Endpoint of the 16th Army Route
The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - army IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GSh - General base, ZhBD - magazine of military operations, Spacecraft - Red Army, u - mechanized (in spacecraft) or motorized (in the Wehrmacht) case, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), MPR - Mongolian People's Republic, RGC - reserve of the high command, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), TVD - theater of operations, TGr - tank Group, td (mn) - tank division (regiment).
In the article, the designations of HE or fronts are used: Far Eastern Front - Zabaykalsky Military District, Zapovo - Western Special Military District, KOVO - Kiev Special Military District, LVO - Leningrad Military District, OdVO - Odessa Military District, OrVO - Oryol Military District, Pribovo - Baltic Special Military District , Siberian Military District - Siberian Military District, North Caucasian Military District - North Caucasian Military District.
A small digression
In two parts, a version on the purpose of displacement will be proposed 16th A and considered the events that occurred at the same time. It should be noted that the documents that reliably confirm the version could not be found ...
In the thirties, a number of countries pursued policies in the interests of their states at the expense of other peoples. They did not care how many tens of millions of people would die in Europe. The three largest countries led the world to a new war. They all played their cards and tried to win. It is about the USA, England and Germany. In the article "The fight for the Second World War" sets out a detailed chronology of events on the eve of World War II.
The Soviet Union tried to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe and its expansion. Our government understood that in a future war the USSR could be one against an alliance of several states. When it was necessary to negotiate with Hitler, the USSR had to negotiate, because other countries tried to negotiate with him. The USSR did not have allies until the start of World War II, and therefore, the Soviet government needed to neutralize the emerging threats itself.
The introduction of the spacecraft into part of the territory of the Nazi-defeated Poland. Is it bad or good from a modern point of view? And from the point of view of that time? When Poland was betrayed by its allies, England and France? If you do not enter the troops of the USSR, then the Nazis will be on the border of the Minsk region ... The introduction of troops in the Baltic countries ... Is this good or bad? The USSR government then pushed the starting line for the German invasion from Pskov to the border of East Prussia.
The entry of troops into Moldova and Bessarabia ... The proposal of Finland to review the borders and the ensuing war ... Is it good or bad for our country? You can find the arguments for and against. Perhaps our government would respond: “It would be much better for the whole of Europe and for the USSR if World War II had not started at all ...”
The government of the USSR tried as hard as it could to confront Germany, which crushed the whole of Europe under itself. Therefore, all the events of the 41st year should be considered in terms of the confrontation of the USSR to a group of countries: Germany, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Japan and, oddly enough, England.
By concluding a non-aggression pact with Japan, our government managed to drive Japan out of the cage of hostile countries. To secure our eastern border and, if necessary, transfer part of the divisions to the European part of the country. Planning for military operations before the war was aimed at surviving our country at all costs. Do not give advantages to our enemies. To delay the beginning of the war or to avoid it ...
Repetition of key points
I will repeat the main points from the previous parts (Part 1 и Part 2).
1. According to the General Staff, Germany in the event of war with the USSR put up to 180 ... 200 divisions without taking into account the allied forces. In the RU report on 20-00 on 22.6.41, the German group, concentrated towards the border, was estimated at 167 ... 173 divisions. The report also refers to the possible approach of new divisions from the west to the border. This indirectly indicates that, until June 22, the RU and the General Staff evaluated the German grouping on the western border (in the event of a war with our country) in the amount of about 180 divisions.
2. Based on the presence of 180 ... 200 divisions of the General Staff at the border, the grouping of the spacecraft troops was determined, which should have been in PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO (hereinafter referred to as western military units), in the LVO and as part of the RGK forces. Taking into account the enemy’s grouping of 180 ... 200 divisions in the General Staff and in the western military districts, in May 1941, "Cover Plans ..." were developed. The army divisions of the RGCs were in their places of deployment until they received instructions. The exception was a few compounds from the composition of 19th A (SCWO). It should be noted that the troops of the RGK are not only the armies moved from the internal districts, but also the corps that were deployed in the territory of the western military districts. For example, the 2nd MK and the 7th SK, which were located on the territory of the OdVO.
