Military Review

Massive use of tanks

233

A bit of history



A tank on the battlefields appeared in World War I as a response to a positional dead end, on the one hand, and as a result of technological development, on the other. In fact, the idea tank hovered over the battlefields from ancient times, but its implementation was hampered by the lack of an appropriate technical base. That is, I wanted something, I wanted it, both before Leonardo da Vinci and after him, but it could not. Although heavy, fully armored cavalry, or walk-cities, this is a quasi-realization of this idea at the “that” level. That is, a combination of mobility and shock (fire) power is something that commanders have long sought. And at the very end of the WWII, it still appeared on the battlefields. That same new weapon. In general, the tanks showed a good performance, although they did not fully justify the tasks assigned to them (unlike aviationwhich exceeded these expectations).

But the birth of tank troops has already taken place. Their finest hour will come a little later, on the battlefields of World War II. And then it was the tank troops that far exceeded all expectations and calculations. New ideas penetrate general’s brains with great difficulty, this simple fact can be confirmed by the fact that even after the demonstrative defeat of Poland, carried out by a combination of “tanks - tactical aviation”, the allied generals (having six months of time) did practically nothing to fundamentally change the course battles in France. But the financial and production capabilities of England and France far exceeded the German ones! However, France fell in 2 weeks.

But in the Soviet Union (unlike France), tank troops received increased attention, and the government did literally everything possible for their development (this can be said even more about Soviet aviation). Monstrous resources were thrown at solving the tasks of the Air Force of the Red Army and tank troops, and backward peasant Russia (this should be taken into account when comparing with the USA, the British Empire, France or Germany) achieved perhaps outstanding results.

And if the material part of the Soviet Air Force was still inferior both to Germany and to the Allies in terms of level (with all desire, it could not be otherwise), then in the materiel of the tank forces of the USSR it was in the lead in many ways. And the number of units of this very technique was very significant for yesterday's peasant country.

However, the experience of the summer of 1941 turned out to be very bitter for both Soviet pilots and Soviet tankers. It was not so much a war as a rout. Moreover, the most annoying thing is to note some “bright spots” in all this gloomy stories quite difficult. A lot has been written about aviation. About tank troops - a little less.

"Rubber" thirty-four


It is very confusing precisely the lack of any clear picture of what the Soviet tank troops at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War were. More truly, this very picture "floats" very strongly. At first we were told for a very long time that there were few Soviet tanks, and the “thirty-four” was a real masterpiece ... Then suddenly it turned out that there were a lot of tanks (and very different ones). Then it turned out that the “thirty-four” was not such a masterpiece. Then ... Somehow the picture floats, floats, and continuously. In order to analyze something, you need to understand the source data, but this is just a very big problem.

And in general, in such a situation there is a very bad feeling that they are trying to deceive you. Is it really so difficult to study the state of Soviet tank troops at the beginning of the war? Is there a problem with the translation of documents? Or with what? Constant “discoveries” provoke an open distrust of Soviet / Russian military-historical science as a whole. It seems that you are dealing with people who are either not entirely competent or not quite decent.

Either we have one situation in the tank troops before the war, then all of a sudden it’s completely different ... This is somehow annoying. Have you, gentlemen, for all the post-war decades, you could not figure out the state of the armored units of the Red Army on June 41st? But how were you going to fight with NATO in Europe?

In general, everything is somehow muddy in the Danish kingdom ... Information on Soviet tanks is just the sea, but somehow it cannot be structured and analyzed. Once again: research is certainly good. Discoveries, too, but here continuous discoveries and sensations on one specific and well-documented topic over the decades have raised suspicions in the qualifications and adequacy of researchers. As the saying goes, a fool makes a lot of discoveries every day.

In order to seriously move on, one must have a firm footing: a clear understanding of the state of the USSR tank forces on June 41st. Well, for the sake of completeness, the same clear understanding of the state of the Panzervaffe on June 41st. And with us, the numbers are floating in different directions, and the performance characteristics of the tanks of the opposing powers are changing with each new “study”. Don't you think this is somehow a little strange?

General sad picture


In any case, after 1991, this topic became the subject of numerous books and articles already in Russia. And the numbers (both quantity and TTX) continued to float, but the overall picture was very gloomy. It was a pogrom, otherwise you will not name. Soviet tank forces strangely did very little, having lost a huge amount of materiel. And this picture is literally mesmerizing ... Well, how so? Why?

There are a lot of books on this subject, and the picture there is quite paradoxical: the initial superiority of the Red Army in tanks ... and the subsequent demonstrative defeat. And so on and on. And somehow it's weird. Moreover, especially at the initial stage of the war, the Red Army had enough artillery and aviation. It seems like there was something to support.

That is, the question is not even that the Soviet tanks did not defeat Hitler in the summer of 41, no, the question is that everything was so merged. No critical losses for the German side. Some kind of paradox. Upon learning how there were tanks at the Red Army at the beginning of the battles with the Wehrmacht, you involuntarily wonder: what did they all do in the summer of 41?

I don’t even want to refute the myth of “suddenness of impact”. Tactically - it is possible, but strategically waiting for the war, preparing for war, and the tanks were preparing just for defense from the west. Poor technical condition of equipment, re-equipment ... What else can you tell? No, if the tanks were transported on platforms, and then there was war and bombing, then everything seems to be understandable, but there were situations when Soviet tankmen left their places of permanent deployment ... and they died just as mediocre from the point of view of disrupting the German invasion.

That is, it turned out that there were large own losses with the non-obviousness of the results achieved. No, well, at least a couple of major battles to win, to chase the Germans, and then be in a strategic environment or stand up due to lack of fuel - is not so offensive. But in June-July of the 41st, “chasing the Germans” somehow did not work out very well. And even in certain sections of the front. But, actually, why?

Legends and myths about the “super-powerful Wehrmacht” have not been questioned for a long time: since Hitler “conquered all of Europe” and killed tens of millions in the USSR, then an extra-powerful army stood behind him. Then it gradually became clear that this was "not quite so." And the situation with the Panzervaffe materiel at the beginning of the war with the USSR looked especially ridiculous. Somehow it was a pity everything was miserable. The “backlash” had the Me-109, the Kriegsmarine “Bismarck”, the German tankers had nothing ... worthy of mention.

Massive use of tanks

And it was to be fought on land. Understanding the transcendent insanity of this situation, Soviet historians described the Panzervaffe materiel without a breakdown by years. Hence the smart talk about the Tigers, Panthers, and other Elephants with Ferdinand. But these brave guys in black tank uniforms invaded the Soviet Union in fact with bare ambitions. As a result, a “historical line” has already arisen for the glorification of Pz-III, Pz-IV. Say, they were devilishly powerful and dangerous tanks ... and they were just to hell.

You know, sometimes it becomes somehow embarrassing for yourself, for those around you, for Russian historical science as a whole. Just because of your age, you remember very well how Soviet-Russian “tank science” science was changing, and somehow it’s very unpleasantly done. Not every merchant from the central market shows such a spinal flexibility. The truth that was yesterday is no longer true, but the one that was the day before yesterday is almost completely forgotten.

- What do you remember?

- I remember the war, the German tanks ...

- What tanks?

- Big ones, black, with crosses ...

- Or maybe the other way around?

- Maybe, and vice versa, the tanks are white, and the crosses are black ...

Theory and practice


There is a normal scientific approach when facts are collected, systematized, studied, laws established, on the basis of which a certain theory is created that describes reality ... It lives for a while, then is replaced by a new one. But there is another, more progressive approach: when a theory is composed, and then facts and results of laboratory experiments are adjusted to fit it.

It is clear that the history of WWII was politicized to the limit in the USSR. It is clear that the results of "scientific research" were determined in advance and at the very top, it is clear that the course of events for the Red Army and especially tank units in the summer of the 41st is absolutely disastrous. All this is understandable.

As a result, as a matter of fact, it was precisely this, the most striking period of military history that fell completely out of the attention of researchers, because it was categorically impossible to investigate something there. It is enough to recall the last scandal with publications on the battle of Prokhorovka and the “alternative” point of view on it. And it was taken literally with hostility. Although it seems to be how many years have passed. How many winters. This is all already - a gray-haired story, you can hit the "alternative", but no, you can not. But the Battle of Kursk as a whole was a defeat for the Wehrmacht. And it was all far from burning in the summer of the 41st. But no, only a canonical version of the story.

Therefore, depending on the political requirements of the moment, the views on the state of the tank units of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war are radically changing, respectively, the technical characteristics and the number of units of those same “shells” begin to “float”. That is, the domestic “tank science” science does not go from facts to theory, but exactly the opposite ... And strictly in accordance with the requirements of the moment. And she can prove anything at all.

I would like to clarify: telling in detail about individual (interesting) examples of armored vehicles is one thing, but to give a general picture of the balance of power is a little different, and if we have no problems with the first, then the second task is somehow fundamentally unsolvable ( one gets the impression).

Unique German Blitzkrieg


But yes, Adolf Hitler really captured most of continental Europe, from the Atlantic to the Volga, and he did it mainly with tanks. And, the most offensive, he did it quite easily and confidently. And each time, that in Poland, that in France, that in Ukraine, the enemy’s front collapsed, and its units found themselves in a hopeless situation, being surrounded (kessel shlaht). And this happened over and over again, like on a conveyor belt.

And each time tanks went forward. Of which, frankly, Hitler had very few, and their quality left much to be desired. You know, blaming Hitler’s opponents for not paying attention to tanks is quite difficult. To say that France was much inferior to Germany in terms of quantity and quality of materiel means frankly crocheting. Reproaches to Stalin and the Soviet marshals in the preference for a “horse that breathes” against the background of the data that are now open look generally a mockery.

We have been told for so long about German militarism and the German military machine that familiarization with the real state of affairs in the field of providing the invincible Wehrmacht with tanks on September 1 of the 39th year can cause nothing but surprise. Everything is so sad and hopeless. We must start with the fact that such miracles of military-technical thought as Pz-I and Pz-II were used with might and main.

A kind of "brilliance and poverty" of the Nazi Panzervaffe in one bottle. Is it precisely with these “armored horsemen of the Apocalypse” that the villain Adolf planned to conquer the planet Earth? Imagine yourself a high-level Soviet military intelligence in the 39th year. All the data on the capabilities and equipment of the German tank divisions are on your table. And why should you be afraid?

On September 1, 1939 (the beginning of World War II), the Wehrmacht had 3190 tanks, of which Pz Kpfw I - 1145, Pz Kpfw II - 1223, Pz Kpfw 35 (t) - 219, Pz Kpfw 38 (t) - 76, Pz Kpfw III - 98, Pz Kpfw IV - 211, 215 - commander, 3 - flamethrower, 5 assault guns. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzervaffe.

Nevertheless, a blitzkrieg in Poland took place. A little later, a blitzkrieg took place in France, where affairs with the Panzervaffe match were not much better.


PzKpfw I - 643 units, PzKpfw II - 880 units, PzKpfw III - 349 units, PzKpfw IV - 281 units, Pz.Kpfw.35 (t) - 128 units, Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) - 207 units.

(Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Campaign.)

Somehow not very impressive. Especially if you take a closer look at these same "panzerkampfvagenami".

That is, it becomes absolutely incomprehensible the ratio of the results and the original numbers. But how so? As a matter of fact, this is precisely why Soviet historians didn’t dig into the figures, but rested on the “anti-human ideology of fascism”. Nazi parades still liked to show on TV. No doubt, filmed pathetic. In the sense of the parade and speech of the Fuhrer. The trouble is that as soon as we begin to "dig deep", namely to study the armored vehicles of the Third Reich, the impression immediately spoils.

Somehow frankly "not impressive." It does not scare or frighten. After all, Imperial Japan, which was preparing a naval blitzkrieg, had Yamato and aircraft carriers. There was something to be afraid of. In general, the fleet is very, very good. And aviation fleet. And what was the Wehrmacht? What was there to be afraid of?

Put yourself in the place of the head of Soviet military intelligence in the prewar period. You need to scare Stalin with the Wehrmacht. What will be the ideas? Show photos of the Pz-I column? Or scroll through the film recording the speech of the Fuhrer? Now, if you remove Adolf’s public tantrums and muffle the pathos of military marches ... it quickly becomes clear that there’s nothing to scare.

Today we know what will happen in the summer of 41, but it is impossible to categorically extrapolate this from the data of the 39-40th for the tank units of the USSR and Germany. German tank units did the unthinkable. Based on the state of their equipment (quality and quantity).


German-Japanese "quality" approach to the creation of the army


In the new European history, the idea of ​​universal appeal comes from revolutionary France. "Citizens, the fatherland is in danger!" These words are written in gold letters in world history. It was then that, not being able to rely on the well-trained royal units (which were already not so reliable, and most of their officers were hostile to the ideas of the revolution), revolutionary generals and commissars actively began to use the masses of poorly trained patriots with the support of traditionally powerful French artillery. And there was no other choice.

For long and complex maneuvers, troops are needed well-trained. Which is desirable to protect. Because how to train them is difficult, long and expensive. That is why Bonaparte from a certain moment had serious problems with German conscripts. Oddly enough, many Germans willingly joined his army (mercenaryism is a curse of the Germans, as one of the classics said). So, to be a professional soldier for a German was normal.

They just got used to the small, expensive and carefully used armies of the previous era. But revolutionary France and Napoleon Bonaparte took a completely different path ... The massive use of recruits. The massive use of artillery and cavalry. And many competent historians note the influence of the Napoleonic Wars on French demography (a separate big topic). Until the brilliant Bonaparte, soldiers were always enough for the French kings. France was famous for this, its many people.

But the brilliant Bonaparte spent them in such quantitiesThat it really became a big problem. Before him, all the French kings rested in a lack of finance in the conduct of large and protracted wars. Bonaparte was faced with a purely demographic problem. A true genius, not otherwise. Revolutionarily approached military affairs! Monument to him, a monument in full growth! At the end of the reign of Louis XIV, France faced a complete economic and financial collapse. As a result of numerous wars, of course. Bonaparte was faced with the fact that there was no one to complete the army. People are over. Horses too. But as a commander, he is brilliant!

But it was precisely the German comrades who did not argue with this ideology of the mass army. What for? They just went their own way. The quality of the training of personnel played a decisive role in the Franco-Prussian and in the First World War. I met data that during the WWII, the Germans lost 40% of the recruits, while the French lost 70%. But nothing surprising, the most well-trained army at the beginning of the war was just German. And this army had to fight for 4 years, and on two fronts.

The main secret of the high combat effectiveness of the German army during the two world wars was quite simple and lay on the surface. High level of training of personnel! And if the Soviet generals before the Second World War counted thousands of tanks and planes, the German ones painfully noted that “in the 39th we even do not have that soldier in the 14th ...”

And then, after all this, some historians ask themselves: why did the USSR not finish off Army Group North, which was blocked in Courland? And everything is simple: during the battles on the Eastern Front, this group of armies suffered the least losses (out of three), and therefore it was categorically impossible to “smash” it even in the 44th. Too good personnel, too experienced.

“In the fall of 1944, during the Memel operation, Army Group North, which at that time consisted of up to 250 thousand soldiers and officers, was pressed against the Baltic Sea and cut off from the main forces. Nevertheless, communication with Germany continued by sea. Here she held the defense until the end of the war - all the attempts of the Soviet troops to complete its defeat failed. ”

(Source: w.histrf.ru/articles/article/show/gruppa_armii_sievier.)

Wanting and being able to do this are slightly different things. To beat quality with quantity is sometimes a very costly undertaking, sometimes simply impossible. The famous three-digit accounts of German aces go from there. Three-digit accounts of German "expert" tankers are also from there. Of quality approach to the construction of the armed forces. That during the fighting could give opponents very unpleasant surprises. Moreover, from the number of units of armored vehicles, the thickness of the armor and the caliber of tank guns, this directly it should not (for some strange reason, we analyze only the ratio of performance characteristics and quantity).

Strictly speaking, the enchanting successes of the Japanese imperial fleet at the initial stage of the war in the Pacific Ocean come precisely from a qualitative approach to the construction of the armed forces of the empire. A kind of "hidden superiority." Deck aviation pilots were trained as astronauts, and candidates were gathered throughout the Yamato country. The best of the best. That is why Pearl Harbor became possible. That is why Ripals and Rinaun. And when these pilots with pre-war training were knocked out, aviation de facto disappeared from Japan. Although they increased the production of fighters with all their might. But the "Marian turkey hunt" once again convincingly proved that in a technically complex war, quantity is a very poor substitute for quality (meaning the quality of personnel training).

Panzer Division as a Complex System


In principle, the same Isaev, exploring the "myths" of the Great Patriotic War, quite convincingly proved to himself that the problem of Soviet tankers at the initial stage of hostilities was not "millimeters of armor and caliber" and not even "the general perfection of the tank design", but the complete imbalance is real operating tank units: that is, an excess of armored vehicles with the actual absence of artillery and infantry ... but the tanks themselves do not fight. Even the best. But that is exactly what happened at the beginning of the war. With trucks to ensure action somehow did not work out. Therefore, to bring guns and infantry to the battlefield did not work. Repair capabilities also left much to be desired. It’s better to just keep silent about providing fuel and air cover.


In such circumstances, the best tanks became useless. Despite any "millimeters, revolutionary design and thousands of pieces." I understand, it's a shame. By the way, this is not a reason to professionally discredit the materiel of Soviet tank troops. Technology itself does not fight. And in itself superiority on the battlefield does not guarantee.

Battles and battles are won not by tanks and battleships, but structureswhich they enter. And the "millimeters" (armor and caliber) are certainly interesting, but they themselves do not solve anything, like the horsepower hidden in the engines. The Japanese gained dominance in the sky over the Pacific Ocean at a very modest TTX "Zero". There other factors played a role.

German tankers conquered Europe on very medium (in all senses of the word) tanks, but in general light ones. But they conquered. The Tigers, the Yagdtigers, and the Koenigtigers did not somehow succeed. Although German divisionsarmed with similar equipment look really intimidating. But they could not achieve something outstanding in terms of captures. The historical paradox. They were beaten on the Eastern Front, and actively beaten, simply because they had already learned how to fight. The first "appearance of the" Tiger "of the Red Army" was passed almost unnoticed by anyone in the latter. But Pz-I in the summer of 41 simply "burned with napalm" and terrified.

The latest offensive of the 6th SS Panzer Army near Balaton on modern technology ended in failure for many reasons, the main of which: Soviet anti-tank artillerymen laid the shell at the target from the first shot. No options. Because experience. The Americans suffered a bit earlier from the same tanks, due to the lack of such skills (well, not the same equipment!).

In technically difficult combat arms and types of troops, to compensate for the quantity by quality is often a hopeless business. The best anti-tank gun cannot be better than the calculation that serves it. Millimeters and things won’t save us, alas. They will not save anyone.

The sudden scandalous discussion around the battle of Prokhorovka (the mother of all tank battles) exposed the same problem of the insufficient qualification of Soviet tank crews of the 43rd year model (at all levels). As it turned out a lot after the war, that legendary battle for the Red Army was not too successful, so to speak. Although it seems as if the war had not begun. And it seems like not suddenness.

But the thing is that tank troops are a technically sophisticated branch of the armed forces, and qualification is crucial here. In general, the miracle did not happen, and although “reinforcements were sent,” it did not help much.

conclusions


The same Isaev, analyzing the megacounts of the German megaases of the Luftwaffe, ironically remarks that this is rather “the temperature of the patient, not the girth of the biceps” and that the Soviet approach of “mass training of pilots” was better than the German bet on experts. I won’t argue about aviation (a big separate issue), but as for tankers and tank units, the conclusion is most likely not in favor of the Soviet approach of mass production of tanks and the use of low-skilled tankers.

Well, I used the Red Army tanks "massively", used from the first days of the war (when the crews were still with pre-war training) And what did she give? Where are the results, Billy? We need results ... but the results are somehow not very good. The most annoying thing is that at least to make a lasting impression on the German soldiers and especially the German tankmen with these "massive tank attacks" at the beginning of the war did not work out very well. Somehow they "did not get deposited" in memory. Yes, and the "legendary thirty-four," they noticed a little late. Far from June. Well, when they noticed, they began to "finish off" the Tiger in a hurry just to repulse the massive attacks of enemy tanks (including). But there was no “panic”.

As a matter of fact, already much later, the Arabs comrades used tanks in the most active way, and it was massive. But they also failed to throw the Israelis into the warm waters of the Mediterranean Sea. It’s hard to say why. Although, based on the number of “Arab” tanks and the size of the territory “the most proud among small states,” that was how it was supposed to end.

Therefore, the traditional Soviet approach to the evaluation of tank troops through pieces, horsepower, millimeters, the author seems somewhat controversial. Any tank cannot be better than its crew, and taking into account the time and amount of resources necessary for the high-quality training of such a crew, the “mass approach” doesn’t work at all. A tank crew below average is more of a burden (a threat?) For their own. Considering the cost of materiel today and in any case a limited amount (T-90 can not be released as much as T-55), the approach to the tank units as elite and shock seems quite reasonable.

The massive use of tanks against a weak enemy is excessive, against a strong one, as practice shows, such a use of tanks (to compensate for everything else) leads to unjustified losses. And the throughput of any communication lines is slightly limited ... as is the ability of any rear to supply fuel. And the more armored vehicles you have, the more it eats fuel, and there are no more roads from this. Well, a large accumulation of tanks (the result of limited roads and fuel) is a dream for enemy aircraft and artillery.

That is, the Soviet "more than 50 thousand units of armored vehicles" - rather reinsurance "troika-generals" than a logical and practically necessary amount.

