Military Review

Oslyabya vs. Mikasa

199

“Already 10 minutes after the opening of fire, Oslyabya received the first significant damage, and after 40 minutes there was a strong fire. Around the same time, Rozhestvensky was seriously wounded, and 50 minutes after the start of the battle, “Suvorov” left the system. An hour after the first shot, Oslyabya went down, and it became clear that the Russian squadron could no longer win this battle. ”


So, according to Vladimir Kofman, the winner of the Tsushima battle was determined.

How did the Japanese decide the outcome of the battle so quickly? This is one of the key Tsushima issues. To get to the answer to it, we will be helped by an analysis of the ratio of the fire impact of the Russian and Japanese fleets in the setting of the Tsushima battle on the example of ships that concentrated the most intense fire. This is Mikasa among the Japanese and Oslyabya among the Russians. Yes Yes! I was not mistaken, it was Oslyabya, not Prince Suvorov, and I will prove it.

As a criterion for assessing the impact of fire, I use the number and caliber of missiles hit (projectiles with a caliber of 76 mm or less will not be counted as incapable of causing significant damage). The issue of the quality of shells will be left outside the article. The chronological framework is from the moment of opening fire until the Oslyaby’s failure (14:20 and 14:40: given Russian time and Japanese. For Tsushima, the time difference was 20 minutes). It makes no sense to use a longer period, because, firstly, the fate of Oslyaby was already decided by that time, and secondly, many Japanese ships moved the fire to other targets.

Is it really Oslyabya that has undergone the most intense fire exposure? To answer this question, let's look at the Japanese scheme of firing in the Tsushima battle, which indicates: the target, the time of firing and the distance on the rangefinder at that time (there are obvious errors in determining the distance). Seven warships, including two battleships, launched their fire on the Oslyabya as the closest or most convenient target (its Japanese ships determined themselves). The fact is that at the time of the opening of fire the restructuring of the Russian squadron in one line had not yet been completed and Oslyabya was at the head of the left column closest to the enemy under the flag of Rear Admiral Felkersam.


If you look at the distribution of goals in Japanese fleet after the opening of fire, even the moment will be discovered when the Oslyabya was in the sights of eight ships at the same time! For clarity, the data were summarized by Vladimir Sidorenko (for which special thanks to him) to the schedule.

Now we can begin to assess the fire impact, that is, try to calculate the number and caliber of shells that have reached Oslyaby.

First, we will examine eyewitness accounts. Michman Shcherbachev from the “Eagle” after some 10-15 minutes of the battle already observed only 10-15 large holes in the Oslyaby’s nose. Impressive numbers! If, looking at the silhouette and the reservation scheme, we assume that the shells hit not only the nose and did not always leave holes (if they hit the armor), then the total number of shells can be estimated at 30-45 or even more. But the reliability of this assumption, we will leave a big question, since Shcherbachev’s testimony could well have been distorted by the extremely emotional impressions of the battle.


Then we will try another way: we systematize specific hits that eyewitnesses mentioned in the records (which is more valuable), or which were mentioned from the words of other persons. We begin to list the damage from the bow to the stern, as their chronology cannot be established. By default, we mean the left side.

1. Living deck near the bow bulkhead. This hit was colorfully described by Novikov-Priboy: “The third shell hit the armadillo in the bow and, tearing out the left clue entirely, turned the entire tank. An anchor fell overboard, and the rope was etched down and hung on a gibacal brace. ” Some of the bow compartments were flooded, but this hole, according to the mine-machine conductor Zavarin and senior mine officer Sablin, was closed up and did not pose a danger. With a high probability, it was a 305 mm shell.

2. The bow tower. According to Sablin's testimony, three shells hit the tower in succession. Zavarin, who personally saw damage to the bow tower, estimates the caliber of at least one of the shells at 305 mm.

3. Bow cutting. According to Novikov-Surf - two hits. The upper bridge was destroyed, fragments penetrated the conning tower, a fire broke out, which is confirmed by eyewitnesses.

4. The nasal casemate of 152 mm guns. Two shells. The first did no harm, but the second shifted the armor plate and knocked the gun out of the pins.

5. 75 mm battery. Three hits, according to the testimony of Lieutenant Kolokoltsev.

6. The average casemate of 152 mm guns.

7. The tenth coal pit. Interestingly, as a result of the hit, the water flooded another spare kruyt-chamber located on the lower deck and protected, except for the armored belt, also with the armored deck. Such penetrating damage can only be explained by the successive hit in one place of two shells, one of which was 305 mm.

8. The mainsail.

9. Gafel.

For convenience, I numbered the damage locations on the ship diagram.


Apparently, there were also fatal holes for the Oslyaby, which caused extensive flooding of the bow inside the citadel, but of which Sablin and Zavarin did not know. Many sources noted a large trim "Oslyaby" on the nose. This is most expressively described by Shcherbachev:

“About 2 hours. 20 minutes ... the roll ... was up to 12 ° -15 ° on the port side and with its bow he sat on the gully, exposing the underwater part of the stern, so that the deck was visible from the bow through the rosters. ”

Flooding of the bow compartments from getting into the living deck near the bow bulkhead could not cause such a strong trim due to the insignificance of the flooded volume. Flooding as a result of falling into the tenth coal pit (and this is between the third pipe and the main mast!), On the contrary, would reduce the trim on the nose. It turns out that diving to the level of clushes can be explained only by the presence of significant flooding of the bow, in addition to those listed by Sablin and Zavarin. Moreover, flooding even of all volumes outside the citadel will not be enough for this.

And how can one not recall the very vivid, but at the same time extremely dubious descriptions of a huge hole in the board, "a real gate where you could drive in the top three." Doubtful - because those who were not on the Oslyab and were unlikely to see it themselves write about this hole; and, in addition, there is no clear localization of this hole. The flagship navigator of the Semyonov squadron has it in the forward unarmored part, which has something in common with getting into a residential deck near the bow bulkhead. Novikov-Priboy points to a very long gap between the mine apparatus and the bathhouse, that is, in the area of ​​the second or third pipe and reports of fallen armored plates, which have a certain similarity with falling into the tenth pit, which was just in the area of ​​the bathhouse. The senior officer of the Orla Schwede saw the absence of one or two plates of the upper belt and the hole in their place, but did not indicate specifically where. Ozerov, the commander of Sisoy the Great, localized the place where there was no armor plate opposite the front bridge (I note that there is no upper belt in this place).

But back to our confirmed hits, which turned out to be 16, of which 3 are supposedly 305 mm. At the same time, the numerous damage to the deck and the unarmored side described by the witnesses, as well as hits that caused fires on the rosters and in the stern, were not taken into account. In addition, the facts of very close shell explosions are striking, which is possible only with a very large total number of hits. Thus, the systematization of specific injuries rather confirms an estimate of 30-45 hits than disproves it.

Now let us check our assessment with Japanese data: is it real in terms of the actual fire impact of Japanese ships. We calculate how many shells should have been hit based on the number of shells fired. We already know what ships and what time fired at the Oslyab. But to calculate the number of shells, you need to know the actual rate of fire. Let's make a calculation.

Assumptions and limitations:

1. The duration of participation in the battle on May 14 is 180 minutes for the Togo squad and 150 minutes for the Kamimura squad.

2. The rate of fire is uniform throughout the battle.

3. The cruiser “Asama” will be excluded from the calculation, because due to failure the projectile consumption is almost two times lower than that of other ships.

4. If possible, we use the data on the consumption of shells only for May 14, but for individual ships there is only data for two days of the battle and we have to put up with this.

5. For 305 mm guns, we calculate the flow rate taking into account the failure of the guns, for the rest - excluding the failure of the guns.

6. We assume that the fire was fired by all the main caliber guns and half the medium caliber guns (one side).

7. Data on a specific caliber averaged for all ships. In fact, there were rather strong deviations, for example, "Sikishima" shot 12-inch shells slower than all (0,10 shells per minute), but 6-inch faster than all (1,10 shells per minute).

An example of calculating the actual rate of fire of the main caliber "Mikas". Two barrels acted for 180 minutes, one barrel - 110 minutes, another - 145 minutes. Consumption - 124 shells in 2 days. 124 / (180 + 180 + 110 + 145) = 0,2 rounds per minute per barrel.

As a result, the following average values ​​of the actual rate of fire were obtained:

305 mm: 0,16 rounds per minute.
254 mm: 0,26 rounds per minute.
203 mm: 0,27 rounds per minute.
152 mm: 0,75 rounds per minute.

Now everything is ready for calculating the fire impact, except for accuracy. First, suppose that the accuracy of the Japanese fire in the Tsushima set could not be worse than in the Yellow Sea, that is, 10% for 305 mm, 4% for 203 mm and 1,5% for 152 mm (in total for 203 mm and 152 mm will be 1,8%, and the superiority in accuracy of 203 mm guns by almost 3 times over 152 mm is confirmed by the statistics of the battle in Chemulpo). We exclude 254-mm shells from the calculation, since at reasonable ratios not a single shell should have hit the target. Thus, if the Japanese in Tsushima fired with the same accuracy as in the Yellow Sea, then Oslyabya would receive 2-3 hits of 305 mm, 5 hits of 203 mm and 12 hits of 152 mm. Total 19-20 hits. Not much! This does not agree with the picture of the destruction of the ship, recorded by eyewitnesses.

But we did not take into account the objective factors affecting the accuracy of the Japanese. These are full commandors and serviceable devices (the beginning of the battle), this is a noticeably shorter battle distance in Tsushima, and this is accumulated experience. Is it possible to accept that these factors allowed the Japanese to be 1,5 times more accurate than in the Yellow Sea and thus reach at least 30 hits - the minimum of the estimated values? I think you can! Then we get 4 hits of 305 mm, 8 hits of 203 mm and 18 hits of 152 mm. Taking into account the fact that Oslyabya was fired upon by the Japanese even after 14:20 (14:40), right up to the moment when it was lying with the keel up, our data turn out to be close to Vladimir Gribovsky’s estimate (40 hits). Thus, it turns out to find a compromise between the picture described by Shcherbachev and the hits recorded by other sources on the one hand, and the sane data on the accuracy of Japanese fire on the other. But this assessment in no case can claim to be highly accurate, because it contains many assumptions and assumptions.


With Mikasa, however, everything is much simpler, since all data on the fire exposure are available. The chronology of hits up to 14:20 (14:40) according to the report of the ship's commander is given below.

Oslyabya vs. Mikasa

Only 5 hits 305 mm and 16 hits 152 mm.


Now you can summarize. The Japanese fire on the Oslyabyu most likely exceeded the Russian fire on the Mikasu, or in extreme cases roughly corresponded to it. Given that the Mikasa was larger and had a much more powerful reservation than Oslyabya, it required much more hits to inflict critical damage on it than it actually received in the beginning of the battle. And Oslyabya would surely have lasted much longer in the battle if it had not had fatal construction flaws in the form of a huge overload and weak fixing of armor plates.

It should not be forgotten that, in addition to Oslyaby, the Prince of Suvorov, Alexander III, and Borodino, judging by the damage, received a completely comparable fire effect. In fact, the most combat-ready ships of the Russian squadron that could fire at Mikasa were suppressed. On the Japanese side, only the Asama cruiser, which temporarily lost a place in the ranks due to damage to the steering gear, received noticeable damage, except for the Mikasa. Thus, it can be stated that one of the instruments for the victory of the Japanese in the Tsushima battle was a significantly more powerful fire effect in the beginning of the battle, that is, an absolute superiority in the number of shells that hit the enemy.

Sources of

Fleet actions. Documents. Division IV. 2nd Pacific Squadron. The third book. The battle of May 14-15, 1905.
Novikov-Surf A. Tsushima.
Semenov V.I. Reckoning.
Gribovsky V. Yu. Russian fleet of the Pacific Ocean. 1898-1905. History creation and death.
Peasants V. Ya., Molodtsov S. V. Armadillos of the “Relight” type.
Melnikov R. M. Armadillos of the Peresvet type.
Kofman V. L. Tsushima: analysis against myths.
sidorenko-vl.livejournal.com
naval-manual.livejournal.com
tsushima.su
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  1. lucul
    lucul 23 May 2020 10: 18 New
    -6
    The difference in the battle in the Yellow Sea and under Tsushima simply does not give any logical explanation.
    Only if Tsushima is a well-planned and prepared special operation, only then can some kind of analysis be carried out.
    1. Insurgent
      Insurgent 23 May 2020 10: 27 New
      11
      Quote: lucul
      Only if Tsushima is a well-planned special operation, only then can some kind of analysis be carried out.

      The fact of the matter is that the Japanese had a carefully planned and prepared plan of operations with a high-quality selection of the composition of the warrant, and the Russian side hastily scrubbing at the guts, created a squadron while having very ghostly plans for her campaign and subsequent actions in the Far East ...
      1. bayard
        bayard 24 May 2020 01: 44 New
        +2
        Quote: Insurgent
        The fact of the matter is that the Japanese had a carefully planned and prepared plan of operations with a high-quality selection of the composition of the warrant, and the Russian side hastily scrubbing at the guts, created a squadron while having very ghostly plans for her campaign and subsequent actions in the Far East ...

        Do not be so derogatory about the headquarters of the Russian Navy, they had a plan, from the very beginning of the campaign of the 2nd squadron. It was according to this plan that she "trampled" bypassing Africa. And it was not at all out of fear of the English fleet (he could overtake it on any part of the route with superior forces), but with the aim of connecting at a rendezvous point with a detachment of Argentine and Chilean cruisers, who were going to acquire through intermediaries in the amount of 10 pieces. And most of them (8 at least) were at the level of the best Japanese armored cruisers. Having received such forces, the 2nd squadron could join the battle with the entire Japanese fleet literally on the move, for it would have had 15 latest armored ships against 12 from the Japanese (4 battleships + 1 non-armored carrier Oslyabya + 10 armored cruisers; against 4 battleship and 8 Japanese armored cruisers). And this is not counting the other ships of the warrant, which in the general battle were hardly useful.
        And the first squadron in Port Arthur was just to wait for the approach of the main forces ...
        That was the plan.
        But in that war, literally everything and everyone was against RI request . An unsuccessful start with serious losses in its very outset, setbacks on the land front, the blockade and siege of Port Arthur, which failed to hold out until the approach of the main forces ...
        The purchase of the “Argentinean” cruisers fell through because of the active position of England, which sent 10 newest armored cruisers to escort the 2nd squadron in the initial part of the journey along West Africa ... Argentines and Chileans fell off and sharply turned the shafts ... Rozhestvensky did not wait for the cruisers .. And he lost an infinitely long time ... And on the bypass of Africa, and on the waiting for the cruisers (the crews for them carried with them on the ships of the squadron) ...
        Port Arthur has fallen.
        That is why the Japanese were so frenzied that he stormed and went to such terrible losses - they were in a hurry before the arrival of the main forces of the Pacific Fleet.
        And they did it ...
        And then there was Tsushima ... shameful world with the loss of territories (South Sakhalin, except for Port Arthur and the Kwantung fortified area) ... reparations (camouflaged as "compensation for the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war) ... The First Russian Revolution 1905 - 1907 GG ... the establishment of the Duma (democratic reforms) ... in short - the decline and death of the Empire.
        This war was lost even at the planning stage, at the planning stage of the construction of Pacific Fleet, the irrational choice of ships for him and the contractors, the wrong time for their readiness and the time for their deployment in the Far East (late 1904 - 1905), while knowing that all of their Japan will receive the latest ships in 1903.
        The Russian fleet was destroyed in parts, each of which was obviously much weaker than the Japanese fleet.
        In the Tsushima battle against 12 armored ships of Japan, only 5 ships of the 2nd squadron of Rozhestvensky could fight on equal terms. All the other ships were just ballast in that battle.
        But they could have been useful in the course of the war itself, had survived Port Arthur before they arrived. It was for this (as auxiliary forces of the fleet) that they were sent on this unfortunate campaign.