3. From May to June 1941, enlisted personnel are called up for training camps, most of which are sent to staffing SDs located in internal districts.
4. In May, the Republic of Moldova arrives on the concentration of the German army on the border with Turkey, on the movement of 3-4 (at least) German divisions on Turkish territory. In addition to reports about the preparation of a war with the Soviet Union, there are reports that states such as Syria and Iraq are next in line for the German invasion. Iraq has a border with Iran, in which pro-German sentiments flourish. Iran that did not set aviation fuel for German and Italian aviation, which counteracted British aviation in Iraq ...
5. According to intelligence, from April 11.3.41, 25 to April 1,43, the rate of concentration of German troops from other theater of operations to our border averaged 25 divisions / day; from April 15 to May 0,95 - 15 divisions / day. From May 19 to June 0,3, the concentration rate decreased significantly and amounted to about XNUMX divisions / day. This could indicate that the Germans chose another theater of operations as the next operations.
P. A. Sudoplatov wrote about this period:
6. Intelligence data, which carried a significant amount of misinformation, also led to the conclusion that Germany would strike the next theater of operations. So, in the RU report dated 31.5.41 it was noted that 120-122 German divisions were concentrated against the USSR. Almost the same number of divisions was concentrated against England on all fronts: 122-126. A comparative number of divisions are concentrated against the two main opponents ... Which enemy will be hit next? How to determine this?
Probably, in the direction in which the associations and formations used in deep breakthroughs are concentrated. Before the start of the war, reconnaissance mobile units (TGr), which consisted of mk. Our command believed that at the end of 1940 Germany had 10 mk, and not a single corps was near our border. They were not found before the start of the war.
Specific example. One of the strongest strike groups is the 2nd TGr, concentrated near Brest. In the operational reports of the General Staff, this direction, where a large mobile group breaks through, is not considered either in the morning of June 22, or in the evening of June 22, or in the morning of June 23. No one suspects a breakthrough and disaster in this direction. Why? Below is a fragment of the map of the ZAPOVO headquarters with the situation that they knew about on June 21. The map was prepared immediately after the outbreak of war (apparently) to explain the causes of the disaster. A similar card should have been in the General Staff.
The map shows that Brest does not have a large mobile German group. There are only two headquarters of the army corps, three headquarters of the infantry divisions (40th, 47th and one with an unknown number, which are estimated in three infantry divisions), two headquarters of the cavalry brigades of the border troops (a total of four cavalry regiments), the headquarters of the tank brigade (two tp) and mp. Brest itself does not have a single artillery regiment ... All German units are deployed far enough from the border. At the same time, about 50-60% of the troops are deployed in the same places in which our intelligence detected them by May 31.
Against the German grouping are four spacecraft and one spacecraft. In the depths are still td and md. According to such intelligence in Moscow, could they really make the right decision on the withdrawal of troops to field positions? Data from the districts about a sharp change in the situation and an increase in the number of German troops directly at the border did not manage to pass along the RU line to the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff. It turns out that the information received by telephone was simply not believed, looking at a map with an older setting ...
Often asked: “Back in May 1941, in RM there was information about the commander of the German tank corps traveling to the area near Brest, and later about the movement of an entire so on. Why didn’t you believe such information? ” There can only be one answer: these were the only reports that were not confirmed for nearly a whole month by any Soviet intelligence or a single source.
At a meeting of the high command staff in December 1940, they repeatedly spoke about the strikes of mobile groups supported by a large number of landing forces, and when breaking through the defensive line, heavy tanks go ahead ...
According to intelligence, as of 25.4.41, Germany had a significant grouping of 8-10 parachute divisions, and not one of them was on our borders. As of May 15, intelligence had known that 1-2 parachute divisions were deployed in Greece, 5-6 on the northern coast of France and Belgium, 2 inland.
