Preparation for the redeployment of troops of the 16th Army in 1941
The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GSh - General base, Spacecraft - Red Army, u - mechanized housing md - motorized division, RGC - reserve of the high command, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), td - tank division.
In the article, the designations of HE or fronts are used: ArkhVO - Arkhangelsk Military District, DF - Far Eastern Front, ZabVO - Trans-Baikal Military District, ZakVO - Transcaucasian Military District, Zapovo - Western Special Military District, KOVO - Kiev Special Military District, LVO - Leningrad Military District (Northern Front - Northern Front) , MBO - Moscow Military District, OdVO - Odessa Military District, OrVO - Oryol Military District, PribOVO - Baltic Special Military District, Northern Military District - Volga Military District, SAVO - Middle Asian Military District, Siberian Military District - Siberian Military District, North Caucasian Military District - Ural Military District - Ural Military District , HVO - Kharkov VO.
In the previous part It was shown that the plans for the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the west in 1941 provided for Germany to set up from 180 to 200 divisions for war with our country. On the side of Germany, troops of Finland, Romania and Hungary could also fight. From March 11 to the start of the war, the number of spacecraft planned by the General Staff to counter the enemy forces, as part of the western military forces, in the LVO and in the armies of the RGK, did not change significantly.
RM until 31.5.41 were unreliable and did not allow to make an unambiguous conclusion about the beginning of the war on June 15 ... 22. There was a lot of misinformation in the RM about the deployment of German troops in the Balkans, about the preparation of a war between Germany and Turkey, about the presence of German troops in Turkey, about plans to send German troops to Iraq and Syria. In the RM, it was said that the war between Germany and the USSR was about to begin, it was said that the war was postponed until the defeat of England and the strengthening of Germany in the Middle East. As misinformation at different levels and in different countries, they threw up information about possible German requirements. For example, about the long-term lease of grain land in Ukraine or the lease of Baku oil fields. That was said about the separation of Ukraine from the USSR ... It was shown that, as of May 31, the British special services did not know either: there would be a war between the USSR and Germany or these countries would conclude a treaty “very dangerous” for England.
Big fees
In the previous part, the issue that is associated with an increase in the number of spacecraft remained unexamined. This is a matter of high fees. It is well known that about 800 thousand people were called up for training. There are many articles on this subject. One of them is an article. Dmitry Shane.
As of December 1.12.40, 97, the spacecraft in 12550 spacecraft had 9 people, 11000 md - each at 10, 9000 militia forces - at 49, 6000 md - at 23 and 3000 md - at 1941. In the spring of XNUMX, the troops of the spacecraft were transferred to new states of peacetime :
- 89 units - for 4/100 staff - 10291 people with the adoption of 4200 people before the state of war (4/400 staff - 14483 people);
- 10 state road police - 4/140 staff - 8829 people (according to the wartime states 14163 people);
- 109 divisions - state 4/120 - 5864 people with the adoption of 6000 people to the state of wartime.
As early as the beginning of 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense prepared a document on the number of persons liable for military service who needed to be involved in training camps in 1941. On March 8, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks allowed non-profit organizations to call for military training in 1941: 90 people for 192869 days, 60 people for 25000 days, 45 people for 754896 days, 30 people for 3105 days. A total of 975870 people.
Before the war, NPOs did not fully use the limit on the number of draftees involved in training camps: over 170 thousand people were not called up. They were probably left to attract to training camps in the second peaceful half of 1941 ...
At the end of March - the beginning of April, the volumes of recruits recruited for training courses in HE were determined. In April and May, the number of draftees recruited for training was clarified for some divisions. The refinement was associated with the disbandment of a number of air assault forces and the formation on their base of airborne and anti-tank brigades. The figure shows the data on the number of recruits accepted by HE divisions in accordance with A note by the chief of the General Administration of the General Staff. It is indicated that the Note was prepared no later than 20.5.41.
It can be seen from the figure that 464300 people will be called up to staff rifle and mountain rifle divisions for the period of the training. Of these, 131550 people, or 28% of the recruits, will be called up to staff the three western border districts and LVO. Thus, a significant part of the enlisted staff was called up for training to staff divisions of the internal districts. Divisions that, if threatened with the outbreak of war with Germany, would advance to the west.
