1941. Concentration of individual armies at the southern state border
The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - army ABTU - armored control (GABTU - The main ABTU), IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GSh - General base, ZhBD - magazine of military operations, Spacecraft - Red Army, cd - cavalry division, u - mechanized housing md - motorized division, RGC - reserve of the high command, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), Ur - fortified area TVD - theater of operations, td - tank division.
In the article, the designations of HE or fronts are used: ArVO - Arkhangelsk Military District, FEF - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Trans-Baikal Military District, ZakVO - Transcaucasian Military District, Zapovo - Western Special Military District, KOVO - Kiev Special Military District, MVO - Moscow Military District, OdVO - Odessa Military District, OrVO - Oryol Military District, Volga Military District - Volga Military District, SAVO - Central Asian Military District, Siberian Military District - Siberian Military District, North Caucasian Military District - Ural Military District, Ural Military District, HVO - Kharkov Military District.
In the previous part events related to the adoption on June 9 of a decision to change the route of the 16th A and 57th TD from the south to the west were examined. Further on, the author’s assumptions will be accompanied by a “?” Sign, the word “probably” or similar words.
Prelude to operations in Iran
Since 1940, England has been considered our opponents. In May-June 1941, the British tried to begin informal negotiations with our government. There are suggestions that the Junkers, arriving on May 15 in Moscow, delivered a message from Hitler to Stalin, which could contain assurances that the USSR would not be attacked and proposals for Middle Eastern territories. After that, the rate of transport of German troops to the border decreased: from 1,43 ... 0,95 divisions / day to 0,3.
In May 1941, the Republic of Moldova arrived, in which it was noted:
- Intensive German air operations and the war in the Balkans have extremely depleted gas supplies. The situation with gasoline has become so complicated that the Germans intend at all costs to force an attack on Iraq to occupy oil sources;
- The forces of German troops for operations in the Middle East (up to 40 divisions) were determined. In addition, up to two parachute divisions can be used in Iraq;
- German troops (at least 3-4 divisions) are already officially marching through Turkey to Iraq and Syria;
- from the German side, illegal influence in the Caucasus is being prepared and airborne parachute troops are being prepared to prevent the destruction of oil industry installations;
- There are a large number of German agents in Iran, weapons are being imported, sabotage is being prepared at the oil fields in Baku. The pro-German sentiments in Iran in all sectors of society are very strong.
It is believed that sabotage groups can freely enter Azerbaijan through the Caspian. The leadership of the country was obliged to respond to the growing threat at our southern borders. After the start of the transportation of troops to the southern theater of operations in Iran, it was decided to increase the presence of illegal agents in the adjacent territory and to begin carrying out special events. Probably the same was done in SAVO.
The operation itself to introduce troops into Iran was not an act of aggression. In accordance with the Friendship Treaty, both parties assumed obligations that were required to be fulfilled. The Treaty spelled out a procedure after which the entry of troops of the USSR was possible, which was later implemented (Operation "Consent").
The point of view expressed in memoirs by I.V. Stalin did not appear unexpectedly on July 2 or 3. It was a consequence of the earlier arrived RM, the refusal to conduct operations in Iran and the reduction of the grouping of the spacecraft in the southern theater.
Destination: Transcaucasia
With 3.6.41 commander Lukin begins work in the General Staff and learns about the location of the army and its tasks in the near future.
(?) 16th And it is necessary to concentrate on the border on the territory of Azerbaijan. A significant part of ZakVO troops is located at the border to deter Turkish or German troops. On the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR, the 24th cd, the 76th and 77th GSD are deployed. Before the start of the war, the sd and gsd districts contain 6 thousand. the state and there is no plan to call the enlisted staff for their staffing, with the exception of the 47th State Duma.
Everything related to the development of an operation to send troops into Iran in June 1941 is unknown to us. We can only assume that the tasks of the operation determined the forces, dates, routes, etc. The depth of the operation depended on the group of forces that was allocated to the General Staff. When relocating, the 16th A had only the 5th micron. Perhaps the army could give the 24th cd, the 76th and 77th gsd. The GDS could be used to cover the Iran-Turkish border. The troops of the 16th A, supported from SAVO, could reach the latitude that captures the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. In this case, the movement of enemy groups across the Caspian was ruled out for sabotage. Judging by the decision to supply grain, sugar, kerosene, manufactory and other goods to the cities of Tabriz, Pahlavi, Rasht and others - this was the main option. It is possible that this was the first stage of the operation.