Author:
Photos used:
tank100.com
Articles from this series:
Hot summer 1941-42. Part of 1
Hot summer 1941-42. Part of 2
Fabulous, magical and amazing military equipment
233 comments
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  1. Pessimist22
    Pessimist22 5 July 2020 05: 52
    -28 qualifying.
    Yeah, low-skilled tankers, with competent command, having done everything on time (like Kuznetsov in the Northern Fleet), it was possible to show completely different results, and the responsibility for 41 years lies with Stalin and his generals.
    1. Revolver
      Revolver 5 July 2020 07: 29
      16
      Quote: Pessimist22
      responsibility for 41 years rests with Stalin and his generals

      Pavlov is not a victim of repression, but was shot for the cause. And not even for the fact that he surrendered Minsk and killed most of the troops entrusted to him in boilers and thoughtless counterattacks. But the way he did it, and his motivation are still awaiting the assessments of historians, because not all archives of that time are open.
      Khrushchev and Eremenko, by their actions, caused a catastrophe of comparable size in 1942 in an attempt to recapture Kharkov. But they were not only not shot, but not even demoted. Although what Stalin expressed to them in a personal conversation, and what Stalin thought about them, one can only guess. We can only regret that Khrushchev was not shot.
      1. Sergey Valov
        Sergey Valov 5 July 2020 08: 22
        +5
        According to this logic, Zhukov had to be shot for preparing the Red Army for the Second World War, and for the company you could also Voroshilov, Stalin for the personnel policy, and so on to the level of platoon commanders.
      2. Vovk
        Vovk 5 July 2020 09: 39
        +5
        Quote: Nagan
        Pavlov is not a victim of repression, but was shot for the cause. And not even for the fact that he surrendered Minsk and killed most of the troops entrusted to him in boilers and thoughtless counterattacks. But the way he did it, and his motivation are still awaiting the assessments of historians, because not all archives of that time are open.

        And you know that it was he who saw the potential in T-34-76, that it was he who led the secret supervision of the project and his support long before the famous run from Kharkov to Moscow.
        You will not find such a thing in historical chronicles, of course, this is an "enemy of the people" ... "German spy" ... "talentless commander" ...
        1. Samson S.
          Samson S. 5 July 2020 18: 10
          +2
          Quote: Vovk
          And you know that it was he who saw the potential in T-34-76, that it was he who led the secret supervision of the project and his support long before the famous run from Kharkov to Moscow.

          So.
          T-34/76 from A-20 to replace the T-26 was invented by the head of ABTU Pavlov.
          He also came up with the T-126SP to make the T-50 to replace the BT-7.
          Those. changed BTT classes. And it is worth a lot.
          He forbade to put in the BTT miserable 40 klb. three inches, which was absolutely correct. And only after Voroshilov survived him in Minsk, a miserable 40 klb appeared on the Soviet BTT. three-inch F-34 and ZIS-5. Which were bad for literally everything.
          1. Revolver
            Revolver 5 July 2020 22: 12
            +1
            Quote: Samson S.
            miserable 40 klb. three-inch F-34 and ZIS-5

            It’s good that it’s not L-11, much less its predecessor L-10.
            1. Samson S.
              Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 03
              0
              Quote: Nagan
              It’s good that it’s not L-11, much less its predecessor L-10.

              Just the L-11 was much better than the F-34.
              L-10 was worse than L-11, but better than F-34.
              You don't seem to understand what a "tank" is.
              Or the fact that the L-11 (and L-10) differed from the F-34. And without this, you will not understand why Pavlov (then the head of ABTU) forbade putting on the T-34 F-34, and on the KV-1, ZIS-5.
              1. Revolver
                Revolver 6 July 2020 00: 44
                +1
                Quote: Samson S.
                L-10 was worse than L-11, but better than F-34.
                You don't seem to understand what a "tank" is.
                Or of how L-11 (and L-10) differed from F-34.

                But the crews asked to give them more T-34s with F-34s instead of L-11s. Initially, battalion, company, and platoon commanders rowed vehicles from the F-34, because they could. Obviously the penetration and flatness of the gun were valued more than understanding "what a tank is".
                What were the differences? Yes, everyone, and first of all a long barrel, due to which they had the best penetration ability with the same shell. And also due to the fact that, unlike the L-11, they were still shotgun shells that provide even better penetration at short distances. Well, and the fact that it was possible to shoot at large elevation angles, without fear of breaking the knee pad.
                No, I didn’t shoot from either gun. I believe that you too. But I had a chance to read about them.
                Yes, by the way, what is a tank, and why is the L-11 more suitable for a tank? Explain to me uneducated.
                1. hohol95
                  hohol95 6 July 2020 08: 02
                  +1
                  And also due to the fact that, unlike the L-11, they were still shotgun shells that provide even better penetration at short distances.

                  When there were sub-caliber shells for 76 mm tank and division guns, the L-11 could only be found on single tanks of the Leningrad Front!
                  1. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 6 July 2020 13: 20
                    +2
                    Quote: hohol95
                    When there were sub-caliber shells for 76 mm tank and division guns, the L-11 could only be found on single tanks of the Leningrad Front!

                    Or Karelsky - there was also one reserve there. smile
                    1. hohol95
                      hohol95 6 July 2020 13: 51
                      +2
                      Logical.
                      In 1943, 107 battalions were reorganized into the 90th tank regiment, and by July 20, 1944 (the moment the Soviet offensive began in Karelia) it included 3 T-28, 8 T-26, 5 T-30, 1 T-60 and 3 T-38.

                      T-28s could have been armed with KT-28s!
        2. orcinus
          orcinus 10 July 2020 18: 54
          0
          Let's not confuse the sweet with the square: Pavlov, as a person who guessed the promising direction of tank building, is one thing, and Pavlov is a general who "could not guess" or did not "want" about the main directions of strikes in Belarus, as well as organize competent defense in entrusted area is completely different! It was the crushing blow to the ZapOVO that later allowed the Germans to help Army Group South, thereby tearing apart the entire Eastern Front by September.
      3. Ryaruav
        Ryaruav 5 July 2020 10: 46
        -3
        Nagan is not Yeremenko, but Tymoshenko, they both had to be shot
      4. smaug78
        smaug78 5 July 2020 18: 54
        +3
        What are you saying? And who set Pavlov as the commander of the district, although before that Pavlov led a maximum of the brigade?
      5. gregor6549
        gregor6549 6 July 2020 14: 34
        +2
        SW Comrade Nagan (aka Revolver).
        Of course, you can blame everything on Pavlov, and on Eremenko, and on Khrushchev, and on many other executors of the directives and orders of Zhukov and Tymoshenko.
        But put yourself in their place. First, you are ordered to concentrate your troops and troops redeployed by order of Zhukov and Tymoshenko from the internal districts, near the border, including in the infamous ledges, then they order you not to succumb to provocations and not to put the troops on alert, then in accordance with the directives No 1,2,3 of the same Zhukov and Tymoshenko, are ordered to launch counterattacks, not giving Pavlov or other military leaders of his level time to understand the situation, assess the state of their troops, understand the plans of the enemy, and the troops to recover after the first attacks of the Germans and etc.
        Add to everything that the tanks, artillery, aircraft, ammunition, fuel, etc., concentrated by orders of the same high military leaders in a narrow border zone, were destroyed or captured by the Germans already in the first hours and days of the war, as a result of which the Germans received areas of hostilities almost complete air supremacy, which gave them the opportunity to bomb with impunity, including targeted, any targets on the ground, receive intelligence in almost real time without special interference and even use 88 mm anti-aircraft guns instead of fighting Soviet aircraft to combat Soviet tanks T34 and KV, which the German anti-tank artillery did not take then.
        Those. Due to the "competent" strategic planning of Zhukov and your comrades, from the very beginning of the DB, you lost everything that could effectively fight the Germans, and then the same comrades order you to rush into insane and thoughtless counterattacks, without delving into whether you have enough forces, means and time to deliver such counterstrikes.
        I believe that you would end up on the same firing list as Pavlov and many others, including the chiefs of the military and veterinary services of the district. What were they shot for?
        And mind you. Having given his "approvals" to the execution of Pavlov and his team in accordance with the list prepared by Mehlis, Stalin limited himself to their executions, without presenting any formal accusations to Zhukov, Timoshenko, or other military leaders, whose affairs were no better than Pavlov's. ... Yes, and could not show, tk. both Timoshenko and Zhukov were only diligent executors of Stalin's idea to inflict a sudden blow on the Germans, for which, in fact, Zhukov concentrated a mass of troops where they should not have been and where they were ineptly killed or captured.
        And Zhukov did this not because he was so "stupid" as many now portray him, but because he did everything in the same way on Khalkhin Gol. Then it worked, but in June 41 it didn't
        As one of the reasons for the defeat of Kr. The army at the beginning of the war is also called the lack of radio communications in the troops, which they say was one of the reasons for the loss of control of these troops. But at the same Khalkhin Gole Zhukov even forbade the use of cash radio communications, so as not to disclose their intentions to the Japanese. And with a wire connection at Khalkhin Gol it was not very. But this did not hinder the command and control of troops.
        But with topographic maps, without which troop control is really, impossible, at the beginning of the war there really was a disaster. Those. there were more than enough cards and the cards themselves were of the highest quality, only the vast majority of them were maps of Romania, Poland, Germany, etc., but the maps of their territory on which they had to fight were scanty.
    2. Samson S.
      Samson S. 5 July 2020 18: 02
      -14 qualifying.
      Awful article.
      Its author does not know that:
      1. The Germans carried out the re-equipment of the Panzerwaffe after France and before the USSR twice, in the autumn of 1940 and in the spring of 1941. And not the tanks that attacked the USSR at all. More precisely, those in France, too. But in the second line, following the latest models.
      2. In the USSR there was no normal artillery.
      There wasn’t at all.
      Moreover, the whole war.
      And the first tank gun in the USSR since the 40s was made only in the 60s of the last century.
      Therefore, there was simply nothing to oppose the German tanks.
      And the Soviet mechanized corps simply could not get to the areas of concentration. Someone did not start right in the park. And someone broke down on the road. Well, those who nevertheless entered the battle were easily and simply destroyed by the German art.
      Why?
      Because the USSR produced "Soviet products". Those. shit.
      You can fight with shit, but it turns out very human. What WWII and 2MB and demonstrated.
      I quit reading further.
      1. smaug78
        smaug78 5 July 2020 18: 58
        +6
        The re-equipment of the Panzervaffe, the Germans after France and before the USSR, was carried out twice, in the autumn of 1940 and in the spring of 1941.
        Will you please the source of information? Moreover, the USSR carried out rearmament too ...
        And the first tank gun in the USSR since the 40s was made only in the 60s of the last century.
        ZIS-2, SPM, F-22 are looking at you a little bewildered ...
        Anyway mate. pull up part ...
        1. Samson S.
          Samson S. 5 July 2020 19: 09
          -13 qualifying.
          Quote: smaug78
          Will you please the source of information?

          Are you banned on the Internet?
          Are you the difference between Pz.KpfW.IV Ausf.D and Pz.KpfW.IV Ausf.E do not understand?
          Quote: smaug78
          Moreover, the USSR carried out rearmament too ..

          What I did with my BTT of the USSR is called ... I do not want to swear.
          But if without a mat, then everything was according to the scheme "the need to make a cunning".
          Quote: smaug78
          ZIS-2, SPM, F-22 are looking at you a little perplexed ..

          Is Soviet shit perplexed?
          Yes, except that it is only capable of it.
          The three-inch model (the one that was tsarist and battle-worthy) was destroyed by "Soviet designers" in 1930. For some time, thanks to Pavlov, the BTT was kept, not allowing the conscientious three-inch shoes there. But he was exiled to Minsk, after which the Soviet BTT did not go well either. They were "rearmed" for this squalor too.
          ZIS-2 was actually the first Soviet independent gun. And like everything Soviet, it was nonsense. Delirium ordinary. Which was done for 4 years (from 1940 to 1943). But they didn’t do anything sensible. They simply did not know how to do anything sensible.
          Quote: smaug78
          Anyway mate. pull the part up ..

          Funny.
          1. smaug78
            smaug78 5 July 2020 19: 27
            +3
            And again a stream of thoughts, while it’s funny:
            the difference between Pz.KpfW.IV Ausf.D and Pz.KpfW.IV Ausf.E do not understand
            And what is so terrible there?
            What he did with his BTT of the USSR is called
            And Guderian, so narrow-minded, simply suggested copying the T-34.
            Is Soviet shit perplexed?

            Three-inch (the one that was royal and combat-ready)

            What, a three-inch is an anti-tank gun? laughing
            ZIS-2, USV, F-22

            Is Soviet shit perplexed?
            What are you saying, again the Germans are looking at you strangely. Wrong, they just adopted this "shit" into service? Whether the grandfather's three-inch model laughing laughing
            1. Samson S.
              Samson S. 5 July 2020 19: 46
              -9
              Quote: smaug78
              And what is so terrible there?

              Nothing. It's just a very different BTT.
              Quote: smaug78
              And Guderian, so narrow-minded, simply suggested copying the T-34.

              This is an invention of Sovagitprop.
              German tanks were the best in the years of WW2 (except for the British Comet). Therefore, the Germans did not make sense to copy the TG-34 type.
              Quote: smaug78
              What, a three-inch is an anti-tank gun?

              It depends on what kind. ZIS-3, yes, initially. Although it was called a "divisional gun".
              And the Soviet three-inch from 1930 just didn’t do anything else for their performance characteristics. Only were as big as a barn.
              But even the three-inch ones were suitable for this already in the second half of 2. Then they were just farts of an unknown purpose. For a couple of forty.
              Quote: smaug78
              Wrong, they just adopted this "shit" into service?

              It is only in your world. But in fact, the Soviet guns (not only three-inch), they TAKE UNDER THE REDUCTION. After all, they did not know how to count sopromat in the USSR. And if in the USSR 22 kJ were shot with F-1490, then the Germans shot 2080 kJ from the same barrel. At the same time, they altered the gun itself in Pak 36 (r). Pak 36 (r) and F-22, these are different guns. F-22 without alterations in the German army were called FK36 (r). Usually these were transit guns.
              1. smaug78
                smaug78 5 July 2020 20: 09
                +1
                Clearly, a set of slogans. Keep on making me laugh laughing laughing And how cute you are with
                Three-inch (the one that was royal and combat-ready)
                jumped off laughing laughing
                1. Samson S.
                  Samson S. 5 July 2020 20: 13
                  -5
                  So you show someone a finger. and he’s already funny.
                  It happens.
                  1. smaug78
                    smaug78 5 July 2020 20: 20
                    +1
                    Nonsense with pouting cheeks is always funny ... So what's up with the royal three-inch as an anti-tank gun?
                    Nothing. It's just a very different BTT.
                    and what is so different about it that raised the modification of Pz.KpfW.IV Ausf.E to a new level, in your opinion?
                    https://www.livejournal.com/media/1075750.html
                    1. Samson S.
                      Samson S. 5 July 2020 20: 24
                      -5
                      Quote: smaug78
                      So there with the imperial three-inch as an anti-tank gun?

                      With what?
                      Where did the imperial three-inch come from in the USSR after 1930? They only stood on tanks. And even then, until 1941
                      Quote: smaug78
                      and what is so different about it that raised the modification of Pz.KpfW.IV Ausf.E to a new level, in your opinion?

                      What does the "new level" have to do with it?
                      The armor was 30 mm of "cement" (like 40 mm of wire rod) and became 50 mm of cement (like 67 mm of wire rod).
                      Few?
                      So the "legendary T-34" had 45 mm. And the "outstanding KV-1" had 75 mm.
                2. hohol95
                  hohol95 5 July 2020 20: 19
                  +2
                  Do not argue with the next reincarnation of "Mr. Carbine"!
                  Nothing can fix this "camerada" ...
              2. nedgen
                nedgen 5 July 2020 23: 12
                +1
                Sorry Samson, but obviously you are missing something. (Of course, if you do not take into account that you all hate Soviet a priori). So firstly German tank guns of almost the same three-inch caliber and the first Pz-IV guns are still crap. Secondly, the F-22 could be redone to a more powerful one precisely because the Soviet designers knew the compromise. This is Grabin’s idea. Not to use a shot of another royal three-inch gun and to use a shot from a 76mm anti-aircraft gun, but it was your favorite Pavlov who didn’t let him do it because you see in the warehouses there are still a lot of stocks of these shots from the PMV and forced to remake trunks under a shot of the royal three-inch gun. But Grabin nevertheless decided to leave the possibility of boring the breech and using a more powerful shot, of course, for this purpose, a muzzle brake had to be installed. (which Grabin thought to do if he was allowed to increase the power of the F-22) than the Germans took advantage of. Something did not meet so that the Germans could also increase the power of the F-22USV or ZiS-3. As for the power ZiS-2. And you dear, can you tell me at least one gun comparable in power to the 57mm WWII gun? Only now began to appear such and that at the expense of telescopic ammunition. And ZIS-2 is not shit but a MASTERPIECE. The fact that they could not establish serial production of trunks is one thing and it all rested on the lack of modern machines for the production of trunks. That's when they got the machines for land lease then they established the production of trunks with almost no defects. As for Pavlov, well, he didn’t allow the Soviet three-inch tanks laughing and this is without counting several hundred T-28s with 76mm guns of the SOVIET design L-10. And a few dozen T-35s. But the fact that it was precisely HE who did not allow long-barrel three-inches to tanks is TRUTH. He forced to install the F-32 stub on the KV-1 and L-11 on the T-34 and then put the sticks in the wheels of the F-34 on the T-34 because you see the barrel flew beyond the dimensions of the tank. And in general, he died to the death of installing an 85mm gun in the KV-1 and T-28, although the gun passed factory tests successfully. As for the bad Soviet three-inch and the excellent imperial three-inch 1902 fool Yes, the royal three-inch was an excellent gun in the WWII, but not in WWII. She has an angle of horizontal aiming of 5 degrees and vertical from -3 to +17 degrees, the complete absence of podsorivaniya that absolutely excludes towing a piston shutter with speeds above 20km / h which limits the rate of fire, not to mention the range of the arrow due to the short barrel which is 8200m. And the height is even higher than the ZiS-3. And in WWII, if you look, it suddenly turns out that it is the ZiS-3 that is considered the BEST 76MM WWII WEAPON. As for the alterations of the Soviet guns, I did not hear something so that the Wehrmacht was remodeling a different gun than the F-22. Neither ML-20 nor M-30 nor others. Yes, they installed both ZiS-3 and F-22USV on a self-propelled gun, but this is essentially not a modernization of the guns themselves. A and ML-20 and M-30 in the Wehrmacht used without any alterations. However, at the end of 1942, Grabin suggested installing a 34mm gun with 76mm anti-aircraft gun ballistic in the T-76-76 turret, but since they were no longer firing shots for these guns, they decided to mount an 85mm ZiS-S53. Moreover, the OFS 85mm is more powerful than a 75 or 76mm gun.
                1. Samson S.
                  Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 47
                  -3
                  Quote: nedgen
                  and the first Pz-IV cannons are still shit.

                  For reference, a variation of the German tank gun KwK 37, contemptuously called a cigarette butt, in 1943 was put on a field carriage and adopted by the Red Army where it was called OB-25. Probably she was still not so bad, since such a thing happened to her.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  Secondly, the F-22 could be redone to a more powerful one precisely because the Soviet designers knew the compromise. This is Grabin’s idea. Not to use a shot of another royal three-inch gun and to use a shot from a 76mm anti-aircraft gun, but it was your favorite Pavlov who didn’t let him do it because you see in the warehouses there are still a lot of stocks of these shots from the PMV and forced to remake trunks under a shot of the royal three-inch gun. But Grabin nevertheless decided to leave the possibility of boring the breech and using a more powerful shot, of course, for this purpose, a muzzle brake had to be installed. (which Grabin thought to do if he was allowed to increase the power of the F-22) than the Germans took advantage of.

                  The nonsense that you convey from Grabin's memoirs is called "sabotage." For such a thing in the USSR they were shot (Tagunov, for example, was shot precisely for such a thing with 3-K). It's just that Grabin wrote his memoirs in milder times. Therefore, I came up with such a legend.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  Something did not meet so that the Germans could also increase the power of the F-22USV or ZiS-3.

                  ZIS-3 Grabin did already in 1942. At this time, he already had at hand the German PaK97 / 38 arr. 1941 Which, in fact, was the prototype of the ZIS-3.
                  And the SPM Germans also dragged into PaK 39 (r). They are easy to recognize by DT. They had exactly the same jamb as the F-22 - too massive and thick barrel and chamber.
                  From ignorance designers sopromat.
                  Here she is:
                  https://forum.axishistory.com/download/file.php?id=187709
                  Quote: nedgen
                  And you dear, can you tell me at least one gun comparable in power to the 57mm WWII gun?

                  Of course not. Because ZIS-2 was a natural delirium of a madman. Moreover, not even Grabin, but Kulik.
                  To do a VET gun with MZA ballistics, one still has to think of such insanity.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  And ZIS-2 is not shit but a MASTERPIECE.

                  Gee-gee-gee.
                  But is it anything that in the USSR at that time only BBSs with a length of not more than 3,7 clb could steadily do, and 57 mm BBS was 4,1 clbs long?
                  But nothing that was stable in the USSR (except for a couple of special plants) that could drill only 100 + 5% inch long trunks, and the ZIS-2 trunk was 135,6 inch long?
                  But nothing that ZIS-2 arr. 1943 was heavier than ZIS-2 arr. 1941 for 20%?
                  But it’s nothing that the estimated maximum n / s of BBS was 960 m / s, but actually it was 990 m / s (they miscalculated slightly with armor penetration, so they lightly sprinkled gunpowder into the sleeve, which made the charging density abnormal).
                  And I can give you such items for this "masterpiece".
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 9 July 2020 13: 43
                    +1
                    PaK97 / 38 arr. 1941

                    A very interesting statement.
                    And the Germans themselves claim that the production of this "mutation" of the French 75 mm began in 1942.
                    And in 1941 she could not get into the eyes of Grabin.
                2. Samson S.
                  Samson S. 6 July 2020 00: 11
                  -2
                  Quote: nedgen
                  That's when they got the machines for land lease then they established the production of trunks with almost no defects.

