Military Review

1941. Concentration of individual armies at the southern state border

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1941. Concentration of individual armies at the southern state border

The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - army ABTU - armored control (GABTU - The main ABTU), IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GSh - General base, ZhBD - magazine of military operations, Spacecraft - Red Army, cd - cavalry division, u - mechanized housing md - motorized division, RGC - reserve of the high command, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), Ur - fortified area TVD - theater of operations, td - tank division.


In the article, the designations of HE or fronts are used: ArVO - Arkhangelsk Military District, FEF - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Trans-Baikal Military District, ZakVO - Transcaucasian Military District, Zapovo - Western Special Military District, KOVO - Kiev Special Military District, MVO - Moscow Military District, OdVO - Odessa Military District, OrVO - Oryol Military District, Volga Military District - Volga Military District, SAVO - Central Asian Military District, Siberian Military District - Siberian Military District, North Caucasian Military District - Ural Military District, Ural Military District, HVO - Kharkov Military District.

In the previous part events related to the adoption on June 9 of a decision to change the route of the 16th A and 57th TD from the south to the west were examined. Further on, the author’s assumptions will be accompanied by a “?” Sign, the word “probably” or similar words.

Prelude to operations in Iran


Since 1940, England has been considered our opponents. In May-June 1941, the British tried to begin informal negotiations with our government. There are suggestions that the Junkers, arriving on May 15 in Moscow, delivered a message from Hitler to Stalin, which could contain assurances that the USSR would not be attacked and proposals for Middle Eastern territories. After that, the rate of transport of German troops to the border decreased: from 1,43 ... 0,95 divisions / day to 0,3.

In May 1941, the Republic of Moldova arrived, in which it was noted:

- Intensive German air operations and the war in the Balkans have extremely depleted gas supplies. The situation with gasoline has become so complicated that the Germans intend at all costs to force an attack on Iraq to occupy oil sources;

- The forces of German troops for operations in the Middle East (up to 40 divisions) were determined. In addition, up to two parachute divisions can be used in Iraq;

- German troops (at least 3-4 divisions) are already officially marching through Turkey to Iraq and Syria;

- from the German side, illegal influence in the Caucasus is being prepared and airborne parachute troops are being prepared to prevent the destruction of oil industry installations;

- There are a large number of German agents in Iran, weapons are being imported, sabotage is being prepared at the oil fields in Baku. The pro-German sentiments in Iran in all sectors of society are very strong.

It is believed that sabotage groups can freely enter Azerbaijan through the Caspian. The leadership of the country was obliged to respond to the growing threat at our southern borders. After the start of the transportation of troops to the southern theater of operations in Iran, it was decided to increase the presence of illegal agents in the adjacent territory and to begin carrying out special events. Probably the same was done in SAVO.


The operation itself to introduce troops into Iran was not an act of aggression. In accordance with the Friendship Treaty, both parties assumed obligations that were required to be fulfilled. The Treaty spelled out a procedure after which the entry of troops of the USSR was possible, which was later implemented (Operation "Consent").



The point of view expressed in memoirs by I.V. Stalin did not appear unexpectedly on July 2 or 3. It was a consequence of the earlier arrived RM, the refusal to conduct operations in Iran and the reduction of the grouping of the spacecraft in the southern theater.

Destination: Transcaucasia


With 3.6.41 commander Lukin begins work in the General Staff and learns about the location of the army and its tasks in the near future.


(?) 16th And it is necessary to concentrate on the border on the territory of Azerbaijan. A significant part of ZakVO troops is located at the border to deter Turkish or German troops. On the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR, the 24th cd, the 76th and 77th GSD are deployed. Before the start of the war, the sd and gsd districts contain 6 thousand. the state and there is no plan to call the enlisted staff for their staffing, with the exception of the 47th State Duma.


Everything related to the development of an operation to send troops into Iran in June 1941 is unknown to us. We can only assume that the tasks of the operation determined the forces, dates, routes, etc. The depth of the operation depended on the group of forces that was allocated to the General Staff. When relocating, the 16th A had only the 5th micron. Perhaps the army could give the 24th cd, the 76th and 77th gsd. The GDS could be used to cover the Iran-Turkish border. The troops of the 16th A, supported from SAVO, could reach the latitude that captures the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. In this case, the movement of enemy groups across the Caspian was ruled out for sabotage. Judging by the decision to supply grain, sugar, kerosene, manufactory and other goods to the cities of Tabriz, Pahlavi, Rasht and others - this was the main option. It is possible that this was the first stage of the operation.

(?) If the 16th A had 5th MK, parts of ZakVO (28th MK and two cd) and with the support of a group from SAVO, it was possible to carry out the operation to the Abadan field (to the coast of the Persian Gulf), on which Refinery. In this case, the property of the Anglo-Persian oil company was taken under control and the supply of petroleum products from this region could be controlled. It was important that the production of aviation gas in this region was carried out at only two plants - at one in Baku, and at the second - at the Abadan field. Such an operation could be planned only with the tacit consent of the British to prevent the oil industry from falling into the hands of the Germans or pro-German circles in Iran.

At the first stage of the operation, a lot of mobile troops were required, and the rifle formations of the 32nd sk (46th and 152nd sd) were not particularly needed. The presence of these divisions was required later for the protection of facilities, for the provision of garrison service, etc. At the time of the decision to transfer the troops, both divisions were kept in peaceful states and the rise of the enlisted personnel in ZabVO was not planned. When sending the 152nd SD, it had the smallest number among all divisions of internal HEs, which were subsequently sent to the West, which once again indicates that initially the 152nd SD was not sent to the west. After changing the route of the 16th A, the concentration of the 46th SD became irrelevant and therefore, after the outbreak of the war, it was first mobilized, and only then from June 27 began to go to the West. ZhDB 16th A:

“[By 14.7.41 16th A] continued its concentration ... 16 A included ... 32th cc consisting of ... two divisions: 152nd cd concentrated completely in peacetime states ... 46th cd concentrated not completely ... This division was also staffed by state. peaceful ? time ... "



The phrase about the peaceful state of the 46th SD in the magazine is underlined, a question mark is placed. Captain I.F. The nomads who left ZabVO on June 3 did not know that the arriving 46th SD was a full-time division. The head, checking the entry in the ZhBD, emphasized the word "peaceful" and put a question mark, because he could have more accurate information.

(?) In May-June 1941, 3816 civilians were mobilized to be sent to Iran in the Azerbaijan SSR: 82 party workers, 100 employees of Soviet organizations, 200 employees of the security agencies, 400 police officers, 70 prosecutors, 90 judges and 150 printing houses, etc. d. Appointed the leaders of the subcommissions and lead the commissions ...

Transportation of troops of the 16th army across the sea


In the memoirs of A.A. Lobachev was noted that in 7 days all the echelons of the army were sent. In fact, until June 3, it was only possible to send the 17th TD and, possibly, part of the 109th MD. From June 4 to June 14, the 13th td was dispatched. The trains also continued to leave from the 109th MD. The last sent 152nd SD. Urgent dispatch to the West for three weeks of four divisions looks somehow incomprehensible. Perhaps that is why in the memoirs the term was changed to 7 days.

(?) Sending echelons of the army was carried out so that the port of Krasnovodsk could cope with the transport of troops across the Caspian Sea. After the operation was canceled, the trains went to the West along the same Central Asian route, as there was no need to hurry anywhere especially - after all, the beginning of the war was not expected ... This is also confirmed by the fact that the six rifle divisions of the Siberian Military District, for which 36000 people were planned to be called up, had not been transferred to the West before the war.


At that time, three shipping companies of the People’s Commissariat of the Sea worked on the Caspian Sea. fleet: “Caspflot” (82 vessels with a total carrying capacity of 87 thousand tons), “Kasptanker” (69 vessels - with a total carrying capacity of 205 thousand tons, including 11 large-capacity tankers with a carrying capacity of 9600 tons each) and “Raidtanker” (122 vessels - with a total carrying capacity of 240 thousand tons). The Caspian marine fleet occupied the first place in the USSR in freight traffic and accounted for up to 1/3 of the freight traffic. It is clear to everyone that people and cargo cannot be accommodated in tankers, but during the war years they were used to evacuate refugees and equipment of their decks. During the evacuation of refugees from the deck of a large tanker transported up to 4500 people, and on the decks of other tankers - 2000 ... 2500. When ballasting tankers on decks, it was possible to transport military equipment.

When evacuating equipment from the North Caucasus in the Baku port, they were able to reach the volume of freight traffic up to 100 wagons per day. If these were two-axle 20-ton cars, then up to 2000 tons of cargo were transported per day. At the indicated time, there were four-axle 50-ton cars. In this case, the volume of transported goods was even greater. By the end of 1941, during the evacuation of the population, 10 ... 12 thousand people a day were transported through the Baku port. The author assessed the mass of equipment, weapons, vehicles (without personnel and small arms) of the 17th TD, which amounted to about 11,3 thousand tons. When consistently arriving at the port, the division’s echelons within 7 days had to carry up to 1,62 day, 1200 thousand tons and 2000 ... XNUMX people. Theoretically, troops could be transported through the Caspian Sea, but to the detriment of the economy ...

Why didn’t troops send from the North Caucasian Military District?


The question was asked: “Why were troops transported from Transbaikalia to Transcaucasia, but not sent from the North Caucasian Military District?” From the composition of the North Caucasian Military District, SDs could be used, but they were not required for the rapid advance of troops.

The 26th MK began its formation in the North Caucasian Military District in March 1941. In the book M. Meltiukhova "Stalin's lost chance" provides data on the availability of armored vehicles in the districts. After the beginning of the transportation of troops from ZabVO on June 1, in the North Caucasian Military District there were: 2 tank BT-2, 84 - BT-5, 1 - two-tower T-26, 1 - T-26, 3 - flamethrower HT-26, 22 - T-38, 44 - T-37, 80 - T-27 and 47 armored vehicles. A total of 237 tanks, of which 87 are armed with guns. Therefore, the corps was not sent to ZakVO. The 5th MK was transported from ZabVO, which had more than 1000 tanks (of which about 900 equipped with guns) and 213 armored vehicles.

In May, the 26th MK was part of the 19th A, but due to the small number of old tanks with limited motor resources, it was not transferred to KOVO until June 27. In June, in the 19th A, the corps was replaced by the 23rd mk from the OrBO (413 tanks, of which about 186 were equipped with weapons). Prior to the outbreak of the war, the 23rd MK was also not put forward in the KOVO.

On the twentieth of May 1941, the future war with Germany was seen in a completely different form, the closer to its beginning. Commander of the 21st MK D.D. Lyalyushenko wrote:

About a month before the start of the war, when I was at the GABTU, I asked my boss: “When will the tanks arrive to us? After all, we feel the Germans are preparing ... "
“Do not worry,” said Lieutenant General Ya. N. Fedorenko. - According to the plan, your building should be fully equipped in 1942.
- And if the war?
The spacecraft is strong enough without your body...

In mid-June, the use of phase 2 mechanized corps in case of war is already under consideration. But only being considered ...

Destination: Central Asia


According to the official point of view, the 57th TD has been advancing to the West since May. On the forum Singularist assumed that according to the initial plans of the 57th TD, it was necessary to carry out other tasks than to participate in the battles near Smolensk. The author agrees with his point of view. An indirect confirmation of this is the following fact. The commander of the 29th mk (he will soon be appointed or has already been appointed head of ABTU FEF), transferring V.A. Mishulin did not indicate instructions to the General Staff that the division is part of the 16th A. Therefore, there was no such indication in the directive from the General Staff and a separate division remained such at the end of May. Until June 12, not a single document or memoir of veterans of the 16th A says that the 57th division was part of their army. Only on arrival at the General Staff in the late evening of 11 or the next day, the division commander could enter the 57th TD into the army of Lukin.


After receiving the directive on the redeployment of troops from ZabVO to the General Staff, only Commander Lukin was called. On June 3, the second leader of the 16th A, PMC Lobachev, was called to Moscow. Presumably on June 3 they call in the General Staff and the commander of the 57th TD. More in GSH from 16th A did not call not a single comcor (out of two) and not a single divisor (out of five). This can only indicate that a separate division had to perform a special task.

Looking at the map, Lukin saw that some other formations, not indicated by numbers, should be stationed to the left of his army ... During the lunch break, Lukin ... saw ... commander of the Ural Military District General Yershakov ...
“Why play hide and seek,” Yershakov said. - You and I were almost neighbors in the east, apparently, and now you have to act next door ...
[M.F. Lukin] - And I look at the map and think, who is my left neighbor? .. "

The 16th A’s left neighbor was to be located on the other side of the Caspian, in SAVO. Consequently, in SAVO it was planned to transport troops from the Ural Military District (22nd A). It turns out that the two armies of the RGK from the end of May are not planned by the General Staff for use in the West! Somewhere after 10 ... 12 echelons of the 22nd army could begin to move along the railway line Aktyubinsk - Arys and further to the southern border. It is hard to say how many rifle divisions were planned to be transported from the Ural Military District. It can only be noted that there were no good tanks in the Ural Military District except for a few dozen T-27s and T-37s.

There were no good tanks in SAVO, in which in March 1941 the 27th mk began to form (9th, 53rd TD, 221st md). Until June 1941, tanks in the corps were in only one 9th building. All tanks arrived after participating in the war in Finland, underwent major repairs and had limited motor resources. In the spring of 1941, there were about 321 tanks in SAVO, incl. equipped with a gun - 250. It should be noted that in the spring in the 27th microns quite intensive three-month exercises with the active use of equipment were held.

To conduct an operation in Iran (from SAVO), good tanks were needed. Probably the 57th TD was to be used in the district to perform a special task. For example, to connect with the moving parts of the 5th microns on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Reliable tanks were also needed for operations in other areas of SAVO. At this time, 50 fairly modern BT-7M tanks suddenly appeared in the okrug, of which 9 had walkie-talkies. In the MVO statements, these tanks were listed from 1940 to 1.4.41, and on June 1 they already appeared in the statement of the district of secondary importance. It is logical to assume that the decision to send them to the southern theater was made simultaneously with the decision to transfer troops of the 16th A and 57th TD.

Pre-war teachings in ZakVO and SAVO


According to plans, two different groups of general staff of the General Operations Department of the General Staff were to conduct exercises in the districts. The exercises and trips with the participation of the General Staff were planned in ZakVO from May 10 to 20, and in SAVO from May 10 to May 30. According to the memories CM. Shtemenko The main staff of the department left for training in May:

Before leaving, it turned out that neither the chief of the General Staff nor his deputy could leave and the exercises would be led by the commanders of the troops: in ZakVO - D.T. Kozlov, in SAVO - S.G. Trofimenko. However, the very next day after our arrival in Tbilisi, Lieutenant General Kozlov was urgently summoned to Moscow. It was felt that something unusual was happening in Moscow ...
Major General M.N. Sharokhin ... The front was commanded by the deputy commander of the district’s troops, Lieutenant General P.I. Batov ... After analyzing the exercises in ZakVO, the ship headed from Baku to Krasnovodsk ...