        A sad ... but instructive story. recourse angry
        hi
        1. Nehist
          Nehist 24 May 2020 02: 36 New
          +3
          Gg enchanting nonsense! And where does Argentina and Chile have such an amount of DBK? You would have looked at the composition of their fleets at that time, and there aren’t any such numbers
          1. bayard
            bayard 24 May 2020 05: 19 New
            +1
            Young man, you juggle caution with words. no
            If you have not heard anything about this story, about the Argentine-Chilean war, for which they bought these ships, about the fact that this war ended in peace exactly before the REV. And having ended the conflict and faced with shattered finances, but having serious fleets in terms of composition, they were not averse to getting rid of extra ships.
            The history of the cruisers ordered by Argentina from the Italian company Ansaldo (type Garribaldi) Mita and Roca is best covered. They are after the renaming of Rivadavia and Moreno, they are the same after they were bought by the Japanese Nisin and Kasuga. . True, they were first offered to Russia (on the eve of the REV), but Witte, in "noble anger" and concern for the "domestic producer", did not allow them to be purchased.
            But immediately after the outbreak of war, the loss of several ships at once and the realization that the 1st squadron was weak, and the hastily formed 2nd squadron was weaker and had ships with unrepaired factory defects, remembered the Argentine and Chilean cruisers.
            And spun around ...
            You can see in more detail "Exotic Cruisers" S.A. Gladkikh. There are other sources. There is a whole detective series with secret negotiations (according to the then international agreements, a belligerent country did not have the right to purchase warships from a neutral country, so an intermediary was needed) ...
            But the fact that the crews for these cruisers brought with them right up to Madagascar is a well-known thing (from Madagascar all the extra crews were sent to Russia by coal miners). That is why Rozhdestvensky and fussed around Africa, it is precisely because of this that 10 of the latest British armored cruisers that sent Russian sailors so nervous were sent behind our squadron. And this is exactly what the Argentines and Chileans were so afraid of, that the secret deal ... was canceled.
            But in vain Rozhdestvensky stood at a rendezvous point, losing precious time.
            Once again, Russia was outplayed in this war. And its British intelligence and diplomacy outplayed it ... Alas.
            Look for yourself, there are a lot of materials on this topic, there are photos of those cruisers. I was interested to get to know this. You may also be interested.

            Once again . Be careful with the expressions on the forum.
            Ugly.
          2. Sergey49
            Sergey49 30 May 2020 00: 19 New
            +1
            In fairness, in the book “Exotic Cruisers” by S. A. Gladkikh 7 ships are listed which are known to have been negotiated and three more about which were rumors of negotiations:
            Garibaldi, 1895
            General San Martin, 1896
            General Belgrano, 1897
            "Pueyrredon", 1897
            General O'Higgins, 1897
            Esmeralda, 1896
            Chacabuco, 1898

            "Capitan Prat"
            Buenos Aires
            "Nueve de Julio"
            But from the text of the book, as I understood it, Rozhestvensky could not expect the ships to join him along the way because there are all the options for buying ships, the projection of pure water - firstly, the purchase was supposed to be delivered to different places (Libava, Azores, Madagascar, Crete, arrest in the Pacific Ocean under a neutral flag, etc.), secondly, at different times and in different numbers, thirdly, including with the condition of being held under the wrong flag until the end of the war.
            Too bad, because the bayard version seemed pretty to me.

            What do you think, by joining not 8-10, but 2-4 from the above list, could the result of the battle be changed? Can a crew master a ship during its journey across the Indian Ocean to fully conduct combat operations?
        2. Comrade
          Comrade 24 May 2020 05: 39 New
          +8
          in order to connect at a rendezvous point with a detachment of Argentine and Chilean cruisers, who were going to purchase through intermediaries in the amount of 10 pcs. And most of them (8 at least) were at the level of the best Japanese armored cruisers.

          Armored cruisers of Argentina, four units:
          Garibaldi, San Martín, Belgrano and Pueyrredón (all types of Garibaldi)
          Armored Cruisers of Chile, two units:
          O'Higgins, Esmeralda. Both are much weaker than any of the Japanese armored cruisers.
          Total six armored cruisers. Whether it was possible to put them on a par with the Japanese armored cruisers is a moot point.
          In reality, our only attempt was to buy two Argentinean cruisers, the most perfect and least "killed."

          It was useless to talk with Chile on this subject; they did not even sell their O'Higgins to the States during the Spanish-American War.
          1. bayard
            bayard 24 May 2020 06: 36 New
            0
            Type "Garribaldi", which Argentina had 4 pcs. , these are the same "Nishin" and "Kasuga", which the Japanese have shown themselves quite well, fighting in the same battle line and in the same unit with the Japanese battleships. True, their real speed turned out to be only 18 - 18,5 knots, but this was quite enough for operations in the same unit with armadillos.
            There were different versions of purchases during that epic: two cruisers from Argentina and Chile, 4 from Argentina and 3 from Chile, and finally 5 each. both ... The purpose of this activity was not only to obtain the data of the cruiser in the Russian Navy, but also not to allow the Japanese to acquire them for themselves. An example with the missed opportunity to acquire “Rivadia” and “Moreno” (Nisin and Kasuga) then (winter-summer 1904) made me look at this opportunity seriously.
            But exactly on the eve of the war, Chile offered Russia to buy from them 2 armadillos ordered in England ... but as a result of Witte's obstinacy, England herself bought these ships - if only Russia would not get it. Show then (in 1903) the leadership of the Republic of Ingushetia promptness, as part of the Pacific Fleet could only be from new buildings at least 3 armadillos and 2 armored cruisers, not to mention the possibility of purchasing available ships.
            After the outbreak of war, international treaties ruled out this possibility (in neutral countries).
            There was even an idea that France would buy these cruisers for Russian money and hold it in their ports until the end of the war, with the subsequent transfer to Russia. For Japan, too, was looking for opportunities to acquire them. Even through England.
            There was an exciting adventure, like such a plot is not reflected in literature or cinema ... A whole "bondiana" a la rus could turn out ... A bunch of adventurers and intermediaries, houses of the Rothschilds and Morgan, insurance company Lloyd (England) ... Nichrome (horseradish is a useful plant) our ancestors did not break off. repeat angry
            bully
            1. Nehist
              Nehist 24 May 2020 09: 59 New
              +1
              N-yes you apparently do not know how to read. Higher
              They wrote that a total of two Fleets 6 DBK. As for the Chilean armadillos, they are not needed in the RIF from the word Absolutely.
              1. bayard
                bayard 24 May 2020 13: 23 New
                0
                Quote: Nehist
                a total of two Fleets 6 DBK.

                Sure ?
                Only Argentina, only one type of armored cruisers built by Ansaldo, had 4 units. :
                - "Garribaldi"
                - "General Belgrano"
                - "General San Marino"
                - Pueurredon
                Chile was going to buy 3 armored cruisers.
                The intermediaries were constantly changing, looking for workarounds for procurement bypassing international treaties.
                When they found out that Japan was also looking for an opportunity to buy these cruisers through the mediation of England, they even wanted to redeem all the cruisers through the mediation of France with their sediment until the end of the war in French ports.
                The maximum number of cruisers possible for purchase was called - 10, including two or three armored ... and even several destroyers.
                It is this figure - "10" was named by Novikov when he describes the hanging of the squadron at the rendezvous point off the coast of West Africa.
                And the crews for these cruisers brought with them.
                At the squadron.
                This, too, Novikov - a participant in the campaign.

                Quote: Nehist
                N-yes, you apparently do not know how to read.

                Young man, I did warn you with a kind word - quit being rude.
                And read the link.

                What about
                Quote: Nehist
                As for the Chilean armadillos, they are not needed in the RIF from the word Absolutely.

                Is that probably from Witte you got?
                Why are Russian "Relights" better than "Chilean" battleships?
                Were they superfluous too?
                THE RUSSIAN Navy HAS ALREADY THEN - at the time of the REV, any battle-worthy ships were needed, because there was not enough cash. And these would, against the Japanese cruisers, come to the court as well as possible.
                It was clever and brute force on the eve of the war - they refused the Argentine cruisers, and then bit their elbows when the Nishin and Kasuga drew themselves in a Japanese warrant.
                And regretted the Chilean armadillos.
                And there were bits in parts.
                And they also regretted that more ships were not ordered at foreign shipyards. First, they promised Kramp an order for 2 battleships, 2 cruisers and up to 50 destroyers, exhausted the US citizen's nerves, traded for every penny, and ordered only two ships.
                And he would have built.
                Two Retvisans are better than one. Especially if in Port Arthur.
                You look at the Port Arthur squadron - with what the war met?
                And until that time they were just fooling around: "And they are not needed for nothing ...".
                So, count everything that was abandoned and add to the Port Arthur squadron. You look, and the war wouldn’t have wondered.
                1. Nehist
                  Nehist 24 May 2020 19: 48 New
                  +1
                  I wonder where you will take shells for these ships? English guns stand on them. What's on the armadillo what's on the DBK. England remind you of Japan’s ally in the end, after the purchase, there are ships, but they have nothing to shoot with. Have you thought about this situation? By the way, this was one of the significant factors in refusing to buy ready-made ships. But the fact that Kramp had to order 2 EDB agrees.
                  1. bayard
                    bayard 25 May 2020 01: 48 New
                    +3
                    Quote: Nehist
                    I wonder where you will take shells for these ships?

                    I AM ? Shells for guns of ships of 116 years ago? belay
                    And if about the GShF, while negotiating "exotic cruisers", it was just about purchasing ships with one and a half shells, spare parts and 4 torpedoes per vehicle. By the way, the Italian battleship, which they offered to Russia, was abandoned precisely because of the main caliber - 320 mm. But for me, during the prewar race to complete the Pacific Fleet, it was possible to go for the purchase of this exotic - with a set of standard shells for the barrel resource and the subsequent replacement of guns with domestic ones. At that time, the region needed to collect an adequate group in terms of numbers and quality by the middle-end of 1903 (England and the USA insisted on the Japanese attack on Russia in the second half of 1903, immediately after they received all the ordered ships). It is for this that Yankel Schiff allocated credit for the war on Yap.
                    Russia was not lucky with the tsar at that time - young and narrow-minded. "I do not want this war, which means it will not be" - stupidity and arrogance.
                    Quote: Nehist
                    English guns stand on them. What's on the armadillo what's on the DBK. England remind you Japan's ally

                    The Chilean armadillos needed to be done in a slightly different way than the Chileans themselves wanted - to sell ships before they were surrendered. It was necessary to give a loan to Chile for the redemption of ships with the entire BC and repair kit, to enter into its fleet (just nominally) and then transfer it to the Republic of Ingushetia in order to avoid England blocking the deal. These were very peculiar armadillos. Their GK was really 10 inches, but here's an auxiliary ... 14 x 190 mm. !!! Now imagine these ships in a battle line against the Japanese cruisers. In this case, their auxiliary caliber would be much more effective than the Japanese 6-inch. Yes, and their booking was quite on the level. And the speed is 19 knots design, 20 knots maximum.
                    These boats in the REV would be very useful.
                    Quote: Nehist
                    But the fact that Kramp had to order 2 EDB agrees.

                    And not only 2 armadillos. Crump, while visiting the English shipyards, was very inspired by the English armored cruiser and wanted to build something similar. Here SUCH cruisers (promised to order 2) and it would be necessary to order. With 20 l / s vehicles, these would be animals with a speed of 000–21 knots (for comparison, see the Rurik-22 cruiser) and the armament of the GK at 2 ". Moreover, Kramp was promised a contract to launch a shipyard in Port Arthur (his friend, also an American businessman, was to build.) There were serious plans ...
                    If you take a closer look at the pre-war period, then you should pay attention to those cruisers that RI ordered abroad:
                    - French "Bayan". It was worth ordering the French not two EBs and a cruiser, but two cruisers, while enhancing their armament (speed and armor were good).
                    - The Bogatyr of the German company Vulkan had excellent cars of 20 l / s. It had to be built just like an armored cruiser with a 000 ”GK and a speed of 10–21 knots. And in the amount of 22–2 units. We would have had at least two such ships in Port Arthur by the fall of 3.
                    - "Askold" smile the company "Germanverf" on 3 cars had a capacity of 23 l / s and a speed of 600 - 24,5 knots - almost like a "Novik". This ship was also worth building as an armored cruiser with the same weapons as the Bogatyr. And in the same amount. The shipyards really wanted to receive such an order, I strongly advised to do it and Wilhelm-24,75 to his brother ... did not break the stubborn.
                    - the cruiser "Novik" of the company "Shihau" ... here the circus came out completely. It turned out to be a wonderful light cruiser, the company could order 3-4 such ships to order and build it very quickly ... but instead it was clowning with the abduction of technical documentation, attempts to build on its own ... puffs with construction and the result was unfinished “stones” in Rozhestvensky’s squadron. But if she had ordered 3-4 such ships from Shihau, she would not only have handed over the documentation for them for free, but would also arrange technical support for the construction of their sisterships at Russian shipyards. As a result, by the fall of 1903, there would have been 4-6 such cruisers in Port Arthur.
                    And more about the squadron battleships of the Borodino type. The type was chosen very unsuccessfully - the complex architecture greatly delayed their construction. And they inflated their price for the clouds (about 15 million rubles). While Retvisan was much simpler in architecture, but much more rational and easy to build. Its price was only 8 million rubles. True, without weapons, but for this, along with ammunition, you can throw another 1 million. smile . But if “Retvisan” were chosen as the basis of the entire line, then the entire series would have been built much faster and it would have been much cheaper.
                    As a result, all or almost all of this series would be in the Far East on time.
                    And that’s exactly what sane people offered to do.
                    But the English lobby and French protectionism won (when, for a bribe from the francophos, the respected Kramp was refused the already agreed contract in its entirety, giving half of the order of its competitors and ... excluding the destroyers from the order). Moreover, at the final stage of the contract, his hands were so twisted that the price of the ships was so ... problems with Varyag boilers could prove to be quiet revenge for wasting time and nerves. But this is my hypothesis.
                    The RPE has largely become an educational and reader for all fleets of that time yes . Two modern fleets of approximately equal strength met for the first time (even though the Russian fleet was dispersed), many theories and methods were confirmed and refuted, the ways for the further development of fleets and naval weapons became obvious ... In a word - for everyone - a training war, for RI - the beginning state collapse.
                    The experience of this war and the period of preparation for it is very important to this day. This war must be studied in all aspects, and not just the history of battles - diplomacy, reconnaissance, counterintelligence, logistics, training, state planning for the long term.
                2. Sergey S.
                  Sergey S. 25 May 2020 12: 07 New
                  +1
                  Quote: bayard
                  It was clever and brute force on the eve of the war - they refused the Argentine cruisers, and then bit their elbows when the Nishin and Kasuga drew themselves in a Japanese warrant.