(?) If the 16th A had 5th MK, parts of ZakVO (28th MK and two cd) and with the support of a group from SAVO, it was possible to carry out the operation to the Abadan field (to the coast of the Persian Gulf), on which Refinery. In this case, the property of the Anglo-Persian oil company was taken under control and the supply of petroleum products from this region could be controlled. It was important that the production of aviation gas in this region was carried out at only two plants - at one in Baku, and at the second - at the Abadan field. Such an operation could be planned only with the tacit consent of the British to prevent the oil industry from falling into the hands of the Germans or pro-German circles in Iran.
At the first stage of the operation, a lot of mobile troops were required, and the rifle formations of the 32nd sk (46th and 152nd sd) were not particularly needed. The presence of these divisions was required later for the protection of facilities, for the provision of garrison service, etc. At the time of the decision to transfer the troops, both divisions were kept in peaceful states and the rise of the enlisted personnel in ZabVO was not planned. When sending the 152nd SD, it had the smallest number among all divisions of internal HEs, which were subsequently sent to the West, which once again indicates that initially the 152nd SD was not sent to the west. After changing the route of the 16th A, the concentration of the 46th SD became irrelevant and therefore, after the outbreak of the war, it was first mobilized, and only then from June 27 began to go to the West. ZhDB 16th A:
“[By 14.7.41 16th A] continued its concentration ... 16 A included ... 32th cc consisting of ... two divisions: 152nd cd concentrated completely in peacetime states ... 46th cd concentrated not completely ... This division was also staffed by state. peaceful ? time ... "
The phrase about the peaceful state of the 46th SD in the magazine is underlined, a question mark is placed. Captain I.F. The nomads who left ZabVO on June 3 did not know that the arriving 46th SD was a full-time division. The head, checking the entry in the ZhBD, emphasized the word "peaceful" and put a question mark, because he could have more accurate information.
(?) In May-June 1941, 3816 civilians were mobilized to be sent to Iran in the Azerbaijan SSR: 82 party workers, 100 employees of Soviet organizations, 200 employees of the security agencies, 400 police officers, 70 prosecutors, 90 judges and 150 printing houses, etc. d. Appointed the leaders of the subcommissions and lead the commissions ...
Transportation of troops of the 16th army across the sea
In the memoirs of A.A. Lobachev was noted that in 7 days all the echelons of the army were sent. In fact, until June 3, it was only possible to send the 17th TD and, possibly, part of the 109th MD. From June 4 to June 14, the 13th td was dispatched. The trains also continued to leave from the 109th MD. The last sent 152nd SD. Urgent dispatch to the West for three weeks of four divisions looks somehow incomprehensible. Perhaps that is why in the memoirs the term was changed to 7 days.
(?) Sending echelons of the army was carried out so that the port of Krasnovodsk could cope with the transport of troops across the Caspian Sea. After the operation was canceled, the trains went to the West along the same Central Asian route, as there was no need to hurry anywhere especially - after all, the beginning of the war was not expected ... This is also confirmed by the fact that the six rifle divisions of the Siberian Military District, for which 36000 people were planned to be called up, had not been transferred to the West before the war.
At that time, three shipping companies of the People’s Commissariat of the Sea worked on the Caspian Sea. fleet: “Caspflot” (82 vessels with a total carrying capacity of 87 thousand tons), “Kasptanker” (69 vessels - with a total carrying capacity of 205 thousand tons, including 11 large-capacity tankers with a carrying capacity of 9600 tons each) and “Raidtanker” (122 vessels - with a total carrying capacity of 240 thousand tons). The Caspian marine fleet occupied the first place in the USSR in freight traffic and accounted for up to 1/3 of the freight traffic. It is clear to everyone that people and cargo cannot be accommodated in tankers, but during the war years they were used to evacuate refugees and equipment of their decks. During the evacuation of refugees from the deck of a large tanker transported up to 4500 people, and on the decks of other tankers - 2000 ... 2500. When ballasting tankers on decks, it was possible to transport military equipment.