The table does not contain data on PribOVO, which submitted the application a little later. According to historian S. L. Chekunov, fees in the specified district were to begin on June 24. Basically, the assigned composition for these divisions was called up for 45 days and was supposed to be in the formations from 1 ... 15 to July 15-30. Probably, during this period the General Staff expected a war with Germany or a delay from the war for a while ... The rest of the personnel called up for training served to replenish units and formations of other combat arms and types of troops, as well as to equip some rear structures.
Events in the Balkans and the Middle East
Turkey. 19.10.39/1940/XNUMX the British-French-Turkish military alliance was concluded on mutual assistance in the event of the transfer of hostilities to the Mediterranean region. In the spring of XNUMX, hostilities affected the region, and the Allies demanded that Turkey fulfill its obligations. However, the government declared Turkey a "non-belligerent country." After the defeat and occupation of France, Germany's position in Europe strengthened significantly. The Turkish government was forced to balance between strong Germany and England, which was still trying to maintain its position in the Balkans.
In the summer of 1940, an agreement was signed on Turkish-German economic cooperation. At the same time, a similar agreement was valid with England. In the spring of 1941, Germany invaded Yugoslavia, defeated the Anglo-Greek forces, and conquered Greece. German troops approached the Turkish border. Turkey could repeat the fate of other countries: either become an ally of Germany, or be captured by its troops.
In March 1941, a pro-German government came to power in Iraq. On April 8, Churchill noted: “We must ensure the safety of Basra, as Americans are increasingly vigorously insisting on creating a large assembly base there, where they could directly deliver their aircraft ... "
An English infantry brigade landed in Basra on April 18, and the Anglo-Iraq War began in May, which lasted 30 days. The Iraqi government hoped for the arrival of German ground forces, but only German and Italian air units arrived. On June 1, a government was established in Iraq that focused on England. Now, British troops at any time could be on the border of Turkey and Iran.
In April and June 1941, the Turkish government refused to let British troops through its territory heading for combat operations in Iraq and Syria. The Turkish government also refused to let the Wehrmacht troops through its territory, which were planned to be sent to Iraq and Syria. On 18.6.41, a friendship and non-aggression treaty was concluded with Germany.
Iran. As early as the 20s, Iran relied on Berlin in a confrontation with London or Moscow. In 1928, the Germans participated in the creation of the "National Bank of Iran", and in 1929 an Iran-German friendship and cooperation agreement was signed. In 1937, a conspiracy was revealed in the army, which aimed to overthrow the Shah and establish a Nazi dictatorship. Participants in the conspiracy were executed, but in the absence of an alternative, Iran continued to maintain good relations with Berlin.
In 1940, the Germans began to build the city of Nazis in Iran, in which members of the youth organization "National Defense" took part. A large number of books, brochures and leaflets were brought to Iran. In cinemas they provided films free of charge glorifying the power of German weapons. The Germans recruited and bought the owners of influential newspapers, using the Iranian press as the mouthpiece of their propaganda. Pro-Nazi youth and officer organizations began to multiply throughout the country. By 1941, Germany accounted for more than 40% of Iran’s total turnover.
Since April 1940, Germany supplied military equipment and weapons to the Iranian army. Supporters of Germany were in all the power structures of the country and the army. The territory of Iran was used to conduct espionage and subversive work against the USSR and to disorganize the most important areas of the Soviet rear. The country was a springboard for an attack on British possessions in India, and could also serve as the basis for an attack on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. 25.6.41 Berlin officially demanded that the Iranian government enter the war on the side of Germany.
The situation on the part of the southern border of the Soviet Union since the spring of 1941 became increasingly tense ...
16th Army Promotion
There are no published documents regarding the nomination of the 16th Army. Its true route will have to be restored from the recollections of veterans and based on an analysis of documents that at first glance seem far from the fate of the 16th Army.
The most frequently used discussions are the memoirs of a member of the Military Council of the 16th Army A. A. Lobachev. The author will also not change traditions.
From the memoirs it is clear that the commander of the ZabVO does not know where the army is heading. He knows only about the direction to the west. The order to begin the redeployment was brought to the command of the district and army unexpectedly on May 25. The memoirs do not say anything about whether the command and personnel knew about the expected change of location after the General Directive of April 26.
