Adolf Hitler: war loser strategist or politician?


Today they talk about this a lot and with taste. Both here and in the West. In the West, they especially like the theme of the brilliant German generals and the incompetent corporal who commanded them. And if it were not for Hitler's miscalculations, then the victory would definitely have been for Germany, and in general.


That's about this very "and in general" we are now discussing.

In general, the two commanders-in-chief of the warring countries with military training did not have much. That is, even with a civic education it was so-so, we no longer remember the military. Hitler received a certain combat experience in the First World War, but Stalin did not even have such experience. That did not stop Joseph Vissarionovich from taking leading positions in the military structures of the Red Army and even successfully confronting Krasnov near Tsaritsyn and Kolchak (with Dzerzhinsky) near Ufa.

There were, of course, outright failures, such as the Polish campaign, where Stalin and Budyonny openly behaved in a bad way.

But we are not talking about that. And about such an interesting thing as the enormous capacity for work of the leaders of the two countries, which helped both in their work on the issues of warfare.

In essence, neither Stalin nor Hitler created the plans for Barbarossa or Bagration. This was done by those who are most intended for this, that is, officers of the general staff. And the commanders-in-chief only carried out strategic leadership, determining the general lines of conduct for troops and fleets.

Another question is who put more pressure on their generals, subordinating them to their will and imposing their line of behavior.

I believe that here Hitler would give a big head start to Stalin. Indeed, not being, as they would say now, an expert, but a true communist, Stalin preferred to take all complex decisions collectively.


Yes, many Soviet military commanders and managers would have given their right hand for Stalin to take all the questions individually. It's easier to live like that. And it would be to whom to blame everything in case of failure. But Stalin's communist convictions did not allow him to hit the map with his fist and shout that it should be so.

Although, of course, special freethinking had to be earned. But they deserve it, right?

Although, of course, that the NKVD and the Gestapo had enough specialists who could explain to the particularly smart whose spies they were.

In general, with many similarities, the leaders of the two systems were very different. From a calm way of behavior of Stalin to a completely hysterical Hitler. But the point is not that Hitler was a little disgraceful and longed for all these roaring crowds marching past him. He knew how to get a crowd, that's a fact.

Adolf Hitler: war loser strategist or politician?

But if the German leader wanted only blind veneration and worship ... He really wanted to be “in the subject,” so he consciously put pressure on his generals. Often sacrificing military intentions to political ones.

Of course, it is good to watch crowds roaring with delight and defeated capitals underfoot. Undoubtedly. However, this is not always effective.


Let's look at a small alternative scenario.

In the Soviet Union, there have always always been two capitals. The first, administrative is Moscow. And the second, political, cradle of the revolution is Leningrad.

As you know, Hitler's plans included the destruction of both cities.

“The Fuhrer’s decision is unshakable to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground in order to completely get rid of the population of these cities, which otherwise we will then be forced to feed during the winter. The task of destroying these cities must fulfill aviation. Do not use for this. Tanks. This will be a “people's disaster”, which will deprive the centers not only of Bolshevism, but of Muscovites (Russians) in general. ”

(From the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army F. Halder, July 8, 1941.)

Dismantle - this is understandable. But why then does the Fuhrer’s strange order come on September 12, 1941, which said: Leningrad should not be taken. Someone called it salvation, someone considers it the beginning of a tragic blockade, but let's see what happened next.

And then the commander of the Army Group “North” von Leeb was ordered to immediately transfer the 4th Panzer Group (together with 5 Panzer and two motorized divisions), as well as the entire 1st Luftwaffe Air Force (about 700 aircraft) to the Army Group “Center”.

In fact, von Leeb remained with the 16th and 18th armies and the 5th air fleet, which was half as numerous as the 1st.

In fact, the offensive launched near Moscow required the Germans more forces and equipment than they could have expected. There was simply nothing to take Leningrad. It was not worth counting on the victorious march of the Finnish army; the Finns did not recover even after the Winter War. And at the disposal of the Leningrad Front was a sufficient number of combat-ready units.

In 1941, in August, after the division of the Leningrad Front into the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts, the Leningrad Front included the 8th, 2nd and 48th armies, the Koporsk, South and Slutsk-Kolpinsk operational groups. Plus ships of the Baltic Fleet and the 13th Air Army.

In such a situation, it was really easier to arrange a complete blockade of the city. Which, in fact, happened. The Germans were by no means fools, and by that time they already knew very well that Leningrad would have to wash themselves with blood in full.

An excerpt from the military diary of Army Group North from 12.10.1941/27.10.1941/XNUMX and XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX on military operations against Leningrad.

«12.10.1941.
The operational department of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces passes to the group of forces the order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht:

The Führer again decided not to accept the surrender of Leningrad, even if it was proposed by the enemy. The moral justification for this is clear to the whole world. Just like in Kiev, where as a result of explosions with the use of clockwork there was a grave threat to the troops, this should be foreseen even more in Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad is mined and will defend itself to the last man, was reported by Soviet Russian radio itself. Therefore, no German soldier should enter this city. Those who try to leave the city through our line should be returned by using fire. ”

(Source: Bundesarchiv / Militararchiv, RH 19 III / 167. Quoted from: "The war of Germany against the Soviet Union. 1941-1945", p. 69.)

So, it is necessary to take Leningrad, but there is no strength for this. Therefore, they decided to simply starve to death. Well, let’s take it for a plan that may have hit the mood and moral condition of the Soviet people. The cradle of the revolution, after all ...

But Leningrad survived, and the two armies trodden around and around, until the moment they began to drive them in January 1943.

Move on. Next we have Moscow.


What do you think, purely according to Golenishchev-Kutuzov, with the loss of Moscow the whole country would be lost? I am sure many will agree that no. Moreover, a reserve Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was organized in Kuibyshev, from which the leadership of the troops would come from just like from Moscow.

Moreover, if anyone dreamed of surrender, it is very quiet.

Hitler was guided by purely European principles. Poland, France, Belgium, as soon as the capitals were captured by German troops, automatically stopped resistance. Well, or almost immediately. Another thing is the Soviet Union. Quite a different matter.

So, Moscow.

Crazy battles near Moscow in the fall of 1941, when everything that was possible rushed into the battle, when regiments and divisions of the national militia burned out near Vyazma, Yelnya, Rzhev and other settlements, gave way to a lull caused by the mud.

And then winter came and that very “strange” counterattack near Moscow. Strange by that. that the advancing Soviet troops were not 3 to 1, as it should be according to all the canons of the strategy, but fewer than the defenders.

Soviet units totaled 1,1 million people, 7 652 guns and mortars, 415 rocket artillery installations, 774 tanks (including 222 heavy and medium) and 1 thousand aircraft.

The German Army Group Center had 1,7 million people, about 13 guns and mortars, 500 tanks and 1 aircraft. (Data on the publication: "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 170-615: brief история"Under the general editorship of B. S. Telpukhovsky and the collective. Military Publishing House, 1984)

It is clear that the German units were exhausted by the heroic resistance of Soviet soldiers and militias, plus fresh personnel Siberian divisions did their job.

And Army Group Center, consisting of 3 armies and 3 tank groups (Gepner, Goth and Guderian), was drawn into a positional confrontation, which essentially ended in nothing.

And against the Germans stood 6 armies of the Western Front, 3 armies of the Bryansk Front and 5 armies of the Reserve Front in the second echelon.

It is clear that the German army and the Soviet army differed in composition, the point is not that. And the fact that all this colossus (German army groups) was dragged into protracted positional battles until the end of 1943.

For what? In order to "tear down Moscow and Leningrad from the face of the earth."

It is clear that the Fuhrer’s desire is the law. For those who do not understand, there are specially trained employees in the SS branch, called the Gestapo. On work with especially misunderstood.

It is clear that Hitler was not Stalin; he didn’t put the generals at the start of the war against the wall for no reason. At the end, a three-bird raced, and the generals were planted and shot no worse than ours in 1941. Nevertheless, to repeat the fate of General Walter von Brauchitsch, who was simply kicked out of the army after the failure of the capture of Moscow exactly on 19.12.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, those who wanted did not have to line up.

Strange, right?

Does the Fuhrer want Moscow? You are welcome. We will do our best. Wants Leningrad? More complicated, but also everything will be in the order. Stalingrad? Yes, what problems ... Everything will be!

Meanwhile, in the memoirs of Manstein and Guderian, one can sometimes find words about the fact that they did not agree with how Hitler intervened in affairs. And he intervened constantly.


The most interesting thing is that when the Führer did not find the “white verse” and he did not try to show himself to be a brilliant commander, everything went just fine with the Wehrmacht. Manstein cites the Crimean and Kharkov operations as an example, where the Germans simply perfectly planned and carried out everything. But Hitler did his best to help with operations.

Yes, by the way, Kharkov.

It’s not especially customary for us to talk about events such as Kharkov, the Barvenkovsky ledge, Maly Rovenki ... And yet this is a terrible and tragic part of our history. And it doesn’t matter who filthy planned the offensive, who didn’t spend it that way. The important thing is that our army suffered huge losses, and the road to the Caucasus was actually open.


And here Hitler really does something stupid.

Let’s even assess at the level of couch strategists what was more important: to take Grozny and Baku, depriving the entire Red Army of fuel, or to weigh Stalin with the plague by taking Stalingrad?


This is the front line we got in 1942. Very long. Almost two and a half thousand kilometers. With a few key points.


Leningrad. Strategically not important. Because there were no such active battles.

Moscow. Strategically ... Politically important, but nonetheless, it was difficult there.

Stalingrad. Also politically important. After the Germans captured Rostov-on-Don, one could forget about Stalingrad.

Voronezh. A meat grinder, grinding those who were supposed to go under Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Plus SEW, which the Nazis wanted to cut, but failed.

Grozny and Baku with their oil fields.

Point.

The final could have come much earlier if Hitler heeded the voices of his generals and did not fight in hysteria about Stalingrad and Voronezh. He did not try to capture Moscow and rot Leningrad. He did not set political goals above the military.

That is, all the forces that it is possible (and the Germans were masters in the ability to concentrate and transfer troops) were to be thrown to the south. At the oil fields of Grozny and Baku.

Could the Germans end the war ahead of schedule, leaving Soviet engines without fuel?

Easily.

Siberian oil reserves were not even explored at that time, all fuel was produced from Grozny and Baku oil. For some time it was possible to extend due to the supply of gasoline from the USA and accumulated reserves, but sooner or later exactly what would happen in Germany in 1945, when the equipment simply could not be used due to lack of fuel.

And here the question arises.

All that Hitler could isolate for the capture of the oil fields was to single out Army Group A from the composition of Army Group South, consisting of:
- 1st tank army;
- 17th army;
- 3rd Romanian army.

Yes, according to the original plan, it was supposed to add the 4th Panzer Army of Goth and the 11th Army of Manstein to Army Group “A”. The most serious and prepared connections with the most experienced commanders.

