Why is Russia subject to the West? Tips for Vladimir Putin
As part of the ongoing on-site project of Central Eurasia, a virtual expert discussion entitled “Tips Vladimir Putin ”was touched on a complex block of issues around the interaction between Russia and the West. A number of authoritative experts from the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Central Asian countries responded to these questions: Valery Ivanov (Russia), Marat Shibutov (Kazakhstan), Alexey Dundich (Russia), Evgeny Abdullayev (Uzbekistan), Igor Piliaev (Ukraine), Andrey Kazantsev (Russia ) and Murat Laumulin (Kazakhstan).Vladimir Paramonov (Uzbekistan), head of the Central Eurasia project: dear colleagues, it seems to me that at the level of strategy / development strategies, Russia stands with the same positions with the West, retaining only disagreements (or their appearance) on less significant issues, in fact tactical and not at all of a strategic nature. In this regard, it seems that no matter what decisions Russia takes on the post-Soviet space, Central Asia, Afghanistan and other regions, all this does not change the essence of the common - strategic subordination of Russian politics to global / western development / interaction schemes. What do you think about that? Do you agree with this statement? What do not agree?
Valery Ivanov (Russia), retired third-class state adviser to the Russian Federation: I believe that Russia simply does not have any other real, and most importantly serious, opportunities to influence the situation. Hence attempts to save face in a bad “surrender”. How many times has it been proposed to “stake oneself”, in particular, in Afghanistan by participating in the restoration of the economy of this country. Yes, where there. There are some more global ideas, and the losses are incommensurable.
Marat Shibutov (Kazakhstan), representative of the Association of Cross-Border Cooperation (Russia) in Kazakhstan: I’ve been saying this a long time ago that the Russian Federation in our region has been acting as a junior partner of the United States and the countries of the region cannot be counted on for key issues between them. Given that the EU seems to have already buried the Nabucco project in its original form and will receive gas only from Azerbaijan, the rivalry on this front will be minimal. Another thing is China. It is possible that the United States, which is now strengthening its presence in the Pacific, will be concerned about strengthening China in our country in Central Asia. It is in the interests of both the United States and the Russian Federation that a small but controlled destabilization of the region takes place, which would allow the Chinese to be thrown out of here, and the countries of the region returned back under the influence of the Russian Federation and the United States.
Alexey Dundich (Russia), lecturer in the Department of Oriental Studies at MGIMO (University): in my opinion, Russia has its own policy in the post-Soviet space, and it is not subordinate to Western development schemes. Another thing is that it really does coincide with the western on strategic issues. This situation may change, for example, if the actions of the West contradict Russian strategic interests. As, for example, they contradict in Syria. At the same time, Russia will perceive a more sensitive situation in Central Asia, since the region is closer. For example, the presence of coalition troops in Afghanistan is in line with Russian strategic interests, as is the presence of transit bases in Central Asia, which ensure the supply of coalition. However, reducing the level of tension in Afghanistan and an attempt to obtain additional bases that are not fundamental for ensuring regional security will cause opposition from Russia.
Yevgeny Abdullaev (Uzbekistan), researcher: my personal feeling is already from the war in the Persian Gulf (1991). Russia (then USSR) is strategically integrated into the policies of Western countries, more precisely, the United States. Another thing is that periodically there were attempts to "play" what was lost as a result of Gorbachev's detent and the collapse of the USSR (positions in the post-Soviet space, influence in the Middle East). The most successful of them were those that were somehow pragmatically related to the export of hydrocarbons (here you had to listen to economists and to act more cautiously, which was good); the least successful were when Russia acted out of purely military interests (in the case of Georgia). But the overall “pro-Western” strategic vector in Moscow’s foreign policy over the past quarter century has remained unchanged.
