Military Review

US intelligence success. For eight years they listened to the negotiations of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR

85

Nuclear Submarine USS Halibut (SSGN-587)


The Cold War gave the world several decades of confrontation between the two superpowers, which obtained intelligence information by any means available, including involving intelligence and specialized submarines. One of these operations ended for the Americans very successfully. For eight years, the U.S. military listened to negotiations between Pacific bases fleet USSR in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Vilyuchinsk and the headquarters of the fleet in Vladivostok.

A successful reconnaissance operation for the Americans with the search and connection to the submarine cable fleet, laid along the bottom of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, was carried out with the involvement of the Halibut nuclear submarine, designed for special operations. The reconnaissance operation itself was called Ivy Bells (“Ivy Flowers”) and lasted from October 1971 to 1980, while NSA officer Ronald Pelton passed on information about the operation to KGB residents working in the United States.

Beginning of maritime confrontation


The first attempts to obtain intelligence information about the USSR with the help of submarines by the Americans began in the late 1940s. True, the campaign of two US military diesel-electric submarines USS "Cochino" (SS-345) and USS "Tusk" (SS-426) to the coast of the Kola Peninsula in 1949 ended in complete failure. Boats that received modern equipment for electronic reconnaissance aboard could not obtain at least some valuable information, while a fire occurred on board the Cochino submarine. The Tusk submarine managed to come to the aid of the emergency boat, which removed part of the crew from the Cochino and began towing it to Norwegian ports. However, the Kochino boat was not destined to get to Norway, an explosion thundered aboard the submarine, and it sank. Seven sailors died, dozens were injured.

Despite the obvious failure, the US sailors and the US intelligence community did not abandon their ideas. In the future, American boats regularly approached the coast of the Soviet Union with reconnaissance missions both in the Kola Peninsula region and in the Far East, including in the Kamchatka region. Often, American submariners entered Soviet territorial waters. But such operations did not always go unpunished. For example, in the summer of 1957, near Vladivostok, Soviet anti-submarine defense ships discovered and forced the USS Gudgeon, an American special reconnaissance boat, to emerge. At the same time, Soviet sailors did not hesitate to use depth charges.


Submarine USS "Cochino" (SS-345), July 1949

The situation really began to change with the massive appearance of atomic submarines, which had much greater autonomy and which did not need to rise to the surface during the campaign. The construction of reconnaissance submarines with a nuclear power plant on board has opened up new possibilities. One of these submarines was the USS Halibut (SSGN-587), launched in January 1959 and accepted into the fleet on January 4, 1960.

Submarine Halibut


The nuclear submarine Halibut (SSGN-587) became the only ship of this type. The name of the submarine is translated into Russian as “Halibut”. USS Halibut was originally created as a submarine designed to perform special operations. But for a long time it was used for test launches of guided missiles, and also managed to serve as a multi-purpose nuclear submarine with missile weapons on board. At the same time, in 1968, the submarine was seriously modernized and refitted to solve modern reconnaissance missions.

By modern standards, this is a small submarine with a surface displacement of more than 3600 tons and an underwater of about 5000 tons. The longest boat was 106,7 meters. A nuclear reactor mounted on board the boat transmitted the generated energy to two propellers; the maximum power of the power plant reached 7500 hp. The maximum surface speed did not exceed 15 knots, underwater - 20 knots. At the same time, 97 crew members could be accommodated on board the boat.


Nuclear Submarine USS Halibut (SSGN-587)

In 1968, the submarine began to be modernized at the shipyard Mare Island, located in California. The boat returned to the base at Pearl Harbor only in 1970. During this time, side thrusters, a near and far lateral sonar, a towed underwater vehicle with a winch, photo and video equipment on board, and a diving camera were installed on the submarine. Also on board the submarine appeared powerful and at that time modern computer equipment, as well as a set of various oceanographic equipment. It was in this reconnaissance version that the boat went many times to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, carrying out reconnaissance activities, including in Soviet territorial waters.

Operation Ivy Bells


In early 1970, the US military became aware of the existence of a wired communication line laid along the bottom of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk between the bases of the Pacific Fleet in Kamchatka and the main headquarters of the fleet in Vladivostok. Information was received from agents, and the fact of the existence of such a connection was confirmed by satellite intelligence, which recorded work in some areas of the coast. At the same time, the Soviet Union declared the Sea of ​​Okhotsk its territorial waters, imposed a ban on the circulation of foreign ships. Regular patrols were conducted in the sea, as well as exercises of the ships of the Pacific Fleet, and special acoustic sensors were placed at the bottom. Despite these circumstances, the command of the US Navy, the CIA and the NSA decided to conduct a secret intelligence operation Ivy Bells. The temptation to listen to underwater communication lines and obtain information about Soviet strategic nuclear submarines located at the base in Vilyuchinsk was great.