But ... We can say that a miracle happened.

The 11th Army, leaving the 42nd Army Corps in Army Group A, set off for Leningrad.

The 4th Panzer Army, leaving 1 (one!) Panzer Corps in Group A, went to Stalingrad.

3 Romanian army in full force was at Stalingrad.

11th army: 7 divisions in two corps and the Romanian mountain rifle corps (2 mountain rifle and one regular division). In the swamps and forests near Leningrad, especially mountain shooters were very useful. 42nd Corps left in the south - 2 infantry divisions.

The 4th Panzer Army was a three-corps structure. Each corps consisted of three tank divisions, it is easy to calculate that 6 out of 9 divisions went to Stalingrad.

The Romanian army consisted of 8 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions with a total number of 152,5 thousand military personnel and 11,2 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers, combined in 4 corps and reserve.

It can be estimated that Hitler’s political fanabery took away at least 400 thousand people from the most important direction. With tanks, artillery, mortars and other components.

So the 1st tank and 17th field armies of the Wehrmacht, the 1st Romanian army corps and the cavalry corps led the attack on the Caucasus.

Undoubtedly, it was also a force. But tanks in the mountains are so-so. Especially in the mountains of the Caucasus, where the main vehicle is a donkey. Or a horse, but harder with a horse.

Of course, the Southern Front of Malinovsky and the Transcaucasian Front of Tyulenin were not the best formations, but at the cost of tremendous effort and failure they were able to stop the advance of the Germans. 10 armies of these fronts and even 4 armies of the disbanded North Caucasus Front (Budyonny was the commander) proved to be an insurmountable barrier.

Moreover, 51 army from the North Caucasus Front went to Stalingrad.

As a result, the Soviet command solved one of the most important tasks: it did not allow the loss of oil fields. But there was another successfully solved problem: the doubting Turkey did not take the side of the Germans.

It could have turned out quite difficult if the Turks decided to support the Germans. Most likely, their interests would all be there, in the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR. But the successful occupation by Britain and the Soviet Union of Iran, which nevertheless was a neighbor of Turkey, as well as the successful actions of Malinovsky and Tyulenin, convinced the Turks that it was not worth interfering.

It so happened that in the pursuit of political bonuses Hitler lost too much.

In order to completely bleed the technique of the Red Army, it was not necessary to stagnate near Leningrad and Moscow. It was necessary to take several key railway junctions on the North Caucasus and Southeast railways.

Oil pipelines were a rarity then. And in the production of fuel and lubricants reflected failures on the fronts. However, we’ll talk about this separately.

But the main message of this material, returning to the very beginning, I consider the following: no matter how "brilliant" Hitler was, no matter how short-sighted and inept Stalin tried to expose, it is obvious that if it were not for the political ambitions of the German Fuhrer, the outcome of the war could have been completely to others.

Of course, this is nice: roaring and clapping crowds, rallies of thousands, marches, parades ... Loud statements, promises ...





All this is beautiful, pompous and pleasant. And for the sake of this, you can be arbitrary, but ... But it is better if specially trained people are engaged in military affairs. Staff officers.

And when not completely (or rather, not at all) trained people begin to mix politics and military strategy, it turns out to be very unpleasant.

The Germans by 1942 had all of Ukraine with its coal and black soil. Almost all of the Black Earth region is rich in soil. Yes, the occupied land would give birth to the Germans a little, but it would not give anything to the USSR.

It only remained to deprive the country of fuel. But this did not happen, as I understand it, due to these political promises. Hitler did have masters. Like almost all world politicians.

The desire to stage a show with the capture of Moscow and Stalingrad in 1942 eventually led to Berlin in 1945.

A very instructive story, to know which is very useful to many modern masters. Sometimes grandiose processions and parades can lead somewhat to the wrong place where it was originally planned ...
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  1. Crowe 5 June 2020 04: 42 New
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    There were, of course, outright failures, such as the Polish campaign, where Stalin and Budyonny openly behaved in a bad way.

    There Tukhachevsky did not behave in the best way, and not Stalin and Budyonny.
    1. Mavrikiy 5 June 2020 06: 25 New
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      Leningrad. Strategically not important. Because there were no such active battles.
      Moscow. Strategically ... Politically important, but nonetheless, it was difficult there.
      Stalingrad. Also politically important.
      Does the author not know about the strategic importance of Stalingrad? Hint: Stalingrad is located on the Volga, and it flows into the Caspian Sea, on the banks of which stands Baku. Well..... request Yes, the geography Olympiad does not threaten.
      1. Insurgent 5 June 2020 07: 16 New
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        Adolf Hitler: war loser strategist or politician?

        It is foolish to deny that Hitler was some kind of strategist and politician, as it is foolish to deny that he lost the venture he had undertaken to "gain world domination", and as a POLITICIAN and as a STRATEG.
        1. Ilya-spb 5 June 2020 08: 24 New
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          A very instructive story, to know which is very useful to many modern masters. Sometimes grandiose processions and parades can lead somewhat to the wrong place where it was originally planned ...


          Here is this final replica of the author ... what is hinting at?)))
      2. igordok 5 June 2020 07: 19 New
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        Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad are all important transport centers. Their loss could lead to serious strategic losses.
      3. Viktor Sergeev 5 June 2020 08: 41 New
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        It is interesting how Stalingrad differs from the terrain, for example, by 20 km. downstream? block the Volga and oil is not supplied. Then calmly seize the railway tracks bypassing Stalingrad, and to the maximum the fields themselves and that’s all, the oil got up. Only a psycho fall could get involved in urban battles, and only a couple of weeks later, realizing what was going on, could only continue with a stubborn psycho fall, which Hitler was, thank God.
        1. Ptolemy Lag 5 June 2020 09: 33 New
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          Persistent rumors are circulating that Hitler was prompted ... Someone from his inner circle.
          1. akunin 5 June 2020 15: 01 New
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            Quote: Ptolemy Lag
            Persistent rumors are circulating that Hitler was prompted ... Someone from his inner circle.

            Stalin called and said that he would "pick it up" or "poimeet."
        2. pmkemcity 5 June 2020 11: 33 New
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          Quote: Victor Sergeev
          It is interesting how Stalingrad differs from the terrain, for example, by 20 km. downstream? block the Volga and oil is not supplied. Then calmly seize the railway tracks bypassing Stalingrad, and to the maximum the fields themselves and that’s all, the oil got up. Only a psycho fall could get involved in urban battles, and only a couple of weeks later, realizing what was going on, could only continue with a stubborn psycho fall, which Hitler was, thank God.

          PsychoD, psychoD ... If Hitler is apro-o-axis-it ...
          Stalingrad is infrastructure, and no one needs a bare field. This is the flank of the same Caucasian grouping.
          1. Alexey RA 5 June 2020 13: 29 New
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            Quote: pmkemcity
            Stalingrad is infrastructure, and no one needs a bare field. This is the flank of the same Caucasian grouping.

            It’s not just infrastructure - it’s also STZ and Barricades. Production and repair of tanks, tractors and artillery. That is, the tank corps of the Red Army, concentrated around the city, receive factory repair of equipment and operational replenishment of its losses.
        3. gsev 5 June 2020 16: 22 New
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          Quote: Victor Sergeev
          Only a psycho fall could get involved in city battles,

          The Red Army in Stalingrad is pinned to the Volga. All crossings are shot by artillery. Over the crossings, the dominance of the Luftwaffe. Artillery of the Red Army on the low left bank, its connection with observer-spotters through the Volga. The transfer of any reinforcements to the right bank is equivalent to forcing the Volga in the direction known to the enemy. For the entire 2nd World War, the Wehrmacht did not have such ideal conditions for grinding the enemy troops. Namely, the destruction of the Red Army in the Stalingrad direction, and not the capture of Stalingrad, was the goal of the German command in this direction.
        4. Maki Avellevich 12 June 2020 09: 49 New
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          Quote: Victor Sergeev
          It is interesting how Stalingrad differs from the terrain, for example, by 20 km. downstream?

          Firstly, leaving the enemy’s military on the flank in the city fortress is fraught.
          secondly, for its reasons, Hitler decided to take this particular city and not somewhere downstream. why not defend themselves in the city in the place of the bare steppe?
      4. Doccor18 5 June 2020 09: 33 New
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        Quote: Mavrikiy
        Leningrad. Strategically not important. Because there were no such active battles.
        Moscow. Strategically ... Politically important, but nonetheless, it was difficult there.
        Stalingrad. Also politically important.
        Does the author not know about the strategic importance of Stalingrad? Hint: Stalingrad is located on the Volga, and it flows into the Caspian Sea, on the banks of which stands Baku. Well..... request Yes, the geography Olympiad does not threaten.

        And Leningrad was strategically important no less than politically. No wonder they created an entire group of armies for his direction. Leningrad is the largest Russian port in the Baltic, the largest transport hub. The Germans wanted to use this port for quick transfer of replenishment and strategist. stocks. But ... it didn’t work out, the Leningraders were painfully steadfast in defending their city.
      5. paul3390 5 June 2020 14: 58 New
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        In the same way, the author forgets that, among other things, Moscow is the central transport hub, to which many railways are pulled. Just look at the map. With the loss of this knot, it would have been much, much more difficult for us ... And not very well, respectively, significantly easier. And then the capital was still a powerful industrial center, not like now - only loot from all over the country sucks and saws ..
      6. bayard 5 June 2020 19: 52 New
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        Quote: Mavrikiy
        Does the author not know about the strategic importance of Stalingrad? Hint: Stalingrad is located on the Volga, and it flows into the Caspian Sea, on the banks of which stands Baku.

        Well, come on, Astrakhan also stands on the Volga, only downstream, and it would be much easier to take it.
        Or do not take cities at all (long, street battles, heavy losses), but go to the right bank of the Volga and install artillery to exclude navigation on it. It was possible to mine the fairway.
        The author is right - Grozny and Baku were more important. There would still be Bashkir oil, but it was not so much and it was heavy (less gasoline yield).
        And it is very good that Hitler had these tantrums about Moscow and Stalingrad.
      7. AAK
        AAK 5 June 2020 20: 18 New
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        OKV's strategic mistake is SIMULTANEOUS offensive operations in Stalingrad and the North Caucasus. It was enough not to split up the forces, but to advance north of Stalingrad (here one more bizar of Aloizovich - take the city named after his main adversary, but what battles in a large city are - everyone remembers well from the history of the Second World War and the first Chechen one), the Volga and the end of oil delivery are cut ... From possible actions by technically weak forces of the North Caucasus Front, a defensive position along the bend of the Don was enough ... They cut the Volga, strengthened and then it was possible to move towards the Caucasus, the SKF troops cut off from the mainland would be especially equipped nothing, in such a situation, Turkey could enter the war on the side of Germany, at least to divert part of the troops. An attempt to redirect oil tankers to at least Guryev, so that they could later transport it by train, could well be thwarted or limited to the limit by the actions of the Luftwaffe ... in general, somewhere like that ...
    2. tihonmarine 5 June 2020 07: 40 New
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      Quote: Crowe
      There Tukhachevsky did not behave in the best way, and not Stalin and Budyonny.