                  It is useless to argue over the exact numbers ... there was too much talk ...
                  It is a fact that the significance of the Nissin and Kassuga cruisers was recognized by all.
                  The Japanese instantly outbid them after the failure of Russia.
                  Virenius's squad in Port Said missed ... Due to the indecision of the commander, the unarmed cruisers slipped into the Indian Ocean.
                  After the Strait of Moluks, Togo met them with almost his entire fleet ...
                  And the timing of the beginning of the war coincided with the appearance of these ships from the Japanese.
                  By the way, “Nissin” fired at Port Arthur from a distance of more than 80 cabs. So these were useful ships. And due to the lack of armadillos, it was they who were placed in the column of armadillos.
                  If Russia bought these ships, maybe there would have been no war? At least by a certain date.
                  As for different opinions, it’s understandable, some fog up the enemy, others engage in self-agitation, and someone just dreams of good ....
                  1. bayard
                    bayard 25 May 2020 13: 55 New
                    +2
                    The whole history of Russia's preparations for that war is an example of how this cannot be done. All that could have been done wrong. And the main reason is the young and near king, whom the Anglophiles played as best they could, leading Russia to the start of the war as unprepared as possible. Wrong types of ships, wrong dates, completely useless shells, delays of ready-made ships dispatched to the Far East (Witte tried his best here), insufficient funding and delays in paying (from Witte himself) shipbuilding programs, and the Port Arthur, as a naval base - the channel is not deepened, the dock is not built, coastal batteries are not deployed (except for the Golden Mountain and the Electric Cliff), the garrison for defense is not enough ...
                    And as for the number of cruisers from Chile and Argentina ... Well, nobody in the naval headquarters considered Chilean “Captain Prat” to be an armadillo - by all accounts, this is a cruiser. 6901 t. VI, 4 x 240 mm - main caliber and 8 x 120 - auxiliary. Yes, it’s already 12 - 13 years old, but the speed was 18,3 knots, and when the boilers were replaced in 1910, it issued 19,5 knots in general. And he went for scrapping only in 1935. So he was not an old man then, and he could bring benefit in the war. Therefore, having learned that Japan was looking for an opportunity to redeem the Chilean and Argentinean cruisers, in Russia, they decided to redeem everything there, if only the enemy did not get to gain. That's when the figure of 10 cruisers arose, and even several destroyers.
                    And if we talk about the military value of those Chilean armadillos that Russia refused, and England bought for itself - "Swiftshur" and "Triem", then these were simply outstanding ships, ideal hunters for Japanese cruisers. When booking at the level of an armadillo, they had a speed of over 20 knots, and in terms of firepower only the weight of an airborne salvo was 3 (!) Times higher than any Japanese armored cruiser. The volley was superior even more, because they had a 4 x 254 mm main gun, they had an auxiliary caliber of 14 x 190 mm (with a barrel length of 50 calibers, which gave greater speed and penetration power than even the main battle ship of Japanese cruisers).
                    If these two ships were to be in Port Arthur, the two of them could calmly go out to the entire Kamimura detachment with its six armored cruisers, and do whatever they want with them. They were equal in speed with them, and the Japanese shells would not have taken them. While even the auxiliary caliber of these ships could become fatal for the Japanese cruisers.
                    And we refused this absolute tool against enemy cruisers.
                    Buy them Russia in 1903, the war would not have happened, especially if the Argentine cruisers were acquired.
                    Russia purposefully led to defeat in the war, revolution and collapse. The agents were led by all the same partners as now.
                    And the current situation is the same as then - the day before.
                    1. Sergey S.
                      Sergey S. 25 May 2020 23: 00 New
                      +1
                      Quote: bayard
                      Russia purposefully led to defeat in the war, revolution and collapse. The agents were led by all the same partners as now.

                      I agree ...
                      Our "allies" were annoyed by the claim for independence, which was not backed up by real opportunities to influence the situation.
                      Throughout the nineteenth century, the British were irritated by the Russian autocrats who ranted about their greatness, but in fact did nothing to make the people of Russia meet the demands of the times. What was the cost of only abolishing serfdom, which was centuries late ... and rid the peasants of poverty and hard labor.
                      And the soldiers were perceived as hard labor ...
                      The British saw all this from the height of constitutional superiority, and did not understand how this backward Russia hinders the establishment of progressive orders ...
                      I am silent about morality. Advanced Protestants and other similar apostates do not have it.

                      As for Russia. then the British were right in many ways. Their incitement to Japan, their indulgence to the revolutionaries, their purchase of friends and the sale of former friends ... allowed Britain to rule not only the seas, but also world finances ... So far, the same Anglo-Saxons, but already from the USA, did not seize the initiative.

                      The fleet has become an indicator of the strength and health of the country. And the Russian steam and armored fleet is an indicator of Russia's weakness and backwardness. Outwardly beautiful ships, sometimes successful, did not bring success to the Homeland. And the era of the beautiful ships of Tsushima ended.

                      And today in the West Russia is perceived in a similar way ...
                      And if the Crimean War was about 40 years from the Napoleonic wars victorious for Russia, then we are already separated from the Great Victory of the USSR by 75 ... and 30 years from the Great USSR itself.
                      This is me about
                      Quote: bayard
                      And the current situation is the same as then - the day before.

                      I agree completely.
                      I really hope that the mistakes of the last Romanovs will not be repeated.
        3. Dmitry V.
          Dmitry V. 27 May 2020 12: 36 New
          0
          Quote: bayard
          and in order to connect at a rendezvous point with a detachment of Argentine and Chilean cruisers, who were going to purchase through intermediaries in the amount of 10 pcs.


          Not only ships win battles - crews and their training.
          What is the use of a beautiful ship if the crew on it is less than a month old: not well-coordinated, without training, guns not shot.
          These are just fantasies.
          1. bayard
            bayard 27 May 2020 15: 49 New
            0
            Russia then had no choice - it was necessary to strengthen the 2nd squadron with armored ships capable of conducting a squadron battle. Going to the Far East with only 4 new battleships and one, in fact, the Oslyabya armored cruiser (the rest for the battle did not count), was pure fantasy. One could not get through to the connection with the 1st squadron, just as they did not break into Vladivostok as a result.
            Through Tsushima.
            And having received in reinforcement 7 armored cruisers (the Chilean armadillo was considered Russian exclusively by the cruiser), Rozhestvensky would have received a total of 12 armored ships capable of holding a squadron speed of 18 knots.
            Yes, uninformed crews and underdeveloped ships, but the chances of a breakthrough to Port Arthur became more realistic. Moreover, the Arthur squadron had to go out to meet at sea, and if necessary, support it with fire.
            The task was precisely in the BREAK in Arthur. And the union of the forces of the fleet.
            Then everything would have gone differently.
            And there could be no other plan of action.
            While holding on to Port Arthur.
            When Arthur fell, Rozhdestvensky proposed abandoning the breakthrough to Vladivostok, and having made Kamran Bay his base, begin the cruising war and the blockade of Japan, with the start of negotiations. Using the 2nd and 3rd squadrons as a trump card in this auction.
            But the young king literally "jammed the tower" ... and the fleet was sent to certain death.
            And died.
            If Rozhdestvensky would have gone the short way through Suez, he probably would have managed before the fall of Port Arthur, but he could have broken through there ... question.
            But it turned out much worse than it could have been. Russia lost all three squadrons of its newborn Pacific fleet.
            In parts .
            It is inglorious.
            Alas.
            But with the Argentine and Chilean cruisers there was a chance.

            And with an adequate king on the throne, we would have no war.
            Would not dare Japan.
            I would not even dare to think.
            Russia with a sane tsar would not have heaped so many stocks.
        4. ALARI
          ALARI 29 May 2020 08: 01 New
          0
          Well, suppose you can buy everything that’s sold for money, but WHEREWHERE can you get trained crews from which can serve and service this type of cruisers? Or would Chileans and crews be rented out?
          1. bayard
            bayard 29 May 2020 13: 13 New
            +1
            Russia then had no choice. Either go with five ships suitable for battle, or buy the missing ships in the secondary market. The crews carried these ships with them (called up for mobilization, from reserve crews and removed from lower priority ships) and hoped to master the cruisers during the campaign.
            From these cruisers were going to form a "detachment of high-speed armored ships" - a high-speed wing of the squadron. What was the Japanese Kamimura squad. To counter enemy cruisers.
            Then it was already clear that in preparation for the war and the formation of the Pacific Fleet, we lost - the fleet could not be pulled together before the attack, and now we had to get out.
            Do not get out.
            Both halves of the fleet were obviously much weaker than a single Japanese fleet.
            But if Yapi had been pulled for another half a year or a year, then they would have had no chance, from the word at all. They masterfully took advantage of the window of opportunity. And they won.

            But the decision to purchase cruisers from Argentina and Chile was the only right one ... There was a chance ... It did not grow together.

            And precisely because of this, the Japanese so frantically stormed Port Arthur - to be in time before the arrival of the 2nd squadron of the Russian fleet. Against the combined forces of the Pacific Fleet, their fleet was powerless. And then their troops in Liaodong, Korea and Manchuria would be cut off from supplies and doomed to death or surrender.

            And if RI had bought Argentinean cruisers (future Nisin and Kasugu) and Chilean armadillos (just completed by Armstrong) in 1903, there would have been no war at all.
            The whole history of the REV is a history of errors, miscalculations, and betrayal. And the incompetence of the king.
            1. ALARI
              ALARI 29 May 2020 14: 05 New
              0
              Thank you, I did not know that the 2nd Squadron had spare crews with it. I remember from the literature that the crews for new battleships of the 2nd squadron were recruited from all fleets and barely recruited, there were not enough trained people. And here it seems everyone has scraped.
              1. bayard
                bayard 29 May 2020 16: 47 New
                0
                It was just about the crews for these - failed cruisers. These extra crews were sent home while standing in Madagascar on German coal miners' ships.
                And that is why the British cruisers (10 of the latest armored cruisers having a speed of 6 pcs. - 21 knots, 4 pcs. - 24 knots. GK - 9,5 ") chased the Rozhestvensky squadron in the initial phase of the campaign along West Africa - to prevent the transfer of" exotic cruisers "(10 cruisers were expected, including about 3 armored, and several destroyers) by Argentines and Chileans. The rendezvous point was in a certain bay in the middle part of West Africa.
                This campaign of the English cruisers was very actively covered by the press - daily reports. Thus, pressure was exerted on Chile and Argentina, along with diplomatic pressure. And the Latins surrendered. They refused to implement the deal, which was disavowed (prepared secretly, because international treaties prohibited the purchase of weapons of a belligerent country from a neutral one).
                England, by the way, violated these treaties by smuggling Japanese gun barrels for naval guns, shells, and other military goods ...
  2. K-50
    K-50 23 May 2020 10: 33 New
    +7
    Thus, it can be stated that one of the tools for the victory of the Japanese in the Tsushima battle was a significantly more powerful fire effect in the beginning of the battle, that is, an absolute superiority in the number of shells that hit the enemy.

    Unfortunately, there, in addition to the number, the power of the shells affected. Both because of the greater amount of explosives in each shell, and because of its greater brisance and flash point, which increased destruction and fires. sad
  3. The leader of the Redskins
    The leader of the Redskins 23 May 2020 10: 38 New
    +3
    Serious mathematical analysis. It is mathematical, because anything happens in battle. Recall at least the same "Hood." It does not give in to mathematics.
    1. Macsen_wledig
      Macsen_wledig 23 May 2020 11: 12 New
      +5
      Quote: Leader of the Redskins
      Recall at least the same "Hood." It does not give in to mathematics.

      Taking into account Jutland, everything is within the framework of statistics. :)
      1. saigon
        saigon 23 May 2020 19: 16 New
        +1
        In the Jutland battle, the statistics of shooting by the British were very different among different squadrons of LC, the statistics were pulled by 5 squadrons of battleships, but battlecruisers drastically pulled the figure down.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 20: 28 New
          +8
          Not certainly in that way:))))
          The best accuracy among the British in the battle of Jutland was demonstrated by the 3rd squadron of battlecruisers - 4,56 percent; Then - the British "343 mm" superdreadnoughts - 3,44%. Only after them - the 5th squadron
        2. Macsen_wledig
          Macsen_wledig 23 May 2020 21: 34 New
          +1
          Quote: saigon
          Jutland battle shooting statistics

          I'm basically about the death of battle cruisers ...
  4. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 23 May 2020 10: 47 New
    12
    Um, an interesting opinion yes
    But the author should not forget that the mistake of the Russians in rebuilding the 1st armored detachment led to the Oslyaby stop, which would let Oryol go forward. Those. in the beginning of the battle, the Japanese shot at a fixed target. And if you take into account that for any calculation of the shot, an adjustment is made for the speed of the enemy, the lion's share of Japanese hits on a standing ship fell on the bow because of the amendments. And if the experience of the battle in the Yellow Sea showed that in movement and in battle with one or two enemy ships that same “Relight” in principle sustained a strike, then the motionless “Oslyabya” under Tsushima, as one of the flagships, received attention even briefly, but of all the Japanese ships of the main forces. What was enough for him. Even several high-explosive shells in the bow of the ship, unarmoured over the waterline, did their job. And then the ship, which had gained speed, aggravated all measures to eliminate flooding from the first shells. Increasing pressure on the bulkheads, trim on the nose, a couple more hits and that’s all ... Shoot the Japanese with armor-piercing, this would not be the case with Oslyaby, because the shells simply flew through the unarmored nose without bursting, but high-explosive instant action against bare skin ... no
    hi
  5. PPD
    PPD 23 May 2020 10: 48 New
    +5
    When comparing, one should not forget about the displacement - at Mikasa it is 15 tons.tons against 12-13 tons.on ours. Yes, and the quality of construction. Oslyabya the most poorly constructed Relight.
    In addition, Oslyabya was born as an armadillo cruiser. those. it’s essentially an armored cruiser.
    It is believed that this is the forerunner of battlecruisers. If you conceived it as a raider, then you need to use it. In a good place for these ships as the flagship in the Vladivostok cruiser squad,
    or to your cruisers. There they would be in their place. And it is so amazing how in this situation Oslyabya lasted so much. And the "skillful" leadership of the squadron played a role. sad
    1. lis-ik
      lis-ik 23 May 2020 17: 34 New
      +3
      Quote: PPD
      In addition, Oslyabya was born as an armadillo cruiser. those. it’s essentially an armored cruiser

      So he was called the "armourer."
      If you conceived it as a raider, then you need to use it.

      The raiders then quite successfully operated armored decks and auxiliary cruisers.
      1. PPD
        PPD 23 May 2020 23: 36 New
        +1
        In the documents of the MTK, in 1895 it was as follows: "3 screw steel armored cruiser with a displacement of 12677 tons." And after Peresvet was bought from the Japanese, that cruiser became quite official.
        To speak one, to design initially, to lay down the conditions for this design, is a hefty forecastle, for example.
  6. Engineer
    Engineer 23 May 2020 10: 57 New
    +2
    How do you shoot six with one target ?? What kind of shooting methods were used? The British at Dogger Bank, even three of them alone could not fire
    The author can be praised. I would also give my version of the death of Oslyabya. From his description it is clear that he does not share the very common version of the collapsed armor belt on an armadillo.
    1. Insurgent
      Insurgent 23 May 2020 11: 06 New
      +7
      Quote: Engineer
      How do you shoot six with one target ?? What kind of shooting methods were used? The British at Dogger Bank, even three of them alone could not fire


      Yeah recourse ... It is difficult, but in practice it is practically impossible, relying only on optical instruments and mathematics to "separate" their hits from the hits of others. With the clear impossibility of correctly introducing firing amendments following from this.

      Actually, I’ve never been a gunner, but according to the practice of the database, we know what consequences the corrector’s error can cause when he takes someone else’s breaks as his own, neglecting elementary timekeeping from the sound of a shot to a break ...
      1. lis-ik
        lis-ik 23 May 2020 19: 45 New
        0
        Quote: Insurgent

        Actually, I’ve never been a gunner, but according to the practice of the database, we know what consequences the corrector’s error can cause when he takes someone else’s breaks as his own, neglecting elementary timekeeping from the sound of a shot to a break ..

        But the cover is never a hit! Although it’s close .....
        1. Alf
          Alf 23 May 2020 22: 27 New
          0
          Quote: lis-ik
          But the cover is never a hit!

          But the concept of "water hammer" from a large-caliber projectile has not been canceled.
      2. Alf
        Alf 23 May 2020 22: 26 New
        +1
        Quote: Insurgent
        It’s difficult, but in practice it’s practically impossible, relying only on optical instruments and mathematics to “separate” their hits from the hits of others

        If only the whole detachment does not shoot at one “key turn”.
        1. Insurgent
          Insurgent 24 May 2020 07: 43 New
          +1
          Quote: Alf
          If only the whole detachment does not shoot at one “key turn”.

          In my comment I described inconsistent the work of two mortar batteries and an inconspicuous spotter who couldn’t distinguish “his” arrivals from “strangers”, and on the basis of this he gave incorrect corrections that almost cost some people ...
    2. KVU-NSVD
      KVU-NSVD 23 May 2020 11: 35 New
      +5
      Quote: Engineer
      How do you shoot six with one target ??

      Only if the breaks are multi-colored and, accordingly, in the ammunition special. sighting shells - the truth in the descriptions of Tsushima I did not meet this. But there I think it was easier - the shelling did not start at the same time, and then observing the gaps only near and hit, they did not bother with identifying their gap .. but this is possible if the target does not maneuver and moves at a slow speed
      1. Engineer
        Engineer 23 May 2020 11: 40 New
        +3
        So, as far as I remember, there were no color markers in the RJE yet.
        Bunich recalled the phrase “having shot, they transmitted the distance data to the ships of Kamimur following”
        But this is only the installation of the sight, and even then it is necessary to introduce an amendment to the relative position of the ship.
        1. KVU-NSVD
          KVU-NSVD 23 May 2020 11: 44 New
          -1
          Quote: Engineer
          So, as far as I remember, there were no color markers in the RJE yet.