                  Stumble. In 1940, they began to develop a cannon, which could only be produced by receiving machine tools from the United States. Which without the entry of the USSR into WW2 on the side of the Anglo-Saxons, no one in the USSR would have sold before the war.
                  Awesome "strategic decisions".
                  Quote: nedgen
                  He forced to install the F-32 stub on the KV-1 and L-11 on the T-34 and then put the sticks in the wheels of the F-34 on the T-34 because you see the barrel flew beyond the dimensions of the tank.

                  You write nonsense.
                  This is from the fact that you do not know how the imperial three-inch differed from the Soviet one.
                  Soviet three-inch yuzala OFS OF-350. Which in wartime would not be. And he was not, was O-350A. In terms of fragmentation, it is comparable with the 57 mm OFS of the Anglo-Saxons.
                  The royal three-inch (and colonel) yuzali F-354. Which was significantly better than the O-350A.
                  The main enemy of the tank is artillery. And so the main ammunition tank is the OFS. OFS L-11 and F-32 (F-354) was significantly better than the OS F-34 and ZIS-5 (O-350A).
                  That's all. And "tank duels", they are found mainly in "tanks". In which you clearly outplayed.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  And in general, he died to the death of installing an 85mm gun in the KV-1 and T-28, although the gun passed factory tests successfully.

                  You read less memoirs of Grabin. Togad nonsense will not write.
                  There was no 85 mm gun before the war, except for the 52-K anti-aircraft gun.
                  There were attempts, but there was no gun.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  She has a horizontal pickup angle of 5 degrees and a vertical from -3 to +17 degrees

                  Dear, this is called the characteristics of the carriage.
                  And I wrote about ballistics.
                  You can understand the difference?
                  Quote: nedgen
                  complete absence of subcortex

                  What kind of suspension can there be in a tank?
                  It was about tank guns.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  And in WWII, if you look, it suddenly turns out that it is the ZiS-3 that is considered to be the BEST 76MM WWII WEAPON

                  Gee-gee-gee.
                  A pathetic semblance of the German PaK 97/38, is this the best 2MV gun?
                  What do you smoke?
                  ZIS-3 already in 1943 was an obscure cannon, which was bad for everything. Like the forty-five.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  As for the alterations of the Soviet guns, I did not hear something so that the Wehrmacht was remodeling a different gun than the F-22.

                  F-22
                  SPM
                  3-K
                  51-K
                  52-K
                  The last three were bored to caliber 88 mm, and the first two used more powerful ammunition. At the same time, the Germans called the 3-K and 51-K because of the short barrel "Russian klystyr".
                  Quote: nedgen
                  Yes, they installed both ZiS-3 and F-22USV on a self-propelled gun, but this is essentially not a modernization of the guns themselves

                  These never installed.
                  PaK36 (r) (called BTK PaK36 (Sf) on BTT) was installed.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  A and ML-20 and M-30 in the Wehrmacht used without any alterations.

                  And why shouldn't they have used trophies?
                  The Germans generally had bad weapons. Therefore, they put into business everything that fell into their hands.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  However, at the end of 1942, Grabin suggested installing a 34mm gun with 76mm anti-aircraft gun in the T-76-76 tower

                  That would be crazy nonsense. It was possible to put such a gun on the BTT, but exclusively on the self-propelled guns.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  but since shots for these guns were no longer fired

                  Yeah. And the rear 76 mm anti-aircraft guns what ammunition ate?
                  Quote: nedgen
                  decided to mount an 85mm ZiS-S53.

                  So there was no other gun in the USSR, except for the 85 mm anti-aircraft guns 52-K. So they did at its base that it would succeed. And then what happened, they put where they put it.
                  Soviet 85 mm guns were inferior to German 75 mm guns of the KwK / StuG / PaK 40 series in almost everything.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  Moreover, the OFS 85mm is more powerful than a 75 or 76mm gun.

                  What nonsense!
                  The Soviet 85 mm OFS was noticeably weaker than the German 75 mm OFS for the KwK / StuG / PaK 40. Now I don’t remember exactly, but one and a half times weaker for sure.
                  1. nedgen
                    nedgen 6 July 2020 01: 39
                    +2
                    Thanks for all the nonsense that I gave as an example. Especially about copying OB-25 with KwK37 and copying ZiS-3 from PaK97 / 39 laughing If they had only once seen them in pictures, they would not have written such nonsense. About a more powerful office of 1.5 times .... Well, if the Germans didn’t use TNT but something like a TGA, it might be more powerful, but the entire explosive charge of a 75mm gun was 650g. and at 85mm 741g, BUT I SPEAKED THAT 76mm OFS is weaker than 85mm OFS.
                    As for the fact that the gun with the 76mm anti-aircraft gun can be installed in the T-34-76 turret, it could be nonsense, but even the opaque sample was made and even drunk, BUT the machine wasn’t accepted for service because of the termination of the production of shots to 76mm anti-aircraft guns which are unlikely at that time there are so many left, otherwise it would be a very successful solution for modernization during the repair of tanks. In addition, the fact that the gun with the 76mm anti-aircraft guns does not mean at all that the gun has dimensions of 76mm anti-aircraft guns. According to your logic, it should also be noted that a 125mm 2A46 cannon can be installed only in self-propelled guns ??? In addition, in 1939-40 they installed an 85mm cannon in the T-28 turret and I saw a picture of this tank. And this gun withstood factory feeds !!!And what about the anti-aircraft guns firing in the rear? And what the hell are stocks made of? If 76mm rounds to 76mm 1902 guns were in huge numbers even before the war and even from the time of WWII even French deliveries? Who said they weren’t for the 76mm anti-aircraft guns? Especially since the 76mm anti-aircraft guns weren’t particularly massive anyway? And the fact that ZiS-2 was a stupid decision is your opinion and various sofa experts' opinions. The back mind is all geniuses. Eto you now know that there were no machine tools, but you did the same trunks, albeit with 80-90% rejects, but they did the same! they began to produce technology without marriage, although this took several years) And the fact that they started to produce ZiS-90 trunks after delivering cars under Lend-Lease is my opinion, but I'm not sure about this. It is possible that production has been established before. I have no information. Just assumed. But is it UTB I DO NOT KNOW. Like you too. And that's it. Tired of it. You have IMHO. There is no point in arguing with such a person.
                    1. Octopus
                      Octopus 6 July 2020 08: 38
                      +1
                      Quote: nedgen
                      Well, if the Germans didn’t use TNT, then something like TGA can be more powerful

                      Both sides used amatol. But the Soviet, especially the Dolendizian, was distinguished by a rather sad quality. In addition, the shells of military release were distinguished by their sad quality.
                      Quote: nedgen
                      Eto you now know that then there were no machines

                      Some kind of strange argument. But Grabin did not know what he had with the walls in the factory? Why?
                  2. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 6 July 2020 15: 09
                    0
                    Quote: Samson S.
                    Stumble. In 1940, they began to develop a cannon, which could only be produced by receiving machine tools from the United States. Which without the entry of the USSR into WW2 on the side of the Anglo-Saxons, no one in the USSR would have sold before the war.

                    Well, judging by the list of machine tools for the tank production of the STZ, the USSR could buy non-consumer goods in one more place.
                    And what about the machines from the Allies to the war - you remember about the capitalist and 300% of the profit. Someone sold us 12,7mm quad Vickers before the war. wink
                    Quote: Samson S.
                    The royal three-inch (and colonel) yuzali F-354. Which was significantly better than the O-350A.

                    And which in the war just as would not have died. Because a grenade with a steel case in wartime is a luxury. Take the cast iron - and do not buzz.
                3. Octopus
                  Octopus 6 July 2020 08: 33
                  +3
                  Quote: nedgen
                  And in WWII, if you look, it suddenly turns out that it is the ZiS-3 that is considered to be the BEST 76MM WWII WEAPON

                  )))
                  You are absolutely right. ZiS-3 is really considered the best 76mm weapon of war. Because all other countries, except the USSR, refused to use the alterations of the French gun of 1897 in the pre-war time or (the Americans) at the beginning of the war in favor of larger howitzers.
                4. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 6 July 2020 14: 57
                  +2
                  Quote: nedgen
                  This is Grabin’s idea. Not to use a shot of another royal three-inch gun and to use a shot from a 76mm anti-aircraft gun, but it was your favorite Pavlov who didn’t let him do it because you see in the warehouses there are still a lot of stocks of these shots from the PMV and forced to remake trunks under a shot of the royal three-inch gun.

                  What does Pavlov have to do with it? When Grabin did the F-22. Pavlov commanded the 4th mechanized brigade.
                  The choice of the shot for the F-22 was made by the native industry, which did not have copper to produce from scratch the mobilization of new shots for the divisional cannon (15 million pieces) with a three times heavier sleeve.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  He forced to install the F-32 stub on the KV-1 and L-11 on the T-34 and then put the sticks in the wheels of the F-34 on the T-34 because you see the barrel flew beyond the dimensions of the tank.

                  But uv. M. Svirin claimed that it was Pavlov who, following the results of the Spanish events, demanded the installation of a gun with the ballistics of a divisional gun on the tank. That is - 76/40.
                  Quote: nedgen
                  And in WWII, if you look, it suddenly turns out that it is the ZiS-3 that is considered the BEST 76MM WWII WEAPON.

                  And who in WWII still had divisional 76-mm guns? EMNIP, the same Yankees abandoned 75-mm guns before entering the war and used their 75-mm guns temporarily, only until they got 105-mm.
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 6 July 2020 14: 12
              0
              Quote: smaug78
              And Guderian, so narrow-minded, simply suggested copying the T-34.

              The Soviet T-34 tank is a typical example of backward Bolshevik technology. This tank can not be compared with the best examples of our tanks, made by us and repeatedly proved their advantage.
              © G. Guderian. 03.10.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX
              In a few days, these same T-34s will turn into invulnerable and everywhere passing super tanks ... because von Langerman will need to be greased. smile
              Quote: smaug78
              And what is so terrible there?

              Well, at least the fact that the frontal armor of the "three-ruble" and "fours" modernized after France was too tough for our 45-mm (with shells until November 1941) and 76-mm (for "shrapnel on strike").
              The same "three-ruble note" got a 5-cm "curt" and a "sandwich" of 30 + 30 mm in the forehead (and then a 50-mm stove).
    3. Civil
      Civil 6 July 2020 08: 41
      0
      The meaning of the article is simple - the weapon itself does not fight. 41 years is an ode to sloppiness, only Stalin’s iron will turned the pogrom to Victory.
    4. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 6 July 2020 13: 19
      +3
      Quote: Pessimist22
      Yeah, low-skilled tankers, with competent command, having spent everything on time (like Kuznetsov in the Northern Fleet), it was possible to show completely different results

      To carry out all the events - you need to have a completely different USSR.
      And not the one that, due to the lack of tanks, stores the fuel reserves of the military districts extraterritorially (at the place of processing). Not the one that replaces ZISs with GAZs 1: 1 (after which all calculations for the rear and supply can be thrown out the window) - because there are simply no ZISs. Not the one whose artillery is being pulled by an agricultural tractor, but the army team almost obscenely curses the STZ designers for their "supposedly tractor", which sometimes does not even pull itself. Not one that cannot provide the army even with diesel fuel and automobile gasoline.
      And it’s not the USSR that physically cannot provide crew training with new equipment, because the B-2 resource is 100 hours at the stand, one crew is trained to minus 50 hours, and the industry provides 1 in 10 tanks for spare diesels.
  2. Kars
    Kars 5 July 2020 05: 57
    +5
    All the same, I did not understand the main premise.
    And the opinion of the author about Ulanov’s book Order in the tank troops is so interesting.
    1. svp67
      svp67 5 July 2020 06: 57
      +4
      Quote: Kars
      And the opinion of the author about Ulanov’s book Order in the tank troops is so interesting.

      Shane and Ulanova. There are two authors. And it seems to me that the author didn’t read it, or if he did, he didn’t understand
      1. Mitroha
        Mitroha 5 July 2020 07: 18
        10
        Apparently, the author did not read much at all, but looked through. Another historian-pseudo-analyst with the message "We were beaten, beaten and it is surprising that they did not kill us. For everything is bad with us, but everything is fine with them."
    2. Miner
      Miner 5 July 2020 11: 43
      10
      All the same, I did not understand the main premise.


      The main message of the Author is clear and understandable - the QUALITY of the structural units of the army and their competent management in painful actions is MORE IMPORTANT (based on historical facts) than the NUMBER of armor, people, etc. caliber guns.
      1. Olezhek
        5 July 2020 12: 01
        +4
        Well, yes, somehow. request
        1. DesToeR
          DesToeR 6 July 2020 14: 53
          -1
          Hmm !!! The author can still begin to write about Belarus again? AND? Tanks are clearly not yours!
      2. Dr. Frankenstucker
        Dr. Frankenstucker 5 July 2020 12: 34
        0
        Quote: Miner
        The main message of the Author is clear and understandable - QUALITY

        Yeah, directly captivates with the novelty.
        1. mat-vey
          mat-vey 5 July 2020 13: 35
          0
          About "quality" is generally interesting - but where could it come from in principle? The army necessary for the upcoming war has just begun to be created.
          1. Dr. Frankenstucker
            Dr. Frankenstucker 5 July 2020 21: 34
            -1
            Quote: mat-vey
            The army necessary for the upcoming war has just begun to be created.

            'just-only' - is it since when counting?
            1. mat-vey
              mat-vey 17 July 2020 13: 13
              0
              Quote: Dr. Frankenshtuzer
              just '- this is since when counting?

              "... the law" On universal conscription, "regulating the formation of the Soviet army, was adopted on September 1, 1939. It established that citizens of the USSR, regardless of race, nationality, religion, educational qualification, social origin and status, are obliged to serve service. "
          2. Igoresha
            Igoresha 5 July 2020 22: 26
            +1
            I read a book in childhood, owls. during the exercises, tankers knocked the coil from under the radio line installed on the barrel on the move, like everyone knew how and could

      3. svp67
        svp67 5 July 2020 13: 32
        +2
        Quote: Miner
        The main message of the Author is clear and understandable

        It’s just not at all understood, and most importantly, if this is so, then it is HARMFUL.
        Quote: Miner
        The QUALITY of structural units of the army and their competent management in painful actions is MORE IMPORTANT (based on historical facts) than the NUMBER of armor, people, etc. caliber guns.

        Victory is achieved where you were able to create superiority over the enemy, albeit local, so that both quantity and quality are ALL IMPORTANT, you just need to use this skillfully
  3. Ali Kokand
    Ali Kokand 5 July 2020 06: 13
    +6
    It should be noted and the difference in the overall level of education. No wonder the Germans themselves noted that the school teacher wins the war. And the top officers of the Wehrmacht in the vast majority had the experience of the First World War. The quality of the OKW was also on top. Perhaps the role played by the lack of experience of large-scale hostilities among the leadership of the Red Army. The Abwehr correctly acted with his saboteurs and Brandenburg 800 units. The lack of communication is really a deadly argument. It took time to work out a new tactic. And the general level of the mess should also be taken into account. Outright betrayal also took place. While the General Staff and Headquarters did not have reliable data on the situation on the fronts, what organized resistance can we talk about? All this was, there was a flag of victory over the Reichstag. I also do not understand the reasons for any shyness in assessing the beginning of the Second World War. What are you afraid of?
  4. svp67
    svp67 5 July 2020 06: 56
    12
    but continuous discoveries and sensations on one specific and well-documented topic over the decades have raised suspicions about the qualifications and adequacy of researchers. As they say, du.rak makes a lot of discoveries every day.
    Already after such a passage, I just want to ask the author, but he does not make any discoveries every day?
    Only a person who has never done this historical research could write such a thing ....
    How a real historian works, as opposed to a "hyipist". He sits for days, weeks and months in various archives and “shovels” tons of documents, analyzing and organizing them.
    But can he do this only with those documents that he is given for review and, moreover, he still needs to know, or at least guess where to look for them, since the archive funds are vast and even most of them remain closed and have not been opened since war time. They find interesting facts and data where they could not even think ...
    So, we will have to learn a lot of discoveries in historical terms.
    Either we have one situation in the tank troops before the war, then all of a sudden it’s completely different ... This is somehow annoying. Have you, gentlemen, for all the post-war decades, you could not figure out the state of the armored units of the Red Army on June 41st? But how were you going to fight with NATO in Europe?
    It seems that apart from the "Book of Future Commanders" the author has never read anything else in his life ... just sad.
    "Flies and cutlets" are different substances, and one must be able to separate them. If the author draws his conclusion from the articles in the "Book of Future Commanders" and the magazine "Ogonyok", then yes, but for a more serious conclusion it was necessary at least to know that we had a lot of stamped literature for students of the academies, where all this was dealt with and serious conclusions
    No, well, at least a couple of major battles to win, to chase the Germans, and then be in a strategic environment or stand up due to lack of fuel - is not so offensive.

    I still can't read all these "clever thoughts" anymore ... Author, what materials did you work with? What was analyzed, what was analyzed?
    Author You sit down and listen to this story of a PRESENT HISTORIAN and a BIG SPECIALIST in the history of the development of the armored forces. How tankers fought in the early days of the war, how they won and died ...

    That is, the Soviet "more than 50 thousand units of armored vehicles" - rather reinsurance "troika-generals" than a logical and practically necessary amount.
    I'm just amazed how the author manages to say the right words and draw stupid conclusions.
    But will the author not name the length of our country from West to East and from North to South ... In the pre-war and post-war times, a large number of tanks in the USSR required the objective reality to have some strong tank groupings, and most importantly, their reserve in the West, South and East directions that to be ready to repulse any enemy .... At the moment, the tank has somewhat lost its relevance in terms of a universal means of armed struggle, new "tools" have appeared on the battlefield and above it, but nevertheless, until it completely leaves the arena of armed struggle the tank is still far away
    1. Olezhek
      5 July 2020 09: 38
      +1
      Already after such a passage, I just want to ask the author, but he does not make any discoveries every day?
      Only a person who has never done this historical research could write such a thing ....
      How a real historian works, as opposed to a "hyipist". He sits for days, weeks and months in various archives and “shovels” tons of documents, analyzing and organizing them.


      Well, you know, when the battles that have long become history and well documented (the 20th century after all!) Over the past 30 years, the "historical picture" regularly and diametrically changes - this cannot but raise questions.
      Moreover, the specifics (what happened really and what are the actual reasons for the defeat of the Red Army) as it was not.
      That is, the assessment of the situation changes from "Stalin was nothing until Stalin was a criminal and only then before Stalin was a genius ..." But there was no understanding with the "tank pogrom of the 41st" ...
      1. svp67
        svp67 5 July 2020 10: 10
        0
        Quote: Olezhek
        That is, the assessment of the situation changes from "Stalin was nothing until Stalin was a criminal and only then before Stalin was a genius ..."

        What are you talking about? What are you trying to say now?
        1. Olezhek
          5 July 2020 10: 16
          +3
          That is, the assessment of the situation changes from "Stalin was nothing until Stalin was a criminal and only then before Stalin was a genius ..."

          What are you talking about? What are you trying to say now?


          In the early 80s, they tried not to mention much about Stalin in the historical context ...
          Then he became a villain and a criminal, then ...

          Since what year, sobsno speaking? repeat
          1. svp67
            svp67 5 July 2020 10: 19
            +4
            Quote: Olezhek
            Since what year, sobsno speaking?

            Since 1967, and what ...
            Quote: Olezhek
            In the early 80s, they tried not to mention much about Stalin in the historical context ...
            Then he became a villain and a criminal, then ...

            Oh, and "porridge" in your head ...
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 6 July 2020 15: 55
        +1
        Quote: Olezhek
        Well, you know, when in battles that have long become history and well-documented (the 20th century, after all!)

        Blessed is he who believes. ©
        EMNIP, SW. Ulanov in his LJ described the picture of the liberation of one city in the presentation of archival docks. The Germans were knocked out by infantry and tankers. So, in the infantry documents about the tankers there is practically nothing, and in the same docks of the tankers about the infantry there are a couple of references. The pictures of the battles are completely different, only the geographical names coincide. And it seems that the infantry and tankers liberated two different cities. smile

        And according to the history of armored vehicles - less than five years have passed since the time when the four-volume edition of uv. M. Svirin, as uv. Y. Pasholok began to publish excerpts from documents refuting what is written in the four-volume.
    2. Olezhek
      5 July 2020 09: 42
      +2
      Author You sit down and listen to this story of a REAL HISTORIAN and a BIG SPECIALIST


      Komrad, such movie libraries on the Internet for thousands of hours of viewing with a tail.


      Tell us better briefly about the tank battle near Dubno?
      And why was it like that?
      Materiel was not enough?
      Or were there traitors around?
      1. svp67
        svp67 5 July 2020 10: 17
        +3
        Quote: Olezhek
        Komrad, such movie libraries on the Internet for thousands of hours of viewing with a tail.

        And you find an hour and a half and listen to how a real historian works, what he found, what he discovered ... maybe then you will understand at least a little something. And so you have some kind of "pioneer" views ...
        Quote: Olezhek
        Tell us better briefly about the tank battle near Dubno?

        That’s what your mistake is ... IN BRIEF ... There are so many reasons and reasons that in short we can only say that the German infantry divisions showed how, having organized anti-tank defense, saturated with anti-tank artillery and other anti-tank weapons, supported by aviation, methodically, without even having your own tanks, you can stop and destroy randomly attacking enemy tank masses, deprived of the support of infantry, artillery and aviation. This is so brief
        1. Olezhek
          5 July 2020 10: 23
          +2
          That’s what your mistake is ... Briefly ... Yes there are so many reasons and reasons that in brief you can only say that


          Dear comrade, imagine that you personally commanded Soviet tanks near Dubno.
          The battle is over, you are summoned to Headquarters and comrade. Stalin asked all the same sacramental question: what happened, darago tavarisch?

