Russia changes approach to nuclear deterrence
It happened. The continuous systematic preparation of the United States for an offensive nuclear war with the first strike finally provoked a visible response from the top political leadership of Russia.
On June 2, 2020, the President signed Decree # 355 “On the fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s nuclear deterrence policy”. As usual, the non-specialized press noticed only a part of important nuances, and the main one, “ideological”, missed completely.
The Western media, however, very lightly and superficially covered this event, and on a very small scale.
Meanwhile, there is something to notice there.
New approach
Previously, there were no open, public documents relating to nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the availability of such a guidance document is very important. Being signed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he sets the framework for the High Command and, in fact, determines the strategy for the whole country. He shows the masses and politicians of the lower levels those boundary conditions that we determine for ourselves. It also contains a message for “partners” regarding what lines they should not run if they do not want to see the end of their world with their own eyes. Actually, the obligatoriness of publicity is from this. And do not think that this decree is an element of some kind of propaganda. This is not true. This is truly a framework document of the domestic nuclear strategy. What is especially important is the indication in the text of the document that it is the basis for "nuclear planning".
Previously, there was only one document, where something was explicitly said about Russia's use of nuclear weapons. It was a military doctrine. We quote her points regarding this issue.
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27. The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.
The decision to use nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.
Now we have a much more detailed description of the process.
It makes no sense to bring the entire text of the application to the decree here. Let's analyze the basic things.
First and foremost: signs of the very “aggression, when the very existence of the state are jeopardized, are announced.”
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19. The conditions determining the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation are:
a) the receipt of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
b) the use by the adversary of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction across the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;
c) the enemy’s impact on critical state or military facilities of the Russian Federation, the failure of which will lead to the disruption of the response of nuclear forces;
d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is jeopardized.
What is interesting and important? Point "c".
Firstly, the threat of incapacitating the enemy of systems that allow Russia to use strategic nuclear forces before the exchange of nuclear strikes was aloud recognized. For example, with the help of sabotage (including nuclear) means, with the help of which command posts, communications centers, locations of persons authorized to decide on the use of nuclear weapons, elements of a missile attack warning system can be attacked, critical for the country.
Secondly, the right of Russia to use nuclear weapons in response to such actions has been voiced.
To apply it first, before the start of a nuclear war as such, at a time when the enemy is only trying to secure for himself the opportunity to strike with impunity.
In fact, with this paragraph, Russia announces its right to a PREVENTIVE NUCLEAR KICK. And this is the first time. And this is only the beginning.
It has long been obvious to specialists that this should have happened sooner or later. And the reason for this is the active preparations for an offensive nuclear war by the United States, ongoing regardless of who is currently occupying the White House.
Those interested in the issue can refer to the article “We are building a fleet. Special Operations: Nuclear Deterrence ", which lists what preparatory actions the United States is conducting, which gives them reason to consider themselves entitled to start an offensive nuclear war, what ideological attitudes of American society make it ethically acceptable, and what benefits America will receive as a result of such a war, if it were successful.
It is also obvious that no demonstration of the possible consequences leads to the fact that the Americans thought better of it. And there were such demonstrations.
On March 1, 2018, President Putin demonstrated a number of military systems under development during his message to the Federal Assembly. Among them were three weapon systems, the very logic of the combat use of which (joint combat use) leaves no double interpretations as to what they are really intended for.
The first weapon is a hypersonic glider, known today as the Vanguard. This maneuvering hypersonic unit is well known to the Americans: it was shown to them many years ago, when the system did not yet have a name and it was still undergoing tests. Then the Americans already destroyed the ABM Treaty, but all other instruments of international security were still in effect. The demonstration, however, did not stop their preparations, and on March 1, 2018, what was attached to the "Vanguard" was shown.
The “Dagger” missile system with a quasiballistic air-based missile and the laser complex, known today as the “Relight”. What makes all these systems related? The fact that together they do not make sense in any other case than in the case of the FIRST nuclear strike against the United States.
And next year during the next message to the Federal Assembly it was announced that, if necessary, Russia would launch missile strikes at decision centers - and this did not mean ICBM strikes.