          Yes, I do not say. I just suggested options for the situation with the adjustment of fire, when six are hit on one ship.
      2. lis-ik
        lis-ik 23 May 2020 20: 27 New
        0
        Quote: KVU-NSVD
        Only if the breaks are multi-colored and, accordingly, in the ammunition special. sighting shells

        Shimoza. It is by color and hit.
    3. rytik32
      23 May 2020 16: 29 New
      +2
      Quote: Engineer
      I would also give my version of the death of Oslyabya.

      Due to the death of Oslyaby.
      According to Sablin, the roll began to increase after falling into a 10 coal pit. Further, water began to be poured into the damaged porticoes of the guns and through the holes in the freeboard, the ship turned over. It is obvious. But when they hit the 10th coal pit, only two rooms were directly flooded: this pit and the spare hook camera. So, these flooding was not the cause, but simply became the last straw ...
      And then what caused the big trim and roll? Obviously, not getting into the living deck near the bow bulkhead. I will explain why. Zavarin took his people out of the room of underwater mine vehicles when the ship was already agonizing, but these rooms were not flooded, the exit routes to the upper deck through the bow tower were not flooded.
      And then what was flooded? Only coal pits in front of the bowhouse remain. They occupy a substantial volume in the hold, on the lower deck and on the living deck. Water entering them might not have been noticed if these pits were not used. How did the water get there? Through holes in an unarmored residential deck and then through damage or holes in the armored deck, for example, ventilation or for supplying coal - there are already many options.
      1. Engineer
        Engineer 23 May 2020 16: 46 New
        +2
        In short, Oslyabya was methodically kicked until the buoyancy reserve was exhausted.
        1. rytik32
          23 May 2020 17: 14 New
          0
          There were many factors: construction overload, excess coal reserves (I remind you that nobody planned to fight with the maximum coal reserves), poor-quality armor plates fastening, the effect of a hail of shells, due to which flooding was not noticed in time
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 18: 09 New
            +1
            Quote: rytik32
            There were many factors: construction overload, excess coal reserves

            On Oslyab in the morning of May 13, there were 1415 tons. What kind of excess coal reserve are we talking about?
            1. rytik32
              23 May 2020 22: 43 New
              0
              According to Melnikov, "From a normal supply of 1200 tons, 105 tons were borrowed in favor of artillery, which reduced the estimated cruising range by 300 miles." That is, 1095 is normal. It was 1415, even if they burned 100 tons. All the same, it turns out that the stock is more than normal, which I called excess. What's wrong?
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 23: 34 New
                +3
                Quote: rytik32
                It was 1415, even if they burned 100 tons. All the same, it turns out that the stock is more than normal, which I called excess. What's wrong?

                In warships, the normal and full supply of coal is distinguished. Overloading is the acceptance of coal in excess of the full reserve. The presence of coal in excess of the normal supply is natural, and can not be considered excess. In almost all cases, if this is possible, admirals put their ships into battle with a full supply of fuel. The British admirals in the PMV didn’t even care about the fact that the 343-mm dreadnought GBP went under water :))))
                1. rytik32
                  24 May 2020 09: 12 New
                  -1
                  I will quote Melnikov again: “The total capacity of coal pits of 2120 t, which remained unchanged, made it possible to take more than enough fuel into overload.”
                  Those. all that is more than a normal coal supply is an overload. Here is such an interpretation. And Oslyabya was overloaded.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2020 13: 16 New
                    +3
                    Quote: rytik32
                    I will quote Melnikov again

                    Alexey, I'm already shocked by your quotes. To begin with, we will open Krestyaninov with Molodtsov and we will see that the total supply of Peresvet coal is 2058 tons. Then, open Melnikov and read the quote you quoted FULLY
                    The overload that arose in the project began to be compensated for due to coal reserves. From the normal reserve of 1200 tons, 105 tons were borrowed in favor of artillery, which reduced the estimated cruising range by 300 miles. The unchanged full capacity of 2120 tons of coal pits made it possible to take more than enough fuel into overload.

                    That is, we are talking about the fact that due to the well-known construction overload (namely, known) at Peresvet, the normal supply of coal was reduced (respectively, the total supply was also reduced - one is a consequence of the other). But, due to the fact that the size of the coal pits was kept the same, Peresvet had the opportunity to take an additional amount of coal overload, that is, over the full supply.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Here is such an interpretation.

                    Yeah :)))
                    1. rytik32
                      24 May 2020 14: 15 New
                      +1
                      I think we understood each other for a long time))
                      You consider overload that is in excess of the full supply of coal, I am that of more than normal.
                      It is clear that the reason that the belt was almost completely in the water was not coal, but construction overload. And they planned to compensate for the underload of coal. The question is, was it possible to take a little less coal? And here the key problem was the lack of large reserves of good coal in Vladivostok.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2020 19: 31 New
                        +4
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The question is, was it possible to take a little less coal? And here the key problem was the lack of large reserves of good coal in Vladivostok.

                        Alexei, this is completely wrong. The key problem was to get to the Vladivostok after the battle with the available coal reserves :)))))
                        I can remind you that after the battle in ZhM Peresvet returned (according to eyewitnesses) with almost empty pits, and the EMNIP came out with 1500 tons (too lazy to look, but approximately true) I can remind Tsesarevich, with his colossally increased consumption of coal. Emerald, which barely had enough coal to reach the Russian coast ...
                        The actual consumption of coal in battle rises sharply relative to normal. Then - combat damage, especially pipes that drop traction and require increased consumption of coal. In general, to give battle, having on board a normal supply of coal can only be due to its own base, and nothing else. Togo, by the way, had a full supply of coal :)))
                2. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 24 May 2020 21: 51 New
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Overloading is the acceptance of coal in excess of the full reserve. The presence of coal in excess of the normal supply is natural, and cannot be considered excess.

                  I'm already tired of pointing out your constant glitches in obvious issues. Of course, the author is right in this particular case. Normal displacement is calculated for a NORMAL coal reserve. The height of the waterline is of course also calculated for the NORMAL coal reserve. A full supply (even more than Full!) Means that the armor belt has gone into the water ...

                  Peresvet in the Yellow Sea did not have problems after many hits, precisely because their load was previously calculated. Hopelessly stupid Rozhdestvensky did not bother himself for a single second with calculations ..
  7. Macsen_wledig
    Macsen_wledig 23 May 2020 11: 09 New
    +2
    brought together Valery Sidorenko

    Why are you so Vladimir Vladimirovich? :)
  8. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 11: 10 New
    +7
    I'm sorry, but ... somehow it doesn't add up.
    Thus, if the Japanese in Tsushima fired with the same accuracy as in the Yellow Sea, then Oslyabya would receive 2-3 hits of 305 mm

    If we take the impacts with your coefficients over the entire time period, it turns out, for example, that 3-4 rounds of 305 mm caliber should have got into Oslyabyu (50 minutes of firing Sikishima and Fuji * 0,16 rounds / min * 4 = 32 shells, whence 10% - 3 or 4 hits), which is in good agreement with the opinion of eyewitnesses.
    We should not forget that in the beginning of the battle, besides Oslyaby, also Prince Suvorov, Alexander III, and Borodino, judging by the damage, they received quite comparable fire impact

    Have not received. In the first half hour he concentrated precisely on “Suvorov” and “Oslyab,” he was transferred to Alexander after Suvorov's failure. That is, other Russian EDBs, of course, also came under fire, but - periodically, and did not suffer comparable damage.
    On the Japanese side, only the Asama cruiser, which temporarily lost a place in the ranks due to damage to the steering gear, suffered significant damage, except for the Mikasa. Thus, it can be stated that one of the instruments for the victory of the Japanese in the Tsushima battle was a significantly more powerful fire effect in the beginning of the battle, that is, an absolute superiority in the number of shells that hit the enemy.

    In general, it is not clear where this conclusion came from.
    If, for example, we consider Russian hits, say, from 14.10 to 14.40, that is, roughly, in the first half hour, then it turns out (according to the respected realswat) 38 hits in Japanese ships, the time of which is recorded. But the question is, there were many hits, the time of which is unknown.
    That is, realswat was able to identify the time of 84 hits, in total, as you know, there were about 230 of them. It turns out that if these unknown hits were distributed proportionally to the known ones, then 104 shells hit Japanese ships in the first half hour :)))) You counted 30 in Oslyabyu , well, even 40-50 in Suvorov ... Where is the superiority? :))))
    In short - the existing knowledge base about Tsushima does not allow to draw a conclusion about the number of hits in Russian / Japanese ships in the beginning of a battle. Too little data
    1. rytik32
      23 May 2020 11: 54 New
      +3
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      If we take the impacts with your coefficients over the entire time period, it turns out, for example, that 3-4 rounds of 305 mm caliber should have got into Oslyabyu (50 minutes of firing Sikishima and Fuji * 0,16 rounds / min * 4 = 32 shells, whence 10% - 3 or 4 hits), which is in good agreement with the opinion of eyewitnesses

      I counted to 14-40 in Japanese, so 40 minutes of firing two armadillos. If you count the time later, then your calculations are correct.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      In the first half hour he concentrated precisely on “Suvorov” and “Oslyab,” he was transferred to Alexander after Suvorov's failure.

      You're wrong.
      For example, for whom Fuji shot:
      14.11 - 6200 m, Oslyabya
      14.14 - 5200 m, "Oslyabya" (12 ”shell hit was recorded)
      14.15 - 5500 m, Oslyabya
      14.18 - 4800 m, Oslyabya
      14.21 - 5500 m, the second ship in the line (type "Borodino")
      14.38 - 4600 m, second ship
      14.40 - 4700 m, the first ship in the line
      14.42 - 5400 m, the second ship ("the first is covered by smoke", as I understand it)
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      In general, it is not clear where this conclusion came from.

      Well, in the evening I will calculate how many hits the Japanese should have had for the period from 14-10 to 14-40 and calculate the recorded hits in all Japanese for the same period. Compare.
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      as you know, there were about 230

      How is it known?
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 12: 17 New
        +4
        Quote: rytik32
        You're wrong.
        For example, for whom Fuji shot:

        And who shot the remaining 3 Japanese battleships? :)
        Quote: rytik32
        Well, in the evening I will calculate how many hits the Japanese should have had for the period from 14-10 to 14-40 and calculate the recorded hits in all Japanese for the same period. Compare.

        I'm waiting :)
        Quote: rytik32
        How is it known?

        Surgical and medical description of the naval war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of the Maritime Department in Tokyo.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 12: 41 New
          +5
          But here is what I would like to note - taking as a basis the coefficients calculated by you (firing speed and accuracy) and with the assumption that in the first half hour all Japanese ships of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments fired (and this is not so), we get 46 -47 hits in Russian ships, which even with a factor of 1,5 accepted by you gives 69-70 hits.
          Given the fact that the Russian ships made 38 hits, the time of which is known reliably, and some other number of hits, the time of which is not fixed, a large difference in the number of hits, even kill, is not visible
          1. Catfish
            Catfish 23 May 2020 12: 58 New
            +3
            Good day, Andrey! hi
            How is life, how is health, when will you please us with a new article? smile drinks
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 13: 45 New
              +9
              Hello, Konstantin! hi
              Quote: Sea Cat
              How is your health

              An autopsy will show! soldier
              Quote: Sea Cat
              when will you please us with a new article?

              Posted on moderation. I generally thought that I would get by with one article to complete the story of "Pearls," but, crap, I got two. However, both are written, so as soon as the first one comes to the main page, I'll immediately post the second for moderation.
              1. Catfish
                Catfish 23 May 2020 15: 50 New
                +7
                Two articles are always better than one. I'm already in anticipation. smile
          2. rytik32
            23 May 2020 16: 36 New
            0
            Andrei, do you understand that without specifying a caliber, at least tentatively, the number of hits says nothing? 305 mm and 76 mm shells have different effects, right?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 16: 46 New
              +1
              Quote: rytik32
              Andrei, do you understand that without specifying a caliber, at least tentatively, the number of hits says nothing?

              I understand. And I also understand that the number of hits with calibers of 75 mm and lower in the same LM was earlier, on January 27, 1904, it was very small, and certainly it could not be large in the first half hour of the battle
          3. rytik32
            23 May 2020 16: 38 New
            -1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            and some more hits, the time of which is not fixed

            But what is the caliber of these unfixed hits?
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 16: 51 New
              +2
              Quote: rytik32
              But what is the caliber of these unfixed hits?

              Well, Japanese medicine says about 115 hits with a caliber of 120 mm and above and about the same amount of smaller calibers. Honestly, I would not take this as an axiom - the ratio is really fantastic.
              1. rytik32
                23 May 2020 19: 57 New
                0
                Why is it fantastic?
                The method of aiming "over the masts", a good rate of fire of 76-mm guns - you can get a lot of hits. And most likely the enemy will not notice them)))
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 20: 16 New
                  +2
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Why is it fantastic?
                  The method of aiming "over the masts", a good rate of fire of 76-mm guns - you can get a lot of hits.

                  For one simple reason. In those cases when it is possible to check the effectiveness of the firing of guns with a caliber of 75 mm and below (that is, the number of shots and hits, or at least only hits, is known), this number is vanishingly small. For example, in ZhM it is reliably known already about one hit of a 75-mm caliber projectile on both sides and another 57-mm projectile hit at night. Of course, there were hits of an undetermined caliber (in the aggregate of the order of 60-62, but this is less than the number of hits by large-caliber shells (77) and, frankly, six 27-mm hit the Japanese ships in the battle on January 75, and 6 caliber hit the Russian 75 mm and one 57 mm, despite the fact that 17 identified shells of larger calibers fell into Japanese ships, and 30 into Russian ones.
                  1. rytik32
                    23 May 2020 20: 41 New
                    +1
                    Andrei, you repeat the mistake of Rozhestvensky, who did not believe in the complete destruction of the squadron from the experience of previous naval battles. And you are trying to prove that such accuracy could not be according to previous battles. The premise of my article - it could very well! Accuracy of the Japanese "Oslyaba" least was 1,5 times higher than in the Yellow Sea. Otherwise, you will have to call the liars Shcherbachev, Sablin and other witnesses.
                    Tsushima happened precisely because of the very high accuracy of the Japanese fire.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 22: 19 New
                      +2
                      Quote: rytik32
                      And you are trying to prove that such accuracy could not be according to previous battles.

                      All right
                      Quote: rytik32
                      The premise of my article - it could very well! The accuracy of the Japanese in Oslyaba was at least 1,5 times higher than in the Yellow Sea.

                      GENERAL ACCURACY. But a situation in which the accuracy of artillery fire with a caliber of 152-305 mm would increase 1,5 times or 2 times, and with a caliber of 75 mm and lower it would suddenly increase 10 times or more - this does not happen
          4. rytik32
            23 May 2020 23: 56 New
            +1
            I also figured, but with the assumption in favor of the Japanese, that they all shot from 14-10 Japanese time. It turned out 12 305 mm, 1 254 mm, 15 203 mm, 40 152 mm, a total of 68. According to the Japanese, he took not 38, but 34, excluded a close gap, a rupture of the trunk and two 75 mm. It turned out 9 305 mm, 1 203 mm, 22 152 mm, 2 120 mm.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2020 00: 00 New
              +1
              Quote: rytik32
              I also figured, but with the assumption in favor of the Japanese, that they all shot from 14-10 Japanese time.

              So be it, although they didn’t shoot :)
              Quote: rytik32
              It turned out 12 305 mm, 1 254 mm, 15 203 mm, 40 152 mm, total 68

              With a coefficient of 1,5.
              Quote: rytik32
              According to the Japanese, he took not 38, but 34, excluded a close gap, a rupture of the barrel and two 75 mm.

              Here I did not understand a little. What and where did you exclude?
              1. rytik32
                24 May 2020 09: 16 New
                +1
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                With a coefficient of 1,5.