          And you told him: Ha! Yes there are a billion reasons! And all are weighty!

          randomly attacking masses of enemy tanks, deprived of the support of infantry, artillery and aviation


          1 Who is to blame for the "chaos"?
          2 in this war zone did the Red Army lack infantry, artillery and aviation?
          How is the class?
          1. svp67
            svp67 5 July 2020 10: 54
            +3
            Quote: Olezhek
            1 Who is to blame for the "chaos"?

            Yes, many guilty. And not only Stalin, but also Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Pavlov ... and so on up to and including corps commanders ...
            Quote: Olezhek
            The battle is over, you are summoned to Headquarters and comrade. Stalin asked all the same sacramental question: what happened, darago tavarisch?

            They called General Pavlov with his headquarters to give clarifications ... Do you know the result of the proceedings?
            1. Olezhek
              5 July 2020 11: 56
              +5
              They called General Pavlov with his headquarters to give clarifications ... Do you know the result of the proceedings?


              But we have a hypothetical situation, execution of God does not threaten you with execution
              The trick is that Comrade's long (and abstruse) explanations Stalin would not listen
              The reasons for the defeat must be expressed: clearly, briefly, clearly (and honestly)

              Option: patamushta you make us fight on "rusty lighters" (with the transition to hysteria) will not work

              Yes you mess comrade Stalin in the Red Army - also

              PS Of interest.
              And the threat of an imminent and imminent execution would prevent you from formulating the reasons for the defeat of the tank units of the Red Army in June of the 41st short and clear? Or would it be the other way around?
              1. svp67
                svp67 5 July 2020 13: 30
                -1
                Quote: Olezhek
                And the threat of an imminent and imminent execution would prevent you from formulating the reasons for the defeat of the tank units of the Red Army in June of the 41st short and clear? Or would it be the other way around?

                I don’t know, depending on what state it would be ... The trouble is that at the time when the judgment was made on Pavlov and his people, many data were not yet known, so that the conclusions could only be general
              2. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 6 July 2020 16: 03
                +1
                Quote: Olezhek
                But we have a hypothetical situation, execution of God does not threaten you with execution
                The trick is that Comrade's long (and abstruse) explanations Stalin would not listen
                The reasons for the defeat must be expressed: clearly, briefly, clearly (and honestly)

                The lack of mobilization of the armed forces.
                Unworked interaction between the arms of the armed forces.
                Incomplete formation of mechanized corps, including incomplete coordination of connections and understaffing of their l / s and equipment.
                Excessive initiative of command of all levels, reaching the direct violation of orders of higher commanders.
                The low educational level of the ordinary and junior command personnel, as well as the draft contingent, which does not allow filling up the staff of specialists (primarily in communications).
      2. Krasnodar
        Krasnodar 5 July 2020 18: 22
        +1
        Quote: Olezhek



        Tell us better briefly about the tank battle near Dubno?
        And why was it like that?
        Materiel was not enough?
        Or were there traitors around?

        Communication problems (there were very few radios), respectively, with control, and therefore with interaction, and with air support / cover
  5. Eug
    Eug 5 July 2020 07: 02
    18
    As from the characteristics of the tank they switched to the qualification of crews, so from the qualifications of the crews it is necessary to switch to the professionalism of the command of the structures in which these tanks are used.
    Paradoxically, the defeat in WWI and the limitations on the number of the Wehrmacht made it possible to very carefully select l / s both in terms of personal qualities and the quality of training, and at all levels. In the Wehrmacht there were practically only "war fans" like Guderian, Rommel, Manstein.
    PS As for me, the main enemy of the army (and possibly not only the army) is window dressing.
    1. Gato
      Gato 5 July 2020 09: 49
      +5
      I categorically support, especially regarding the role of the Reichswehr in the further successes of the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, in every defeat lies the reason for future victories (and vice versa).
      It seems to me that the reason for the success of the Wehrmacht is not so much in the training of rank-and-file staff, but in the training of company and regiment commanders, most of whom were carefully selected back in the XNUMXth Reichswer. After all, they should be the ones who train ordinary and junior commanders.
      Even if you put the USSR out of the brackets, it is hard to imagine that the French and English infantrymen and tankers were trained at times worse than the German ones. But with the officer corps, things were not much better than in the USSR. And this is not clear, at least the USSR had objective reasons in the form of the Civil War and violation of the continuity, the almost complete absence of officers with 1MB experience.
      1. Eug
        Eug 5 July 2020 10: 26
        +2
        Thanks for the tactful amendment, of course the Reichswehr. The Germans tried to bring the actions of a commander at any level to a certain degree of automatism, while granting quite broad powers. As for the training of the officer corps, as for me, the general literacy and responsibility of the German population affected. In the USSR, mass illiteracy had only just begun to be fought (it took a couple of generations to pass), while the rest of the military service was either unpopular and the literate and capable found an alternative, or excessively caste with little regard for personal data. And also a very high-quality system of training at the level of tactics of officer cadres at the Germans - not schools and academies for theoreticians, but "advanced training" courses for the most capable military personnel practically up to the battalion commander (consistently "passing" through all stages) with consideration of the actions of all branches of the military ... This system also had y'zyan - the deprivation of the lower units of the best personnel could not but affect their combat effectiveness.
        1. Gato
          Gato 5 July 2020 12: 24
          +8
          This system also had y'zyan - the deprivation of the best cadres of the lower units could not but affect their combat effectiveness.

          This was just offset by the fact that such servicemen, as a rule, returned to their unit. There was also such a nuance: the commander who nominated his subordinate Fenrich or non-commissioned officer to the officer post, after training received him back to the unit, so that there would be no bad thoughts to fuse the dumb subordinate somewhere to increase. Those serving in the CA will understand the benefits of this approach. lol
      2. Aaron Zawi
        Aaron Zawi 5 July 2020 11: 02
        +1
        Quote: Gato
        ... the USSR, at least, had objective reasons in the form of the Civil War and violation of the continuity, the almost complete absence of officers with 1MB experience.

        Um, and 70 thousand officers with WWI experience from the General Staff to company commanders, weren’t they incorporated into the Red Army from 1918 to 1920?
        1. Zeev zeev
          Zeev zeev 5 July 2020 11: 19
          +2
          After 1920, there was still the year 1930, and then 1937. That is, officers with the experience of the First World War left hundreds at best. In addition, the WWI experience for tank forces and anti-tank defense was more harmful than useful.
          1. Gato
            Gato 5 July 2020 12: 41
            +1
            WWI experience for tank forces and anti-tank defense was more harmful than useful

            Why? The sudden and massive use of tanks in a narrow sector of the front, the tactics of assault groups, defense in depth with strong points - all these are the "trends" of WW1, though in the west. Rather, the experience of the Civil War became harmful
            1. Zeev zeev
              Zeev zeev 5 July 2020 16: 42
              +1
              The experience of the civil war with its long-distance raids without logistics (which I’ll plunder, I’ll eat) and the extremely successful propaganda experience (which they later tried unsuccessfully against the Germans) was even more harmful.
        2. Gato
          Gato 5 July 2020 12: 15
          +1
          Um, and 70 thousand officers with the experience of PMV from the General Staff to the company commanders

          The figure, to say the least, is fantastic. B.M.Shaposhnikov is not an indicator at all, almost all Soviet marshals, not to mention the divisional commanders, are, at best, 1MV subalterns and non-commissioned officers. About the company commanders - it’s not even funny, the 1MB officer in 1941 should be 40 years old. Where have you seen the Red Army comrades at that age?
          1. Aaron Zawi
            Aaron Zawi 5 July 2020 12: 18
            0
            Quote: Gato
            Um, and 70 thousand officers with the experience of PMV from the General Staff to the company commanders

            The figure, to say the least, is fantastic. B.M.Shaposhnikov is not an indicator at all, almost all Soviet marshals, not to mention the divisional commanders, are, at best, 1MV subalterns and non-commissioned officers. About the company commanders - it’s not even funny, the 1MB officer in 1941 should be 40 years old. Where have you seen the Red Army comrades at that age?

            I'm not about 41 years old. And about 18-20gg, when the foundation of the Red Army was laid.
            1. Gato
              Gato 5 July 2020 14: 04
              +1
              about 18-20gg, when the foundation of the Red Army was laid

              Here you can bring a few arguments:
              - Yes, there were almost more former officers in the Red Army than in the White. But for the most part, these were non-staff military officers of wartime with minimal training;
              - the experience of the war on the Western (for Russia) front could not be compared with the experience that the Germans and allies on the Western (for Germany) front received;
              - With the mass demobilization of the Red Army after the Civil War and the transition to the minimalistic territorial principle of the 1929 model, who was left in the service in peacetime? Most likely, classically correct commanders. And with former and military experts they usually acted as with their comrades Moors;
              - For example, take the forge of commanding personnel - the Red Army Academy. Of her superiors, Mr. Klimovich (1918-1919), Mr. Snesarev (1919-1921), and Mr. Lebedev for a short time had a full academic education. And then went such noble commanders as Tukhachevsky, Hecker, Eideman. For a short time, her superiors were Frunze and, in fact, the real General Stacker B.M. Shaposhnikov. N.A. Verevkin-Rakhalsky - former headquarters captain; Khozin graduated from the ensign school. Naturally, the training at such an academy could not be compared even with the semi-underground Kriegsakademie, which had a huge impact not only on the army, but also on the state in general, since the former head of the General Staff Hindenburg was the president.
      3. Dr. Frankenstucker
        Dr. Frankenstucker 5 July 2020 13: 10
        +2
        Quote: Gato
        It seems to me that the reason for the success of the Wehrmacht is not so much in the training of rank-and-file staff, but in the training of company and regiment commanders, most of whom were carefully selected back in the XNUMXth Reichswer. After all, they should be the ones who train ordinary and junior commanders.

        The Provisional Reichswehr carried out the tasks of fighting the Reds and protecting the eastern borders, in these circumstances, the personnel and training methods remaining from the imperial army were quite enough according to the instructions of 1918. The suppression of internal rebellions dictated their own terms - training in tactics of conducting urban battles prevailed - the Provisional Reichswehr and the Freikor were police forces. But the new Reichswehr von Seeckt was building according to the concept of Fuhrerheer - an "army of commanders", every officer, non-commissioned officer and private at any time would be ready to take the next step. This was no longer a Prussian military tradition. This was a new army, in which, among other things, officers were trained to command allied branches of the military - infantry officers, for example, learned to maintain guns and command an artillery platoon. Von Seeckt was, if not a genius, then very close to that)
        1. Gato
          Gato 5 July 2020 14: 30
          +1
          The interim Reichswehr had the task of fighting the Reds and protecting the eastern borders

          Well, the Allies so wanted it. Although, it is unlikely that they did not understand that the Reichswehr would sooner or later become the personnel backbone of something new.
    2. Hagen
      Hagen 5 July 2020 11: 26
      +1
      Quote: Eug
      defeat in WWI and restrictions on the number of the Wehrmacht made it possible to very carefully select l / s both in terms of personal qualities and the quality of training, and at all levels. In the Wehrmacht there were practically only "war fans" like Guderian, Rommel, Manstein.

      Discussions about the origins of the German army's strength must begin with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which, one might say, pushed German military thought into the leaders of industry progress. And it was advanced military thought that contributed to the success of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of WWII.
      1. Dr. Frankenstucker
        Dr. Frankenstucker 5 July 2020 14: 59
        0
        Quote: Hagen
        it can be said that German military thought was pushed into the leaders of industry progress. And it was advanced military thought that contributed to the success of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of WWII.

        no doubt, but if we touch on training methods, the imperial army and the Reichswehr von Zekt (and later the Wehrmacht) are completely different armies.
    3. Virus-free crown
      Virus-free crown 5 July 2020 15: 05
      +3
      Quote: Eug

      PS As for me, the main enemy of the army (and possibly not only the army) is window dressing.

      In-in !!! I can't say for the Second World War, but in peacetime before and after it, I can say for sure based on my experience of serving in the Soviet Army in the late 80s of the last century ... I served in the autobahn, we built "points" from which our nuclear missiles were supposed to retaliate in the event of the outbreak of the Third World Wave ... "Show-off" flourished in our lush double color, subscripts, non-compliance with the Charter of the USSR Armed Forces, etc., etc. (((I estimate the efficiency of our work at 10-15 percentage of what we could have done - if we did it wisely ... After serving in the army, I had a bitter aftertaste, so that instead of "strengthening the defense of the Motherland", we would do anything - but just not this the most ... Strengthening the defense ... (((
  6. Revolver
    Revolver 5 July 2020 07: 07
    11
    Everything is true, but ... and the best crew cannot be better than the equipment on which they are fighting. If the 76mm F-34 cannon, aka ZIS-5, does not penetrate 100mm of the Tiger's armor even at close range, and the tiger's 8.8cm cannon penetrate from more than a kilometer and 45mm of the T-34 sloped armor, and the 75mm perpendicular KV, then there is no chance ... If the T-34 still had some chance, due to the speed and maneuver, to enter the Tiger at a short distance, the KV did not have this chance either. Therefore, let us be silent for a minute in memory of those who knew this arithmetic and nevertheless went into battle, carried out orders, and paid the highest price. The T-34-85 and the IS appeared not because someone wanted to shove an 85mm cannon into them, but because it was already impossible to do without it.
    1. svp67
      svp67 5 July 2020 08: 02
      +8
      Quote: Nagan
      That's right, but ... and the best crew can not be better than the equipment on which he is fighting.

      The best crew can squeeze everything out of their equipment and a little more ...
      Quote: Nagan
      If the 76mm F-34 cannon, aka ZIS-5, does not penetrate 100mm of the Tiger's armor even at close range, and the tiger's 8.8cm cannon penetrate from more than a kilometer and 45mm of the T-34 sloped armor, and the 75mm perpendicular KV, then there is no chance ...

      So every time I read something like that and right before my eyes the front line, where the Germans have, which is along the front, which is every 100 meters deep, but that there is 100, after 50 there are "Tigers" ...
      And how many of them were there in general, at one specific period of time on the entire Eastern Front, did you ask yourself a question? Our tanks and, accordingly, tankers and without the "Tigers" had enough mortal enemies.
    2. bubalik
      bubalik 5 July 2020 08: 30
      +4
      Nagan (Revolver of the Nagan system sample 1895 g.) Today, 08: 07

      ,,, the author about 41 g. raises the question.
      Soviet historians described the Panzervaffe materiel without a breakdown by year. Hence the smart talk about the Tigers, Panthers, and other Elephants with Ferdinand.

      ,,, and you go there, "Tigers".
      1. Revolver
        Revolver 5 July 2020 09: 16
        +3
        Quote: bubalik
        and you go there- "Tigers"

        Quote: svp67
        before the eyes of the front line, where the Germans have, which is along the front, which is in depth every 100 meters, but what is there 100, after 50 there are "Tigers" ...

        Well, let's assume that there were no Tigers. And the Panthers with their impenetrable forehead were very amazed at the side with cardboard armor, so we believe that they were not there either. But here's what to do with the Pz IV Ausf. F2 and newer with their forehead 80mm, which 76mm was taken only from 500 meters, while the KWK 40 long-barreled 7.5cm pierced 45mm T-34 armor from about a kilometer? And Stug III? Also consider what was not? And finally tanks do not fight tanks? Then where are such losses in the tank units of the Red Army? Solid fanatic boys from the Hitler Youth with faustpatrons from Stalingrad to Berlin every 100, no, take it more often - 50 meters of the front? Or the anti-aircraft guns FLAK 8.8 stuffed as often?
        1. bubalik
          bubalik 5 July 2020 09: 36
          +5
          Then where are such losses in the tank units of the Red Army?

          ,,, now reading about 124 TBR. September October.
          Forming, knocking together 2 weeks.
          The order to go to the area of ​​concentration. Without reconnaissance, without artillery, under the fire of the anti-aircraft defense we read:

          ,,, out of 25 KV tanks, only 4 turned out to perform a combat mission !!! and even surrounded them.

          farther.
          release them failed


          Все. request
          For 3 days, the tanks burned everything, infantry laid up to 70%, 15 of the tankers only left.


          Now it’s easy to argue from the sofa, I’m not at all imploring the feat of the tankmen,
          but such planning was most likely everywhere.
          1. BAI
            BAI 5 July 2020 12: 27
            +4
            A 58 tank division? Arriving at the front on November 5, November 16, took part in the battles of the 16th army under the command of Rokossovsky. On November 16, 139 BT-7s of 194 available were lost. There were no other tanks in the division, only BT-7, and they attacked prepared positions.
            From November 18 to 20, ALREADY IN THE 30TH ARMY, the division is losing 40 more tanks. By November 20, the 58th Panzer Division consisted of only 15 tanks, 5 guns and 350 fighters of the first line units.
            November 20, 1941 Mehlis reported to Stalin:
            “The 58th Panzer Division, which arrived from the Far East, was defeated due to the criminal leadership, and its remnants are concentrated in Voronino. On November 20, General Kotlyarov, the commander of the 58th Panzer Division, shot himself dead, leaving a note: “General disorganization and loss of control. Guilty of the higher headquarters. I do not want to be responsible for the general mess. Go back to Yamuga for anti-tank obstacles, save Moscow. ” After the signature, this surrender added: "Ahead without prospects." The 8th tank brigade looks better, but now it has 2 KB, 34 T-2, 26 T-8, 40 T-107. The 114th motorized rifle division has 51 fighters at the front, and XNUMX crews without tanks in the rear. Mehlis. "

            From the reports we see that the affairs in 107 divisions are even worse, but it is not known for how long. But the 58th tank was destroyed in 4 days, the main damage - in 1 day, in one (first) battle (November 16).
            1. bubalik
              bubalik 5 July 2020 13: 26
              +3
              ,,, and how the tanks contained. About the tractor in general, either cry, or laugh. No.
              1. strannik1985
                strannik1985 6 July 2020 15: 20
                +1
                Well, how the tanks contained.

                202 MD was formed in February 1941, PriOVO, it included T-26, Renault FT-17, Fiat 3000, Vickers, and a T-26 tractor. The division should be operational in 1942, if not 1943.
          2. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 6 July 2020 16: 38
            +1
            Quote: bubalik
            ,,, now reading about 124 TBR. September October.
            Forming, knocking together 2 weeks.

            And not from scratch:
            2. To staff the brigade, draw the personnel and materiel of the 24th Panzer Division and the 146th Tank Regiment, 198th Infantry Regiment.

            Quote: bubalik
            ,,, out of 25 KV tanks, only 4 turned out to perform a combat mission !!! and even surrounded them.

            This is the second part of the Marlezon Ballet. First, the brigade’s route was supposed to go through reconnaissance and gas processing facilities. The brigade simply lost its intelligence. And the GPZ woke up the Germans and retreated to the main forces.
            Reconnaissance actions: a platoon of tanks in the amount of 3 vehicles was allocated to the reconnaissance, the commander of the reconnaissance was platoon commander Lt. Goncharov, from the 1st tank battalion. Intelligence made at 4.00 on the route: Uritsk - pos. Lenin and further south in the direction of the village. Volodarskoe. Intelligence task: to move along the specified route, break into the area that is south-east of the village. Volodarskoe.
            The directing tank of Lieutenant Kuznetsov lost his way and left to Ligovo; his further actions are still unknown. All of the following reconnaissance platoon tanks under the command of Lieutenant Goncharov, chief of intelligence, went along the route of the main forces of the tank group, their further actions are unknown.
            Actions of the GPZ (main outpost): The GPZ acted at 4:30 as part of the 1st company of the 1st tank battalion without one platoon. The chief of the GPP is the company commander, senior lieutenant Moshkov. Of the 4 tanks at the exit from the starting position, one tank did not exit due to technical malfunctions.
            GPZ in the amount of 3 tanks, moving along the route Uritsk, pos. Lenin, Kikenka, approaching Kikenka was met by the fire of the VET from the area of ​​individual houses north of Kikenka, got involved in the battle. Due to technical malfunctions, one tank stopped at the bridge north of Kikenki. When the GPZ returned back to the eastern outskirts of the village of Lenin (Kuybyshev school), the GPZ was fired by the fire of 2 anti-tank guns. The tank of the company commander, Lieutenant Moshkov, caught fire. A crew of 3 people made their way to their own. The 2nd tank, also knocked out by the fire of the anti-tank fire, is from the area east of the outskirts of the village. Lenin, moved to the area mark "K" and began to fire from a place. As a result of the battle, one anti-tank gun was destroyed. The fire of the second anti-tank vehicle was hit and caught fire. The fate of the crew is unknown.

            And, yes, by 15:00 on 08.10.1941/4/XNUMX there were more than XNUMX combat-ready tanks:
            124 TP put forward an advance group of 8 tanks, which entered the village. Lenin. Tanks are fighting, communication with the landing party ("Swallow") has not been established. The main forces of the regiment are located north of the state farm "Proletarskiy Trud" (western). Tanks moved from the regiment to eliminate the enemy in the Pishmash area. The infantry cover of tanks takes up a perimeter defense in the area of ​​the railway crossing to the Pishmash plant. At the same time, a sapper company and a rifle company of a motorized battalion (124 MSPB) 124 TBR are moving westward from the Hunting House.
            1. bubalik
              bubalik 6 July 2020 18: 01
              0
              hi
              And not from scratch:
              To staff the brigade, draw the personnel and materiel of the 24th Panzer Division

              ,,, if only from l / s.
              Since 10.08.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, the division has been conducting defensive battles near Luga, covering the rear of the Luga line from the villages of Daimishche and Vyra, at the end of August, after leaving the city, the division was surrounded, destroyed the material part, and in small groups came to the location of Soviet troops in the region of Slutsk.

              22.09.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX disbanded, whether the remainsof the full staff went to staff the 124th and 125th tank brigades.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 6 July 2020 18: 36
                +1
                Quote: bubalik
                ,,, if only from l / s.

                I had in mind precisely the personnel, and with at least some experience.

