantry needed tanks for RPEs, and the USSR did not pull the formation of 90 mobile units in a short time.

By the way, the draft I mentioned, written by Vasilevsky’s hand, is also an option.

By and large, this is the only, relatively normal option.

[SIT]

Naturally, warheads themselves could overcome water barriers, but what about Grossstransportraum? In addition, our panzerstrasse is not at all the panzerstrasse of Europe. I saw a road near Mstislavl along which the Germans walked. She was called a big dog there. This is just a good primer, but after tanks and even light rains of 100 km it is the day of the way for the truck.
With mechanized corps, it really turned out according to V.S. Chernomyrdin - they wanted the best, but it turned out as always. Create created, it seems like the Germans, but how to operate them no experience. For fighters, it was possible to organize temporary jump airfields, and bombers would have had enough range. Otherwise, only a preemptive strike, set out in a draft Vasilevsky. But history does not know the subjunctive mood and people whose bones still lie in those cauldrons can not be returned. Especially here near Sevastopol. In the forest, on top of the Dark Beam near Kamyshly, human bones, gray from time to time, come across. At the Mekkensi farm (now the 2nd cordon) every year, search engines raise more and more. Someone is found right in the trenches, and someone in a German sanitary burial ground is a pit, in it there are corpses in layers with traces of fire on the bones, i.e. dumped, doused with gasoline, set on fire, and then fell asleep. There are no such medallions; they are only found in those found in the trenches. Who are these guys? We will never know. And from the 35th battery in the direction of the lighthouse on Cape Khersones, everything was built up with cottages. How do they sleep there? I went there in the early 80s. Then it was a marines training ground. There at every step were pieces of metal (mostly fragments of mortar mines and shells), the remains of shoes and bones, bones, bones. On the shore of the Cossack lay the wounded in anticipation of evacuation. No one really knows how many there were. The maximum estimate is up to 30 thousand. And there the German battery pounded all night. Mash. Sevastopol July 1942 is not just a disaster, it is an apocalypse for those who ended up there.

[aglet]

"Commanders Pavlov, Kirponos in Crimea"
for all their merits, the above-mentioned citizens did not live to the Crimea

[lelik613]

You should not look for a conspiracy where on the surface terry stupidity.

[Kronos]

At that time, all the armies of the allied countries opposing the Nazis had exactly the same defeats on their account. Manstein in Africa defeated the British for a whole year and a half

[Bar1]

Quote: Kronos

Manstein in Africa defeated the British for a whole year and a half

yes insanity grew stronger on this forum, maybe Rommel?

[Kronos]

Yes, Rommel is sure that the wrong name wrote the essence, it does not change

[Kronos]

The battle of Dieppe, for example, the British landing, ended in complete failure.

[Nikolai Korovin]

We are writing Manchester, we are reading Liverpool. According to this principle, there is no difference between Manstein and Rommel, of course. Very similar surnames.

[aglet]

"Manstein in Africa with much smaller forces defeated the British for a whole year and a half."
Manstein, actually in Africa was not. Do you think the clashes of patrols in Africa, for a real war?

[Kronos]

What patrols? 500 thousand allied forces and 430 thousand nazi a small skirmish can not be called

[aglet]

"What kind of patrols? 500 thousand allied troops and 430 thousand Nazis are not a minor skirmish."
Well, if they all fought, then yes. and since they mainly sat in the traffic police, confining themselves to patrol raids, even the Italians could not cope, but then the Germans gave them a thrush, and they went to roam Africa. and there were a little less of them there than you say, about two times

[oldbuddy]

Citizen Yuri Apukhtin simply does not know the material well, so he is trying to portray the command of the Red Army fools:

"The 51st Army had eight rifle divisions and three cavalry divisions .... That is, more than half of the 51st Army was not where the German offensive began."


The commander of the 51st Separate Army, Colonel General KUZNETSOV, reports:
28 1941 of August

"1. The task is to keep the Crimean peninsula in our hands.
2. Means and forces - four infantry and three cavalry divisions, two infantry regiments, four KSD (Crimean infantry divisions), a motorized tank regiment (one and a half battalion wedges)

There is no large-caliber military artillery, no tanks.
271 and 276 SD have one third of the division and regiment artillery.
Upon receipt of weapons, three rifle divisions of local formations can be introduced, the combat effectiveness of which cannot be taken into account in the near future.

The army will comply with the directives of the Headquarters by the forces and means given to it.
106 and 156 sd — organized and drawn in, but not fired. 271 and 276 sd - newly formed, weakly knocked together, with 24 guns each, requiring serious hardening and knocking together. 40, 42 and 48 cd - a new formation that requires serious hardening.
Motorized regiment - a new organization, with a good composition.
4 csd is a new unit, but can stubbornly maintain its position. 1, 2, 3 KSD - at the formation stage, without armament and equipment. 9 ck does not have hull artillery

3.Operating directions.
In this situation, the following operational areas are emerging for the army:
1st - north. In terms of the number of expected enemy forces, it is the most dangerous. "

In other words:
of 8 rifle divisions - 2 pre-war formations, the most combat-ready were reasonably placed in the north.

Three rifle divisions (KSD - Crimean rifle divisions) - these are divisions of the militia without weapons and equipment
40, 42 and 48 cd - were formed after the start of the war from volunteers "no age limit" for a light staff of 2500 "sabers". They had no artillery.

[place]

Quote: Olgovich

The defense of Crimea and Sevastopol is an example of the exceptional heroism of soldiers and officers

-----------------------------------------------

The German soldier, at least during the period of victories, possessed no less exceptional heroism. So there is no need to draw a mythological image of the people who won the war. contrary to to their superiors and commanders. Such a mythical people and state is not required. Why does he need bosses at all? Huh?

Both the author and the readers, in a single servile impulse, seemed to "forget" about the existing balance of forces. The Germans had about 2 times more infantry, 10 times more aircraft, 3 times more tanks. Lies are what you write.
The main thing is maybe more crap on the graves of Soviet leaders, for times have come and the bar has come different! We must please the new masters!
It is inconvenient to remember that in the 19th century the "First Defense of Sevastopol" ended in the same defeat. And there will be no third defense, for you will run away at the first opportunity.

[AsmyppoL]

The unsuccessful defense of the Crimea in the fall of 1941 is of course a very sore subject ... It is insanely sorry for the tens of thousands of our soldiers killed and captured, where most of them died ... But the situation was exactly the same in the border and subsequent battles summer - autumn 1941. Unfortunately - this was the inevitability inherent in the decisions and instructions of the pre-war and the initial period of the war.

According to the cover plans and the instructions received in the initial period of the war, the enemy was to land mass landings in the amount of several divisions on the Crimean coast.
General Batov recalled that in June, intelligence had overwhelmed with special messages about the preparation of troops on the Romanian coast for landing on the Crimean coast and even caravans of ships that had already left the landing. In June 1941, according to intelligence, there were up to 32-35 only German divisions in Romania, of which up to 15 were motorized and tank divisions !!
These formations did not appear against the Southern Front. Therefore, the enemy conceived a big trick in the form of landings. but in reality it was the misinformation of the German command ...

After an unsuccessful command in the Baltic states, a new commander arrives in Crimea with a demotion. In the Baltics, basically, all the initiative actions to bring PribOVO into a kind of combat readiness were pushed by the chief of staff P.S. Maples. For which he paid and became a victim of denunciations by scouts who failed to reveal the real situation in the adjacent territory before the start of the war.
The new commander, who lived in fear of arrest (if they were arrested by the chief of staff of the front, then they could be arrested next in turn) showed no initiative - only blindly following the directives from Moscow ... They said from Moscow that the chipmunk is a bird, the way it is ! They said from Moscow that the enemy could land an airborne assault and determined the forces to counter the airborne assaults - that’s what you should do ...

The second problem is the insufficient supply of arms and equipment to the newly formed divisions and the insufficient interaction of the troops of various people's commissariats: NPO and NKVMF. It was required to appoint an Authoritative Commander of the Crimean troops, including naval formations in the Crimean troops, subordinating everything to the commander. Consider the possibility of redistributing arms between these troops (from the fleet to ground units). If necessary, transfer a number of naval units and weapons from the coast of the North Caucasus.
There was an urgent need for commanding personnel who had experience of fighting near the border in order to organize the proper training of personnel of newly formed formations.
When everything was streaming in the main directions, the secondary direction was not given due attention from the Center, and the commander did not take the proper initiative ...

The third problem is the dominance of the enemy in the air. There was nothing to be done, unfortunately ... Aviation was not enough in the main directions. It was necessary to significantly strengthen air defense units, but there was the same problem: the main systems of 37 mm and 85 mm were not adequately provided with shots ... This, after the outbreak of war, led to the fact that entire regiments were withdrawn from the combat area, t .to. for 2-3 days they were left without ammunition. With 37 mm guns it was even worse. By June 22, some divisions had no shots at all (there were few of them), others had 300-600 shots per barrel and quickly burned this ammunition. And in the central warehouses there were also almost no these shots ...

[AsmyppoL]

Thus, even to strengthen the defense of the isthmuses with one or two divisions, it seems to me that the situation has changed insignificantly. It took the enemy more time to gnaw through the defense, and the defense itself and the ways of transporting reserves, ammunition, and transporting the wounded were under the dense influence of enemy aircraft. Plus the lack of proper interaction between all parts. Lack of experience in commanding personnel at all levels ... These problems were everywhere and just could not be eliminated from them ... Probably, defeat could not be avoided, unfortunately ... What should I do?
It is difficult to say, but there were still major defeats of the Red Army troops associated with the inept command of the fronts and armies in the presence of not entirely reliable intelligence data ... It seems to me that everything that happened should be taken for granted ... And those who died at the fronts or in captivity they themselves figured out in another world and, perhaps, forgave the culprits of their death ... I personally have no right to blame the possible culprits ...

[Cartalon]

The defeat was inevitable since in 1942, the Wehrmacht was superior in quality to the spacecraft, therefore all spring offensive operations failed, in the Crimea there was no room for mobile defense, hence the result.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Cartalon

The defeat was inevitable since in 1942, the Wehrmacht was qualitatively superior to the spacecraft

With our means and forces such as were in Crimea in 1942, and even in 1941, far superior to the enemy, victory was inevitable.

But the quality of leadership is below all criticism.

Successful defense was already near Moscow.

[Cartalon]

It was winter near Moscow, extended communications were inclement weather, the quality of troops and the quality of command and control in the Crimea decided it.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Cartalon

It was winter near Moscow

The Germans have winter, but we have it .... no ?!

Quote: Cartalon

in Crimea, the quality of troops and the quality of command and control were decisive.

we had no quality management.

The troops, in general, fought well, but under SUCH leadership ...

[aglet]

"The troops, on the whole, fought well, but with SUCH leadership ..."
and the result of their good fight? no matter how they fought, but the command that did not know how to command passed them all

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

The troops, in general, fought well, but under SUCH leadership ...

Without entering into a discussion with you, I recommend reading the book "The Truth About SMERSH" by Ivanov in order to understand how some troops "fought" in the Crimea:

It should be noted that the Crimean Front included many representatives of the Caucasian peoples, among them Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis. The latter fought especially badly. Many of them deserted in droves. To the question: “Why did you run?” they all had the same answer: "Kursak (stomach) is sick." Many in the trenches froze, although the frost did not exceed 4-5 degrees. Going on the attack, they thrust the rifle under the arm, their hands into the sleeves of their greatcoats and forward. If one of them was killed or wounded, then those who were nearby stopped, sat down on the ground, forming a living circle, and expressed their grief with mournful cries: "Wai, wai, wai ...". The enemy, seeing a motionless bunch of soldiers, opened aimed fire and quickly destroyed everyone. At the front, Azerbaijanis were contemptuously called “Yaldashi”, although this word in Azerbaijani means “comrade”

Well, what kind of commander would skillfully fight with such an audience in 1941-1942?

[Olgovich]

Quote: ccsr

there were many representatives of the Caucasian peoples, among them Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis.

The bulk are Slavs.

[alone]

Quote: ccsr

The truth about SMERSH "Ivanov, to understand how some troops" fought "in the Crimea:

Let's start with the fact that in the Azerbaijani language, the stomach is not a kursak. That's just this all this nonsense that Ivanov wrote is understandable. And why did the Russians surrender then? There were only fifty generals, if not more. Was the "kursak" sick too? Did you not think that if the front is controlled by people like Mehlis, then there is another there could be no result.

[ccsr]

Quote: lonely

That's just on this and all this nonsense that Ivanov wrote is understandable.

L.G. Ivanov went through the entire war from the first day to the last, and I believe him more in describing the war than all the authors of this forum combined - he is a legend of military counterintelligence, and has never been refuted by anyone.

