Military Review

Bagration. About one of the largest military operations in history

18
Bagration. About one of the largest military operations in history

If we talk about the most large-scale military operations in all history human civilization, then one of these is clearly the operation "Bagration". In historiography, it has another name - the Belarusian operation.


In the operation, which lasted from June-August 1944, only from the Soviet side forces of more than 1,5 million soldiers and officers were involved. The enemy side is about 1,2 million people. At the same time, fascist German formations lost almost one in three during this operation, deployed by Soviet troops. But there is still no exact loss data.

One of the developers of the operation plan "Bagration" was the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Alexei Antonov. The main objective of the operation was the defeat of the German Army Group Center. At the same time, it was planned to inflict crushing blows on the flanks of the enemy, followed by the encirclement of his troops and the complete liberation of Belarus from the invaders.

Despite the fame of Operation Bagration, many white spots remain in it - those moments that are not known to the general public. For its part, the famous domestic historian Alexei Isaev is trying to fix this. The Day TV channel publishes his lecture on the events of the summer of 1944 on the western borders of the USSR:

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  1. svp67
    svp67 3 June 2020 19: 22 New
    +8
    The summer of 1944 is our full answer to the Germans in the summer of 1941, after which Germany had almost no chance to win

    1. WILL
      WILL 3 June 2020 19: 30 New
      +4
      Brilliant Operation! Ordinary Fighters bowed Bagration - Baghramyan!
      The result even exceeded expectations! Grandfather received the Order of the Red Banner!
      1. Garris199
        Garris199 4 June 2020 03: 53 New
        0
        Bagration-Chernyakhovsky will say no less correctly. 3rd Belarusian showed unprecedented agility in that operation.
    2. alone
      alone 3 June 2020 19: 48 New
      +6
      Quote: svp67
      after him, Germany had almost no chance to win

      The chance to win was taken away from them in 1941 .. At the end of the 42nd year, German generals themselves (adequate, not fanatics) realized that there would be no military victory. And after the Dnieper, Hitler was supposed to shoot himself
    3. Kuroneko
      Kuroneko 4 June 2020 04: 42 New
      +1
      The summer of 1944 is our full answer to the Germans in the summer of 1941, after which Germany had almost no chance to win

      Where and how the war will end - it became clear after Stalingrad, much earlier.
  2. rocket757
    rocket757 3 June 2020 19: 25 New
    +3
    We are proud of the victories of our people, our army!
  3. knn54
    knn54 3 June 2020 19: 27 New
    +3
    The most successful offensive operation of the twentieth century.
  4. alone
    alone 3 June 2020 19: 53 New
    +3
    The success of the operation was in choosing the right strike direction. The enemy did not expect that it was the swampy place of Vybrayo for the direction of the main strike .. And the highlight was that having left 4 full-fledged tank armies in the 1st Ukrainian lane, they misinformed the entire Wehrmacht headquarters .. The Wehrmacht General Staff until of the last second before the start of the operation, he believed that it was on the strip of the 1st Ukrainian Front that the main blow would be dealt ..
  5. Old Horseradish
    Old Horseradish 3 June 2020 22: 18 New
    +1
    According to many, Alexey Isaev is, to put it mildly, a superficial military historian. There are many scientific papers with a detailed analysis of his "scientific flights". Personally, I am alarmed by the fact that this historian bakes books like pies. This alone speaks volumes.
    "In the next opus of the inventor of the military newspeak, as always, there is no deep analysis, instructive and useful conclusions for the present
    The books of the military historian Alexei Isaev, dedicated to the turning point in the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, 1943, have the same features as other works of this very prolific author. This is an extreme fragmentation of the presentation and a very selective citation of sources. The whole picture does not work, but Isaev does not need it. Its task is to provide some vivid strokes of events, confirming the main conclusions. "
    https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/17987

    I repeat once again: now the books have begun to be written not just because everyone is not lazy, but without exception. Either they want to cut the dough, or go down in history, or both. Well, Dumas wrote 50 volumes, for which he and Dumas fantasized on historical topics. But when a military historian writes collected works in a short time, this, to put it mildly, causes suspicion.
    1. Petrik66
      Petrik66 4 June 2020 09: 17 New
      0
      From the point of view of the author of the article quoted by you, Boris Sokolov, the best historian of the Second World War is Lev Lopukhovsky. I decided to take an interest in the works of this author. Here is the first paragraph: Regarding the author’s opinion regarding the Red Army’s fundamental unpreparedness for the war and its catastrophic defeats of the 41st year, the most important reason for the failures, from Lopukhovsky’s point of view, was the mass repressions against the command personnel of 1937-1938. It was this that led to the fact that the vast majority of commanders and commanders preferred to lose the battle, fulfilling all the orders and instructions of the higher authorities, often not meeting the real combat situation, than even winning, but contrary to instructions.
      Mr. Isaev does not stoop to such a thing.
      1. Old Horseradish
        Old Horseradish 4 June 2020 10: 23 New
        -3
        Quote: Petrik66
        the author regarding the basic unpreparedness of the Red Army for the war and its catastrophic defeats of the 41st year, the most important reason for the failures, from the point of view of Lopukhovsky, was mass repressions against the command staff of 1937-1938. It was this that led to the fact that the vast majority of commanders and commanders preferred to lose the battle, fulfilling all the orders and instructions of the higher authorities, often not meeting the actual combat situation, than even winning, but contrary to instructions.