                Because I am not such an optimist as to assume the presence of equipment in the tank division of the 10th "spring" MK, which left 23.06.1941 tanks on the 49, and then another 55 tanks on the march. And which was then driven from the Karelian Isthmus to the Luga border (along the way, taking it to battalions), after which it was turned into the formation of tank brigades.
        2. Mordvin 3
          Mordvin 3 5 July 2020 09: 47
          +3
          Quote: Nagan
          And finally tanks do not fight tanks? Then where are such losses in the tank units of the Red Army?

          From stupidity. My grandfather was ordered to move into the village, so they did not even uncovered the trunks. I wonder why no one writes about covers? Grandfather said that I remember exactly.
        3. Olezhek
          5 July 2020 10: 09
          +1
          Well, let's assume that there were no Tigers. And the Panthers with their impenetrable forehead were very amazed at the side with cardboard armor, so we believe that they were not there either.


          And you read what and how they stopped the Tigers near Moscow in the 41st ... you will be shocked! belay
          It was a trash ... (giant secret anti-tank ditches strewn with branches - they jokingly called them "anti-slope")

          Once again - all the successes of the Wehrmacht were to Tigers and Panthers ....
          Paradox... request
          There were no good tanks - there were victories
          Appeared - no more victories ...
          1. svp67
            svp67 5 July 2020 10: 41
            +3
            Quote: Olezhek
            And you read what and how they stopped the Tigers near Moscow in the 41st ... you will be shocked

            And show the reference, I would like to laugh ... Tigers in the 41st near Moscow ...
            Quote: Olezhek
            There were no good tanks - there were victories

            Who told you this? The Germans had excellent tanks designed for a specific "blitzkrieg" strategy, and as long as this strategy worked, they matched.
            Quote: Olezhek
            There were no good tanks - there were victories
            Appeared - no more victories ...
            Don't you want to say this about our tank troops? That the T-34 in 1944 and 1945 was a "miracle weapon", with impenetrable armor and a super gun? There is no such thing. But victory followed victory there, simply because they created effective tank troops and learned how to use them correctly.
            1. Olezhek
              5 July 2020 11: 44
              0
              The Germans had great tanks, developed for a specific strategy of "blitzkrieg" and while this strategy worked, they corresponded.


              crying

              1. Samson S.
                Samson S. 5 July 2020 18: 20
                +3
                This is not what went to the USSR.
                Models of the autumn of 1940 - spring of 1941 went to the USSR.
                And this is not at all what is in the photo.
                They just had nothing to punch (if in the forehead).
                50 mm cemented armor, this is 67 mm rolled armor.
                30 + 30 mm German armor, this is 70 mm rolled armor.
                What to beat? Clappers like a forty-foot and a three-inch?
                So the last armor-piercing was not. They were only supplied to tank guns (at first). It is only in 1942 that three-inch guns became actually anti-tank guns (ZIS-3). But by that time, the Germans had once again rearmament (BTT). In the spring of 1942, therefore, 1942 was no less catastrophic for the Red Army than 1941.
                1. hohol95
                  hohol95 5 July 2020 20: 44
                  +1
                  What to beat? Clappers like a forty-foot and a three-inch?

                  And why the proud French and diehard sons of Britain were unable to stop the "steel hordes of the Huns"?
                  They also did not have adequate artillery?
                  And tanks?
                  Or maybe "heads on shoulders"? Like the Russians!
                  1. Samson S.
                    Samson S. 5 July 2020 20: 49
                    -2
                    Quote: hohol95
                    Do not argue with the next reincarnation of "Mr. Carbine"!
                    Nothing can fix this "camerada" ...

                    PS.
                    The Russians in that war fought not at all where you fantasized it for yourself. You confused them with the Great Russians, who are actually "Soviet Russians", not Russians.
                    1. hohol95
                      hohol95 5 July 2020 20: 58
                      0
                      Not at all there? Ay ah ah, where?
                      Together with Krasnov and Shkuro?
                      And about the photo with a "bad" you shouldn't be so ...
                      Didn't the foreheads be strengthened in the "two" and were not used on an equal footing with the "C" and 38T.
                      But that forehead did not reach 50 mm. And not all 38T had it like that ...
                      The Germans had enough new models and modernized old ones. But there were cars that did not go through modernization.
                      1. Samson S.
                        Samson S. 5 July 2020 21: 12
                        -1
                        Quote: hohol95
                        Didn't the foreheads be strengthened in the "two" and were not used on an equal footing with the "C" and 38T.

                        No.
                        In addition, Pz.III, Pz.II and Pz.38 (t), these are BTTs of different classes.
                        Quote: hohol95
                        But that forehead did not reach 50 mm.

                        Reached all Pz.III, Pz.IV and Pz.38 (t) after the fall of 1940.
                        In the summer of 1941, the Germans had the majority of such cars of new models, 60%.
                        So the rumors about a "weak German BTT" are greatly exaggerated.
                        Just boobies are not aware of the cemented armor and how it differs from the rolled one.
                        Quote: hohol95
                        The Germans had enough new models and modernized old

                        60% to 40% in relation to Pz.III, Pz.IV and Pz.38 (t).
                        Quote: hohol95
                        But there were cars that did not go through modernization.

                        Modernization was not carried out at all. There were just different models.
                      2. hohol95
                        hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 15
                        +1
                        In addition, Pz.III, Pz.II and Pz.38 (t), these are BTTs of different classes.

                        Does it mean that the German tank divisions were distinguished by "different classes"?
                        2 division - 22 deuces, 33 38t and 20 triples with 5 fours ...
                        22nd Division - 28 deuces, 114 38t, 12 triples and 22 fours - the main strike force is 38t ...
                        And these divisions were used differently than divisions where there was no 38t?
                      3. Samson S.
                        Samson S. 5 July 2020 22: 32
                        0
                        Quote: hohol95
                        Does it mean that the German tank divisions were distinguished by "different classes"?

                        They were distinguished by weapons.
                        There was not enough new BTT for all divisions.
                      4. hohol95
                        hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 42
                        0
                        They were distinguished by weapons.
                        There was not enough new BTT for all divisions.

                        New? So 38T were new to the Germans until July 1942!
                        Your answer does not pull on "excuse".
                        Machines, as you say of different classes, were used equally ...
                        And no one divided the divisions into classes — just tank divisions.
                      5. Samson S.
                        Samson S. 5 July 2020 22: 58
                        0
                        Quote: hohol95
                        So 38T were new to the Germans until July 1942!

                        Depends on what.
                        Teach materiel.
                        Quote: hohol95
                        Your answer does not pull on "excuse".

                        Sneeze.
                        Quote: hohol95
                        Machines, as you say of different classes, were used equally ...

                        The Germans are organized people. Tanks were used mainly for their intended purpose.
                        It was in the Red Army that the T-34 infantry escort tanks, due to the shortage of the KV-1, were immediately recorded in the breakthrough tanks. After that, the Germans literally burned such "breakthrough tanks" in batches.
                        Quote: hohol95
                        And no one divided the divisions into classes — just tank divisions.

                        You invented the divisions of different classes.
                      6. hohol95
                        hohol95 5 July 2020 23: 04
                        0
                        Depends on what.
                        Teach materiel.

                        The latest G model - 324 pieces until July 1942!
                        Spit.

                        Saliva please? Or by air ...
                        You invented the divisions of different classes.

                        But were the British and French tank divisions not divided into classes?
                        Royal, cavalry and others ...
                      7. Samson S.
                        Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 15
                        0
                        Quote: hohol95
                        The latest G model - 324 pieces until July 1942!

                        So what?
                        Why did you write this to me?
                        Quote: hohol95
                        Or by air ...

                        By air.
                        Quote: hohol95
                        But were the British and French tank divisions not divided into classes?

                        You are sick?
                        Probably so.
                        We were discussing the Germans, when suddenly the British and French got out from somewhere.
                        Are you able to understand what is at stake?
                        I think no.
                      8. hohol95
                        hohol95 5 July 2020 23: 20
                        -1
                        So what?
                        Why did you write this to me?

                        So that you learn the materiel ...
                      9. Samson S.
                        Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 26
                        -1
                        I knew that without you.
                        Have you decided to write directly everything that you generally know in a row?
                      10. hohol95
                        hohol95 6 July 2020 08: 10
                        0
                        Have you decided to write directly everything that you generally know in a row?

                        All that I know - you do not need at all!
                        No, well, if you want - I can tell a couple of fables about life ...
      2. hohol95
        hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 24
        0
        In the summer of 1941, the Germans had the majority of such cars of new models, 60%.
        So the rumors about a "weak German BTT" are greatly exaggerated.
        Just boobies are not aware of the cemented armor and how it differs from the rolled one.

        Especially "boobies" are aware of the quality of Czech armor from the words of the tanker Karius ...
        Modernization was not carried out at all. There were just different models.

        Does this mean that enhancing armor on "deuces" by installing additional armor is not an upgrade?
        And the rearmament of the "triplets" of models E and F from 37 to 50 mm gun is also not an upgrade?
      3. Samson S.
        Samson S. 5 July 2020 22: 38
        0
        Quote: hohol95
        Especially "boobies" are aware of the quality of Czech armor from the words of the tanker Karius ...

        And here you distort.
        Or don’t you know that Czech armor was homogeneous, and German, heterogeneous?
        This is not "armor quality". This is its structure.
        Different armor. Despite the fact that there and there, cement.
        Quote: hohol95
        increased armor on "deuces"

        Respected.
        I am not interested in "modernization of twos" in any way.
        The Pz.II is a "reconnaissance tank". They are not worth mentioning at all. That is why the Pz.II is not on the list of German armored vehicles that I gave you.
        Quote: hohol95
        And the rearmament of the "triplets" of models E and F from 37 to 50 mm gun is also not an upgrade?

        Pz.III c KwK 36 ceased to produce another 1940
        You have already decided what times you write. And don't juggle the facts so explicitly.
      4. hohol95
        hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 52
        +1
        The Pz.II is a "reconnaissance tank".

        Ah, tankers from the African corps didn’t know this truth.
        Then they would only ride in intelligence on their d’s ...
        But they would not have rushed to the British by order of Rommel.
        And why on June 22, 1941, in 3 and 18 tank divisions there were 58 and 50 deuces? Is it for intelligence?
        Or shortage?
        And in other divisions there were from 30 to 50 units.
        Is that all for intelligence?
        Pz.III c KwK 36 ceased to produce another 1940

        So in 1940, and began to change one gun to another with previously released cars! Or is it not an upgrade upgrade?
      5. Samson S.
        Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 08
        +1
        Quote: hohol95
        Ah, tankers from the African corps didn’t know this truth.

        These are their problems.
        Quote: hohol95
        And why on June 22, 1941, in 3 and 18 tank divisions there were 58 and 50 deuces?

        How many times do you need to write about the fact that the new BTT was not enough for all German divisions?
        Quote: hohol95
        So in 1940, and began to change one gun to another with previously released cars! Or is it not an upgrade upgrade?

        Are you able to understand the difference between 1940 and 1941?
        It seems to me that no.
      6. hohol95
        hohol95 5 July 2020 23: 17
        0
        Are you able to understand the difference between 1940 and 1941?
        It seems to me that no.

        Do you think that the triples modernized in this way did not fight in the USSR?
        And they could not strengthen their frontal armor in repair chats or in factories during repair?
        Can you understand this or not?
        Or do you think the Germans drove their tanks and did not think about their modernization during the repair to enhance their combat capabilities?
        And why did they invent sets of additional armor and send them to the troops?
      7. Samson S.
        Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 20
        -1
        Quote: hohol95
        Do you think that the triples modernized in this way did not fight in the USSR?

        Oh, nonsense.
        I told him about Ivan, and he told me about a boob.
        You somehow give the impression of a dishonest person. An honest person cannot act so slippery in life.
        Quote: hohol95
        Or do you think the Germans drove their tanks and did not think about their modernization during the repair to enhance their combat capabilities?

        No modernization during repairs by the Germans was carried out.
        Quote: hohol95
        And why did they invent sets of additional armor and send them to the troops?

        They did not send anything to the troops. And they installed shielding at manufacturing plants. On some models. For example, 30 + 30.
      8. hohol95
        hohol95 5 July 2020 23: 23
        0
        An honest person cannot act so slippery in life.

        Oh thanks for such a gorgeous compliment! Well done! good
      9. Samson S.
        Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 25
        0
        Compliment?
        However ...
  • hohol95
    hohol95 5 July 2020 20: 59
    -1
    The Russians in that war fought not at all where you fantasized it for yourself. You confused them with the Great Russians, who are actually "Soviet Russians", not Russians.

    But the French and the British, where necessary, fought?
    1. Samson S.
      Samson S. 5 July 2020 21: 21
      -1
      Quote: hohol95
      But the French and the British, where necessary, fought?

      Who do you want?
    2. hohol95
      hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 25
      0
      They need to! French and British.
    3. Samson S.
      Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 10
      0
      It was a war for British interests (in 1940). The French did not need it for nothing. That they showed the British in 1940. They did not become, as in the years of WW1, British cannon fodder in Europe. We left this "happiness" to another country.
    4. hohol95
      hohol95 5 July 2020 23: 19
      -1
      We left this "happiness" to another country.

      So it was necessary to declare Moscow and Leningrad free cities and go "to drink Bavarian"?
      And let the Britons themselves "settle" their interests with the Germans and Japanese!
    5. The comment was deleted.
    6. Hhrist
      Hhrist 7 July 2020 17: 19
      -1
      Quote: hohol95
      And let the Britons themselves "settle" their interests with the Germans and Japanese!

      That would be the perfect vairant.
      By the way, since March 1941 these were not so much the interests of the British as the interests of the Amers. Everything, by the spring of 1941, the Britons were completely blown away. And the Americans took everything into their own hands. And they keep everything in their hands to this day.
  • Dr. Frankenstucker
    Dr. Frankenstucker 5 July 2020 15: 06
    -1
    Quote: Olezhek
    There were no good tanks - there were victories


    I hesitate to ask - how do you imagine a "good tank"?
  • DesToeR
    DesToeR 6 July 2020 15: 08
    0
    What makes you think that the Tigers and Panthers were good tanks? Good for what? In order to shoot a T-34 in a frontal clash? But what about the theory of a deep offensive operation (well, or blitzkrieg in German)? How can you plan an offensive operation if your tanks have a cruising range of less than 100km over rough terrain? Only the lazy did not write about the fact that the MTG of these German novelties "gave up" practically on the first day of the battles. WWII was primarily maneuverable, not frontal / ramming. Where it was impossible to knock out the Germans and we bypassed the resistance by the "far side", went out into the operational space, and in the cauldron everything would be digested in "their own juice" - both the mighty KVs and the invulnerable Tigers.
  • svp67
    svp67 5 July 2020 10: 38
    +4
    Quote: Nagan
    Then where are such losses in the tank units of the Red Army? Solid fanatic boys from the Hitler Youth with faustpatrons from Stalingrad to Berlin every 100, no, take more often - 50 meters of the front?

    And imagine the bulk of our destroyed tanks is quite a work of German artillerymen, with their anti-tank, field and anti-aircraft guns, as well as tank destroyers. This is what I will always reproach the Czech "gnomes" for, because this is the "evil animal" that killed our grandfathers and great-grandfathers more than the entire family of "cats"

    The Germans quite intelligently and effectively created anti-tank defense, and our command learned this from them.
    1. Gato
      Gato 5 July 2020 14: 41
      +3
      Quote: svp67
      our command learned this from them

      Not always. The system of vocational schools is our invention and the Germans made an extremely unpleasant impression.
  • svp67
    svp67 5 July 2020 10: 20
    +2
    Quote: bubalik
    Soviet historians described the Panzervaffe materiel without a breakdown by year.

    What kind of historians are these? For the sake of interest
    1. bubalik
      bubalik 5 July 2020 10: 36
      +2
      ,,, Sergey, and you ask the author, his quote.
  • Cetron
    Cetron 5 July 2020 17: 28
    +1
    I agree with you about the heroism of the Soviet soldier, but the article that the Wehrmacht tank company with a platoon of panzergrenadiers grind the RKKA infantry regiment to 41 m in dust, and in the summer of 42nd too. The tank regiment of the Red Army stupidly perished against a company of PD of Germans reinforced with anti-tank weapons. Where were our AT facilities?
    1. Samson S.
      Samson S. 5 July 2020 18: 29
      -2
      Quote: Cetron
      Where were our AT facilities?

      Nowhere.
      The Red Army fought the entire war without actually having adequate artillery at all.
      Any artillery, not just anti-tank.
      What can I say if the first Soviet tank gun was created only in 196? year (at the beginning of the decade, I don’t remember the year exactly).
      Everything was compensated by the losses, which were enormous for the Red Army.
    2. hohol95
      hohol95 5 July 2020 20: 37
      0
      I agree with you about the heroism of the Soviet soldier, but the article that the Wehrmacht tank company with a platoon of panzergrenadiers grind the RKKA infantry regiment to 41 m in dust, and in the summer of 42nd too.

      Did the rifle regiment destroy directly with one tank company and one infantry platoon? Without aviation and artillery ...
      Tell me an example?
      1. Cetron
        Cetron 5 July 2020 21: 21
        +1
        I am talking about the battlefield, and artillery and aviation are support. Where is our support?
        I read in the documents: we flew, no enemy was found. 20 km in the direction of the "aces of the goering" they are threshing a fur column, there is no cover, no air defense. We ran out of fuel and flew to the airfield. The Germans followed, they bombed everything: again there is no cover, there is no air defense - there are no planes either. Until the end of the war, the troops were not saturated with anti-aircraft guns. And those that were, shot well only at their own (a bunch of testimonies).
        1. Samson S.
          Samson S. 5 July 2020 21: 26
          -1
          Quote: Cetron
          The antiaircraft guns did not saturate the troops until the end of the war.

          So, after all, 61-K was saturated with something incompetent. There was little sense from which.
          And only at the end of the war they caught on and began to make 72-K. Although the 72-K itself was adopted in 1940
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 36
            +1
            So, after all, 61-K was saturated with something incompetent. There was little sense from which.

            It turns out that 40 mm Bofors was a complete "suck"?
            Ancestor 61-K.
            1. Samson S.
              Samson S. 5 July 2020 22: 41
              -1
              Quote: hohol95
              It turns out that 40 mm Bofors was a complete "suck"?

              Land Bofors (air-cooled was sludge).
              But the 61-K, unlike the Bofors, was FULL sediment.
              Quote: hohol95
              Ancestor 61-K.

              The progenitor of 61-K was 49-K. And the ancestor of the 49-K was Bofors.
              Do not forget about the 49-K. Since the 61K was a lot of rubbish precisely because of the roots of the 49K. But there were enough of their stocks. Shoals 49-K and 61-K in 61-K have developed.
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 54
                0
                Land Bofors (air-cooled was sludge).
                But the 61-K, unlike the Bofors, was FULL sediment.

                Why did all the belligerents use such a "sloppy" t Bofors then? Maybe there was nothing better?
                1. Samson S.
                  Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 00
                  -1
                  Quote: hohol95
                  Why did all the belligerents use such a "sloppy" t Bofors then?

                  Due to reach in height.
                  Erlikons and analogues did not reach them.
                  But Sea-based Bofors (with water cooling) became famous.
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 5 July 2020 23: 06
                    +1
                    Due to reach in height.
                    Erlikons and analogues did not reach them.

                    So that means we had to reach the height here and used 61-K. Than we others are worse.
                    25 mm 72-K to this height did not take.
                    1. Samson S.
                      Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 17
                      0
                      Quote: hohol95
                      Than we others are worse.

                      All the worse, the 61K is not Bofors.
                      Quote: hohol95
                      25 mm 72-K to this height did not take.

                      She at least took it somewhere. And 61-K after a quick (very fast) overheating has not taken anywhere for a long time.
        2. hohol95
          hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 29
          0
          Until the end of the war, the anti-aircraft guns were never satiated. And those that were, shot well only at their own (a bunch of evidence).

          Ask this question to the manufacturers of that time.
          Why did they fail in the "industrially developed since the 19th century" country to establish gross production of anti-aircraft guns and machine guns of all mothers and shells for them!
        3. hohol95
          hohol95 5 July 2020 22: 57
          0
          Until the end of the war, the anti-aircraft guns were never satiated. And those that were, shot well only at their own (a bunch of evidence).

          So there is a lot of evidence about how German pilots shot down their allies along the Axis.
          And the Hungarian pilots shot down the German He-111. And artillerymen and tankers constantly fired on their own tanks!
          And it was in all the warring armies!
  • WapentakeLokki
    WapentakeLokki 5 July 2020 21: 43
    +1
    ... what about the summer of 1941..and the confrontation of the KV-1 (with their 75 mm armor in a circle) and the Deutsche Pz.III..Obts Panzervaffe with their 50 mm guns that did not take the KV point blank ... but they reached Moscow ... and what .. and how ... and why ... but the answer is simple ... and complicated ... and, by the way, has not been given ...
    1. Samson S.
      Samson S. 6 July 2020 00: 40
      -2
      Quote: WapentakeLokki
      and the confrontation of KV-1 (with their 75 mm of armor in a circle) and Deutsche Pz.III.