When evacuating equipment from the North Caucasus in the Baku port, they were able to reach the volume of freight traffic up to 100 wagons per day. If these were two-axle 20-ton cars, then up to 2000 tons of cargo were transported per day. At the indicated time, there were four-axle 50-ton cars. In this case, the volume of transported goods was even greater. By the end of 1941, during the evacuation of the population, 10 ... 12 thousand people a day were transported through the Baku port. The author assessed the mass of equipment, weapons, vehicles (without personnel and small arms) of the 17th TD, which amounted to about 11,3 thousand tons. When consistently arriving at the port, the division’s echelons within 7 days had to carry up to 1,62 day, 1200 thousand tons and 2000 ... XNUMX people. Theoretically, troops could be transported through the Caspian Sea, but to the detriment of the economy ...
Why didn’t troops send from the North Caucasian Military District?
The question was asked: “Why were troops transported from Transbaikalia to Transcaucasia, but not sent from the North Caucasian Military District?” From the composition of the North Caucasian Military District, SDs could be used, but they were not required for the rapid advance of troops.
The 26th MK began its formation in the North Caucasian Military District in March 1941. In the book M. Meltiukhova "Stalin's lost chance" provides data on the availability of armored vehicles in the districts. After the beginning of the transportation of troops from ZabVO on June 1, in the North Caucasian Military District there were: 2 tank BT-2, 84 - BT-5, 1 - two-tower T-26, 1 - T-26, 3 - flamethrower HT-26, 22 - T-38, 44 - T-37, 80 - T-27 and 47 armored vehicles. A total of 237 tanks, of which 87 are armed with guns. Therefore, the corps was not sent to ZakVO. The 5th MK was transported from ZabVO, which had more than 1000 tanks (of which about 900 equipped with guns) and 213 armored vehicles.
In May, the 26th MK was part of the 19th A, but due to the small number of old tanks with limited motor resources, it was not transferred to KOVO until June 27. In June, in the 19th A, the corps was replaced by the 23rd mk from the OrBO (413 tanks, of which about 186 were equipped with weapons). Prior to the outbreak of the war, the 23rd MK was also not put forward in the KOVO.
On the twentieth of May 1941, the future war with Germany was seen in a completely different form, the closer to its beginning. Commander of the 21st MK D.D. Lyalyushenko wrote:
About a month before the start of the war, when I was at the GABTU, I asked my boss: “When will the tanks arrive to us? After all, we feel the Germans are preparing ... "
“Do not worry,” said Lieutenant General Ya. N. Fedorenko. - According to the plan, your building should be fully equipped in 1942.
- And if the war?
— The spacecraft is strong enough without your body...
“Do not worry,” said Lieutenant General Ya. N. Fedorenko. - According to the plan, your building should be fully equipped in 1942.
- And if the war?
— The spacecraft is strong enough without your body...
In mid-June, the use of phase 2 mechanized corps in case of war is already under consideration. But only being considered ...
Destination: Central Asia
According to the official point of view, the 57th TD has been advancing to the West since May. On the forum Singularist assumed that according to the initial plans of the 57th TD, it was necessary to carry out other tasks than to participate in the battles near Smolensk. The author agrees with his point of view. An indirect confirmation of this is the following fact. The commander of the 29th mk (he will soon be appointed or has already been appointed head of ABTU FEF), transferring V.A. Mishulin did not indicate instructions to the General Staff that the division is part of the 16th A. Therefore, there was no such indication in the directive from the General Staff and a separate division remained such at the end of May. Until June 12, not a single document or memoir of veterans of the 16th A says that the 57th division was part of their army. Only on arrival at the General Staff in the late evening of 11 or the next day, the division commander could enter the 57th TD into the army of Lukin.
After receiving the directive on the redeployment of troops from ZabVO to the General Staff, only Commander Lukin was called. On June 3, the second leader of the 16th A, PMC Lobachev, was called to Moscow. Presumably on June 3 they call in the General Staff and the commander of the 57th TD. More in GSH from 16th A did not call not a single comcor (out of two) and not a single divisor (out of five). This can only indicate that a separate division had to perform a special task.