If we assume that the chief of the General Staff and his deputy were unable to leave due to the preparation of the operation to send troops to Iran, then the general specialists could leave Moscow from May 24-25. They arrived in Tbilisi on May 26-27. A day later, the commander of the ZakVO was urgently summoned to Moscow. On May 26, commander Lukin, who left on the 27th, was also urgently called to Moscow.

General Batov commanded a front that could turn around from the headquarters of ZakVO. But the front at that time was at least two armies. If at the front and one army headquarters in the district headquarters they could still recruit commanders, then where to get the personnel for the second army headquarters? Perhaps the second army was the displaced army from Transbaikalia ... The 16th A was already heading to ZakVO, but it was unlikely that this was known during the exercises ...

After the departure of the General Staff Commission to SAVO in ZakVO, the second exercises were held. P.I. Batov: “13-17.6.41 in Transcaucasia ... there were exercises. I just returned from them - I find out that I was ordered to urgently arrive in Moscow ... ". A trip to Moscow and documents for a report on the drug addict defense are discussed by General Batov and the chief of staff of the district, F.I. Tolbukhin. Consequently, the commander of ZakVO has not yet returned from Moscow. Due to a change in route of the 16th A, plans for the General Staff in the district should have been changed. This was what General D.T. Kozlov. CM. Shtemenko:

[In SAVO. - Note author] during the game, I managed to travel along the border from Serakhs to Ashgabat and then through Kizil-Atrek to Hasan-Kuli with the goal of studying the theater, along with Sharokhin and the chief of the operational department of the SAVO headquarters, colonel Chernyshevich.



M.I. Kazakov (Chief of Staff SAVO):

In early June, we conducted a command post exercise. Responsible representatives of the General Staff: Major General M.N. Sharokhin, who then worked as the head of the department for the Middle East Theater, and Colonel S.M. Shtemenko. The theme “Concentration of a separate army to the state border” was worked out.
June 11 received a call from Moscow. They called either the commander or me. S.G. Trofimenko wanted to personally analyze the teachings, but he didn’t feel well, and therefore it was decided that I would go on call ...

The exercises worked out a topic that turned out to be close to actual events, since the arrival of 22nd A. was expected. It is possible that exercises were conducted in ZakVO on a similar topic ... After the outbreak of war, the ZakVO commander put into effect a plan to cover the border with Iran and Turkey . In response to his actions, an encryption came from the chief of the General Staff: “Your main task: to prevent Turkey and Iran from provoking a war with us by any action. Do not give a reason to complain about us ... " That's right, because after changing the route for the nomination of two armies, the grouping of our troops in the southern theater was significantly weakened ...

Continued Operation Development



In the memoirs of M.I. Kazakova pay attention to four main points. The first. 8 days before the start of the war, the Chief of Staff of the SAVO is working on some documents. The deputy chief of the General Operations Directorate works with him. Less than two days before the start of the war, the chief of the General Staff carefully studies the documents. It turns out that these documents are not sent to the district: they are sealed and deposited, i.e. its sending by secret mail to the district is not provided. It is possible that General Kazakov took the baton from the commander of 22nd A and worked on the district’s plans for Iran, i.e. the operation itself in preparation for the entry of troops into Iran did not stop.

Second moment. Around June 18, Kazakov asks a question to Vasilevsky: "When will the war begin with fascist Germany?" Deputy Head of the Operations Department A.M. Vasilevsky, who is fully obliged to own the situation at the border and its understanding in the General Staff, answers: “Well, if it does not start in the next 15-20 days ...” At this time, the General Staff is not exactly sure when the war will begin, and in some books it is written that from June 12, according to the directives of the General Staff, troops began to withdraw according to cover plans in anticipation of the war on June 22. Even a certain GSh directive of June 18 was invented ... But it turns out that some of the events on the eve of the war are distorted. This can be seen on the example of the relocation of the 16th A.

Third. In the 3rd part, Mehlis answered the question of his deputy Kovalev about the purpose of transportation of the 16th A. I.V. Kovalev: the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented “A note was asked of our leadership for an explanation: why did the Soviet 16th A move from the Transbaikalia by rail to the west? Stalin ordered Marshal Tymoshenko to temporarily turn the 16th A train to the south and inform Berlin that the army was heading for the Persian border in case the British tried to strike from India through Persia. It is unlikely that they believed in Berlin, but achieved their goal - one of our armies was detained on the way. I learned about this case from Mehlis ... "

Let us pay attention to the measures of secrecy when working out the plans of operations in the General Staff. The list of people who were familiar with the operation plan was reduced to a minimum. Only Vasilevsky, Vatutin, Zhukov and Tymoshenko worked with Lukin. To exclude familiarization with the plans of unauthorized persons, the commander was locked in the room. In the memoirs of M.I. Kazakov there are the same persons: Vasilevsky, Vatutin and Zhukov. Since the operation was fully postponed, the developed documents were not reported to the narcotics of defense, unlike the plans that M.F. Lukin.

It turns out that the prepared documents in the General Staff should not have come to the district headquarters, which once again confirms the highest level of secrecy of the operation. Commander Lukin simply did not reach this step, since his participation in the operation was canceled. Mehlis would not divulge top-secret information during the period of its preparation: he might simply not have known about it. If the question was asked after June 10, then disinformation was issued in response. Even in this case, it was not necessary to disclose information that could damage the party and the country in the future ...

As an example of how they treated the highest secrets at that time, I will give a simple example. After leaving the office G.K. Zhukov, his adjutant, proposed to the cryptographer Khramtsovsky to seal a packet with sheets from a notebook for cipher telegrams. He agreed: «[From the office. - Note auth.] Zhukov appeared, pale, lips compressed. He asked: “Khramtsovsky! Why is the document in the hands of my adjutant? ” Khramtsovsky replied: "He did not see the telegram, he only put a wax seal."
To which Zhukov reacted as follows: “In the Civil War, commissars, it happened, adhered to a special disciplinary charter for the Communists. It had three punishments: remark, warning, execution. You are a communist! Consider the warning received! .. "


The Arys-Aktyubinsk railway was viewed from the side of a passenger plane, and General Kazakov unequivocally defined the chain of trains of the 16th A as military transportation through his district. If the enemy spies were at the railway stations or near the road, then they could more easily reveal the fact of military traffic to the West. It was not possible to hide the fact of troop transportation to the west. And why was it hiding? If even after June 10, army troops began to be transported not to the western special districts, but to the territory of the internal district - OrVO! What does the Germans care about troop movements inside the country? It should be noted that the mythical note of the German Foreign Ministry has not yet been found, and not a single employee of our Foreign Ministry has ever written about such a fact. We came across an example of misinformation to hide the operation even after it was canceled ...

And the fourth point. On June 13, Kazakov met Lukin at the General Staff, and on June 14-15 several more army commanders appeared there. Several are three or more people. Perhaps it was the commanders of the 20th, 21st and 22nd armies who arrived to familiarize themselves with the plans for using their troops.

After the outbreak of the war, SAVO somehow began to act. The author does not support the version about the introduction of the 22rd State Security Service troops into Iran on June 83. There are too many inaccuracies in this version. Many missing servicemen (disappeared on the western fronts, not in Iran). It turned out that marching units formed from military personnel assembled from the district’s units were also sent from the SAVO to the front. But the author could not dispute the three facts of the use of military personnel on the territory of Iran before the operation "Consent". For example:


Data on belonging to a specific military unit of the Red Army V.E. Bidenko (blessed memory of him!) Could not be found. It is possible that after the outbreak of the war, the intelligence forces operating in Iran against German agents and sabotage groups were strengthened by volunteer units from SAVO or ZakVO units ...

Changing the grouping of troops in the south theater


After June 9, the 16th A and 57th TD received a new route - to OrVO.

22nd And after the directive of the General Staff on June 12, began the relocation to ZAPOV.

On June 10, a directive comes from the General Staff to the Ural Military District on the introduction of symbols, probably for parts to be redeployed to the West.


On the southern theater of war, the threat remained and was reflected in the Certificate (13.6.41) “On the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war in the West”. The figures below show the dependences of changes in the total number of troops of the ZakVO and SAVO, as well as the number of divisions that the General Staff planned to leave in these districts after the transfer of part of the troops in the army of the RGK.


After changing the routes of transportation of the 22nd A and 57th TD, the number of divisions remaining on the territory of SAVO doubled.

After changing the route of the 16th A, the number of troops remaining in ZakVO increased by 50%. The certificate states that there are 20 divisions in the Western Military District and North Caucasian Military District, without taking into account one more division (North Caucasian Military District) involved in protecting the Black Sea coast. From the autumn of 1940 until 13.6.41, according to the plans of the General Staff in the North Caucasian Military District, only one SD should remain on guard of the coast. Thus, due to the threat in the Transcaucasus, five more divisions remained in the North Caucasus Military District, which had previously been planned to be sent north. Thus, after changing the routes for the advance of troops from Transbaikalia and from the Ural Military District, the number of troops to cover the southern borders (taking into account the divisions in the North Caucasian Military District) doubled.

The last lines of the Help contain the phrase: “Given the favorable situation in the West, 17 divisions may be additionally allocated ...; SKVO - 5 divisions ...; ZakVO - 5 divisions; SAVO - 5 divisions ... "but when no one knew the situation on the borders with Turkey and Iran before the start of the war. After the outbreak of the war and the defeat of a large number of our border troops, divisions will be transferred from the North Caucasus Military District and the North-Western Military District to the West, but this will be associated more with hopelessness, because GSh will have nothing left to do ...

Army troops from internal districts


And what is happening with the armies that are formed or will be formed on the basis of the internal districts?

16th A headed to Transcaucasia, on June 9-11 - to ORVO. On June 12, the Directive on relocation to the territory of the okrug was sent to KOVO from 15.6. 10.7 troops of the 16th A each consisting of: army directorates with service units, 5th mk (13th and 17th td, 109th md), 57th td and 32nd sk (46th and 152nd SD, 126th Corps Artillery Regiment). 16th A is part of the district troops and is subordinate in all respects to the District Military Council. By 14.7.41, the 46th SD and 5th MK had not yet fully concentrated (up to 40% of the troops did not arrive from the corps).

18th A (HVO). According to the directive dated 13.5.41, the 25th sk (three battalion) was transferred to camps on the territory of KOVO and on May 29 it was included in the 19th A. The 25th mk from the KhVO and the remaining divisions did not rise before the war, and headquarters 18- th And not formed.

19th A In accordance with the directive of May 13, at the end of May and the beginning of June, four SD and one GDS from the North Caucasian Military District are sent to the territory of KOVO.


20th A after the start of the war, it will be formed on the basis of the OrMO and the MBO troops. The 61st and 69th sk, 7th mk entered the army. Before the war, not a single corps rose and did not advance anywhere.

21th A formed in June 1941 on the basis of PrivO. In May, an appeal began on the training camp. The servicemen were going to maneuver in the KOVO: this is how the district commanders have been oriented since May. In June, the transfer of the army to the Gomel region began. The last train departed on June 20.

22th A (Ural Military District), by directive of May 13, by an additional instruction, was to be transferred to the West as part of two rifle corps. From the end of May to June 9-10, she was preparing for a transfer to the south. June 12 received a directive on relocation to the territory of ZapOVO. The arrival of the echelons of the 61st and 63rd sk (a total of six SD) was supposed to take place from June 17 to July 2. June 13 begins loading troops in the echelons. By the beginning of the war in the Zapovo arrived three sd.

28th A (ArVO). In accordance with the directive of June 19, the front should have been formed on the basis of the district, and on June 24 a new directive will be formed on the formation of the army instead of the front.

13.6.41 KOVO receives a directive to transfer closer to the state border to the new camps of the 31st, 36th, 37th and 55th sk - by campaign; 49th sk - by rail and hike. A similar directive comes in ZAPOVO on the withdrawal of deep divisions to the places of deployment of the second echelons of cover armies.

This is natural, since troops from the internal districts began to arrive to play the role of VO reserves. The problem is that the withdrawal of troops from the reserves of the districts by some writers is perceived as the beginning of the implementation of measures under cover plans, which is not true. Why? Because all of the indicated formations, which are part of the rifle corps of the reserves of the districts, should have been advanced west only after mobilization! They were supposed to take the remaining assigned staff and, most importantly, automobile (including tractors) and horse-drawn vehicles. Since they were provided with transport by only 40-50%, the divisions advanced by the campaign had only portable ammunition, brought a lot of training equipment and everything necessary for the subsequent camp life. Most of the artillery, due to lack of transport, remained at permanent deployment points. Therefore, regarding the advancement of these formations, we can only speak of their movement closer to the second echelon of cover armies. Movement is limited to combat-ready divisions. Enough time was needed to increase their combat effectiveness. Here is a concrete example of such an extension. Captain Comrade Malkov (commander from the 163rd ap 64th sd 44th sk):

21.6 the regiment was loaded into the train at art. Dorogobuzh, where there was a camp of the rifle corps, for what purpose, was not known. 22.6 at 7 o’clock settled at the station. Smolevichi, at 17 o’clock drove up to Minsk, where they only learned about the start of hostilities.
The regiment immersed in the echelon was understaffed, 50% of the materiel was not thrust. There were only 207 shells for the entire regiment. They took all property with them, i.e. bedding, tents. As such, they moved to the front.
This was the situation throughout the division. She had live ammunition, only training stock ... During the battle in the UR, the division received cartridges from the UR site, and I received enough shells for the 76 mm gun, for 122 mm shells there weren’t ...

The rifle division was advanced by echelons and was able to load even materiel not provided with transport. The division received ammunition and 76-mm shells from the warehouses of Ur. It is difficult to say whether there were enough shells for the 45-mm anti-tank guns that were not part of the 163rd artillery regiment. But in the warehouses of Ur there are no 122-mm shells. Also, they could not have mortar mines, because the 122-mm guns and mortars are not in service with the URA ... According to the norms, more than 40 thousand hand grenades are required for a rifle division. But were they in such quantity in the warehouse of Ura? ..

Why did they begin to transfer troops from the internal districts?



Pavel Anatolyevich indicates the reason for the concentration of spacecraft troops in the western special military “Prevent the adversary from creating on our borders a group that would possess overwhelming superiority over the spacecraft”. I suggest checking this version. The author is not a specialist in the part of the redeployment of the infantry troops to the west, and therefore he used data from the Internet. The figure below shows the change in the size of the German grouping at our border and the troops of the 1st and 2nd echelon of the cover armies of the western border districts. Since in May - June 1941, according to the documents of the General Staff, the 9th Army is part of the South-Western Front, the data on the KOVO and OdVO in the figure are combined.