                Yes, with a coefficient of 1,5 relative to accuracy in LM.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Here I did not understand a little. What and where did you exclude?

                Regarding the list from http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=8426
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2020 13: 39 New
                  +1
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Regarding the list from http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=8426

                  Alexey :)))))) Do you understand what you are doing now?
                  Estimating the number of Japanese hits in Russian ships, you actually ignore both Russian and Japanese data, because they seem insignificant to you and boldly fit them to the result you need (took statistics, multiplied by one and a half times). But when the turn of Russian hits comes, you become an ardent skeptic. Even a top-secret war is not a decree for you - you go to the commander Mikasa's report and try to take data from there. At the same time, you interpret the report exactly as it suits you, that is, if there are different interpretations - a 305 mm shell or 75 mm, then 75 mm. If a direct hit is in question, or a shell fell nearby - it means that it fell nearby :)))
                  And you are not even embarrassed by the fact that the Japanese took their very secret history quite seriously, used cross-sources, and that if they indicated the number of hits in Mikasu, which did not quite coincide with the commander’s report, then they probably had some reasons for this.
                  That is, for the Japanese, you take not the actual data, but what suits you, for the Russians, the minimum estimate possible. And even here you completely ignore the fact that there were a sufficient number of hits in Japanese ships, the time of which was not fixed, and it is obvious that some of them just hit the Japanese when the EDB of our 1st detachment had not yet been disabled.
                  Alexei, your owl h-ski is uncomfortable on the globe :))))
                  1. rytik32
                    24 May 2020 13: 54 New
                    0
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    took statistics, multiplied one and a half times

                    Andrew, this is not a fit. This is an estimate minimum number of hits based on witness testimony. Less is simply impossible. More is possible. You can not multiply by 1,5 but by 2.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Even a top-secret war is not a decree for you - you go to the commander Mikasa's report and try to take data from there

                    There are no questions for me what to use, source or literature, if both are available.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And you do not even bother that the Japanese took their secret history seriously enough

                    I don’t know how a top secret story was written. I doubt that you know.
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And even here you completely ignore the fact that there were a sufficient number of hits in Japanese ships, the time of which is not fixed

                    I agree, unaccounted-for hits cannot be ignored, it is necessary to understand.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2020 19: 56 New
                      +2
                      Quote: rytik32
                      This is an estimate of the minimum number of hits based on the testimony of witnesses. Less is simply impossible.

                      Until I see no other argument than your desire
                      Quote: rytik32
                      You can not multiply by 1,5 but by 2.

                      It’s possible by 10, but the value of such calculations? The problem is that the coefficient of 1,5 reflects your vision of the number of hits, but not their actual number.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      There are no questions for me what to use, source or literature, if both are available.

                      A top secret story is not literature, it is a document. Moreover, the document is strictly for internal use, designed to work with him as naval officers at the level of the naval academy. The Japanese wanted to get the most reliable report on the war, so the findings were checked and double-checked according to various sources. So, for example, the report of Commander Mikasa could be checked according to the shipyard repairing the armadillo (I do not say that it was for sure, I myself can’t work with the Japanese text, I didn’t even meddle).
                      Quote: rytik32
                      I don’t know how a top secret story was written. I doubt that you know.

                      You can talk with a respected Valentine (nickname on VO - "Comrade") You just entered into a discussion with him :))))
                      Quote: rytik32
                      I agree, unaccounted hits cannot be ignored

                      OK, great.
                      And now look - pure mathematics and no fraud :)))) Surgery speaks of 115 hits with a caliber of 120 mm and above. The respected realswat managed to count 84 hits, of which 13 were unidentified or small caliber. Total medium-large calibres - 71, but you exclude 2 more, considering them 75 mm. It remains 69. In total, we have 69 described hits and 46 not described, and assuming their uniform distribution is proportional to those described, and that 34 shells hit the Japanese in the first half hour, we get that 56-57 shells hit the Japanese in the first half hour. Suppose all unidentified hits were large calibers (5 hits) then we have 74 described hits and 51 not described. Total calculation takes the form
                      115/74 = 1,55 (roughly) * 34 = 52-53 hits.
                      Conclusion. Even with assumptions that seem true to you, we have 52-53 Russian hits against 68 Japanese. That's why I strongly disagree with your conclusion.
                      Thus, it can be stated that one of the tools for the victory of the Japanese in the Tsushima battle was a significantly more powerful fire effect in the beginning of the battle, that is, an absolute superiority in the number of shells that hit the enemy.
                      1. rytik32
                        24 May 2020 21: 10 New
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        It’s possible by 10, but the value of such calculations? The problem is that the coefficient of 1,5 reflects your vision of the number of hits, but not their actual number.

                        OK. Let's recount it again. 16 hits in my numbered list. Another 10-15 saw Shcherbachev in the nose. Only one of the hits in the numbered list in the nose, we subtract it. It turns out already 25-30 hits. Another hit in the stern (a fire was recorded), rosters (also a fire), deck. So it runs minimum 30 hits. This is without any odds! Any objections?
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 May 2020 17: 27 New
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Any objections?

                        Of course, there is.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        16 hits in my numbered list. Another 10-15 saw Shcherbachev in the nose. Only one of the hits in the numbered list in the nose, we subtract it. It turns out already 25-30 hits.

                        I will not find fault with your list, although I could. But the 16 hits you calculated - without the time of hits, that is, these shells hit Oslyabya in general, and not during the first half hour, as we believe. And 10-15 holes of Shcherbakov are holes, not shells, there could have been fragmentation holes, he could count hits in the nasal casemate, etc. etc.
                        I don’t argue that there are about 30-35 shells in Oslyabyu, I don’t argue about shells per hour of battle. But we think in the first half hour ...
                      3. rytik32
                        25 May 2020 17: 54 New
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And 10-15 holes of Shcherbakov are holes, not shells, there could have been fragmentation holes

                        It sounds "At least 10 - 15 huge holes gaped in my nose." Obviously not fragmentary.

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        he could count hits in the nasal casemate

                        There were no holes in the nasal casemate. The first shell did nothing noticeable (but most likely loosened the armor), and from the second the gun flew off the pins and the armor ran into the embrasure.

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I don’t argue that there are about 30-35 shells in Oslyabyu, I don’t argue about shells per hour of battle. But we think in the first half hour

                        After the Oslyaby failed at 14-20 (in our time), the Japanese changed their goals, it is unlikely that many shells arrived.
                        I even ran through the list, there are doubts about the time for only one hit in the cabin and for getting into the average 152 mm and 75 mm casemates. Only for them there is a chance that they were received after 14-20.
                        And 30-35 shells are only those that fell into the “testimony”. And how many were "undocumented"? By the way, I forgot about getting into the 3rd pipe))) But also a question with time. And I didn’t count the gaps near, for example, when a splinter wounded a man in a battery on the starboard side.
                  2. rytik32
                    24 May 2020 22: 49 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    And now look - pure mathematics and no fraud :))))

                    It’s not by chance that I took Mikasu. He has a hit on the realswat table 31 and a hit on surgery 31))) No odds are needed)))
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    The respected realswat got 84

                    Please note only in 12 ships!
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Surgery says 115 hits

                    Also in 12 ships?
                    I had more than 12 hits in surgery in 130 ships, but of all calibers, including close gaps. It didn’t work out exactly because of a typo in Iwata.
                  3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 25 May 2020 17: 05 New
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    It’s not by chance that I took Mikasu. He has a hit on the realswat table 31 and a hit on surgery 31))) No odds are needed)))

                    Correctly. Because the hits in Mikasu were clearly documented. EMNIP was another ship, which recorded the time of all hits
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Please note only in 12 ships!

                    I agree.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    I had more than 12 hits in surgery in 130 ships, but of all calibers, including close gaps.

                    There it will be difficult to calculate precisely because of the ambiguity in calibers. You can go from the opposite, judging by the descriptions of this source, a dozen large-caliber or medium-caliber shells hit the Japanese class 2 cruisers, again, it is unclear how many destroyers are. In general ... I don’t think that it will result in a sane analysis, although you are right, of course, in terms of the need to exclude shells that hit the light Japanese ships
                  4. rytik32
                    25 May 2020 17: 58 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    although you are right, of course, regarding the need to exclude shells that hit the light Japanese ships

                    Dug up:
                    During the destroyer battle “Loud” and “Shiranui” the last hit more than 20 shells.
                    During night torpedo attacks, the Japanese destroyer No. 68 (with a displacement of 89 tons) received up to 30 hits and reached the base
  • rytik32
    23 May 2020 17: 01 New
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    And who shot the remaining 3 Japanese battleships? :)

    Just to quote Campbell:
    "These two ships (Suvorov and Oslyabya) were the main targets of the Japanese, but fog and smoke often worsened visibility, so, around 14.15 on Togo’s squad it was noted that only battle flags were visible on the nails of Russian ships; other Russian ships were also fired. According to to the report of the English observer (Pakenham), who was on Asahi, Alexander got several hits at the beginning of the battle and soon caught fire. After Suvorov disappeared into the smoke at 14.20, Alexander became the target for several Japanese ships and "Burned. According to Packenham, Borodino received a heavy hit around 14.10."
    So not only Suvorov and Oslyabya. Two more cruisers fired at Nicholas 1, but it cost ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 20: 20 New
      +1
      Quote: rytik32
      According to the report of the English observer (Pakenham)

      Alexander received several hits and burned, Borodino received one hit and nearly went out of order (!?!) The eagle and Navarin (or sisu) “definitely got hits” but also definitely did not suffer significant damage.
      Quote: rytik32
      So not only Suvorov and Oslyabya.

      Yes, not only. But seriously, the fire was not concentrated on other Russian ships, and "several hits in Alexandra" and "one hit in Borodino" well, this is in no way equivalent to the one you specified
      in the beginning of the battle, besides “Oslyaby”, also “Prince Suvorov”, and “Alexander III”, and “Borodino”, judging by the damage, received a completely comparable fire effect
      1. rytik32
        23 May 2020 20: 49 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        But seriously, the fire was not concentrated on other Russian ships, and "several hits in Alexandra" and "one hit in Borodino" well, this is in no way equivalent to the one you specified

        So you don’t mind that our three head battleships were under fire? Great. It is difficult to judge the number of hits - no data.
        But there is a fact that after 14-25 hits in the “Mikasu” sharply decreased. There is no other explanation than the fact that the fire of our first three armadillos ("Eagle", as we know, suffered the fire) was suppressed, I do not see. And to crush you need a lot of hits. Hence my conclusions.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 22: 12 New
          +1
          Quote: rytik32
          So you don’t mind that our three head battleships were under fire? Great.

          I initially did not mind this. I wrote
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          In the first half hour he concentrated precisely on “Suvorov” and “Oslyab,” he was transferred to Alexander after Suvorov's failure. That is, other Russian EDBs, of course, also came under fire, but - periodically, and did not suffer comparable damage.

          You postulate the opposite, but the words of Campbell and Packinham, whom he quotes confirm exactly my point of view.
          Quote: rytik32
          But there is a fact that after 14-25 hits in the “Mikasu” sharply decreased. There is no other explanation than the fact that the fire of our first three armadillos (the "Eagle," as we know it suffered the fire) was suppressed, I do not see.

          Sorry, but this is elementary :))) After the U-turn, Mikasa cut the course of our squadron and went on a sharp course, from which it was very difficult to shoot - accordingly, the fire was transferred to other Japanese ships
          And my point of view is fully confirmed by hit statistics. That is, from 14.10 to 14.24 there were 21 hits (the time of which was noted) of which only 3 were not in Mikasu. And then from 14.25 to 14.40 - 17 hits, of which only 3 - to Mikasu :))))
          Russian ships suffered a fire, that's all :))))
  • rytik32
    23 May 2020 23: 14 New
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Surgical and medical description of the naval war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of the Maritime Department in Tokyo.

    Do not read. If you help with this, I will be grateful. I found the quote "In total, according to the" Surgical and medical description of the naval war between Russia and Japan in 1904 - 1905 ", published by the Medical Bureau of the Maritime Department in Tokyo in 1905, during the Tsushima naval battle, about 100 Russian caliber shells fell into Japanese ships from 120mm and up and about 60 smaller calibers. "
    Something doesn't fit.
    And one more question. Destroyers hit here too?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 23: 29 New
      0
      Quote: rytik32
      Do not read. If you help with this, I will be grateful.

      Yes, in general, I also did not master the original - it is not strong in Japanese :))) But in a systematic way, the translation, at the time, rocked, and - incomplete. I can send a dash in PM - where

      Quote: rytik32
      And one more question. Destroyers hit here too?

      Yes, of course.
      1. rytik32
        23 May 2020 23: 44 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Yes, of course.

        Then it’s clear who massively planted shells with caliber up to 120 mm)))
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 23: 54 New
          0
          Quote: rytik32
          Then it’s clear who massively planted shells with caliber up to 120 mm)))

          Alas, it is not confirmed :))) According to the same source, only 33 shells of all calibers hit the destroyers :)))
  • 27091965
    27091965 23 May 2020 15: 35 New
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In general, it is not clear where this conclusion came from.


    If you mean fire at the beginning of the battle. That on this issue is the work of the English admiral R. Kustans, in it he analyzes the Tsushima battle maneuvering fleets, the number of guns used, etc. He writes that in the initial phase of the battle, after the completion of the turn of the first detachment of Admiral Togo and the continued turn of the second detachment, he could use 17 large-caliber guns and 46 medium-caliber guns (8 inch guns are included in this number). The fleet of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky could return fire from 12 large-caliber and 19 medium-caliber guns.
    The most vulnerable target at this point in the battle was the battleship Oslyabya, which was used by the Admiral of Togo.
    At the end of his work, he concludes that everyone will have his own attitude to him.

    " This study of battle is convincing evidence that the victory of the Japanese was due to superior skill in tactics, and not superior speed. The formation of the Russian fleet was erroneous to the extreme. Admiral Togo took full advantage of this and his skillful actions led to significant superiority. "
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 16: 31 New
      +3
      Quote: 27091965i
      He writes that in the initial phase of the battle, after completing the turn of the first detachment of Admiral Togo and continuing to turn the second detachment, he could use 17 large-caliber guns and 46 medium-caliber guns (8 inch guns are included in this number). The fleet of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky could return fire from 12 large-caliber and 19 medium-caliber guns.

      Sorry, but this is such a thing :)))))
      The fact is that the course angle at which the Japanese combat detachments unfolded is still not exactly known. From what conclusions R. Kustans came to (I did not read) - he clearly took the Japanese version. Accordingly, his calculations are just a version of what could have been there provided that the initial data were correct, and not an axiom. Moreover, excuse me, the version is extremely biased, since even in the Japanese version of those events there are 12 heavy Russian guns after the Japanese reversal - This is a fantasy that completely ignores Russian documents.
      In addition, the number of guns is not equivalent to the number of hits. So I never saw the answer to my doubts.
      Quote: 27091965i
      At the end of his work, he concludes that everyone will have his own attitude to him.

      My conclusion is that the work of R. Custans is extremely superficial
      1. 27091965
        27091965 23 May 2020 19: 47 New
        +4
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        My conclusion is that the work of R. Custans is extremely superficial


        I am not trying to convince you of his innocence, this is one of a large number of works devoted to the Tsushima battle. In addition, there is the opportunity to read what he wrote about her.

        " The actions we described should not be taken as an accurate representation of what actually happened. Diagrams (schemes) are not exact battle plans, but they show possible options for action in this battle. They indicate that it was possible and note the limiting conditions for any decisions.. "

        This is the view of a naval officer at this battle and there are interesting points in it.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 22: 04 New
          +2
          Quote: 27091965i
          This is the view of a naval officer at this battle and there are interesting points in it.

          Surely there is, but my English ... crying
      2. rytik32
        24 May 2020 14: 19 New
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        My conclusion is that the work of R. Custans is extremely superficial

        I read this book in passing. But the author rests on the fact that Togo competently placed Mikasu well ahead of our squadron (but this is far from the first minutes of the battle), so that it would be difficult to shoot at him from both distance and course angles. But it was convenient for our armadillos. And all this is supported by calculations.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2020 19: 27 New
          +1
          Quote: rytik32
          And all this is supported by calculations.

