Adolf Hitler: war loser strategist or politician?
Today they talk about this a lot and with taste. Both here and in the West. In the West, they especially like the theme of the brilliant German generals and the incompetent corporal who commanded them. And if it were not for Hitler's miscalculations, then the victory would definitely have been for Germany, and in general.
That's about this very "and in general" we are now discussing.
In general, the two commanders-in-chief of the warring countries with military training did not have much. That is, even with a civic education it was so-so, we no longer remember the military. Hitler received a certain combat experience in the First World War, but Stalin did not even have such experience. That did not stop Joseph Vissarionovich from taking leading positions in the military structures of the Red Army and even successfully confronting Krasnov near Tsaritsyn and Kolchak (with Dzerzhinsky) near Ufa.
There were, of course, outright failures, such as the Polish campaign, where Stalin and Budyonny openly behaved in a bad way.
But we are not talking about that. And about such an interesting thing as the enormous capacity for work of the leaders of the two countries, which helped both in their work on the issues of warfare.
In essence, neither Stalin nor Hitler created the plans for Barbarossa or Bagration. This was done by those who are most intended for this, that is, officers of the general staff. And the commanders-in-chief only carried out strategic leadership, determining the general lines of conduct for troops and fleets.
Another question is who put more pressure on their generals, subordinating them to their will and imposing their line of behavior.
I believe that here Hitler would give a big head start to Stalin. Indeed, not being, as they would say now, an expert, but a true communist, Stalin preferred to take all complex decisions collectively.
Yes, many Soviet military commanders and managers would have given their right hand for Stalin to take all the questions individually. It's easier to live like that. And it would be to whom to blame everything in case of failure. But Stalin's communist convictions did not allow him to hit the map with his fist and shout that it should be so.
Although, of course, special freethinking had to be earned. But they deserve it, right?
Although, of course, that the NKVD and the Gestapo had enough specialists who could explain to the particularly smart whose spies they were.
In general, with many similarities, the leaders of the two systems were very different. From a calm way of behavior of Stalin to a completely hysterical Hitler. But the point is not that Hitler was a little disgraceful and longed for all these roaring crowds marching past him. He knew how to get a crowd, that's a fact.
But if the German leader wanted only blind veneration and worship ... He really wanted to be “in the subject,” so he consciously put pressure on his generals. Often sacrificing military intentions to political ones.
Of course, it is good to watch crowds roaring with delight and defeated capitals underfoot. Undoubtedly. However, this is not always effective.
Let's look at a small alternative scenario.
In the Soviet Union, there have always always been two capitals. The first, administrative is Moscow. And the second, political, cradle of the revolution is Leningrad.
As you know, Hitler's plans included the destruction of both cities.
(From the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army F. Halder, July 8, 1941.)
Dismantle - this is understandable. But why then does the Fuhrer’s strange order come on September 12, 1941, which said: Leningrad should not be taken. Someone called it salvation, someone considers it the beginning of a tragic blockade, but let's see what happened next.
And then the commander of the Army Group “North” von Leeb was ordered to immediately transfer the 4th Panzer Group (together with 5 Panzer and two motorized divisions), as well as the entire 1st Luftwaffe Air Force (about 700 aircraft) to the Army Group “Center”.
In fact, von Leeb remained with the 16th and 18th armies and the 5th air fleet, which was half as numerous as the 1st.
In fact, the offensive launched near Moscow required the Germans more forces and equipment than they could have expected. There was simply nothing to take Leningrad. It was not worth counting on the victorious march of the Finnish army; the Finns did not recover even after the Winter War. And at the disposal of the Leningrad Front was a sufficient number of combat-ready units.
In 1941, in August, after the division of the Leningrad Front into the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts, the Leningrad Front included the 8th, 2nd and 48th armies, the Koporsk, South and Slutsk-Kolpinsk operational groups. Plus ships of the Baltic Fleet and the 13th Air Army.
In such a situation, it was really easier to arrange a complete blockade of the city. Which, in fact, happened. The Germans were by no means fools, and by that time they already knew very well that Leningrad would have to wash themselves with blood in full.
An excerpt from the military diary of Army Group North from 12.10.1941/27.10.1941/XNUMX and XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX on military operations against Leningrad.
The operational department of the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces passes to the group of forces the order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht:
The Führer again decided not to accept the surrender of Leningrad, even if it was proposed by the enemy. The moral justification for this is clear to the whole world. Just like in Kiev, where as a result of explosions with the use of clockwork there was a grave threat to the troops, this should be foreseen even more in Leningrad. The fact that Leningrad is mined and will defend itself to the last man, was reported by Soviet Russian radio itself. Therefore, no German soldier should enter this city. Those who try to leave the city through our line should be returned by using fire. ”
(Source: Bundesarchiv / Militararchiv, RH 19 III / 167. Quoted from: "The war of Germany against the Soviet Union. 1941-1945", p. 69.)