Until May 31, a group of German troops concentrated on the border (with the exception of the Poznan-Danzig-Thorn area) does not have an overwhelming superiority over units of the 1st and 2nd echelon of cover armies of the western border military forces.

In Pribovo, one rifle division, which is assigned to the reserves of the district, is actually located in the same areas as the troops of the second echelon. The redeployment of the 2th SD began on June 14, and the redeployment of the 11th SD was delayed due to the insufficient number of cars.

In ZAPOV, too, there is no overwhelming superiority of the German group over the troops of the district. In the second half of June, a covert transfer of troops to the area of ​​deployment of two echelons began. But there can be no talk of any Soviet Union attack on Germany, since not quite combat-ready divisions are being thrown. Most of them are thrown on foot.

Against the KOVO troops and especially the OdVO there is a significant advantage of the German group. Basically, this advantage was ensured by the misinformation of the German command. When the Allied forces were counted, the overwhelming superiority of the enemy was even more ensured. And, of course, it required the achievement of at least some parity with the German group. Especially after the arrival of the RM about possible provocations on the Romanian border by June 8.

On June 13, a decision was made to transfer five sk and another SD to the areas of deployment of two echelons of armies covering the KOVO. There is no reason not to believe the version of P.A. Sudoplatova. All troops that were subject to redeployment arrived at their destinations in late June or early July 1941. The leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft did not take into account the most important circumstance - Hitler's disease, on which the arguments in the form of parity of troops at the border and the presence of significant reserves of the spacecraft did not work.

He possessed only a manic idea ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
1941. Where did the 16th Army go??
Endpoint of the 16th Army Route
Preparation for the redeployment of troops of the 16th Army in 1941
1941. Where the 16th Army was preparing to redeploy?
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  1. cavl
    cavl 1 July 2020 05: 48 New
    30
    Thanks to the author for interesting and voluminous material! To date, I have not been able to get so detailed with this area of ​​military history. It will be interesting sometime in the future to read the opinions of historians Isaev, Timin and Chekunov on the events in the movement of troops of 16 and 22 armies to the south
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 1 July 2020 07: 29 New
    +2
    What does the Germans care about troop movements inside the country? It should be noted that the mythical note of the German Foreign Ministry has not yet been found, and not a single employee of our Foreign Ministry has ever written about such a fact.

    This note was mentioned by one of the commentators in the discussion of the previous article.
    On the proposal to present her, silence followed, which is natural.

    The leadership of the Soviet Union and the SC did not take into account the most important circumstance - Hitler's disease, on which the arguments in the form of parity of troops at the border and the presence of significant reserves of the SC did not work.

    He possessed only a manic idea

    I don’t know, I don’t know: to say that we suffered terrible military defeats of 41,42 g from a sick person — do not respect ourselves ...

    The country's leadership did not take into account the other, that a belligerent, and, therefore, fully combat-ready mobilized army on our border can only adequately withstand the same combat-ready mobilized army, which was not done

    Intervention in Iran was absolutely truebut the reference to the agreement is untenable: of course, there were no armed organizations against the USSR in Iran. The same British there were three times as many Germans in Iran -2950 against a single thousand Germans.

    Shkha proposed to send them and stop the aggression, there was no answer, for the real reasons were completely different - preventing Iran from becoming an ally of Hitler and the Iranian transnational corridor
  3. bubalik
    bubalik 1 July 2020 22: 28 New
    13
    21st A. In June, the transfer of the army to the Gomel region began. The last train left on June 20.

    387 PAP RGK
    Before 28 June the regiment was mobilized according to the state of wartime and on the same day went to the front.
    12.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, the regiment took military order on the left bank of the Dnieper in front of the city of Rogachev.
  4. antivirus
    antivirus 2 July 2020 13: 33 New
    +1
    the executors ("cleaners"?) in the General Staff and their subordinates did not know the whole political cuisine - who-where-how-how-how-did they divide the countries (according to the presence of agents, in the Comintern) + are now called "social polls" - preferences, loyalty ideas, etc., etc.; labor productivity and delivery speed - LOGISTICS-mob reserves.
    this is all empty - articles on coal costs in steam locomotives
    in the archives of TsKVKPb and the Comintern, the British Royal family (not required to declassify - they are not state) ....
    In Switzerland, are German cells that are not accessible to Amer and Angles and us?
  5. Polymer
    Polymer 6 July 2020 12: 11 New
    19
    Not very easy to read material. But this is precisely what it is valuable for - the real work of the Historian is visible here, and not the custom-made articles of popularizers and propagandists. The cycle is a huge plus!
    1. VS
      VS 6 July 2020 12: 37 New
      -19
      This nonsense is golem and not the work of a historian))) An anonymous man is trying to prove that Lukin’s army went to the Caucasus to fight with Turkey and that means the German attack was not expected and this is nonsense))

      If you are a historian - be kind enough to take into account ALL the available information and not just what you want - to fit your own nonsense))

      Marshal I.Kh. Baghramyan described these events as follows:
      “In the second half of May, we received a directive that ordered the 34th Infantry Corps with corps units, four infantry divisions and one mountain infantry division to be sent from the North Caucasus Military District and stationed in the camps ... The first echelon was to arrive on May 20 ...
      ... The new army will include all five divisions of the 34th Rifle Corps and three divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps of the North Caucasus Military District. The army will be subordinate to the people's commissar. It will be headed by the commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District, Lieutenant General I.S. Konev. A day later (14 May - K.O.) The General Staff warned: one more, 16th army of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukina. She will be transferred from Transbaikalia in the period from June 15 to July 10 ... ".
      These directives on the transfer to KOVO of units from the North Caucasian Military District (North Caucasian Military District), the 19th Konev Army and the 16th Lukin Army from Transbaikalia are also shown in the collection of Yakovlev. Parts of the North Caucasus Military District were to arrive in KOVO from June 3rd to 17th. The 16th army from Transbaikalia was supposed to arrive in KOVO from June 15 to July 10, 1941.
      "Directive of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the KOVO
      No. 503904 May 13, 1941 Top Secret Ex. Number 1
      People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR ordered:
      1. To accept and place in the camps on the territory of the okrug one administration of a page [Christmas tree] corps with corps units and one artillery regiment, four twelve thousandth infantry divisions and one mountain infantry division from the North Caucasian Military District ...
      3. Arrivals from SKVO to place connections:
      a) Management of 34 pages of the corps with corps units and an artillery regiment, 38 and 129 pages of a division in Trushniki camp. The main discharge station is Bila Tserkva. The first control echelons of 34 ck and 38 sd will arrive on 20.5.41. The first echelons of 129 sd will arrive 3.6.41 ...
      5. All SCWO formations arriving on the territory of the KVO remain part of the SKVO troops and are subordinate to the SKVO operational group led by the deputy. SKVO commandos, Lieutenant General Reuters ...
      7. The operational training of the headquarters and troops rests with you.
      8. For the organized reception and creation of normal conditions for the training of arriving troops you should:
      a) Immediately organize reconnaissance of the camps by the commanders of the KOVO headquarters and, together with representatives of the arriving formations, who will be in the camps no later than 17.5.41., allocate areas for each formation.
      .
      Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft General of the Army Zhukov
      Head of the Opera. General Staff Lt. Gen. Malandin
      (TSA MO RF. F. 131. On. 12507. D. 1. pp. 71-75. Manuscript on the form: “NPO of the USSR. Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.” Original, autograph. There are resolutions of Colonel General Colonel General Kirponos and a member of the Military Council of the KOVO of the corps commissioner Vashugin and chief of staff of the KOVO, Lieutenant General Purkaev. There are litters.) "

      Ie already MAY 14 KOVO headquarters KNEW that the 16th Army is going to NIM in KOVO)))
  6. cavl
    cavl 7 July 2020 05: 22 New
    17
    Quote: V.S.
    This nonsense is bullshit and not the work of a historian))) An anonymous author is trying to prove that Lukin’s army was going to Transcaucasia to fight Turkey, which means an attack by Germany was not expected [/ b]


    We are faced with a typical example, when a person who wrote 12 works on the topic of the beginning of the war does not understand at all what is written in the article !! The writer Oleg Y. Kozinkin could not understand anything in the article on the 16th Army. In the same way, he cannot understand anything in the documents prepared on the eve of the war. therefore, in his writings he can state only his own fabrications!
    There is not a word in the article that Lukin’s Army was marching in Transcaucasia in order to fight Turkey!
    In addition, the gross errors in the comments of Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin show that he cannot write his books either .... Just someone uses this person as a screen to falsify our history ....
    Only two months ago, this writer claimed that the 2nd mechanized corps located in the Odessa military district before the start of the war began to advance according to plans for covering the district .... And this is supposedly after 12 years of studying the events on the eve of the war. Our writer is not even clear that The 2nd mechanized corps belonging to the Reserve of the High Command cannot fulfill the cover plans of the Odessa Military District. This building is not provided for in the plans! Already a lot of nonsense I did not have to meet in books ....
    1. VS
      VS 7 July 2020 08: 15 New
      -18
      16 The Army WAS NOT GOING to Transcaucasia NEVER))) IT initially went to KOVO near the towns of Proskurov and Shepetovka ..))) Right now, this is the Khmelnytsky region)))

      And if she went to the Caucasus, then with whom did she have to fight then if not with Turkey? With IRAN or what?)) There was not enough Konev’s army — which in THESE days was driven to KOVO?)))
      Calm down anonymous - 16 And it was originally in KOVO - for the war with Germany))) And all its “maneuvers” are no more than Moscow’s reaction to the German Note on it)))

      Ischo of times - REMEMBER the anonymous are illiterate - 16 And it was originally in KOVO - for the war with Germany)))

      ...........................
      The 2nd MK was taken where it should be - in connection with the expectation of an attack by Germany - did that become clear?)))
      1. cavl
        cavl 7 July 2020 11: 04 New
        17
        First of all, you wrote twice that the 2 mechanized corps was being withdrawn according to the district's cover plans. I can search and cite your thoughts.
        Secondly, 2 mechanized corps was not taken out where necessary in anticipation of a war with Germany. You are cheating again. This building was simply located at the training grounds, and Sergey Chekunov wrote about this.
        You simply do not have knowledge from the military sciences to write something truthful about pre-war events.

        Thirdly, you again showed that the article was NOT read, and the opinion was supposedly authoritative. The writer who expresses an opinion without reading the text is worthless. This shows the frivolity of the writer Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin.

        Fourth, when the directive on the redeployment of the 19th army followed, what event followed immediately after May 13, 1941, and what event was not in part 16 of the army? I am sure that your knowledge is not enough to answer this question.
        In addition, three historians who have seen correspondence about the start of transportation of the 16th army claim that she did not go to KOVO. You did not see the directives, you do not have the ability to analyze events.
        You don’t even have the mind to understand that all events are closely related, including the directive of May 13 to the Trans-Baikal District.
        Lack of knowledge, writer Oleg Kozinkin. Or story falsifier
        1. cavl
          cavl 7 July 2020 11: 10 New
          14
          By the way, the article also indicates why it was impossible to use the troops of the North Caucasian Military District. I understand that this was the answer to your question from 2 or 3 parts. What once again shows the low level of your knowledge from military science and the lack of ability to search the Internet for material!
        2. VS
          VS 8 July 2020 12: 41 New
          -15
          Quote: cavl
          three historians who have seen correspondence about the start of transportation of the 16th army claim that she did not go to KOVO

          WHAT else correspondence did YOUR THREE historians see and - WHO are these historians then?)) Regular anonymous clowns?))
          GSH directive for 16 A lead?))
    2. VS
      VS 7 July 2020 08: 19 New
      -16
      Quote: cavl
      someone uses this person as a screen to falsify our story ....

      so I do not hide my name from the public, unlike you anonymous cutters-so glad for the fact that the USSR did not expect a war and did not prepare for it))) That the Germans fooled RU so that the stooges alter someone like)))
      1. cavl
        cavl 7 July 2020 11: 07 New
        17
        They did not alter epaulettes, but applied false signs on them, indicating parts. Therefore, in June, documents were repeatedly written about the distortion of intelligence on the epaulettes of German troops. The last such document has a date of June 21, 1941. Well, I say, you do not have enough knowledge of the children's storyteller Oleg Y. Kozinkin!
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 10 July 2020 22: 37 New
          -17
          Quote: cavl
          Therefore, in June, documents were repeatedly written about the distortion of intelligence on the epaulettes of German troops.

          Stop lying, writer - first show these documents, and then discuss what is written in them.
          Quote: cavl
          The last such document has a date of June 21, 1941.

          Let’s give a link to it, if you say such a thing, but this is all blah blah blah. And how the change of epaulettes influenced the call signs of the Wehrmacht units - tell us in more detail the woe-military, before you mock O. Kozinkin. And then they laughed at you for a long time, and you tell all tales to a gullible public, like the author of these false scientific statues.
          1. AsmyppoL
            11 July 2020 07: 00 New
            11
            And the radio station callsigns in no way affected intelligence data. There is a separate part about this especially for Milchakov, in which it is shown that the data of the radio interception did not completely change the vision of the reconnaissance situation on the territory of the enemy. For example, just as the headquarters of the army corps (7th and 12th) were in completely different places for many months, they were there before the start of the war.
            But in words without documents you can chat a lot, which you do ...
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 11 July 2020 14: 46 New
              -17
              Quote: AsmyppoL
              And the radio station callsigns in no way affected intelligence data.

              You’re lying about verbiage - the data of radio intelligence by separate reports, even on the eve of the war, were corrected by separate reports, such was the order.
              Quote: AsmyppoL
              But in words without documents you can chat a lot,

              This is what you are doing a liar, because you will not get a single link to genuine documents, because you do not have them. All the nonsense about the 16th Army and its alleged dispatch to participate in the war against Turkey or Iran and the eggs you’ve eaten up are not worth it until you submit a document repealing the General Staff Directive on the final destination of this army in KOVO. Here is the directive:
              No. 545. Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the head of the Red Army to the commander of the KOVO troops
              No. 504 206
              12th of June 1941
              Top secret
              Of particular importance
              Ex. No. 2
              1. On the territory of KOVO from 15–06 to
              10.07.41/16/XNUMX, the XNUMXth Army will arrive, consisting of:

              Now, when you find an order to cancel it, then I will not consider you a miserable dreamer.
              The radio interception data completely coincided with the intelligence intelligence data, but all the information turned out to be false. therefore, do not write unprovenly ...

              Your lies aren’t backed up by any documents - aground, your week. On the contrary, all intelligence data was 95-97% reliable and all military historians and professionals recognize this, but you do not belong to them.
              I strongly doubt your ability to analyze and understand information. and judging by the huge number of cons - I'm not the only one.