Looking at the map, Lukin saw that some other formations, not indicated by numbers, should be stationed to the left of his army ... During the lunch break, Lukin ... saw ... commander of the Ural Military District General Yershakov ...
“Why play hide and seek,” Yershakov said. - You and I were almost neighbors in the east, apparently, and now you have to act next door ...
[M.F. Lukin] - And I look at the map and think, who is my left neighbor? .. "
“Why play hide and seek,” Yershakov said. - You and I were almost neighbors in the east, apparently, and now you have to act next door ...
[M.F. Lukin] - And I look at the map and think, who is my left neighbor? .. "
The 16th A’s left neighbor was to be located on the other side of the Caspian, in SAVO. Consequently, in SAVO it was planned to transport troops from the Ural Military District (22nd A). It turns out that the two armies of the RGK from the end of May are not planned by the General Staff for use in the West! Somewhere after 10 ... 12 echelons of the 22nd army could begin to move along the railway line Aktyubinsk - Arys and further to the southern border. It is hard to say how many rifle divisions were planned to be transported from the Ural Military District. It can only be noted that there were no good tanks in the Ural Military District except for a few dozen T-27s and T-37s.
There were no good tanks in SAVO, in which in March 1941 the 27th mk began to form (9th, 53rd TD, 221st md). Until June 1941, tanks in the corps were in only one 9th building. All tanks arrived after participating in the war in Finland, underwent major repairs and had limited motor resources. In the spring of 1941, there were about 321 tanks in SAVO, incl. equipped with a gun - 250. It should be noted that in the spring in the 27th microns quite intensive three-month exercises with the active use of equipment were held.
To conduct an operation in Iran (from SAVO), good tanks were needed. Probably the 57th TD was to be used in the district to perform a special task. For example, to connect with the moving parts of the 5th microns on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Reliable tanks were also needed for operations in other areas of SAVO. At this time, 50 fairly modern BT-7M tanks suddenly appeared in the okrug, of which 9 had walkie-talkies. In the MVO statements, these tanks were listed from 1940 to 1.4.41, and on June 1 they already appeared in the statement of the district of secondary importance. It is logical to assume that the decision to send them to the southern theater was made simultaneously with the decision to transfer troops of the 16th A and 57th TD.
Pre-war teachings in ZakVO and SAVO
According to plans, two different groups of general staff of the General Operations Department of the General Staff were to conduct exercises in the districts. The exercises and trips with the participation of the General Staff were planned in ZakVO from May 10 to 20, and in SAVO from May 10 to May 30. According to the memories CM. Shtemenko The main staff of the department left for training in May:
Before leaving, it turned out that neither the chief of the General Staff nor his deputy could leave and the exercises would be led by the commanders of the troops: in ZakVO - D.T. Kozlov, in SAVO - S.G. Trofimenko. However, the very next day after our arrival in Tbilisi, Lieutenant General Kozlov was urgently summoned to Moscow. It was felt that something unusual was happening in Moscow ...
Major General M.N. Sharokhin ... The front was commanded by the deputy commander of the district’s troops, Lieutenant General P.I. Batov ... After analyzing the exercises in ZakVO, the ship headed from Baku to Krasnovodsk ...
Major General M.N. Sharokhin ... The front was commanded by the deputy commander of the district’s troops, Lieutenant General P.I. Batov ... After analyzing the exercises in ZakVO, the ship headed from Baku to Krasnovodsk ...
If we assume that the chief of the General Staff and his deputy were unable to leave due to the preparation of the operation to send troops to Iran, then the general specialists could leave Moscow from May 24-25. They arrived in Tbilisi on May 26-27. A day later, the commander of the ZakVO was urgently summoned to Moscow. On May 26, commander Lukin, who left on the 27th, was also urgently called to Moscow.
General Batov commanded a front that could turn around from the headquarters of ZakVO. But the front at that time was at least two armies. If at the front and one army headquarters in the district headquarters they could still recruit commanders, then where to get the personnel for the second army headquarters? Perhaps the second army was the displaced army from Transbaikalia ... The 16th A was already heading to ZakVO, but it was unlikely that this was known during the exercises ...