So, it is necessary to take Leningrad, but there is no strength for this. Therefore, they decided to simply starve to death. Well, let’s take it for a plan that may have hit the mood and moral condition of the Soviet people. The cradle of the revolution, after all ...
But Leningrad survived, and the two armies trodden around and around, until the moment they began to drive them in January 1943.
Move on. Next we have Moscow.
What do you think, purely according to Golenishchev-Kutuzov, with the loss of Moscow the whole country would be lost? I am sure many will agree that no. Moreover, a reserve Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was organized in Kuibyshev, from which the leadership of the troops would come from just like from Moscow.
Moreover, if anyone dreamed of surrender, it is very quiet.
Hitler was guided by purely European principles. Poland, France, Belgium, as soon as the capitals were captured by German troops, automatically stopped resistance. Well, or almost immediately. Another thing is the Soviet Union. Quite a different matter.
So, Moscow.
Crazy battles near Moscow in the fall of 1941, when everything that was possible rushed into the battle, when regiments and divisions of the national militia burned out near Vyazma, Yelnya, Rzhev and other settlements, gave way to a lull caused by the mud.
And then winter came and that very “strange” counterattack near Moscow. Strange by that. that the advancing Soviet troops were not 3 to 1, as it should be according to all the canons of the strategy, but fewer than the defenders.
Soviet units totaled 1,1 million people, 7 652 guns and mortars, 415 rocket artillery installations, 774 tanks (including 222 heavy and medium) and 1 thousand aircraft.
The German Army Group Center had 1,7 million people, about 13 guns and mortars, 500 tanks and 1 aircraft. (Data on the publication: "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 170-615: brief story"Under the general editorship of B. S. Telpukhovsky and the collective. Military Publishing House, 1984)
It is clear that the German units were exhausted by the heroic resistance of Soviet soldiers and militias, plus fresh personnel Siberian divisions did their job.
And Army Group Center, consisting of 3 armies and 3 tank groups (Gepner, Goth and Guderian), was drawn into a positional confrontation, which essentially ended in nothing.
And against the Germans stood 6 armies of the Western Front, 3 armies of the Bryansk Front and 5 armies of the Reserve Front in the second echelon.
It is clear that the German army and the Soviet army differed in composition, the point is not that. And the fact that all this colossus (German army groups) was dragged into protracted positional battles until the end of 1943.
For what? In order to "tear down Moscow and Leningrad from the face of the earth."
It is clear that the Fuhrer’s desire is the law. For those who do not understand, there are specially trained employees in the SS branch, called the Gestapo. On work with especially misunderstood.
It is clear that Hitler was not Stalin; he didn’t put the generals at the start of the war against the wall for no reason. At the end, a three-bird raced, and the generals were planted and shot no worse than ours in 1941. Nevertheless, to repeat the fate of General Walter von Brauchitsch, who was simply kicked out of the army after the failure of the capture of Moscow exactly on 19.12.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, those who wanted did not have to line up.
Strange, right?
Does the Fuhrer want Moscow? You are welcome. We will do our best. Wants Leningrad? More complicated, but also everything will be in the order. Stalingrad? Yes, what problems ... Everything will be!
Meanwhile, in the memoirs of Manstein and Guderian, one can sometimes find words about the fact that they did not agree with how Hitler intervened in affairs. And he intervened constantly.
The most interesting thing is that when the Führer did not find the “white verse” and he did not try to show himself to be a brilliant commander, everything went just fine with the Wehrmacht. Manstein cites the Crimean and Kharkov operations as an example, where the Germans simply perfectly planned and carried out everything. But Hitler did his best to help with operations.
Yes, by the way, Kharkov.
It’s not especially customary for us to talk about events such as Kharkov, the Barvenkovsky ledge, Maly Rovenki ... And yet this is a terrible and tragic part of our history. And it doesn’t matter who filthy planned the offensive, who didn’t spend it that way. The important thing is that our army suffered huge losses, and the road to the Caucasus was actually open.
And here Hitler really does something stupid.
Let’s even assess at the level of couch strategists what was more important: to take Grozny and Baku, depriving the entire Red Army of fuel, or to weigh Stalin with the plague by taking Stalingrad?
This is the front line we got in 1942. Very long. Almost two and a half thousand kilometers. With a few key points.
Leningrad. Strategically not important. Because there were no such active battles.
Moscow. Strategically ... Politically important, but nonetheless, it was difficult there.
Stalingrad. Also politically important. After the Germans captured Rostov-on-Don, one could forget about Stalingrad.
Voronezh. A meat grinder, grinding those who were supposed to go under Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Plus SEW, which the Nazis wanted to cut, but failed.
Grozny and Baku with their oil fields.
Point.