Quote: lonely

And you did not think that if the front was run by people like Mehlis, then there could be no other result.

Mehlis had to be shot for the Crimean Front - this is my personal opinion, so I do not see the point of discussing anything.

[alone]

Quote: ccsr

Ivanov went through the whole war from the first day to the last, and I believe him more in describing the war than all the authors of this forum combined - he is a legend of military counterintelligence, and has never been refuted by anyone.

Ivanov can go through a war and no one disputes his merits. But don’t I know what the word stomach means in my native language? And yet, if representatives of one nationality would disdain others, we would receive ears from a donkey We all got it, not Victory .. The Soviet people won the war. But not separate people

[ccsr]

Quote: lonely

But do I not know what the word stomach means in my native language?

For L.G. Ivanov, this was not his native language, and he wrote it 60 years after these events, so that inaccuracy is excusable to him.

Quote: lonely

The Soviet people won the war. And not a separate people

But I do not dispute this - I just gave an example of a front-line soldier’s assessment of certain categories of servicemen from the Transcaucasian republics. You do not agree with his assessment - then give another evidence of the front-line soldier from the Crimean front.

[alone]

Quote: ccsr

For L.G. Ivanov, this was not his native language, and he wrote it 60 years after these events, so that inaccuracy is excusable to him.

On the contrary ... this inaccuracy leads to certain wrong thoughts. Or maybe it was not the Azerbaijanis, but the Uzbeks, for example?

Quote: ccsr

You do not agree with his assessment - then give another evidence of the front-line soldier from the Crimean Front

Unfortunately, few people came out alive from there, and it is unlikely that there were living people who were captured. But I knew an old man who was captured near Kharkov (Russian). Sometimes, sometimes he was reluctant to tell how he was captured. So, nobody he did not blame it. Once only after the feast, he cursed the entire command of the front for mediocrity. He probably knew better than me and you

[aglet]

"Well, what kind of commander would skillfully fight such an audience in 1941-1942?"
one that would dilute these warriors, evenly, among the Slavs

[Kronos]

No, near Moscow it was precisely a well-prepared counteroffensive with accumulated reserves of shells and fresh troops

[oldbuddy]

You are just a fool.
In Crimea, there were only 2 combat-ready divisions. The rest is "people's militia without age restrictions."
Such are the means and forces

[Olgovich]

Quote: oldbuddy

You are just a fool.

Quote: oldbuddy

In Crimea there were only 2 combat-ready divisions

Yes

Quote: oldbuddy

You are just a fool.

[oldbuddy]

"And also an example of endless post-war lies about" overwhelming superior "forces - didn't you write that?

You.

So, I say: You are a fool

[Olgovich]

Quote: oldbuddy

"And also an example of endless post-war lies about" overwhelming superior "forces - didn't you write that?

You.

So, I say: You are a fool

You have already been answered once, do you not understand Russian?
One more time:

Quote: oldbuddy

You are just a fool.

Got it, no?

[oldbuddy]

I see, you are dumber than I thought.

[Olgovich]

Clear,

Finally, the THIRD time, who are you?

Well, and freedom!

Tired of ...

[aglet]

“There were only 2 combat-ready divisions in Crimea. The rest was“ people's militia without age restrictions. ”Such are the means and forces.”
in Crimea there was a coastal army, 235 thousand people, with appropriate weapons.
"September 24 German forces two infantry divisions (46th and 73rd), with the support of artillery and aviation, went on the offensive on the Perekop isthmus. In the course of heavy fighting, by September 26, they managed to break through the Turkish shaft and capture the city of Armyansk. "
two infantry divisions are about 25 thousand people, without tanks, only with full-time artillery.

[oldbuddy]

"there was a coastal army in the Crimea, 235 thousand people"?
:)
Well, that’s where you climb with this level of knowledge, huh?

“In the period of October 2-17, 1941, 86 thousand soldiers and commanders, 16 thousand civilians, 462 guns, 34 tanks, 1158 vehicles, 163 tractors, more than 3,5 thousand horses, a large amount of ammunition, food and other cargoes were evacuated from Odessa ".

The main core of the Primorsky Army left Odessa on 11 transports, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 8 minesweepers and 3 cannon boats on the night of October 16-17.
Match dates?

Now about Perekop and about "no tanks, only with regular artillery"

In addition to the “native” 173rd artillery regiment of the 73rd front (36 howitzers 10,5 cm and 12 gauge 15 cm), the advancing units during the assault on Perekop supported:

- 15 cm division of howitzers, 132nd front, (12 guns) subordinate to the corps
Romanian 54 heavy motorized division (15 cm)
The 110th artillery commandant’s command, which included the 49th regiment of heavy artillery of army submission and four separate heavy batteries. In his submission were 30,5 cm Czech mortars.
-4th jet artillery training division
-190th Assault Gun Division

Well, really, where do you go with this level of knowledge?

[aglet]

"In addition to the" native "173rd artillery regiment of the 73rd infantry division (36 howitzers 10,5 cm and 12 caliber 15 cm), the advancing units during the assault on Perekop supported:

- 15 cm division of howitzers, 132nd front, (12 guns) subordinate to the corps
Romanian 54 heavy motorized division (15 cm)
The 110th artillery commandant’s command, which included the 49th regiment of heavy artillery of army submission and four separate heavy batteries. In his submission were 30,5 cm Czech mortars.
-4th jet artillery training division
-190th Assault Gun Division
Well, really, where are you going with such a level of knowledge? "
173 ap belonged to the staff of 73 front, the 15 cm division of howitzers of the 132nd front — in the state of 132 front, all the others were also in someone’s state were in someone’s state, well, maybe, except for the 49th regiment. and 51 army had no artillery? straight at all?
"Parts of artillery:
66th Light Artillery Brigade of the 21st Breakthrough Artillery Division
151st cannon artillery brigade
827th howitzer artillery regiment
764th anti-tank artillery regiment
99th guards mortar regiment of rocket artillery
17th anti-aircraft artillery division
1267th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
1276th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
1279th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
2014th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
77th Guards Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment "
Naturally, not all of them were in its composition in 1941, but most of it. so the Germans didn’t have all of their artillery there in 41

[oldbuddy]

And, the standard trick of "rezunists" is to count all equipment and people from Brest to Vladivostok from the Soviet side, while in Germany - only on the front line.
:)

Let me remind you of your statement:

"On September 24, German troops with the forces of two infantry divisions (46th and 73rd), supported by artillery and aviation, launched an offensive on the Perekop Isthmus. In the course of heavy battles, by September 26, they managed to break through the Turkish Wall and capture the city of Armyansk."
two infantry divisions are about 25 thousand people, without tanks, only with regular artillery "


Remembered?

So, this is not true.
On September 24, the 46th and 73rd infantry regiments launched an offensive on the Perekop Isthmus, not only with regular artillery.

In addition to the “native” 173rd artillery regiment of the 73rd regiment (36 howitzers 10,5 cm and 12 gauge 15 cm), the advancing units during the assault on Perekop were supported by non-staffing of these divisions:

- 15 cm division of howitzers, 132nd front, (12 guns) subordinate to the corps
Romanian 54 heavy motorized division (15 cm)
The 110th artillery commandant’s command, which included the 49th regiment of heavy artillery of army submission and four separate heavy batteries. In his submission were 30,5 cm Czech mortars.
-4th jet artillery training division
-190th Assault Gun Division

I explained well, my little Wikipedia fan?

Once again: on September 24, these artillery units supported the advance of the 46th and 73rd infantry regiments at Perekop. And they did not have these divisions on staff.

Perekop defended the Soviet 156th SD.
German divisional and corps artillery were opposed by two Soviet artillery regiments of incomplete composition: the 434th light and 498th howitzer. By the weight of the salvo, they were in total inferior to one German divisional artillery regiment.
On September 25, the 260th anti-tank division was deployed to Perekop.
It's all
Did I explain it clearly?
:)

[ccsr]

Quote: oldbuddy

Did I explain it clearly?

You explained everything absolutely correctly and easily, but it would be even better if you cited the source, because our "mitrofanushki" will not believe you anyway, and will tryndet that two German divisions have captured the entire Crimea.

[aglet]

"that our" mitrofanushki "will not believe you anyway, and will tryndet that two German divisions have captured the entire Crimea."
Do you have facts that this was not so?

[aglet]

"Perekop was defended by the Soviet 156th SD."
51 army defended Crimea, in which there was a lot of artillery. but there was no one to do the maneuver by forces, where they stood, they were captured there and surrendered.

[oldbuddy]

"the Crimea was defended by 51 army, which had a lot of artillery"
:)

You, the acrobat, are very deeply off topic.
I don’t understand why you are arguing with such a level of knowledge.

The 51st Army had very little artillery.
These are:
There was no artillery of army or corps submission
Three artillery militia divisions did not have.
Two “pre-war” divisions each had two artillery regiments:
The 106th division included the 553rd LAP and 574 GAP,
156th SD of the 434th AP and 498 GAP.
The divisions formed during the war had one artillery regiment each:
The 276th had the 852nd AP,
271st - 850GAP.
The “light” cavalry divisions had one equestrian artillery division of 76mm cannons.

Well, really, I don’t understand why you are getting into a dispute with such a level of knowledge?

[aglet]

“The 51st Army had very little artillery.
These are:
There was no artillery of army or corps submission
Three artillery militia divisions did not have.
Two “pre-war” divisions each had two artillery regiments:
The 106th division included the 553rd LAP and 574 GAP,
156th SD of the 434th AP and 498 GAP.
The divisions formed during the war had one artillery regiment each:
The 276th had the 852nd AP,
271st - 850GAP.
"Light" cavalry divisions had one equestrian artillery division 76mm guns. "
how many trunks you will not answer again, I realized the level of knowledge does not allow. but add 462 more to these trunks; this is artillery of the coastal army, taken out of Odessa.
"The" light "cavalry divisions had one equestrian artillery division of 76mm guns each"
so the Germans didn’t have only one big bertha

[aglet]

"Now, that's not true.
On September 24, the 46th and 73rd Infantry Divisions went on the offensive on the Perekop Isthmus not only with regular artillery. "
but there were only two divisions, do you agree? if you are interested, count the trunks on both sides, and keep in mind that the forces of 51 armies were evenly distributed along the entire coast, and in the most dangerous direction, at the crossroads, there was the very minuscule. during the storming of the dig, the Germans concentrated all the artillery that was nearby, and the goats spread it with a thin layer over the entire area, although there were much more artillery in the 51 army than the Germans, plus the Black Sea Fleet, with naval calibers. we are talking about this, but about the unprincipled belonging of the guns to different parts. in the end, all Soviet artillery in the Crimea belonged to 51 armies, by state, but this did not help her at all

[oldbuddy]

Well, what kind of Kozlov was in Crimea in 1941?
You, the acrobat, are very deeply off topic.


At Perekop, the most dangerous area, commander of the 51st Separate Army Kuznetsov sent virtually the only combat-ready unit — the 156th pre-war formation.

About artillery, I already answered you.

And I also have a question: why are you getting into a dispute with such a level of knowledge?

[aglet]

"I have already answered you about artillery.
And I also have a question: why are you getting into a dispute with such a level of knowledge? "
answered? I asked you not by name, but by the number of trunks to calculate — what, is there a lack of knowledge? In two armies of artillery, there will always be more than the Germans. I will answer your question in advance - I don’t need it, I already know
and somehow your assessments of my knowledge do not bother me at all

[oldbuddy]

Stubbornness is the first sign of stupidity, my little friend aiguillette.
In your case, unfortunately, not the last one.

1. At the time of the storming of Perekop, there was only one in the Crimea, the 51st Army.

2. She had very little artillery.

3. The reference book of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces "The combat composition of the Soviet Army", and "The list of military associations, formations, units and institutions that were part of the active army" determines the composition of 51 armies on 01.10.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX:
106, 156, 172, 184, 271, 276, 320, 321 sd, 40, 42, 48 cd, 51, 52 ap, det. mototanket regiment, otb,

4. The level of your knowledge is demonstrated by the list given by you:
"Parts of artillery:
66th Light Artillery Brigade of the 21st Breakthrough Artillery Division
151st cannon artillery brigade
827th howitzer artillery regiment
764th anti-tank artillery regiment
99th guards mortar regiment of rocket artillery
17th anti-aircraft artillery division
1267th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
1276th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
1279th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
2014th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
77th Guards Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment "
:)

Durilka cardboard, this is the composition for 1945. For 1945.