      Where did you come up with such confrontations?
      There were none of them.
      Quote: WapentakeLokki
      MBT Panzerwaffe with their 50 mm cannons that did not take KV point blank

      The KVs dealt with German anti-tank vehicles, not BTTs. Tank duels were accepted mainly in "tanks". But votina, this is not a computer shooter.
      1. WapentakeLokki
        WapentakeLokki 6 July 2020 18: 58
        +2
        ... man, and you heard about Zinovy ​​Kolobanov's fight on the KV-1 ... no ... but this (not ORDINARY, let's face it) tank (namely TANK Karl) battle took place ... but about the KV-1 in The opposing Panzer divisional (yeah, tank division) of the Wehrmacht ... and knocked out only fit-up `` Akht-Akht '' ... and such episodes in 41 ... eh ... how quickly everything is forgotten ... sadness ...
        1. Hhrist
          Hhrist 7 July 2020 17: 12
          -1
          Quote: WapentakeLokki
          Zinoviy Kolobanov’s battle on KV-1

          This is when he used the KV-1, like a pillbox?
          Yes, there was such a case. The Germans had nowhere to get around this bunker.
          And they did not have artillery for its destruction.
          And Kolobanov competently created the jam, knocking out the terminal BTTs.
          But this is not a tank battle. This is the battle of the bunker (represented by KV-1) with tanks. Tank battles, they are different.
          1. WapentakeLokki
            WapentakeLokki 7 July 2020 18: 53
            0
            .... it was an ambush ... or, in your opinion, when the Tiger crawls to a strategically important height and locks the battlefield, it becomes a bunker ??? .. you already decide ... yeah .. but in general art consists of that in order to put the enemy in an under-attack position ... and destroy ... and call on the tankmen to meet face to face so this is not WOT ... and, again, by the way, starting in the summer of 1943 the Wehrmacht’s heavy tank battles such - remote battles and what .. it wasn’t the tankmen but .. who ??? ... and the famous battle of Michael Wittmann ... this is not a tank battle ... well, I don’t play WOT ..
            1. Hhrist
              Hhrist 7 July 2020 19: 11
              -1
              Quote: WapentakeLokki
              when the Tiger crawls to a strategically important height and locks the battlefield, does it become a pillbox ???

              But what about? It is the armored pillbox in this case that it becomes.
              Quote: WapentakeLokki
              in general, art consists in putting the enemy in an under-attack position.

              Respected.
              Tank, offensive weapons.
              Bunker, defensive weapon.
              Tank becomes a pillbox not with his hands. He fights differently. Not like in WOT.
              Quote: WapentakeLokki
              and urge tankers to meet face to face

              Such cases during the war years on the fingers count. They were only in Soviet films often.
              Quote: WapentakeLokki
              by the way, starting in the summer of 1943, the Wehrmacht’s heavy tank battles fought just like that - distance battles and what .. it wasn’t tankmen but .. who ???

              Heavy tank battalions were designed to break through the STRENGTHENED enemy defenses.
              Unlike conventional tank divisions and regiments, designed to break through the usual field defense of the enemy.
              Tigers, heirs of the pre-war "breakthrough tank" concept. Its last unsuccessful representative in the Red Army was the KV-1.
              Quote: WapentakeLokki
              and the famous battle of Michael Wittmann ... this is not a tank battle ..

              No, this is not a tank battle. This is a mess. The collapse of the German defense.
              Quote: WapentakeLokki
              Well, I don’t play WOT ..

              This is your business.
              1. WapentakeLokki
                WapentakeLokki 8 July 2020 18: 52
                0
                ... but not to play WOT is MY MATTER ... and judging by your words .. that's right !!!
    2. Hhrist
      Hhrist 7 July 2020 17: 15
      -1
      Quote: WapentakeLokki
      confrontation KV-1 (with their 75 mm of armor in a circle) and Deutsche Pz.III... OBT Panzervaffe

      Such a confrontation is only in your head.
      In fact, the Panzerwaffe was opposed by field magpies 53-K. Which did not take German tanks in the forehead almost at point blank range.
      A KV-1, few opposed. First of all, because the KV-1 moved occasionally and not far. Due to the defective gearbox, which was made (new) only in the summer of 1942. On the KV-1C model.
      No, but what, cool designers did cool BTT.
  • chenia
    chenia 5 July 2020 09: 45
    +2
    The main reason for the failures of 1941 was the absence of a PSU in the Red Army due to the constant reorganization (moreover, in technically more complex troops). We did not have well-coordinated units (yes, at this level). And the endless flow of personnel created a situation where instead of a combat collective there was a group of unfamiliar people. In 1941, we lost four times more prisoners (over the time period) than in 1942 (also not a very successful year).
    Impact power (tanks) were correctly reduced to MK.
    But.
    Firstly. it was necessary to throw MK on exercises in the fall already (to start learning to manage formation). The flaws of OShS, the shortcomings of software and equipment would immediately come out.
    Secondly, it was not fucking to start forming 30 MK. This took all the tanks (TBbr) from the UK, and finally blurred the frames.

    Nemchura (after France) with an increase in the number of TDs (doubling), only halved the TBRs. leaving in TD on TP. Those. essentially did not change the tank component. They understood that it was quickly impossible to prepare personnel, and they would not have two more divisions (if according to the old OSH), but would not be uneven (naturally for a certain time).
    By the way, in fact, their tank division. it turned out not quite tank. And the formation of the echelon of success has been very conditional. At the first stage (when our resistance was weak), it worked. And already on the Kursk Bulge completely failed.
    1. Olezhek
      5 July 2020 10: 06
      +1
      The main reason for the failures of 1941 was the absence of a PSU in the Red Army due to the constant reorganization (moreover, in technically more complex troops). We did not have well-coordinated units (yes, at this level). And the endless flow of personnel created a situation where instead of a combat collective there was a group of unfamiliar people


      And this is to blame 1) Beria 2) Stalin
      Or is it the leadership of the Red Army?

      And the endless flow of personnel created a situation


      Typical impersonal turnover. It seems that it is not the situation in the army that is being described, but the formation of certain atmospheric fronts.
      Did anyone lead the RKKA, or did the "overflows create a situation" there? request
      1. chenia
        chenia 5 July 2020 11: 19
        0
        Quote: Olezhek
        Or is it the leadership of the Red Army?


        Of course, the leadership of the Red Army.
        The guys were carried away by the construction of the aircraft, more influence, more posts, quantity to the detriment of quality.
        As an excuse, I can say that most of the BP events were planned for the fall (and further) of 1941, assuming that in 1941 the Germans would not go to war, at most a provocation (like Khalkhin-Gol). Indeed, the Germans were not ready. Had they faced the Red Army at the end of 1942, the war would have ended in 1943. Hitler made a clear strike when we were engaged in "dressing up".

        Quote: Olezhek
        Typical impersonal turnover.


        I am a former military professional. Activities to form 30 MK, does not fit in the head. This is the speed with which the command staff of the units should change (I just know the time for which it is possible to bring down the combat team, it is 3-4 months, and this is with constant composition and more or less normal BP. And when the TBR turns into a TD. And then into MK (for two years), you can only deal with the tracking of parks and constant acquaintance with both the command staff and the rank and file.

        I know how much time is needed for the command platoon to become a normal company, and beyond. And this is after four years in high school, where I entered by a good competition, having a good secondary education (I generally studied at the ZFTSh at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology).

        I cited the Germans as an example. They did not increase the amount of TP, doubling the TD. Why?
        Quote: Olezhek
        Did anyone lead the RKKA, or did the "overflows create a situation" there?


        In part. I answered (see above). Tymoshenko, Meretskov and Zhukov are the main culprits (although I justified them a little, our typical one will probably carry it through). And only then. they seized (excl. Timoshenko), for Khrushchev’s thesis. where is all the blame on Stalin.
        1. Zeev zeev
          Zeev zeev 5 July 2020 12: 33
          +1
          Well, if it comes to that, the blame for the defeat of 1941 begins precisely with the country's top leadership (including Stalin personally). Seeing the successes of the Wehrmacht tank forces in Poland and France, Stalin demanded an increase in the number of tank formations, and the high command of the army, not wanting to repeat the fate of Tukhachevsky, Blucher and Yakir, cheerfully answered "yes!" The result is known.
        2. mat-vey
          mat-vey 5 July 2020 13: 50
          0
          Quote: chenia
          The guys were carried away by the construction of the aircraft, more influence, more posts, quantity to the detriment of quality.

          What do you mean carried away? What just took and "carried away"?
          1. chenia
            chenia 5 July 2020 14: 55
            +1
            Quote: mat-vey
            What do you mean carried away? What just took and "carried away"?


            But there is such a thing as caste interests. So they lobbied for such an expansion. And to find a justification for such actions and present to the first person in urgent need to accomplish this is not difficult (time, it was this that contributed to this). Yes. and safety net - more, no less.
            1. mat-vey
              mat-vey 5 July 2020 15: 01
              0
              Quote: chenia
              So they lobbied for such an expansion.

              Ahhh ... that means they lobbied .... But the fact that the war was brewing was absolutely nothing to do with it .. And the first person didn’t even know what it was necessary to prepare for war?
              If the army increases several times, then the need for personnel increases several times - the truth is an unexpected connection ...
              1. chenia
                chenia 5 July 2020 15: 46
                +2
                Quote: mat-vey
                If the army increases several times,


                Up to 30 MK? And then in his memoirs he was surprised, and why the heck so much when the war ended with six TAs.
                I’ll tell you so, SA from the 70s was already redundant.

                Quote: mat-vey
                And the first person did not even guess what it was necessary to prepare for war?


                The first person is informed about the prospects for the development of the armed forces. taking into account possible events, competent, but interested citizens in uniform (then in buttonholes). And how will they describe the situation, the problems and the ways of resolving this and that will be the decision of the first person (or he himself, both in intelligence and at the machine?).
                1. mat-vey
                  mat-vey 5 July 2020 15: 57
                  0
                  Quote: chenia
                  they will describe the situation, the problems and the ways to solve it, and that will be the decision of the first person (or he himself, both in intelligence and at the machine?).

                  He himself simply knew how to think, analyze and draw conclusions ..
    2. igopot
      igopot 5 July 2020 10: 45
      +1
      Competent interaction of arms and types of troops. Rokossovsky and some brigade commanders competently fought with their mechanized corps. Providing a tank attack with artillery. Cover artillery and tanks by infantry. And air cover ... The author correctly brought up the nameplate. To bring all artillery into a single fist, and not to spray it.
      1. Hhrist
        Hhrist 7 July 2020 17: 04
        -1
        Quote: igopot
        Rokossovsky and some brigade commanders competently fought with their mechanized corps.

        Oh.
        This is how successful?
        Didn’t run, but retreated by order?
        Then yes, successfully.
        Quote: igopot
        Providing a tank attack with artillery.

        So there was no artillery in the Red Army. Everything was destroyed in the interwar period by the method of "modernization" and "creation of new models" (having no analogues in the world, of course). Only in trifles, something of the autocracy remained.
    3. Hhrist
      Hhrist 7 July 2020 17: 09
      -1
      Quote: chenia
      And already on the Kursk Bulge completely failed.

      The Germans' offensive operation in the Kursk region did not fail, but was canceled due to the opening by the Anglo-Saxons of a second front in Europe (in Italy). Duce had to be rescued, moreover, urgently. But the Germans did not have troops on the 2 main fronts. Therefore, their reserves did not go to Kursk (and further, to Saratov, where they planned to go), but to Italy.
      But Italy still could not be pulled out, she soon surrendered.
      1. chenia
        chenia 7 July 2020 17: 52
        0
        Quote: HHrist
        The Germans' offensive operation in the Kursk region did not fail, but was canceled


        Well yes,. definitely. They sent to Italy the broken-down Leibstandart AG without equipment (to perform police functions), in order to disrupt the strategic operation. And then after 4 months they surrendered as much as Zhytomyr (520 km west of Prokhorovka), although our people had to leave it, but this is an attack. The Germans did not keep what was achieved, did not keep the initial, did not hold the intermediate. they didn’t keep such a line as the Dnieper, and another 100 km behind it.
        Is the whole Wehrmacht in Italians blown up.

        Normally did not fail
        1. Hhrist
          Hhrist 7 July 2020 18: 09
          -1
          Quote: chenia
          They sent to Italy the broken-down Leibstandart AG without equipment (for police functions)

          The fact that the concept of "transport logistics" is unknown to you is already clear to me.
          What for to drive trains with BTT from Kursk to Germany, from Germany to Italy and from Germany to the Eastern Front, if they can only be sent from Germany to Italy? And there the crews would take out from the Eastern Front.
          Quote: chenia
          The Germans did not keep what was achieved, did not keep the initial, did not hold the intermediate. they didn’t keep such a line as the Dnieper, and another 100 km behind it.

          Of course.
          Indeed, in 1943, in the direction of Italy, they created as many as two army groups (Kesselring and Rommel). And this is a very serious number of troops. In Stalingrad, for example, an army was defeated, not a group of armies. Only in the 10th German army (in the Kesselring group) there were 6 divisions: the German Goering tank division, the 15th and 29th motorized infantry divisions, the 16th and 26th tank divisions, as well as the 1st parachute division.
          1. chenia
            chenia 7 July 2020 20: 03
            0
            Quote: HHrist
            The fact that the concept of "transport logistics" is unknown to you is already clear to me


            Well yes! Where are we going. But the AG carried out police functions, and after full staffing and rearmament (not conducting combat operations in Italy for a single day) resisted to correct the "successes at Kursk" on the eastern front.

            Quote: HHrist
            Indeed, in 1943, in the direction of Italy


            Until May 1943, the entire British army (four times superior to the enemy) fought with four German divisions for two years. And another six months with 4,5 (this is half the GG division you indicated, and this is when the Americans with the French appeared in Morocco). And Kesselring just itched in Rome. Then he clicked on Sicily.

            You are new to this. site, this topic was discussed 30 times (here and about the 2nd SS Panzer Corps were inserted. (forgetting to note that this is a pair of three generals with a pair of battalions of combat and rear support in total).

            So. that we have long decided here that Soviet propaganda of law near Kursk broke the Wehrmacht ridge.
            So what to do. Such facts.
            So that you have to live with it.
      2. hohol95
        hohol95 8 July 2020 08: 11
        0
        Duce had to be rescued, moreover, urgently. But the Germans did not have troops on the 2 main fronts. Therefore, their reserves did not go to Kursk (and further, to Saratov, where they planned to go), but to Italy.

        So they saved Mussolini?
        And in 1944, who was saved? Already yourself dear?
        By the middle of July 1944, the German Goering division took up positions south of Florence, but already on July 15 received an order for urgent redeployment to the Eastern Front.

        And why was it so urgently required to send "GG" again to the Eastern Front?
        The Russians have cloned hordes of "orcs and war chariots" again!
        And they carried out Operation Bagration ...
        And poor Germans rushed from European wines to Russian moonshine throughout the war.
  • Vovk
    Vovk 5 July 2020 09: 47
    +6
    Consider the 6-month training courses for tank crews of medium and heavy tanks in 1943.
    The general methodology for practical consolidation of theoretical skills - a driver mechanic - 1 hour driving at the training ground, practical shooting - only 1 time with 3 shells at the training ground, practical interaction with infantry at the training ground - was not practiced, practical interaction at the level - tank battalion, regiment at the training ground - not practiced.
    And this is 1943
    1. Olezhek
      5 July 2020 10: 00
      +3
      The general method for practical consolidation of theoretical skills is a driver mechanic - 1 hour driving at the training ground, practical shooting - only 1 time with 3 shells at the training ground,


      These tankers are enough for one battle, and then you need to make new tanks and train new crews.
      Conveyor belt, however.
      And it's easier to start than stop
      1. DesToeR
        DesToeR 6 July 2020 15: 17
        0
        Quote: Olezhek
        Conveyor belt, however.
        And it's easier to start than stop

        No, it’s not easier. It’s easier to prepare a hundred mega aces for tanks assembled almost manually. And it’s quite another to establish an uninterrupted flow of personnel to the front interconnected with a similar flow of equipment and weapons from factories.
  • Krasnoyarsk
    Krasnoyarsk 5 July 2020 10: 09
    -1
    It is very difficult to read the article. A lot of repetition. That’s because, yes therefore.
    There is a lot of "water". And the conclusions from the article are ambiguous.
    In a word, the article is crude and verbose.
    1. Hagen
      Hagen 5 July 2020 11: 34
      +2
      Quote: Krasnoyarsk
      And the conclusions from the article are mixed.

      Conclusions, just, are unequivocal: the army in peacetime must live in the "field" and fight at every opportunity, no matter how the liberals from politics react to it.
  • iouris
    iouris 5 July 2020 10: 51
    0
    The publication should be a review or the content should contain elements of novelty, but in any case, the author should be scientific. In the introductory part, a goal should be set, tasks formulated and the relevance of the publication justified. Main part. The presentation should be concise, informative, evidence-based. The absence of references to publications of other authors, the expert level and scientific qualifications, which are confirmed, is a bad sign. In the final part there should be brief conclusions, a statement that the goal has been achieved. So what did the author want to tell us, which confirms his expert level?
  • bandabas
    bandabas 5 July 2020 11: 14
    0
    It’s a pity that they pushed us and the Germans with their foreheads. And not for the first time.
    1. iouris
      iouris 5 July 2020 13: 36
      -1
      Get ready for new challenges.
    2. evgeniy.plotnikov.2019mail.ru
      evgeniy.plotnikov.2019mail.ru 6 July 2020 13: 37
      0
      Yes, sorry, bandabas. But, and who does not allow to be STRONG? Who does not allow modern, effective managers to engage in nonsense, giving out a country, but really RAISE it, to bring back joy, meaning, meaning? Indeed, the WWII experience does not teach them anything.
      It will not help ,, savings ,,, ,, communication ,,,, innate enterprise ,, if, your country is at a loss. ,, Enjoy, big and small problems will be ALL! How do idiots explain this?
      ... And then, overslept ,,. ,, Normal ,, villains, led by German resident Tukhachevsky imposed on the Red Army tanks with ,, funny ,, armor. What about the others? Thousands of others ,, Ohvitserov ,,? Back in the early 30s, it was known that an armor-piercing projectile of a 37mm gun pierced through and BT and T-26. A little ,, move, started only after the ,, Finnish ,,. Screens, new cars ... But I’ve all been with BT and T-26 since Spain. Why were they silent and pretending that everything was normal? Convinced foes, on the allowance of the adversaries consisting ... - with those everything is clear. But what about the others? Which themselves burned in Spain, on Khalkhin Gol?
      Half-truths and lies have become commonplace - that’s the problem. The human material ,, flogged ,,,. Why?
      ,, Atheist ,, try to explain that Orthodoxy, besides Velsenskogo, also has a meaning and significance. There is no cadet or cadet certificate from the parish priest about confession - a reason for expulsion from school. So it was in the Republic of Ingushetia in the 1918th century. Confession is like going to the bathhouse, washing yourself, and cleansing yourself. But is it that after XNUMX, human people have become more honest and purer than their predecessors?
      ..As soon as Stalin did not fight liars! A textbook case is a famous episode with the counting of finished planes ... And how did you lie to the General Staff in the early days of the war, bringing to the white heat Joseph Vissarionovich? How, courageously, the colors that were set to the minimum hours of the body did not sleep, how they personally drove into senseless bloody attacks ...
      A MILITARY MACHINE cannot work effectively without truth. A lie for her is like a sand for ICE.
      ... Flags for controlling tank units? Have you tried to lean out of the hatch under the enemy machine-gun fire? And now, horror, what. They tried to wave flags in 1979 and 1980, at the beginning of the Afghan war. On the other hand, as they did not teach then, tankers are not taught now how to observe the battlefield. Binoculars are optional equipment. ,, Zadrail ,, hatch - and ,, flew ,, ...
      Our ancestors of the period of the Russian Empire were not idiots. Look at the grandiose results of their work and our modest ones. What country they left us and what we have now. Warsaw was our city, like Helsinki, if SHO. It is said - two heads have an eagle .. What is not clear? The power of the king and the power of the patriarch. Serious strong, princely, power, but also serious, spiritual, power. Equal heads, equal. The law of God is a defense against the education of the false, uninterrupted,. ,, Subhuman, "who did not have a spiritual core, could never and will never be able to withstand high-intensity battles
    3. Hhrist
      Hhrist 7 July 2020 16: 59
      -1
      Quote: bandabas
      It’s a pity that they pushed us and the Germans with their foreheads.

      And who pushed something?
      Is it possible that Dzhunashvil was handled by Molotov during the negotiations of the latter in November 1940 in Berlin?
      After all, it was after these negotiations that Hitler ordered the preparation of a plan of war with the USSR. Until that moment, the Germans did not have a detailed plan.
      Quote: bandabas
      And not for the first time.

      Enchanting. Especially considering the fact that 1MV was actually muddied by Russia. Not one, of course. But basically, she.
  • BAI
    BAI 5 July 2020 11: 57
    0
    Battles and battles are won not by tanks and battleships, but structures

    Well this is a direct quote from Corned Beef.
    1. Olezhek
      5 July 2020 11: 59
      -1
      Big minds think alike lol
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 6 July 2020 16: 57
      0
      Quote: BAI
      Well this is a direct quote from Corned Beef.

      Then Isaev. He often repeated that structures were not fighting tanks.
  • Dr. Frankenstucker
    Dr. Frankenstucker 5 July 2020 12: 09
    -1
    That is, the Soviet "more than 50 thousand units of armored vehicles" - rather reinsurance "troika-generals" than a logical and practically necessary amount.