      I completely agree. There is no fault of Stalin and Budyonny.
    3. svp67 5 June 2020 07: 52 New
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      Quote: Crowe
      There Tukhachevsky did not behave in the best way, and not Stalin and Budyonny.

      Everyone was good there. And Stalin and Budyonny too long ignored the order to arrive in Warsaw, who knows, maybe they acted faster and such a rout would not have happened
      1. Dr. Frankenstucker 5 June 2020 09: 00 New
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        Quote: svp67
        And Stalin with Budyonny


        Budyonny with nothing, they did not give him an order - he did not go to Tukhachevsky. Stalin and Egorov were intriguing.
  2. Same lech 5 June 2020 04: 46 New
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    that if it were not for the political ambitions of the German Fuhrer, the outcome of the war could be completely different.

    Ah Roman Roman ... how many times have I heard and read about those who attacked Russia ... and if only Russia (the USSR) would have been defeated.
    But for some reason, unaccounted factors that radically change the picture always intervene in history.
    And if Hitler would have thrown all the resources of the Wehrmacht to capture the Caucasus and the USSR would have been defeated ... smile babble ... exactly the same reason Napoleon conquered Moscow at the time.
    War ... a real war is always a road through a swamp where there is one careless movement and you are stuck in the mud along the very nostrils.
    1. Olgovich 5 June 2020 06: 50 New
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      Quote: The same Lech
      And if Hitler would have thrown all the resources of the Wehrmacht to capture the Caucasus and the USSR would have been defeated.

      If he had done so, he would have received a devastating blow from the flank and, in fact, from the rear from Stalingrad. which ours tried to implement, but already in 1943

      therefore, he could not leave him in the rear and had to take him.

      and he was sorely lacking in all directions of forces.

      As for the Nazi generals, they happily shoved their miscalculations and crimes onto Hitler.

      Hitler lost because. that he was an adventurer, although he knew the nature of the West.

      up to a certain point he was fantastically lucky, but this could not go on forever and the laws of numbers, resources and reserves still said their word.
      1. qQQQ 5 June 2020 09: 26 New
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        Quote: Olgovich
        If he had done so, he would have received a devastating blow from the flank and, in fact, the rear from the side of Stalingrad ...

        They removed the language, I want to add that when taking Moscow, Turkey and Japan promised to enter the war, so from a military point of view, all Hitler’s actions were justified. But Hitler's generals, when all his actions brought success, first sang odes about his genius.
        1. Viktor Sergeev 5 June 2020 09: 38 New
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          Too shy to ask: did they promise you? You can talk about anything, but neither Turkey nor Japan did not want to attack the USSR, until it was completely demoralized, they had rich experience.
          1. qQQQ 5 June 2020 10: 24 New
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            Quote: Victor Sergeev
            did they promise you?

            In fact, no one hid that with the fall of Moscow they are ready to join the war.
    2. Doccor18 5 June 2020 09: 41 New
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      Even if Hitler was an ideal strategist, defeated Britain before, took into account the experience of war in gigantic spaces, captured Leningrad and Moscow ... what would this ultimately change? Only the timing of the end of the war and the number of victims. The fact that the red flag would fly over the Reichstag is inevitable. Hitler and his "general strategists" initially had no chance to defeat the USSR in open confrontation.
      1. dzvero 5 June 2020 15: 06 New
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        The capture of Britain in the 1940s would free up fairly large reserves (the fact that the Germans held the entire war in Norway and France). Plus, the demoralization of colonial troops in North Africa and the BV — access to Middle Eastern oil, the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Sea as an inland lake. Plus production base. Plus the fleet (and not just the military). Plus free sea trade with neutrals. For the USSR, there was a lack of assistance in the 41st (yes, not much, but still tangible, especially in the fall). It is not known whether the Red Army would have survived in the summer of the 41st if the Germans had an additional two or three dozen divisions.
        1. Doccor18 5 June 2020 16: 05 New
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          The capture of Britain in the 1940s would free up fairly large reserves (the fact that the Germans held the entire war in Norway and France).

          These reserves were already used in 1942. Yes, and to call them large the language does not turn. 29 divisions, including 4 tank.
          Plus, the demoralization of colonial troops in North Africa and the BV - access to Middle Eastern oil, the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean Sea as an inland lake

          In Africa, Rommel, whom Americans love so much, "heroically" fought against the British units for almost 3 years. Parts were so-so. The results are even worse.
          1. dzvero 5 June 2020 16: 18 New
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            29 divisions - as many as were in Army Group North on June 22, 1941 ...
            1. Doccor18 5 June 2020 16: 24 New
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              Quote: dzvero
              29 divisions - as many as were in Army Group North on June 22, 1941 ...

              Has this group of armies achieved much? Leeb could not even take Leningrad. And according to the plan, Arkhangelsk was due to leave by the end of the summer ... These plans were utopian from the beginning. The Germans simply dizzy after victories in Europe. But all of Europe is much smaller than Russia. The Germans are three times less than the Russians.
              1. dzvero 5 June 2020 16: 34 New
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                Utopian - yes. Dizzy with success ... But now imagine that Leeb had twice as many troops. Or in the Army Group Center there were “extra” dozen divisions and Guderian would continue east instead of turning south.
                I mean, the rejection of the Sea Lion was Hitler's first strategic mistake. In fact, Germany again did not escape the war on two fronts.
                1. Doccor18 5 June 2020 16: 41 New
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                  Refusing to take over the UK, in my opinion, was the most important and serious mistake. The second mistake is the war with the USSR. Germany 75 years ago had real chances to become one of the three world powers, along with the USA and the USSR. And this triumvirate to this day would decide the fate of the entire planet. Hitler did not see this, did not want or could not see. This was not seen by all of his generals. Therefore, the strategists of them are bad. And they were not bad politicians, for their time, to be honest.
        2. Doccor18 5 June 2020 16: 18 New
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          Plus the fleet (and not just the military). Plus free shipping with

          Strongly good (really) the French fleet helped Hitler? A strong British would also help. All ships would go to colonies or to the USA. What trade? With whom? With turkey? So she was. And with whom else?
          Nothing would have changed fundamentally. Germany is too small, the Germans were too few for such ambitions. There was no territory, no resources, no colonies, not enough population for the tasks that Hitler set. Only two countries in the world are able to fight for world leadership: the United States and Russia. They have everything for this: territory, resources and enough population.
          1. dzvero 5 June 2020 16: 24 New
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            As for the navy, yes. But how long will it last in the colonies without proper maintenance? In the United States, ships would be interned, since the United States and Germany at that time did not fight. The German fleet would have operational scope for the entire Atlantic.
            Trade not only with Turkey, but also with Latin America - for example, supplies of tungsten were blocked in the 43rd. And with the same US could well trade.
            1. Doccor18 5 June 2020 16: 31 New
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              In the United States, ships would be interned, since the United States and Germany at that time did not fight.

              A huge British fleet would organically join the US Navy. This would make the American fleet as far back as 1941, and not in 1944, the strongest in the world. The United States would love to use them in the Pacific. And the drama at Pearl Harbor would not be so significant, if at all. 100 British battleships and cruisers are powerful!
              1. dzvero 5 June 2020 16: 35 New
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                Eto - yes. But let's not delve into the alternative drinks
                1. Doccor18 5 June 2020 16: 44 New
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                  I’m all about the fact that, as real or as an alternative, the Germans did not have a chance to win.
                  1. Kisa 5 June 2020 21: 41 New
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                    had to stick to the original plan. They didn’t even count on half a million boilers for that. turned away to Kiev - what kind of amateur activity is this ?! . those two weeks weren’t enough when on October 5th after the adoption of the decision on the evacuation of the capital, the authorities pulled away from Moscow and panic began
  3. Far B 5 June 2020 04: 49 New
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    If only if ... What happened happened. And alternative versions are better left to alternative. And then you can fantasize a lot: if Hitler had finished the Anglo-Francs near Dunkirk, if the USSR had begun to wet the Angles in Africa before, if, if ... The thankless job is an alternative story.
    1. Mavrikiy 5 June 2020 05: 07 New
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      Quote: Far In
      What happened happened. And alternative versions are better left to alternative.

      In vain, so recklessly, one cannot relate to the experience of the past. It is the analysis that indicates errors and allows them to be avoided in the future. However, if you work for the world behind the scenes, then .... repeat The author may be mistaken and more “correct” solutions may be proposed for victims of frost and dirt, railway tracks.
      For example, now we are improving roads in the country strictly from west to east, but not from north to south. repeat
      1. Far B 5 June 2020 05: 17 New
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        Yeah, I’m working exclusively on the backstage of the world. Sitting in the Far Eastern North. Have you tried to eat? And then it is fraught - today the world behind the scenes seems to be everywhere, tomorrow the little green men.
        Analysis should be carried out in hot pursuit, and not after three quarters of a century. Because now such an analysis is absolutely useless. Circumstances have changed radically, you know. It was not without reason that Europe was ceded to Hitler because the European generals were preparing for the past war (i.e., the First World War). And this, mind you, is not 75 years old, but only 20.
      2. BAI
        BAI 5 June 2020 13: 03 New
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        For example, now we are improving roads in the country strictly from west to east, but not from north to south.

        And the Don roads M4 (Moscow - Rostov-on-Don) and the new high-speed Leningradskoye highway (Moscow - St. Petersburg) are unaware of this.
      3. ANB
        ANB 6 June 2020 12: 18 New
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        . For example, now we are improving the country's roads strictly from west to east, but not from north to south

        The M4 and M11 routes have recently been built and are being repaired. It seems they are just North - South. With M2, the construction is worse, but it is less relevant, and it is constantly being repaired.
  4. arhitroll 5 June 2020 05: 00 New
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    Hitler, if he was the greatest, is a ram. Attack the USSR ...
    1. Mordvin 3 5 June 2020 07: 01 New
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      Quote: arhitroll
      Hitler, if he was the greatest, is a ram. Attack the USSR ...

      We take the word of Heinrich, from the Nyurberogsky process:
      The main thing is that we did not know and did not understand the Soviet Russians. They were and will remain a mystery. No good agent can reveal the true military potential of the Soviets. I am not talking about the number of guns, planes and tanks. This is what we knew approximately. I am not talking about power and mobility of industry. I am talking about people, and Russian people have always been a mystery to a foreigner. Napoleon also did not understand him. We only repeated Napoleon's mistake.
    2. Ptolemy Lag 5 June 2020 09: 41 New
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      Hitler is an enemy of my country, but he was not a ram, even close. Many threw him in the war, did not keep these promises, the result is logical ...
      1. BAI
        BAI 5 June 2020 13: 06 New
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        Hitler is an enemy of my country, but he was not a ram, even close.