Igor Pilyaev (Ukraine), Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor: quite right. The strategic subordination of Russian policy to external, development schemes developed outside Russia is a constant fundamental, essential characteristic of the Russian Federation from the moment it appeared on the political map in 1991. The Russian Federation, through its bureaucracy and oligarchs, is fully integrated into the new world order as a raw material non-national appendage with decorative autonomy and nuclear weapons - the unwitting gift of the late superpower. The regime of “managed democracy” in the Russian Federation has, until now, in principle, suit all the leading actors of world politics. The losers from such a state of affairs remain, first of all, the Russian people, which in essence have no national state, and Russian civil society.
Andrei Kazantsev (Russia), Doctor of Political Sciences, Director of the MGIMO Analytical Center (U): the topic of strategic restrictions on the possibility of Russia pursuing this or that foreign policy in Central Asia is very important. However, here, with a light hand, a number of authors of the left (Delyagin, Kagarlitsky) and neo-Eurasian directions (Dugin, etc.) who are not well versed in international relations (“Dugin, etc.”) have “wound” a lot of mythology, which must be eliminated in order to pursue a realistic .
Yes, we depend on the world market, on the Western banking system, on formally Western (and, in fact, most often, Russian, previously withdrawn) investments. And that limits our foreign policy. We are also dependent on the world communications system and on Western popular culture. It is desirable to get rid of these constraints, since any state strives to maximize its strength. However, we must understand that we exist in an interdependent world, where complete elimination of restrictions is impossible. On the contrary, one should try to realize these limitations and make the most of them for our own benefit.
The question that Russia (for example, due to the economic and other restrictions imposed by the global system) is severely limited in its ability to pursue an active foreign policy, including in Central Asia, arose naturally. This is due to the fact that Russia's policy after the collapse of the USSR was extremely passive. Russia was not so much a subject as an object of the system of international relations, which was caused by the lack of sufficient economic and political resources of the Kremlin.
In particular, in Central Asia, this was manifested in the complete and deliberate loss by Moscow of all instruments of influence in the first half of the 1990s. Russia deliberately minimized its presence in the region. In the new millennium, in connection with the increased possibilities of the state (especially in connection with the rise in oil prices and the establishment of a "vertical of power"), a great interest arose in pursuing a more active policy. At the same time, the search began for tools to increase the subjectivity of the state in the external arena, including the efforts of experts. However, it is impossible not to understand that activity and subjectivity cannot be an end in themselves. The power of the state must be “smart.” No wonder the world is now talking about smart power (smart power) in international relations.
The “cleverness” of power should consist, first of all, in accepting the realities of the regional and international system of relations and in optimally realizing the interests of Russia in these conditions. We simply will not have any other conditions, and fantasizing (or nostalgic) on this topic is practically meaningless. The problem is that, resist - do not resist, be indignant - do not be indignant, these realities will have to be taken into account. In this regard, Moscow’s policy in the region will always be limited, regardless of our desires. However, it is necessary to consider how to use even these restrictions for the benefit of Russia.
The realities are as follows.
1. The recognition of the existence of independent states of Central Asia and the rejection of the illusion of the possibility of recreating the USSR or something similar in any new (albeit, for example, Eurasian shell). The region is now effectively (not in terms of policy effectiveness, but in terms of realizing the possibility of control itself) controlling local elites and / or counter-elites (for example, criminals), and they are closely connected, although they partially compete. If you do not fully understand this priority of local elites, then effective interaction with the Central Asian elites is impossible.
In addition, under this condition, the main argument for opponents of cooperation with Russia in the Central Asian region and their allies in the West disappears. Recreation of the USSR or another imperial form through economic integration is unattainable, it can be done only by conquest. Therefore, a number of neo-Eurasianists (above all, Dugin), who confuse Eurasian economic integration with the re-establishment of the Eurasian empire, are doing Russia a very bad service. They simply quarrel Moscow with the local elites of the new independent states, and also give these elites the opportunity to appeal to the support of the West, using the imaginary threat to their independence (not without reason Dugin is one of the most quoted Russian authors in the West).