The final could have come much earlier if Hitler heeded the voices of his generals and did not fight in hysteria about Stalingrad and Voronezh. He did not try to capture Moscow and rot Leningrad. He did not set political goals above the military.
That is, all the forces that it is possible (and the Germans were masters in the ability to concentrate and transfer troops) were to be thrown to the south. At the oil fields of Grozny and Baku.
Could the Germans end the war ahead of schedule, leaving Soviet engines without fuel?
Easily.
Siberian oil reserves were not even explored at that time, all fuel was produced from Grozny and Baku oil. For some time it was possible to extend due to the supply of gasoline from the USA and accumulated reserves, but sooner or later exactly what would happen in Germany in 1945, when the equipment simply could not be used due to lack of fuel.
And here the question arises.
All that Hitler could isolate for the capture of the oil fields was to single out Army Group A from the composition of Army Group South, consisting of:
- 1st tank army;
- 17th army;
- 3rd Romanian army.
Yes, according to the original plan, it was supposed to add the 4th Panzer Army of Goth and the 11th Army of Manstein to Army Group “A”. The most serious and prepared connections with the most experienced commanders.
But ... We can say that a miracle happened.
The 11th Army, leaving the 42nd Army Corps in Army Group A, set off for Leningrad.
The 4th Panzer Army, leaving 1 (one!) Panzer Corps in Group A, went to Stalingrad.
3 Romanian army in full force was at Stalingrad.
11th army: 7 divisions in two corps and the Romanian mountain rifle corps (2 mountain rifle and one regular division). In the swamps and forests near Leningrad, especially mountain shooters were very useful. 42nd Corps left in the south - 2 infantry divisions.
The 4th Panzer Army was a three-corps structure. Each corps consisted of three tank divisions, it is easy to calculate that 6 out of 9 divisions went to Stalingrad.
The Romanian army consisted of 8 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions with a total number of 152,5 thousand military personnel and 11,2 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers, combined in 4 corps and reserve.
It can be estimated that Hitler’s political fanabery took away at least 400 thousand people from the most important direction. With tanks, artillery, mortars and other components.
So the 1st tank and 17th field armies of the Wehrmacht, the 1st Romanian army corps and the cavalry corps led the attack on the Caucasus.
Undoubtedly, it was also a force. But tanks in the mountains are so-so. Especially in the mountains of the Caucasus, where the main vehicle is a donkey. Or a horse, but harder with a horse.
Of course, the Southern Front of Malinovsky and the Transcaucasian Front of Tyulenin were not the best formations, but at the cost of tremendous effort and failure they were able to stop the advance of the Germans. 10 armies of these fronts and even 4 armies of the disbanded North Caucasus Front (Budyonny was the commander) proved to be an insurmountable barrier.
Moreover, 51 army from the North Caucasus Front went to Stalingrad.
As a result, the Soviet command solved one of the most important tasks: it did not allow the loss of oil fields. But there was another successfully solved problem: the doubting Turkey did not take the side of the Germans.
It could have turned out quite difficult if the Turks decided to support the Germans. Most likely, their interests would all be there, in the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR. But the successful occupation by Britain and the Soviet Union of Iran, which nevertheless was a neighbor of Turkey, as well as the successful actions of Malinovsky and Tyulenin, convinced the Turks that it was not worth interfering.
It so happened that in the pursuit of political bonuses Hitler lost too much.
In order to completely bleed the technique of the Red Army, it was not necessary to stagnate near Leningrad and Moscow. It was necessary to take several key railway junctions on the North Caucasus and Southeast railways.
Oil pipelines were a rarity then. And in the production of fuel and lubricants reflected failures on the fronts. However, we’ll talk about this separately.
But the main message of this material, returning to the very beginning, I consider the following: no matter how "brilliant" Hitler was, no matter how short-sighted and inept Stalin tried to expose, it is obvious that if it were not for the political ambitions of the German Fuhrer, the outcome of the war could have been completely to others.
Of course, this is nice: roaring and clapping crowds, rallies of thousands, marches, parades ... Loud statements, promises ...
All this is beautiful, pompous and pleasant. And for the sake of this, you can be arbitrary, but ... But it is better if specially trained people are engaged in military affairs. Staff officers.
And when not completely (or rather, not at all) trained people begin to mix politics and military strategy, it turns out to be very unpleasant.
The Germans by 1942 had all of Ukraine with its coal and black soil. Almost all of the Black Earth region is rich in soil. Yes, the occupied land would give birth to the Germans a little, but it would not give anything to the USSR.
It only remained to deprive the country of fuel. But this did not happen, as I understand it, due to these political promises. Hitler did have masters. Like almost all world politicians.
The desire to stage a show with the capture of Moscow and Stalingrad in 1942 eventually led to Berlin in 1945.
A very instructive story, to know which is very useful to many modern masters. Sometimes grandiose processions and parades can lead somewhat to the wrong place where it was originally planned ...
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