After the departure of the General Staff Commission to SAVO in ZakVO, the second exercises were held. P.I. Batov: “13-17.6.41 in Transcaucasia ... there were exercises. I just returned from them - I find out that I was ordered to urgently arrive in Moscow ... ". A trip to Moscow and documents for a report on the drug addict defense are discussed by General Batov and the chief of staff of the district, F.I. Tolbukhin. Consequently, the commander of ZakVO has not yet returned from Moscow. Due to a change in route of the 16th A, plans for the General Staff in the district should have been changed. This was what General D.T. Kozlov. CM. Shtemenko:
[In SAVO. - Note author] during the game, I managed to travel along the border from Serakhs to Ashgabat and then through Kizil-Atrek to Hasan-Kuli with the goal of studying the theater, along with Sharokhin and the chief of the operational department of the SAVO headquarters, colonel Chernyshevich.
M.I. Kazakov (Chief of Staff SAVO):
In early June, we conducted a command post exercise. Responsible representatives of the General Staff: Major General M.N. Sharokhin, who then worked as the head of the department for the Middle East Theater, and Colonel S.M. Shtemenko. The theme “Concentration of a separate army to the state border” was worked out.
June 11 received a call from Moscow. They called either the commander or me. S.G. Trofimenko wanted to personally analyze the teachings, but he didn’t feel well, and therefore it was decided that I would go on call ...
June 11 received a call from Moscow. They called either the commander or me. S.G. Trofimenko wanted to personally analyze the teachings, but he didn’t feel well, and therefore it was decided that I would go on call ...
During the exercises, a topic was worked out, which turns out to be close to the actual events, since the arrival of the 22nd A. It is possible that in the ZakVO, exercises were conducted on a similar topic ... After the start of the war, the commander of the ZakVO put into effect a plan to cover the border with Iran and Turkey ... In response to his actions, an encrypted message came from the chief of the General Staff: “Your main task: to prevent Turkey and Iran from provoking a war with us by any action. Do not give a reason to complain about us ... " That's right, because after changing the route of the two armies' advance, the grouping of our troops in the southern theater of operations was significantly weakened ...
Continued Operation Development
In the memoirs of M.I. Kazakova pay attention to four main points. The first. 8 days before the start of the war, the Chief of Staff of the SAVO is working on some documents. The deputy chief of the General Operations Directorate works with him. Less than two days before the start of the war, the chief of the General Staff carefully studies the documents. It turns out that these documents are not sent to the district: they are sealed and deposited, i.e. its sending by secret mail to the district is not provided. It is possible that General Kazakov took the baton from the commander of 22nd A and worked on the district’s plans for Iran, i.e. the operation itself in preparation for the entry of troops into Iran did not stop.
Second moment. Around June 18, Kazakov asks a question to Vasilevsky: "When will the war begin with fascist Germany?" Deputy Head of the Operations Department A.M. Vasilevsky, who is fully obliged to own the situation at the border and its understanding in the General Staff, answers: “Well, if it does not start in the next 15-20 days ...” At this time, the General Staff is not exactly sure when the war will begin, and in some books it is written that from June 12, according to the directives of the General Staff, troops began to withdraw according to cover plans in anticipation of the war on June 22. Even a certain GSh directive of June 18 was invented ... But it turns out that some of the events on the eve of the war are distorted. This can be seen on the example of the relocation of the 16th A.
Third. In the 3rd part, Mehlis answered the question of his deputy Kovalev about the purpose of transportation of the 16th A. I.V. Kovalev: the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented “A note was asked of our leadership for an explanation: why did the Soviet 16th A move from the Transbaikalia by rail to the west? Stalin ordered Marshal Tymoshenko to temporarily turn the 16th A train to the south and inform Berlin that the army was heading for the Persian border in case the British tried to strike from India through Persia. It is unlikely that they believed in Berlin, but achieved their goal - one of our armies was detained on the way. I learned about this case from Mehlis ... "
Let us pay attention to the measures of secrecy when working out the plans of operations in the General Staff. The list of people who were familiar with the operation plan was reduced to a minimum. Only Vasilevsky, Vatutin, Zhukov and Tymoshenko worked with Lukin. To exclude familiarization with the plans of unauthorized persons, the commander was locked in the room. In the memoirs of M.I. Kazakov there are the same persons: Vasilevsky, Vatutin and Zhukov. Since the operation was fully postponed, the developed documents were not reported to the narcotics of defense, unlike the plans that M.F. Lukin.