Specially for the operation, the upgraded Halibut submarine was equipped with modern reconnaissance equipment. The boat was supposed to find an underwater cable and install a specially designed listening device above it, which received the designation “Cocoon”. The device contains all the achievements of electronic technology available to Americans at that time. Externally, the device, placed directly above the marine cable, was an impressive seven-meter container of cylindrical shape with a diameter of about a meter. In its tail part was a small plutonium power source, in fact, a miniature nuclear reactor. It was necessary for the operation of equipment installed on board, including tape recorders, which were recorded negotiations.

US intelligence success. For eight years they listened to the negotiations of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR

The same "Cocoon", which was placed above the underwater cable

In October 1971, the Halibut submarine successfully penetrated the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and after a while managed to detect the necessary submarine communication cable at great depths (from 65 to 120 meters in various sources). Previously, he was spotted by American submarines on electromagnetic radiation. In a given area, a deep-sea guided vehicle was first launched from a reconnaissance boat, and then divers worked on the spot, which they installed over the Cocoon cable. This unit regularly recorded all the information that went from the bases of the Pacific Fleet in Kamchatka to Vladivostok.

Let's not forget about the level of technology of those years: wiretapping was not conducted online. The device did not have data transfer capabilities, all information was recorded and stored on magnetic media. Therefore, once a month, American submariners had to return to the device so that the underwater swimmers would extract and collect the records by installing new magnetic tapes on the Cocoon. Subsequently, the information received was read, decrypted, and comprehensively studied. An analysis of the records quickly showed that in the USSR they were confident in the reliability and impossibility of wiretapping, so many messages were transmitted in clear text without encryption.

Thanks to reconnaissance equipment and the use of specialized nuclear submarines, the U.S. Navy for many years gained access to classified information that directly related to the security of the USSR and the USA. The US military gained access to information about the main base of strategic submarines of the Pacific Fleet.

Ivy Bells Intelligence Failure


Despite the fact that Operation Ivy Bells was one of the most successful intelligence operations of the US Navy, the CIA and the NSA during the Cold War, it ended in failure. After more than eight years of listening to the negotiations of Soviet sailors in the Far East, information about the reconnaissance equipment connected to the submarine cable became known to the KGB. Information on the operation Ivy Bells Soviet residency in the United States gave an employee of the NSA.


Ronald Pelton during his arrest in 1985

It was Ronald William Pelton, who in October 1979 did not pass the polygraph test, answering a question about drug use. The test was carried out as part of the regular certification and affected Pelton’s career, which was demoted, deprived of access to classified information, at the same time the monthly salary of an NSA employee was halved. Ronald Pelton did not want to put up with this state of things and in January 1980 he turned to the Soviet embassy in Washington.

Pelton, who had worked at the NSA for 15 years, shared valuable information that he had access to throughout his service. Among other things, he talked about the operation of Ivy Bells. The information received allowed the Soviet sailors in late April 1980 to find and raise to the surface the American intelligence equipment, the same "Cocoon". Ivy Bells officially put an end to intelligence operations. It is curious that Pelton received $ 35 from the Soviet Union for valuable information, this amount cannot be compared to the costs of the US budget for an intelligence operation in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. True, the information received for many years by the American command was truly invaluable.
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  1. Ross xnumx
    Ross xnumx 6 June 2020 05: 54 New
    +5
    Ivy Bells officially put an end to intelligence operations. It is curious that Pelton received $ 35 from the Soviet Union for valuable information, this amount cannot be compared to the costs of the US budget for an intelligence operation in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

    You read such articles, and the hesitation takes from those actions the HMS (the comfortable living of which the Russian taxpayers provide) and the EBN (the comfortable living of the family and the widow of which the Russian taxpayers provide), which nullified all the results of the USSR’s opposition to the Western Cold War policy.
    hi
    1. tlauicol
      tlauicol 6 June 2020 06: 20 New
      +7
      1971 year

      [quote = ROSS 42] [quote] On
      You read similar articles, and the scumbag takes from those actions the HMS (the comfortable living of which is provided by Russian taxpayers) and EBN [/ quote]
      1. Pike
        Pike 6 June 2020 07: 11 New
        13
        The above persons contributed to a much greater drain of information ...
  2. The leader of the Redskins
    The leader of the Redskins 6 June 2020 06: 11 New
    10
    A plot worthy of a box office spy detective! Where do screenwriters look, sucking out ... a substance that is later filmed for millions?
  3. KVU-NSVD
    KVU-NSVD 6 June 2020 06: 12 New
    0
    In early 1970, the US military became aware of the existence of a wired communication line
    In October 1971, the Halibut submarine successfully penetrated the Sea of ​​Okhotsk
    and then the divers worked on the spot, which they installed over the Cocoon cable.
    the device, located directly above the marine cable, was an impressive seven-meter container of cylindrical shape with a diameter of about a meter. In its tail was a small plutonium power source, according to
    That is, in about a year and a half, such a complex device was designed, manufactured and tested? I don’t believe .. And therefore, either preparation for the operation began much earlier than the beginning of the 70th and, accordingly, the cable was also found much earlier, or similar “Cocoons” were already in a single number and were used on other underwater cable lines. Indirectly, the option of earlier detection and the beginning of preparation is confirmed in article
    Previously, he was spotted by American submarines on electromagnetic radiation.
    the very fact of the existence of such a connection was confirmed by satellite intelligence, which recorded work in some areas of the coast.