        Wow! Very deep thought. Be sure to read this author. This largely explains the mega-catastrophe of the Red Army and the Soviet Union in 1941. As for the answer to your comment, then, probably, the opinion of one of the main creators of the victory of Vasilevsky is worth anything to you? And not the opinions of market historians.

        Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky believed that the repressions of 1937 played a significant role in the history of the USSR:
        "Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps, there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year. In the fact that Hitler decided to start a war in the forty-first year, an assessment of the degree of defeat of military personnel that took place in our country played a big role."
        1. alstr
          alstr 4 June 2020 12: 30 New
          +1
          The repressions of 37 years, of course, played a role, but far from decisive. It should be borne in mind that the mine was laid long before the age of 37.
          The purge of the army from military specialists in the early 30s also played a negative role. Then the case of Tukhachevsky.
          As a result, in the moment when it was necessary to deploy a large army, it simply did not find a sufficient number of trained officers.
          It should be borne in mind that until the age of 39 the army was formed according to the residual principle. And this is understandable - collectivization and industrialization - all this required personnel. And the best shots were sent there.
          And only in the year 39 there is a double growth.

          Unlike Germany, where, on the contrary, only the best remained in the army (unlike us. And they retained it completely, and not like us). And when, at 35 g, they also began to dramatically increase the army, then they had enough competent personnel.

          And the reason for the defeat of 41 g lies mainly in this. The difference in the quality of personnel in the late 20s and early 30s.

          On the other hand, it should be noted that if you didn’t purge the army in the 30s, it’s possible that there would be no Soviet Union by 41 g, because another coup was quite possible.
          1. strannik1985
            strannik1985 4 June 2020 12: 49 New
            -1
            It should be borne in mind that the mine was laid long before the age of 37.

            And it was called the Frunze reform, or rather, the transition to the mixed (conscription and territorial - militia) recruitment principle, as well as the General Staff’s calculations that the coalition army of the Little Entente in the 20-30s would be the financial / technical / organizational assistance of developed countries (England, France). Thus, by the beginning of 1935 the rifle forces had personnel - 14 SD, mixed 16, territorial-police 42, i.e. out of a total of 255 regiments / brigades, 156 were police. The military service of military service there served ~ 8 months for 5 years (the first year 3 months, the next 4 to 1 month), with an understandable quality in the training of personnel, the training of officers who, apart from the initial training and administrative functions, did not really do anything.
            Within that framework, you can’t do any better; the army (rifle troops) must be reduced or increased funding.
            1. alstr
              alstr 4 June 2020 13: 08 New
              +1
              Better could be done if we take the example of the German army. Having similar problems with financing, but for other reasons.
              But apart from financing, there were not enough qualified people in the army, because the economy required more and more qualified specialists. And cool specialists were lured just like that.
              And when compared with Germany, then this was not there. Those. if we opened hundreds of factories, then these hundreds of factories were idle.

              From here, in Germany, the army could afford to drop out, and we went to the army according to the Komsomol order. And far from always, these personnel were adequate in officer positions.
              1. strannik1985
                strannik1985 4 June 2020 13: 26 New
                0
                Better could be done if we take the example of the German army.

                The integrity of the borders of Germany was guaranteed by the treaties and the signatory countries, in particular the USA, England, France. Plus, the Dowes / Jung plan made the Weimar Republic one of the leaders in terms of industrial production in Europe (second place in the world after the United States).
                Therefore, Seeckt could afford an "army of commanders", high quality training and military science.
                Infantry - without options, in theory they could do something with the Air Force and BTV, but it did not work out.
        2. Petrik66
          Petrik66 4 June 2020 16: 31 New
          -1
          I just clicked on the link that you brought. https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/17987 it was on Sokolov that there was a link. There is no absolute truth; there are only opinions of this or that person. And he tends to make mistakes, to be biased. For me, personally, Isaev is more understandable than others, but this does not mean at all that I deny the right to write letters about the war to other people (I’m sure that now they all feel better). And links to memoirs? Well, Konev, for example, had a very low opinion of Tukhachevsky, of Yakir, of Belov, and of Yegorov and Blucher. But this is the opinion of specific people at a particular time. Something seems to me that if our marshals wrote their memoirs in 1951, then the question of repression would not have been so acute?
  6. Valter1364
    Valter1364 3 June 2020 23: 35 New
    -1
    Lecture in one go. Well done! I have not heard anything that contradicts what I know from the history of the Second World War. Let historian Aleksey Isaev be better than modern cheap hand-made films about the war.
  7. Dedok
    Dedok 4 June 2020 15: 32 New
    -1
    We will never know the reasons or we will not be able to comprehend them - we live in "another reality" ...
    Much is still closed not only for us, but also for those admitted to secrecy.
    Because there is “politics and politicking” all around, why is the stamp removed from some documents, but not from others? what are the true motives for such actions?
    So it turns out that we are forced to think out / invent the undisclosed before us, although we live in a different dimension and just mind - we can’t understand those events in any way. How many documents were simply destroyed so that there was no clarity?
    Talking about historical truth in this case is not necessary ...