Here is what Putin said:
What is important in this regard, and there is a lot of novelty. According to their tactical and technical data, including the flight time to these control centers, these weapons will fully correspond to the threats directed against Russia.
Put the fragments of the mosaic together.
Offensive forces
The following necessary steps are required for delivering a sudden nuclear strike against an adversary. Firstly, preparation for it should be carried out secretly. Secondly, the fact of striking him must be realized at a point in time when it is too late to react. Thirdly, the fact of the launch of missiles must be hidden from the enemy. Fourth, before striking, the adversary’s decision-making system should be at least temporarily paralyzed: roughly speaking, it should be beheaded.
How does all this help achieve new systems?
The secretive training of a force intended for striking can be done in stages in peacetime. At the same time, the ICBMs on which the Vanguards are standing do not need any special preparations: they are always ready, including in peacetime.
American provocations with bombers, their missile attacks on Russia’s friendly countries and other hostile actions allow Russia to increase the degree of combat readiness of individual formations ... and never then reduce it. Thus, it will be possible to get away from actions that unmask preparations for the strike, such as, for example, changing the operating mode of radio networks and the like. Everything will be done in stages and in advance.
Peresvet lasers make it possible to blind American SPRN satellites, preventing them from detecting radiation from torches launching toward the US missiles. “Daggers” are located at airfields very far from potential theater of operations, but if necessary, their carriers reach the launch line in dozens of minutes. And these flights alone do not pull on a strategic threat. Moreover, the “Dagger” carrier, the MiG-31K, is not indistinguishable from satellite interceptors from which it was created. And this makes it possible to literally "hide the needle in a haystack" - to "replace" the interceptors with ready-to-use shock machines in advance. What will be their goals? American nuclear bombs in Europe, separate military bases in the same place in Japan.
That’s why this complex is really needed, and that’s what kind of operation it will be (God forbid) be used. This is not against aircraft carriers; such a small ARLGSN, which this missile is equipped with, against mobile naval targets especially does not give anything. And physics, frankly, interferes.
But it is possible to verify the map of the surroundings of the Büchel air base (for example) with the missile map embedded in the GOS missile using this RLGSN after decelerating the missile over the target.
But the Americans also have an SPRN radar, right? And they are capable of detecting a missile strike on American territory itself, right? So.
And here the Vanguard comes to the rescue. According to the official version, his ability to fly in the atmosphere is needed to overcome missile defense. But such a missile defense system, which could repulse a volley of our heavy missiles, the United States not only does not have, it will never be. Their missile defense is a missile defense to prevent a retaliatory strike, and it needs to be able to deliver the first strike on their own, and if it was successful (and they count on it), then the missile defense will be able to repel part of that frail retaliatory salvo with surviving missiles, on which we We will remain capable.
Then, the question is, why do we need “Vanguard”? And then, that it goes much lower than conventional warheads, and the SPRN radar will detect it almost above the target, when there is simply no time to repulse the strike. That’s what the “twenty-fly” flight in the atmosphere is designed for. That is why instead of several warheads they put on a heavy missile one planning one, sacrificing the number of warheads. This is not against missile defense. This is against radar SPRN.
Someone will object that in this case the enemy also manages to react. After all, like us, Americans can regard the blinding of their companions as the beginning of a war.
Or, even if they didn’t regard it like that, then they will have even two or three minutes to organize a counterattack with the Vanguards.
And here the need arises to gain time - just remove the decision makers. Not necessarily nuclear weapons. But be sure to remove. It will take time to find the person in charge from the list of leaders who succeed the president in the event of his death among the Americans. But it is necessary to destroy the necessary goals with something: managers, some communication centers, and the parking of some aircraft. Suddenly, before Peresvet went into action.
And here we need to recall Putin’s words about the attacks on decision centers. How can such a blow be dealt?
We look news.
On the ground target. Hypersonic rocket. Which even corvettes will be able to launch. The Russian fleet cannot fight on an equal footing with the American, and indeed can not do it at all, not even on equal terms. But deploying a troika of ships against both coasts of the United States in peacetime may well. And to ensure the launch of missiles from their side - too.