              These anonymous hackers hired by you have tried, and professionals who rarely read your nonsense, quite normally evaluate my texts. In general, you don’t even call anyone, because decent people don’t hide their names - this is an assessment of your paperwork.
          2. AsmyppoL
            11 July 2020 07: 17 New
            +1
            This did not affect the callsigns of the radio frequencies. As there were fake German units at the end of May 1941, they remained in the same places on June 21. There was a special part about this, where all known messages taking into account radio interception were analyzed. Specific example. The 7th and 12th army corps, according to radio interception, were hundreds of kilometers from their true location for several months. The radio interception data completely coincided with the intelligence intelligence data, but all the information turned out to be false. therefore, do not write unprovenly ...
            1. AsmyppoL
              11 July 2020 07: 23 New
              11
              I strongly doubt your ability to analyze and understand information. and judging by the huge number of cons - I'm not the only one. All the pros are a bunch of the same pseudo-experts like YOU. Most of them are from the same team providing science fiction writers Kozinkin and Martirosyan.
              Why do I doubt your abilities as a military expert? Yes, because after I scanned three times in detail with scans of the Intelligence Directorate of June 22, 1941, maps of the KOVO headquarters, previous reports of the Intelligence Directorate and the intelligence department of the OdVO headquarters showed that the number of German troops in Romania for a long time was at least 28 divisions and then to he arrived a few more (which is written in the summary), you stubbornly assert about seven divisions in Romania. Yes, there were exactly seven of them, but according to intelligence, there were many more.
              1. AsmyppoL
                11 July 2020 07: 24 New
                17
                And you even having the text of the bulletin before your eyes and explained to you three times, write all silliness and insults. This is the behavior of a typical couch expert ...


                1. cavl
                  cavl 11 July 2020 11: 03 New
                  +3
                  Citizen Milchekova just has a senile disease. He forgets what he read. There remains the last thought and mania of genius.
                  It's easier to ignore it minus.
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 11 July 2020 15: 23 New
                    -19
                    Quote: cavl
                    Citizen Milchekova just has a senile disease. He forgets what he read.

                    Where are verbiage links, you may stop evading direct questions, as the author of the articles does. You were accused of writing, and you decided that you would dodge the answer:
                    Stop lying, writer - first show these documents, and then discuss what is written in them.

                    However, I already realized for a long time that you are just a racket, which is why you have nothing to present.
                2. ccsr
                  ccsr 11 July 2020 15: 12 New
                  -19
                  Quote: AsmyppoL
                  And you even having the text of the bulletin before your eyes and explained to you three times, write all silliness and insults.

                  A miserable liar, you didn’t even understand that these divisions were transferred from Bulgaria to Romania already before the attack on the USSR and they were opened after the start of the war. Golikov in his report on page 6 indicated that the number of 7 German divisions in Romania was confirmed, and this is an unambiguous fact. And what was established by additional data already on June 22, so they still had to be checked, which is why in the first part of the intelligence report, Golikov indicated the exact figure, which was documented:
                  https://www.mil.ru/files/files/camo/images/23-11610-19-06.jpg
  7. VS
    VS 8 July 2020 12: 43 New
    -16
    Quote: cavl
    By the way, the article also indicates why it was impossible to use the troops of the North Caucasian Military District. I understand that this was the answer to your question from 2 or 3 parts. What once again shows the low level of your knowledge from military science and the lack of ability to search the Internet for material!

    and why it was NOT possible to use 19 A against Turkey?)) Fantasies of the anonymous cite this account?))
    1. cavl
      cavl 11 July 2020 10: 48 New
      14
      I understand that Kozinkin could not master the article.
      There were no tanks in the North Caucasus Military District.
      Therefore, the mechanized corps, in which there were more than 1000 tanks, was redeployed to the border with Iran.
      In addition, five divisions from this district were already preparing for redeployment. In addition, rifle divisions were not required at the time in Transcaucasia.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 11 July 2020 15: 27 New
        -18
        Quote: cavl
        Therefore, the mechanized corps, in which there were more than 1000 tanks, was redeployed to the border with Iran.

        There was no war with Iran in the plans of the General Staff in 1941 - do you even think what you write before you carry such nonsense. That's why all the movements and deviations from route 16 of the Army were clearly disinformational for the Wehrmacht, and not because Stalin decided to fight with Iran - however, for you and the author of the statues this is a Chinese letter, you can lie further in the same vein.
  8. VS
    VS 8 July 2020 12: 43 New
    -16
    Quote: cavl
    They did not alter epaulettes, but applied false signs on them, indicating parts. Therefore, in June, documents were repeatedly written about the distortion of intelligence on the epaulettes of German troops. The last such document has a date of June 21, 1941. Well, I say, you do not have enough knowledge of the children's storyteller Oleg Y. Kozinkin!

    with felt-tip pens))) And how - did this help the Germans greatly?)))
    1. cavl
      cavl 11 July 2020 11: 02 New
      17
      Write nonsense again. Of course, this helped the Germans, since according to intelligence there were no 4 tank groups. Instead, in the Tilsit region there were scattered units of 20 armored divisions and a tank regiment. They appear in the same place and in the district report of June 21. Intelligence observed anything, but not real tank divisions.
      3 tank group also not found. Instead, intelligence found two motorized divisions that never existed, and the SS panzer division invented by the scouts. This has been written about many times. The army chief of staff in this sector did not even hear about tank divisions on the right flank. But he knew well about 40000 infantry west of Augustow. This is noted in his diary.
      2 tank group - not detected. About this with the map scans there is text in the previous part. Instead of a Guderian group, they found two tank regiments, a motorized regiment and as many as six cavalry regiments.
      1 tank group - not found. Instead, two tank and two motorized divisions were found, which on June 21 were located almost 50 km from the border. This was written by a general from the operational department of the army - 1 tank group was not found. The head of the operations department Baghramyan wrote about this, that two motorized corps entered a breakthrough in those areas where they were not expected. They did not expect it because intelligence did not find them.
      The props with shoulder straps helped the Germans a lot, since unexpectedly appeared tank groups with numerous motorized corps tore up the border groups of the Red Army.
      1. VS
        VS 11 July 2020 18: 28 New
        -20
        Quote: cavl
        The props with shoulder straps helped the Germans a lot, since unexpectedly appeared tank groups with numerous motorized corps tore up the border groups of the Red Army.

        calm down - if the intelligence was so crap one's pants then the HEADS would fly right away - and THIS was not)) So calm down - the donkeys have nothing to do with it - it wasn't the cause of the defeat of the Red Army))
        THE TOTAL number of tank PARTS in Moscow knew how they could or could not or wouldn’t be going to some TGs - THEREFORE KNEW))) So your cries and lamentations about the fact that there is NO type in reporting TG data - YES TO spit on these TGs as units - OTHERWISE evaluate the data in the General Staff = according to the number of divisions !!))
        And now ignoramus look - the structure of the Germans etc.)) And lo and behold - the Germans consisted of ALL ONE TP in fact)) And the TANK regiments most often appear in intelligence reports - like TP)) And now consider the ignorant TANKS in pieces - according to THIS to the reports, and you were surprised - it turns out against the districts to BE IDENTIFIED in PIECES of tanks and that means in terms of TP and so on - the tank units of the Germans EXACTLY)))
        so that your donkeys can shove it to hell - not THEIR REASON FOR THE rout of the Red Army))

        And as for the articles of the anonymous author - who knows, CHOES FIT for his fantasies and chooses 16 A)) Memoirs that he likes - about Iran and Turkey, he licks and Baghramyan’s words telling them that in KOVO on May 14 they told the General Staff that he will also arrive and 16 A - did not notice)))
        But you can cutters continue to expose yourself to a fool and ignoramuses)))
  9. VS
    VS 11 July 2020 18: 15 New
    -19
    Quote: cavl
    I understand that Kozinkin could not master the article.
    There were no tanks in the North Caucasus Military District.
    Therefore, the mechanized corps, in which there were more than 1000 tanks, was redeployed to the border with Iran.
    In addition, five divisions from this district were already preparing for redeployment. In addition, rifle divisions were not required at the time in Transcaucasia.

    you refute Baghramyan’s words - that on May 14 they were told that to them - in KOVO !!! - the 16th army will arrive soon)))

    The anonymous author is trying to prove that the attack in Moscow did not expect that it was unexpected for Stalin and under THIS delirium ignores the fact that he doesn’t suit him but masculine what he likes and this is a sign of a liar)))
    1. AsmyppoL
      12 July 2020 09: 44 New
      15
      You also cannot refute the words of Eremenko, Lobachev and Lukin about the direction of the 16th army in Transcaucasia to the border with Iran.
      And if you appeal to the words of the head of the KOVO operations department Baghramyan, then read his words about the unexpectedness of the war and about the unexpected blows of two motorized corps in unexpected directions. A.V. directly says the same thing. Vladimirsky about NOT DETECTING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE FIRST TANK GROUP AT OUR BORDER.

      I can comment on Baghramyan’s words that in the middle of May arrival was expected in case of expectation of the start of the 16th army war in KOVO. But the problem is that even on June 11 (after changing its route) the 16th Army was going to ORVO, and not to KOVO. Timin and Isaev asked you about this, but you were thoughtfully silent, I do not know the truth. Sergey Leonidovich Chekunov wrote about this to you on the forum, but it didn’t reach you. You do not have knowledge from the field of military science, writer Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin ...
      1. The comment was deleted.
        1. A1Lukno
          A1Lukno 12 July 2020 17: 46 New
          +9
          So this is about June 11th. Why cite a cryptographic telegram dated June 12?
          In the message by reference there was a large article about this.
          I now also see how facts can shuffle
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 12 July 2020 22: 53 New
            -18
            Quote: A1Lukno
            So this is about June 11th. Why cite a cryptographic telegram dated June 12?

            And what does it have to do with it? Such a directive is prepared not a day or two before its signing, but much earlier, if only because it must be agreed with the People’s Commissariat of Railways. It is necessary to determine in advance the final points of arrival of the army and take into account the possibilities of the railway. stations and driveways. In peacetime, this takes much longer than during the war, which is why the decision to transfer the 16th Army to the KOVO was made back in May, but all this was kept secret until the signing of the directive. And all the nonsense of the author of the articles that she was sent for the war with Iran was only a fruit of an unhealthy mind - at that time no one even thought about the war with Iran in the NPO.
  10. VS
    VS 11 July 2020 18: 39 New
    -19
    Quote: cavl
    I understand that Kozinkin could not master the article.
    There were no tanks in the North Caucasus Military District.
    Therefore, the mechanized corps, in which there were more than 1000 tanks, was redeployed to the border with Iran.
    In addition, five divisions from this district were already preparing for redeployment. In addition, rifle divisions were not required at the time in Transcaucasia.

    calm down already - the 16 army was NOT REDISLOCATED to Iran or Turkey))) It originally went to KOVO))
    DISCOVER THE UNIVERSITY "Help" Vatutin and read - WHERE went 16 A))) Oops - in KOVO)))
    I’ll give you a hint - the MAP dated 15 MAY is attached to this reference !!!
    Guess the batan - do the data in the help text match the data on the MAP that is attached to it?)))
    1. AsmyppoL
      12 July 2020 09: 37 New
      16
      Well, again, a clear lie. The map of May 13 is not attached to the Vatutin Certificate of June 1941, 15.
      The applied situation on the map dated 15.5.41 does not coincide with the data given in the Help.
      Are you not at all able to compare the situation on the map with the data provided in the Help?
      First of all, the 22nd Army, which was supposed to be nominated in June in the Central Asian military district for entry into Iran after a change in the situation according to the directive of June 12, went to ZAPOVO. Only not to the area marked on the map of May 15, in near Vitebsk (to Dretun!). How is it not to know such ELEMENTARY THINGS ??

      The 21st Army didn’t go to the border of the USSR with Hungary and Slovakia, as on the map of May 15, but went to the Gomel region - it’s ZAPOVO! Well, how not to know this ??

      The 18th Army, which is located on the map near the border with Romania, will not be raised until June 22, i.e. after the outbreak of war ... The 20th Army is at the border and will also be raised after the outbreak of war.
      The 24th army from the reserve of the RGK - will also be raised after the outbreak of war.
      The 28th army from the reserve of the RGK - is not being formed and since June 19, the front command has been formed on its basis ...
      19th army. Five divisions arrived from its structure in early June - about half. 5 divisions remained in the North Caucasus Military District. True, at the end of May, an infantry corps was introduced into the army from the KhVO (which was supposed to be part of the 18th army), which was in camps in the KOVO, but near the border with the KhVO. The mechanized corps, part of the 19th army, did not advance until the outbreak of war ...
      In addition, five divisions were excluded from the troops on the map dated May 15, which, after the 22nd Army did not arrive, it was decided to leave in the Central Asian Military District.
      After the 16th Army did not arrive in Azerbaijan, it was decided to leave five divisions in ZakVO and not redeploy them to the troops shown on the map of May 15. It was also decided to leave five divisions in the North Caucasian Military District, in order to strengthen the troops of the Northern Military District.
      Thus, Vatutin’s Help could not have a map of May 15, as an application. this map did not reflect the composition of the troops, which is given in the Certificate.
      The only things that remained unchanged on the map are the border armies (without the 13th army from the ZAPOVO) and the arrival areas of the 19th and 16th armies. But the composition of the troops of the 19th and 16th armies shown on the map of May 15 did not reflect the arriving troops according to the directives of June 12 and, therefore, the composition in accordance with the Certificate of June 13, 1941 ... It is excusable for the writer to not know these THINGS, but a person of 12 years supposedly studying events on the eve of the war is not excusable ...
      1. VS
        VS 15 July 2020 09: 57 New
        -16
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        False. Not attached to Vatutin's Certificate of June 13, 1941, a map of May 15.
        The applied situation on the map dated 15.5.41 does not coincide with the data given in the Help.

        so take and ask CHEKUNOV - about the MAP drawn on May 15 - = to VATUTIN's reference dated June 13)))

        Have you seen THIS MAP? NEA))) You have no idea what this card is and WHERE the pot IT 16 A goes)))

        By the way, you are more careful with Chekunov - God forbid, he will read your nonsense here))) he will IMMEDIATELY and ... he will call you if he reads your nonsense t)))

        Quote: AsmyppoL
        The 22nd Army, which was supposed to move to the Central Asian Military District in June to enter the territory of Iran after a change in the situation on the 12 June directive, went to the ZapOVO. Just not in the area marked on the map dated May 15, in the vicinity of Vitebsk (in Dretun!). How is it not to know such ELEMENTARY THINGS ??

        calm down - did not go and THIS army in Wed. Asia))) Or bring the DOCUMENT where it is indicated - goes to Wed. Asia))
        Once upon a time - the troops were deployed and withdrawn by the armies of the RGK - according to the OPERPLANE of the General Staff - according to the MAP dated May 15 !!))) And the fact that the 22nd went in the end to Belarus, so what can you do - the main blow of the Germans was ALWAYS waiting in the General Staff )))


        Quote: AsmyppoL
        five divisions were excluded from the composition of the troops shown on the May 15 map, which after the 22nd Army did not arrive, it was decided to leave in the Central Asian Military District.

        are you even talking about WHAT card do you want an anonymous miracle? Chekunov talked about a MAP dated May 15, which was attached to Vatutin's certificate of JUNE 13, and HE also showed that this card has nothing to do with the plan of May 15)))
        Miracle - if you refer to Chekunov, then first find out that he REALLY wrote about these veschi on the militer for more than 10 years!)))