        The ram will not reach Moscow, Leningrad in a few months. If Hitler is a ram - then who are those who suffered from his defeat from 1939 to 1942?
        1. FIR FIR 5 June 2020 17: 36 New
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          A ram will not reach Moscow, .... A ram will not reach Moscow ...

          It was not Hitler who reached Moscow, but 5.7 million German soldiers and officers, of whom one in seven died and one in four was injured.
  5. Mavrikiy 5 June 2020 05: 46 New
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    There were, of course, outright failures, such as the Polish campaign, where Stalin and Budyonny openly behaved in a bad way.
    The author, the Polish campaign developed well, advanced 600 km. But the main zrad - Tukhachevsky fool with an adventurous trip to Warsaw.
    the Polish army was indeed on the verge of a catastrophe, even according to outside observers (in particular, General Fori, a member of the French military mission, noted that “at the beginning of the operation on the Vistula, for all military specialists, the fate of Poland seemed completely doomed, and not only the strategic situation was hopeless, but and morally, the Polish troops had formidable symptoms that seemed to finally bring the country to death ”
    Tukhachevsky took a chance and got full pants instead of champagne. request
    Although, of course, that the NKVD and the Gestapo had enough specialists who could explain to the particularly smart whose spies they were.
    The author, it’s already clear whose spy. Cranberry lover.
  6. Mavrikiy 5 June 2020 06: 04 New
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    It is clear that Hitler was not Stalin; he didn’t put the generals at the start of the war against the wall for no reason. This was at the end of the triple bird, and the generals were planted and shot no worse than ours in 1941
    Ostap suffered. By the way, what kind of map is St. Petersburg, Volgograd, German? repeat
  7. Free wind 5 June 2020 06: 07 New
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    Photographers should try very hard to make Goebels, at least a little like a person. An alternative story, it is certainly interesting, but thank God it is an alternative. What kind of owners did Hitler have? Well, actually thanks to these owners for ordering Hitler to make stupid decisions.
  8. Cartalon 5 June 2020 06: 36 New
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    Very weakly, with this self-isolation I listened to a bunch of Isaev's lectures, after them reading such articles is sad enough
  9. Mordvin 3 5 June 2020 06: 43 New
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    Leningrad. Strategically not important. Because there were no such active battles.

    Um ... I was not too lazy, I took out a children's book:
    - The best parts of the Nazi Wehrmacht were thrown to Leningrad

    Daniel Al, if anything, historian.
  10. Vitaly Tsymbal 5 June 2020 07: 08 New
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    Dear editors of the Military Review, make a special section for the “buffoon’s novels” - ALTERNATIVE HISTORY, for as Roman understands history, you will not name history ... For such an interpretation of the history of the Second World War in the Soviet school, they did not even put a triple with two minuses, no "watered reasons", but for superficial knowledge of the material ....
    1. pmkemcity 5 June 2020 11: 37 New
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      Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
      ALTERNATIVE HISTORY, for how Roman understands history, you cannot call history ..

      The "possessed" author.
    2. BAI
      BAI 5 June 2020 13: 12 New
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      Yes, there is already a whole company - Altukhin, Samsonovs.
      But this touches:
      Dear editors of the Military Review, make a special section for the "buffoon novels"

      Mr. Skomorokhov is one of the editors of the site and personally issues warnings, which then hang for years.
  11. apro 5 June 2020 07: 08 New
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    I think Agitler is a loser politician. The politician determines his opponents ... and the strategist decides how to deal with him ...
  12. Aleksey Aleksandrovich 5 June 2020 07: 17 New
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    With regret, I can say that Hitler with a bang lost everything, today takes revenge. And not somewhere in Europe, but here we have, in Russia! Our grandfathers defended the country, defeated the terrible enemy, and we, we are doing everything to deflect and predict this victory!
    A couple of days ago, an article appeared in VO "On Navalny, after his insulting post depicting a veteran, they were reported to the prosecutor's office"[u] [/ u]. The meaning of the article is that a well-known fighter with the regime and a guardian for the happiness of the Russian people in his post in one of the social networks allowed himself a vile statement to veterans of the Great Patriotic War.
    And it personally struck me that the vast majority of commentators practically justified Navalny’s act. After reading the comments on the article, I felt terrible. People justify the person who poured the shit of our glorious ancestors on the grounds that he has the right to do this because Navalny is the only person in Russia who fights corruption, brings officials to the open water, etc.
    So after 75 years, Adolf Aloizovich alas takes over. This is scary.
  13. Alien From 5 June 2020 07: 23 New
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    These creatures walked on Our land ....... there is no mercy for them !!!!!!!!
  14. parusnik 5 June 2020 07: 24 New
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    "Ah, if, ah if, there would be no life, but a song would" (c)
  15. Lavrenty1937 5 June 2020 07: 39 New
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    From Rostov to Stalingrad, about 375 km. If the Germans are not taken Stalingrad, then the distance from Rostov to the Red Army will be much less - somewhere 200 - 300 km. This means that Soviet troops with a powerful flank strike could cut off the Caucasian grouping of German troops from the main forces of the German army with the corresponding consequences. Without even planning to capture Stalingrad, Hitler would have to hold significant forces to parry a possible strike by the Red Army in the direction of Stalingrad - Rostov. And this means that Hitler simply could not significantly increase the Caucasian grouping at the expense of the Stalingrad.
    1. Viktor Sergeev 5 June 2020 08: 57 New
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      In war, not everything is decided in a direct way. What would they cut off from? Rather, our Caucasian group would fall into the ring.
      1. Alexey RA 5 June 2020 13: 52 New
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        Quote: Victor Sergeev
        In war, not everything is decided in a direct way. What would they cut off from?

        Those tank corps, which in real life tried to break through the northern part of the German half-ring - both from the city and from the north to the city.
        In addition, the plants of Stalingrad continue to operate (including STZ), so there will be no problems with repairs and new equipment.
  16. The comment was deleted.
  17. Unknown 5 June 2020 07: 48 New
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    The 20th century was rich in personalities who left their mark on history, it’s also Churchill, Roosevelt, you can add a Mussolini with a stretch. but the head of state, in addition to purely military aspects, must also take into account economic as well as diplomatic aspects. the blockade of Leningrad belongs to them. judging by the author’s remarks, the Germans needed to be under St. Petersburg, so much money and strength should not be kept, but a large part should be transferred to the Caucasian direction. Well, the rest, together with the Finns, Peter will be squeezed. but ours, too, in a blocked city did not sit idly by, but delivered sensitive blows both from the city and from the outside of the ring. the breakthrough of the blockade led to the collapse of the defense of the “group of the north” and exit to the rear, of the group of the center, which later happened in 1943-144. in such cases, the behavior of the Finns, it’s not even necessary to predict, the Germans would have definitely been abandoned. the prospect of staying alone K.A. they obviously did not like it. Therefore, the manstein with his army was transferred to St. Petersburg, where she had to repel our next blow. after reflection, manstein didn’t have any strength or ammunition left, which he writes about in his lost victories. Actually, you don’t need to refer to manstein, the storyteller is the same. but when you read the same speer, you will find out that Hitler, when making decisions, said ... the generals don’t understand that the current war is an economic war, and without it, it’s a trumpet. like that. yes and the Gestapo - heheim the state capitol was not as omnipotent as it seems. the conspiracy of the generals was clearly profound. where to him to our bodies. here with obstinate generals, Hitler fought the whole war, well, this is a separate issue.
    1. Tuzik 8 June 2020 00: 29 New
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      Quote: Unknown
      . Actually it’s not necessary to refer to the manstein, the storyteller is the same.

      The storyteller what? I agree with the losses, but here you can understand it, at the time of writing on the reverse side, the numbers were even more fabulous, but what else?
  18. svp67 5 June 2020 08: 03 New
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    What do you think, purely according to Golenishchev-Kutuzov, with the loss of Moscow the whole country would be lost?
    Immediately, of course not, but the fact that this question would immediately arise in all its glory, yes ...
    In all matters the author misses one VERY important aspect, namely the organization of the troop supply lines. It was in this aspect that Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad were very important. The capture of Moscow and Stalingrad would immediately put the Soviet side in a very disadvantageous situation, when we would sharply lose in the speed of supply of replenishment and material resources of the army. Our railroad and river workers worked at the limit. Remember how hastily it was necessary to rebuild the railroad tracks on our Volga coast, from the BAM rail, in order to at least somehow supply troops near Stalingrad, and the supply along the Volga altogether ceased. The capture of Leningrad, on the contrary, allowed the Germans to sharply improve the supply of their troops both in that region and in the North, relying on the port of Leningrad and a much better developed railway network than in the Baltic states.
    We were very lucky that the Germans did not calculate the strength of our resistance and they simply did not have enough forces and means, as a result of which they were forced to choose more important goals at the moment ... How did this happen with the re-targeting of tank groups from the Moscow direction for the encirclement forces SWF.
    1. Free wind 5 June 2020 08: 41 New
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      By that time, mainly excavation work was going on in BAM, 50 clometers were laid. The rails were removed from many other less important and unfinished roads. In the North, the railways were dismantled, well, and other sources.
      1. svp67 5 June 2020 08: 53 New
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        Quote: Free Wind
        Well, and other sources.

