The anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy for the first time passed without veterans

Well, after all, from an ambush. In this case, our German intelligence broke.

I think it’s good that they didn’t have to fight against each other

After this date, after. Not from London fighters flew to the front.

TANK Pogrom of Nazi Germany in the West
FRONT IN THE LIGHT OF SOME ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS
G. G. Popov
Moscow Technological Institute
[quoteBefore the Battle of Ardennes, German troops lost many tanks in France. Until the end of November 1944
Western allies kept pace high
according to German forces, almost giving them no rest.
Ahead of Operation Overlord and
July 31, 1944 the German command was forced to send 1347 medium and heavy tanks to France, as well as 337 self-propelled guns. Of them completely
406 tanks and 75 self-propelled guns were destroyed, 353 tanks and 117 self-propelled guns were seriously damaged [13, S. 330], the remaining
the technique was also mostly destroyed in
August battles. According to OKW, the loss of the West
Allies from the day of landing until August 13, 1944 were 3370 tanks in Normandy [Ibid.], but this
the figure hardly looks plausible, however, the losses of the tank alliances of the Western Allies were
really big. For comparison, we give
the figure given in the encyclopedic work on the Eastern Front of Steve Crawford, GA "Center" on
the start of Operation Bagration had
at the disposal of 900 tanks [14, p. 243] (it is not said about self-propelled guns, but, most likely, they are ranked
S. Crawford to the tanks). According to S. Crawford, everyone
tanks and self-propelled guns of GA Center were lost during
Soviet offensive. According to C. Bishop, the loss of the German side during Operation Bagration in
tanks amounted to 2000 units (here, most likely,
self-propelled guns were included), the Soviet army lost in
during the offensive in Belarus 2957 tanks [10,
with. 124] (slightly less than a third of those involved
operations). Thus, during the Soviet offensive in Belarus, GA Center received tanks,
including from his group in Ukraine. However, shortly before the start of Operation Bagration, Hitler
ordered the transfer of the SS Panzer Corps II (9th and
SS 10th Panzer Divisions to France [13, S. 349],
which to a large extent weakened the defense of the German
troops on the Eastern Front.] [/ quote]
http://www.vestnik.vsu.ru/pdf/history/2017/02/2017-02-14.pdf

I can not talk about the Eastern Front in isolation from what is happening around. For example, our heroic efforts practically did not affect American-English actions with Africa (at first) / Asia. Our successes were also not particularly influenced by the allied flotation system, as well as by the construction of strategic aviation by them. That is, from the end of the summer of 1942, the Allies in any case would begin strategic bombing of the industry / housing estate in Germany, after 1943 they would in any case begin to drive the Japanese. With North Africa, everything is not so obvious - what happened there influenced us, what happened with us influenced that front. There is food for thought.
I highlighted all this because, regardless of the success or failure of the Germans in the USSR, these events would most likely have happened in the same way as they had happened, would have worked on an increasing scale, and in 1943+ would have reached very bad dynamics for the Germans.
What could have happened differently with us? A thousand options. It is definitely possible to say that the Germans were exhausted at the Battle of Moscow at a brisk pace of blitz, uneven advance of the front, bad weather and growing focal resistance. They couldn’t take Moscow exactly at 100% —we still had the strength, a sort of Stalingrad would have come out — when the maximum that they could have captured most of the city — but to possess everything they wouldn’t have the strength and resources, we would have had forces and resources to at least oppose them. Our industry is already beyond the Urals but has not yet developed, the dem. Potential on our side is twofold - I think we would have constrained them at least until the spring with fierce city battles, in the worst of all situations. Further, there would probably be some stalemate in the situation and Hitler would either squeeze Moscow, or Leningrad, or strike in the South — we would already have enough forces to resist it at least more efficiently — and enough space to the Urals to not allow us to break us in the presence of political will and people. In 1942, the Germans began in the rear partisanship + tensions of North Africa + from the summer of the bombing of Germany + I am more than sure that Stalin is not the kind of person who would go to make peace. Thus, I suppose that even assuming that Leningrad fell in 1942 and managed to unite the front with the Finns, we still have a greater dem. potential, inaccessible industry, probably we would not have surrendered oil in 1942 either.
I suppose that in 1942, in the worst possible scenario, we would still have resisted, holding down the main focus of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe and causing damage to the enemy’s manpower.
In 1943, the Germans were flooded from Africa - I think that this would have happened anyway, because the possibilities of the axis and allies in that region are incomparable - and suppose that at that moment the Germans, with their liberated forces, solve the problem with Moscow (if there is one) and Caucasian oil - in the yard the summer of 1943. The bombing of Germany intensifies, the dem.potential of Germany + Austria (at the beginning of the war 76 million) lost by then ~ 3.5 military and ~ 1 million civilians, but the Germans still need to occupy the Urals and keep the European part of the USSR in a huge front. At this time, they need to solve problems in Italy and Yugoslavia and endure raids, the US has been working on the atomic bomb for half a year, the Allied industry is at its peak (like their propaganda, which has already leaked information about the "death camps").
At this point, Hitler has nothing to cover - the mobilization of various plankton and the replacement of ostarbeiters in Germany is already beginning. Plankton is not fighting as well as before, interruptions with alloying metals begin, partisans clung to the Soviet Union for thousands of kilometers - they don’t even think of signing the world. In general, I will not bore you further - the point is that before 1943 they could not have broken us logically, after 1943 Germany would have fiercely tolerated from the West and would have lost the lion's share of forces in the east by that time - in the worst case, the Germans would have finished It would be in the same 1945 by winter - just banally losing the opportunity to focus on such a large occupied territory and bleeding the army and air force.

In the worst scenario, we would have lost Msk / Leningrad and Baku oil - more people by ~ 3-4 million, but we would not have left the war, I am more than sure.

Well, for maintenance, I have no doubt that they were planning, it was hard not to notice the painstaking Japanese work from the 1920s under the creation of a fleet that clearly exceeded their need for a purely Asian region.
I’m talking about Europe and the Mediterranean - you know how it happens, they retroactively “rule” the story on the topic “we were getting ready and were ready”, well, like the image of the authorities, all things .. well, I always had a feeling that Hitler’s success was No one was ready for France, in principle, as well as for success in Poland. Further, of course, it was possible to calculate the industrial capacity of the German military machine - through the parameters of the fuel produced, the productivity of shipbuilding and aircraft factories - with a certain degree of error.
It was possible to calculate the approximate ambitions of the Reich through the possibilities of logistics - but, for example, to calculate that they would refuse to design strategic aircraft to suppress England - it would be difficult to calculate ..
What Italy would blow to Greece was also not painful. That the Iraq will not "burn out" the rebellion.
That Hitler will not be able to “pick up” Franco or throw him off, given the help from the Germans in the GV .. I will not argue with you about the facts, it’s just a question of “conformity” of the American pre-war (and the initial period of the war) estimates and, in general, the degree of vision of the uncle Sam always caused me a lot of skepticism ..