It should be noted that of the compounds of the 32nd ck, one 152nd cd is mentioned, and this is no accident. The second division of the 32nd sk (46th regiment) since April 1941 was kept in the state of 4/120, i.e. had less than 6000 personnel. Before the war, the ZabVO did not plan to call on the assigned staff to understaff their sd. Therefore, this division was not ready to head west. And it’s right, because neither May 25 nor June 15 did anyone expect the outbreak of war with Germany. The division remained in ZabVO, awaiting orders for mobilization, and after mobilization (at the end of June) was sent to the west (where it arrived on 14.7.41). It turns out to be interesting: the 16th army is supposedly going to the west, and one of its divisions is not staffed, although funds remained for the draftees in NCOs. This incident does not at all resemble the departure of the 16th Army to the war on June 22 ...
A similar situation is observed with two divisions of the DF: the 21st and 66th. Both divisions were supposed to head west in May 1941, but, it turned out, they were not particularly expected in the west ... There was no expectation of a war there ... The transfer of the 21st SD began only in August, and the 66th SD remained in reserve front.
Next, we consider an excerpt from the book “Commander Lukin”, which confirms the information contained in the memoirs of A.A. Lobachev.
In the memoirs of I.U. Moskvina says that they learned about the upcoming relocation in early May. This is closer to the truth. It is a question of a transfer to the west or of withdrawal to camps near Chita.
What else is interesting in the memories? First: the echelons of the 5th mk continue to decrease even after June 3, the term named by A.A. Lobachev, the deadline for sending army formations. Second: there is no mention of camouflage tools and equipment for their transportation. It seems that only tanks and the fact of transporting tanks somewhere were carefully masked. Tankers were even forced to remove emblems from their buttonholes.
In the memoirs of V.A. Giga from the 17th megapixel also does not talk about disguising automotive vehicles. Yes, and masking three cars on two platforms is somewhat difficult ...
Consider the recollections of the military physician of the 333rd artillery regiment of the 152nd SD B.M. Feoktistova.
Still, the 16th Army learned about relocation in early May. He was announced to relocate to the west. Families were allowed to pack and load things in crates. Two wagons intended for commander’s belongings entered the artillery regiment. The memoirs did not say about any problems during the delivery of things to the Central warehouse of NPOs - this was probably the usual thing during transportation. It is likely that other parts of the 16th army could carry things commanders ...
Husbands took almost all things from home, leaving the bare minimum. Still, in the large city of Alma-Ata, the train stopped, and it was possible to walk not far from the station. This fact, of course, could not add secrecy in the transportation of troops ...
In addition to the troops of the 16th Army, the 57th TD, which was deployed near the border on the territory of the Mongolian People’s Republic, was heading west. Consider the memories of the commander of the 57th TD V.A. Mishulina. The visit of the commander of ZabVO at the end of April is very similar to checking the connection to the dispatch in accordance with the General Directive of April 26. The commander did not inform the command of the compound about the upcoming transfer.
For the secret redeployment of the 57th TD from the border, not only tanks, but artillery should have been masked. Again, the personnel learned about the fact of relocation, which could not contribute to the secrecy of transport. Interesting: how strong was Japanese intelligence at the border in Mongolia? ..
Information from special services received in early June
On June 3, a message came from an agent of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB:
W. Churchill:
Note by Deputy Commissar of State Security of the USSR with the text of the conversation received by agents 6.6.41: “The Germans are extremely indignant at the intransigence of Turkey on the issue of German troops passing through Turkish territory. Filov concluded that Moscow prevented German-Turkish agreement on the admission of troops ... "
On June 9, a message came from Schiller:
If the war with England is not completed before the fall, the Germans intend to occupy Ukraine and the Donbass to provide themselves with coal and iron, which will happen regardless of the proposals and concessions that we will make under the threat of conflict. If the war ends before fall, then a deal with the USSR is possible without armed conflict...
Message from Elder June 9: “Next week, the tension in the Russian question will reach its highest point, and the question of war will be finally resolved. Germany will present to the USSR a demand to provide the Germans with economic leadership in Ukraine and the use of the Soviet military fleet against England ... "
Closer to June 10th, messages begin to become more alarming.
To be continued ...
Information