    PS. Was the power plant radioisotope or direct reactor? For the late 60s, super-technological. Or maybe it's all the tales and when taking information from the drives just at the same time and changed the battery?
    1. Bashkirkhan
      Bashkirkhan 6 June 2020 07: 20 New
      +6
      The same "cocoon" was installed by craftsmen from the National Security Agency at the bottom of the Barents Sea. From there, they received invaluable information - about the deployment of our submarines off the coast of Sweden, Norway and other NATO countries, under the ice of the Arctic, about all nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya.
    2. svp67
      svp67 6 June 2020 07: 22 New
      +7
      Quote: KVU-NSVD
      That is, in about a year and a half, such a complex device was designed, manufactured and tested?

      Americans in this matter “ate a dog” and constantly tried to install something similar on our communication lines and not only underwater, but also underground
    3. old_pferd
      old_pferd 6 June 2020 11: 19 New
      +6
      Our first radio beacons on the Ether-M RTGs were produced since 1976, the Americans put small similar ones in Alaska in the 1960s
    4. knn54
      knn54 6 June 2020 14: 04 New
      +7
      The boat went along the coast of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk for more than a week, avoiding possible detection, but the submariners finally saw the sign "Do not moor" on the northern coast of the sea. The video probe pointed to the cable, and the submarine went along it. 40 miles from the coast, far from Soviet territorial waters, she stopped.
      Breathing a mixture of oxygen and helium, divers installed a listening device on the cable. Surprised, the submariners found that the Pacific Fleet line is NOT ENCRYPTED.
      ... In 1979, a similar "bug" was installed in the Barents Sea on the line Severodvinsk-Murmansk by the submarine USS Parche.
      PS ALSO, in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, they collected the wreckage of the Soviet anti-ship missiles, recreated, and developed against it. "counteraction".
      1. KVU-NSVD
        KVU-NSVD 6 June 2020 14: 21 New
        +5
        Quote: knn54
        Saw the Do Not Moor Sign
        found that the PF line is NOT ENCRYPTED.
        Confidence that the Sea of ​​Okhotsk is under control ... Although the use of a strategic cable line without ZAS means is criminal gouging - of subscribers, signalmen, octagos, specialists.
        POSTLUTO, in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, collected fragments of the Soviet anti-ship missiles
        Cherry on the cake, apparently the pond was walking ...
  4. Free wind
    Free wind 6 June 2020 06: 12 New
    14
    Well wow failure, 8 years to know about the Pacific Fleet routes as a train schedule. Yeah, in some cases, the Americans could allow us to play cat and mouse with our ships and submarines .. For 8 years the equipment is still outdated, maybe the Americans allowed to reveal this operation. So it was possible to organize an ambush, next to this unit, and destroy the divers and the carrier submarine at the same time, or mine it.
    1. Qas
      Qas 6 June 2020 07: 13 New
      +3
      What is the Pacific Fleet route? What are you talking about? Listened to the underwater cable lying on the bottom. The task of the Americans was to find the cable and figure out how to read information from it (without opening it). They did it successfully.
      1. KCA
        KCA 6 June 2020 16: 26 New
        -6
        The submarine cable has at least 15 millimeters of armor, so how can you listen to it without breaking it? She does not conduct radio waves at all, but blocks them, having crashed into a cable, can I get access to several pairs of wires and whoever guesses, do these pairs transmit messages from the Pacific Fleet headquarters or for fishing vessels? At least a billion dollars to spend, through armor - a mesh of steel and aluminum foil can not hear anything, well, nothing will pass the aluminum winding
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 6 June 2020 18: 38 New
          +5
          Quote: KCA
          At least a billion dollars to spend, through armor - a mesh of steel and aluminum foil can not hear anything, well, nothing will pass the aluminum winding

          Highly sensitive receiving devices make it possible to detect screen reemission during the operation of long-distance communications equipment. It all depends on the distance of these receivers from the radiation source, which is why there are strict standards for laying wires and cables in rooms and ground. By the way, the Germans already during the war created a system to intercept our HF communications.
          1. vladcub
            vladcub 6 June 2020 20: 41 New
            0
            “to intercept our RF communications,” but I read everywhere that RF communications cannot be intercepted.
            1. Qas
              Qas 7 June 2020 09: 09 New
              +2
              Nothing is impossible (within the framework of reality, of course. Otherwise, start now ..). There are difficult tasks. She was executed. By the way, but don’t remember, but for what reason did the USA constantly make noise about our Losharik? What was there about the fact that it would cut the underwater cables and consider the information from them?
            2. ccsr
              ccsr 7 June 2020 12: 47 New
              +1
              Quote: vladcub
              but everywhere I read that RF communication is not possible to intercept.