        Moscow tram lines ...
  19. mmaxx 5 June 2020 08: 16 New
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    As I understand it, the author would have won the war against Stalin. Only the Germans went to Stalingrad in order to cut off the supply of the same Caucasian oil. They did not know about the Volga oil. And to step in the steppe, it’s not in the mountains. Yes, the Germans went through Stalingrad with very small losses, defeating everything and everyone. And in other places, silly Hitler kept troops because silly Stalin drove fines and fanatical sodates with machine guns and zealots into senseless attacks. So right now, is it called in the West?
    And Moscow is generally garbage. Why did Hitler go there? Ahh! He wanted to dig the sea there. By the way, I would have done the same there now. Only in those days was it a railway junction.
    And with the surrender of Moscow we were faced with huge problems.
    Neither Hitler nor his generals were stupid (the normal word is banned here)
  20. Undecim 5 June 2020 08: 20 New
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    Both here and in the West. In the West, they especially like the theme of the brilliant German generals and the incompetent corporal who commanded them. And if it were not for Hitler's miscalculations, then the victory would definitely have been for Germany, and in general.
    Dear author, it is advisable to read what is written in the West, and not use propaganda cliches. Otherwise, you can get into a completely stupid situation, as with this article.
    We're watching.
    “The finale could have come much earlier if Hitler listened to the voices of his generals and did not fight hysterically about Stalingrad and Voronezh. He did not try to capture Moscow and rot Leningrad. He did not set political goals above the military.” This is written by the author in today's article.
    "In a military-strategic sense, Hitler’s desire at all costs to take Stalingrad did not make sense. It was a symbolic confrontation. Stalingrad, since it bears the name of Stalin, could ... symbolize the form of victory. Therefore, Hitler drove on foot even the remaining without cars, tank crews. "
    And this is from an interview with British historian Anthony Beaver of Radio Liberty. The question is - who wrote it off from whom?
    For those who have not read Beevor, a brief summary.
    In the West, there are two well-known scholars of Russian history - Richard Pipes and Anthony Beaver. Pipes dealt with the history of the revolution in Russia and his biography officially included work at the CIA, while Bivor - the history of the Second World War and his biography contains only the British Military Academy. Even Western historians are extremely cautious of their “research”, considering them to be propaganda rather than history.
    And Bivor gave the above interview in 1998 just about the publication of his book "Stalingrad.", Where he, like the author of today's article, argues that the Battle of Stalingrad was not of strategic importance, but was caused by Hitler's "hysteria".
    In reality, Hitler knew the strategy better than the author of the article, so he understood that Stalingrad was of crucial strategic importance not just as a large industrial center or transport hub, but of fundamental military importance as the bridgehead of Soviet troops on the western bank of the Volga.
    In accordance with the Blau plan, the German Army Group A was advancing into the North Caucasus with the aim of capturing Soviet oil fields, and the grouping of forces at Stalingrad threatened the northern flank of the advancing troops. That is why Army Group B, including the 6th Army of Paulus, was torn to the east, to the Volga. Their real goal was not just Stalingrad, but the cover for the advance of Group A. The task of the Soviet command was to keep the bridgehead on the west bank of the river, since it itself threatened the German offensive in a southerly direction, while simultaneously holding down significant forces of Army Group B.
    This is how it happens when the author writes on a topic from which he is far.
    1. chenia 5 June 2020 10: 23 New
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      Quote: Undecim
      That is why Army Group B, including the 6th Army of Paulus, was torn to the east, to the Volga.


      In. It's right. A plus. And then throw all the strength there. where it’s easier to build a defense and exhaust the enemy. I wrote below. What would be.
    2. Alexey RA 5 June 2020 14: 13 New
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      Quote: Undecim
      In accordance with the Blau plan, the German Army Group A was advancing into the North Caucasus with the aim of capturing Soviet oil fields, and the grouping of forces at Stalingrad threatened the northern flank of the advancing troops. That is why Army Group B, including the 6th Army of Paulus, was torn to the east, to the Volga. Their real goal was not just Stalingrad, but the cover for the advance of Group A.

      In the original version, the main task of Paulus was to surround and defeat Soviet forces. Stalingrad, on the other hand, was mentioned at the very end - as a “bonus" goal, which you must try to achieve, or at least fire / bomb (Directive 41).
      The main operation on the Eastern Front. Its goal, as already indicated, is to defeat and destroy the Russian troops located in the Voronezh region, south of it, and also west and north of the river. Don. Due to the fact that the necessary connections for this will only come gradually, this operation breaks up into a series of consecutive but interconnected strokes that complement each other. Therefore, they should be distributed in time from north to south in such a way that in each of these attacks in decisive directions as much as possible forces of the land army, and especially aviation, are concentrated.
      Due to the fact that the insensitivity of the Russians to the operational environment has been clearly revealed, the main attention (as was the case in both battles in the area of ​​Vyazma, Bryansk) should be given to individual breakthroughs in order to closely surround enemy groups.
      It is necessary to avoid that, as a result of the approach of troops intended for encirclement too late, the enemy will be able to avoid this encirclement.
      It should not be allowed that due to the too rapid advance of tanks and motorized troops to great depths, communication with the infantry following them would be lost; it is also impossible to allow such a situation when tank and motorized troops themselves lose the opportunity to provide direct assistance to the infantry advancing with heavy battles by delivering strikes to the rear of an enemy captured in ticks.
      Therefore, regardless of the main operational goal, one should always set himself the task of destroying the attacked enemy, and this goal should be reflected in the very organization of the offensive and use of troops.
      The beginning of this operation should serve as a comprehensive offensive or breakthrough from the area south of Orel in the direction of Voronezh. Of both groups of tank and motorized troops intended for maneuvering, the north should be stronger than the south. The purpose of this breakthrough is to capture the city of Voronezh. While part of the infantry divisions will have the task of immediately equipping a powerful defensive line from the original offensive area (Oryol) in the direction of Voronezh, tank and motorized formations will have to continue the offensive with their left flank from Voronezh along the Don River to the south to interact with troops making a breakthrough from the Kharkov region to the east. And here the main task is not to force the Russians to push their front, but to, in cooperation with motorized formations striking downstream the Don River, destroy the forces of the Russians.
      The third offensive in the framework of this operation must be organized in such a way that the forces striking downstream of the Don river join forces in the Stalingrad region from those coming from the Taganrog, Artemovsk region between the lower reaches of the Don river and Voroshilovgrad through the Donets river to the East. These forces should then join with the tank army advancing on Stalingrad.
      If during this operation, especially as a result of the capture of undestroyed bridges, it becomes possible to create bridgeheads east or south of the Don River, it must be used. In any case, it is necessary to try to reach Stalingrad, or at least expose it to the influence of our heavy weapons so that it loses its significance as a center of the military industry and a communications center.

      And only when Paulus did not succeed, and the Red Army retreated east, the plan was changed, and Stalingrad appeared on the list of the main objectives of the operation (Directive 45).
      Army group B, as previously ordered, has the task, along with the equipment of defensive positions on the Don River, to strike at Stalingrad and defeat the enemy grouped there, seize the city, and cut the isthmus between Don and Volga and disrupt river transport .
      1. Tuzik 8 June 2020 00: 44 New
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        Quote: Alexey RA
        The purpose of this breakthrough is to capture the city of Voronezh.

        But Bok, after all, was shot precisely for the storming of Voronezh, such as it was not necessary to take him. Kidanul Aloizych Field Marshal.
    3. Local from the Volga 5 June 2020 17: 20 New
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      the author is just an eccentric!
  21. Viktor Sergeev 5 June 2020 08: 48 New
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    As Comrade Napoleon said in the movie "Kutuzov": the mistake was when he decided to attack Russia.
    Hitler, as previously Karl12 and Napoleon had cartographic cretinism, did not understand that in Russia there are no roads in their understanding, and most importantly they really believed in the clay colossus, not understanding the nature of the Russians (Soviet).
    1. Darkesstcat 5 June 2020 09: 11 New
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      Well, they had an example of a war between the USSR and the Finns, so it’s not unfounded.
      1. Tuzik 8 June 2020 00: 45 New
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        And the first world.
  22. chenia 5 June 2020 09: 44 New
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    The withdrawal of troops from other directions, suggests. that ours could withdraw troops from these areas and strengthen the Caucasian direction. And to defend a narrow coastal zone (on one side of the sea, on the other mountain) is much easier. This is not the Volga steppes, you can’t roll out tanks. I would have to gnaw line after line (it’s hard to get around here). This is Thermopylae. And there would have been German divisions in a train, one is fighting. five watching .. And the Germans would be carried away. And there would have been a "Stalingrad" in the Caucasus. Only it would be captured not 6th A with part 4 TA, but the entire group "A", with all the alleged gain ..
  23. Dr. Frankenstucker 5 June 2020 09: 53 New
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    Hitler politician did not force Britain to peace.
    Hitler-strategist failed Barbarossa.
    1. pmkemcity 5 June 2020 11: 44 New
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      Quote: Dr. Frankenstucker
      Hitler politician did not force Britain to peace.
      Hitler-strategist failed Barbarossa.

      And so I did not receive the Nobel Peace Prize.
      1. Dr. Frankenstucker 5 June 2020 11: 51 New
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        Quote: pmkemcity
        And so I did not receive the Nobel Peace Prize.


        bully
      2. Revolver 5 June 2020 18: 43 New
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        Quote: pmkemcity
        Quote: Dr. Frankenstucker
        Hitler politician did not force Britain to peace.
        Hitler-strategist failed Barbarossa.

        And so I did not receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

        But it got Barack Hussein Obama.
        - Excuse me, for what?
        - It is said, but!
        1. Mordvin 3 5 June 2020 18: 45 New
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          Quote: Nagan
          But it got Barack Hussein Obama.

          Gorby got it too .... angry
  24. sanya 5 June 2020 10: 37 New
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    Frankly, Germany had every opportunity to win the war by concentrating efforts in the Middle East in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic
    But apparently there were hidden reasons why Hitler started the war against the USSR without ending the war against the British Empire ...
    As you know in Yugoslavia, the Soviet special services conducted a joint operation with the British special services (coup) ....
    I believe that Comrade Stalin and Comrade Beria worked for the British crown, unlike the first Bolsheviks who worked for the German General Staff
    This was the real reason for the German attack on the USSR
    1. Dr. Frankenstucker 5 June 2020 12: 02 New
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      Quote: sanya
      Frankly, Germany had every opportunity to win the war by concentrating efforts in the Middle East in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic


      very doubtful.
      In addition, Hitler was fatally unlucky with the allies on this theater. The Italians made their mark in Somalia and S. Africa, the French in Syria, Rashid Ali generally had little chance.
      1. sanya 5 June 2020 13: 43 New
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        These were tactical failures, besides not German
        With the right approach, Germany could win the war in a year and a half
        But apparently Hitler knew something ...
        Apparently the new Bolsheviks with Stalin at the head did not just clean out the old Bolsheviks.
        In other words, British agents finally defeated German agents in the USSR
        And when the joint operations of the USSR and the British Empire began, it became clear that the war would be on two fronts
    2. Kwas 6 June 2020 07: 46 New
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      Well, what about working for the British crown, you bent a little. Even in the midst of perestroika, I have not heard such a version. But I can voice my version of the reasons for Hitler’s decision to attack. Suppose, somewhere in the beginning of 1940, a reconnaissance report on the quantity and production of our tanks and aircraft hits his desk. Adik compares these figures with the German and wonders, but who is it against? And he decides unambiguously that there are no more options against him, except that we will release China, but even that, there is not so much to do. Let’s leave out what our management thought. At the same time, following the results of the Finnish war, he understands that our army, so far not quite in shape, must be beaten, and now. And whether he had a chance to win the Britons, completely depended on our (and state) position.
      1. sanya 6 June 2020 08: 27 New
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        The British crown confirmed not so long ago that Beria was still a British spy
        The USSR of Stalin and the British crown carried out a joint operation to change power in Yugoslavia (and this during the war with Germany)
        Hitler knew what was going on in the Red Army even without a war in Finland
        1. Kwas 6 June 2020 08: 41 New
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          And what evidence of the Beria recruitment provided by our British opponents?
          1. sanya 6 June 2020 11: 29 New
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            He was recruited before the revolution ...
            1. Hantengri 6 June 2020 13: 57 New
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              Quote: sanya
              He was recruited before the revolution ...