It turns out that the prepared documents in the General Staff should not have come to the district headquarters, which once again confirms the highest level of secrecy of the operation. Commander Lukin simply did not reach this step, since his participation in the operation was canceled. Mehlis would not divulge top-secret information during the period of its preparation: he might simply not have known about it. If the question was asked after June 10, then disinformation was issued in response. Even in this case, it was not necessary to disclose information that could damage the party and the country in the future ...
As an example of how they treated the highest secrets at that time, I will give a simple example. After leaving the office G.K. Zhukov, his adjutant, proposed to the cryptographer Khramtsovsky to seal a packet with sheets from a notebook for cipher telegrams. He agreed: «[From the office. - Note auth.] Zhukov appeared, pale, lips compressed. He asked: “Khramtsovsky! Why is the document in the hands of my adjutant? ” Khramtsovsky replied: "He did not see the telegram, he only put a wax seal."
To which Zhukov reacted as follows: “In the Civil War, commissars, it happened, adhered to a special disciplinary charter for the Communists. It had three punishments: remark, warning, execution. You are a communist! Consider the warning received! .. "
The Arys-Aktyubinsk railway was viewed from the side of a passenger plane, and General Kazakov unequivocally defined the chain of trains of the 16th A as military transportation through his district. If the enemy spies were at the railway stations or near the road, then they could more easily reveal the fact of military traffic to the West. It was not possible to hide the fact of troop transportation to the west. And why was it hiding? If even after June 10, army troops began to be transported not to the western special districts, but to the territory of the internal district - OrVO! What does the Germans care about troop movements inside the country? It should be noted that the mythical note of the German Foreign Ministry has not yet been found, and not a single employee of our Foreign Ministry has ever written about such a fact. We came across an example of misinformation to hide the operation even after it was canceled ...
And the fourth point. On June 13, Kazakov met Lukin at the General Staff, and on June 14-15 several more army commanders appeared there. Several are three or more people. Perhaps it was the commanders of the 20th, 21st and 22nd armies who arrived to familiarize themselves with the plans for using their troops.
After the outbreak of the war, SAVO somehow began to act. The author does not support the version about the introduction of the 22rd State Security Service troops into Iran on June 83. There are too many inaccuracies in this version. Many missing servicemen (disappeared on the western fronts, not in Iran). It turned out that marching units formed from military personnel assembled from the district’s units were also sent from the SAVO to the front. But the author could not dispute the three facts of the use of military personnel on the territory of Iran before the operation "Consent". For example:
Data on belonging to a specific military unit of the Red Army V.E. Bidenko (blessed memory of him!) Could not be found. It is possible that after the outbreak of the war, the intelligence forces operating in Iran against German agents and sabotage groups were strengthened by volunteer units from SAVO or ZakVO units ...
Changing the grouping of troops in the south theater
After June 9, the 16th A and 57th TD received a new route - to OrVO.
22nd And after the directive of the General Staff on June 12, began the relocation to ZAPOV.
On June 10, a directive comes from the General Staff to the Ural Military District on the introduction of symbols, probably for parts to be redeployed to the West.
On the southern theater of war, the threat remained and was reflected in the Certificate (13.6.41) “On the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war in the West”. The figures below show the dependences of changes in the total number of troops of the ZakVO and SAVO, as well as the number of divisions that the General Staff planned to leave in these districts after the transfer of part of the troops in the army of the RGK.
After changing the routes of transportation of the 22nd A and 57th TD, the number of divisions remaining on the territory of SAVO doubled.
