Military Review

Work closely together


Military conflicts of recent years clearly indicate the increased role of UAVs in the organization and conduct of air raids. And the role of these air attack weapons continues to grow as their interception is further complicated. The point here, of course, is not in the pilot’s very lack of IOS data - in the end, the V-1 and V-2 were still drones. The fact is that modern UAVs “suddenly” began to possess capabilities disproportionate to the costs of their production and acquisition. They are capable of causing significant damage to ground targets and troops, being cheap and, accordingly, massive weapons. Attempts to counter them using powerful air defense systems and long-range and medium-range air defense systems are inadequate by the criterion of "cost-effectiveness". Shooting down “bayraktars” with one and a half-ton SAMs of the S-300 air defense system is like lighting a cigarette from a hundred-dollar bill. As a result, short-range air defense systems come to the fore as the most cost-effective shots. But their missiles are often too expensive to destroy compact and cheap UAVs. (Although, of course, the cost-effectiveness of defense equipment should be assessed not in comparison with the means of attack, but in comparison with the price of the guarded object.) The next step would be to use short-range anti-aircraft missiles, MANPADS and ZAK. But another problem pops up here - these systems have rather limited capabilities for reconnaissance of the air situation and the defeat of subtle and high-speed targets.

Short-range air defense systems come to the fore as the most cost-effective shots. But their missiles are often too expensive to destroy compact and cheap UAVs.

The designers of the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol and the Rubin Research and Production Enterprise managed to solve this problem. They developed a system for interfacing Tor air defense systems with a wide range of air defense systems, man-portable air defense systems and close-range air defense systems. The “Tor” air defense system in this connection is the “leading” combat vehicle, and the short-range systems play the role of followers, building their work in support of a powerful target detection station and no less powerful “big brother” airborne computing center.

At the moment, Tunguska-M1 air defense systems, BMO Gibka-S, Shilka-M4 air defense systems, Bagulnik air defense systems and a set of automation tools for anti-aircraft gunners for air defense systems, can be used as “slave” combat vehicles in the near future - ZAK "Derivation" and BM "Typhoon-Air Defense". Two “slave” complexes can be interfaced with one “leading” BM “Tor-M2” air defense system.

In a simplified form, the scheme of operation of the "link", consisting of 2-3 combat vehicles, is as follows:

The main work on reconnaissance of the air situation is carried out by the Tor-M2 air defense detection station.

  • Upon detection of targets, the on-board computer center of the “leading” BM classifies them according to the degree of danger and decides on the independent destruction of the IOS, or on interception by means of the “slave” systems.

  • When deciding to transfer the target to the limits of responsibility of the “slave” BM, they are given information from the SOC of the Tor-M2 SAM, using which, melee complexes use their regular means to intercept the target.

Previously, such pairing could only be carried out by means of the “Rangir-M” battery command post or the reconnaissance and command module of the Barnaul-T KSA. This was justified only for battery formations and higher. Now it is possible to create compact heterogeneous units of 2-3 BM.

In this case, a wide range of tasks is solved. Airborne reconnaissance and target designation is carried out by the SOC of the Tor-M2 SAM, which is much more powerful than the means of detecting melee complexes and MANPADS. As a result, the weapons of the latter receive significantly more accurate information, which increases their effectiveness. The relatively expensive missiles of the MD complex are used only against the most dangerous targets, the rest are destroyed by cheap missiles of the "guided" short-range BM or artillery fire ZAK and ZSU. Induced by the principle of "shot-forgot" (using homing heads) MANPADS at the right time can significantly increase the density of fire in addition to using the radio command guidance method (much more accurate, but not always quite productive) SAM SAM. The "hybrid" link no longer requires BKP, which, firstly, makes it cheaper, and secondly, reduces the period of information exchange between BMs and, accordingly, increases the speed of response to a threat. It became possible to create a layered air defense system not only at the level of armies and divisions, but also at a regimental and even divisional level. If the Shilka-M4 ZSU or the prospective Derivation ZAK are included in the “link”, the hybrid unit gets the possibility of self-defense from ground forces, due to the proven effectiveness of ZSU combat work against unarmored and lightly armored ground targets and enemy manpower.

Working in close conjunction, various air defense systems can show their strengths to the greatest extent, and the inevitable "weaknesses" (such as the relatively expensive SAM SAM systems or the weak reconnaissance capabilities of short-range air defense systems and air defense systems) are effectively stopped by the capabilities of the associated air defense systems. The system for interfacing the Tor-M2 air defense systems with complexes of subordinate units has successfully passed type tests both at stands and at landfills.

Among other things, the modernization increases the export potential of Russian air defense systems, since it makes them more attractive from an economic point of view for the "low-budget" armies of small countries. Moreover, there are no analogues in the world practice of the created system for interfacing the air defense systems of MD with short-range complexes. Foreign military attaches will be able to get acquainted with the increased capabilities of the Russian air defense missile systems already during the upcoming Army 2020 international military-technical forum.