              You have a strange notion of proof ... lol
              1. sanya 6 June 2020 14: 12 New
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                For believers in holy Bolshevism, nothing is proof
                All the holy Bolsheviks were foreign agents
                When you manage to understand this simple thing, it will become clear what actually happened
                And the murders of Mirbach who essentially led the Bolsheviks from his embassy
                And the notorious Brest peace
                And the cleansing of the army and intelligence from the "old Bolsheviks"
                And then why the USSR found itself in a coalition with the British Empire
                And the Cambridge Five
      2. Hantengri 6 June 2020 08: 48 New
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        Quote: Kwas

        Well, what about working for the British crown, you bent a little. Even in the midst of perestroika, I have not heard such a version.

        Kostya, it’s customary to talk to “You,” even when you really don’t want any muskrat ... And, in general, you are simply not capable of the entire depth of the flight of the conspiracy theological thought of comrade sanya, because you yourself are a drunkard! Polish... wassat
        1. Kwas 6 June 2020 09: 10 New
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          About politeness I will consider. As you know, by default I turn to “You”. Just the phrase “You” didn’t work out very well. And I myself am not a spy, but a scout. The difference must be understood!
          1. Hantengri 6 June 2020 09: 25 New
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            Quote: Kwas
            Just the phrase “You” didn’t work out very well.

            And, now, we must, we must make an effort on ourselves! And pour out the poisonous miasms of your brain with the help of an emphasized, polite form of communication.
            Quote: Kwas
            And I myself am not a spy, but a scout. The difference must be understood!

            Come on! Not a big difference. I myself, too, must be a spy. I just can’t decide how: Polish, Slovenian, German, or (if you dig a little deeper) generally Swedish. laughing
            1. Kwas 6 June 2020 09: 43 New
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              Sorry, Comrade Colonel, but it really doesn’t matter what kind of spy you are, (the lumberjack or the poacher) the main thing is the enemy (and therefore there is one punishment). And I’m a scout, because ours, and I’ve got a reward for that!
  25. Evgeniy1976 5 June 2020 10: 50 New
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    The Germans did plan to take Leningrad in 1942 with the Finns. Already plans were made up.
    1. Alexey RA 5 June 2020 15: 27 New
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      Quote: Eugene1976
      The Germans did plan to take Leningrad in 1942 with the Finns. Already plans were made up.

      Not just plans. The Germans had already concentrated their forces, having transferred 11 A Manstein from the Crimea.
      The plan of the operation as a whole was similar to that according to which von Leeb was supposed to act in September 1941 - a strike through the Neva between Leningrad and Ladoga towards the Finns and a complete blockade of the city.
      But the plan was not implemented for the second time either: two weeks before the planned start of the German offensive, the Soviet Sinyavinsky operation began - another attempt to break through the blockade. And Manstein was forced to abandon the forces concentrated for the offensive to repulse the Soviet strike. Our attack was stifled, the shock force fell into the cauldron (fortunately, not too dense - many managed to get out), Leningrad remained in blockade.
      But the Germans' victory turned out to be pyrrhic - their shock group suffered losses that made the beginning of the offensive impossible. And besides, the stock of artillery ammunition intended for the offensive was expended.
  26. Ivan Chapaev 5 June 2020 10: 58 New
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    A superficial article - the troops of the Red Army would not stand near Moscow in this case, but would have hit the flank. On the other hand, the same Guderians were very surprised by Hitler's order to stop tanks near Dunkirk, which allowed the British to evacuate, but Hitler correctly reasoned - if you lost tanks near Dunkirk, then what turned out to be right. Or the capture of the Eben-Enamel fortress - after all, this is Hitler’s plan with an airborne landing. The Führer was not a fool.
    1. Dr. Frankenstucker 5 June 2020 12: 27 New
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      Quote: Ivan Chapaev
      it’s Hitler’s airborne plan.


      then there was a pyrrhic victory in Crete.
    2. Alexey RA 5 June 2020 15: 35 New
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      Quote: Ivan Chapaev
      On the other hand, the same Guderians were very surprised by Hitler's order to stop tanks near Dunkirk.

      The order was von Rundstedt. Hitler only endorsed the already executed order - and based on the arguments of the same von Rundstedt. smile
  27. BAI
    BAI 5 June 2020 12: 48 New
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    1.
    Strange by that. that the advancing Soviet troops were not 3 to 1, as it should be according to all the canons of the strategy, but fewer than the defenders.

    In the initial period of the war, the Germans conducted successful offensive operations without numerical superiority. (in common on that sector of the front where the operation was carried out. Superiority was only directly on the front breakthrough, all other sectors were exposed). Near Kursk, the Germans almost broke through the defense of Vatutin, without superiority.
    2.
    Let’s even assess at the level of couch strategists what was more important: to take Grozny and Baku, depriving the entire Red Army of fuel, or to weigh Stalin with the plague by taking Stalingrad?

    You can start with the fact that it is not necessary to capture the Caucasus, it is enough to cut the way for the delivery of oil and oil products from the Caucasus. And he alone - through Stalingrad. Why do we need oil reserves if you can’t use them?
    Despite this:
    The question of the capture of the Caucasus again arose in the spring of 1942. Directive No. 41 of the OKB, signed by Hitler on April 5, 1942, as the main operation of the German summer offensive, provided for a breakthrough in the southern sector of the front with the aim of destroying Soviet troops west of the Don, capturing the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus and crossing across the Caucasian ridge. By capturing the Caucasus, the German leadership hoped to drag Turkey into the war, disrupt the USSR’s ties with the allies through Iran and put it on the brink of disaster in general, having achieved favorable changes in the strategic situation in the Near and Middle East. A significant problem for Germany was the provision of raw materials and fuel. Hitler’s words are widely known at the meeting of the commanders of the army group “South” on June 1, 1942: “If I do not receive Maykop and Grozny oil, I must end this war.”

    No one ever refused to capture the Caucasus.
    Just no one could have foreseen the defeat of the Red Army near Kharkov, which allowed the Germans to go to Stalingrad. The situation has changed - plans have changed.
    This also explains why they did not immediately throw all their forces into the Caucasus. If the blitzkrieg were a success, the issue with the Caucasus could be solved without rushing according to the Rosenberg plan:
    On May 8, 1941, Rosenberg approved the instructions for the Reich Commissariats of the occupied eastern regions, where he emphasized the need to create in the Caucasus with the territories adjacent to it a "federal state with a German authorized mission."
  28. Operator 5 June 2020 13: 20 New
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    The author is clearly not a strategist or even tactician - if German forces were concentrated in the North Caucasus, they would be guaranteed to receive a flank attack from the Red Army from the Stalingrad region and end up in the boiler (see, for example, the unrealized operation "Saturn").

    Therefore, the Wehrmacht was forced to advance in two diverging directions - Grozny and Stalingrad, and in 1942 he no longer had forces - it was also necessary to keep large groups near Moscow and Leningrad. In other words, apart from the blitzkrieg in 1941 (which failed), Germany had nothing to rely on strategically in the war with the USSR. The continuation of the war in 1942 amid the mobilization of the Soviet economy and the combat cohesion of the Red Army on the Leningrad-Moscow-Voronezh-Rostov-on-Don line is already a failure and a complete discrepancy with the Barbarossa plan.

    Those. there is no strength to attack both Stalingrad and the Caucasus at the same time, and an offensive only to the Caucasus will end with a grandiose cauldron, hence the inevitable concentration of the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad in order to secure the flank and at the same time cut off the Soviet Union’s fuel delivery routes from the Caucasus. And this decision could not be corrected in any way - be it even Hitler or the German general of seven spans in the forehead.
    1. DDT
      DDT 8 June 2020 00: 20 New
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      Boiler? Without oil? On what? only infantry and horse-drawn vehicles? He’s not so wrong.
  29. Alexey RA 5 June 2020 13: 20 New
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    Some kind of mess with dates.
    Dismantle - this is understandable. But why then does the Fuhrer’s strange order come from on September 12 1941, which said: Leningrad not to take. Someone called it salvation, someone considers it the beginning of a tragic blockade, but let's see what happened next.

    «12.10. 1941.
    The operational department of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces passes to the group of forces the order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht:
    The Führer again decided not to accept the surrender of Leningrad, even if it was proposed by the enemy. The moral justification for this is clear to the whole world. Just like in Kiev, where as a result of explosions with the use of clockwork there was a grave threat to the troops, this should be foreseen even more in Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad is mined and will defend itself to the last man, was reported by Soviet Russian radio itself. Therefore, no German soldier should enter this city. Those who try to leave the city through our line should be returned by using fire. ”

    10th month is October. Not September. As of October 1941, the question of taking Leningrad by storm was no longer standing - the main forces of the 4th TGr had been leaving near Moscow for several weeks now. So the Fuhrer is absolutely right - there is no need to ruin the forces of GA "North" in urban battles. Especially considering its successful offensive in the Tikhvin direction.
    But in the first half September 1941 the storming of Leningrad was in full swing. Moreover, von Leeb led him in violation of Directive No. 35, which ordered first to surround the city, cutting it off from Ladoga. And the Germans turned off this assault only on September 17.09.1941, 4, when the GA Sever had to give up the XNUMXth TGr (and with a delay of two days).
  30. Kwas 5 June 2020 13: 33 New
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    In general, I support abusive comments, the analysis is very so-so. But speaking on the topic, yes, Hitler, unlike Stalin, really could not stand the contradictions of the generals. But their "love" was mutual, sometimes reaching sabotage. Adolf received the general / officer corps in fact inherited from William, without cleaning it up, and for the most part they despised him. As Rezun wrote in his time, the army had to be cleaned even before the war. And do not remove generals like Guderian after the first defeat. And yes, as a politician and strategist, he lost by getting involved in a hopeless war, and making it a "war of annihilation," thereby cutting off all paths to a compromise world.
  31. Andrey VOV 5 June 2020 13: 50 New
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    I do not quite agree with the author about Moscow. Besides the fact that it is the capital, Moscow, even then and now it is a huge transport junction and a lot of roads were built in such a way that Moscow cannot be avoided, plus this is a human resource, let’s say, plus the city’s industry. Moscow, in principle, could fall if the Wehrmacht didn’t turn its troops, especially the armored ones to close the boiler near Kiev, which Guderian was mildly not happy about.
  32. iouris 5 June 2020 14: 09 New
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    This is a liberal discourse.
    1) Hitler did not wage the Great Patriotic War.
    2) Hitler is the Fuhrer, not a strategist or politician.
    3) World wars proceed according to the approved financial plan.
  33. akunin 5 June 2020 15: 15 New
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    a lorry on firewood in the back of a cannon and almost a tank. or tracked armored trains wink
    not sure but
    Fischer — Tropsch synthesis was invented in lean oil but coal-rich Germany in the 1920s. for the production of liquid fuels. It was used by Japan and Germany during World War II to produce alternative fuels. The annual production of synthetic fuel in Germany reached more than 124 thousand barrels per day ~ 6,5 million tons in 1944
    perhaps ours possessed the proper knowledge (20 years passed + we went to visit each other).
    1. Alexey RA 5 June 2020 15: 37 New
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      Quote: akunin
      perhaps ours possessed the proper knowledge (20 years passed + we went to visit each other).