After changing the route of the 16th A, the number of troops remaining in ZakVO increased by 50%. The certificate states that there are 20 divisions in the Western Military District and North Caucasian Military District, without taking into account one more division (North Caucasian Military District) involved in protecting the Black Sea coast. From the autumn of 1940 until 13.6.41, according to the plans of the General Staff in the North Caucasian Military District, only one SD should remain on guard of the coast. Thus, due to the threat in the Transcaucasus, five more divisions remained in the North Caucasus Military District, which had previously been planned to be sent north. Thus, after changing the routes for the advance of troops from Transbaikalia and from the Ural Military District, the number of troops to cover the southern borders (taking into account the divisions in the North Caucasian Military District) doubled.
The last lines of the Help contain the phrase: “Given the favorable situation in the West, 17 divisions may be additionally allocated ...; SKVO - 5 divisions ...; ZakVO - 5 divisions; SAVO - 5 divisions ... "but when no one knew the situation on the borders with Turkey and Iran before the start of the war. After the outbreak of the war and the defeat of a large number of our border troops, divisions will be transferred from the North Caucasus Military District and the North-Western Military District to the West, but this will be associated more with hopelessness, because GSh will have nothing left to do ...
Army troops from internal districts
And what is happening with the armies that are formed or will be formed on the basis of the internal districts?
16th A headed to Transcaucasia, on June 9-11 - to ORVO. On June 12, the Directive on relocation to the territory of the okrug was sent to KOVO from 15.6. 10.7 troops of the 16th A each consisting of: army directorates with service units, 5th mk (13th and 17th td, 109th md), 57th td and 32nd sk (46th and 152nd SD, 126th Corps Artillery Regiment). 16th A is part of the district troops and is subordinate in all respects to the District Military Council. By 14.7.41, the 46th SD and 5th MK had not yet fully concentrated (up to 40% of the troops did not arrive from the corps).
18th A (HVO). According to the directive dated 13.5.41, the 25th sk (three battalion) was transferred to camps on the territory of KOVO and on May 29 it was included in the 19th A. The 25th mk from the KhVO and the remaining divisions did not rise before the war, and headquarters 18- th And not formed.
19th A In accordance with the directive of May 13, at the end of May and the beginning of June, four SD and one GDS from the North Caucasian Military District are sent to the territory of KOVO.
20th A after the start of the war, it will be formed on the basis of the OrMO and the MBO troops. The 61st and 69th sk, 7th mk entered the army. Before the war, not a single corps rose and did not advance anywhere.
21th A formed in June 1941 on the basis of PrivO. In May, an appeal began on the training camp. The servicemen were going to maneuver in the KOVO: this is how the district commanders have been oriented since May. In June, the transfer of the army to the Gomel region began. The last train departed on June 20.
22th A (Ural Military District), by directive of May 13, by an additional instruction, was to be transferred to the West as part of two rifle corps. From the end of May to June 9-10, she was preparing for a transfer to the south. June 12 received a directive on relocation to the territory of ZapOVO. The arrival of the echelons of the 61st and 63rd sk (a total of six SD) was supposed to take place from June 17 to July 2. June 13 begins loading troops in the echelons. By the beginning of the war in the Zapovo arrived three sd.
28th A (ArVO). In accordance with the directive of June 19, the front should have been formed on the basis of the district, and on June 24 a new directive will be formed on the formation of the army instead of the front.
13.6.41 KOVO receives a directive to transfer closer to the state border to the new camps of the 31st, 36th, 37th and 55th sk - by campaign; 49th sk - by rail and hike. A similar directive comes in ZAPOVO on the withdrawal of deep divisions to the places of deployment of the second echelons of cover armies.