        Quote: AsmyppoL
        After the 16th Army did not arrive in Azerbaijan,

        well tell me - HOW you can get to Azerbaijan was in the 41st year - from Transbaikalia - lay a route on the map you are our anonymous artist)))

        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Vatutin's reference could not have a card dated May 15 as an attachment, since this map did not reflect the composition of the troops as shown in the Help.

        so WHAT ARE YOU ABOUT WHAT map dated May 15 you are talking about - anonymous miracle?)) CHEKUNOVA want to refute ?? ((uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu ((How brave you are (((
    2. The comment was deleted.
  11. AsmyppoL
    12 July 2020 09: 05 New
    17
    Quote: ccsr
    A miserable liar, you didn’t even understand that these divisions were transferred from Bulgaria to Romania already before the attack on the USSR and they were opened after the start of the war. Golikov in his report on page 6 indicated that the number of 7 German divisions in Romania was confirmed, and this is an unambiguous fact. And the fact that it was established by additional data already on June 22, so they still had to be checked, which is why in the first part of the intelligence report, Golikov indicated the exact figure, which was documented


    Yes, the situation is very running. You cannot understand an ordinary document, but try to conduct expert evaluations. In addition, you have big problems with arithmetic ... In the summary of the General Administration of the General Staff of the Spacecraft dated June 22, 1941, after all, there are numbers that can be checked. This is the number of German divisions brought to the front (or to the border) for June 20 and 21, 1941. It comprises 22-24 divisions.

    Using the simplest arithmetic operation, we obtain the number 22 ... 24 of the division.
    In addition, the summary explicitly refers to the delivery of precisely FIVE divisions and with this figure the number of divisions brought up is 22 ... 24.
    If we subtract from the number 33-35 the number of divisions summed up for June 20-21 from Bulgaria, we get the number of German divisions on June 19, 1941. It is 28 ... 30 divisions.
    The Intelligence Agency's report of May 31, so the number of German divisions in Romania is defined in 28 divisions.
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 12 July 2020 13: 36 New
      -16
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Yes, the situation is very running. You cannot understand an ordinary document, but try to conduct expert evaluations.

      Enough to lie to the dreamer, because all military documents are read from the first page to the last, and on page 6 the number of German divisions in Romania is indicated as reliable and verified information. But what is indicated on page 7 was received just before the attack and, for objective reasons, could not be verified even on June 22, which is why different profane people grabbing figures from the general text of the intelligence report do not understand at all why such a discrepancy could be in ONE service document. Go teach materiel, amateur and liar.

      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Using the simplest arithmetic operation, we obtain the number 22 ... 24 of the division.

      Smother verbiage - in the intelligence report they specifically share that information that is reliable and confirmed by various sources, and that which has been received, but has not yet been documented by other means of intelligence. However, I have long understood that for you this is a dark forest, although you constantly lie about conducting reconnaissance on the eve of the war for a long time, but still remained a balabol.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      The Intelligence Agency's report of May 31, so that the number of German divisions in Romania is defined as 28 divisions.

      Three weeks before the attack, the number of divisions in Romania could change many times - and here you again showed your stupidity, although you constantly muttered that the Germans conducted misinformation events until the outbreak of war. Have you already decided somehow - why did the Germans change their buttonholes and maneuver troops until June 22? By the way, any division from Romania was possible within a day - two could be transferred to any section of ZAPOVO, PribOVO or KOVO. But you are not in the subject, that’s why you can’t understand what Golikov reported on in the June 22 intelligence report.
    2. 8Schlaf
      8Schlaf 13 July 2020 05: 59 New
      +6
      After such a clear explanation, only a seriously ill person may not understand the meaning. Do not pay attention to his messages. There is such a thing - the idea is fixed. A person is already in the same state when he cannot get away from this idea. Disease. Stop just talking to him.
      I always read your article carefully. Thanks you. Much is now understood differently.
      1. AsmyppoL
        13 July 2020 07: 12 New
        10
        I do not post such detailed explanations for Milchakov, but for readers like you. So that they understand how to respond to the comments of the aforementioned gentleman, whom the discussions are overwhelming with a huge amount of materials from the Internet. Often he writes well-known things or begins to reason using his rather poor stock of knowledge ... Ignoring him and assessing his level of knowledge is noticeable in the number of minuses. Therefore, I do not communicate with Mr. Milchakov.
        Thank you for your rating, the materials I have presented!
  12. AsmyppoL
    12 July 2020 09: 16 New
    17
    Oleg Kozinkin, science fiction writer:And now ignoramus look - the structure of the Germans, etc.)) And lo and behold - td of Germans consists of TOTAL OF ONE tp in fact)) And the TANK regiments most often appear in reconnaissance reports - like tp)) And now consider the ignorant TANKS in pieces - according to THESE reports - and you wondered - it turns out to be against the districts IDENTIFIED in the PIECES of tanks and, therefore, in TP and td - tank units of the Germans EXACTLY)))
    so that your donkeys can shove it to hell - not THEIR REASON FOR THE rout of the Red Army))
    And as for the articles of the anonymous author - who knows, CHOES FIT for his fantasies and chooses 16 A)) Memoirs that he likes - about Iran and Turkey, he licks and Baghramyan’s words telling them that in KOVO on May 14 they told the General Staff that he will also arrive and 16 A - did not notice)))
    But you can cutters continue to expose yourself to a fool and ignoramuses)))


    Here is a writer Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin and writes his books, completely not adhering to historical veracity ... How did you get that our intelligence knew that there was ONE TANK REGULE in the German tank division ??? For 12 years of exploration, you still didn’t understand that our reconnaissance believed that there were TWO TANKS regiments in the German tank division ?! And who can read such a balcony? Apparently, readers are completely brainless .... belay
    In all intelligence reports, tank divisions are conditionally created from two tank regiments. But in fact, intelligence “knows perfectly well” that the German tank division consists of a tank brigade (two tank regiments), a motorized brigade (two motorized regiments), an artillery regiment and an anti-tank regiment. Up to full-fledged tank divisions were lacking in a motorized brigade and anti-tank regiment. Artillery regiments have found enough.
    Yes, everything is neglected and hopeless ... As soon as it concerns some arguments, not quotes, the writer Kozinkin Oleg Yuryevich immediately gets into trouble and expresses such fantastic things that even schoolchildren are ashamed to say that ... For twelve years it’s not understand intelligence? This is a hopeless case ...
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. RuSFr
        RuSFr 14 July 2020 16: 18 New
        10
        If you don't like looking at the link, you can go to the RF archive. Why yell like a woman in a bazaar?

        Report of the head of the GABTU KA on the organization, armament and means of combat between the BT and MV KA and foreign armies dated May 21, 1941 (TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 11353, d. 895.)
        1. RuSFr
          RuSFr 14 July 2020 16: 54 New
          16
          You can find it on other sites. What is the problem? What kind of squeals are women?

          1. ccsr
            ccsr 14 July 2020 21: 44 New
            -17
            Quote: RuSFr
            You can find it on other sites. What is the problem? What kind of squeals are women?

            The problem is that various crooks snatch some kind of table from the report materials, and attribute that its data was allegedly obtained from our intelligence. But if these liars read the entire report, and on page 22 read item 1. Proposals, then these fools would understand that military intelligence has nothing to do with these tables. On the contrary, the speaker asks to instruct RU GSh to obtain accurate data, because GABTU did not have them. Moreover, the accompanying note indicates that 6 (sixth) copies are sent to the GABTU. report (it has their registration number) and it must be destroyed according to the instructions of the People's Commissar, and what was posted on the network for some reason without specifying the copy number, which cannot be at all, and most importantly why they did not follow the instructions of the People's Commissar. Can you explain this, two bazaar women?
            1. AsmyppoL
              15 July 2020 05: 49 New
              +3
              I realized that if you get away from the woman's squeals and act like a man, then you can find the Report.
              I can easily clarify these questions, but only when you write the cherished phrase about the June 22nd summary. After apologizing for your stupidity
              1. The comment was deleted.
                1. AsmyppoL
                  15 July 2020 12: 05 New
                  +2
                  Is it a lie, then you can't understand the text in the summary? Killed
                  1. The comment was deleted.
            2. AsmyppoL
              15 July 2020 17: 41 New
              14
              As usual, a completely incompetent opinion. According to Mr. Milchakov, the GABTU has its own intelligence, which delivers information about the German tank forces on its own and without involving the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft ... Well, this is the same as according to the intelligence report of the Republic of Uzbekistan on June 22.

              The Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft was a co-rapporteur of the said Report. It is indicated in the protocol of the GVS of the spacecraft. I can also easily answer the rest of the questions, but after your tearful apology. I do not want to communicate with a person who offends me and does not have the proper knowledge, moreover ...
  13. VS
    VS 15 July 2020 09: 42 New
    -18
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    You also cannot refute the words of Eremenko, Lobachev and Lukin about the direction of the 16th army in Transcaucasia to the border with Iran.
    And if you appeal to the words of the head of the KOVO operations department Baghramyan, then read his words about the unexpectedness of the war and about the unexpected blows of two motorized corps in unexpected directions. A.V. directly says the same thing. Vladimirsky about NOT DETECTING THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE FIRST TANK GROUP AT OUR BORDER.

    I can comment on Baghramyan’s words that in the middle of May arrival was expected in case of expectation of the start of the 16th army war in KOVO. But the problem is that even on June 11 (after changing its route) the 16th Army was going to ORVO, and not to KOVO. Timin and Isaev asked you about this, but you were thoughtfully silent, I do not know the truth. Sergey Leonidovich Chekunov wrote about this to you on the forum, but it didn’t reach you. You do not have knowledge from the field of military science, writer Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin ...

    look at the miracle on the railway road map - the General Staff gives instructions to KOVO - the 16th army will arrive at you = besides the others - and a month later gives the General Staff directive)) And now ignoramus open Vatutin's certificate of June 13 and see WHERE the 16th army is registered there))

    Are you referring to chekunov? So he showed it for a LONG time - the MAP DATED MAY 15 is attached to vatutin's certificate !!! So ask him yourself - WHERE was the 16th army going?))
    1. AsmyppoL
      15 July 2020 11: 54 New
      15
      Oh, how many letters and not a single proof. Why should I ask S. L. Chekunov if we are dealing with you, Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin? Or are you unable to answer for your words? Say something and are not responsible for your outpourings?

      You already once told me, referring to S. L. Chekunov, that the frontier mechanized corps, according to some directive, began to move forward according to cover plans.
      I have proved to you that you are cheating. By the example of all tank and motorized divisions of PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and OdVO.
      You tried as an argument to present the withdrawal of the 2nd mechanized corps of the RGK to the camps according to the plans to cover the ODVO ... This is the height of incompetence ... And where did the units of the 2nd mechanized corps go in the comments in the book about the memoirs of the division commander, S.L. Chekunov wrote. You didn't understand that either ...
      Therefore, I can say that your knowledge is not enough to understand the words of the historian Sergei Leonidovich.

      A secret example. Sergei Leonidovich told you directly: "...
      If you knew where the 16th Army was being taken, you would not [speak. - Approx. ed.] about the "war with Germany" ... The place of its new deployment does not correlate in any way with the war with Germany ... "

      You did not understand where this army was going from April 26, 1941 to June 9-11.
      The historians Isaev and Timin spoke directly about this to you and Martirosyan.
      The commander of the 57th Panzer Division wrote that the army was redeployed to the ARVO, and Lukin told his relatives about this to the teams.
      It looks like you are lying again, having no evidence, sending me to the Chekunov. And you can't even quote this historian ...

      The cons to your posts shows that many readers see you cheating and being rude. To further reduce the number of readers who still favor you, I am ready to discuss with you a number of issues on the page of this site. Just give facts, not clear dispatches to unknown sources.

      No more than two questions. Otherwise, you fill up with well-known information, avoiding specific answers.

      1) I argued that you do not have data that Vatutin's certificate dated 13.6.41/15.5.41/XNUMX had an attachment (or was attached to it) a map from XNUMX.
      I gave my arguments.
      On the map dated May 15, there are 15 divisions among the troops, which, in accordance with a certificate dated June 13, remained in Central Asia, the Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus.
      Therefore, I could not attach a card with erroneous data!

      Armies from the Ural and Volga military districts did not go to the places indicated on the map.
      It was easier to draw a new map rather than attach a map with the wrong setting.

      18, 20, 24 armies did not advance to the border. 5-6 days after the release of the certificate, it was decided not to form the 28th army.

      Do you have any counterarguments? Or will you deceive the people again?
      1. VS
        VS 16 July 2020 09: 52 New
        -10
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        1) I argued that you do not have data that Vatutin's certificate dated 13.6.41/15.5.41/XNUMX had an attachment (or was attached to it) a map from XNUMX.
        I gave my arguments.

        but why would anyone need YOUR t..n arguments if YOU ARE NOT IN THE COURSE of the question and the same CHEKUNOV wrote directly on the militer - a MAP dated May 15 is attached to Vatutin's certificate and this is not a map to the so-called. plan of May 15?)))
        You are afraid to turn to Chekunov on behalf of him because HE will call YOU with your nonsense ...
        as he called something like a fool anonymous madam on the militer)))
        Do you need Chekunov's quoted words about this card? No problem)))

        "" According to S. Chekunov, the concentration of our troops in May-June "proceeded in accordance with the plan, the essence of which is set forth in Vatutin's notes dated 13 and 14.06.1941. Attached to the note dated 13.06.1941/15.05.1941/13 is a map dated 22/2020/398. This was the base ... Vatutin has attached a map to the certificates (in fact, there are TWO documents), the content of which is described in the document. All movements are documented, redeployment locations are indicated. " Those. - in May Zhukov and Vasilevsky draw a map for the future deployment of our troops in case of war with Germany. And according to this map, by June XNUMX, Vatutin reports on how many divisions of the Red Army we have concentrated in districts, and also proposes where to place the RGK armies, in which districts ... "(" Tragedy on June XNUMX. Authors and culprits ", M. XNUMX, p. XNUMX)
        Chekunov assures that the map dated May 15, under which the troops are being withdrawn in June, and the "plan of May 15" are not the same thing. ))) Do you need his words about this in quotes?)))