      The theory was. But with practice everything was very bad.
      In 1939, it was decided to build eight artificial liquid fuel plants with a capacity of 200 thousand tons of gasoline per year: in Vladivostok - productivity of 30 thousand tons per year; Cheremkhovo - 30 thousand tons per year; Gdov - 10 thousand tons per year; Syzran - 10 thousand tons per year; Moscow region - 30 thousand tons per year; Ivanovo region - 30 thousand tons per year; in Kolyma - 30 thousand tons per year; in Drilling - 30 thousand tons per year.
      At first glance, the decision to produce artificial gasoline was somewhat unusual for a country with high oil production. But it was explained by the great vulnerability of the Baku and Grozny oil areas in wartime, as well as the remoteness of consumption areas from oil production areas. The production of synthetic gasoline made it possible to obtain fuel locally and was less dependent on the Caucasian oil fields.
      Difficulties in the implementation of the program for the construction of artificial liquid fuel plants led to the fact that by 1941 not a single enterprise had ever been launched, construction work continued on only three of the eight plants.
      © Mmelia A.A. Mobilization training of the national economy of the USSR.
    2. Kwas 5 June 2020 19: 10 New
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      Apart from artificial liquid fuels, there was another alternative - wood-burning gas-powered cars. They were.
      1. Revolver 5 June 2020 20: 49 New
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        Quote: Kwas
        Apart from artificial liquid fuels, there was another alternative - wood-burning gas-powered cars. They were.

        It would do for the USSR, and for Germany, at least for mass use, it is unlikely that the forests there were reduced in the early Middle Ages, and where to get firewood? And not all cars are suitable. Lorry, perhaps the optimal size. In passenger cars there is no place for such a “stove”, and the tank needs it of such a size that it would be no bigger than the tank itself. And I met planes on gas generators only in fantasy reading.
        1. Kwas 6 June 2020 07: 29 New
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          Well, yes, it is about the USSR. And only about private use. Nobody thought to transfer everything to a lawsuit, even in Germany. Diesel fuel lawsuit still does not fry. But since they had little oil, they had to somehow get out, but they couldn’t massively use our captured T34 - everything went to the fleet. But for us it was still less important, more likely to save, and so that it was possible not to carry gas at all in some places.
  34. NF68 5 June 2020 16: 32 New
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    This "strategist and politician" was very violent. Happened and chewed carpets and tantrums often rolled up.
    1. Revolver 5 June 2020 18: 53 New
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      Quote: NF68
      This "strategist and politician" was very violent. Happened and chewed carpets and tantrums often rolled up.

      Well, you never know, in our time, politicians also chew. Who snot, who ties. Of course, a tie looks small compared to a carpet, well, Georgia is not Germany.
      1. NF68 7 June 2020 17: 53 New
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        Quote: Nagan
        Quote: NF68
        This "strategist and politician" was very violent. Happened and chewed carpets and tantrums often rolled up.

        Well, you never know, in our time, politicians also chew. Who snot, who ties. Of course, a tie looks small compared to a carpet, well, Georgia is not Germany.


        If Hitler would be smarter, he would not get in touch with the BI, France, the USA and the USSR. By peaceful means, Hitler would be able to achieve at least part of his goals with much less risk, and so he put everything in Germany upside down for which he and all of Germany suffered.
  35. Revolver 5 June 2020 18: 30 New
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    Novel,
    I’m never a military man, but I don’t have to be a strategist to see this. In addition to political importance, Stalingrad was also needed by the Germans to cover the left flank of the troops advancing in the Caucasus. The Volga was a natural border, not to mention the fact that tankers transported Caucasian oil to oil refineries along it. And if Paulus with his 6th army was sent to the Caucasus, leaving the Italians, Hungarians, and Romanians to cover, then the attack of the Red Army from Stalingrad to Rostov and further to the Sea of ​​Azov was asking for, cutting off much more German troops than was surrounded at Stalingrad. There was no Crimean bridge then, and even the "engineering geniuses" Germans could not have built it in a couple of weeks or even months, and only a limited number of people and materials can be transported on barges. Air Supply? He was lacking even the 6th army surrounded in Stalingrad, and here the whole group. And winter in the foothills of the Caucasus is not at all more comfortable than in Stalingrad. So the war would end in 1943.
    It is another matter if Hitler did not disperse troops in 1941 on the entire front from the White to the Black Sea, but concentrated on the Caucasus, the USSR would have to be sour. The loss of Caucasian oil and the Iranian Lend-Lease route would by no means contribute. Another thing is that then the USSR could organize a strike, say, from the Baltic on Koenigsberg, as it was planned, and there KV-2 would show itself in the case for which they were prepared. But in our reality what happened happened, and the story cannot be rewritten.
    1. Cartalon 5 June 2020 18: 50 New
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      Everything was much simpler, an absurd mistake was the transfer of the 11th army from the Crimea to Leningrad.
    2. Sergey Zhikharev 6 June 2020 08: 42 New
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      And if Paulus with his 6th army was sent to the Caucasus, leaving the Italians, Hungarians, and Romanians to cover, then the attack of the Red Army from Stalingrad to Rostov and further to the Sea of ​​Azov was asking for, cutting off much more German troops than was surrounded at Stalingrad. There was no Crimean bridge then, and even the "engineering geniuses" Germans could not have built it in a couple of weeks or even months, and only a limited number of people and materials can be transported on barges. Air Supply? He was lacking even the 6th army surrounded in Stalingrad, and here the whole group. And winter in the foothills of the Caucasus is not at all more comfortable than in Stalingrad. So the war would end in 1943
      .
      A blow then begs, but will there be a blow? The offensive of the winter-summer of 1942 is not successful for the Red Army, and a massive blow to Rostov could turn into a failure. So a titmouse in hands is better (for example, successful operation Mars) than a crane in the sky (Big Saturn).
      And will there be a crane? In RI, the Germans were able to evacuate through the Kerch Strait. In the meantime, they have not been evacuated - they are being supplied, the shoulder of logistics is much better than near Stalingrad (less load on aviation).
      And finally, 1943 is too optimistic. The Germans still have enough strength (the Battle of Kursk or its analogue will not), will begin to build fortifications along the Dnieper, the Vistula. But in 1944 the war will end
  36. Sergey Zhikharev 6 June 2020 08: 49 New
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    This material by Roman Skomorokhov is rather weak. For a separate article, chaotic. The question of Hitler, both a strategist and a politician, remained unresolved.
    For example, how Hitler proved himself as a strategist in the capture of Europe. What plans did the generals propose, and what did Hitler choose (the same blow to France, the generals wanted the old fashioned way). What plans did the generals offer when it came to German defense?
  37. ser56 6 June 2020 13: 49 New
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    Another frankly illiterate delirium of the author ... request
    1) War and politics are not separable ...
    2) to step on the Caucasus with the intestine without covering the flank with the capture of Voronezh and Stalingrad - nonsense ... request
    3) The army is an association ... hi
    1. Alexey RA 8 June 2020 08: 51 New
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      Quote: ser56
      2) to step on the Caucasus with the intestine without covering the flank with the capture of Voronezh and Stalingrad - nonsense ...

      Yeah ... especially if you recall - why the Germans lingered near Voronezh, and where were the two most equipped panzerdivis, which according to the plan should have been in the south.
      1. ser56 8 June 2020 22: 03 New
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        Quote: Alexey RA
        and where were the two most equipped panzerdivisi

        and if ours struck on the flank to the sea? remember the liberation of Rostov in 41g. and the Germans fleeing from the North Caucasus at the end of 42 .. request
        Just the capture of Stalingrad, and then a blow along the Volga down - solved the issue of extended flanks ... request
        the question is not in the strategy - the question is in the forces - the Germans only thanks to the mediocrity of the command of the Red Army in the SWF and the Crimea could succeed in the summer of 42 request
  38. bubalik 6 June 2020 20: 15 New
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    Underestimated OKV Astrakhan direction.

    The consequences of the loss of Astrakhan could become the most tragic, since in this case the railway connection with Transcaucasia would be cut, and the supply of precious oil products from Baku could be carried out only through remote Guryev with its poor infrastructure.

    86% of oil, 65% of gas and 56% of manganese ore mined in the Soviet Union accounted for Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus. These strategic cargoes mainly went through Astrakhan by river and rail.
    In terms of traffic, the Astrakhan port was not inferior to the largest ports of the Soviet Union. There was a transshipment of bread, cotton, and the transfer of oil and other important cargoes from sea vessels going from the Caspian to river ones heading up the Volga inland.
    1. Revolver 6 June 2020 21: 41 New
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      Quote: bubalik
      Underestimated OKV Astrakhan direction.

      Yes, probably they understood all this, only the reserves of equipment, and especially of people, in Germany were not dimensionless. Well, the defenders of Stalingrad somehow didn’t act according to the German plan, these subhuman people, instead of raising their hands and ordering to go to work for the Reich, bite into the ground and did not let the German supermen to the Volga. There too, the reserves that they could scrape together were thrown away, even Rommel was taken away everything that is possible and that is impossible too, but all to no avail. Well, and as a side effect, the defeat of the Afrika Korps by the British. And why would Rommel, who had so successfully attacked, suddenly slowed down and began to hastily retreat? Without reserves, ammunition, and fuel that everyone threw into the Stalingrad meat grinder, you won’t get much.
      1. bubalik 6 June 2020 21: 50 New
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        defenders of Stalingrad somehow did not act according to the German plan

        ,, maybe so, Stalingrad was supposed to be taken by July 25, Astrakhan - on August 5, Baku - by the end of September. Stalingrad stood, had to go through the Kalmyk steppes, at the junction of two armies.
        In general, the story of the defense of Astrakhan is little voiced.
  39. demo 6 June 2020 21: 50 New
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    Soviet units totaled 1,1 million people, 7 652 guns and mortars, 415 rocket artillery installations, 774 tanks (including 222 heavy and medium) and 1 thousand aircraft.

    The German Army Group Center had 1,7 million people, about 13 guns and mortars, 500 tanks and 1 aircraft. (Data on the publication: “The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 170-615: A Brief History” under the general editorship of B. S. Telpukhovsky and the collective. Military Publishing House, 1941)


    It was clear in 1984 that the ratio was not what was required.
    And at that time there was an order, and it was simply carried out.