As of May 31, our border had one paratrooper regiment against the ZAPOVO and two units (either regiments or battalions) against the KOVO. One parachute division is deployed in the central part of Romania. Intelligence also brings information that two paratrooper divisions will be used to capture oil fields in the Soviet Caucasus. All information about these divisions is a fiction, but it comes from intelligence as reliable ... They believe it, and in Moscow they try to calculate their response.
In the Republic of Moldova there is evidence that Germany has 15-18 SS divisions. These are elite compounds. But intelligence did not find any of these divisions near our border at this time and will not detect them before the outbreak of war ...
It’s heavy, in contrast to which our KV-3 tanks are created and anti-tank brigades are formed with 107-mm cannon guns and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns (there are smaller guns in the brigades), but not one of the heavy ones will be found at our borders before the war. This is also misinformation ...
No one in the spacecraft leadership at this time can't even come to mindthat available at the border about 125 German divisions (rather than 180) without airborne divisions, without heavy troops, without creating shock mobile groups are capable in a short time break up KA frontier armada ...
Changing the size of the group on the eastern borders
From the autumn of 1940 to June 1941, in the documents of the General Staff on the planning of spacecraft groupings in the West and in the East, there is a change in the number of troops of the Far Eastern Front and ZabVO. Various options are being considered for sending troops from this theater of operations to the European part of the country.
On 18.9.40, in the draft Notes on the Basics of Deployment ..., as part of the FEF and ZabVO troops, in the event of war in the West, there should be up to 39,5 divisions.
11.3.41 in the "General Plan of Strategic Deployment Plan ..." provides for the presence of up to 38,5 divisions, taking into account the redeployment of three divisions from the Siberian Military District.
After concluding an agreement with Japan and ratifying it on April 26, instructions from the General Staff on preparations for relocation were sent to the Far Eastern Front and ZabVO:
- from the Far Eastern Front - control of the 31st air force, the 211st and 212nd airborne brigades, the 21st and 66th regiments;
- from ZabVO - the 16th A as part of the 32nd sk (46th and 152nd SD) and 5th microns (13th and 17th TDs, 109 ppm).
The management of the 31st sk, 211st and 212nd airborne brigades descended west in the month of May.
On May 13, the KOVO sent a Directive on the redeployment to the territory of the SK control district with hull units, GDS and four SDs of 12000 each. Arrival of the first echelons of control of the corps, the 28th State Duma and 38th SD - from May 20. Arrival of the first echelons of the 158th, 171st and 129th SD - from June 2-3.
Perhaps this was due to the relocation to the border of German divisions. Until May 15, the rate of transport of troops was about 0,95 divisions / day. No one could predict how the speed of German troops would change by the end of May or early June. Therefore, there is a slight increase in the group of RGCs in the KOVO (5 divisions in 15-20 days).
On the same day clarifying directives are sent on preparations for the transport of troops to the headquarters of the DF and ZabVO. According to these Directives, it was required to prepare in addition to sending 82nd md (ZabVO), 59th td and 69th md from FEF.
After May 17, a draft document is being prepared at the General Staff, according to which 27 divisions remain at the Far Eastern Front and ZabVO (there were five brigades, which were not taken into account in the counting of troops).
At this time, in the Far Eastern Federal District there are 17 SD, 3 TD, 2 MD, 1 CD, and in ZabVO - 6 SD, 4 MD, 5 TD. In accordance with “Considerations ...” ten divisions should be sent from the indicated regions from the indicated regions from Moscow to the west: one unit, four units and five units.
At the end of May, six divisions are being prepared for dispatch from ZabVO: 13th, 17th and 57th TDs, 109th MDs, 46th and 152nd Divisions. Therefore, we can say that when making the decision to send troops from ZabVO, they were not guided by the project “Considerations ...”
In the Certificate “On the Deployment of the Armed Forces in the event of a war in the West” dated June 13, 31 divisions remain in the FEF and ZabVO (21 div, 4 TD, 5 MD and 1 CD), i.e. all divisions that remained after sending the 5th MK, 32nd SK and 57th TD. This again confirms the assumption that the project “Considerations ...” was not considered when planning the spacecraft groupings.
The beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army
Somewhere after April 23, certain RMs come in, which cause shock in Moscow. Something is being discussed in the People’s Commissariat of Defense and in the General Staff. With some kind of proposal, the leaders of the AC apply to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and to the government. As a result of the discussion, an urgent directive is sent to the headquarters of the ZabVO on April 25.
On the morning of April 26, the commander of the troops and a member of the Military Council of the ZabVO together with the command of the 16th A are sent to the troops. Unexpectedly for all, the chief of staff calls the commander of the district to the telephone and reports on the receipt of the urgent directive. The district command and the 16th A fly by plane to Chita and learn about the instructions on sending the army. Only the direction is voiced - somewhere to the west. Loading should be carried out at night, and the district chief of staff has a schedule for sending trains.
If the trains began to load on the night of April 26-27, then by the morning of the 27th the first train went. According to the memoirs of the member of the Military Council of the 16th A.A. Lobachev, the first to leave were the tankers, and by the morning of June 3 (in 7 days) all the formations and units of the army had left. It turns out that this is not entirely true ...
There is a recollection that the artillery regiment of the 109th md arrived on June 5 in Chita. The 46th SD (from the 32nd sk) began to relocate to the west only at the end of June. The report on hostilities of the 13th TD indicates the later dates for sending army units:
Similar events occur when sending the 57th TD from the MPR. The division commander does not mention in the memoirs the deadline for the start of the dispatch, but, obviously, the first echelon also set off by the morning of June 27, because he arrived a little later than the first echelon of the 16th A, sent from Transbaikalia. The last train, probably, was also sent somewhere on June 3. The redeployment order was unexpected, because lumber for masking tanks and guns had not been brought in advance to the place of deployment of the division on the territory of the MPR.
V.A. Mishulin (commander of the 57th TD):
When transporting tanks, they disguised themselves as wooden crates. Or around the tanks a frame was constructed, covered with a tarp. Sentries from the equipment were also hidden. When transporting the first echelons of the army, the personnel were in closed wagons, in which it was forbidden to open doors and hatches at stages and at large stations. The echelons did not stop at large stations, and personnel were fed at small stations.
Army transportation route
A. A. Lobachev in his memoirs indicates the route of the echelons of the 16th Army. This route is confirmed by the memories of other veterans. The echelons will continue to move along the same route after the outbreak of war. There are no memoirs or documents confirming the fact of transporting the echelons of the army before the war on the Trans-Siberian Railway. For a long time, A. A. Lobachev’s memoirs were the only ones that 16th A was intended (or it seemed to be intended) for redeployment to the Transcaucasus.
The fact of transporting by rail in Central Asia is completely incomprehensible. Railways in Central Asia are single-track, unlike the double-track Trans-Siberian Railway. The transportation of many military echelons along these roads was to significantly reduce the volume of transportation of national economy products and raw materials for several republics. This is due to the fact that the speed of transportation of trains on a single track is almost two times lower than on a double track. In some sections of the double-track road, there were funds to accelerate the movement of trains. Therefore, the choice of the route is one of the mysteries of the movement of the 16th A. Both available directions of the railways from Central Asia were overloaded to connect with the rest of the USSR to the north-east and north-west.
E. Drig. "Mechanized corps of the Red Army in battle":
Endpoint of the 16th Army Route
In the book “Commander Lukin”, a version is proposed about the end point of the route of the 16th Army in early June 1941. In the next part, we will try to verify this version using indirect facts and memoirs of war veterans.
In preparation for the transportation of troops of the 16th Army and when moving in echelons, war veterans voiced three alleged goals for the redeployment of the army. The first is a westward movement, i.e. to the European part of the USSR. The second is for the war with Turkey. The third is the border with Afghanistan. Non-commanding military personnel did not name a country like Iran in their memoirs.