21st Artillery Division formed 1 January 1943
827th Howitzer Artillery Regiment as part of the 51st Army since March 1945
764 anti-tank artillery regiment in 51 armies from 01.10.1943
99th Guards Mortar Regiment of Rocket Artillery from September 1944
17th anti-aircraft artillery division (and 1267, 1276, 1279, 2014 zenap) from 01.08.1944/XNUMX/XNUMX
77 Guards anti-aircraft artillery regiment from 01.01.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX

:)
Well, that's where you climb with this level of knowledge, huh?

5. Directly Perekop was covered by one, 156th SD

6. The 156th SD had little artillery (see my comment)

7 .. The two German infantry divisions attacking the positions of the 156th Rifle Division had, in addition to standard artillery, a lot of artillery (see my comment)

I explained it easily, and my little, stupid friend aiguillette?

[aglet]

"Stubbornness is the first sign of stupidity, my little friend aiguillette."
"I explained it clearly, and my little, stupid friend aiguillette?"
"You are really very stupid"
I would, if I were you, watch the bazaar, you are our smart guy.
the Germans took over the dig with the forces of 2 divisions, but did not develop success - they had other things to do, more important. they waited until "By mid-October, by the decision of the Headquarters, the Primorsky Army was transferred from Odessa to the Crimea. Thus, the Soviet troops in Crimea were seriously strengthened and began to number 12 rifle, 4 cavalry divisions, plus separate units formed from the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet."
"On October 18th, the 11th German Army launched an offensive against the Ishun positions." by that time, the seaside army had already successfully fled from Odessa, and brought with them - "86 thousand military personnel with weapons. 570 guns, 938 vehicles, 34 tanks and 22 aircraft were removed."
no cho so strength, it was possible to fight successfully? it is only the coastal army. I did not look for the weapons of the 51st army, I was lazy, but since they did not write that these soldiers were armed with shovel shafts, it means that they were armed according to the state, in particular, artillery of at least 330 barrels of different calibers. if you remember, poor-minded, initially it was about the amount of artillery we and the Germans, during the assault on the dig. the staff artillery of the 51st and the coastal armies, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov flotilla was many times superior to all the artillery of the Germans during the assault on the dig and yishun.
but all the forces of the two armies were evenly spread around the perimeter of the peninsula in anticipation of the amphibious landing of the Germans, and gathered at Simferopol, Sevastopol and Kerch, to repel the airborne landing of the Germans, 20 thousand people. There was no one to defend the dig, which allowed the 2nd infantry divisions of the Germans, with standard artillery and completely without tanks, to capture the dig and go to the Ishun isthmus. and who was in command then - goats, blacksmiths or bats, did not play a fundamental role, they were warriors standing each other - manstein, by forces of 7 infantry divisions with standard weapons, without tanks (not counting trophy ones), in a month (not counting Sevastopol) , was able to defeat two Soviet armies, bring the Black Sea Fleet to silence, and seriously threaten Taman. this is the military leader - not goats, not once, and not bats

[oldbuddy]

Let's summarize preliminary results.

I here decided, for fun's sake, to see how many times during our communication you lied:

1. "in the Crimea there was (FALSE) a coastal army, 235 thousand people (FALSE)"

2. "This is about 25 thousand people (FALSE), without tanks (HALF), only with regular artillery (FALSE).

3.a 51 army had no artillery? straight at all?
"Parts of artillery:
66th Light Artillery Brigade, 21st Artillery Breakthrough Division (FALSE)
151st Cannon Artillery Brigade (FALSE)
827th Howitzer Artillery Regiment (FALSE)
764th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (FALSE)
99th Guards Mortar Regiment of Rocket Artillery (FALSE)
17th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division (FALSE)
1267th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (FALSE)
1276th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (FALSE)
1279th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (FALSE)
2014th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment (FALSE)
77th Guards Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment "(FALSE)

4. "the Crimea was defended by 51 army, in which there was a lot of artillery" (FALSE)

5. goats (FALSE) smeared it ... the forces of 51 armies were evenly distributed along the entire coast (FALSE), and in the most dangerous direction, at the digging, there was the most scanty (FALSE).

6. "there was much more artillery in 51 armies than the Germans" (FALSE)

7. two armies will have more artillery than the Germans. (FALSE)

8. "were armed according to the state, in particular, artillery of at least 330 barrels of different calibers" (FALSE)

9. when storming a dig. the standard artillery of the 51st and coastal armies, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov flotilla was many times superior (FALSE) to all the artillery of the Germans during the assault on the digging and the Ishun.

10.Manstein, by forces of 7 (FALSE) infantry divisions with standard armament (FALSE), without tanks (excluding trophy) (FALSE)

Congratulations, Mr. Sovramshi
:)

[aglet]

"Congratulations, Mr. Sovramshi"
Well, that is, there were no two armies in the Crimea, but what was, was armed with shovel cuttings, without artillery, tanks, aviation, aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, Azov flotilla? Manstein had 70 pd and 375 tanks, right? if not, then who is lying? baht or oldbuddy? and on point 5 of your accusations, can you, a little more in detail, about the presence of troops at the dig, for example? besides your cries, facts could be cited, but I understand, there is nowhere to take them, all that remains is to scream. "
You are really very stupid. "- quote from your statement

[oldbuddy]

I wrote 10 points where you lied.
Do you agree that you are a liar?
If not, object specifically to each item.

Let's start with point 1.

"there was a coastal army in the Crimea, 235 thousand people, with appropriate weapons"

Did you write this?
Do you agree that this is a lie?

.

[oldbuddy]

You are really very stupid.
At the time of the storming of Perekop, there was no Primorsky army in Crimea.
I have already informed you about this.
Are you a schoolboy?

[aglet]

"There was no Primorsky army in Crimea at the time of the storming of Perekop"
and when did she appear there?

[icant007]

The evacuation of the Primorsky Army from Odessa to Sevastopol was carried out from October 1 to October 16, 1941.

[ccsr]

Quote: aglet

In the course of heavy fighting, by September 26, they managed to break through the Turkish shaft and capture the city of Armyansk. "
two infantry divisions are about 25 thousand people, without tanks, only with full-time artillery.

Under the dominance of German aviation in the air and the ability to conduct reconnaissance and adjustment of the fire of ground forces, these two divisions received multiple superiority over our units that opposed them. Do you even know that the commanders of the infantry and tank units of the Wehrmacht had radio stations operating in the same network as the Luftwaffe and received operational and reconnaissance information from them directly on the battlefield. We didn’t really even come to the end of the war, and you want our units in 1941 to be able to seriously contrast the technical superiority of the German army. You would have listened to less slogans, but rushed at numbers, but it would have been better if you had studied the quality of the Wehrmacht’s weapons and compared it to ours, then maybe you looked at the true state of affairs differently.

[aglet]

"The ability to conduct reconnaissance and adjust the fire of ground forces, these two divisions received a multiple superiority over our units that opposed them."
we had it — an artillery reconnaissance, they say, and an airman, even Simon wrote about it, so what, did it help a lot? they ran ahead of their own screech, to the middle of the Crimea. although they can be understood, the commanders fled, the cartridges ran out, there is no grub; where can the soldier go? only to the rear. they went to the rear. they thought someone needed them there

[ccsr]

Quote: aglet

we had it, an artillery reconnaissance, they’d call, and an airman, even Simon wrote about this

Simonov alone did not know that the airman did not work directly with regiment commanders, but could transmit information only through radio stations of airfields. And artillery reconnaissance worked on its own radio network, to which the commanders of the infantry regiments had no access. I don’t even mention about the quality of communication - this is generally a sore subject of the entire initial period of the war, and which was not decided until the Victory. So if you do not know this, this does not mean that the problem of command and control in the Crimea did not exist.

[aglet]

"Simonov did not know one thing that the aircraft controller did not work directly with the regiment commanders, but could transmit information only through the radio stations of the airfields. And the artillery reconnaissance worked on its own radio network, to which the commanders of rifle regiments had no access."
don’t believe it — the air operators contacted their airfields, on which the planes were waiting for their data. and the artillery reconnaissance officers contacted their batteries on their radio network. why would they contact the commanders of the rifle regiments? they could talk with them on the phone

[ccsr]

Quote: aglet

Why should they mess with the commanders of rifle regiments? they could talk to them on the phone

Who is this on the phone with - the pilot of the reconnaissance plane, or the commander of a howitzer artillery regiment from the Supreme Command's reserve? I'm afraid you overestimate our communications systems of that time.

such a huge amount - 6 aircraft, 12 minutes - as it is not enough for the Black Sea Fleet, no

Against the Sevastopol base, it is quite enough to paralyze the exit of the fleet from the bay of this city.

[aglet]

"There was no room for mobile defense in Crimea, hence the result."
Well, yes, the whole Crimea was built up with megacities at that time, and the mountains, like in Tibet, well, straight, do not pass, do not drive

[Alekseev]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The unsuccessful defense of Crimea in the fall of 1941 is of course a very sore subject ...

Like any topic about the disasters of 1941-42.
But what is the reason for such massive failures?
Probably, G.K. Zhukov named the reason for this most succinctly and succinctly. ".... the Germans had an advantage in all respects."
It happened, historically, and Mekhlis, Kozlov, 63rd Guards Rifle Division, etc. are only visible "tips of the iceberg".
Everything is complex, Suvorov without trained miraculous heroes would not have won victories, as well as excellent troops the mediocre commander can easily bring to defeat.
We, as Stalin replied to the same Mehlis, “did not have the Hindenburgs in reserve” ...
Of course, the mechlis and goats were pushed into secondary roles, many talented people were nominated, with Soviet soldiers at the end of the war, according to I. Konev, "it was possible to storm the sky", but it was a long and very bloody process.
Nevertheless, the reason for the defeat of Hitlerite Germany is not only and not so much in the outstanding qualities of commanders and troops, but in the fact that, according to the same Stalin (see General Staff in the War Years by General Shtemenko), the Germans tore apart their country economically, they did not were able to find more resources than the allies, and we created a single military camp.
In 1943-45, the high command, the troops, and the armaments changed qualitatively, and with the help of the Allies, one should not forget about this either, the supplies and catastrophes began to happen among the Germans. True, not so massive in terms of the number of losses ...

[Bar1]

Quote: Alekseev

Probably, G.K. Zhukov named the reason for this most succinctly and succinctly. ".... the Germans had an advantage in all respects."

some kind of arctic fox. So many years have passed, probably HUNDREDS of research on the outbreak of war. Already a long time ago an analysis was carried out and the forces of the opposing armies were calculated and this alignment was in favor of the Red Army. Ours had more tanks, planes and guns. This is the opinion of ALL historians.
And you all refer to the opinion of a liar Zhukov.

[Kronos]

By itself, more equipment does not give anything when there are no experienced officers, tank pilots because they were knocked out in battles

[Andrey VOV]

You .... what right do you have for Marshal to call a liar? You yourself snuffed gunpowder, you scoundrel? You wrapped your intestines? Shut your mouth ...

[Bar1]

Quote: Andrey VOV

You .... what right do you have for Marshal to call a liar? You yourself snuffed gunpowder, you scoundrel? You wrapped your intestines? Shut your mouth ...

dude, I don’t call Zhukov a liar, but the historian Martirosyan. I’m answering him, and don’t clap with his teeth.

[Andrey VOV]

I apologize then, infuriated

[8Schlaf]

That's what this rezunist Arsen Martirosyan is. For the sake of receiving money I’m ready to write any lie. The hut is restored by distorting events.
Eugene on concrete examples showed his complete worthlessness, as a historian or a fraudster without shame and conscience.
This is not G.K. Zhukov a liar, but the Martirosyan himself. To blame someone, you should first not lie yourself.
Parents did not teach Martirosyan to be honest and respect the fallen. So they lived in vain if they left it behind themselves

[aglet]

"You .... what right do you have to call Marshal a liar? Did you yourself sniff gunpowder? Did you wind up your guts? Shut your mouth ..."
Calm down, son, Calm down, you yourself didn’t wind anything anywhere, and you didn’t smell gunpowder at all, rather, on the contrary. just read the memoirs, and not just the marshal, and you will understand, if you can, that a lot, about his role in that war, he came up with

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alekseev

Probably, G.K. Zhukov named the reason for this most succinctly and succinctly. ".... the Germans were advantage in every way"

The Russian Defense Ministry has other figures: before the destruction of the Crimean Front in May 1942, the German 11th Army was the largest in number of people inferior Crimean Front 2 times, by the number of artillery - by 1,8, and by the number of tanks - by 1,2 times. But the Germans had 1,7 times superiority in aviation.
The density of artillery was high, amounting to 81,5 guns and mortars of 76 mm caliber and above, as well as 8 anti-tank guns per 1 km of the front. Plus a fleet that the Germans did not have.