        S. Chekunov: “All actions in June 1941 were documented and took place in accordance with the planned actions. ... First they acted on the basis of the April documents, then on the basis of the May documents. As a result, with minor changes it turned out according to the document dated May 15 (these are not considerations) ...
        For greater accuracy with regard to plans: the concentration went in accordance with the plan, the essence of which is set out in Vatutin's notes dated 13 and 14.06.1941. Attached to the note dated 13.06.1941/15.05.1941/XNUMX is a map dated XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. This was the base. ... A map is attached to Vatutin's certificates (in fact, there are TWO documents),

        314

        the content of which is described in the document. All movements are documented, relocation locations are indicated. " (Before June 22. M. 2019.)



        So yourself to him and ask for clarification - if cho is not clear)))

        As I understand it, you are brandishing a map to the preemptive strike plan ???? anonymous you are my restless - but on IT the troops were not withdrawn from the word support)) For details - to CHEKUNOV)))

        Ischo once - the map to the General Staff's plan of a preventive strike has nothing to do with the withdrawal of troops and Vatutin's certificate on which the troops were withdrawn))
        1. AsmyppoL
          16 July 2020 10: 08 New
          +6
          I am not afraid to contact S.L. Chekunov. I'm just having a conversation with you. I ask you for arguments, but I don't want to turn to my uncle. I demand an answer from you! Above you prove the opposite. Not me!

          I showed with specific examples that twice, when you refer to Sergei Leonidovich, your information turned out to be false. Not so it comes to you.
          Without proof - it's just your chatter, for which you again turn out to be not responsible. And S.L. must answer. Chekunov.
          Either the facts, or we end the discussion behind your obvious defeat due to lack of knowledge ...

          And what about the intelligence materials on the presence of one tank regiment in a German tank division? Again, nothing to show ??
  14. VS
    VS 15 July 2020 10: 06 New
    -16
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    I realized that if you get away from the woman's squeals and act like a man, then you can find the Report.
    I can easily clarify these questions, but only when you write the cherished phrase about the June 22nd summary. After apologizing for your stupidity

    so why there is NO etc. in the bulletins, but there is a TP?))) And - so how many German tanks were waiting for in German TPs?))
    1. AsmyppoL
      15 July 2020 12: 15 New
      16
      2) provide evidence that the Intelligence Directorate and the General Staff knew that the German tank division had only one tank regiment. You wrote about this above. Or ripped off again? No argument, so use any reason ...

      In intelligence reports, it is believed that the German tank division consists of two tank regiments.
      In addition, the GABTU report directly indicated the presence of a tank brigade in a tank division, consisting of two regiments ...

      Where did you get your statement about the knowledge in the General Staff and in intelligence about the presence of the Germans in the division only one tank regiment? Or ripped off again?
      1. VS
        VS 16 July 2020 10: 23 New
        -9
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        In intelligence reports, it is believed that the German tank division consists of two tank regiments.

        yes, fig cho is considered there - if in the RD they write about the TP)) Do not try to get away with verbiage about the topic - in the RD they write about the TANK regiments more often than about the TD of the Germans))) So you can count the lope of the TANKS waiting against each district)) And prove that the General Staff did not know the lope of tanks in the German TP)))
  15. VS
    VS 15 July 2020 11: 44 New
    -18
    Here is what I.P. Makara - Head of the Department of the History of Wars and Military Art of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Major General, Ph.D.
    “... A very important decision was made to deploy the troops of the second strategic echelon - the reserve armies of the High Command. The formation of this echelon in the Western theater of operations began on May 13, 1941, when, with the permission of I.V. Stalin, the General Staff issued orders to move the four armies formed in the internal districts: the 22nd - from the Ural Military District to the Velikiye Luki region, the 21st - from the Volga Military District to the Gomel region, the 19th - from the North Caucasian Military District to the area of ​​Bila Tserkva and 16th - from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Proskurov region. The 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District, which was transferred to the subordination of the 19th Army, was also transferred to the west.
    The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of the completion of the concentration in the areas outlined by the operational plans, in the period June 1 to July 10 1941 of the year. There were also other inter-district and intra-district regroupings of troops.
    Total from the inner districts in accordance with the strategic deployment plan began the advancement of 28 divisions, 9 corps directorates and 4 army management. At the same time, three more armies from the Oryol, Siberian and Arkhangelsk military districts (20, 24 and 28) were preparing for the transfer.
    All these troops were supposed to make up the Reserve Army Group ("armies of the second line") with headquarters in Bryansk, the commander of which was supposed to appoint Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny (however, the command of the army group - that is, the reserve front - was not created by the beginning of the war). " ("From the experience of planning the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war with Germany and direct preparation for repelling aggression", Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal No. 6, 2006, pp. 3-9)
    The city of Proskurov is Khmelnitsky since 1954, and Shepetivka is a city, a regional center, which is part of the modern Khmelnytsky region. This area is about 300 km from the border with Poland, and about 100 km from the border with Romania ...
    Those. according to the plans of strategic deployment, the withdrawal of the RGK armies from the internal districts to the western ones was carried out - according to the strategic deployment plan.
    Well, the memoirs of Baghramyan were cited above - they were already informed on May 14 that KOVO should also arrive, in addition to 19th A, also 16th ...

    General and Ph.D. Makara - think about it - nHead of the Department of the History of Wars and Military Art of the Military Academy of the General Staff The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is so-so .. ... but ANONYMOUS type Evgeny learned the whole strange secret = Went to fight with Iran and Turkey !!))))
    And they also wrote lessons - you think some officers .. INU GSh - that the unloading and concentration of these armies went according to the operational plan of the GSh))) .. and these areas coincided))

    but our anonymous figs do not care that his ravings do not fit - he will not notice this))) He will find the correct memoirs)) Where the military DOESN'T KNOW, but only wonder where and why they are going, that in THIS case it is NORMAL business - they are NOT LEGAL it was in these armies to know what they were not supposed to know - where and why they were going))) \

    In general, in vain the anonymous author spent half a year here breeding conspiracy theories about how Stalin wanted to insidiously attack Iran and Turkey, but thank God Hitler interfered with this insidious plan)))
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. AsmyppoL
      15 July 2020 18: 54 New
      14
      Writer O. Yu. Kozinkin, when he does not know the correct answer or knows, but pushes his wrong one, always hides behind quotes and offensive phrases. In 2018, at a meeting of historians, he already got into a mess, I don't know where and when the armies were moving from the inner districts. Or to the West, as Arsen Benikovich Martirosyan and Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin tried to assert. They also claimed that the armies began to move in May 1941. So it is written in publicly available books. But it turns out that these armies were moved to a completely different place and some of them have not even been nominated yet ... Both writers showed themselves not in the best light at a meeting of historians (link http://zhistory.org.ua/nikifrov.htm )

      O.Yu. Kozinkin: "Well, yes, the inner districts began to move forward in May ..."
      A.B. Martirosyan: "Please, can we name these directives ..."
      M.F.Timin: “Excuse me, but where did the troops go on April 26? Can you tell me? ”
      A.B. Martirosyan: “From the inner districts ...” A long silence due to the understanding of some kind of trap and not knowing the correct answer.
      M.F.Timin: "Where?"
      A.B. Martirosyan: "To the Western ..." Long silence for the same reason.
      M.F.Timin: "Where? Which "Western" ones? "
      A.B. Martirosyan: "To the western districts ..." A long silence.
      M.F.Timin: "Where? Which "Western" ones? "
      O.Yu. Kozinkin trying to come to the aid of Martirosyan: "To Belarus, to the Ukraine ..."
      A.B. Martirosyan repeats the hint: "To Belarus, to Kievsky ..." Long silence.
      M.F.Timin: “To which“ Belarus ”? Will you specifically indicate which armies went where? "
      O.Yu. Kozinkin: "An army was moving out of the Volga region near Orsha ..." Long silence.
      A.V. Isaev: "When did they advance?"
      A.B. Martirosyan asks Kozinkin: "Do you have here with you? ..." Silence of both. They look at the table.
      M.F. Timin: “Well, for example, if we take the Arkhangelsk District, for example, and the Trans-Baikal Front, then the two armies were moved completely not to the border, not to Ukraine, for example. This is well known now. And therefore to present this advancement of deep armies as a movement to the west ... "
      O.Yu. Kozinkin: “Stop, they’re further advancement ...”
      M.F. Timin: "Where?" After a long silence Kozinkin M.F. Timin finishes him off again: "Where?"
      after a pause O.Yu. Kozinkin begins to say: "Well, to the western direction ..." Again, a long silence.
      A.V. Isaev: “No, wrong! This is not true."
      M.F. Timin: “You give the wrong information. Not true. "
      O.Yu. Kozinkin: “Well, Konev’s army from Zabaye ... where did it move from Transcaucasia?” Falls silent. understands that he’s talking nonsense ... Konev’s army is from the North Caucasus Military District.
      A.V. Isaev: "Where? Tell me! "
      O.Yu. Kozinkin: "She moved to Ukraine ..." Long silence.
      M.F. Timin: “One army. All!"
      O.Yu. Kozinkin: "Did the Urals District send an army?"
      M.F. Timin: "Where?"
      Intervenes A.V. Isaev: "In April, did not send."
      O.Yu. Kozinkin: "Not in April, in May ..." Is silent.
      M.F. Timin: "Where?" Kozinkin and Martirosyan look at the table and are silent.
      A.V. Isaev: "Good. A specific question for you: where did the 16th Army go? ”
      M.F. Timin: "To Voronezh."
      O.Yu. Kozinkin bewildered: "And what is Voronezh?"
      M.F. Timin: "Why?"
      O.Yu. Kozinkin confused: "What is the" Why "?"
      M.F. Timin: “Why did she go to Voronezh?”
      O.Yu. Kozinkin: "What why"?" Is silent.
      M.F. Timin: “Well, she’s not at West. I was driving in that sense ... "
      A.V. Isaev: "And then she went ..."
      M.F. Timin: “And then the 28th army rode ...”
      O.Yu. Kozinkin: "And then they wrapped it ..."
      M.F. Timin: "Where?"
      A.V. Isaev comes to the rescue with the constant silence of opponents: “Mikhail! Give a laconic answer. "
      M.F. Timin: “To Yaroslavl. Because no one went to the western border for some kind of "deployment" of the group there. "
      A.V. Isaev"16th Army went to Transcaucasia... It was turned. I reveal a secret, here Michael will not let me lie 10 June... Therefore, to say that the "red button" was pressed on April 26 is not true ... "
      1. AsmyppoL
        15 July 2020 19: 04 New
        +9
        A.B. Martirosyan reads: "Troop transfers began closer ..."
        M.F. Timin: "Where?"
        A.V. Isaev: "Where?" Martirosyan and Kozinkin are silent.
        A.V. Isaev: "In the Transcaucasus?"
        O.Yu. Kozinkin: "Well" where? " What for?"
        M.F. Timin: "The next question is" why "?"
        O.Yu. Kozinkin: "What for? Is it just that they nominated? ”
        M.F. Timin: “Naturally, that not just like that... "
        A.V. Isaev: "... They didn’t go west ..."
        O.Yu. Kozinkin: "You said that" the internal districts began on June 11th. " But this is not true! Inland counties began to advance until June 11th. They started in late May... "
        A.V. Isaev: "In the amount of one army."
        M.F. Timin: “Where were they going? They did not advance to the western border. ”
        O.Yu. Kozinkin: “I am not saying that the western border. I said, "to the western counties." In any case ... ”So the western districts are the border districts. Both writers already called Belarus and Ukraine, but this did not satisfy historians.
        A.B. Martirosyan: “In May ... Directives were signed in April. In May-June there was a transfer of the 19th Army from the North Caucasus Military District, the 20th from Orlovsky, the 21st from Privolzhsky, the 22nd from Ural ... "
        A.V. Isaev"20th didn’t go anywhere". I mean, the 20th Army was not advanced before the war.
        A.B. Martirosyan : “The 19th Army ...”
        A.V. Isaev"One 19th Army».
        A.B. Martirosyan : “The 19th Army ...”
        A.V. Isaev"One 19th Army».
        A.B. Martirosyan after silence: "Cherkasy, the White Church ..."
        A.V. Isaev: “20th, 21st, 22nd went much later. Therefore, they reached only the border of the Dnieper ... "
        1. AsmyppoL
          15 July 2020 19: 20 New
          +4
          O.Yu. Kozinkin tries to cite the following statement as arguments: "Here is what I.P. Makar - Head of the Department of the History of Wars and Military Art of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Major General, Candidate of Historical Sciences: “... A very important decision was made to advance the troops of the second strategic echelon - the armies of the reserve of the High Command. The formation of this echelon at the Western Theater began on May 13, 1941, when, with the permission of I.V. Stalin’s General Staff ordered the nomination of four armies formed in the internal districts: the 22nd from the Ural Military District to the Velikiye Luk region, the 21st from the Volga Military District to the Gomel region, the 19th from the North Caucasian Military District to the area of ​​the White Church and the 16th - from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Proskurov area. The 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District, which was subordinated to the 19th Army, was also transferred to the west."

          Everything is half true here. as well as in the book "1941. Lessons and conclusions." There, too, there is a text on the nomination of four armies and heaps of divisions from May 13, 1941 under a directive from the General Staff, but this is a lie. And the head of the department and the authors of the book "1941. Lessons and conclusions." wrote what you can write.

          On June 13, a directive came in confirming preparations for advancement to the camps in the west. She basically repeated the text of the directive of April 25th. It was necessary to prepare the calculation of parts for loading in trains. At the same time, it was planned to transfer six divisions from the ZabVO (three TD, one MD and two SD), six SD from the Siberian Military District, two SD from the Far Eastern Front, to the west.
          divisions from UrVO, PrivO, KhVO and OrVO. They did not forget the North Caucasian Military District, the Northern Military District and the Northern Military District. All towards a possible enemy.

          On June 13, only 5 divisions from the North Caucasus Military District begin to prepare for promotion and move to camps on the KOVO-KhVO border of the 25th sk from the KhVO — the future 18th Army. Of the 19th army, formed on the basis of troops of the North Caucasian Military District, only 5 divisions advanced (four SD and one GSD). The remaining five divisions remained in the district. Not only one army was advanced in KOVO, but only its half.

          On May 25, an urgent directive came on the nomination of the 16th Army to the West, but it was preparing to go to Transcaucasia. This is evidenced by historians, Marshal Eremenko, generals Lobachev and Lukin. and, most importantly, no one refutes them ...
          1. AsmyppoL
            15 July 2020 19: 37 New
            10
            In Moscow, Lukin meets the commander of 22 and during the conversation finds out that he is his left neighbor. The left neighbor can only be located in the North Caucasian Military District. Of the entire 16th army, only the commander Lukin is called to the General Staff, and later the commander of the 57th separate tank division also arrives there. None of the two comicors of the 16th Army and none of the 5 divisional commanders were summoned to Moscow, but the divisional commander of the 57th. It looks like this division was going to SAVO. At the same time, 50 fairly modern BT-7M tanks arrive in SAVO, of which 9 are radio-fired. In the same period, the district school of scouts was thrown completely into Iran. It seems to provide support for the entry of troops into Iran from ZakVO and SAVO. The trains of six divisions from ZabVO leave for more than three weeks! Two rifle divisions (152nd and 46th) arrived by July 12th. At the same time, the 46th was first mobilized, and only then began on June 27 to go to the West.