              The Germans developed equipment for removing information from our wired channels, which allowed us to capture high-frequency signals due to spurious emissions. And sometimes they could connect this equipment to our lines - it was revealed by the end of the war, and there are materials on the network that describe the work of German intelligence to intercept information.
        2. vladcub
          vladcub 6 June 2020 20: 14 New
          0
          So this is all an invention of the author? So it turns out by your logic.
          During the Cold War, as in other things before and after it, espionage and counter espionage did not doze off. There have been so many successes and failures that any dreamer has to choke on envy
        3. hjvtp1966
          hjvtp1966 6 June 2020 22: 00 New
          +1
          There is nothing absolute, all radiation does not disappear at all, and can be detected. We need appropriate equipment and algorithms, a striking example is the detection of gravitational waves last year. There are also radio telescopes. And in a huge cable length, the currents be healthy.
        4. gsev
          gsev 9 June 2020 08: 53 New
          +1
          Quote: KCA
          well, the aluminum winding will not miss anything

          You just need to make a high-sensitivity operational amplifier!
    2. Olgovich
      Olgovich 6 June 2020 08: 06 New
      0
      Quote: Free Wind
      Well wow failure

      Exactly!

      I wonder how many Americans for this "failure" received awards and how many Soviet goals flew!
    3. KCA
      KCA 6 June 2020 08: 29 New
      +6
      I doubt that top-secret negotiations were conducted without the use of ZAC, on a simple radio relay station there are both ZAS and channel compaction equipment, and then the Pacific Fleet headquarters is direct without encryption? Or didn’t they specifically encrypt what the Americans were supposed to hear?
      1. Yuri Tverdokhleb
        Yuri Tverdokhleb 6 June 2020 10: 18 New
        -1
        I absolutely agree.
        All negotiations, all telegrams or messages could and should go through ZAS. And decryption requires a long time and a powerful computer base, and that is not a fact!
        1. KCA
          KCA 6 June 2020 11: 03 New
          +5
          In 1992, the Makhovik ZAS had secrecy rates for a week, a month, and forever, computer performance has increased dramatically since then, but like the ZAS productivity, I used the T-219 Yacht at that time, a rare analog crap with frequency modulation lacking a musical ear, almost did not understand what they were saying, and the “Flywheel” was digital, with a loopback of each symbol, the number of rings was limited only by the performance of the “Flywheel” itself
          1. Andrei Nikolaevich
            Andrei Nikolaevich 7 June 2020 20: 31 New
            0
            I read the comments and see that a bunch of former ZASovtsev came running. And cleaning ladies with bugs on toilets do not need to be sent ..)
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 7 June 2020 20: 56 New
              +2
              Quote: Andrey Nikolaevich
              I read the comments and see that a bunch of former ZASovtsev came running.

              All the secrets of the former bolters have long been known to NATO - one of them was even the Deputy Minister of Defense of Estonia after the collapse of the USSR, and the Ukrainian military had long ago reported to their masters from the United States.
              1. Andrei Nikolaevich
                Andrei Nikolaevich 7 June 2020 21: 14 New
                -4
                was even deputy defense minister of Estonia
                I do not think that NATO fools are sitting. It is unlikely that they could trust these new halyam, something serious. Given the size and "power" of such a "state" as Estonia, the Deputy Minister of Defense, at the level of the military commissar of a small town
                1. Andrei Nikolaevich
                  Andrei Nikolaevich 7 June 2020 21: 16 New
                  -4
                  I will supplement it. As for the Ukrainian military, it was necessary to shout less about "eternal fraternal friendship." And now, we disentangle.
                2. ccsr
                  ccsr 7 June 2020 21: 25 New
                  +3
                  Quote: Andrey Nikolaevich
                  Given the size and "power" of such a "state" as Estonia, the Deputy Minister of Defense, at the level of the military commissar of a small town

                  In fact, this senior officer had a VUS, allowing him to know all the equipment of the ZAS of the Soviet period, and there were a lot of such officers in the former Soviet republics, and some now became Ukrainian nationalists.
                  As for the Ukrainian military, it was necessary to shout less about "eternal fraternal friendship." And now, we disentangle.