And before, the superiority of forces was generally overwhelming, but in the fruitless and illiterate attacks of February - April on this front, our losses in people amounted to 226 370 people. - an unimaginably large loss figure on such a small front - almost a quarter of a million in three months!

Then in just ten days of May, the loss is still 150 000 people, the Germans spoke of 170 prisoners you ...
http://mil.ru/winner_may/history/more.htm?id=12122008@cmsArticle

[aglet]

"The RF Ministry of Defense has different numbers"
and you believe these villains? because Zhukov, Marshal of victory!))

[Podvodnik]

the Germans tore their country economically, they could not find resources more than the allies, and we had created a single military camp.

You are absolutely right. The Germans simply did not have enough resources. Neither human (especially them) nor economic. And this despite the fact that all of Europe worked to supply the Wehrmacht, and the French SS units defended the Reichstag until the last soldier.

Great article. Many thanks to the author. The same thing happened on other fronts. Our history calls this "discrete miscalculations." And the reasons are outrageously simple. This is personnel policy. Thanks to her, those who could report loudly and clearly in time were promoted to the top of the leadership. He had an excellent bearing and the ability to bend. Lick and bow in time to the authorities. And as it came to the point, my back bent down, the commanding voice disappeared, my hands trembled. Until those who could defend and substantiate their opinion came forward. In peacetime, cartridges, shells, bombs, missiles, torpedoes cannot be spared. Otherwise, a disaster. And you know who was right: "Cadres decide everything."

Grandfather was taken prisoner in the Crimea. He said: the "frame" flew, then the artillery hit it .... They ground everything. Only 15 people remained alive. And my grandfather was shell-shocked. The splinter hit the helmet. Then they were taken to the rear for re-formation. I tried to ask in more detail, practically did not tell anything. I just remembered something funny. He answered my request: "scary, granddaughters."

You need to know the history of your country as it was and is. There is nothing to be ashamed of. Thanks again to the author.

[aglet]

"Probably, the most succinct and succinctly named the reason for this was G.K. Zhukov." .... the Germans had an advantage in all respects. "
Well, he said very specifically, he covered his ass, like, it’s not his fault, historically it happened. Does anyone know the numbers about the number of tanks, planes, artillery? infantry, after all? but there was no one to command, and the beetles, with their inept actions, did more harm than the Germans. marshal of victory, ...

[SIT]

HOW could the enemy expect to land on the Crimean coast if there were several antediluvian Romanian destroyers against the Black Sea Fleet consisting of 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 3 leaders, 16 destroyers, 47 submarines, and even a lot of small things like Mo and torpedo boat divisions? By this, the fleet alone numbered 600 aircraft.

[aglet]

"HOW the enemy could expect to land troops on the Crimean coast in the presence of several antediluvian Romanian destroyers"
Well, Batov, Kozlov and Mehlis, how do you know about this? it’s you smart here, and they settled in the dugout, and that's all, they only absorbed buckwheat and stew, and they pulled vodka, on the orders of the people's commissar

[ccsr]

Quote: SIT

HOW the enemy could count on landing on the Crimean coast if there were several antediluvian Romanian destroyers against the Black Sea Fleet, consisting of 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 3 leaders, 16 destroyers, 47 submarines and a bunch of little things like Mo

Silently - by mining all exits from the bases of our ships, as well as their destruction with the help of aviation. By the way, in 1944, German troops were partially evacuated to Romania on Romanian ships, and this proves that in 1941 they could participate in landing operations with German air cover.

[aglet]

"Silently - by mining all exits from the bases of our ships, as well as destroying them with the help of aviation"
but nothing that was nothing to mine? Yes, try to go to the bases. with aviation, yes, our boats were from the last century in air defense. and no blacksmiths bother about it. all their aviation and sunk

[ccsr]

Quote: aglet

but nothing that was nothing to mine?

You do not even seem to know anything about the first raids on Sevastopol, and you still reason what the Germans could do:

In the morning airstrike, German pilots were supposed to block the ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the bay. To implement the plan, each of the 6 aircraft was equipped with two mines, which were parachuted from a height of 800-1000 m. Each of the mines, and they were of the LMB type - Luftwaffe Mine B, was equal to a ton of TNT in power.

[aglet]

"You don't even seem to know anything about the first raids on Sevastopl, and you are still wondering what the Germans could do."
well, did that help the Germans a lot?
and try to go to the bases, as I said before, didn’t anyone bother the Germans to put mines? And such a huge number - 6 airplanes, 12 min.

[aglet]

"By the way, in 1944, German troops were partially evacuated to Romania on Romanian ships, and this proves that in 1941 they could participate in landing operations under the German air cover."
it was in 1944, and it proves absolutely nothing. in 1941, the Germans and their allies had nothing to land on the Black Sea, even without the Black Sea Fleet

[Igoresha]

By June 22, some divisions had no shots at all (there were few of them), others had 300-600 shots per barrel and quickly burned this ammunition. And in the central warehouses there were also almost no these shots ...

remained on the border and captured by the Germans, or was not from the word at all?

[AsmyppoL]

In two tank divisions, there were no 37-mm rounds from the word "generally".

Special message of the 3rd Directorate of NPO from 1.7.41: “Despite the signals about the real possibility of an enemy attack, individual commanders of units of the South-Western Front did not manage to quickly repel an enemy attack ... The air defense was poorly organized. The anti-aircraft artillery of the five front-line air defense brigades and the rear, consisting of 37-mm and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, did not have shells for them ... The anti-aircraft artillery of the 18th zenap of the 12th army, which guarded the city of Stanislav from enemy air raids, did not have 37 -mm shells ... "

Perhaps this condition was in some other divisions. On average, ZapOVO divisions had 300 37 mm rounds per barrel. In PribOVO, the condition was much better - an average of 600 shots. Perhaps this was possible to organize due to the increased activity of the district command.
With 85 mm shots, the condition was somewhat different. There were about 140 shots per barrel in the border districts. since it was believed that in case of war shots would come from the Center, the shells were not particularly spared. They shot a lot and aimlessly.

Admiral Golovko: "... Reports are coming from everywhere about fascist planes, about unidentified silhouettes of surface ships, about periscopes of submarines. Onshore anti-aircraft batteries and ship artillery fierce but still useless fire on planes: by strangers and friends. They still do not know how to shoot in a combat situation, or distinguish between types of aircraft ... " He was lucky that the armament was 76 mm anti-aircraft guns, to which there were a lot of shells.

I read all this, and then I myself understood Victoria's materials from the series "An Unexpected War ..."
If interested, see the two links. Somewhere she had something else interesting - sorry, I don’t remember ...

https://topwar.ru/144454-neozhidannaya-voyna-gitlerovskoy-germanii-s-sssr-chast-14.html

https://topwar.ru/146368-neozhidannaja-vojna-gitlerovskoj-germanii-s-sssr-pvo-chast-19.html

[Alexey RA]

Quote: AsmyppoL

With 85 mm shots, the condition was somewhat different. There were about 140 shots per barrel in the border districts. since it was believed that in case of war shots would come from the Center, the shells were not particularly spared.

With 85 mm shots, the condition was also awful. On 01.06.1941/416/4,2, the industry was able to produce only 140 thousand rounds of the required 158 million. 150 shots per gun (0182 on average for the armed forces) for an anti-aircraft artillery system is less than one BK (09.05.41 shots according to the norms of the Order of the NCO No. XNUMX dated XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX).

[Igoresha]

Thank you, the materials on the links are interesting.
I’m reading one of Zamulin’s books about the Battle of Kursk, there, too, not everything is good with ammunition

In this way, if industry in 1940 (the year when 37 and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns began to arrive in the spacecraft) and in the first half of 1941 they completely fulfilled the plan for anti-aircraft shells, even this additional quantity would hardly be enough for 2-3 busy days of the war the rate of fire with which anti-aircraft gunners fired.

[Korsar4]

How not to remember? The Kerch disaster is so well known. Yes, and felt. Although it may be personal. Grandma survived there. And then she got to Germany in 1945.

And the defense of Crimea without the defense of Sevastopol can not imagine. With all the pain and heroism.

[Free wind]

The Black Sea Fleet did not provide any support. The German fleet was not there, the Turks were not allowed. And Romanian, Black Sea, if not superior, he could fight on an equal footing. And we were preparing for the landing a hundred years ago. In 41, the main parts of the Germans fought near Moscow and Leningrad. The Germans had few aircraft. But how it happened. Alas. Sorry for our soldiers.

[Catfish]

The German fleet was not there, the Turks were not allowed. And Romanian, Black Sea, if not superior, he could fight on an equal footing. AND

What German ships did the Turks not let through and from where? Where did the German ships come from in the Mediterranean, there were several submarines there, but they did not make much of the weather. The Italians had no time for us, they also suffered defeat after defeat at home, in their “Mare Nostra”. So the Turks have nothing to do with it.
The Germans threw several small submarines by rail to the Black Sea, which they didn’t glorify themselves, and several Fleet Assault Barges armed with artillery, but they were only BDBs, albeit very good, and they couldn’t compete with our ships.
There is nothing to talk about the Romanian fleet - three (I do not remember exactly) destroyers are not a fleet, they did not go out into the sea during the whole war.
In short, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet in its composition completely dominated the entire Black Sea water area. Even if all the states of the Black Sea basin had come together, our fleet would still be stronger.
Aviation is another matter. The Germans at that time had quantitative and qualitative superiority, and the training of their pilots was at a very high level.
And so it happened that for political reasons, the leadership of our country took care of the iron boxes, and plugged the "holes" in the defense with the bodies of people.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sea Cat

Even if all the states of the Black Sea basin had come together, our fleet would still be stronger.

You forget about the total dominance of German aviation in the Black Sea in 1941-1942, which is why our fleet simply could not complete the task in full. The water area itself was small, which is why it was necessary to drive the fleet to the southeast of the Black Sea. But this is a consequence of the loss of our aircraft, and not the fact that the fleet did not know how to act - you yourself say this:

Aviation is another matter. The Germans at that time had quantitative and qualitative superiority, and the training of their pilots was at a very high level.

Quote: Sea Cat

And so it happened that, for political reasons, the leadership of our country cherished iron boxes,

And if they were all sunk in 1941 - would it be easier for us?

[Catfish]

You forget about the total dominance of German aviation in the Black Sea

I do not forget, read carefully.

Aviation is another matter. The Germans at that time had quantitative and qualitative superiority, and the training of their pilots was at a very high level.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sea Cat

I do not forget, read carefully.

Then why argue that our fleet was significantly stronger than all the other fleets in the region, if it did not have the most important thing - air cover from German aviation? Even before the war, we had created naval aviation as an independent family, and this best proves that the strength of the fleet cannot be estimated without taking into account the air cover of at least the main naval bases.

[Catfish]

Well, here they are not talking about the merits of the "Luftwaffe", which eliminated almost all of our aviation in this theater. I'm talking about ships as such, is it really incomprehensible?

[ccsr]

Quote: Sea Cat

I'm talking about ships as such, is it really incomprehensible?

And I’m talking about the role of the Black Sea Fleet as a whole, because some authors have too one-sided assessments, from which it may appear that the fleet did not live up to expectations. The mere fact that our entire fleet did not suffer losses from enemy aircraft on June 22nd is the best proof that preparation for a war in the fleet was better.

[Catfish]

The absence of losses at the very beginning, this is exclusively the merit of N.G. Kuznetsov, he simply sabotaged the order "not to succumb to provocations" and gave his own, bringing the fleet to full combat readiness. What happened next is a completely different matter.

[aglet]

"But this is a consequence of the losses of our aviation, and not the fact that the fleet did not know how to operate."
and what, was able? I knew that the pilots were to blame for the fact that the fleet could not fight.
"And if they were all sunk in 1941, would it be easier for us?"
and what didn’t sink - what was the meaning of them? Was it much easier for you?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: aglet

and what, was able? I knew that the pilots were to blame for the fact that the fleet could not fight.

But what - did someone know how to act with the complete superiority of the enemy in the air? The British under Crete were saved only by the presence of LCs that at least tanked the damage.
We didn't have such "tanks". "Parisian" even after all the upgrades on the "Queen" does not pull.

[aglet]

"The British in Crete were saved only by the presence of LK, which at the very least tanked damage."
and how, it’s interesting, saved them? the Germans, however, captured Crete by airborne forces, and no one could stop them

[ccsr]

Quote: aglet

and what, was able? I knew that the pilots were to blame for the fact that the fleet could not fight.

A fleet without air cover cannot fight at all in limited water areas. It is strange that you do not understand this.

Quote: aglet

and what didn’t sink - what was the meaning of them? Was it much easier for you?