          Well, yes - if you only take into account that nobody knows the exact position of Mikasa relative to our ships, and that, generally speaking, we transferred the fire from mikasa to other enemy ships, then the value of these calculations cannot be underestimated :)))
  • Demagogue
    Demagogue 23 May 2020 11: 31 New
    -2
    In Russia-Japan, only Poltava was of military value and had normal booking. It is no coincidence that their prototype Nicholas I was almost not injured in the Tsushima battle.
    1. Macsen_wledig
      Macsen_wledig 23 May 2020 12: 57 New
      +4
      Quote: Demagogue
      It is no coincidence that their prototype Nicholas I was almost not injured in the Tsushima battle.

      Naturally...
      Because they practically didn’t shoot at him.
      1. Demagogue
        Demagogue 23 May 2020 13: 06 New
        -2
        If you watch the battle in the Yellow Sea, then when the Japanese caught up with our squadron for the first time and concentrated their fire on Poltava, they resisted. And when they began to shoot at the head Tsesarevich from the second approach, he left the battle. But Cesarevich was stronger than Borodino.
        Borodino's flaws are most obvious when compared with classmates with the same American Maine. So most clearly.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 13: 55 New
          +3
          Quote: Demagogue
          If you watch the battle in the Yellow Sea, then when the Japanese caught up with our squadron for the first time and concentrated their fire on Poltava, they resisted.

          The only question is that they did not focus fire on Poltava. Sevastopol received up to 20 hits, “Poltava” - 25, but “Relight”, for example, 37 or even more. Tsesarevich received 24 hits, and his damage was noticeably less than that of “Poltava”
          Quote: Demagogue
          And when they began to shoot at the head Tsesarevich from the second approach, he left the battle

          He left the battle due to loss of controllability due to the hit of a shell in the conning tower and the failure of the helm. And they, generally speaking, were in Poltava and Tsesarevich quite similar in design. That is, if the same shell would hit the same place in Poltava - and it would also lose control.
          Quote: Demagogue
          Borodino's flaws are most obvious when compared with classmates with the same American Maine.

          Incorrect comparison. In terms of protection, for example, Borodino was just an almost perfect battleship against the Japanese. And from the point of view of artillery, the Poltava type had no advantages either.
          1. Demagogue
            Demagogue 23 May 2020 14: 04 New
            -2
            How is the thick armor of Poltava worse against the Japanese than the thin armor of Borodino? By artillery it is clear that there is no difference.
            However, if we compare Poltava with Iowa, which is similar in generation, then the parameters are at the same level, while Borodino’s defense is weaker than that of Maine.
            And the fact is that Poltava did not receive damage to key mechanisms, either in the Yellow Sea or under Tsushima. And Makarov chose Poltava as the flagship.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 14: 34 New
              +4
              Quote: Demagogue
              How is the thick armor of Poltava worse against the Japanese than the thin armor of Borodino?

              Elementary. For the entire Russo-Japanese War, only one case was documented when Russian 229 mm armor (EBR Pobeda) was pierced while the Japanese shell did not go inside - it knocked out the cork and remained outside. There is also a case of breakdown of 102 mm of the upper belt of the EMNIP Peresvet. Otherwise, if my sclerosis does not lie to me, the Japanese shells did not even take 76 mm of armor.
              In fact, there were no normal armor-piercing shells in the REV. Our armor was pierced (fixed to 178 mm, but not higher), but had a miserable armor action (few explosives). Japanese shells had a lot of explosives (including armor-piercing ones) but with the exception of the above exception they could not really penetrate armor.
              Thus, the very moderate thickness of the Borodino reservation, which, nevertheless, protected a large side area and a waterline along the entire length, turned out to be, in fact, an ideal tool against Japanese shells. But about Poltava, with their short, albeit very thick armored belt, and with their bare ends this cannot be said.
              Quote: Demagogue
              and Borodino’s defense is weaker than that of Maine.

              Yes, how to say? Maine had an armored belt of 280 mm, yes, but there was nothing behind him, and Borodino had a 194 mm bevel for 40 mm, and it was not clear to me where the American had a 280 mm section and started 102 mm. Borodino’s second armored belt was continuous, but the American’s only in the middle of the hull. Given the tendency to overload and the relatively low height of the main armored belt, even in normal load - a very bad decision for an American. Maine's casemates are well protected, but our SK towers are also wow :)
              In general, the American may be better protected, but I would not say that this is some kind of overwhelming advantage.
              Quote: Demagogue
              And the fact is that Poltava did not receive damage to key mechanisms, either in the Yellow Sea or under Tsushima.

              Under Tsushima, there was no Poltava, but in the Yellow Sea they were still received. Recall damage to the car of Poltava, because of which he was forced to slow down and lagged behind the squadron when the Japanese caught up with her. This is not to mention the fact that the same Poltava had serious damage to the hull and was intensively flooded with water, received trim on the stern and lost speed. Sevastopol had broken pipelines and in the second phase of the battle was forced to reduce the speed to as many as 8 knots (just when the steering was damaged on Tsesarevich)
              Quote: Demagogue
              And Makarov chose Poltava as the flagship.

              He was not looking for a better ship :)
              1. Demagogue
                Demagogue 23 May 2020 14: 58 New
                -1
                When Tsushima Poltava was not,


                I meant Nicholas 1, proto-Poltava. Which by the way was the only one that caused the Japanese serious damage.

                As for the battle in the Yellow Sea, in the end all of Poltava remained in service. Fatal injuries were not there. Despite the fact that the Japanese did not fire at them weakly.
                I always liked the decision of the Americans to put on Iowa in addition to the main caliber of 8 mm guns. Under Tsushima, the Japanese cruisers with their 203 mm delivered a lot of problems, and this would have leveled the chances.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 16: 36 New
                  +3
                  Quote: Demagogue
                  I meant Nicholas 1, proto-Poltava. Which by the way was the only one that caused the Japanese serious damage.

                  Yes, not a fact. This opinion, but not absolutely reliable.
                  Quote: Demagogue
                  As for the battle in the Yellow Sea, in the end all of Poltava remained in service

                  Sorry, but Poltava fell behind, and Sevastopol had similar problems. This is not emphasized in the sources, but it was.
                  Quote: Demagogue
                  Fatal injuries were not there.

                  So Tsesarevich did not have them all the more. But both Poltava were brought into a state that deliberately excluded the possibility of their breakthrough to Vladivostok - even if coal were enough for this.
                  Quote: Demagogue
                  I always liked the decision of the Americans to put on Iowa in addition to the main caliber of 8 mm guns.

                  I am not against your preferences, but generally speaking against armadillos both the 152 mm and 203 mm are almost equally useless
              2. Demagogue
                Demagogue 23 May 2020 15: 26 New
                -1
                And by the way, how didn’t they pierce the armor if the tower on one of the Japanese battleships was demolished from Nicholas 1?
                And I consider the choice of Makarov y Poltava as a drakkar to travel to Valhalla, I consider an important circumstance.

                And in comparison with Maine, it seems to me that Borodino has too high a silhouette, a good target.



                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 16: 41 New
                  +4
                  Quote: Demagogue
                  And by the way, how didn’t they pierce the armor if the tower on one of the Japanese battleships was demolished from Nicholas 1?

                  This is what? :))))) If you are about Fuji, then there were no towers on it. It had an armored dome covering the barbet and having an armor thickness of 152 mm. As I wrote above, Russian shells pierced armor up to 178 mm inclusive, what is the contradiction?
                  Quote: Demagogue
                  And I consider the choice of Makarov y Poltava as a drakkar to travel to Valhalla, I consider an important circumstance.

                  And what was he to choose? Peresvet and Pobeda were designed with artillery equivalent to armadillos of the 2nd class, Retvizan and Tsesarevich were under repair. But initially Makarov raised his flag on Askold in general, and what, will we draw far-reaching conclusions from this? wink
                  Quote: Demagogue
                  And in comparison with Maine, it seems to me that Borodino has too high a silhouette, a good target.

                  And good seaworthiness, that is, a good combat platform for artillery.
                  1. Demagogue
                    Demagogue 23 May 2020 16: 55 New
                    -2
                    Do you think that the artillery of the Japanese cruisers did not play a predominantly 203 mm role?

                    As for Peresvetov, Witgeft put them in a line in front of the Poltava. And the last time Makarov went precisely to two Poltava at sea. Weapon of choice))

                    In height: do you think the Americans mistakenly underestimated? Indiana, too, was not much in Poltava.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 17: 11 New
                      +4
                      Quote: Demagogue
                      Do you think that the artillery of the Japanese cruisers did not play a predominantly 203 mm role?

                      So alright, there would be only one I thought so. In general, one of the generally recognized results of the NRF is that armadillos can receive decisive damage from artillery of at least 305 mm, and that even 254 mm lose a lot, and smaller calibers are practically useless.
                      Of course, they played a role of 203 mm - they hit, exploded, somewhere wedged guns, somewhere else they did some dirty tricks. But watch the wok fight with Kamimura. After all, both Russia and Gromoboy against the background of the EDB are very weakly armored, and yet they lashed for a long time with the double superiority of the Japanese (when Rurik knocked out). The Japanese were already corny ammunition was coming to an end, but there was no sense :)))
                      And so, if you analyze - then here are my attempts :))) https://topwar.ru/141824-razmyshleniya-ob-effektivnosti-yaponskoy-srednekalibernoy-artillerii-v-cusime.html
                      Quote: Demagogue
                      As for Peresvetov, Witgeft put them in a line in front of the Poltava.

                      Only there can be many reasons for this. Relights are newer and, you will laugh, better protected (here you can argue, but certainly not worse). In addition, the problems with the speed of Poltava are well-known - in a battle it is better if the trailer lags behind than if the formation is broken. Finally, in battle, if we are talking about a small detachment, it is most correct to put the most powerful ships in the tail and head of the column
                      Quote: Demagogue
                      In height: do you think the Americans mistakenly underestimated?

                      We created Borodins from the very beginning, assuming the need to send them halfway around the Far East. But for ships for which such voyages were not expected, they made a relatively low side (Three Saints, the same Potemkin)
                      1. Demagogue
                        Demagogue 23 May 2020 17: 37 New
                        -1
                        Borodinians have developed very easily for the prodigy that you represent them. This does not happen. The excuse that all the Japanese fired on a pair of our ships is untenable. 4 battleships versus two, so what? They tried to do the same in the Yellow Sea. The identity of Rozhdestvensky against Witgeft is the only factor obtained. Or fatal defects of Borodino. Perhaps low quality new crews. I come to such conclusions.
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 18: 07 New
                        +1
                        Quote: Demagogue
                        Borodinians have developed very easily for the prodigy that you represent them. This does not happen.

                        Wow - easy :)))) How many shots of Suvorov in time? As a result, they drowned with torpedoes. Alexander III when he led the squadron at the enemy was substituted under crossing T, but it was a conscious decision to break under the stern of the 1st combat and in those conditions - perhaps that is the only true one. It was then, by the way, that the Japanese managed to do decent damage. And even after that, Alexander fought for a long time. The death of Borodino is probably an accident, a lacquote almost by the last shot in the battle.
                        But that is not the question. And the fact is that Oslyabya, which was armored about the same as Poltava, collapsed first, and very quickly, much faster than a Borodino-type EDB. About the same amount of Poltava would have survived under the Japanese fire. You have already been cited as an example Sisoy the Great, who, having similar protection with the Poltava, was effortlessly knocked out of the battle line by the Japanese - and there wasn’t much need to hit it
                        Quote: Demagogue
                        They tried to do the same in the Yellow Sea. The identity of Rozhdestvensky vs. Witgeft is the only factor obtained

                        Higher quality of preparation of the Japanese than in the BM, better shells, and, finally, decisive tactics of Togo, who was not afraid of how to approach the Yellow Sea from the very beginning of the battle, do not you consider factors? :)))
                      3. Demagogue
                        Demagogue 23 May 2020 18: 40 New
                        +1
                        The distance of the battle in the Yellow Sea was greatly reduced at times. It was not by chance that I remembered the 203 mm caliber. Suvorov and Oslyabya they spud very densely. In the Yellow Sea, this was not. This is a possible factor.
                      4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 20: 02 New
                        +2
                        Quote: Demagogue
                        The distance of the battle in the Yellow Sea was greatly reduced at times.

                        In Tsushima, it contracted even more.
                        Quote: Demagogue
                        Suvorov and Oslyabya they spud very densely. In the Yellow Sea, this was not. This is a possible factor.

                        Exactly what is possible. But the analysis of known hits does not give reason to consider the 203 mm caliber as something significant
                      5. Demagogue
                        Demagogue 23 May 2020 20: 11 New
                        +2
                        Our ships that sank, how do you fully analyze? And then if you give as a factor the improvement of shells, then why not assume that the Japanese improved the shells of 203 mm caliber. They added the same. Having so many carriers of this caliber, it would be foolish not to try to fully use them. And besides, I came across information that the Japanese after Tsushima experimented further with small calibers. So they considered them a factor.
                      6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 22: 03 New
                        +2
                        Quote: Demagogue
                        Our ships that sank, how do you fully analyze? And then if you give as a factor the improvement of shells, then why not assume that the Japanese improved the shells of 203 mm caliber. Added in the same

                        Assume - you can. But to say for sure - is no longer possible. I tried to do analytics according to Orel, but everything is very incomprehensible there. In total there were 10 hits that significantly affected the combat effectiveness of the squadron battleship. But the caliber of the shells that caused them was more or less reliably determined only in three out of ten cases - two 305-mm (damage to the hull and the right aft 152-mm turret) and one 203-mm (disabled FCS). Of the remaining 7 injuries, 6 were caused by 203-305-mm shells, and one (fire in the right bow tower) - by a shell, in general, of any caliber.
                        Quote: Demagogue
                        And besides, I came across information that the Japanese after Tsushima experimented further with small calibers.

                        They experimented, but only the very first RBKRs with the experience of the RVE (Tsukuba) received 305-mm guns :)))) And in medium-sized EDB calibers, the Japanese already waved a 1904-mm gun in 254
                      7. rytik32
                        24 May 2020 09: 21 New
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        I tried to do analytics according to Orel, but everything is very incomprehensible there

                        Not bad written by realswat https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/56157.html
                      8. Demagogue
                        Demagogue 24 May 2020 11: 48 New
                        +1
                        It seems to me that 203 mm still played a role. If not for them, Suvorov and Oslyabya could continue to fire for a few more minutes. One lucky shot on Mikasa and the situation is changing.
                        The distance was reduced for both sides, this is not a factor. Here, the effectiveness of 203 mm at short distances could increase.

                        Well, the commandos trained in the Kyudo technique have exacerbated. The path of the fiery bow)))
          2. rytik32
            23 May 2020 20: 13 New
            0
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But watch the wok fight with Kamimura. After all, both Russia and Gromoboy against the background of the EDB are very weakly armored, and yet they lashed for a long time with the Japanese double superiority (when Rurik knocked out).

            There, first of all, the question of distance played. Kamimura was afraid to come close, and did the right thing. The “bloody” hit in “Iwat” confirmed this. And when there is nothing to be afraid of, the Yakumo and Ivate legos hit Ushakov. By the way, if for the fight with “Ushakov” we apply the same coefficients as for “Oslyaby” (6% for 203 mm and 2,25% for 152 mm), it turns out that “Ushakov” drowned itself: 4 203 mm and 5 152 mm hits))) Surely the accuracy of the Japanese was much higher. Rather closer to the accuracy of Asama in Chemulpo (11% for 203 mm and 6,8% for 152 mm). Therefore, do not call fantastic a large percentage of hits by the Japanese. It is a fact!
          3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 22: 33 New
            +2
            Quote: rytik32
            There, first of all, the question of distance played. Kamimura was afraid to come close, and did the right thing.