                  I agree. But do not forget that even the Warsaw Treaty allies used our equipment, and even there someone who told the NATO did not give in to any control at all.
                  1. Andrei Nikolaevich
                    Andrei Nikolaevich 7 June 2020 21: 36 New
                    -4
                    Exactly. I agree with you, completely. Therefore, I am in favor of a gradual cessation of the policy of "fraternal peoples." Of course, we should be grateful to the small number of citizens of Belarus and Ukraine who nevertheless retained respect for our common history and common culture.
                    However, we must also understand and objectively look at two things — we are citizens of different states and each of our countries has its own internal and external interests, its own wishes. And these “interests” are not always the same. It is better to remain good neighbors mutually respecting each other than to have worthless and ever-asking "brothers" who are selling relatives, in their own political interests.
                    For example: Have you ever heard of “fraternal” relations between England, France, the USA, Canada and Australia? .. Meanwhile, they have “common national roots and cultures” as our leadership likes to say ..
            2. KCA
              KCA 8 June 2020 07: 58 New
              +3
              Officially, I am a specific ZASovets, military commissar for a long time studied everything that was written in my military-industrial complex, all military-technical institutes, and in the end I wrote a specialist T-219, although I ended up serving as the unit commander, head of the R-145BM, I don’t think that NATU is interested what I came across 27-28 years ago, and my subscription admission has long ended
          2. KPblC
            KPblC 11 June 2020 20: 51 New
            0
            As if on the Goniometer something is clear 3 knots and Zina, Katya, Vasya, Petya begins.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 6 June 2020 14: 31 New
        +3
        Quote: KCA
        I doubt that top-secret negotiations were conducted without the use of ZAC, on a simple radio relay station there are both ZAS and channel compaction equipment, and then the Pacific Fleet headquarters is direct without encryption?

        Of course, the author of the article is poorly versed in the issues of closing communications and encryption, which is why he fantasizes when he states that:
        True, the information received for many years by the American command was truly invaluable.

        First, you need to know that time and that technique in order to understand that then there were open telephone channels through which no secret conversations were conducted and which were recorded by the Americans.
        Secondly, there were closed telephone channels, with temporary durability, through which it was forbidden to conduct conversations with owls. secret issues, and it was only allowed to discuss those that had a signature stamp no higher than the secret, and even then there were many restrictions. These conversations were of interest to the Americans, and they recorded and decrypted them. But due to limitations and irregular data acquisition of the equipment, the value of such information in the overwhelming majority of cases was no longer of operational interest, if only because the event itself had already occurred or was recorded by other means of control.
        If, for telephone communications, they used the "Mace", which then entered service, then to hell that the Americans decrypted - this is a fact, and they would not have had anything at all.
        As for the closed telegraph messages, which were of the greatest interest to the Americans, then the "Spring" had guaranteed stability, and the Americans could not decipher anything - this is also a fact. The only thing they could use was the mistakes of the mechanics when getting into communication, and then the prerequisites for information leakage could arise.
        So in the end, they could receive information, but not the information that was of interest from the point of view of operational control of the situation on the theater of operations - they used completely different types of intelligence.

        Quote: KCA
        Or didn’t they specifically encrypt what the Americans were supposed to hear?

        This was the case with the Berlin cable, and then they staged a show exposing the intrigues of American intelligence, although our special services already knew that there was wiretapping of our cable in real time.
        1. KCA
          KCA 6 June 2020 16: 05 New
          +2
          Television broadcasts about the Berlin tunnel repeatedly talked about its disclosure at the time of construction, about wiretapping of Pacific Fleet, and there is no mega-unit with RITEG, maybe the security period has not passed yet, but you should not sin about the mechanics if you were instructed to use the ZAS, then no one violated it, even though I had the 1st admission, I can say for sure, if anything, the ZAS always participated, well, maybe because through the Flywheel the ICBM targets were transmitted by telegraph in punched tape, the secretary of the Flywheel in 132 Maikop I saw the brigade a couple of times, flashed through the barracks, and didn’t show my nose to my room, although he didn’t even talk to him, he wiped them with alcohol, of which there were a lot, with gilded conclusions
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 6 June 2020 18: 31 New
            0
            Quote: KCA
            about wiretapping of Pacific Fleet cables, and even there is no mega-unit with RITEG,

            It has been known for a long time - you may just not heard about it. RTGs were also used a long time ago, we are on the Lunokhod, Americans in reconnaissance buoys. So there is nothing unique in this system.
            Quote: KCA
            but about the mechanics you are sinning in vain,

            No wonder - there were such facts, and sometimes experts of the State Technical Commission opened them.
  5. Krasnoyarsk
    Krasnoyarsk 6 June 2020 07: 48 New
    +8
    = Ivy Bells intelligence failure =
    Failure, when it didn’t work. And then 8 years of work .... This is an incredible success!
    1. Pavel57
      Pavel57 8 June 2020 19: 04 New
      0
      8 years, about a bug hung in the US embassy in the ambassador’s office.
  6. Operator
    Operator 6 June 2020 08: 55 New
    +6
    Not a nuclear reactor, but a radioisotope generator, of course.