Firstly, the fleet guarded our Caucasian coast from attacks by ships and submarines of the allies of Germany, and secondly, it helped air defense units in repelling attacks on our naval bases. I'm not saying that the fleet helped to save our ships, which later participated in the Kerch-Eligent operation in 1943. It is impossible to consider the actions of the fleet as something outstanding, but nevertheless the Germans were afraid to use their BDB for transporting troops to the Novorossiysk region from the Crimea, when Brezhnev fought there.

[aglet]

"Firstly, the fleet guarded our Caucasian coast from attacks by ships and submarines of Germany's allies, and secondly, it helped air defense units in repelling attacks on our naval bases."
read about the presence of submarines and the enemy’s fleet, commensurate with the Black Sea Fleet, and about air defense, please, in more detail, all the losses of the Black Sea Fleet in ships (nothing allows them to be called ships), came from enemy aircraft. and there was nothing more commensurate with him there
"nevertheless, the Germans were afraid to use their BDB to transport troops to the Novorossiysk region from the Crimea"
and there was nothing to bring, the Germans there were crumbs there, literally, a trifle, and mainly reservists. Crimea was kept by their faithful allies - Crimean Tatars

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Sea Cat

In short, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet in its composition completely dominated the entire Black Sea water area. Even if all the states of the Black Sea basin had come together, our fleet would still be stronger.
Aviation is another matter. The Germans at that time had quantitative and qualitative superiority, and the training of their pilots was at a very high level.

Uh-huh ... after the arrival of German aviation, the Black Sea Fleet could only operate within the radius of coastal aviation. And then with an eye - the ships "Verpa" sank backlashes already in the area of ​​work of Yakov, and then how they rolled out the base in Novorossiysk.
Without air cover, the air defense of the Black Sea Fleet ships did not even ensure their own survival (not to mention covering for someone). The fate of the "Flawless" is an example of this.

Quote: Sea Cat

And so it happened that for political reasons, the leadership of our country took care of the iron boxes, and plugged the "holes" in the defense with the bodies of people.

It's not just politics. The fact is that the Black Sea Fleet was in a situation where there was nothing to compensate for lost or heavily damaged ships. All shipyards and normal repair factories went to the Germans.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alexey RA

and how then they rolled out the base in Novorossiysk.

Oops, just now I noticed that a piece had dropped out about the work of backlashes on "Tashkent" and about the fact that if "Impeccable" had not taken the blow, then LD might not have reached Sevastopol at all. "Rolled out later"of course refers to 1942.

[saigon]

Could you tell me in more detail whom did the Turks not let in from the Germans?
Yes, the Hans did not have a damn or even less in the Mediterranean.

[AsmyppoL]

According to pre-war plans, since 1940 it was believed that in the event of war an Itelian fleet would enter the Black Sea. This is written in the documents

[Marine engineer]

“By June 1941, the Italian fleet was badly battered by the British.
On November 12, 1940, the Italian battleships Littorio, Andrea Doria, as well as the battleship Conte de Cavour, which the Italians were unable to put into operation until the very end of World War II, were torpedoed by British planes in the port of Toronto.
One of the main battles of the Italian fleet with the English in the Mediterranean, at Cape Matapan, March 27, 1941. ended with the complete collapse of the Italians.
The British in this battle sank the latest Italian cruisers Zara, Paula and Fiume, destroyers Vittorio Alfieri, Vincenzo Giberti and Alfredo Oriani, and the battleship Vittorio Veneto was seriously damaged.
By June 1941, the British managed to drown the Italian heavy cruiser San Giorgio, the light cruisers Armando Diaz and Bartolomeo Coleoni.
In fact, after the battle at Cape Matapan, the Italian navy practically stopped any active operations against the British. ” (from)

The British did not have to hide their victories. I believe all this was written in English newspapers, i.e., in open sources. To whom it was supposed, it was necessary to draw conclusions and correct their “horror stories” about Italian battleships-cruisers in the Black Sea.

[aglet]

"that in the event of war the Italian fleet will enter the Black Sea. It is written about this in the documents"
and did he come in?

[A1Lukno]

All information about the enemy was received from intelligence.
According to intelligence, the fleet entered the Black Sea.
General Batov wrote:

Since the Supreme High Command Headquarters and the Southern Front were not interested in the situation in the ground forces of Crimea — they were not up to us — we had to get an orientation mainly through the headquarters of the fleet. I still have extracts from intelligence and other staff documents of that time. What is there only! June 22: landing in Constanta is being prepared ... by air reconnaissance 10 enemy transports were discovered ... direction to the Crimea. June 24: a submarine was discovered on the Shohe traverse ... the concentration of ships in the Constanta area indicates the preparation of a landing ... at the Bucharest airfields, an accumulation of six-engine transport aircraft for the transfer of paratroopers. June 27: The Italian fleet sailed through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea for a landing in Odessa and Sevastopole. June 28: the presence of 150 landing boats in Konstanz is confirmed. In the first half of July, the same thing - from the Constanta region, Tulcea, from Romanian airfields, you can wait for day-to-day landing, both sea and air. On July 7, the headquarters of the Danube Flotilla announced that 37 transports with troops left the ports of Bulgaria and Romania in an unknown direction ...

It was time and again to raise troops on alert, which turned out to be in vain.

[Marine engineer]

The head of the intelligence department of the Black Sea Fleet in 1941 was Colonel Namgaladze Dmitry Bagratovich.
“.. Colonel Namgaladze DB provided ... the fleet commander with intelligence data, both in the land direction and in the marine situation, completely ... " (from the description given by DB Namgaladze as the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet) "(c)

[AsmyppoL]

I think that when you quoted, you didn’t mean that the head of the intelligence department with a Georgian surname was a dilettante or a tyrant in his area ... Just for more than a year and a half the fleet has been oriented towards the passage of the Italian fleet in the Black Sea in case of war. The forces and means were involved for the timely detection of this event. Therefore, a signal arrived ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Marine Engineer

The head of the intelligence department of the Black Sea Fleet in 1941 was Colonel Namgaladze Dmitry Bagratovich.
“.. Colonel Namgaladze DB provided ... the fleet commander with intelligence data, both in the land direction and in the marine situation, completely ... " (from the description given by DB Namgaladze as the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet)" (from)

Against the background of this excellent characteristic of the Fleet’s intelligence chief, Batov’s statement that the intelligence from the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet was confused and inaccurate looks completely misleading. This is how one extract from the service description refutes the memoirs of another participant in the battles for the Crimea, who wanted to hide his mistakes in obtaining intelligence from the RO of the Southern Front headquarters.

[ccsr]

Quote: A1Lukno

General Batov wrote:

Since the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Southern Front were not interested in the situation in the ground forces of Crimea — they were not up to us — we had to get an orientation mainly through the headquarters of the fleet. I still have extracts from intelligence and other staff documents of that time. What is there only!

Batov was just the commander of the rifle corps in the Crimea, and therefore did not receive intelligence reports from the Southern Front with the outbreak of war - at least this should be understood from his memoirs. But he does not write why the chief of intelligence of the corps in this case was not urgently seconded to the intelligence department of the Southern Front in order to coordinate with the head of the department to include Batov’s corps in the calculation of the distribution of intelligence reports.
Not a bit begging for the merits of this commander, it still seems to me that he himself did not show sufficient initiative to receive intelligence from the headquarters of the Southern Front, and that what he received from the fleet was quite possibly misinterpreted to them if there was estimated information there. In general, I think that Batov’s memoirs, like all memoirists, should be treated with caution, if only because in the Crimea our troops did not show themselves brilliantly in the light of the defeat of the Crimean Front.

Quote: A1Lukno

It was time and again to raise troops on alert, which turned out to be in vain.

And this is the direct duty of any commander in the war - otherwise it would have happened what happened on June 22 in Brest.

[8Schlaf]

The deputy commander of the district is not appointed to the post of commander of the corps.
Therefore, his position before the formation of 51 army was called - the commander of the Crimea.
Therefore, it was correct to receive reconnaissance reports through the headquarters of the fleet, since part 9 of the corps, numerous formed fighter battalions — to counter airborne assaults, naval units and air force units — had to respond to the threats noted in the reports.
As a senior military commander in Crimea, he directly interacted with the NKVD and the NKGB. The level of his position is something close to the army group.
This is closer to his post until June 20. This is confirmed by the fact of his admission and the setting of the task by the People's Commissar of Defense on June 20. The facts of the reception by the People's Commissar of the appointed corps commanders are not known, and he received the commanders.

[ccsr]

Quote: 8Schlaf

The deputy commander of the district is not appointed to the post of commander of the corps.
Therefore, his position before the formation of 51 army was called - the commander of the Crimea.

This is not entirely true, because his position was called differently until June 20:

in November 1940 - to the post of commander of the 9th Special Rifle Corps in Crimea, and June 20, 1941 - simultaneously to the post Commander of the Ground Forces in Crimea.

And by definition, he could not be a commander of the Crimean troops, because parts of the Navy Commissariat, including coastal, as well as parts of the NKVD did not obey him.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Therefore, it was correct to receive intelligence reports through the headquarters of the fleet, since part 9 of the corps should have responded to the threats noted in the reports

Under the structure of the NPO and the NKVMF at that time, this was prohibited, but once such a decision was made at the very top, it becomes unclear why Batov did not get intelligence from the Southern Front intelligence Director. Can you explain why he did not do this, since he refers to poor information from the NKVMF intelligence structures?

Quote: 8Schlaf

As a senior military commander in Crimea, he directly interacted with the NKVD and the NKGB.

This was all carried out by the heads of the border districts — I don’t see anything unusual in this with respect to Batov.

Quote: 8Schlaf

The level of his position is something close to the army group.

Moreover, he should have been concerned about receiving intelligence from the headquarters of the Southern Front, and not be content only with naval intelligence reports. But why he didn’t do it, the question is of course interesting. Can you say something about this?

[8Schlaf]

It’s hard for me to watch the entire text of your message from my cell phone. Once you ask me, I will state my opinion.
I am not an event reviewer.

Why didn’t they receive intelligence from the district headquarters.
Prior to this, all the information in the Crimea came from the headquarters of the Odessa Military District. On the eve of the war, the district headquarters was divided. According to the recollections of the commander of the Far Eastern Military District Chief of Staff of the okrug, the first information about the training of troops was also received from the headquarters of the Odessa military base.
According to the memoirs of Zhukov (not the chief of the General Staff) from the headquarters of the Odessa military base in early-mid-June (I don’t remember exactly) at a meeting in the district headquarters Zakharov showed the naval map with the intelligence.
If there was a ban, then it was bypassed.
There was hardly such a ban on getting the NKVD reconnoitered from the border guards. In all border military districts, such an exchange took place from the division to the district headquarters. This is mentioned in the memoirs.

The headquarters of the Southern Front began to arrive from June 24. Its main part is from the 25th. There were huge communications problems at the front headquarters. For example, the regiment of communications of the front did not arrive until July 1. On June 30, shift workers in Odessa were called upon to work on telegraphic apparatus. Somewhere on the 25-26th, from the headquarters of the 9th Army they sent 2-3 telegraph apparatus by plane to the front headquarters.
The first reason is the very limited connection of the front headquarters with the armies and corps. The course could not reach the special building.
The second reason. The headquarters only arrived and he would have to deal with the troops at the border and arriving with the 18th army, and not with the rear, to which the Crimea could be assigned. The confusion and deployment of the front headquarters. The lack of intelligence from the arriving 18 army ...
The third reason. Tense relations between Zakharov and Tyulenev. All information went to the district headquarters from intelligence of the 9th capability of which was limited by the land border. Information may not arrive on time ...
At the same time, Maritime Aviation conducted reconnaissance of the water area and coast of Romania. Also, long-range aircraft from the Crimea flew for reconnaissance. Therefore, information from sea pilots was more relevant than from the headquarters of the front. Information to the front headquarters could come with a big delay or come in a truncated form.
Since Batu was called by the chief of the General Staff and warned of the need to defend the coast from naval and airborne landings, the naval forces could, on instructions from above, simply provide fresh intelligence about ships and ships of the enemy directly. So it would be more logical

[ccsr]

Quote: 8Schlaf

I am not an event reviewer.

I already guessed about it.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Prior to this, all the information in the Crimea came from the headquarters of the Odessa Military District.

So Batov was included in the mailing list, since he was the commander of experienced troops in the Crimea. The question immediately becomes - why didn’t he later use this information, since he did not like the naval data.

Quote: 8Schlaf

at a meeting at the district headquarters, Zakharov showed the naval map with the reconnaissance.
If there was a ban, then it was bypassed.

This is normal practice, and the ban concerned the fact that top-level intelligence could not be brought to a certain category of heads of various people's commissariats without the permission of the chief of the General Staff of the General Staff. This is purely in order to keep secret sources of information, especially undercover ones.