    Siberian oil reserves were not even explored at that time, all fuel was produced from Grozny and Baku oil.
    Siberian reserves were discovered much later than the Second World War ended.
    First, the Romashkinskoye field was discovered, which for many years became the main production base in the USSR.
    And that was in 1944.
  40. DDT
    DDT 8 June 2020 00: 13 New
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    Well, thank God that the possessed did not go towards the Caucasus, indeed, now, it would be possible everything would be different. It seems to me that Hitler was playing war, this is his problem. He wanted the war to go on forever. It’s like if you play stretagia on a computer, it’s interesting and you do everything to keep the game going. Until giving tribute to opponents wink Here Hitler, he was apparently a "computer nerd," such as those that are chopped into tanks today hi
  41. Tuzik 8 June 2020 01: 34 New
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    For me, the northern direction was more important. An attack through Tikhvin to join with the Finns, the defeat of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet, the liberation of the 18th army and Finnish forces, and further from the same region of Tikhvin with good supply, an attack to the south like Blau, with access to the rear of the Volkhov, Kalinin, Western fronts, their entourage, the capture of Moscow, and then even further south to Stalingrad, the Caucasus.
    1. Alexey RA 8 June 2020 08: 54 New
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      So ... even in the Directive No. 21 provided: first - Leningrad, then - Moscow. smile
      1. Tuzik 8 June 2020 12: 33 New
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        After the sleeves, they reacted to the northern direction, even by the fact that they appointed Leeb there, and did not remove him for mocking the tank group. )) They just took the group so that it would not suffer. )) Notice how lazy and reluctant from the first day, Halder describes in the diary the battles in the north, in comparison with other directions. For me, it was necessary to launch all 4 groups to the north of Pripyat at once, with the Runches, Kleists, and Reichenau. And let Leeb sit in a position in Ukraine. How would ours respond with the constant threat of a flank strike from the north? How many troops would withdraw from Ukraine, or would rush to Romania or strike north in the direction of Boku? Golovnyak would have been provided with a serious one.
        1. Alexey RA 8 June 2020 15: 03 New
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          Quote: Tuzik
          Notice how lazily and reluctantly from the first day, Halder describes in the diary the battles in the north, in comparison with other directions.

          So Halder in the diary entries on the fighting, paid attention mainly to those places where the performers were knocked out of the plan.
          And GA "Sever" flew forward at such a speed that von Leeb was forced to "take off" the infantry, transferring the transport to supply 4 TGr.
          Quote: Tuzik
          For me, it was necessary to launch all 4 groups to the north of Pripyat at once, with the Runches, Kleists, and Reichenau. And let Leeb sit in a position in Ukraine. How would ours respond with the constant threat of a flank strike from the north?

          Flank strike through the Pripyat swamps? For the Germans, the main problem of the first stage of Directive 21 was that the southern and northern groups did not have an "elbow connection" due to the impassable terrain between them.
          Can the road network withstand four TGr supplies? EMNIP, mechanized units "eat" twice as much supply and fuel per day of combat as infantry units. And the rear is added to them to supply them. designed for twice as large needs and several times greater supply shoulders (speed of advance is greater). Won't the Germans get their version of our Polish campaign of 1939, when the mechanized corps equipment paralyzed the communications of the army rear of the Red Army and stood up without fuel?
          And what will happen to the west of the border? Even in real life, the Warsaw railway junction got up due to the inability to process and send trains on time.
          1. Tuzik 8 June 2020 15: 24 New
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            Where three were supplied, the fourth would be supplied somehow. In my opinion, the first one complained about the supply in Ukraine most of all.
            And with the capture of Leningrad, that two groups with skillful command would probably have dealt with by September, this question would be closed. And in September, the attack of two armored tanks from the 18th from the north, and the full GA Center from the west, Moscow would not have left a chance. Ours would have to keep a lot of troops in Ukraine, hiding from both the west and the north, suddenly Guderian will turn (as it was). And he planned to wrap up after Moscow, along with the other three groups. Sickle.
  42. Kostadinov 8 June 2020 15: 34 New
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    1.
    There were, of course, outright failures, such as the Polish campaign, where Stalin and Budyonny openly behaved in a bad way.

    Failure in the Polish campaign beat Tukhachevsky - so he “missed” the Polish offensive on the Vistula. Stalin and Budyonny only had successes from Kiev to Lviv.
    2.
    In fact, the offensive launched near Moscow required the Germans more forces and equipment than they could have expected. There was simply nothing to take Leningrad.

    Taking Leningrad beat even harder than Moscow. Leningrad was strengthened incomparably better than Moscow and it was protected by the formidable artillery of the fleet. Nothing of the kind struck near Moscow.
    Throwing tanks at the fortifications of Leningrad - it is necessary to come up with.
    3.
    The final could have come much earlier if Hitler heeded the voices of his generals and did not fight in hysteria about Stalingrad and Voronezh. He did not try to capture Moscow and rot Leningrad. He did not set political goals above the military.
    That is, all the forces that it is possible (and the Germans were masters in the ability to concentrate and transfer troops) were to be thrown to the south. At the oil fields of Grozny and Baku.

    If Hitler went to the Caucasus, leaving the Red Army at Staligrad deep in tila on his communications, then the scale of his defeat in the winter of 1942/43 could hit several times more. The entire South Army group could get into a cauldron in the Caucasus and the end of its Reich could come much earlier.
    4.
    It was necessary to take several key railway junctions on the North Caucasus and Southeast railways.
    Oil pipelines were a rarity then. And in the production of fuel and lubricants reflected failures on the fronts. However, we’ll talk about this separately.

    The Germans interrupted the railroad anyway, but oil was transported from Baku along the Caspian Sea and then along the Volga.
    5.
    The Germans by 1942 had all of Ukraine with its coal and black soil. Almost all of the Black Earth region is rich in soil. Yes, the occupied land would give birth to the Germans a little, but it would not give anything to the USSR.
    It only remained to deprive the country of fuel.

    The USSR did not die of hunger and without Chernozemia. He did not capitulate, and if the Germans managed to take Baku. The most valuable equipment and people could be evacuated from Baku by sea. This guaranteed dobic and refining several million tons of oil without Baku. The USSR also received oil and fuel from Iran through the Caspian. And this is not a Lendlis delivery because Soviet troops beat Iran. But the most important thing is that the USSR could fight with several times less oil. The Red Army could successfully advance and with 2-3 times fewer tanks, planes and cars. Proof of the war in Korea 1950-53.
    1. Alexey RA 8 June 2020 15: 45 New
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      Quote: Kostadinov
      Throwing tanks at the fortifications of Leningrad - it is necessary to come up with.

      So von Leeb wanted to do near Leningrad what Zhukov did near Berlin: with the blow of the 4th TGr, he quickly cut off the personnel units of the Red Army from the city. And then take the city, the defenders of which remained "in the field."
      At the same time, he violated the direct order to strike bypassing the city, through the Neva - to join the Finns.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      The USSR also received oil and fuel from Iran through the Caspian.

      If the Germans take Baku, then this route closes - the backlash from Baku will simply be carried out by ports and tankers.
      Quote: Kostadinov
      And this is not a Lendlis delivery because Soviet troops beat Iran.

      Through Iran, this is just a land lease.
  43. Kostadinov 8 June 2020 16: 39 New
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    So von Leeb wanted to do near Leningrad what Zhukov did near Berlin: with the blow of the 4th TGr, he quickly cut off the personnel units of the Red Army from the city. And then take the city, the defenders of which remained "in the field."
    At the same time, he violated the direct order to strike bypassing the city, through the Neva - to join the Finns.

    To cut off the army from the fortified city, which it protects? Von Leeb did not have time to do this when the Red Army beat several hundred kilometers from the city, but here he wants to when it is several tens of kilometers from the city. With this, Leningrad is not Berlin and Moscow is a large port. Troops can be evacuated by sea.
    Connecting with the Finns and the great surroundings of Leningrad is a somewhat better idea, but also very difficult to implement. For this it is necessary to transfer troops from the Center to the North, cancel the offensive near Moscow in October 41 and create all conditions for the successful offensive of the Red Army and Stalingrad near Moscow as early as 41.
    If the Germans take Baku, then this route closes - the backlash from Baku will simply be carried out by ports and tankers.

    The Luftwaffe was not able to interrupt the supply of Leningrad through Ladoga and Stalingrad through the Volga and interrupt the supply through the Caspian will be incomparably more difficult.
    Through Iran, this is just a land lease.

    Lendlis also went through Iran, but oil delivery did not hit “through” but from Iran itself. This is a slightly different matter.
  44. Martin 8 June 2020 17: 50 New
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    Another confirmation that all thoughts on the subject of “if” is a blank shot. There is noise, there is no result. (Unless the result is the same noise).
    Hitler screwed up? Well, screwed up. It is a normal state of war. In general, the wins are won not by the brilliant super-commanders, but by the one who has done the least job. Why the military is taught from the experience of the past war, although it is obvious that the next will be completely different. But because the past jambs are being taken apart so as not to repeat them from now on. And all ingenious operations are therefore ingenious because they passed with the least amount of jambs.
    The authors of the “alternatives” do not understand: act side A otherwise than in history, side B would also behave differently. This is good with Savin in the "Sea Wolf" (popadants, yeah, fashionable now). Having got from the XXI century. in 1942 and having assisted in correcting the known jambs, they were faced with the fact that after a year the “after-knowledge” was exhausting itself, because the story has already gone differently, with new problems and blunders that are impossible to know about in our 2012th. In any case, on a tactical and operational scale.
  45. itis 10 June 2020 22: 33 New
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    according to the "Barbarossa" plan, developed by the staff under the command of Paulus, by the winter of the 41st Wehrmacht was to go to the arch Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan. completed the task, but did not take neither Peter nor Moscow. Blitzkrieg failed. economic war broke out, oxygen was shut off, or rather, “blood of war”, railways in the European part of the USSR were unsuitable, hundreds of kilometers of traffic jams. Hitler’s strategy (I know everyone knows) was great. after proser Tymoshenko near Voronezh to break two armor with one armor-piercing one. block the Volga, as a transport artery of fuel (but it would not be enough, after the Moscow battle it became clear at the headquarters that there was no Storage) and close the production itself, taking Baku. very clever and right. by all accounts, it should have faded. but ... here politics intervened (much earlier), that is, before (earlier) the accepted opinion that the Slavs are untermanshi. who is engaged in sports perfectly understands. I myself remember (free-style wrestling) how a more technical one gets caught, so you get wild and already run up against the mat with a different horn. this “a little bit” (they didn’t politically expect sporting behavior from the suckers) and played off to the headquarters calculations, which rolled perfectly in Europe. read the memoirs of Manstein, who was to release the sixth army of Paulus in Stalingrad. he blames everything on the too charismatic Adik (whom the fortunetellers had predicted a victory for sure) but skipped surprised phrases about the irresistible heroism of the Russians, who spat on death like a woman on an iron. Germans themselves are also not poor, therefore it is essential. IMHO - in the bottom line, neither Hitler lost nor Stalin won. defeated the Russian people (and the women in the rear. not a single monument !!) with normal sporting behavior.
  46. And Makarov 14 June 2020 08: 36 New
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    Hitler is primarily a project.