    Is this, as I understand it, a reference to the memorable note of Tukhachevsky by the drug addict Voroshilov?
  • Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 5 July 2020 12: 50
    +4
    Well yes. All right. Millions of people lay down in vain precisely because of this - low quality management. Often the command transferred the situation from victorious to complete defeat ... It cannot be said that such a situation is a purely Soviet invention. Army control in all countries is inefficient and poorly built. There is a reason for this, which is slightly lower. The first question is why did the Germans manage so well?
    Well, firstly, the Germans were preparing to fight. And this is in principle not accepted in the army. Armies in states are not created and equipped for this. And the Germans prepared, and efficiently. Secondly, the strong quality of the Germans as a nation is discipline, the ability to work in teams. Thirdly - a set of experience on weak opponents, time for training.
    The second question is - why are armies created in states? Armies are created primarily in order to steal. If you sculpt civilian products, you are very limited by the consumer. There are many consumers, and this is good and bad. Well, that a lot of buyers. It’s bad that damned consumers make a ton of demands on the product, and you need to spend a lot of money to satisfy them. There is little profit left! The goal of capitalism is by no means satisfying demand. That's nonsense, that is nonsense. The goal of capitalism is maximum profit with minimum cost!
    And military products are ideal in this regard. Instead of millions of picky consumers - a small military department. Which you can just buy at the root. Instead of the mass use of products, there are rare maneuvers (which are easy to make quite rare, practically irrelevant). Huge volumes of orders that go to warehouses, and are not used. Of the opponents whom the capitalists need to "defeat", who remains?
    Real fit warlords. Which will not put up with junk, which enters the army instead of good weapons and equipment. Since capitalists determine everything in the state, they also determine everything in the army. Real peacetime officers do not grow. They just can't. Thousands of eyes make sure that a sensible officer does not receive any power. Well and so on, you can continue for a long time.
    In the USSR, all these negative trends were fully present, just with a Soviet flavor. Monetary competition was partially replaced by career - if you were in sight, then instead of a fortune you received power. However, there is also a lot of money (those who want to figure it out can read the biography of aircraft designer Yakovlev. That's who designed it ...). Plus one more problem. There was no state like the USSR in the world. No one simply knew how to build control systems in such a state!
    And Stalin did poorly. Very bad. Which ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR. The foundation of the collapse was laid precisely when really effective management mechanisms were not created. And it is dreary to horror ...
    1. Hhrist
      Hhrist 7 July 2020 16: 54
      -1
      Quote: Mikhail3
      there was no such thing as a USSR like the USSR.

      In ancient times and even in the era of the early Middle Ages, Europe was full of "socialist states". Of course, they were based on other cults (not on pseudo-religion such as Marxism-Leninism). And they called themselves differently.
      But there is no doubt that they were the first "socialist states". Those. totalitarian sects, headed by a leader or chieftains, which have some signs of primitive statehood. Of course, apart from the leaders of such sects, the rest of the members were their slaves. Everything is the same as in the USSR.
      Quote: Mikhail3
      No one simply knew how to build control systems in such a state!

      Unlike uneducated ignoramuses (Soviet citizens), the world is full of uneducated people. And they are aware of how the totalitarian sects, primitive in their structure, function (even if they have assumed a pseudo-state guise), and what is going on inside of them.
      Such primitive entities have no chance of success. Archaic society is doomed to die. And assimilation by neighbors. It is simply uncompetitive. Unless it itself is aware of its backwardness and does not take measures to eliminate such backwardness.
      But this rarely happens with totalitarian sectarians. They most often have suicidal tendencies.
      Quote: Mikhail3
      And Stalin did poorly. Very bad. Which ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR.

      The degradation of the USSR led to its degradation, carried out by Dzhugashviley from 1927 to 1934. During this degradation, the USSR lost even the theocratic feudal state (which was under Ulyanov) and turned into a totalitarian sect, functioning on the basis of slave-owning TPO. Those. USSR in 1927-34 failed during the early Middle Ages, and even deeper into Antiquity.
      Quote: Mikhail3
      the collapse again was laid precisely when really effective management mechanisms were not created.

      "Control mechanisms" is a problem of tenth or even twentieth degree of importance.
      1. Mikhail3
        Mikhail3 8 July 2020 09: 01
        +1
        Quote: HHrist
        Unlike uneducated ignoramuses (Soviet citizens), the world is full of uneducated people. And they are aware of how the totalitarian sects, primitive in their structure, function (

        That's right. Uneducated people who consider themselves to be educated on the basis of the fact that they have learned several textbooks of arbitrary chatter are full in the world.
        And these people sincerely "think" (in fact, the humanities do not think. Not given) that the ancient polis has at least something in common with the modern scientific and technological state. Since there is nothing in common between these systemic formations, there is nothing to talk about. Sorry.
  • chenia
    chenia 5 July 2020 14: 07
    +4
    Quote: ZeevZeev
    Seeing the successes of the Wehrmacht tank forces in Poland and France,


    Therefore, they copied (June 1940) Tank groups (we have the Shock Army) including MK. Very correct decision and timely.
    And then ....
    Blinded OShS, well, check how the car will spin. And in the People’s Commissariat and the General Staff they began to replicate the muddy formation. What, comrade Stalin is to blame? Year. there were no real exercises (that’s how they played on the cards and everything was planned in real life for the fall of 1941). And they began to form 30 MK. In my time, ADN at TP was introduced for several years (and this is a unit), a lot of dissertations, experiments, etc.

    I mean, as soon as I had to advance. immediately remembered the large tank formations. And the OSB was folded right. And they found the right amount.
    And in the MK it was necessary to have three battalions in the TS, and three tanks in platoons. And MK is already drying up to 600 tanks, and a quarter fewer battalions. And this is based on the TBR (at the place of deployment), you can deploy two TP (there will be only 1/4 more tanks, and one third of units (instead of 4 battalions there will be 6). This means, although with a creak, you can use the training fields , shooting ranges and tank-tracks of the former fire brigade. And the former fleet with the entire structure will have only 1/4 more equipment (warehouses, refueling, MTOR, battery). And not from scratch in an open field. Well, a third more frames are needed, and not twice.

    Here the author is right, they ditched the quality in quantity ..
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 6 July 2020 17: 10
      +1
      Quote: chenia
      Therefore, they copied (June 1940) Tank groups (we have the Shock Army) including MK. Very correct decision and timely.

      Not copied. And they tried to repeat the German OShS in the form in which it was reflected in the crooked and muddy mirror of intelligence.
      Quote: chenia
      Blinded OShS, well, check how the car will spin.

      But there is nothing to check. Our industry promised to fully equip one MK by the fall of 1941.
      Although the first bell was in 1940, when they checked the introduction of MK into the battle during the KShU - the complete garbage came out: the corps, even in theory, did not fit into the breakthrough lane and pulled a huge rear tail behind it.
      1. chenia
        chenia 6 July 2020 19: 28
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        And they tried to repeat the German OShS in the form in which it was reflected in the crooked and muddy mirror of intelligence.


        I agree. But in principle, it turned out correctly, it was only necessary to correct (in the conservatory (TP)) (as they did when they started to advance (in 1942).

        .
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Our industry promised to fully equip one MK by the fall of 1941.


        That’s precisely why Tymoshenko, Meretsky, and Zhukov had to be pressed. What to replicate, it is not clear what, and even on such a scale. And they could. here you need only one tank division to drive, well, fully equipped. The rest, at the company level, is indicated by one tank. With 2-3 intermediaries, they themselves studied and evaluated at each level. In principle, nothing new. And all the flaws of the OShS, tactical, organizational, technical level, would immediately climb out. Recommendations and a bunch of new standards would come up. Well, something like this should be.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 6 July 2020 20: 02
          0
          Quote: chenia
          That’s precisely why Tymoshenko, Meretsky, and Zhukov had to be pressed. What to replicate, it is not clear what, and even on such a scale.

          And how else to justify the industry order of thousands of tanks, tractors and other special equipment - if there are no structures to which they should go? wink
          And how to train personnel for future "optimal MC" - and to train urgently and a lot, because the war can be already in 1942? And these cadres are far from the ones that will be in the post-war USSR. There is no time for OShS - BTV needs to teach people with three grades of education at least the basics of tank management. smile And if you wait for the optimal OSH, then you will have to train them after the start of the war.
          Quote: chenia
          The rest, at the company level, is indicated by one tank.

          Yeah ... and then it suddenly turns out that a real MK on a real march draws real columns of all its units and formations much further than on imitations. And the speed of the mixed column is much lower, and it actually eats a lot more fuel. And the gadish reconnaissance battalion, when fully equipped, cannot conduct reconnaissance, because it lacks radios and the range of their communications. And you need to again rotate the OSH to push the MK at least into the size of the battlefield.
          For the USSR-1941 with its level of training of ordinary and command personnel, only exercises in a 1: 1 scale can become the only accurate measure.
          And most importantly - not a single fully equipped and well-coordinated division until the summer of 1941 was in the BTV. It’s not even a matter of technology - it’s a matter of l / s: coordination at the division level is planned only for July-August 1941.
          1. chenia
            chenia 6 July 2020 21: 05
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And if you wait for the optimal OSH, then you will have to train them after the start of the war.


            There is no need to wait. it is necessary at least for a shitty OShS to drive the MK to the landfill, and there it is already "chemistry" to compress to optimize. Here it quickly comes to what to leave and what to throw away. And so they were engaged in tracing parks. for future technology.

            Quote: Alexey RA
            And how to train personnel for future "optimal MC" - and to prepare urgently and a lot,


            So prepare three mediators near each commander. You will not believe. but this is the main way of learning. You evaluate, you are evaluated (intermediaries are usually of one position, and come to the appropriate level). Here you can prompt and peep. And the first (experimental) MK can probably be recruited from more prepared ones. And on its basis to conduct demonstrative methodological classes on the organization of BP in units. And to drive it with rotation (gradual, sharp will not pass) commander and l / s.sostav.

            Quote: Alexey RA
            and then suddenly it turns out that the real MK on the real march

            That's right, you need to know such a colossus should have several extension routes. And the division would have shown it all. There would be all the standards and organizational arrangements for the preparation and conduct of the march and climbed out.
            It is natural to stick to a TD both a motorized rifle regiment (they could be thrown off onto one regiment of a car and brought to the state), and divisions of combat and rear support. A battle group, as I said. A month, another, and proposals on the OSH, on technology, on the organization of events, the methodology for conducting BP, would have already gone. maintenance and service.

            I have said so many times (and there’s nothing alternative, because it happened so. But the experience with blood came), make the tank regiment a three-battalion. and three-tank platoons in the TP-up to 94-96 tanks.
            MK "dries up" up to 480 main tanks + 100-120 tanks for combat support units.
            Total 600 tanks. And everything else in general and not so bad. Well, if you focused on 9 MK. then TBR remained in the UK (at least in the border districts). And these formations in defense constitute an attack group (counterattacks, counterattacks) or provide cover when retreating. Well, it appeared. at least some time on the PSU (albeit at least worthless).
  • demiurg
    demiurg 5 July 2020 18: 34
    +3
    Please return the cons for the articles.
    Not a word about the concentration of armored vehicles, not a word about the walkie-talkie, about the presence of mechanized traction in the troops, about the coherence of units ....
    Tanks are not only armor, they are also eating and shooting for the crew. And spare parts for tanks that need to be delivered quickly. The Germans dragged the first years of the war on walkie-talkies and on superiority in the mobility of troops. And on the experience of the Polish and French campaigns. As soon as the experience of the Red Army command staff became comparable with the German one, the walkie-talkies appeared in most tanks and planes, and the trucks became comparable with the Wehrmacht, everything was fine.
    But the white gods in Courland .... Fie on them, they were not needed by anyone, and what they are not capable of. Therefore, they were left in the rear. The same "high-class" fighters in 44 and 45 were driven with rags with rags at an offensive pace higher than that of the Wehrmacht in 41.
    1. Mikhail3
      Mikhail3 6 July 2020 09: 05
      +1
      Quote: demiurg
      The Germans dragged the first years of the war on walkie-talkies and on superiority in the mobility of troops.

      The mobility of troops is not higher than the mobility of their slowest part. Therefore, the mobility of both sides was the same, like a tank with one caterpillar - an infantryman. Walkie-talkies are a good thing ...
      The Germans, among other things, had Guderian, who developed and implemented the concept of equalizing marching speeds. Roughly speaking, he explained how tanks should not break away from infantry and supplies, and at the same time win.
      The Germans won not because they moved faster, but because they were there on time. Their command chains were shorter. Their data transmission and application system was shorter and more accurate. Their officers were able to quickly and correctly apply the orders and information received to them. Everything was arranged much more efficiently with them, and walkie-talkies could not do here))

      And then we surpassed them in all of this.
      Unfortunately, military experience, for well-known reasons (Stalin died) did not go into peaceful construction ...
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 6 July 2020 17: 19
        0
        Quote: Mikhail3
        The mobility of troops is not higher than the mobility of their slowest part. Therefore, the mobility of both sides was the same, like a tank with one caterpillar - an infantryman.

        But we have motorized infantry moving for the most part on their own. Rybalko even in 1943 was forced to drive his motorized riflemen on foot, bringing the daily march, EMNIP, to 50 km. Or carry part of the infantry (only with the arrow) in tanks.
        And at the adversary’s infantry rode behind the tanks in trucks.
        1. Mikhail3
          Mikhail3 7 July 2020 08: 40
          0
          Like all our historians, you overestimate the technical equipment of the German army. Soviet heritage - Soviet historians were very little concerned with historical truth, as the party told them. The party already made mistakes ...
          In general, the Germans were not much better off. Their infantry are also quite a few marshiers on foot. Another thing is that the control technology in the German army itself was better, understand? If you need to urgently transfer infantry, vehicles, which are no more than in the Soviet units, will be quickly subordinated to this task.
          This situation is immeasurably better than if you have more equipment, but massaging it for the needs of suddenly arising non-standard tasks is difficult. You spend more resources on this technique than your opponent, and he moves faster. Do you understand? Competent management in similar conditions always wins. IS ALWAYS.
          Do not go with the flow. And do not swim against the tide, Swim where you need!
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 7 July 2020 10: 07
            0
            Quote: Mikhail3
            In general, the Germans were not much better off. Their infantry are also quite a few marshiers on foot.

            The problem is that even so she overtook our infantry.
            The actions of the German infantry against the 5th A are indicative, when the German infantry divisions re-maneuvered our infantry, capturing the leading points and crossings by advanced detachments until our retreating forces approached and pressing our rifle divisions to the river. The motorized reconnaissance battalion and the PT division, together with the abnormal use of rear trucks, for some time make a motorized regiment from the infantry division ... or at least a couple of battalions.

            The very same ambush is that the Germans had fully mechanized formations that did not stratify on the march into tanks, infantry and always lagging artillery. It was their advantage in "group mobility" that ensured the success of the Germans in 1941 and 1942.
            Typical 1941 scenario: the Panzerwaffe breaks through the front, quickly seizes the communications and crossing nodes, surrounding our formations. Our reserves are late, and even the infantry with artillery is lagging behind the tanks. As a result, bare tanks go with virtually no infantry and absolutely no artillery to break through the ring, meet with German tanks, infantry, artillery (conventional and PTA) - and die on German defense. And then the German infantry comes and replaces the tankers, making the ring impenetrable.
            1. Mikhail3
              Mikhail3 7 July 2020 11: 58
              0
              You perceive the whole picture as it is, without analyzing it) This perception has its advantages ... In general, this
              the Germans had fully mechanized formations that did not stratify on the march into tanks, infantry, and artillery that was always lagging behind.
              science fiction, and completely unscientific. But it is abundantly represented in Soviet historiography, obscuring the brains of people. There are no such compounds, they are impossible, and they are not needed. Unless in the movie about moving cities attacking each other something like this takes place, the city drags everything on itself)
              "Eternally lagging artillery" ... The whole German trick is that the movement of their formations was planned and ensured in such a way that there were no eternally lagging behind. That's the whole secret. Is the artillery moving the slowest? So it just means that she must START MOVING BEFORE EVERYONE! Do you understand? And not to catch everyone later! And this means that the commander planning the operation must correctly calculate the speed of movement of his units, make the correct corrections for dirt, take into account other factors, and thus prepare the strike.
              Instead, the order came to everyone at the same time, artillery tractors (what a surprise !!) do not keep up with the tanks ... This does not mean that the Germans had any special units. It just means that at first we had bad commanders who were poorly trained and raised in vain. Poor teachers taught them poorly, illiterate political workers raised them, Stalin tried to improve the quality of this mess by stirring up fear of punishment (which he did a lot of success, but the method itself was not used in the best way), etc.
              What am I, in fact, talking about.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 7 July 2020 12: 24
                0
                Quote: Mikhail3
                There are no such compounds, they are impossible, and they are not needed.

                Kampfgroup Eberbach. Which, in a couple of hours, mainly due to artillery fire, forced the full-blooded battalion of captain Kim, entrenched in front of Krichev, to leave its position. Moreover, from the artillery, Eberbach even had 15 cm guns and 21 cm mortars ..
                Quote: Mikhail3
                Is artillery moving slowest? So it just means that she must START MOVING BEFORE EVERYONE! Do you understand?

                Yeah. And then either arrange a traffic jam, interfering with the movement of all other units, or crawl out onto the enemy first.
                Artillery must begin folding so that it falls into place in the column. And this place is the middle-tail, so as not to crawl out on tractors directly to the enemy.
                Quote: Mikhail3
                Instead, the order came to everyone at the same time, artillery tractors (what a surprise !!) do not keep up with the tanks ...

                You mix two things - coagulation and march. The problem of the Red Army was precisely that even if the mechanized convoy was organized properly, on the march the artillery that took its place in the convoy with its 3-5 km / h was hopelessly behind the tanks and motorized infantry.
                As a result, a situation like "The GPZ stumbled upon an entrenched infantry battalion - calls up artillery fire - two hours later nothing remained of the battalion's defense"For our mechanical units in 1941 it was impossible - after half a day of march, the artillery was deep in the rear.
                Quote: Mikhail3
                And that means that the commander planning the operation is obliged to correctly calculate the speed of movement of his units, make correct corrections for dirt, take into account other factors, and thus prepare the strike.

                With tractors 1941-1943 the commander had to send artillery half a day before the tanks left. Otherwise, it either turned out to be far in the rear, or the entire mechanical connection had to crawl at 3-5 km / h. smile
                And how do you command to act in breaking the enemy’s defense and developing success in the rear? Proceed with the artillery regiment? Or put it in the head of the column, immediately behind the GPP?
                1. Mikhail3
                  Mikhail3 7 July 2020 13: 43
                  0
                  Pancake. You are trying to assemble a single column from heterogeneous units. Once a swan, cancer and pike ... That was the problem. The cool commander of the Red Army is directly visible, unable to understand why the Germans succeed, but he doesn’t. And you don’t hear me ...
              2. strannik1985
                strannik1985 7 July 2020 14: 36
                0
                Such compounds do not exist, they are not possible, and are not needed.

                The horses in the Wehrmacht TD were only in the field reserve battalion (26 goals - 20 light, 6 heavy draft, 13 wagons, 26 bicycles).
                Is artillery moving slowest?

                The ancestors had a lot of practice in organizing marches, but their howitzers in mobile units appeared after the war, until June 1945 they managed with a combination of 76 mm guns and 120 mm mortars.
                1. Mikhail3
                  Mikhail3 7 July 2020 14: 50
                  0
                  And while in the army of the Wehrmacht, something was accumulated for five million horsemen.
                  1. strannik1985
                    strannik1985 7 July 2020 15: 20
                    0
                    By June 1941, about one million horses. However, horse-drawn was field artillery of infantry divisions, i.e. where the speed of the march corresponded to the speed of the infantryman. The anti-tank artillery in the PD is completely on motorized traction, in the tank / motorized divisions all is similar, the ARGK is the largest part, on average 3-4 divisions of barrels with a caliber of 105 to 210 mm were in the motorized corps.
                    1. Mikhail3
                      Mikhail3 7 July 2020 16: 15
                      0
                      All this is secondary. A correctly used horse is several times faster than an incorrectly applied Formula 1 car. Quantitative indicators in this section only obscure the essence of the matter.
                      1. strannik1985
                        strannik1985 7 July 2020 16: 42
                        0
                        All this is secondary.

                        http://tankfront.ru/ussr/doc/gko/gko_2791ss.html
                        Tell your contemporaries. They wanted a GAP in every TA, in reality there was only one.
    2. Olezhek
      6 July 2020 19: 50
      -1
      The same "high-class" fighters in 44 and 45 were driven with rags with rags at an offensive pace higher than that of the Wehrmacht in 41.


      I want to live in your universe ...
  • Samson S.
    Samson S. 5 July 2020 18: 35
    -5
    But the Battle of Kursk as a whole was a defeat for the Wehrmacht.

    Oops.
    Suddenly.
    Why would suddenly defeat?
    Since when did the refusal to solve the initial tasks (access to the Volga to Saratov) be a defeat?
    1. strannik1985
      strannik1985 6 July 2020 15: 28
      0
      Why would suddenly defeat?

      Those. do you think they were advancing, then to retreat? good
  • Bogatyrev
    Bogatyrev 5 July 2020 22: 05
    0
    So the T-26 wasn’t worth taking out of the rifle divisions. If they knew that it would be so - at least some sense would be of them.
    1. Samson S.
      Samson S. 5 July 2020 23: 13
      -1
      Quote: Bogatyrev
      So the T-26 wasn’t worth taking out of the rifle divisions. If they knew that it would be so - at least some sense would be of them.

      T-26 in rifle divisions has never been.
      And there were never other tanks there either.
      T-26s were in mechanized divisions. And these are other troops. And their functions are completely different.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 6 July 2020 17: 33
        +1
        Quote: Samson S.
        T-26 in rifle divisions has never been.

        There were departs to the SD - until they were removed from there according to the results of the Special Forces. And then not all of them - the Far Eastern Federal District retained their otb.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 6 July 2020 17: 22
      0
      Quote: Bogatyrev
      So the T-26 wasn’t worth taking out of the rifle divisions. If they knew that it would be so - at least some sense would be of them.

      There was no use from them - which was demonstrated by the Special Economic Fund.
      PAULOV. (...) Unfortunate fate befell us in the Red Army - and during any war befall - our division tanks. You will excuse my harshness, but I must say bluntly: all that was stated that tanks were necessary in order to teach interaction, today it turned out to be a bluff, no interaction was taught. More than 7 thousand tanks are scattered across divisions and they did not play any role. They were helpless. Battalions of the rifle division, twin T-37 tanks with T-26 - Kutzai organization, low-power T-37 tanks are not able to walk on the Malomalsky mud. These battalions, part of the infantry divisions, had no effect. And let them say, let me correct, if I incorrectly say that they were most often turned to the guard of the headquarters of regiments and divisions.
      VOTE. Correctly.
      PAULOV. But this amounts to about 7 thousand tanks.