    General-purpose non-encrypted communication was carried out over the submarine cable (encrypted communication was via radio), because the Americans did not know much.
    1. hjvtp1966
      hjvtp1966 6 June 2020 11: 25 New
      +4
      Probably so, but analyzing changes in the volume of traffic, activity, topics, the composition of subscribers over a period of time, comparing with known activity, for example, boat detections, important conclusions can be drawn, including forecasts. Even if it becomes known that one hundred wives of submariners will call their mothers in a short period of time and ask them to send woolen socks, it can already be assumed that one hundred submarine officers will be sent somewhere soon. I can imagine how much information can be fished just from the communication of support services. Although, of course, an order with terms and routes, etc. will be transmitted in cipher. Schedule of trains will be last year and that is not a fact.laughing
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 6 June 2020 14: 35 New
      +2
      Quote: Operator
      General-purpose non-encrypted communication was carried out over the submarine cable (encrypted communication was via radio), because the Americans did not know much.

      You are not right - for sure there were closed telephone lines and even more so telegraphic channels ZAS. The fact that they could find out little was a fact, but sometimes chatty bosses might not respect the regime of secrecy, and something fell into the hands of the Americans - this was also not excluded, although control points constantly monitor that they do not chat too much through open channels.
      1. KCA
        KCA 6 June 2020 16: 30 New
        -1
        Talkative bosses could not get in touch themselves, for this they had liaison officers who could not score at the ZAS, otherwise the tribunal
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 6 June 2020 18: 33 New
          +2
          Quote: KCA
          The chatty bosses themselves couldn’t get in touch,

          Why do you think so? Many officials had direct access to the switch, especially at stationary facilities.
      2. vladcub
        vladcub 6 June 2020 20: 31 New
        +1
        "chatty bosses", and how many balabol jokes could poison or gossip.
        My opinion: the "cocoon" is certainly a great success for the Americans, but their analysts should not rely entirely on the "cocoon", but only as an integral part of the information
    3. Mikle2000
      Mikle2000 9 June 2020 19: 29 New
      0
      And it is not clear what is needed for. If there was enough magnetic tape for a month and it was sailing to change it, then why not at the same time change the battery? Even for money it is much cheaper, not to mention everything else.
  7. VicktorVR
    VicktorVR 6 June 2020 10: 39 New
    +1
    "a small plutonium power source, essentially a miniature nuclear reactor"
    You do not say? :)
    1. hjvtp1966
      hjvtp1966 6 June 2020 11: 30 New
      +4
      As I understand it, a radioisotope source is a heat source for a thermoelectric generator. It seems that along the Northern Sea Route such sources fed unattended lighthouses (or radio beacons? For light it hurts a lot of electricity what ).
    2. Pavel57
      Pavel57 8 June 2020 19: 06 New
      0
      I wonder how COCOON was disassembled on the shore?
  8. Charik
    Charik 6 June 2020 11: 36 New
    0
    Yes, with current technologies you can do such operations in general - which you can’t imagine
  9. Aviator_
    Aviator_ 6 June 2020 12: 01 New
    -1
    Previously, he was already spotted American submarines on electromagnetic radiation.

    And from this place in more detail, pzhlst. How is it in a conductive medium (salt water) that an e / m wave will propagate? Author, teach physics, fix school deuce!
    1. Mikle2000
      Mikle2000 9 June 2020 19: 31 New
      0
      Iron is a completely conductive medium and an electromagnetic wave propagates along it.
      1. Aviator_
        Aviator_ 9 June 2020 20: 17 New
        0
        Iron is a completely conductive medium and an electromagnetic wave propagates along it.