Therefore, it is necessary to carefully consider the ideology of Eurasian integration, without putting it at the mercy of extremists. It is this, i.e. The search for a new, adequate to the realities of our time and pragmatic Eurasian ideology is currently occupied by such well-known Russian experts, such as A.I. Podberezkin. The request for this is formulated in the well-known election article of V.V. Putin, and much earlier, he was formulated in a large number of publications by N.A. Nazarbayev.
2. Moscow in the first half of the 1990-s. lost strategic control over the region in terms of not allowing other key global players into it. Local elites / counter-elites constantly “play” on the contradictions of the main great powers involved in the region (Russia, USA, China, etc.). Even if a number of Central Asian states (especially such dependent countries as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) integrate into structures like the CSTO, this does not mean that the Russian Federation has exclusive strategic rights to the region.
At the same time, all Central Asian states interact through NATO with the USA and through the SCO with the PRC. Often they use rapprochement with Russia to receive new proposals from the United States and vice versa. The significance of the PRC is growing, which is becoming the priority No. 1 for the whole of Central Asia, gently “squeezing out” Russia.
Consequently, we need to understand how to prevent the Central Asian elites from continuing to play us, intensifying our confrontation with other great powers where we do not need it.
Tashkent is particularly famous for such a strategy in the Bismarck's “realpolitik” style, which likes to play the contradictions of the great powers in order to maximize its regional influence. We are already often pointlessly competing with the United States where it would be more profitable for us to cooperate (for example, in the fight against extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking, the formation of failed states, etc.). And in the future, we can push our heads together with the People's Republic of China, which is disastrous in general.
So, Moscow, at a minimum, is strategically limited in Central Asia to the interests of local elites and the interests of other great powers involved in the region. Without accepting these realities, it will be very difficult for us to work in the region.
Murat Laumulin (Kazakhstan), chief researcher at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies: the European focus will remain a key focus in relations between the Russian Federation and the West. According to Western analysts themselves, some issues that complicate Russian-European relations today may become less significant or disappear altogether. Although a number of disagreements are likely to persist, some will escalate. Europe’s current concern about Russia's undemocratic nature will simply disappear, questions of protecting the rights of citizens and the need for the rule of law will lose relevance (although disputes over the discrepancy in achieving these goals will remain). Nevertheless, serious disputes concerning the relations between Russia and the European Union will not go anywhere (relations between Russia and NATO can also be a source of problems).
As observers unanimously draw conclusions, relations between Moscow and the European Union have been at a dead end for several years. Russia is only watching how the EU is looking for a way out of the debt and institutional crisis. In the last of his electoral articles, Vladimir Putin made it clear that his sympathies are on the side of that version of anti-crisis reforms and institutional transformation that Berlin and Paris defend (its implementation will help consolidate German-French domination in a united Europe). It is assumed that such a transformation will have a positive impact on the relations between Russia and the EU.
According to experts, there are various options. One of them is that the decision-making mechanism in the EU will quite quickly be brought into line with the new economic realities, and the principle of “Europe at different speeds” will be consolidated at the institutional level. The separation of the European Union into several integration echelons would contribute to the emergence of additional zones of cooperation, serving as “bridges” from the European Union (its main core) to the Eurasian Union. The implementation of a differentiated model of different-speed integration would lay the foundation for a new mega-project with reference points in Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Kiev and Moscow. So far, however, such a scenario looks purely hypothetical.
Another option is to delay the process of reformatting the EU, in which Berlin will have to make concessions to partners on secondary issues. Probably one of the victims will be a course in relation to Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. It is in the eastern direction that the simulacrum of the single foreign policy of the European Union has a chance to extend its life. Then the stagnation in relations between Moscow and the European Union undergoing internal transformation will drag on for years. Europe will obviously be unable to seriously discuss strategic partnership issues with Moscow. In addition, the decisive intensification of Russian policy in the APR sooner or later will force the EU countries to take a fresh look at the prospects for relations with the largest country in Eurasia.