Quote: 8Schlaf

The headquarters of the Southern Front began to arrive from June 24. Its main part is from the 25th. There were huge communications problems at the front headquarters.

There were several months before the defeat of the Crimean Front - what are you talking about?

Quote: 8Schlaf

For example, the regiment of communications of the front did not arrive until July 1.

The head of the front’s intelligence department had his own radio nodes, so there’s no need to talk about how complicated it was, because the intelligence radio networks are not connected with the deployment of a communications regiment.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Information may not arrive on time ...

In fact, there is a report card for urgent reports, and for failure to meet deadlines, you can be brought to a tribunal during the war. Let's leave it - you are clearly not in the subject.

Quote: 8Schlaf

At the same time, Maritime Aviation conducted reconnaissance of the water area and coast of Romania. Also, long-range aircraft from the Crimea flew for reconnaissance. Therefore, information from sea pilots was more relevant than from the headquarters of the front.

Who told you this, if the naval had a coastal squad consisting of five points, which conducted radio reconnaissance long before the start of the war? Often, more information came from them than from aviation flights, read Strelbitsky, who described the work of such a point in ZAPOVO.

Quote: 8Schlaf

Since Batu was called by the chief of the General Staff and warned of the need to defend the coast from naval and airborne landings, the naval forces could, on instructions from above, simply provide fresh intelligence about ships and ships of the enemy directly.

So they introduced her to Batova, and he writes in his memoirs that she was of poor quality and confused. That is why I asked, why did he not organize the receipt of intelligence information from the headquarters of the Southern Front, at least in a curtailed form, which would reflect questions concerning the Crimean Peninsula? The young lieutenant, the commander of the reconnaissance point, himself came to the chief of intelligence of the 51st Army and received all the necessary orders in October 1941, and the chief of intelligence of Batov's corps had not bothered to organize the receipt of intelligence information from the front headquarters until that time. Something is wrong here - I don’t believe in this version of Batov, because I know how the NGSH Zhukov "forgot" in his memoirs that he saw Golikov's intelligence reports, which he himself signed.

[aglet]

"Every now and then we had to raise the troops on alarm, which turned out to be in vain."
this only speaks of the lack of undercover intelligence, and the worthlessness of the commanders. but the absence of tanks at the manstein, they could notice? here we are talking not about undercover intelligence but about simple observation from the trenches. or were there no trenches? just fled to the center of the peninsula, away from the enemy?

[aglet]

"June 27: Italian fleet proceeded through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea for the landing in Odessa and Sevastopol"
and check with aviation, for example, or else how could it be?
"28 June: 150 landing craft confirmed in Constanta"
and how is it confirmed? and even if they were, what would they be able to land, under the most favorable conditions? a regiment of infantry, or two, without any gain? is it fatal?

[Kwas]

Quote: Free Wind

And Romanian, Black Sea, if not superior, he could fight on an equal footing.

How is it not superior? Battleship, 5 (?) Cruisers, 2 leaders, dofiga destroyers ... But did the Romanians have at least something comparable?

[VicktorVR]

They killed so many people and simply demoted in ranks and posts? ..

[Catfish]

Mehlis generally pretty bad, and not only in the Crimea.

[alone]

Quote: Sea Cat

Mehlis generally pretty bad, and not only in the Crimea.

Mehlis was a member of the Supreme High Command Headquarters and the head of the political leadership of the Red Army. Wherever he was sent, arrests of command personnel, searches for spies and enemies began. representative of the Commander. And then he would have done more business.

[Alexey RA]

In fact, it was Mehlis who knocked out tanks for the Crimean Front into several tank brigades, including even KV.
And here is what the Crimean Front did with them during the offensives of February-April 1942:

out of 29 HF on the move on February 27 to March 5, 6 vehicles remained, out of 19 T-34 - 7.

... already on the first day of the offensive (March 13), all KVs of the 13th battalion and all T-229s of the 34th Tank Brigade which were available on the morning of March 39th (tanks of the KV brigade did not participate in the battle) were disabled.

for the entire duration of the fighting from February 27 to April 12, 1942, the Crimean Front irretrievably lost 14 KV out of 66 arrived on the Kerch Peninsula, 6 out of 20 T-34s, 110 T-26s out of 320, 51 T-60s out of 150.

© Isaev
The last figures are only non-refundable. And how many more cars went into repair ...

[Catfish]

Yuri, thank you very much! Great article!

[iouris]

In the initial period of the war, the leadership of the state and the command of the Red Army were not able to organize resistance to a more experienced and organized enemy, there was practically no aviation. Under such conditions, the Anglo-Saxons are not capable of waging war. The turning point came only in 1943, when bitter experience was accumulated. This is an eternal story.

[Zeev zeev]

I advise you to get acquainted with the defense of the island of Malta at about the same period. When the Anglo-Saxons vigorously so dismissed the superior forces of the enemy

[Alexey RA]

Quote: ZeevZeev

I advise you to get acquainted with the defense of the island of Malta at about the same period. When the Anglo-Saxons vigorously so dismissed the superior forces of the enemy

In the air. On earth, the same Anglo-Saxons, having a numerical superiority, cheerfully merged Rommel so - and if the Germans had not completely neglected the logistics, then the videos would have reached Cairo.

[Zeev zeev]

Quote wikipedia
"At this time, the fleet of fighters based in Malta consisted of only a few outdated Gloster Gladiator biplanes. According to popular legend, there were only three aircraft, and they were called" Faith "," Hope "," Mercy "(Faith, Hope , Charity), and were accidentally forgotten in Malta during transportation, disassembled.In reality, the unit was created on the initiative of Air Force Vice Marshal Forster Maynard, who was appointed to Malta after the fleet left for Alexandria and Gibraltar. He twice tried to requisition those transported to Egypt and planes from Egypt to create a proper Maltese unit. The second time he succeeded and the "Hal Far link" was created (the airfield at Luka was not yet ready and the only runway was at Hal Far). The personnel were also recruited from the base garrison. In total, the Maltese had from 6 to 10 aircraft, but there were only 3 (the flight) in assembled and airworthy condition, the rest were the source of spare parts. there is little fighting spirit of the Maltese, although the combat successes of the old biplanes were close to zero - the maximum speed of the Gladiator barely exceeded 400 km / h, while the Italian bombers had 420-430 km / h. However, the attacks of fighters and the firing of anti-aircraft guns forced them to bomb from high altitudes and speeds, which made it almost impossible to accurately hit. Only on June 21 was one victory achieved, and the next day the island's defense was reinforced by a squadron of Hurricanes that arrived on the island after the defeat of France. "
Against all Italian aviation and navy.

[Chilean Abalon]

Konstantin Simonov very well described the tragic events in Crimea in his books.

[Eug]

I read and don’t understand how this could be ...

[Kronos]

Yes, usually allies on land, too, until 1943 were continuous failures against the Germans

[aglet]

"Yes, usually the Allies on land also had continuous failures against the Germans until 1943."
you do not compare the scales. allies in general until June 6, 1944 fought with the Germans? or do you think these voshkany in Africa for the war?

[Kronos]

They fought at sea, drowned the German fleet, on land they lost the battle for France, for example, the Battle of Dieppe when they tried to land the troops

[aglet]

firstly, it was about land. secondly, the British fleet was the strongest in the world, but the return was not very large, again, they fought with the Germans far from the battlefield, there wasn’t much sense, to fight with them, we simply measured ourselves with letters .the surrender of all weapons in the dunkirk in exchange for unhindered personnel hacking is a war? their goal was to make noise and give up. they reached their goals

[Kronos]

The British fleet showed itself well - completely crushed the Italian, drowned all the large ships of the pride of the German fleet

[aglet]

"The British fleet showed itself well - completely suppressed the Italian, sank all the large ships of the pride of the German fleet"
Well? I drowned everyone right, and cho? Did the Germans capitulate right away? Or is it like that, on May 9, 1945?

[Kronos]

How could the fleet force them to surrender? This is a matter of the army units. I can also say that the German Luft Wafe or Chris Morinet showed herself badly because the British did not give up

[aglet]

and then what is the point of how the fleet has shown itself? what result? just showed?

[Kronos]

For example, made it impossible to land German troops in England

[ccsr]

Quote: Kronos

For example, made it impossible to land German troops in England

And they did not plan to do this - Hess specially flew in order to warn the British about it in the hope that they would not help the USSR and the war would end quickly. So, there can be no talk of any landing on the territory of Great Britain - the Germans curtailed the program for the construction of landing ships, and the existing BDBs were transferred to the Black Sea. What kind of landing can you talk about then?

[Kronos]

We stopped talking about the landing because the fleet and German aviation could not provide a landing

[Zeev zeev]

The point is that each sunken submarine in the Atlantic is a couple of hundreds of tanks that did not fall under Kursk and a couple of hundred tanks, a couple of thousand tons of stew, a couple of gasoline tankers, a couple of bulk carriers, etc., that came to Murmansk.

[aglet]

"The point is that each sunk submarine in the Atlantic is a couple of hundred tanks that did not fall under Kursk and a couple of hundred tanks, a couple of thousand tons of stew, a couple of aviation gasoline tankers, a couple of dry cargo trucks, etc., which came to Murmansk."
you have a very interesting interpretation of the events there. it was, actually, about the time until June 22, 1941

[SIT]

At 5h52m on 24.05.40, the British battlecruiser Hood was the first to open fire on Bismarck and Prince Eugen. At 6h00m there was a return volley from Bismarck. After 3 minutes The hood exploded and sank in half. So it was in fact.

[Kronos]

Bismarck then sunk

[SIT]

That's it, that then, and all Home Fleet. If it weren’t for a successful torpedo from Albatross, it’s still not known what the situation would be.

[aglet]

"Bismarck was then sunk"
then far later

[Zeev zeev]

Six days later, the Bismarck went to the seabed.

[Zeev zeev]

The allies "got in" (as you put it) with the Germans and their allies before June 6, 1944, in France, Norway, Greece, Crete, Syria, Lebanon, Sicily, Italy, and Libya, Algeria, Tunisia. In addition to this, they fought in the Pacific, Atlantic, Burma, Malaysia, East Africa, Madagascar ...

[aglet]

"Allies" got in "(as you put it) with the Germans"
Well, and what did it lead to? maybe it was simpler and more effective, it was a war with the Germans in Germany, and not in Malaysia?

[Mirabo]

The so-called "fuss in Africa" ​​did not allow the fascists to break through to Arab and Caucasian oil, and did not lead to a backstab of Soviet troops in the Caucasus. And until mid-1944, the Allies fought in Greece, fought for Crete, Greece and invaded Italy. Also, a significant part of human and material resources was diverted for the war with Japan.

[aglet]

"The so-called" fuss in Africa "by you did not allow the breakthrough of the fascists to the Arab and Caucasian oil"
well, if you realize that the Angles were going to bomb the tank in order to prevent Hitler from supplying oil, then yes. but even if the Germans would have captured Arab oil (they certainly didn’t get to the tank, it was 1940), then remember that the oil was then transported to tankers, mainly on camels, there was no infrastructure there, and then, tankers pulled back through the Suez, in the middle of the Middle East, where the English fleet, aviation, and the Gibraltar dominate, as it is not very even, no? and the amers needed the war with Japan just for the sake of excuse why they did not fight the Germans. are you, in general, aware of that so-called war?

[Mirabo]

Quote: aglet

pull through the Suez, in the middle of the Middle East, where the English fleet, aviation, and the Gibraltar dominate, as it is not very even, no

And do not tell me the location of the English fleet? Suez will be captured, Greece not, Crete is also under the Germans, the capture of Malta under such conditions is a matter of time. Or do you think that the Germans are so stupid that purely for the sake of tearing to any deposits?

[aglet]

"Can you tell me where the British fleet is based? Suez will be captured, Greece is not, Crete is also under the Germans, the capture of Malta under such conditions is a matter of time."
but try to drown it all, don’t forget, the British fleet is the strongest in the world, aviation is also a class, there are aircraft carriers, Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier, the Luftwaffe doesn’t work at that distance, the Germans don’t have a fleet in the Middle East, and the Italians are not warriors. and why should the Suez be captured? if Cairo could not be captured? Well, the Gibraltar, the Germans did not even try to capture him, not once.

[aglet]

"The so-called" fuss in Africa "by you did not allow the fascists to break through to Arab and Caucasian oil, and did not lead to a backstab of Soviet troops in the Caucasus"
if you recall that the Britons were about to bomb the tank in order to stop Hitler, then yes, in the back, they did not hit the Britons. and if you recall that the Arabian oil to the tankers, mainly camels, was transported then there was no infrastructure there, and then the tankers were pulled through the Suez-English then, through the cut-off, through the hybrid-again, English, their aviation- Malta, Crete , navy, so very troublesome business with this oil turned out

[Looking for]

interesting is the purpose of such statues on an allegedly patriotic resource.?