            What else is interesting. After the outbreak of the war, two more tank divisions were sent west. The speed of their dispatch was 30 trains per day. And 40 echelons of the 17th TD sent a week. Another week sent the second tank division. THOSE. sending speed was more than 6 times higher. and why? Because the port of Krasnovodsk could transfer a tank division in about a week ... Therefore, the transfer of troops was not rushed ...

            On June 9, a decision was made to transfer troops to the OrVO. On June 11, the commander of the 57th TD was in Moscow and also learned about the re-targeting of his division in the OrVO. But on June 12 there was a directive on the transfer of the 16th army from the 57th to KOVO. Only June 12th. Historians said almost the same thing, but Oleg Yuryevich didn’t get it ...

            Back to the 19th army. After sending the 16th Army to Transcaucasia and planning to transfer the 22nd Army (or part thereof) to SAVO, the transportation of troops from the North Caucasian Military District stopped. No new divisions came from there. Instead of the 26th mechanized corps from the North Caucasian Military District Military District, the 19rd mechanized corps from the Far Eastern Military District was attached, but this corps was not nominated before the outbreak of war.
            1. AsmyppoL
              15 July 2020 19: 51 New
              15
              Therefore, the 19th army subordinated the 25th sk from the HVO. Other armies and divisions began to shuffle further.

              After changing the route of the 16th Army to ORVO, and then to the KOVO (12.6.41) and issuing an order to nominate the 22nd Army in ZapVO (to a completely different area than the map of May 15), 15 divisions from SAVO decided in the General Staff , SKVO and ZakVO not to transfer from districts. too much danger was expected from Iran and Turkey. Therefore, these divisions did not arrive at the places allotted to them on the map of May 15, 1941.

              18th A, which was to be formed on the basis of the HVO before the outbreak of war, was not formed. The mechanized corps for the 19th Army was again taken from the district alone (again, which shows that this structure is not on the map of May 15).
              21st A was formed in June 1941 on the basis of Privo. In May, an appeal began on the training camp. The servicemen were planning to go to maneuvers in the KOVO, but began on June 13, the transfer of the army to the Gomel region. And on the map of May 15, her place was near the border in KOVO.

              The 22nd A from the Ural Military District received a directive on redeployment to the territory of ZapOVO by the directive of June 12. And again, not to the place marked on the map of May 15. It seems that about the map. prepared by Vasilevsky, writer Kozinkin bent again ...
              24th A from the Siberian Military District received an order to form after the outbreak of war.
              28th A from ArVO. In accordance with the Directive of the General Staff of June 19, a front command should be formed on the basis of the okrug, and on June 24 a new directive came about the formation of an army command instead of a front command.

              As a result, according to the attached map to Vatutin’s Note, one can say that one cannot believe this without additional documents, as well as believe O.Yu. Kozinkin.
              The second one. In the book, lessons and conclusions - they printed only what the authors allowed. Therefore, there is not a word about intelligence data received in May-June 1941. From the word not at all. Intelligence materials were unreliable and the authors simply silenced this issue. Sending divisions of the inner districts to the West from May 13 is the lie they were forced to write. This was also written in the 1st part on the movement of the 16th army ...
              So there is no need for political agitation, but give the facts, Oleg Yuryevich. I can demonstrate them. I'm tired of reading all kinds of lies, but I’m not a schoolboy to hang noodles over my ears ...
              1. VS
                VS 16 July 2020 10: 50 New
                -10
                Quote: AsmyppoL
                from the attached card to the Note by Vatutin it can be said that this cannot be believed without additional documents, just like O.Yu. Kozinkin is believed.

                HAVE YOU SEEN THE CARD for help - DO NOT NOTE - do not engage in forgery - but Vatutin HELP dated June 13 ??))))

                Quote: AsmyppoL
                In the book, lessons and conclusions - they printed only what the authors allowed. Therefore, there is not a word about intelligence data received in May-June 1941. From the word not at all. Intelligence materials were unreliable and the authors simply silenced this issue. Sending divisions of the inner districts to the West from May 13 is the lie they were forced to write.

                SO THIS WORK - there was a chipboard - from whom did you hide the truth?)) The circulation was - fifty god forbid copies - for military academies WORK and not for batans))) Work as an analysis of errors that cannot be repeated))
                The agitation there was also about the innocent repressed)) And about the intelligence was - EVERYTHING she needed to give)))

                “The General Staff determined a completely unrealistic order of mobilizing divisions in new areas. By June 5, 1941 the cells left at the points of permanent deployment were to draw up a plan for the reception of horses, wagons and mechanical transport and submit applications for their transportation to new areas. Gthe General Staff at this time had actual data on the final concentration of enemy forces and the timing of their attack"(P.84))))

                Quote: AsmyppoL
                give the facts, Oleg Yuryevich. I can demonstrate them.

                you are doing stupid forgery))

                What is it with Baghramyan then?)))
            2. VS
              VS 16 July 2020 10: 41 New
              -11
              Quote: AsmyppoL
              On June 9, a decision was made to transfer troops to the OrVO. On June 11, the commander of the 57th TD was in Moscow and also learned about the re-targeting of his division in the OrVO. But on June 12 there was a directive on the transfer of the 16th army from the 57th to KOVO. Only June 12th. Historians said almost the same thing, but Oleg Yuryevich didn’t get it ...

              do you at least somehow YOUR words then finally confirm - and then while your current assumptions are bustling)) When will you refute Baghramyan?))

              June 12 KOVO brought deer. that the 16th army will arrive in KOVO. and why are you talking about the transfer of rubbish))) You are doing something forgery - you are our restless anonymous ??))
          2. VS
            VS 16 July 2020 10: 38 New
            -10
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            On May 25, an urgent directive came on the nomination of the 16th Army to the West, but it was preparing to go to Transcaucasia. This is evidenced by historians, Marshal Eremenko, generals Lobachev and Lukin. and, most importantly, no one refutes them ...

            yes, no problem - let’s TEXT of this directive - yap you are our anonymous) nonsense of historians such as thymine or the memoirs of those who DIDN'T KNOW because they didn’t tell ANYONE in those days the place of final unloading is not interesting)))

            Since - TEXT dir. on 16 And will you bring or your IMHO batana ignoring the words of the general and the head of the department ak GSh MAKARA will impose ?? Bring and see WHO is lying - you or the officers of the VNU General Staff or Baghramyan who claims that they were brought to them on May 14 - they will arrive at KOVO except for 19 a and 16 A)))
        2. VS
          VS 16 July 2020 10: 32 New
          -11
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          O.Yu. Kozinkin: “You said that“ the internal districts began on June 11th ”. But this is not true! Inland districts began to advance before June 11. They started at the end of May ... "
          A.V. Isaev: "In the amount of one army."
          M.F. Timin: “Where did you go? They did not advance to the western border. "
          O.Yu. Kozinkin: “I am not saying that to the western border. I said, "to the western districts." Anyway ... "So the western districts are border districts. Both writers have already named Belarus and Ukraine, but this did not satisfy historians.

          because these are historians)))

          They want to drive the RGK armies to the BORDER and this is nonsense)) These armies did not go to the border itself but to the areas of the western districts up to 500 km from the border and in NO way these armies SHOULD NOT go exactly to the border - that's what the shit was about) )) These two rams do not understand this and we did not understand that they do not understand IT)) we thought that these two were smart (((

          But thanks for the printout - I will put Timin's screams in the new book - "Anti-Isaev" will be called - as an example of idiotism of snotty bats)))
      2. VS
        VS 16 July 2020 10: 27 New
        -10
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        They also claimed that the armies began to move in May 1941. So it is written in publicly available books. But it turns out that these armies were moved to a completely different place, and some of them had not even moved yet ...

        the question was WHEN the red button was pressed - like it's late - and we show - the armies of the RGK began to withdraw by the dir. General Staff of May 13)) And WHAT number of a particular army was driven into the Western Districts and these areas, the same Zhukov or Makara indicated completely - NOT IMPORTANT already)))
        so that time wasted in vain on Timin's screams, a ram, a yunaga and a fool)) One hundred wise men will always drive a stupid question into a dead end))
  16. The comment was deleted.
  17. RuSFr
    RuSFr 15 July 2020 20: 48 New
    +4
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    O.Yu. Kozinkin tries to cite the following statement as arguments: "Here is what I.P. Makar - Head of the Department of the History of Wars and Military Art of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Major General, Candidate of Historical Sciences: “... A very important decision was made to advance the troops of the second strategic echelon - the armies of the reserve of the High Command. The formation of this echelon at the Western Theater began on May 13, 1941, when, with the permission of I.V. Stalin’s General Staff ordered the nomination of four armies formed in the internal districts: the 22nd from the Ural Military District to the Velikiye Luk region, the 21st from the Volga Military District to the Gomel region, the 19th from the North Caucasian Military District to the area of ​​the White Church and the 16th - from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Proskurov area. The 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District, which was subordinated to the 19th Army, was also transferred to the west."

    Everything is half true here. as well as in the book "1941. Lessons and conclusions." There, too, there is a text on the nomination of four armies and heaps of divisions from May 13, 1941 under a directive from the General Staff, but this is a lie. And the head of the department and the authors of the book "1941. Lessons and conclusions." wrote what you can write.

    13 June here, in theory, an error and the date should be 13.5.41.
    a directive arrived confirming preparations for moving to the camps towards the west. She basically repeated the text of the April 25 directive. It was necessary to prepare a calculation of units for loading into echelons. At the same time, in the direction of the west, it was planned to transfer six divisions from the ZabVO (three TD, one MD and two SDs), six SDs from the Siberian Military District, two SDs from the Far Eastern Front,
    divisions from UrVO, PrivO, KhVO and OrVO. They did not forget the North Caucasian Military District, the Northern Military District and the Northern Military District. All towards a possible enemy.

    13 June here, in theory, a mistake and the date should be 13.5.41. The author, be careful.
    They are beginning to prepare for the advance of only 5 divisions from the North Caucasus Military District and move to the camps on the border of the KOVO-HVO 25th SC from the HVO - the future 18th Army. From the 19th Army, formed on the basis of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District, only 5 divisions were nominated (four rifle divisions and one state rifle division). The remaining five divisions remained on the territory of the district. Not even one army moved into KOVO, but only half of it.

    On May 25, an urgent directive came on the nomination of the 16th Army to the West, but it was preparing to go to Transcaucasia. This is evidenced by historians, Marshal Eremenko, generals Lobachev and Lukin. and, most importantly, no one refutes them ...
    1. AsmyppoL
      16 July 2020 10: 13 New
      -1
      I apologize to the readers that there were a lot of gross mistakes. In particular, it is also indicated that the 22nd Army was redeployed to the North Caucasus Military District. Of course, to the Central Asian Military District ...
      I apologize...
  18. VS
    VS 16 July 2020 10: 42 New
    -11
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    Let's go back to the 19th Army.

    You would have read the words of KONEV himself about this "transfer" or something))) Cho are you all stupid crap composing from scratch? ((
    1. AsmyppoL
      16 July 2020 11: 27 New
      +8
      I understand that you are criticizing the article without even reading it. There is Konev's recollection of this transfer.
      I think the readers can see what a frivolous and deceitful writer Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin ...
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 25 July 2020 15: 43 New
        -13
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        I understand that you are criticizing the article without even reading it. There is Konev's recollection of this transfer.
        I think the readers can see what a frivolous and deceitful writer Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin ...

        The author did not document this lie about Konev, he did not even give a link to the text in his memoirs. But the most important thing is that the author cannot point to a single historical document confirming his false idea that in 1941 a plan for a war with Iran and Turkey was being developed in an NGO.
        AsmyppoL (Eugene) As usual, a completely incompetent opinion. According to Mr. Milchakov, the GABTU has its own intelligence, which delivers information about the German tank forces on its own and without involving the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft ... Well, this is the same as according to the intelligence report of the Republic of Uzbekistan on June 22.

        Due to his lack of literacy, the author of the article does not know that the head of the GABTU does not have the right to demand anything from intelligence materials from the RU, because F. Golikov is not subordinate to him and he only carried out orders of the People's Commissar and the National General Staff. That is why at the end of the report, the head of the GABTU asks the People's Commissar to instruct Golikov to provide accurate data. And the materials that Fedorenko used have nothing to do with intelligence materials, and are most likely the personal opinion of the author of the report or those who prepared it on the basis of 1940 data. By the way, the author avoided answering why he slipped a copy of the report without a number, while the original copy at number six was returned to the GABTU, and how these two reports coincide. I do not exclude that they are different and all the nonsense that the author is talking about here was not in the report at the military council.
        AsmyppoL (Eugene) The Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft was a co-rapporteur of the said Report. It is indicated in the protocol of the GVS of the spacecraft. I can also easily answer the rest of the questions, but after your tearful apology. I do not want to communicate with a person who offends me and does not have the proper knowledge, moreover ...

        This is a lie, because F. Golikov was not any co-speaker of Fedorenko, since he was preparing a report on his views on new means of struggle, and not an extended report on the views of the GABTU - even here the author managed to lie. If we discard the verbal husk, then the dreamer Yevgeny could not intelligibly explain where the copy without the number came from and where the 6th copy of Fedorenko's report got to, because it could be radically different from what is now posted.
        AsmyppoL (Eugene) You didn’t know where this army was going from April 26, 1941 to June 9-11. Historians Isaev and Timin told you and Martirosyan about this.

        Isaev and Timin can say anything, but the opinion of I.P. Makara - head of the department of history of wars and military art of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, major general, candidate of historical sciences refutes them:
        “... A very important decision was made to deploy the troops of the second strategic echelon - the reserve armies of the High Command. The formation of this echelon at the Western Theater began on May 13, 1941, when, with the permission of I.V. Stalin’s General Staff ordered the nomination of four armies formed in the internal districts: the 22nd from the Ural Military District to the Velikiye Luk region, the 21st from the Volga Military District to the Gomel region, the 19th from the North Caucasian Military District to the area of ​​the White Church and the 16th - from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Proskurov area. The 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkov Military District, which was transferred to the subordination of the 19th Army, was also transferred to the west. The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of completion of the concentration in the areas outlined by operational plans, in the period from June 1 to July 10, 1941. "
        AsmyppoL (Eugene) In intelligence reports, it is believed that the German tank division consists of two tank regiments.

        The author did not support this lie - there is not a single reference to the intelligence report, and it is also not clear who it is "considered" because the level of knowledge of the intelligence officer and the level of knowledge of the head of the intelligence department are too different.
        AsmyppoL (Eugene) In addition, the GABTU report directly indicated the presence of a tank brigade in a tank division, consisting of two regiments ...