      After all, it came to insanity - in order to support infantry with tanks, it was necessary to form consolidated separate tank battalions from tank brigades and crush them to rifle divisions, which had their own tank battalions in the state.
      1. chenia
        chenia 6 July 2020 19: 13
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        There was no use from them.

        We were able to organize BP at the level of units of another kind of troops, infantry units and doge formations only after the war. Silenok and personnel were not enough. It’s one thing in a tank regiment or brigade to organize a power supply unit with responsible persons, and to have a military base — tank tracks, shooting ranges (even from a barrel), training fields. relevant classrooms. The battalion of that time will not pull, and the personnel are rather weak. The same applies to artillery - two artillery regiments in a division are more correct than those for ADN in regiments (at that time, naturally, in my time there was a screw in the SME range.)
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 6 July 2020 19: 50
          0
          Quote: chenia
          We were able to organize BP at the level of units of another kind of troops, infantry units and doge formations only after the war.

          Yes, an ordinary SD 30s could not even provide maintenance and repair of its tanks - traditionally, there were not enough special vehicles even for BTVs.
          Plus, the same T-26s demanded B-70 / KB-70 aviation gas for themselves.
      2. Bogatyrev
        Bogatyrev 7 July 2020 21: 33
        0
        Yes, they did not know how to use them in the offensive in the Special Forces.
        But the conclusion of Marshal Pavlov is clearly administratively wrong - on the grounds that the divisions incorrectly used the T-26, he claims that they are generally useless in the SD.
        But first of all, they would be extremely useful for defense.
        Secondly, their transfer to the mechanized corps made them MORE useless - they only cluttered the roads, complicated the management of the hull and burned the fuel.
        But in the battle formations of the defending SD, a battalion of such tanks in reserve would be very useful. He could eliminate breakthroughs, would give the opportunity to maneuver forces. In many persistent SDs, held in dozens of places and had clever command, such a battalion would greatly enhance their combat stability. In fact.
  • Smirnov Mikhail
    Smirnov Mikhail 5 July 2020 23: 56
    0
    Trying to catch the logic of my favorite author ..

    Quote: Miner
    The main message of the Author is clear and understandable - the QUALITY of the structural units of the army and their competent management in painful actions is MORE IMPORTANT (based on historical facts) than the NUMBER of armor, people, etc. caliber guns.


    The author seems to agree with this, but the leadership, combat experience, training and other technical characteristics of a person are the same quality of the unit as the amount of armor, people, etc. caliber guns in the unit. The unit armed with grenade launchers, better armed with slingshots, the mass is better than the piece, and the smart (experienced, learned) is better than the stupid crowd. And when a unit is inferior in one parameter, then they lift up another to balance (and to win it must be surpassed) ..

    Structure is the nature of the organization, where the latter consists of elements and relationships. There are taps and shocks (elements), and there are water and sewer pipes (connections between the elements) that connect taps and shocks in one piece. So what is the reason for the pogrom of 41-43 years? Was the quality of the element (superior in personnel numbers, superior in armament, superior in combat experience / quality of personnel, and even superior in other ways, all other things being equal) on the Wehrmacht? And you had to throw more masterful rival / crews with corpses / tanks? And in everything else (in structure and relations) was there complete parity?
  • Maxim364364
    Maxim364364 6 July 2020 09: 23
    +1
    The Germans were trained at the beginning of the war perfectly, the morale after France and Poland was strong, so they went ahead like devils, how many shots the 45s managed to make if they were lucky to act from an ambush or suddenly from 100-300 meters, give me a couple of three later everyone, death row. And batteries of more powerful guns met the Fritzes even if they managed to take positions on direct fire, and how much is 500-700 meters, in the absence of at least parity in the number of guns for the number of attacking tanks, even if the Panzer is 1 or 2, the lifetime of the gun or crew was a few shots, in such a situation even exchanging a gun for a tank was not the worst option. How many such exchanges were on the way to Moscow, there are many, the personnel army of the border districts paid the highest price so that the Nazis approaching Moscow, Leningrad and many other cities in the depths of the country would not have an "extra" tank division that could decide the outcome of this or that battle ...
  • Per se.
    Per se. 6 July 2020 10: 52
    -1
    What did the author want to say, Oleg Egorov, in this article? The basis of the material is the era of the Second World War. Moreover, there is a mention of German tanks, of Hitler, but not a word about the role of Heinz Guderian, not a word that the basis of the success of the Germans, this is an excellent interaction of all the armed forces, primarily tanks and aircraft. Without gaining dominance in the air, there would be no victorious tank raids, outbreaks, breakthroughs.
    As a matter of fact, already much later, the Arabs comrades used tanks in the most active way, and it was massive. But they also failed to throw the Israelis into the warm waters of the Mediterranean Sea.


    The Germans would have succeeded, if they were in the place of the Arabs, the Soviet tankmen would have succeeded, not only the Israelis in the "warm waters", but also to the cool English Channel in a few days, which is unthinkable without the massive use of tanks.
    The massive use of tanks against a weak enemy is excessive, against a strong one, as practice shows, such a use of tanks (to compensate for everything else) leads to unjustified losses.
    This is how, on the basis of what hostilities the author made such conclusions, for what "ears" did he pull?

    Well, and the final pearl that "Soviet "more than 50 thousand units of armored vehicles" - rather reinsurance of "generals troechnik" than a logical and practically necessary amount", this is at best a superficial, unprofessional conclusion of the author of the article, at worst - an ideological sabotage. We have already been convinced that a strong fleet of" land "Russia is not needed, that a compact army where the US and NATO are" white and fluffy "friends -partners, now we don't even need tanks, like ... In general, you don't need to sink enemy ships, if you don't let them build, destroy everything in the bud. So it is with tanks, but let's destroy all our tanks, and new ones let's do it piece by piece, let the enemies rejoice, looking at the Russian expanses, where one cannot do without tanks.Warning with the wrong hands, sabotaging the dangerous, encouraging the harmful, this is also the basis of victory over the enemy, the whole question is who is over whom ...
    1. Olezhek
      6 July 2020 19: 58
      -1
      Moreover, there is a mention of German tanks, of Hitler, but not a word about the role of Heinz Guderian


      Even the one who knows no one knows about the bright Heinz ...
      But personally for you in the last photo - Easter egg - there is directly depicted Herr Knispel
      that as a little illustrates the main idea of ​​the article ...
      1. Per se.
        Per se. 7 July 2020 07: 05
        0
        Quote: Olezhek
        Even the one who knows no one knows about the bright Heinz ...
        If so, it will do ... "Easter egg" in the "last photo" does not say anything about the German tactics and strategy of using tanks. The fact that the German "tank ace" Kurt Knispel is proudly looking through binoculars from the commander's hatch is hardly for me, and also does not illustrate the main idea of ​​the article. In general, Oleg, I did not write my comment out of harm. Naturally, criticizing is easier than making articles, but aren't articles written for readers?

        Thank you for attention.
        1. Olezhek
          7 July 2020 11: 56
          -1
          the fact that the German "tank ace" Kurt Knispel is proudly looking through binoculars from the commander's hatch is hardly for me, and also does not illustrate the main idea of ​​the article


          And for me - just yes
          "knispels" did not arise by themselves and not from scratch.
          They were, as it were, an integral part of the Panzerwaffe as an organization where tankers were trained properly and cherished and applied skillfully
          "Tank is a weapon of one battle" - this is not about Panzerwaffe
          1. Per se.
            Per se. 7 July 2020 12: 25
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            Quote: Olezhek
            And for me - just yes
            "knispels" did not arise by themselves and not from scratch.
            But for me, no, more important for me is Kolbanov Zinovy ​​Grigoryevich, who in August 1941 burned 1 Hitler tanks with his crew on KV-22.
            What is the general argument about the fact that the Germans had a better organization in 1941? I did not argue with this, on the contrary. The fact that the tank may burn in the first battle, even with an excellent crew, but tanks weapons of the whole war? Just as obvious. The rest, according to the article, was the first comment. So, do modern Russia need tanks as the main striking force of the ground forces? I believe that yes, you have muddied the answer.
  • pmkemcity
    pmkemcity 6 July 2020 11: 37
    +1
    "Generals-threesomes"

    I have never met such people in my life, but there are as many writers and even losers as I can.
    Regarding the author's "messages":
    - we only September 1, 1939 switched to universal military duty;
    - Wehrmacht motorization. So, without long digging. In the French army in September 1939 there were 62,7 thousand cars, and the Wehrmacht at the time of the invasion of Poland - 120 thousand. Trophies only Dunkirk (this is England, France and Belgium) amounted to 65 thousand. cars and 20 thousand moto. How many took trophies in France? How many are the very poor of the same Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark? Only Austria gave the Führer 350 thousand during the war years. trucks. And how much is France, how many are the same Holland and Belgium? The annual production in Germany itself was more than 80 thousand. trucks. By the way, about the victories - only trophies (!) Near Stalingrad were taken more than 80 thousand cars, that is, the annual production of Germany.
    - and. finally, about the patient, about communication. R. S. Irinarkhov in the book “Western Special ...” notes that ZapOV liaison troops experienced a large shortage of personnel and were provided with radio stations (army and, note, airdromes) - by 26-27%, corps and division - by 7% , regimental by 41% and battalion by 58%. Even with devices: telegraphic - by 56%, telephone - by 50%. And these are regular (!), Which in the state was many times less than in the Wehrmacht! The General Staff believed that there was no need to create reliably protected underground communication lines. Communication with the fronts was planned to be provided through a national network, the nodes and lines of which were concentrated in large cities. In addition, cable lines ran along railways and highways. Such organization of communications led to the fact that literally from the first minutes of the war the General Staff’s communication with the fronts, and fronts with the subordinate troops was broken. And so they fought, an example on March 11, 1942:
  • CastroRuiz
    CastroRuiz 6 July 2020 14: 26
    0
    Ochen kachestvennaya statia.
    Avtoru bolshoe plus.
  • John22
    John22 6 July 2020 22: 08
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    For some reason, we always forget about equipping tanks and aircraft with radio stations in Germany, i.e. communication. Something that did not exist in the USSR until 1943. With the presence of communications, and therefore the control and interaction of tanks, infantry, artillery and aviation, constant reconnaissance, maneuvering by troops and an offensive with the necessary support was possible. It has already been said about the quality of preparation and normal maintenance. The Red Army did not have this for almost the entire war. Have you read somewhere that the Wehrmacht complained about the lack of ammunition? I'm not talking about anti-aircraft cover for infantry and airfields. In all memoirs, air raids are a surprise and horror. Tens of thousands of light tanks were riveted in the USSR (why?), But it was not enough to learn how to use them. In Germany, light tanks were half the size of our "giraffes", which were outdated already at the time of their release. The Germans used an outdated chassis for self-propelled guns, SPAAGs and PTUs, and ours abandoned everything. The topic is very extensive and there is still no complete ifa. Thank God they remembered about Rzhev.
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 7 July 2020 00: 45
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    That is, it turned out that there were large own losses with the non-obviousness of the results achieved.


    The result is very obvious. Successful evacuation of Soviet industry and the transfer of war to the stage of war of attrition.

    And with us, the numbers are floating in different directions, and the performance characteristics of the tanks of the opposing powers are changing with each new “study”. Don't you think this is somehow a little strange?


    The performance characteristics of tanks and the condition of tank troops are a bit different. And the state of the tank troops was as it should have been. Well, it could not have been in a country with a catastrophic lack of personnel, which they simply had not yet managed to grow, better. That is why the French tanks showed themselves in no way, although, unlike the USSR, they had every opportunity not to be disgraced, it can already be said that France was not doing what was needed.
    1. Olezhek
      7 July 2020 11: 49
      -1
      The result is very obvious. Successful evacuation of Soviet industry and the transfer of war to the stage of war of attrition.


      And if all is one - defeat is inevitable, then was it not easier to deploy plywood tank simulators at the borders?

      It would have come out much cheaper!
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 7 July 2020 01: 11
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    And the situation with the Panzervaffe materiel at the beginning of the war with the USSR looked especially ridiculous. Somehow it was a pity everything was miserable. The “backlash” had the Me-109, the Kriegsmarine “Bismarck”, the German tankers had nothing ... worthy of mention.


    In addition to the tank division of 20 thousand people, the Red Army had nothing like it in principle. She had a lot of light tanks, but did not have so many trucks, there was no question about art tractors, and they were developed, but produced in very small quantities, the Germans in the tank division had all the artillery on the fur. traction.

    But yes, Adolf Hitler really captured most of continental Europe, from the Atlantic to the Volga, and he did it mainly with tanks.


    The funny thing is that this is just bullshit. In the 1940th year, the tanks could not be called a narrow tactical instrument; the Wehrmacht went to France with about 3000 tanks, of which only 200+ were Pz-IVD with a 75 mm butt. Everything else had a maximum of 37 mm guns, i.e., from the point of view of causing damage against the background of artillery, it was simply negligible. Even if we take the Soviet BT and T-26, the latter have a battalion level gun, and the former essentially replace cavalry.

    From this, by the way, the question arises, and what strategic tasks could these very tanks solve by themselves? At the same time, the appearance of tanks in itself was due to the fact that during the years of the WWII artillery was located in the depths of defense and a piece of iron with machine guns that was invulnerable to bullets could be a factor affecting the battlefield. Already in 1936, Spain showed that small-caliber guns knock out tanks for nefig to do, then there was Khalkhin-Gol and heavy losses of light tanks from small-caliber artillery. That is, the mere presence of at least 5, at least 25 thousand light tanks for 1941 did not significantly increase the combat efficiency of the army. T-34s with KV-1s were already factors, but one and a half thousand of these tanks is not something that should compensate the Red Army for the lag in numbers from the Wehrmacht of hundreds of thousands of people on the contact line.

    Blitzkrieg is not tanks. These are trained assault groups, mechanized artillery, and general troop training, which, when confronted with a machine-gun nest, will not look like a flock of rams and wait whole until the howitzer knocks it out.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 7 July 2020 10: 30
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      Quote: EvilLion
      Blitzkrieg is not tanks. These are trained assault groups, mechanized artillery, and general troop training, which, when confronted with a machine-gun nest, will not look like a flock of rams and wait whole until the howitzer knocks it out.

      Plus kampfgruppy - tanks with infantry, artillery and the ability to call aviation. Moreover, all this moves together, at the same speed, over a large distance. They broke through the line of defense, walked to the rear of the defenders - and rolled on. Met a weak adversary? He is hit by a head watch. Did not work out? The head patrol leaves the battle, the group deploys artillery - and in a couple of hours rolls out the positions of a full-blooded rifle battalion. After that, the farm of the group collapses, and the rollers roll on. Too strong adversary? Kampfgruppa maneuvers, gropes for a weak spot - and hits there.
    2. Olezhek
      7 July 2020 11: 31
      -1
      In addition to the tank division of 20 thousand people, the Red Army had nothing like it in principle. She had a lot of light tanks, but didn’t have so many trucks,


      In the USSR, they didn’t produce trucks at all in the 39th year, but bought them in America for gold (they only interrupted the nameplates on the Fords) - that's why the defeat ...
      And Stalin is to blame ...
      1. EvilLion
        EvilLion 7 July 2020 12: 42
        0
        Sorry what?

        Initially, 10 samples of the American Ford Ford Model AA truck of 1930 model were produced at the Gudok Oktyabrya plant in Kanavin, but later, before the launch of the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant (NAZ), Soviet engineers prepared their own drawings, reviewing the design, components, platform, and the first serial NAZ -AA left the assembly line of the NAZ on January 29, 1932. By the end of the year, the factory, renamed after the city into the Gorky Automobile, produced 60 GAZ-AA trucks per day.
  • EvilLion
    EvilLion 7 July 2020 01: 30
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    The sudden scandalous discussion around the battle of Prokhorovka (the mother of all tank battles) exposed the same problem of the insufficient qualification of Soviet tank crews of the 43rd year model (at all levels). As it turned out a lot after the war, that legendary battle for the Red Army was not too successful, so to speak. Although it seems as if the war had not begun. And it seems like not suddenness.


    Because it was not a very successful frontal strike. They hit it not quite in that place and had to fight with tanks, which is already a sign of error.

    I won’t argue about aviation (a big separate issue), but as for tankers and tank units, the conclusion is most likely not in favor of the Soviet approach of mass production of tanks and the use of low-skilled tankers.


    In aviation for the Germans, the sad picture is that they lost even more pilots than the USSR. As for tanks, unlike aviation, which is strongly tied to itself, tanks have to fight everything that is on the ground. And German heavy tank battalions, sent to plug Soviet tank breakthroughs, could fire off accounts, especially from ambushes. A characteristic moment, I found only one German tank ace, who fought on a "panther" => the linear units of the Panzerwaffe did not fill any special accounts and just burned nafig, running up to 85 mm anti-aircraft guns, then to ISs, and everything that could run into tank on the offensive. But where these are heavy. There were no tank battalions, a very pleasant for ours and unpleasant for the Germans situation arose when 4-5 Ivanovs under 45 mm armor could shoot the German infantry with all available weapons with complete impunity, reel Deutsche Zoldat on tracks, and create absolutely any guro with them. That is, the mass production of tanks meant saving the lives of thousands of our soldiers and, accordingly, an increased consumption of people by the enemy.

    To build the same equipment that will totally surpass the enemy in terms of performance characteristics, but will not be disproportionately expensive is unrealistic. Rather, on the contrary, the price difference will be twofold, but the increase in the efficiency of interest by 20%.

    And the T-90 is just the fine-tuning of the cost-effective T-72, against the background of the T-64 and T-80, which were slightly better in terms of performance characteristics, and the T-80 was not even a forever broken heap of metal, but it cost a lot more.
    1. Olezhek
      7 July 2020 11: 28
      -1
      about where these heavy. there were no tank battalions, a situation was very pleasant for ours and unpleasant for the Germans, when 4-5 Ivanov, under 45 mm of armor, could completely shoot German infantry with all available weapons with impunity, wound the deutsche soldier on the tracks, and create absolutely any guro with them. That is, the mass production of tanks meant saving the lives of thousands of our fighters and, accordingly, the increased consumption of people by the enemy


      In the summer of 41-42, everything was just that .... belay
      The Hans memoirs for 41-42 are overwhelmed with horror and panic: Russiche schweinen ... shaise ... oh mine gott russishe panzern .... vir sterben allezutzamemen Adolf ist schais ...
      1. EvilLion
        EvilLion 7 July 2020 12: 48
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        You, sorry, read? Even in the summer of 38th year in the Far East, 37 mm guns showed complete dominance over tanks. In 1944, the situation becomes fundamentally different, if there are no tanks of their own, then the infantry has fewer less opportunities to deal with them, and the correct installation of PAK-40 batteries increases critically if it is available, because you won’t deploy them in battle, and the detour becomes fatal.

        If one T-26 could conditionally replace a man of 10 infantry in terms of knocking out enemy personnel, then 10 thousand of these tanks for millions of armies will not do the weather. But the T-34 is already much more effective, and the means of dealing with it are many times less.
  • ratcatcher
    ratcatcher 7 July 2020 01: 44
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    Partly with the author. But. Here is a simple example of troop readiness. 15 mechanized corps that participated in the Battle of Brody. As part of the corps 212 division, which should deal with infantry and artillery support for tanks. The division, for a moment, was formed in the spring of 1941. It has a shortage of junior officers up to 40 percent. And the mass of soldiers are new recruits. Tractor trucks - not available. Because it had to be a tractor obtained from agriculture to mobilize. There are no trucks for transporting infantry, the reason is the same.
    What happens as a result? Right. infantry and guns are not able to support tanks during maneuvers and in attack. Although the tanks of the corps repeatedly knocked down the Germans from their positions in counterattacks and attacks (in the absence of proper art support), the infantry and artillery did not have time to reach the positions and strengthen. Large calibers were thrown almost immediately, since it was impossible to manually roll guns through the forest. And the Germans followed the tanks with infantry and immediately took up positions. And it does not allow the enemy infantry to fight tanks.
    And this is against the backdrop of the domination of the Germans in the sky, which made it possible to destroy tanks from the air. And this is against the background of the disgusting radiification of tanks. Here is such a readiness for war.
    The French had tanks and armored vehicles better than German at the beginning of the war. But here, too, very poorly radio-controlled. And radio is only part of the organization. In which the Germans at the beginning of the war significantly exceeded the enemy. And the fans and us.
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 7 July 2020 15: 51
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    To beat quality with quantity is sometimes a very costly undertaking, sometimes simply impossible.

    In the 20th century, quantity has always triumphed over quality. Examples - First and Second World War, Korea and Vietnam.
    On land, the number is the number of soldiers and their guns, mortars, machine guns and ammunition, not tanks and planes. The Germans in the summer of 41 had a double superiority in the number of well-armed and trained soldiers, and therefore no tanks and aircraft could compensate. The same thing struck in the Chinese Civil War, then in Korea and Vietnam.
    When the number of well-armed Soviet soldiers surpassed the German ones, the German offensive stopped and then turned into a retreat.
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 9 July 2020 10: 24
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    Quote: EvilLion
    If one T-26 could conditionally replace a man of 10 infantry in terms of knocking out enemy personnel, then 10 thousand of these tanks for millions of armies will not do the weather. But the T-34 is already much more effective, and the means of dealing with it are many times less.

    Unfortunately, in 1941, not only one T-26, but also the T-34 could not conditionally beat the equivalent of 10 German infantry.
    Summer 1941 is a classic example of the victory of well-armed, trained and disciplined infantry over large masses of attacking light tanks. According to the Soviet pre-war planning, the Soviet Panzer Division on the move attacks and bistro inflicts a decisive defeat on the German infantry division hastily taking up defense.
    In reality, in 1941 it turned out the opposite. The German infantry was not afraid of the attacking tanks, did not recede from its position and was prepared to be destroyed in close combat. The tanks inflicted some losses (several percent) on the infantry, while they themselves suffered heavy losses and retreated.