[ccsr]

Author:
Yuri Apukhtin

part of the troops went to Adzhimushkaysky quarries and continued to fight there.

You confuse, because in the first occupation of Kerch, very few troops went down to the Adzhimushkaysky and Starokarantinsky quarries, and partisans and underground were mainly based there, because they were originally prepared for this, creating some reserves. But in May 1942, really regular units descended into the Adzhimushkay quarries in large numbers, because there was not enough means of evacuation to the Taman Peninsula. But the figure of 15 thousand military personnel did not find documented evidence, which is why, according to various estimates, it ranges from 5 to 10 thousand military personnel. According to various estimates of modern quarry researchers, this figure is in the range of 8-9 thousand people, although so far there is no exact data on the number descended underground.

[Alexey RA]

Despite the protests of the front commander Kozlov, Mehlis forbade to dig trenches in order to "not undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers."

But what about order No. 143?

The state of defense of the 63rd State Security Service was not brilliant. Inspection carried out in the division for performance Order No. 143 on strengthening equipment positions a few days before the German offensive (the report was dated May 7), it showed: "the trenches and passages were made very narrow and small in places", parapet was not made out, only some fighters had primitive loopholes.

© Isaev

[Tuzik]

Dear Alexei, you often bring Isaev. Are there moments in which you disagree with him?

[Alexander Greene]

Despite the protests of the front commander Kozlov, Mehlis forbade to dig trenches in order to “not undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers”

I wonder where the author dug up this perestroika thesis?
And how much can you hang all the “dogs” for the disaster of the Crimean Front L.Z. Mehlis?

After the successful completion of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation and the seizure of the bridgehead, the front commander, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov received the order of the Headquarters to accelerate the concentration of troops and no later than January 12 to go on a general offensive with the support of the Black Sea Fleet.

But the offensive failed, because there was no well-thought-out plan of the offensive, as well as normal technical support, there was a catastrophic shortage of ammunition and fuel.

On the peninsula, more than 100 aircraft were out of order, artillery without ammunition. The command of the front itself was in Tbilisi; the Kfront commander did not know the position of his units, nor their condition, nor the position of the enemy’s grouping. Mehlis, of course, is from methyl in his telegram to Stalin.

After that, Mehlis got 450 more machine guns for the front, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 mortars of 120 mm caliber and 50 pieces of 82 mm caliber, as well as two divisions of M-8 rocket mortars. The issue of providing the front with an additional number of tanks, anti-tank rifles and their ammunition was being decided. Moreover, Mehlis strengthened the command of the troops with experienced personnel.

The offensive began on February 27, 1942. instead of letting tanks break through in open areas, the infantry, which the Germans simply destroyed, had no place to hide. By April, about 200 thousand people were killed. After which Mehlis demanded that the command of the front be immediately replaced for blatant professional unfitness. Unfortunately. this has not been done.

So the offensive was stifled, but the defense was not strengthened. There was no depth of defense. There was no air defense, all the troops gathered in the first echelon, on a narrow section of frgontai, in the end, they became an excellent target for German aviation and artillery.

Whose fault is it? Front command, but all the bumps fell on the Mehlis.

For what? Because he encroached on the authority of the generals, by his demands for a change in command, he raised the problem of the professional unsuitability of a significant part of the generals. For that he was slandered to smithereens. Moreover, he was a commissar, and the general of commissars could not stand. Such is the truth about Mehlis on the Crimean front.

[ccsr]

Quote: Alexander Green

And how much can you hang all the “dogs” for the disaster of the Crimean Front L.Z. Mehlis?

But why did Pavlov and a number of commanders answer with their life for the defeat of the Western Front, and the Mehlis is better, since he was sent there?

Quote: Alexander Green

But the offensive failed, because there was no well-thought-out plan of the offensive, as well as normal technical support, there was a catastrophic shortage of ammunition and fuel.

So the reason is the catasrophic lack of ammunition and fuel, and not the commander of the Crimean Front.

Quote: Alexander Green

After that, Mehlis got 450 more machine guns for the front, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 mortars of 120 mm caliber and 50 pieces of 82 mm caliber, as well as two divisions of M-8 rocket mortars.

He did not achieve anything, but most likely sent the usual encryption to Headquarters indicating the frustrations of the front, and there the General Staff decided at the expense of whom to allocate the requested weapons and equipment to the Crimean Front. It is not necessary to exaggerate the personal role of Mehlis in this, especially since he was not liked in the People's Commissariat, and could have completely different attitude to his applications.

Quote: Alexander Green

Whose fault is it? Front command, but all the bumps fell on the Mehlis.

You do not correctly assess the status of the Mehlis and the status of the front commander, which is why you are making the wrong conclusion about the measure of responsibility of each of them.

Quote: Alexander Green

For that he was slandered to smithereens.

And the defeat of the Crimean Front seems to have nothing to do with it - well, well ...

Quote: Alexander Green

Moreover, he was a commissar, and the general of commissars could not stand. Such is the truth about Mehlis on the Crimean front.

I propose to find out the opinion of him by L. Ivnov, who was not a general at that time and survived the whole tragedy of the defeat of the Crimean Front:

Among the senior military officials found guilty of the Kerch tragedy in the spring of 1942 was the chief of Glavpur of the Red Army, deputy commissar of defense army commissar 1st rank L.Z. Mehlis [1889-1953). Mehlis did not spare people, he was known among the command as a sharp, decisive person with an unbalanced character and almost unlimited powers, who gained fame as the organizer of quick reprisals, which is why some officers and generals were simply afraid of him.

Do you propose considering him innocent?

[Nehist]

Maybe enough for the Mehlis to hang all the dogs? And yes, the status of the com front is higher than that of the representative of the bet. I would very much like to see the documents of the Comets and the party control that Mehlis led at the time. But most likely they will never be published

[ccsr]

Quote: Nehist

And yes, the status of the com front is higher than that of the representative of the bet.

Where did you get this from? Why on earth is the current deputy. will the people's commissar of defense be lower in status than the commander of the front? I am not talking about the fact that Mehlis scribbled denunciations on the leadership of the front and only disorganized their actions. Well, if a senior military counterintelligence general in his memoirs gave an unpleasant assessment to this figure, then what gives you the right to say that all dogs are hung on the Mehlis?

[Nehist]

So pick up the documents where it is clearly indicated that the representative of the rate is an observer, not a commander. Isn’t it strange that they began to hang dogs on the Mehlis at the same time as on Beria, that is, under Khrushchev ?!

[ccsr]

Quote: Nehist

So pick up the documents where it is clearly indicated that the representative of the rate is an observer, not a commander.

Was Zhukov an observer as a representative of the Headquarters? Do not be ridiculous - these representatives had the authority to cancel the orders of the front commanders at their own discretion, and to take command of the front in a critical situation. Moreover, it got to the point that a special radio operator was assigned to the Headquarters representatives with a small-sized radio station "Sever" and his own cipher keys in order to exchange classified information with the Headquarters, bypassing the front-line encryptors and the front's communications center. For what it was done, I hope you can guess.

[Nehist]

You yourself wrote, In a critical situation !!!

[ccsr]

Quote: Nehist

You yourself wrote, In a critical situation !!!

The Crimean front was just a critical situation.

[Nehist]

Yeah, when the front com is in your hands and knows where and lost control of the troops, then of course it’s critical

[Andrey VOV]

About the Crimean catastrophe, about the operation "Bustard" there are excellent SCIENTIFIC works, not only our archives have been shoveled ... so the article is so ... on a C grade ... but for some reason it caused such a quarrel ... strange

[Tuzik]

My question is, how much is Manstein guilty of this disaster? Assuming that he was not sent to command the 11th Army, but for example Göpner, would this change something?

[Molot1979]

Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side. Each seller of broken clay pots verbally corrects the mistakes of Hannibal. So Yuri Apukhtin clearly got into his own topic and the bonfire of Soviet generals. Since Yuri Apukhtin has both memoirs and research. And it is already clear what forces and where the Germans were, even in the winter of 1941, and in May 1942. At least appoint a special missionary and send him to the military Crimea. Let him explain to Kuznetsov that no naval landings have happened, so let him gather all the troops on Turetsky Val to the last messenger. One trouble - no one knew in the fall of 1941. that the Germans were not going to land on the Crimean shores. But could they? And they could. Moreover, at any moment and without informing the Soviet commanders.
Further. Considering the number of ours, considering the Primorsky Army, is, to put it mildly, a fraud. When the Primorsky appeared on the battlefield, everything was already over. And it does not matter how many there were. All the same, they didn’t have time for the battle. Maybe then it was worth counting not all at once, but still only those who defended the isthmus? Ah, no, no way. Then the Germans will suddenly have a numerical advantage, and hinting at the utter stupidity and lack of professionalism of the red generals will become somewhat difficult.
The third. It seemed to me, or was Herr Apukhtin not aware of the real number of German and Soviet divisions? Well, I will educate him - one German cost about two Soviet. By the way, besides the Germans, there were also Romanians there. The warriors are so-so, but they had to be allocated forces against them. And Apukhtin somehow forgot about these Antoneskovites. I didn’t even mention it.
Fourth. Take the word of the most famous Wehrmacht liar, Mr. von Lewinsky? You're kidding, kid. The German Kamenev lied as he breathed. And he had no tanks. A covetous tear of compassion sprinkles on my monitor. This bastard has more than once come across the most impudent lies that you can imagine. By the way, even during the assault on Sevastopol, he "had no tanks." Only now our tanks, which "did not exist", were completely discerned. As well as the photojournalists who took pictures of them in commercial quantities. Besides, what is Manstein's yap talking about self-propelled guns? Almost every Vermath infantry division had them. Moreover, in 1941, alas, the main gun of the Red Army anti-tank gunnery, the 45-mm cannon, did not take them head-on. With such a technique, you can successfully do without tanks.
Well, you can even write a sheet about losses. Take 100 thousand prisoners out of 69 lost by the Soviet troops? For Manstein, one spit. Although this sinned the entire Wehrmacht. Were they able to capture more prisoners near Kiev than we had on the entire front? We could. So why is Erikhyuska better? Regarding Operation Bustard Hunt: if this matte results in such scanty losses that why did those who fought under his command complain that only half of the divisions were left? Although scanty losses are Manstein's favorite feature. On the Kursk Bulge, he "took" more of our prisoners in a couple of days than he suffered total losses. At the same time, he did not fulfill his task and, in general, the Germans lost a little. And with 10-day bulletins, not everything is smooth for him. After Kursk, he reported that he had lost 3000, and a day later, no longer officially, he complained that 6 thousand. Not bad - I underestimated it by half. And he didn't even get a reprimand. But for some reason, our geshikhters do not focus on such trifles and take the Hans' word for it.
In general, everything is not so simple with this Crimea. Well, about "Hunting for a bustard" - there Kozlov broke firewood. But this shukhl generally managed to fail absolutely everything that was entrusted to him. Although in some places he has quite legitimate excuses. In general, when you are on the defensive, sooner or later they break you. Well, what's the point that the Fritzes have gathered more troops to defend the Turkish Wall? They also merged this peninsula, and much faster than ours in 1941-42.

[ccsr]

Quote: Molot1979

In general, it is not so simple with this Crimea.

I completely agree with your text, because all of you have correctly described. The author of the article evaluates everything too superficially, although now unique documents come across that are opened by the Ministry of Defense, including limited veteran recollections of eyewitnesses of the battles in the Crimea, which were not previously available. Here are the testimonies of the commander of the radio station, who in this situation was able to withdraw his unit to the Taman Peninsula:

[NF68]

In the USSR, the mistakes of 1941 did not work out quickly. There was still much to learn. Therefore, in 1942, from spring to early autumn, when the Germans were firmly stuck in Stalingrad, and even sprayed their forces, having rushed to the Caucasus, the Red Army acted not in the best way

[Andy.Iv]

Author V.P. Meshcheryakov "Stalin and the military conspiracy of 1941. The search for truth." Freely available on the internet. You will read, you will find out why the directives №№ 1, 2, 3 or fakes or very prepared documents. And why, if you believe our officialdom, Molotov returned after a meeting with Schulenburg without a note on the declaration of war. And where was Stalin at the beginning of the war. And how and when was the Headquarters formed, in which the People's Commissar Tymoshenko had the post of chairman, and Stalin was one of. And what position did Comrade Zhukov occupy on 22.06.41, about which he did not report in his memoirs. And where was he on the morning of 22.06.41/22.06.1941/22.06.41. And what position did Meretskov hold on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX? which he also did not mention in his memoirs. And who helped him get away from the firing line. And who and when removed from Moscow the command of the Moscow Military District, headed by General Tyulenev, and why it was done. You will find out how the Soviet Navy was ready for war and why Admiral Oktyabrsky in the morning of XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. called early. of the spacecraft headquarters to Zhukov, and not to his chief, the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov. And a lot of things about the first days of the war, about which they still prefer to remain silent. And after reading, perhaps, finally remove from your ears these Khrushchev-Zhukov noodles, which have been feeding us all for more than a dozen years.