The carried out modernization of the Tor-M2 air defense system expands the scope of this complex, increases the flexibility of managing the air defense system’s cash composition, provides an economically viable solution to both the task of pairing short-range air defense systems of short-range, and the problem of adequately counteracting inexpensive modern means of air attack.
Photos used:
Oryol news (; Club (
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Carib
    Carib 1 June 2020 16: 50 New
    If you still manage to tie up and BMP 2, 3 and subsequent modules. Modern position sensors, optical, photon GPS gyroscopes, small but powerful computers allow you to do this! That density of anti-aircraft fire will be even higher. So there is much more to develop, to strive for.
    1. spectr
      spectr 3 June 2020 09: 02 New
      This is still a problem. The bourgeoisie are just now actively pursuing similar developments (increasing the accuracy of existing systems), and Russia is forced to compensate for the lag with a "super double".
  2. Vlad Malkin
    Vlad Malkin 1 June 2020 20: 45 New
    UAVs are, of course, a big problem for everyone!
  3. Tank hard
    Tank hard 1 June 2020 22: 40 New
    Thank you, I read it with interest. hi
  4. Radikal
    Radikal 1 June 2020 23: 12 New
    From the point of view of theory, the idea sounds convincing, beautiful, but how it looks in practice, at least in the same Syria, where the columns of "military police" during the march in their composition do not have any (anyway visible) air defense systems. What are we waiting for? As always - the arrival of the "fried rooster"? And of course it is possible to theorize it, in offices, classrooms, at exhibitions, that is, in places that are safe for health! sad
  5. sen
    sen 2 June 2020 06: 03 New
    And use your reusable UAV fighter in conjunction with the Tor-M2 air defense system against enemy UAVs.
    1. sav
      sav 2 June 2020 09: 51 New
      This is a further development and another level. But why not?
  6. V.I.P.
    V.I.P. 6 June 2020 11: 20 New
    Derivation is not accepted. For her there is no ammunition with a programmable detonation .. Is the bend and Ledum in the army?
    The usual MANPADS are flexible, if with Verba then the range for aircraft is 6, the height is 4,5 km. The Needle is worse.
    Ledum is an optical guidance system. The plane sees at a distance of 10, an altitude of 5 km. Anything less at shorter distances. The rocket is almost like a shell. What is the shell in Syria and Libya showed at work? Nothing good. The Torah brought to Syria, and they fought off attacks on Khmeinim.
    Tunguska, how many have been upgraded there?)))) I think not at all .. By plane the missile hits a range of 10 km, height 3,5. Cannon 4 and 3 km. On drones will be worse performance.
    Shilka is upgraded in the army and not on the TV?)) On a modernized missile range of 5, height 3,5 km. There’s no point in talking about guns ...
    What can they do against GBU gliding bombs with a drop range of 120 km?
    Turkish Baikatar ATGM UMTAS 8km and MAM bombs 8 km when dropped from a high altitude. Which of the following can work on it for 8 km? Bombs and ATGMs will not intercept anything.
    About Israeli, American, Chinese drones and their weapons, there’s no sense even talking about it ..
    Here Thor on planes works at a distance of 16 km, well, the drone is closer. For cruise missiles and large gliding bombs, a range of 10 km. About small no information. But in range, he can beat the Baikatars before they use weapons ..
  7. dima314
    dima314 7 June 2020 16: 57 New
    yes, I’ll fantasize about everything) I don’t understand what this target designation will provide, well, maybe in Syria or Libya, but in a real combat situation it’s much easier to do reconnaissance and find out the location of the control stations for these drones. It is clear that this is impossible in Syria, because the stations are located on Turkish territory, I think, or on Turkish-controlled territory. in other cases, the search and destruction of such a station is several times cheaper and more profitable than shooting down unpunished drones. destroying guidance systems can disable both the station and personnel, and then look for where the drones will fly to cover the base.
    1. KVIRTU
      KVIRTU 8 June 2020 12: 58 New
      "... it's much easier to do reconnaissance and locate the control stations for these drones."
      What will we scout :) With a desert storm, Bradley’s kit includes laying with the drone of the squad leader, landing on his belly, in the zip spare wings, a camera without bells and whistles, up to 10 km radius, a tablet to it, an hour in the air. You can’t get enough of them for the air defense systems, you won’t get the rifles, this is the problem.
  8. dima314
    dima314 7 June 2020 17: 02 New
    it’s still ridiculous to look at the military armament of these drones that carry 4 ATGMs or 100-kg bombs ... If the Su-25 or Su-34 after detecting the guidance stations without entering the air defense cover zone uses its 8 suspension points and 4-8 tons combat load, then there on earth will become empty and clean. Here we have a strange war and incomprehensible relations between the warring parties. A kind of semi-terrorist drones from a semi-friendly state that controls the sea supply routes of another state ...
  9. dima314
    dima314 7 June 2020 17: 07 New
    far more dangerous and practically invulnerable are kamikaze drones that can be launched in the real area and barrage there until the expected targets appear. It’s more difficult to identify them and they cost little and do not require operator control. Here they can extinguish air defense systems both cheaply and efficiently, as well as armored vehicles or other equipment