The commander of the Western Front mentions the redeployment of the army to the border with Iran (from 30.6 to 2.7) A. I. Eremenko: “At the very end of May, the army received an order to redeploy. The original destination was Transcaucasia near the Iranian border, however, there were changes along the route and the army was sent first to ORVO and then to KOVO ... ” Perhaps Marshal Eremenko heard about this from other war veterans ...
There is only evidence that the 16th Army was not sent to Transcaucasia. The People's Commissar of Railways spoke about this. I.V. Kovalev:
Stalin ordered Marshal Tymoshenko to temporarily turn the echelons of the 16th Army south and inform Berlin that the army was heading for the Persian border in case the British tried to strike from India through Persia. It is unlikely that they believed in Berlin, but achieved their goal - one of our armies was delayed on the way. I learned about this case from Mehlis ...
Readiness for the 16th Army War
In different parts of the 16th A, from the beginning of May, personnel will learn about the upcoming relocation to the west. To the west - this is not necessarily to the western military forces. This could be an inner district, which would border on the western military district. Of course, there was no question of any secrecy of traffic in such an environment. Both the military and family members of command personnel learned about the upcoming transportation. Plans were discussed, some of the relatives went to their relatives, so that later they would come to their husbands to a new place of residence. Rumors spread on trains and in other regions.
Preparing boxes for transporting things. If you look at the 333th artillery regiment of the 152nd SD, then transportation of things required up to two cars in the train. The conversations were not particularly stopped, because the troops were transported from one internal district to another. An order to ban the transportation of things was not given, on the contrary, separate wagons were provided for these purposes. Those. In the beginning - mid-May, the army was not preparing to go to war, but it simply relocated to more civilized places. Only these places were not so far from the western VO.
ZhBD 16th A:
It is characteristic that all the units began loading with the thought that they would be transferred from the wild steppes of Transbaikalia to the European part of the USSR, they would go to camps, were in peace, therefore they tried to take more property for life, life and study.
About everything that is needed for war and battle, they took only by order, all the property of the majority of the beginning. The composition was sent to their family affairs. An unforgivable mistake was in the formation of echelons. Trains traveled without ammunition and equipment weapons. After unloading, they were not operational ...
Such an attitude to the place of future deployment, voluntarily or involuntarily, should have affected the performance of official duties. If the commander of the 57th TD was able to knock out spare parts and tires for cars before redeployment, then in the 109th MD they did not or could not. Perhaps because people did not go to war, but to camps. There, in the camps, everyone will give a lift, and we will manage to do everything on time ... Only they had to engage in battle from the wheels ...
There were also problems with the combat training of the 5th mk. The problems were the same as in other spacecraft associations that had not been opened before the war ...
5th MKB:
a) the case was poorly knocked together and had no combat experience. There was not a single exit to the teachings with a full material part. The elementary traffic rules were not followed during the march, especially the adjustment of routes, the headquarters were not trained to manage their units in the difficult operational environment in which the corps was located;
b) insufficiently decisive and truthful intelligence. Information about the enemy is often increased by intelligence agencies. Military intelligence was conducted very poorly or not at all. As a result of this, during the attack of [the enemy] on 8.7.41, most of the 34 tp tanks got stuck in the swamp in front of the defense of the [enemy] and died from artillery fire;
...
f) the issues of artillery interaction with tanks and infantry are not well defined ...
It turns out that the equipment in the corps was not so reliable, and the corps was not so combat-ready ... For example, part of the 109th division was forced to unload and fight separately from the division:
The book E. Temezhnikova “And our tanks are fast”, an excerpt from the ZhBD of the 16th TP 109th MD is given: “During the period from 2.7 to 19.7, detachment 109 md passed 500 km. The condition of the materiel was unsatisfactory, combat vehicles had an extremely low power reserve of 20-25 hours. There were no and no spare parts. The extremely low technical condition of 16 mp is characterized by the following indicators: out of 113 tanks, combat losses were 12, the rest were out of order for technical reasons ... "
The ending should ...
- Eugene
- Preparation for the redeployment of troops of the 16th Army in 1941
1941. Where the 16th Army was preparing to redeploy?
Information