[ccsr]

Quote: Andy.Iv

finally remove from your ears this Khrushchev-Zhukovsky noodle that has been fed to us all for more than a dozen years.

So you hang your own? Do not worry - people themselves will figure out who they are and what hangs, because open materials are enough now.

[xomaNN]

The motto of the Russian Field Marshal Suvorov "To beat the enemy not by number, but by skill", unfortunately, was correctly applied by the German Manstein, and not the Russian commander Kozlov, com. Black Sea Fleet Oktyabrsky and "mad commissar" Mehlis are representatives of one "very revolutionary" nation.

And you can’t write about the treachery of the Wehrmacht on June 22, 41, for several months as the war went on. It was time it was already time for the Red Army commanders to start fighting properly. With twice and more superiority over the enemy during the defense (!), So will everything in Crimea ...

And the "stability" of the national parts in 41 on the example of the former. Estonian, litas. and the Latvians, who passed en masse to the Germans, for some reason did not alert Stalin. What are these Georgian and Azeri divisions? It is clear that the composition of the troops should have been mixed.

[Tuzik]

Quote: xomaNN

"mad commissar"

definitely. Where did the quote come from?

[xomaNN]

My definition Everything that I read about this figure shows exactly how a political instructor with several rhombuses in his buttonholes should NOT be. Moreover, the harm to the cause was aggravated by the aggressive-hysterical manner of "crushing" the commanders. With the uttermost military incompetence.

[aglet]

"What are these Georgian and Azeri divisions? It is clear that the composition of the troops should have been mixed."
and this, like, the fashion was like that, in 1941, it seems like the whole multinational Soviet people, as one man, came out to defend their homeland, the USSR. interestingly, voluntarily. planned mobilization took its course

[xomaNN]

Namely, they were looking for mythical "enemies of the people", but at the front they did it. Although the blame for the ideology of recruiting the Red Army is, of course, on Stalin and Headquarters, and not on the "Smershevets" (although then they were also called special officers.)

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Bar1

yes insanity grew stronger on this forum

You answered the same thing under a different nickname. right like a schoolboy. Disguised would be better

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Bar1

Quote: Alexey RA

F.I. Golikov, 31.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX

but you must understand that this cannot be so. If Germany was going to fight the USSR, then almost ALL troops should be concentrated near the borders of the USSR. So this info from the GRU is a fake and moreover strategic.

This once again confirms Mr. Martirosyan's complete misunderstanding of how events unfolded on the eve of the war. Because of this amateurish vision, versions of "the conspiracy of the generals of the Red Army", about the "online flight on Stalin's orders" and others were born ... A sofa expert, and also bad, one word

[Yuriy31]

That the tragedy of the Crimean Front, that the death of Sevastopol were the most shameful pages of that war. In both cases, Manstein wiped his nose to our pompous generals and admirals, from the plow, by amphibious assault. Moreover, in Sevastopol, our command from the very beginning of these landings feared like fire and under this case sowed mines all over the coast. On these mines, half of our own fleet was lost. All command and control of troops during the 3rd assault by Oktyabrskiy was reduced to issuing two orders "Stand to death" - sent with a messenger to the front line. And when that "long-awaited" German landing did happen, they found out about it only when its second wave went. In the first wave, according to German data, there were only two lightly wounded. But having missed that landing, the admiral did not stop in his "exploits" and decided to simply run away in a woman's cloak, and for excuse he dragged the entire command staff from the major and above from the front line, which turned the atria into a herd, and doomed it to death and captivity. All my life I've collected the stories of those few survivors there. My grandfather went all this way in the militia, and then even survived in captivity. And only out of 100 thousand prisoners in the city, according to the most rosy estimates, one in a hundred survived. I tried to put everything that I dug into a readable form and present it in the form of a story, so that the descendants would know at what cost that victory was given to us and did not write the pretentious on daddy's machines: "We can repeat" https://author.today/work/71580

[aglet]

"But having missed that landing, the admiral did not stop in his" exploits "and decided to just run away in a woman's cloak,"
you do not confuse it with Kerensky? and what German landing are you talking about here?

[Marine engineer]

On the landing across the North Bay to the South side on the night of June 28-29, 1942

“At 02 a.m., the enemy blew up a smoke screen all over the Northern Bay; under its cover the Germans began crossing 15 (who counted them?) Boats and boats. The enemy managed to capture sections of the coast in several places and went to the Trinity, St. George and Drying beams. At 100 hours and 2 minutes, units of the 50th and 16th German infantry regiments of the 47nd division began forcing the bay in the area of ​​the destroyed bridge over the Black River. The 22th German division crossed to the right. The modern bay near the mouth of the Black River is much wider than it was 24 years ago. The bay, as such, ended in the area of ​​the Oil Harbor, and then there was a swamp, which in June 70 almost dried up.
Frankly speaking, whatever they wrote about the “new” 4th defense sector, there were almost no troops in the coastal area. Our units allocated for the defense of the coastline were in the process of reformation, and the patrols simply overslept the enemy’s advance. And only after half an hour, when the battle was already on the shore, our artillery joined. By this moment, the frontal battalion of the 24th Infantry Division had seized a section of the coast in the area of ​​the modern state district power station, and the enemy managed to gain a foothold on the coast. To the left, in the area of ​​the current Apricotovka, part of the 138th brigade and the 8th brigade of the Marine Corps offered the Germans serious resistance and the two German regiments of the 65th and 213rd could not advance. The coastal batteries opened intense fire on the enemy and were able to sink 17 boats from the second wave of the landing, on which the guns and equipment of the German troops were transported, but the Germans were still able to transport part of the artillery ........ To show serious resistance to the enemy of the 4th sectors failed. ” (FROM). Boris Nikolsky

[RuSFr]

Quote: Bar1

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Bar1

but you must understand that this cannot be so. If Germany was going to fight the USSR, then almost ALL troops should be concentrated near the borders of the USSR

Why should all German troops be concentrated near the border with the USSR, if since 1939 Germany had been at war with England? Moreover, it is necessary to have reserve and training units in Germany, at least from the point of view of saving money on their maintenance and training.

Quote: Bar1

So this infa from the GRU is a fake and moreover strategic.

Doesn't the GRU "expert" take on much? Can you prove with facts that it was false? And then there is one bouncer on intelligence reports of the GRU, hiding under the nickname "Eugene", and you seem to have decided to repeat his path of a dreamer and a liar.

The catastrophe of the outbreak of war must have an explanation, therefore.
there is a premise according to Marterosyan - a conspiracy of generals.
the goal is the falsification of the true picture of the location of German divisions before the war in the eyes of Stalin.
therefore, a report from the GRU can be falsified - this is a very likely picture of those years.
However, I didn’t see this report or the report myself, because in the form of a brief quote I gave Alexey Ra. It’s necessary to cite not the report of their report, but the whole report. Link to the studio.
Well, you have advice not to get confused in the three pines.

This can only be written by a person who does not understand how intelligence information circulated at all levels between the intelligence services of NPOs, the border troops of the NKVD and the NKGB.
Not leading elementary points A. B. Martirosyan through the mouths of BAR1 says obvious nonsense. It can be stated that their knowledge is at the level of primary school students. What documents that this person saw in the archives can be talked about if he does not understand the most elementary?

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

Not leading elementary points A. B. Martirosyan through the mouths of BAR1 says obvious nonsense.

I know that you and AsmyppoL can slander any author if he exposes your lies. In this case, provide evidence that Martirosyan wrote this through the mouth of BAR1, or you are just a swindler trying to bring personal aversion to Martirosyan as obvious evidence referring to the answers of an unknown author under the nickname BAR1.
Personally, I have nothing to do with Martirosyan, I have never talked to him, I don’t interfere with his work, but as far as I know, he doesn’t write to forums at all. So the facts in the studio, verbiage you our foreign ...

[Alexey Gorshkov]

A parallel comes to my mind between the successful throwing off of Blucher and the unsuccessful attempt against Kozlov in the Crimea in 1942! And there and there Mehlis was! And if Blucher was a Far Eastern "king" who was out of control, Kozlov was the same "king" in Iran up to the Crimea, completely disintegrating the troops under his command there! It was just that in 1942 Stalin did not fit in for Mekhlis, but perhaps then Mekhlis and RAV were?

[Yuriy31]

It's hard to say today exactly who was right there. But there are different documents.

[Alexey Gorshkov]

This is not the first time I have come across the statement that the Germans, they say, had no tanks in the Crimea! B R E D !!! "Let's turn on the logic": Crimea is perhaps the only place in the USSR that Germany did not want to make its colony, but DIRECTLY INCLUDE INTO THE REICH! Superheavy guns were almost the only time in the USSR used by the Germans in the Crimea! All this speaks of the EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE of the Crimea for the Germans - and the tanks that were on the less important directions of their strikes were somehow "absent" in the battles for the Crimea ?!
Still doubtful is the story that the Germans, somewhere, "the guards scattered," and the prisoners "bydto ba" did not break free, but "went into captivity in an organized manner!" This is no longer nonsense, but M A R A Z M !!!

[aglet]

"B R E D !!!"
Interestingly, only the Germans wrote about this, but our propaganda did not write directly, but hinted how many tanks the Germans had in the Crimea. "from the Soviet information bureau, well, further
"EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE of Crimea for Germans"
Well, not Crimea, in general, but only Sevastopol. Hitler just a fetishist was, again, shell-shocked by artillery, and therefore sent them, grains, to the Crimea. but there wasn’t any sense from them

[Yuriy31]

Tanks in the Crimea were not only during the second assault, the rest of the time they were. And near Sevastopol, after the collapse of the Crimean Front, even the regiment of our captured tanks took part. At that, one was KV1, which they couldn’t penetrate from our 45 mm cannons, but fortunately, he got stuck in the floodplain of the river and remained there. But the Shtugs with 2-3 shots were guaranteed to burn our primitive bunkers, which were built purely for reporting to the command, and on which that command so hoped. Of the hundreds of those bunkers that today there were only a couple of pieces, the floors were preserved.

[modun]

Manstein is handsome! He had a brilliant operation. And with the capture of Sevastopol, how many prisoners did the Red Army lose?

[place]

Quote: Modun

Manstein is handsome! I performed a brilliant operation.

Just a genius! Since at the same time he did not slam your ancestors, foreseeing in advance what offspring will grow ... very, very sorry ...

As for military talents, they were not unlimited. In winter-spring 1944, suffered a heavy defeat on the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge (Vatutin)
In the spring of 1944, during the Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation (Kom. Zhukov), the 1st Tank Army subordinate to Manstein was surrounded.

As a result, on March 30, 1944, Manstein was awarded the Swords (No. 59) to the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, and on April 1, 1944, he was removed from office and enlisted in the Fuhrer's reserve. He lived on his estate.. But THIS is already a tradition of a society that, although it did not have the strength to win the war, BUT had the intelligence to treat its own people normally, even if they did a pretty good job.

After all, only slaves, serf lackeys, admire those who once beat them well. As the poet said? "The harder the punishment, the dearer they are, gentlemen." Or those who could become them.

[place]

Even the loss and burning of Moscow in 1812 was not a catastrophe either for Kutuzov's contemporaries, or for Emperor Alexander, or for subsequent generations. If such a term refers to situations of the Patriotic War of the 20th century, similar to those that were in the Patriotic War of the 19th century- means the media are in the hands of the enemy.

[Angry]

Hmm ... cadres are everything! An unforgettable phrase by Trotsky .... And we didn’t have such "cadres" during that period of the war. The severe pain of war. The main backbone of the future marshals of the winners appeared only in the Battle of Kursk, who, with their skill, outplayed the honored world luminaries of Germany and defeated the enemy. Glory to the Russian soldier!

[fliger85]

Mehlis, did a LOT of nasty things. He did not have military training, but only knew how to flutter his tongue like many members of the CPSU. Because of him, a large number of soldiers died.

[peter1v]

Thanks to the heroic Transcaucasian divisions, the concept of eldash existed in Kerch for a very long time. This was the name of an infinitely cowardly and pitiful person. While the commanders of these divisions were drinking with prostitutes, the soldiers were begging on the streets of the city of Kerch. They applied for alms from the word yoldash (comrade).