        You are confusing electric current and electromagnetic wave. In a conductive medium, in addition to the bias current (it is in any medium), there is also a conduction current, and so it will transfer the energy of the electromagnetic wave to Joule heat. And that’s it. Therefore, there are such problems with communication with submarines - they need to listen to the signal for the emission of the antenna on extra-long waves, and after it arrives, throw out the antenna and listen to what happened on the surface and what to do.
        1. your1970
          your1970 15 June 2020 17: 53 New
          0
          Quote: Aviator_
          they need to listen to the signal for the ejection of the antenna on ultra-long waves, and after it arrives, throw out the antenna and listen to what happened on the surface and what to do.
          long cable in a thousand km will not go for the antenna?
          1. Aviator_
            Aviator_ 15 June 2020 19: 51 New
            0
            It won’t work. Bypassed by half-wave vibrators several hundred meters long.
            1. your1970
              your1970 15 June 2020 21: 21 New
              0
              I'm not talking about submarines, I'm talking about cable belay
              1. Aviator_
                Aviator_ 15 June 2020 21: 25 New
                0
                It won’t work either - there is no electromagnetic wave in the conductive medium, it goes out quickly.
  10. iouris
    iouris 6 June 2020 14: 47 New
    -2
    Not scouts, but spyware design engineers. And what did it matter if Gorbi and Shevarnadze surrendered in Malta, defeated the USSR, army, aviation and navy.
  11. Looking for
    Looking for 6 June 2020 16: 02 New
    -6
    It is interesting how many Western sources do these "tales" come from and how much does the "Judas silver coins" cost to place such "facts"?
    1. Kronos
      Kronos 6 June 2020 21: 23 New
      +1
      Why fairy tales? The USSR had its own successes in US intelligence
  12. kig
    kig 6 June 2020 16: 04 New
    +2
    it ended in failure
    - More like a big success.
  13. Subtext
    Subtext 6 June 2020 18: 26 New
    -1
    I suspect that the Yankees now know well when on the PCB fleet, where to get brooms and shovels, when combat exercises, when organizational periods. By what time should the materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU be outlined, by what time and in what form to report gross misconduct.
    Although I'm not sure with political workers. How many times information came from them to the sea - all cryptograms
    1. hjvtp1966
      hjvtp1966 6 June 2020 22: 16 New
      0
      Who and when is involved in PCBs and who is not, also information, for example, Political Ivanov stopped managing PCBs or political activities for a certain period, and the Russian submarine passed through the Azores border, then after a while such a coincidence again, perhaps with a certain degree of probability , to judge that this conditional Ivanov is a crew member. Of course, this is a grain of information, but also the numbers of cars that need to be passed through the CP, a telephone discussion of the laundry invoices for washing, how many and where the bread machines go, all this is information for analysts. Americans have always been masters at this.
  14. vladcub
    vladcub 6 June 2020 20: 54 New
    0
    We had material on the site on the operation: “Zlatoust,” when the “bug” was in the office of the American ambassador, today's material is about the “cocoon,” and how many more successful operations there were, and not only the Americans or ours, but there were successes in period until 1917 and during the war.
    I would read with pleasure about such operations
  15. natgajda
    natgajda 7 June 2020 07: 23 New
    +1
    I can believe that they invented and INSTALLED all this equipment. But I will never believe that once a month for 8 years the boat stayed at the same place so that the divers changed the films. I think our people knew about wiretapping and drained the disuse. And when we found out that the project was exposed, leaked ... Almost a hundred times the boat comes to the same place and no one knows about it. And is it in the USSR? Some comedians write ...
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 7 June 2020 12: 53 New
      0
      Quote: natgajda
      But I will never believe that once a month for 8 years the boat stayed at the same place so that the divers changed the film.

      She could pass by this section and read the recorded information, as is done on bluetooth (possibly with an acoustic signal of low power), while freeing recording devices. That is why they might not have paid attention to this operation, considering that the submarine makes a normal reconnaissance campaign.
      1. ANB
        ANB 7 June 2020 20: 26 New
        0
        . how is this done with bluetooth (possibly with an acoustic signal of low power),

        Imagine the physics of the process and the rate of exchange. The boat would have to stand for a very long time near the cocoon.
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 7 June 2020 20: 53 New
          0
          Quote: ANB
          Imagine the physics of the process and the rate of exchange.

          I gave a conditional example, explain the essence of the idea. It was the time of analog systems, and it is possible that a tape recorder with a magnetic wire carrier was used. And it could be scrolled much faster than ordinary tape. And the concept of "long" is relative - an hour or two and it is possible that everyone managed to read it. Although naturally I do not presume to say this, because the principles of removal from this device are not known.
          1. ANB
            ANB 7 June 2020 20: 57 New
            0
            . And it could be scrolled much faster than ordinary tape. And the concept of "long" is relative - an hour or two and it is possible that everyone managed to read

            Not an hour two, but three months four. Reading can be accelerated with electromagnetic exchange (direct contact or through the field), while acoustics will greatly reduce the transmission speed.
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 7 June 2020 21: 06 New
              +1
              Quote: ANB
              Reading can be accelerated with electromagnetic exchange (direct contact or through the field),

              Most likely, they had a manipulator on the boat that placed a flexible cable with a receiving device on the device for taking information from our cable, and the process could happen very quickly. This is just my guess.
              Quote: ANB
              acoustics will greatly reduce the transmission speed.

              I agree. But in this case, she could help to quickly detect this device, working like a beacon at certain distances.
              1. ANB
                ANB 8 June 2020 00: 11 New
                0
                . Most likely, they had a manipulator on the boat that placed a flexible cable with a receiving device on the device for taking information from our cable, and the process could happen very quickly.