This is natural, since troops from the internal districts began to arrive to play the role of VO reserves. The problem is that the withdrawal of troops from the reserves of the districts by some writers is perceived as the beginning of the implementation of measures under cover plans, which is not true. Why? Because all of the indicated formations, which are part of the rifle corps of the reserves of the districts, should have been advanced west only after mobilization! They were supposed to take the remaining assigned staff and, most importantly, automobile (including tractors) and horse-drawn vehicles. Since they were provided with transport by only 40-50%, the divisions advanced by the campaign had only portable ammunition, brought a lot of training equipment and everything necessary for the subsequent camp life. Most of the artillery, due to lack of transport, remained at permanent deployment points. Therefore, regarding the advancement of these formations, we can only speak of their movement closer to the second echelon of cover armies. Movement is limited to combat-ready divisions. Enough time was needed to increase their combat effectiveness. Here is a concrete example of such an extension. Captain Comrade Malkov (commander from the 163rd ap 64th sd 44th sk):
21.6 the regiment was loaded into the train at art. Dorogobuzh, where there was a camp of the rifle corps, for what purpose, was not known. 22.6 at 7 o’clock settled at the station. Smolevichi, at 17 o’clock drove up to Minsk, where they only learned about the start of hostilities.
The regiment immersed in the echelon was understaffed, 50% of the materiel was not thrust. There were only 207 shells for the entire regiment. They took all property with them, i.e. bedding, tents. As such, they moved to the front.
This was the situation throughout the division. She had live ammunition, only training stock ... During the battle in the UR, the division received cartridges from the UR site, and I received enough shells for the 76 mm gun, for 122 mm shells there weren’t ...
The regiment immersed in the echelon was understaffed, 50% of the materiel was not thrust. There were only 207 shells for the entire regiment. They took all property with them, i.e. bedding, tents. As such, they moved to the front.
This was the situation throughout the division. She had live ammunition, only training stock ... During the battle in the UR, the division received cartridges from the UR site, and I received enough shells for the 76 mm gun, for 122 mm shells there weren’t ...
The rifle division was advanced by echelons and was able to load even materiel not provided with transport. The division received ammunition and 76-mm shells from the warehouses of Ur. It is difficult to say whether there were enough shells for the 45-mm anti-tank guns that were not part of the 163rd artillery regiment. But in the warehouses of Ur there are no 122-mm shells. Also, they could not have mortar mines, because the 122-mm guns and mortars are not in service with the URA ... According to the norms, more than 40 thousand hand grenades are required for a rifle division. But were they in such quantity in the warehouse of Ura? ..
Why did they begin to transfer troops from the internal districts?
Pavel Anatolyevich indicates the reason for the concentration of spacecraft troops in the western special military “Prevent the adversary from creating on our borders a group that would possess overwhelming superiority over the spacecraft”. I suggest checking this version. The author is not a specialist in the part of the redeployment of the infantry troops to the west, and therefore he used data from the Internet. The figure below shows the change in the size of the German grouping at our border and the troops of the 1st and 2nd echelon of the cover armies of the western border districts. Since in May - June 1941, according to the documents of the General Staff, the 9th Army is part of the South-Western Front, the data on the KOVO and OdVO in the figure are combined.
Until May 31, a group of German troops concentrated on the border (with the exception of the Poznan-Danzig-Thorn area) does not have an overwhelming superiority over units of the 1st and 2nd echelon of cover armies of the western border military forces.
In Pribovo, one rifle division, which is assigned to the reserves of the district, is actually located in the same areas as the troops of the second echelon. The redeployment of the 2th SD began on June 14, and the redeployment of the 11th SD was delayed due to the insufficient number of cars.
In ZAPOV, too, there is no overwhelming superiority of the German group over the troops of the district. In the second half of June, a covert transfer of troops to the area of deployment of two echelons began. But there can be no talk of any Soviet Union attack on Germany, since not quite combat-ready divisions are being thrown. Most of them are thrown on foot.
Against the KOVO troops and especially the OdVO there is a significant advantage of the German group. Basically, this advantage was ensured by the misinformation of the German command. When the Allied forces were counted, the overwhelming superiority of the enemy was even more ensured. And, of course, it required the achievement of at least some parity with the German group. Especially after the arrival of the RM about possible provocations on the Romanian border by June 8.
On June 13, a decision was made to transfer five sk and another SD to the areas of deployment of two echelons of armies covering the KOVO. There is no reason not to believe the version of P.A. Sudoplatova. All troops that were subject to redeployment arrived at their destinations in late June or early July 1941. The leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft did not take into account the most important circumstance - Hitler's disease, on which the arguments in the form of parity of troops at the border and the presence of significant reserves of the spacecraft did not work.
He possessed only a manic idea ...
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