            What was he afraid of? :))) The battle distance when Stormbreaker and Russia distracted Kamimura was 30 cables.
            Quote: rytik32
            And when there is nothing to be afraid of, the Yakumo and Ivate legos hit Ushakov. By the way, if you use the same coefficients for the battle with Ushakov as for Oslyaby (6% for 203 mm and 2,25% for 152 mm), it turns out that Ushakov himself drowned

            Because you don’t have to do this. Ushakov lost combat efficiency, they came closer to him and finished off. There will be a completely different percentage of hits, only it’s impossible to transfer it to a battle of linear forces, when everyone fights at full strength. That's when Suvorov was shot - there, yes, there was a percentage of hits even more than Ushakovsky, probably. The British won a dozen shells at the WWII in Blucher, too, while they finished it off, but in the LKR, Hipper somehow did not grow together :)
            Quote: rytik32
            Therefore, do not call fantastic a large percentage of hits by the Japanese. It is a fact!

            Again. I call fantastic not a large percentage of hits of the Japanese. I call fantastic the awkward ratio of hitting large and small calibers in Russians :)))) These are "slightly" different things
          4. Comrade
            Comrade 24 May 2020 03: 40 New
            +2
            Quote: rytik32
            if we use the same coefficients for the battle with Ushakov as for Oslyaby (6% for the 203 mm and 2,25% for the 152 mm), it turns out that Ushakov himself drowned: 4 mm and 203 -mm hitting))) Surely the accuracy of the Japanese was much higher. Rather closer to the accuracy of Asama in Chemulpo (5% for 152 mm and 11% for 203 mm)

            It is not.
            According to the Japanese observer, reflected in the diagram from the "Top Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War at Sea in 37-38. Meiji ”, hit on the armadillo’s hull of three 8 '' and of three 6 '' shells.
            The Iwate armored cruiser used up 47 8 '' and 160 6 '' HE shells, the Yakumo 21 HE and 21 8 'HE shells, as well as 59 HE and 59 6' 'armor-piercing shells.
            Total accuracy of shooting the Japanese in the "battle" with the battleship "Admiral Ushakov":
            8 '' shells - 3,37 % (3 / 0,89)
            6 '' shells - 1 .
            Perhaps 6 '' shells gave two to two and a half percent hits, five or six hits of shells of an unknown caliber fell on the pipes.
            But to the accuracy of the shooting of the cruiser Asama, demonstrated on the Chemulpo raid, these two are as far as the moon.
          5. rytik32
            24 May 2020 13: 11 New
            +2
            Yes you are right.
            I also read Gribovsky, with reference to Campbell, there are even fewer hits.
            “Rear Admiral X. gunners in this battle could not boast of particular accuracy: in 30 minutes, firing at a low-speed and low-maneuverable target, they achieved no more than 4-5 direct hits, of which two 203-mm shells. Both cruisers fired 89 203 mm and 278 152 mm shells *, therefore the total percentage of hits was not more than 1,1-1,4 (for 203 mm guns 2,3%). "
            Plus, May 14, 1 203 mm and 2 152 mm.
            Something very few shells held "Ushakov".
          6. Comrade
            Comrade 24 May 2020 16: 17 New
            +1
            Quote: rytik32
            Something very few shells held "Ushakov".

            If you have the desire and time, read the opus Battleship Admiral Ushakov in battles.
            https://topwar.ru/141243-na-dorabotku-nizkaya-unikalnost-bronenosec-admiral-ushakov-v-boyah.html
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 24 May 2020 10: 50 New
    +2
    "Petropavlovsk" was originally the flagship of the squadron. Perhaps it was already adapted to accommodate the commander and headquarters. Because it remained only to call on him. "Tsesarevich" at the time of the death of Makarov did not go out of repair.
  • Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 23 May 2020 14: 51 New
    +3
    Quote: Demagogue
    And Makarov chose Poltava as the flagship.

    Makarov chose Petropavlovsk as the flagship due to the fact that the newest Retvizan and Tsesarevich were under repair from torpedo hits wink
    Quote: Demagogue
    And the fact is that Poltava did not receive damage to key mechanisms, neither in the Yellow Sea,

    The 305-mm shell that fell below the waterline at the beginning of the battle did not explode, a stray fragment flying through the light hatch on the upper deck damaged the bearing of the left propeller shaft, and it was necessary to reduce speed. And since the ship was already returning to Arthur, this damage was not fatal. Had it happened at the beginning of the battle, could Poltava support the 13-node squadron move?
    Quote: Demagogue
    nor under Tsushima.

    what request Cognitive dissonance can happen here ....
    1. Demagogue
      Demagogue 23 May 2020 15: 07 New
      0
      Makarov could choose Peresvet, but he chose Poltava.

      Under Tsushima there was a prototype of Poltava Nikolay 1.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 23 May 2020 15: 20 New
        +2
        Quote: Demagogue
        Under Tsushima there was a prototype of Poltava Nikolay 1.

        Well, due to decrepitude, this ship was practically not paid close attention to the main forces of the Japanese. There is nothing to be surprised at. Well, to be picky, if the Poltavs were built on the basis of the Nikolay 1 project, this does not mean that Nikolay 1 itself possessed the Poltav data, it is unreasonable to put them together
        wink
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 23 May 2020 14: 56 New
    +5
    How is the thick armor of Poltava worse against the Japanese than the thin armor of Borodino?

    Most of the armor on armadillos of the Poltava type is steel-nickel. Only in Poltava itself was a relatively small section of Kruppovskaya, and in Sevastopol - Harveyevskaya. The “Tsesarevich” and “Brodins” have all the Krupp armor. Reservation area is larger. Two armored decks instead of one ... as if the difference is obvious

    By artillery it is clear that there is no difference.

    You are mistaken. On "Poltava" old towers with hydraulic drive. on the "Borodino" electric and all artillery in armor.
    1. Demagogue
      Demagogue 23 May 2020 15: 19 New
      0
      This is all well and good, but only Poltava did not work out in the Yellow Sea, and Borodino under Tsushima, yes.
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 23 May 2020 16: 42 New
        +2
        Look at the Sisoy the Great booking scheme. Very close to Poltava and he had literally a few hits.
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 16: 52 New
        +3
        Quote: Demagogue
        This is all well and good, but only Poltava did not work out in the Yellow Sea

        I can only repeat - they suffered more damage than the Cesarevich.
  • Lannan Shi
    Lannan Shi 23 May 2020 15: 00 New
    +4
    Quote: Demagogue
    How is the thick armor of Poltava worse against the Japanese than the thin armor of Borodino?

    If the resistance of the armor was determined solely by its thickness, the battleships would swim with a main belt of 20 meters. Made of foam.
    Booking Poltava was very ... Original. . Despite all the thickness. In Poltava, it was not so easy to mix 3 types of armor, Schneider-Creusot types 1 and 2, plus Garvevskaya type 1, and the quality of each plate was very individual ..
    But Borodino is already Krupp type 1 .. There is superiority even over the Garva type 1 armor, about 30%. And over Schneider-Creusot type 1, almost doubled. By the way, it was the ShK armor of types 1 and 2 that was the basis of the vertical booking of Poltava. So ... 250 mm of the main belt of Borodinians, oddly enough, is thicker than 400 at Poltava. And this is without discounts on the very diverse, and by no means ideal in general, quality of the "Poltava" armor.
  • Macsen_wledig
    Macsen_wledig 23 May 2020 15: 01 New
    0
    Quote: Demagogue
    And the fact is that Poltava did not receive damage to key mechanisms, either in the Yellow Sea or under Tsushima.

    "Poltava" were under Tsushima? belay
  • Region-25.rus
    Region-25.rus 23 May 2020 11: 56 New
    +3
    Quote: Engineer
    How do you shoot six with one target ?? What kind of shooting methods were used? The British at Dogger Bank, even three of them alone could not fire
    The author can be praised. I would also give my version of the death of Oslyabya. From his description it is clear that he does not share the very common version of the collapsed armor belt on an armadillo.

    “elementary Watson!” (c) - The flagship makes a sighting, having felt the distance it passes to the next matelots. On them, senior gunners make an adjustment for their position in the warrant relative to the flagship and calculate the data for firing the guns of their ship. And then - a quick fire to defeat.
    1. Engineer
      Engineer 23 May 2020 12: 37 New
      0
      Not elementary in any way.
      The distance is the installation of the sight. And there’s also a turret of the gun / turret that is constantly changing. Even if Oslyabya himself stood or was barely crawling, the position of the Japanese regarding him quickly changed.
      If you consider that Japanese ships changed goals "according to the situation", everything becomes even more complicated
      1. Engineer
        Engineer 23 May 2020 13: 20 New
        0
        PS
        According to column 8.6 of the article
        At 14-15 From Nissin to Oslyabyi 7000 m. From Izumo to Oslyabya - 8000 m. With such a difference, relying on the data of the front matelots and introducing amendments is pointless. Shoot immediately according to your rangefinders
      2. geniy
        geniy 23 May 2020 13: 44 New
        -1
        You do not understand the principles of artillery firing - like the vast majority of military history buffs. The fact is that the main error of aiming at ships is the error of determining the range, and not at all a lateral deviation, as when shooting at tanks. Aiming right-left is simple: an optical sight is placed - a kind of small telescope, which shows a deviation of aiming up to one meter, that is, you can shoot at an enemy ship with amazing accuracy - you can even aim at a specific person, such as an admiral. And the corrections for the course of the enemy target ship are actually quite small. For example, at a range of 5 km, the projectile’s flight time is 5 seconds, during this time a Russian ship at a speed of 9 knots (5 m / s) moves only 25 meters, but they are easy to take into account, and if you remember that Oslyabya was almost standing at all, then the accuracy of shooting the lateral deviation of the Japanese could be amazing.
        Therefore, the main difficulty is aiming in range. But her Japanese have successfully decided.
    2. Denimax
      Denimax 23 May 2020 12: 53 New
      -1
      Correction can be done with cruisers. There, they seemed to be on the horizon in a parallel course to the Russian squadron. So volleys from the side of the cruisers will be visible as a strip of gaps, like a whip hit on the water. Given the length of the ships more than a hundred meters, you can quickly determine the range of flight or short flight. Then to transfer a semaphore with simple signals. For example, a shortage of 500 meters, a signal of +5. Another longitudinal fire increases the probability of being hit by range.
      1. Engineer
        Engineer 23 May 2020 13: 12 New
        +1
        Each ship fires according to its data. From cruisers to recognize the ownership of a volley is even more difficult than from the ship that released them. Corrections cannot be made from cruisers.
        1. Denimax
          Denimax 23 May 2020 13: 46 New
          -1
          It is entirely possible that you only need to divide the squadron into groups and manage, like a conductor, an orchestra or choir. For each group, determine the observer on the cruiser. The first group gives a volley, the first, second, third. Then the second group, etc. observers make notes and commit to semaphores. But if each ship shoots according to its data, then it really will be a mess.
          1. Engineer
            Engineer 23 May 2020 14: 28 New
            +1
            But the Japanese did not shoot like that. Just take a look at the outline of article 8.6
            1. Denimax
              Denimax 23 May 2020 15: 14 New
              -1
              Is this about an incomprehensible scheme in Japanese? There the squadrons go in a parallel course, more like a battle in the Yellow Sea. And I just assume that the Japanese could use this method. At least for the initial phase of the battle, when you want to inflict quick damage, to outweigh the strength in your direction. And there, as it goes, everything can mix in battle.
  • Region-25.rus
    Region-25.rus 23 May 2020 13: 17 New
    +1
    Quote: Engineer
    Not elementary in any way.
    The distance is the installation of the sight. And there’s also a turret of the gun / turret that is constantly changing. Even if Oslyabya himself stood or was barely crawling, the position of the Japanese regarding him quickly changed.
    If you consider that Japanese ships changed goals "according to the situation", everything becomes even more complicated

    I repeat more slowly and clearly -
    On them, senior gunners make an adjustment for their position in the warrant relative to the flagship and calculate the data for firing the guns of their ship.
    1. Engineer
      Engineer 23 May 2020 13: 38 New
      +1
      You are very vague about what you write
      No correction for one's position at sea under traffic conditions can normally be calculated. Ships do not follow each other on a chain. This on land at the OP is the main tool and measuring the distance from it to others is not a problem.
      I have cited data on the distance to the target for neighboring matelots. The difference is 1000 meters. No one in their right mind would consider such amendments. Matelot can transmit a distance to neighboring ships. But hardly anyone really used these data. At least under Tsushima.
  • Region-25.rus
    Region-25.rus 23 May 2020 13: 42 New
    0
    Quote: Engineer
    You are very vague about what you write
    No correction for one's position at sea under traffic conditions can normally be calculated. Ships do not follow each other on a chain. This on land at the OP is the main tool and measuring the distance from it to others is not a problem.
    I have cited data on the distance to the target for neighboring matelots. The difference is 1000 meters. No one in their right mind would consider such amendments. Matelot can transmit a distance to neighboring ships. But hardly anyone really used these data. At least under Tsushima.

    I very vaguely traveled to different seas and oceans for 10 years of my life .. in the wake formation, too, under different conditions, and an experienced navigator can calculate much more different parameters, even on a piece of paper in a column. Personally, I myself participated in providing such calculations when I started as a sailor (visual bearings, tracking targets using a primitive visual direction finder, etc.)
    ps
    There was no GPS at that time, so they walked either in coastal visibility or by reckoning.
    1. Engineer
      Engineer 23 May 2020 14: 06 New
      +1
      Then try to scroll in your head the whole chain of obtaining and entering the initial data for shooting, to evaluate delays and possible errors at each stage.
      How simple it is for you. The navigator considers the distance and bearing to the neighbors in the line and often not the nearest ones. In the conditions of a smokehouse from coal. The radio operator runs with a report to the bridge (remember the telephone pipes on the ships of the time). The senior gunner immediately mates everything and gives data from the conning tower.
      The most important thing is what to do after the first 1-2 volleys when the angle to the target has changed? Wait for new directions from those in front, or shoot already at their sights and rangefinders. And if they are inconsistent even in terms of range?
      1. Region-25.rus
        Region-25.rus 23 May 2020 14: 17 New
        -1
        and where did I say that "everything is simple"? In the phrase "Elementary Watson"? winked My friend ... of course I described only the principle itself, which the Japanese used by the way, but not the details. Of course, this was not just in conditions of artillery battle. As I understand it, you have "categorical thinking" - i.e. "everything is simple" or "Everything is complicated" ... "yes-no", "unit zero" ... well ... didn’t you try to think between the extreme points of the concepts? Or "since it’s difficult, it’s impossible in principle?" ))))) So listen to me ... even at a distance of three miles, an experienced sailor, even by sight (knowing the dimensions of the ship) can estimate the distance +/- in three cables. Himself got the better of assessing the distance over the eyes, then checked on the radar. (then they used a rangefinder, warning screams - “aha .. anyone can use the radar) In general, read the ABC book or something, on marine navigation .. I think many questions will be clarified. We hereby depart. For denying the methods that were used, and successfully (for those who used) it’s kind of stupid .. By the way, ours also tried to “hit on the head” with the whole group but (!!!) they quickly stopped. For, as they wrote above, “if everyone conducts a simultaneous shooting, then there will be no sense.
        1. Engineer
          Engineer 23 May 2020 14: 20 New
          +1
          OK. It is a pity that we did not reach the constructive stage
          I myself determined the distance well with binoculars. But it’s easier for me, I'm a land rat, full of landmarks.
  • Bagatur
    Bagatur 23 May 2020 14: 37 New
    -2
    Navy Russian Empire never defeated the fleet great sea power!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 16: 55 New
      0
      Quote: bagatura
      Navy Russian Empire Never Won

      You can clarify what, in your understanding, is considered a victory? :)))
      1. Bagatur
        Bagatur 23 May 2020 18: 08 New
        0
        Trafalgar ... Tsushima ... Of course you have the Gangut ... Chesme ... Kaliakra ... But with all due respect, the Swedes and Turks do not compare with Great Britain, France, Japan, the Kaiser fleet 1914-1918. .. Flooding of the fleet in Sevastopol, Krimskat war I can’t name a victory ....
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 23 May 2020 20: 01 New
          +5
          Quote: bagatura
          But with all due respect, the Swedes and Turks do not compare with Great Britain, France, Japan, the Kaiser fleet 1914-1918.