        This does not mean anything at all, if only because the GABTU quite rightly assumed that if a tank division was reduced from two regiments to one regiment in peacetime, then during the war it could be strengthened by adding another tank regiment, and it will change its structure.
        AsmyppoL (Eugene) Everything is half-truth here. as well as in the book "1941. Lessons and Conclusions." There, too, there is a text about the advancement of four armies and a bunch of divisions from May 13, 1941 on a directive from the General Staff, but this is a lie. Both the head of the department and the authors of the book "1941. Lessons and Conclusions." wrote what you can write.

        I think that the author is constantly lying, and is afraid when he is given an opinion from authoritative sources, such as the book "Lessons and Conclusions" or the original texts of intelligence reports of the time. And his opinion about the head of the department only says that he is just verbiage and cannot refute the arguments of a military scientist.
        AsmyppoL (Eugene) On May 25, an urgent directive came to move the 16th Army to the West, but she was preparing to go to Transcaucasia. Historians, Marshal Eremenko, generals Lobachev and Lukin speak about this. and, most importantly, no one refutes them ...

        This is a lie, if only because, firstly, one cannot completely trust the memoir literature, secondly, there is not a single documentary confirmation of the government's plans to start a war in 1941 with Iran and Turkey, and thirdly, these persons could simply not know until a certain moment about the original intentions of the General Staff.
        AsmyppoL (Eugene) In Moscow, Lukin meets the commander-22 and during the conversation learns that he is his left neighbor. The left neighbor can only be located in the North Caucasus Military District. Of the entire 16th Army, only Army Commander Lukin is summoned to the General Staff, and later the commander of the 57th Separate Tank Division comes there. None of the two corps commanders of the 16th Army and none of the 5 divisional commanders are summoned to Moscow, but the divisional commander of the 57th division was summoned. It is very likely that this division went to SAVO.

        Nothing follows from this at all, especially since the commanders of the districts were privy to the plans of the General Staff, and the division commander could, for example, be summoned for a conversation in order to obtain consent to his new appointment - such a practice existed at that time. And here SAVO, the author of course will not be able to explain, especially in the light of further movements of the 16th Army.
        AsmyppoL (Eugene)
        In the same period, the district school of scouts was thrown completely into the territory of Iran.

        Enchanting lies, because no "district schools of intelligence officers" existed, and besides, it is generally impossible to completely abandon such a "school", if only because there is a permanent staff in the training units that teaches, but there is a variable one, which only after passing the course, can be directed for further action.
        1. AsmyppoL
          25 July 2020 19: 44 New
          11
          The text simply does not reach you. This was the case with the report of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate of June 22. Well, God did not give you the ability for military science ...
          You cannot even understand that the report of the head of the GABTU contains no instructions to Golikov. The report contains proposals for the Main Military Council of the Spacecraft, which can give instructions up to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
          And this is Kozinkin's military expert! What can be in their books is scary to think ...
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 25 July 2020 21: 36 New
            -13
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            Well, God did not give you the ability for military science ...

            For that, God gave you the talent of a liar and a swindler from military history, so rejoice at least this.
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            You cannot even understand that the report of the head of the GABTU contains no instructions to Golikov.

            And the head of the GABTU could not give instructions to Golikov - I already wrote about this. He came up with a PROPOSAL TO AUTHORIZE the RC General Staff to obtain accurate data that Fedorenko did not have:

            So what about the sixth copy of the report, and why are you slipping the unaccounted copy? Will there be an answer, or can't you concoct another lie, as was the case with the district intelligence school?
  19. AsmyppoL
    16 July 2020 11: 25 New
    +9
    Quote: V.S.
    Marshal I.Kh. Baghramyan described these events as follows:
    “In the second half of May, we received a directive that ordered the 34th Infantry Corps with corps units, four infantry divisions and one mountain infantry division to be sent from the North Caucasus Military District and stationed in the camps ... The first echelon was to arrive on May 20 ...
    ... The new army will include all five divisions of the 34th Rifle Corps and three divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps of the North Caucasus Military District. The army will be subordinate to the people's commissar. It will be headed by the commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District, Lieutenant General I.S. Konev. A day later (14 May - K.O.) The General Staff warned: one more, 16th army of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukina. She will be transferred from Transbaikalia in the period from June 15 to July 10 ... ".
    [/B]


    Why cheat again? In Baghramyan's memoirs it is written differently: "In early June we learned that the management of the 19th army was formed. It will be located in Cherkassy. The new army will include all five divisions of the 34th Rifle Corps and three divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps of the North Caucasus Military District [This corps is from the KhVO and transferred to camps on the territory of KOVO. Therefore, we can say that the head of the KOVO operative department may be mistaken in his memoirs]. The army will be subordinate to the people's commissar. It will be headed by Lieutenant General I.S.Konev, Commander of the North Caucasian Military District.
    A day later The General Staff has warned: one more, the 16th Army of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin is to be accepted. She will be transferred from Transbaikalia between June 15 and July 10.
    "

    You associate a day later with a date that is convenient for you. otherwise you are juggling the facts. And in his memoirs a day later it is connected with the beginning of June ... Lukin learned about the transfer to KOVO only on June 12 and on June 13 he left for Kiev.
    The commander of the 57th Panzer Division arrived at the General Staff late in the evening of June 11 and learned that he was going with his division to the Oryol Military District. And on June 12, a directive appears on the transportation of troops of the 16th Army to KOVO. It was on June 12 that the 57th TD, which had not previously been subordinate to the 16th Army, became part of it.

    This is what the historians Isaev and Timin tried to convey to the writer Kozinkin. It was about this that S.L. Kozinkin tried to convey his thought. Chekunov. Four people say that this was not the case: sending the 16th Army from May 26 to KOVO. The writer Kozinkin persists in his delusions and has nothing to show him. Cheating, Oleg Yurievich Kozinkin!

    On the second question, it turns out that the statement that the General Staff knew that there was only one tank regiment in the German tank division was invented by Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin on the basis of post-war aftermath. In other words, in the second question Oleg Yurievich tried to deceive ...
    what kind of writer is this who, on two occasions, twice tries to deceive, because does he have no arguments?
    I think those who look here will understand what can be written in the books of O. Yu. Kozinkin.
    Das ist fantastish and not a single truthful moment ...
    1. VS
      VS 18 July 2020 09: 06 New
      -3
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      A day later, the General Staff warned that another, the 16th Army of Lieutenant General M.F.Lukin was to be received. She will be transferred from Transbaikalia between June 15 and July 10. "

      You associate a day later with a date that is convenient for you. otherwise you are juggling the facts. And in his memoirs a day later it is connected with the beginning of June ... Lukin learned about the transfer to KOVO only on June 12 and on June 13 he left for Kiev.

      exactly - then I burst out - KOVO was warned that the 16th army would arrive at the beginning of June already)))
      thanks for the hint - in the new book on the Isaevs' nonsense about red buttons - corrected)))

      And the fact that Lukin did not immediately recognize - so NOBODY brought the final point of unloading to the army commanders in those days))

      So what did you prove in the end? WHAT did the Lukin commanders know until the very last where they were being driven? SO THIS IS A NORMAL thing)) THIS IS STUPID YFACT they did not tell anyone the end points most often.

      And now refute General ak General Staff Makar - or Zhukov or Zakharov - that the end point was not Shepetovka - KOVO - for this army))

      Quote: AsmyppoL
      This is what the historians Isaev and Timin tried to convey to the writer Kozinkin.

      these two clowns tried to prove that since this army was NOT ON the border itself, then the troops did not withdraw = why they did not wait for the war))

      Well, just like you - with your fantasies that they were waiting for a war with Turkey))) Which, by the way, would be reasonable in its own way - after all, Turkey was Hitler's ally, but why the hell with Konev's army in May - May - sent to KOVO - so that instead of her to move an army from the ZabVO to Turkey ??)) YOU at least turn on the logic sometimes))) Nonsense that Koneev did not have tanks - leave for the rams - in this case, MK from a neighboring region is stupidly attached - if it really needs to be)))

      Choi, I don’t remember that in 2008, troops were sent to Georgia from Transbaikalia — the troops were driven out of the North Caucasian Military District)))

      Quote: AsmyppoL
      It was about this that S.L. Kozinkin tried to convey his thought. Chekunov. Four people say it wasn’t: sending the 16th army from May 26 to KOVO.

      yeah)) boobies and brats Isaev, Timin and Chekunov are THREE people)) and the type you joined them - an anonymous ignoramus and a forger?)))
      And where did she go - did you somehow refute the words of the marshals?))

      Quote: AsmyppoL
      the statement that the General Staff knew that the German tank division had only one tank regiment was invented by Oleg Yuryevich Kozinkin on the basis of post-war after-hours. In other words, in the second question, Oleg Yuryevich tried to deceive ...

      Did I say that the General Staff knew that there was one TP? Are you misinterpreting my words?))) I said that in the reports it’s not so much and TPs are shown most often and there are lopes in TP TANKS - they knew in GSh)))

      and why are liars engaged in forgery always ANONYMOUS? ((((And it’s always filthy slayers for some reason ((((Afraid that you will be caught and dishonored by your NAME?))
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 25 July 2020 15: 46 New
      -11
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Why cheat again?

      The author of the articles is deceiving everyone here, who does not hesitate to distort the facts.
      AsmyppoL (Eugene) On June 9, a decision was made to transfer troops to the OrVO. On June 11, the commander of the 57th TD was in Moscow and also learned about the retargeting of his division in the OVO. But on June 12, a directive appeared on the transfer of the 16th army from the 57th TD to KOVO. Only on June 12th. Almost the same thing was said by historians, but it did not reach Oleg Yuryevich ...

      For the directive to appear on June 12, back in May, it was necessary to submit an application to the People's Commissariat of Railways for the delivery of many thousands of wagons and hundreds of steam locomotives to the established places, otherwise the execution of the directive would be disrupted, because in peacetime such applications are submitted in the month preceding the transportation. But the author is a dilettante in military affairs and he has no idea that after May 13, the General Staff not only calculated the required number of wagons for transportation, but also determined the places of loading and unloading so that a collapse on the railway did not happen.
      AsmyppoL (Eugene)
      Second. In the book, lessons and conclusions - they printed only what the authors were allowed to do. Therefore, there is not a word about the intelligence data received in May-June 1941. No word at all. The intelligence materials were unreliable and the authors simply silenced this question.

      The author did not confirm these fantasies, and the work was of high quality and fairly objective, taking into account the declassified materials. In terms of intelligence, Lessons and Conclusions says:
      "By this time, the General Staff had actual data on the final concentration of enemy troops and the timing of his attack" (p.84)
      What other data were the authors of the book "hushed up" if they already expressed their attitude to intelligence assessments?
      AsmyppoL (Eugene) I apologize to the readers that there were a lot of gross mistakes.

      These were not "mistakes" but a deliberate lie of the author, who hoped that he would not be caught in a fraud with historical facts. But the trick did not pass - in each of his articles there are many not "mistakes" but simply outright lies, and this was noticed by many, which is why now he is building a "good face with a bad game".
      AsmyppoL (Eugene) I know much more than you and it is simply unpleasant for me to communicate with a schoolboy-liar ...

      Actually, the author is a well-known graphomaniac and verbiage, and his "versions" look more like propaganda lies. So I feel sorry for those people who believe him.
      1. RuSFr
        RuSFr 25 July 2020 21: 03 New
        +3
        You don't even know who prepares the layout for the cars.
        Who and according to some document ?? !!
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 25 July 2020 21: 46 New
          -12
          Quote: RuSFr
          You don't even know who prepares the layout for the cars.
          Who and according to some document ?? !!

          You are definitely an amateur in this matter, and you are asking stupid questions, because the calculation of platforms and cars for different formations will be different, if only because the completeness of parts and stocks of property may differ, not to mention that the formations themselves belong to different branches of the military. As for the wagons, they are always assessed by the carrying capacity and volume of the wagon itself, which is why their number may be different even for the same connection if wagons of larger capacity are supplied for loading or higher carrying capacity for the transportation of heavy equipment.
  20. AsmyppoL
    17 July 2020 20: 26 New
    +3
    Quote: V.S.
    Are you referring to chekunov? So he showed it for a LONG time - the MAP DATED MAY 15 is attached to vatutin's certificate !!! So ask him yourself - WHERE was the 16th army going?))


    I searched for two days and found what Sergei Leonidovich Chekunov said.
    You again tried to deceive me ... After all, you seem to be an adult, but you are constantly lying ... And in your book you misinterpreted Sergei Leonidovich's words ...
    I already wrote: you do not get what the historians tell you. Everything fits in your head from the point of view of not a specialist, but from the point of view of a sofa expert ...
    No, with such a person who constantly lies, I don't want to communicate anymore ... I know much more than you and it is simply unpleasant for me to communicate with a schoolboy-liar ...
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  33. cavl
    cavl 27 July 2020 04: 48 New
    +7
    Quote: RuSFr
    You don't even know who prepares the layout for the cars.
    Who and according to some document ?? !!

    So enlighten us
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 28 July 2020 10: 35 New
      -11
      Quote: cavl
      So enlighten us

      And he will not be able to enlighten you - he is an ordinary amateur in this matter, that is why he learned to talk all sorts of nonsense with his tongue, and when he was asked to confirm his knowledge with something, he immediately fled from the answer. So wait for the "answer" and hope to get it ...
      1. RuSFr
        RuSFr 29 July 2020 04: 06 New
        +3
        Quote: cavl
        Quote: RuSFr
        You don't even know who prepares the layout for the cars.
        Who and according to some document ?? !!

        So enlighten us

        I'm on vacation now. I'll be back for the weekend and digging into the computer
  34. RuSFr
    RuSFr 29 July 2020 04: 09 New
    +5
    Quote: ccsr
    Quote: cavl
    So enlighten us

    And he will not be able to enlighten you - he is an ordinary amateur in this matter, that is why he learned to talk all sorts of nonsense with his tongue, and when he was asked to confirm his knowledge with something, he immediately fled from the answer. So wait for the "answer" and hope to get it ...

    So at what level did you prepare the layout for the cars, are you our expert?
    Did you initially touch on the 16th Army?
    Was the layout prepared in divisions or corps or at army headquarters or at district headquarters?
    Show your data backed up by something
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 29 July 2020 17: 39 New
      -10
      Quote: RuSFr
      So at what level did you prepare the layout for the cars, are you our expert?
      Did you initially touch on the 16th Army?
      Was the layout prepared in divisions or corps or at army headquarters or at district headquarters?

      So, as usual, I decided to evade the direct question of another author, because of my grammarlessness:
      Quote: cavl
      So enlighten us

      So will the answer be, or has he decided to portray himself again cunning?