The third option for the development of Russian-European relations may be associated with a sharp exacerbation of the military-political situation in the Middle East, as well as its long-term geopolitical and geo-economic consequences. They are associated with the prospect of reshaping state borders in the Middle East, refugee flows, Turkey’s struggle to realize the ambitions of the regional hegemon in the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the threat of a revival of the Islamic caliphate. Thus, awareness of the common threats of Russia and Europe is one of the most powerful incentives for rapprochement of these states.
As Western experts suggest, the next question will inevitably arise in the future: should Russia join the European Union? Pros include the ability for Russians to travel, learn and work freely in the EU. The disadvantages will be related to the fact that Russia will have to not only allow European corporations to have free trade and investment on its territory, but also to ensure the protection of rights, despite the objections of their Russian competitors and public opinion. Although the acquisition by European firms with quality management of poorly managed Russian companies, the replacement of their management and complete reorganization are in the long-term interests of the country, this will undoubtedly be very painful for some categories of Russians (especially high-ranking managers).
But even if Russia wants to join the EU, this does not mean that the European Union will agree. Latent fear of Moscow persists in some Eastern European countries, so they will seek to block integration.
So, the European Union is likely to expect Russia, aspiring to join the EU, to support democratic transformations in Belarus; reducing military presence in Kaliningrad and the withdrawal of troops from Transnistria; efforts aimed at resolving the Transnistrian problem and the reunification of the region with Moldova; facilitating Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence and normalization of relations between them; rejection of the idea of a special zone of Russian influence, including the former Western Soviet republics (the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova).
It is by no means a fact that Russia will want to accept the conditions for participation in the EU, which, no doubt, the European Union will put forward. However, it is clear that the EU will not change the existing norms in order to fulfill the wishes of Moscow. The rivalry between Moscow and Brussels is increasingly reduced to the question of whether Russia will be able to consolidate its strategic status as the main extractive state with an oligopoly in the field of distribution networks.
Vladimir Paramonov: I thank all the experts who took part in this part of the discussion. I have several additions to the theses of those distinguished colleagues who pointed to the inevitability of some subordination to the West, and I will formulate them in the form of questions. How can the same post-Soviet countries build direct relations with Russia as the main strategic partner / priority, realizing that the Russian Federation, in fact, is already the junior partner of the West and the priority of the post-Soviet space for Moscow itself is at least secondary? How then to develop the integration processes in the economic sphere in the regional re-integration of the post-Soviet space, if Russia simultaneously forces the course towards integration into the global economic space and Western institutions?
I myself will answer these questions: building relationships of a real (rather than declarative) strategic nature and developing reintegration processes in such conditions is impossible by definition. In my opinion, Russia should remain itself, and not try to integrate into certain external schemes and development concepts. Only as an independent center of power, the Russian Federation can count on intensive economic development and play the role of a Eurasian integration power. And if Russia’s dependence on the West today cannot be reduced by Russia on its own, then we should work out and use such schemes and policy algorithms that have at least significantly balanced the Western factor at the expense of, for example, the same Chinese factor. Is it time to turn to face China?
And in such conditions, for the Russian Federation, the search for new ideas and breakthrough solutions should be vital, which is possible only through the development of national intellectual potential, the organization of a stable and large-scale system of state analytical work. If Russia does not do this, then a simple conclusion suggests itself: does it mean that the current political and economic elite of the Russian Federation simply does not need / does not want to do this, and she obviously accepted the subordinate role of her country? But will the leadership of Russia and Russia itself come to terms with this role and with such an elite?
Note: the material was prepared in the framework of a joint project with the Internet magazine “Time of the East” (Kyrgyzstan), http://www.easttime.ru/ with informational support from the IA Regnum (Russia) and the Information Analytical Center of Moscow State University (Russia)
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