At the same time, Americans can stably hold their planes over our ship and track its actions in real time. But they will not be able to stop the launch, as well as warn about it otherwise than by disappearing from the screens of their radar. The speed of information flow along headquarters chains from a commander, for example, an aircraft carrier group to the president, is very high for such an extraordinary situation. They just do not have time to react. Everything will happen too fast.
And then everything is as simple as how scary: the Vanguards partially eliminate the ground potential of a retaliatory strike and communication systems with submarines, the rest of the ICBMs - the rest ...
Mosaic has developed.
What is missing in this scenario? There is not enough solution to the problem of American submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs). On the one hand, even if we miss them, a successful strike on the United States, firstly, will give us many hours to find them (for example, with anti-submarine planes previously raised aviation), and secondly, the Americans, who received a powerful nuclear strike on their territory, will have nothing to oppose such a search. No one will lift fighters into the air to drive out the arrogant Russians.
But, on the other hand, the problem still remains and it is huge: the destructive impact force of these submarines is too great. But so far nothing special has been done in this direction.
Perhaps soon we will see some kind of solution. The described scenario, if it happens, is not tomorrow, but after a few years or decades. The power of the American volley today is lower than it was before: the Americans sacrificed the power of part of their warheads on Trident missiles deployed on submarines, planning to use them specifically as a tool for high-precision offensive nuclear attacks. A fall from 100 kilotons to 5 is very significant, although not all rockets have been affected.
Now their return volley is significantly weaker, although it is still deadly. One way or another, but something is about to happen soon on this front.
This is what the world really showed.
This is what Putin’s words meant: “You haven’t heard us, so at least now listen.”
But Americans don’t hear anyone.
US Congressional Research Service Latest Report “Hypersonic weapons. Background and issues for Congress » dated March 17, 2020, this was explicitly stated: Russian gliders with a nuclear warhead are difficult to detect using existing equipment, the command structure of the US Armed Forces is too slow and will not be able to respond to such an attack. But it is immediately said that this weapon does not add anything to the existing strategic potential. That is, Putin’s message didn’t reach them.
Today we know for sure how this affected American offensive nuclear preparations: in any way, they continue according to old plans.
We told them that if they did not stop, then we ourselves would begin preparations for an offensive nuclear war. They do not understand.
There is essentially no choice left.
Near future
Faced with the inability of the United States, even on issues such as preventing a nuclear war, Russia seems to have begun to slide into escalation. The experimental “Daggers”, apparently, from a technology demonstrator will turn into serial missiles, in any case, the future formation of the first combatant combat units with these missiles has already been announced. As expected, they will be created in the deepest rear of all possible, not far from the Chinese border. However, this does not change anything.
"Vanguards" are already embarking on ballistic missiles, lasers are already on alert. And so began the creation of a regulatory framework that regulates preparations for a nuclear war. So far there is only one situation where a nuclear strike can be delivered preemptively, but all the threats have already been listed, it is indicated that non-nuclear countries will be attacked if necessary, the need to achieve surprise in the use of nuclear weapons is doctrinally fixed.
Much will depend on whether the United States ultimately goes to the START-3 gap. If yes, then that's it. Just delayed for a while. If at the last moment it is possible to agree, then the possibility of a nuclear war will again become purely theoretical, at least for a while. Until the US medium-range missiles are in Europe.
It is to be expected that Russia's nuclear preparations will improve over time.
Currently, the very essence of deterrence is the possibility of guaranteed retaliation. Although there is one situation where a nuclear strike is delivered preemptively, the Fundamentals already exist, but the basis is precisely the understanding of deterrence through retaliation.
So let's call our current approach - containment by the threat of retaliation.
From the Basics:
The adversary clearly demonstrates complete unwillingness to understand this inevitability. The only rational explanation for this misunderstanding is, alas, the adversary’s belief that retaliation can be avoided. The enemy, apparently, has already sentenced everyone.
This means that once a timid sprout in the form of paragraph 19 “c” of section III will one day grow into a new understanding of deterrence as such: not containment with the threat of retaliation, but containment by prevention, through the threat of striking first under certain circumstances.
Very soon we will find out where all this will lead. The brave new world turns out to be just an incredibly dangerous place, but we cannot do anything about it.
It remains only to observe the development of events.
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