                This option is already technically possible.
                Although it is not a fact that releasing divers and changing the block did not work easier and faster. The boat also needs to be accurately positioned and held while the manipulator is working. And with such a colossus it is not very easy. The depth for the diver is trifling.
      2. natgajda
        natgajda 9 June 2020 06: 29 New
        0
        Could, of course, if Blue had an ace at that time. But the article explicitly states that divers were produced and films changed.
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 9 June 2020 12: 37 New
          0
          Quote: natgajda
          could, of course, if Blue had an ace at that time.

          There was another one - a transmitter was connected to the regular microphone of the telephone and all that was discussed in the room could be recorded 50-100-150 meters from the telephone, even if the receiver was on-hook.
          Quote: natgajda
          But the article explicitly states that divers were produced and films changed.

          One must always be critical of what the Americans set out, even with the same divers. The more people know about such an operation, the more difficult it is to keep everything secret. But I do not dispute that it was the divers who changed the film, since this was possible at that depth. True, there is one small nuance - sometimes the enemy’s special services practice installing a charge in such places, and such a diver could simply be destroyed, and it would be brought to the surface. I think that the Americans appreciated such an opportunity, because they knew what our counterintelligence officers were capable of, which means they could hide the real way of collecting information.
  16. Polar Bear
    Polar Bear 7 June 2020 20: 22 New
    0
    There was a similar story on the SF
  17. Edvid
    Edvid 9 June 2020 11: 06 New
    0
    I heard some other information about this. From 1971 to 1985 I went on the research ships of the Far Eastern Scientific Center (Vladivostok). Our KGB curator said that all calls by American submarines through the Kuril Straits are controlled. Most were stopped, and some were "allowed" to enter in order to control their further actions in our waters ... At one time, a man who served on a special vessel of the Pacific Fleet came to the crew. He told how one day they found a "floating buoy" USA stuffed with equipment. They landed a team on him, which made him "completely unusable."
  18. NF68
    NF68 10 June 2020 17: 10 New
    0
    Listen then they listened. But only who could give a 100% guarantee that the Americans did not listen to the desu carefully prepared at the USSR Ministry of Defense or the KGB? This option is also possible.
  19. IC
    IC 12 June 2020 00: 58 New
    -1
    Beautiful operation. But almost useless. Rugged imitation of intelligence activities. Gathered a ton of information. On, and then what. As a result, what practical benefit is there for the USA and what harm is it for the USSR? Did this affect the outcome of the Cold War. In no way. There were many more similar operations, but more expensive. In history, it has always been that the role of intelligence is greatly exaggerated.
  20. bunta
    bunta 12 June 2020 17: 45 New
    0

    Subsequently, the information received was read, decrypted, and comprehensively studied. An analysis of the records quickly showed that in the USSR they were confident in the reliability and impossibility of wiretapping, so many messages were transmitted in clear text without encryption.

    Can someone confirm this? He served in ZAS'e 79-80 gg.
    All transmitted information was controlled by the relevant services. You won’t work in plain text for more than a few minutes. Personally checked.
    There are big doubts about decryption. In the classroom, we were given information that it would take several million years of computers existing at that time to decrypt sensitive data using our equipment.
    1. barium
      barium 16 June 2020 12: 44 New
      0
      all electronics complements intelligence obtained in other ways! He served in the 299th RAP in 71-73, the officers said - the wife comes from the market and says - you know, your regiment and division will be transferred to Ukraine! officer to his wife - stupid things, they did not tell us about this. wife - the whole market talks about it! and for sure, six months later, the division was transferred to the Odessa region. previously the division was in Blagoveshchensk!
  21. Kuz
    Kuz 14 June 2020 08: 54 New
    +1
    Technological advantage gives a lot
  22. Alexander Terentyev
    Alexander Terentyev 29 July 2020 10: 02 New
    0
    It was probably a civilian telephone line. But check the information once a month? If the submarine is planned to enter the distant sea zone, and an order is received over the telephone line, then the Americans, having opened the container and having read the information, will not be very happy - the submarine has been on alert duty in an unknown point of the Atlantic for a month. Probably, the coordinates of combat duty are not transmitted by phone, but are opened from an envelope that lies in the safe of the submarine commander. The safe is not available for this container.
    1. agond
      agond 5 August 2020 19: 01 New
      0
      But what about decoding a message when a short signal corresponds to a long text?
  23. Polar Bear
    Polar Bear 6 August 2020 00: 09 New
    0
    And what of what they were listening to? What is transmitted over the phone? That's right, operational information with a mass of obscene expressions that still need to be deciphered, by the way, the negotiations themselves are actually encrypted. And the boat came once every 4 months not more often, or even once every half a year. That is, the recorded information and plans are already outdated. For an example of the importance of operational information, I will cite my own case from the 80s. My ship went to the right area to track the American submarine, when it was still at the base and preparing to leave, and we arrived there before her, since the necessary information had been received from over the hill from our man in advance. Well, then we found her darling, called in anti-submarine aviation, and then the artillery battalions that approached took her into close contact.