          Well, take the German fleet. The only victory for the whole time of its existence is at least somewhat similar to what you have listed, except Spee’s victory over Kredok’s squadron. The French steam fleet did not win. Italian - unless in the part of special operations, but here we have the drowning of Yasima and Hatsuse.
  • lis-ik
    lis-ik 23 May 2020 17: 18 New
    0
    I just finished reading a series of books by Alexander Pletnev, “Battleships”, “Project Orlan”, “Admirals of the Arctic”. This is an alternative, but it can be seen that a person who knew firsthand familiar with marine topics wrote. Actually, in the “Admirals of the Arctic” the story was about Tsushima, the battleships of the Peresvet and Borodino series, cruisers and destroyers. Very interesting. I recommend it as a non-specialist.
    1. Polente the Wanderer
      Polente the Wanderer 23 May 2020 20: 56 New
      0
      Novikov-Surf "Tsushima" is better to read
    2. Polente the Wanderer
      Polente the Wanderer 23 May 2020 20: 59 New
      0
      Pletnev-Admirals of the Arctic (Fiction, Alternative History, Popadane) - it's just a dream
  • Polente the Wanderer
    Polente the Wanderer 23 May 2020 20: 47 New
    0
    The Japanese ships had a tactical and technical advantage: in the power of artillery fire (910 barrels versus 228), in the rate of fire of guns (360 rounds per minute against 134), in speed (16 ÷ 18 knots against 12 ÷ 13) and in armor (on average 60 % against 40) _ this is in the battle of Tsushima.
    The current Pacific Fleet is inferior to the Japanese "self-defense forces", that is, the fleet in the number of ships, their equipment and the latest weapons. In fact, the situation is exactly the same as during Tsushima .. Pacific Fleet -1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 4 BOD, 2 corvettes , 22 submarines.
    Japan-16 submarines, 4 destroyer-helicopter carrier, 37 destroyers URO, 6 frigates URO.
    The rulers are different, the result may be the same.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 23 May 2020 21: 04 New
    -2
    I did not have time to start, as usual I will express myself at the end .. Nonsense is complete and it is still mildly said .. wassat

    Where does the Japanese-style shooting scheme come from? From alternative Japanese sites? Yes, there are no less such wise men of couch than ours .. From the official battle plan, however, it is clear that not a single one (!) Of the Japanese battleships fired at Oslyab. Only BrKr Kamimura and Nissin with Kasuga, and then only in the first minutes of the battle.

    Moreover, instead of the stupid Japanese scheme, the author should lay out at least a general scheme of the start of the battle at Tsushima, from which it will immediately become clear that all the enemies shot Oslyab almost exactly in the forehead! Front they all shot! At very sharp angles! Therefore, multiple damage is understandable precisely in the bow of the ship. Places of extensive damage are also identified in the reports very accurately, this is the entire nose above the armor belt. If we recall that because of the enormous overload, the armor belt was at the waterline or 10-30 centimeters (!) Higher, it is easy to guess that extensive destruction of the side, with a wave height of 0,8-1,7 meters, led to extensive flooding of the entire armor Decks Deck in the bow. And if we recall the destroyed (and not armored) coaming, ventilation pipes and other trifles, then the causes of extensive flooding are already obvious to all the bow.

    In general, some kind of messy, and very poorly reasoned article.
  • Polente the Wanderer
    Polente the Wanderer 23 May 2020 21: 09 New
    -3
    Novikov-Surf "Tsushima" would not hurt to read the current strategists and draw a conclusion about the combat effectiveness of the Navy.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2020 20: 05 New
      +3
      Quote: Wanderer Polente
      Novikov-Surf "Tsushima" would not hurt to read the current strategists

      They read it a long time ago. And after that they read a lot more to understand how many outright lies Novikov-Pribo piled in his memoirs
  • ser56
    ser56 23 May 2020 21: 26 New
    +2
    "Thus, we can state that one of the instruments for the victory of the Japanese in the Tsushima battle was a significantly more powerful fire effect in the beginning of the battle,"
    and this is a consequence of the mediocre maneuvering of ZPR at the beginning of the battle, heaps .... request
  • Navigator
    Navigator 24 May 2020 00: 57 New
    +1
    "I’ll leave the question of the quality of shells outside the scope of the article." After this, you can no longer read the article.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 24 May 2020 03: 16 New
    +3
    For Tsushima, the time difference was 20 minutes

    The English observer indicated the time of the opening of fire by the battleship “Prince Suvorov” to the nearest second. If we compare with the time indicated in domestic sources, then the difference is eighteen minutes.
    why not remember the vivid, but dubious descriptions of the huge hole in the board, "a real gate where you could drive in three." Doubtful - because those who were not on the Oslyab and were unlikely to see it themselves write about this hole; and, in addition, there is no clear localization of this hole. The flagship navigator of the squadron Semenov located her in the bow unarmored

    The hole was located between 13 and 19 frames. It was there that in the mine hold were minefields and unloaded hulls of minefields, falling outAccording to eyewitnesses, out through this hole.

    The duration of participation in the battle on May 14 for Togo’s detachment is 180 minutes,

    According to Meiji, which did not go into details, ~ 202 minutes are released.
    And according to the details of the English attache of Captain Troubridge (Royal Navy), who watched the course of the Tsushima battle from the side of the battleship Asahi, the ships of the First combat detachment, starting from the sighting shot at Prince Suvorov and ending with the last shot from Fuji , intermittently fired for 4 hours 6 minutes (246 minutes).
    The rate of fire is uniform throughout the battle

    This assumption contradicts the facts, the rate of fire of individual guns under the influence of various factors varied even on the same ship. For example, during the battle at Cape Shantung, the battleship Asahi fired 150 12 "shells, of which 107 (including 40 “forged steel”, 48 shells of model A. R. 2 and 19 “steel”) - from the front barbet.
    the following average actual rates of fire were obtained: 305 mm: 0,16 rounds per minute.

    Turn to the facts.
    The right gun of the fodder barbet mount of the battleship “Fuji”, which was no longer used after the shells of a Russian shell hit it at 14:40, fired twelve shells in 29 minutes. Consequently, the rate of fire of this gun, returning to the diametrical plane after each shot, was 0,41 rounds per minute (12/29).
    First, suppose that the accuracy of the Japanese fire in the Tsushima set could not be worse than in the Yellow Sea, that is, 10% for the 305 mm

    Obviously, the accuracy of the shooting was much higher.
    Total Oslyabya received three 12 "shells. All of them were fired from the battleship" Fuji ", which in these 30-40 minutes fired about two dozen shells of the main caliber.
    All three hits were recorded by observers of the battleship, time is given in the report of the commander.
    If you put time on eyewitness accounts, the following picture emerges.
    First the main caliber shell of the battleship Fuji, which opened fire on the Oslyab at 13:53 (14:11 in Japanese), hit the second Russian flagship three minutes later. Torn on the starboard side in the area of ​​the living deck, he made a large underwater hole in the bow of the Oslyaby. Water poured into the ship into the first and second compartments, through cracks in the deck and fragmented fan tubes, into the six-inch bow cellar and turret compartment. Sealing holes due to running and swelling was impossible, the further distribution of water along the living deck was delayed by a third bulkhead in front of the bow beam, and below the water reached the separation of the bow torpedo tubes and dynamos. At 14:30, I hit the bow of the ship on the right side, not far from the first major hole, opposite the bow tower second 12 "a projectile that blew up a large hole on board through which, according to an eyewitness," the troika will pass through ", through which water flowed into the ship in a continuous stream. The hole was so large that uncharged hull mines fell out through it, stored in one from the premises opposite this place. third 12 "projectile made a hole near the waterline opposite the 10 coal pit, and water, filling the pit and the spare hook chamber, pressured the bulkhead already damaged by the explosion, which separated it from the living deck. Inside the ship, near the dressing station, it rushed As a result of the ever-increasing tilt and trim, shrouded in black smoke and covered in fires, Oslyabya sank even deeper, his ship stalled and crashed, falling to the starboard side.
    1. Comrade
      Comrade 24 May 2020 05: 08 New
      +2
      according to the details of the English attache of Captain Troubridge (Royal Navy), who observed the course of the Tsushima battle from the side of the battleship Asahi

      Sorry, mechanical error. Not Trubridge, but Pakenham left us time in his report when the First combat detachment started / stopped firing.
    2. rytik32
      24 May 2020 09: 38 New
      +2
      Quote: Comrade
      The hole was located between 13 and 19 frames. It was there that in the mine hold there were barrage mines and unloaded shells of barrage mines, which, according to eyewitnesses, fell out through this hole

      Let me doubt it. The cellar of the boom mines was in the hold, below the waterline, and it is difficult to make an underwater hole with shells with an instant fuse. And still could you share the source, who saw this hole?
      Quote: Comrade
      At 14:30 in the bow of the ship on the right side

      Fuji at this time shot at Alexander, according to the report of the ship's commander. And if on the right side, then Oslyabya has already turned around and sat to the very best.
      And your version does not explain where such a big trim came from long before the 2nd and 3rd hits from your post.
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 24 May 2020 17: 57 New
        0
        Quote: rytik32
        Let me doubt it. The barrage mine cellar was in the hold, below the waterline, and it’s difficult to make an underwater hole with shells with an instant fuse

        The hole could be semi-submarine, like on the Varyag, for example.



        Quote: rytik32
        Could you share the source, who saw this hole?

        The Oslyaby crew totaled 922 people, 504 of them died and drowned. 418 people were saved, including 68 wounded.
        Some of the "slabs" wrote memoirs published before the revolution. One of them, fleeing, saw the shells of mines falling out through a hole.

        Quote: rytik32
        Fuji at this time shot at Alexander, according to the report of the ship's commander.

        Does the report have timing for each projectile?
        Depending on the shooting conditions, Japanese ships carried fire from target to target. For example, "Fuji" in 13:53 from a distance of 6 meters opened fire on "Prince Suvorov". And in the diagram in your article, he is already firing at Oslyab.
        1. rytik32
          24 May 2020 21: 22 New
          +1
          Quote: Comrade
          The hole could be semi-submarine, like on the Varyag, for example.

          If you believe Shcherbachev, then the water was already at its very best, i.e. the projectile had to go many meters under water ...
          Quote: Comrade
          Some of the "slabs" wrote memoirs published before the revolution. One of them, fleeing, saw the shells of mines falling out through a hole.

          The hole on the right side, and Oslyabya lay on the port side. And do not forget the trim! How could a hole be seen?
          1. Comrade
            Comrade 24 May 2020 22: 31 New
            +1
            Quote: rytik32
            The hole on the right side, and Oslyabya lay on the port side.

            Around 14:20, the Oslyaby roll was 12 degrees to the port side.
            At 14:40 the battleship capsized and lay for some time on the port side with a roll of 90 degrees. What was the roll when the “Save” command arrived, is not known. In the image below, "Slack" roll 45 degrees.

            Quote: rytik32
            How could a hole be seen?

            Something like this. The hole is represented by a white asterisk.


            Colleague, there is my comment below addressed to you.
            Its essence is simple.
            If you insist that not “Prince Suvorov”, but “Oslyabya” underwent the most fierce attack, it means that less “suitcases” should fall into “Prince Suvorov” than into “Oslyabya”.
            In your article, you, a colleague, suggested that some
            factors allowed the Japanese to be 1,5 times more accurate than in the Yellow Sea and thus reach at least 30 hits - the minimum of the estimated values? Then we get 4 hits 305 mm

            Therefore, according to your logic, "Prince Suvorov" has failed, having received less than four "suitcases". On this conclusion, arising from your words, you can linger and discuss how plausible it sounds.
            The question of the number of hits of 12 '' shells in “Prince Suvorov” is fundamental in your version. You will be able to show how less than four “suitcases” could get into this battleship in the first forty minutes of the battle, consider that you really proved your theory.
            1. rytik32
              25 May 2020 00: 22 New
              0
              Quote: Comrade
              If you insist that not “Prince Suvorov”, but “Oslyabya” underwent the most fierce attack, it means that less “suitcases” should fall into “Prince Suvorov” than into “Oslyabya”.

              The meaning of my article is the assessment of fire exposure. Through the testimonies of the witnesses, we determine the minimum number of confirmed hits and then we deduce the% accuracy of the Japanese.
              I can’t take Suvorov for this - there isn’t such a volume of witness testimony. Therefore, I can neither confirm nor deny who hit more shells. If you have such data - please.
              Why did I call "Oslyabyu" the most fired? Only according to Japanese data, according to whom they fired. This is the Shikishima and partly the Fuji of the battleships. Who is on the “Suvorov”? "Mikasa" and "Asahi" given the fact that they are distracted by others. Total approximately equal. But on the "Oslyaba" hit a lot more cruisers. That is my logic. And I ask you not to forget the time frames indicated by me! Outside of this framework, “Suvorov” received much more shells than “Oslyabya" - this is without a doubt.
              Now to the conclusions. 21 shells hit Mikasu, of which 5 mm. In "Oslyabyu" at least 30 of them at least 3 305 mm. I recorded a 305 mm hit in the nose tower, because the barrel is broken and the tower is displaced - this is clearly not a 203 mm. Those. the impact is at least commensurate, but most likely the Oslyaba got more.
              You write that Suvorov got even more shells (I’ll write again that I can neither confirm nor deny it). It turns out that on three ships, the Japanese influence in the first 30 minutes of the battle is at least 2 times greater than the Russian.
              What did the rest of the ships receive besides the Mikasa, Oslyaby, and Suvorov? The Japanese 4 305 mm + another one exploded close (do you think only 305 mm?). According to our “Alexander” and “Borodin,” I think it is commensurate - here again, there is no way to count.
              1. Comrade
                Comrade 25 May 2020 04: 25 New
                +1
                Quote: rytik32
                Through the testimonies of the witnesses, we determine the minimum number of confirmed hits and then we deduce the% accuracy of the Japanese.

                How could unfired witnesses, being unfamiliar with the impact of Japanese shells, and even under enemy fire, identify the caliber of a projectile?
                According to Kostenko’s memoir, according to eyewitnesses, many dozens of 12 '' shells hit the Orel, which for many years was not in doubt among fleet history buffs.
                However, after it became known the number of 12 '' shells fired by the Japanese, Kostenko’s information no longer inspires confidence.

                Quote: rytik32
                In Oslyabyu at least 30

                Does this include hits drawn from Novikov-Prib's Tsushima?

                Quote: rytik32
                Why did I call "Oslyabyu" the most fired? Only according to Japanese data, according to whom they fired. This is the Shikishima and partly the Fuji of the battleships. Who is on the “Suvorov”? "Mikasa" and "Asahi" given the fact that they are distracted by others. Total approximately equal. But on the "Oslyaba" hit a lot more cruisers. That is my logic.

                The course of your thoughts is clear.
                1. rytik32
                  25 May 2020 09: 39 New
                  0
                  Quote: Comrade
                  Does this include hits drawn from Novikov-Prib's Tsushima?

                  Novikov himself did not see the hit, it means he wrote from other people's stories, so the source is "so-so" and requires verification. But other hits according to his data are fully confirmed by other witnesses. The only place I took 2 hits on Novikov was the conning tower. According to other witnesses, only one hit in the bridge is directly indicated. Why did I believe Novikov and took 2 hits? Descriptions of the destruction around the cabin, the fact of a severe fire, information about the numerous injuries in the cabin indicate that there were much more than one hit.
                  If you are interested, I can write a surname who confirms each damage.
                  1. Comrade
                    Comrade 26 May 2020 05: 19 New
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Why did I believe Novikov and took 2 hits? Descriptions of the destruction around the cabin, the fact of a severe fire, information about the numerous injuries in the cabin indicate that there were much more than one hit.

                    Novikov often gave out fiction or other people's “hunting stories” as historical facts, so there is no way to take him seriously.

                    Based on erroneous input, you deduced that Oslyabya
                    4 305 mm, 8 hits of 203 mm and 18 hits of 152 mm. Taking into account the fact that Oslyabya was fired upon by the Japanese even after 14:20 (14:40), right up to the moment when it was lying with the keel up, our data turn out to be close to Vladimir Gribovsky’s estimate (40 hits).

                    For half an hour in Oslyabya could not get so many medium-caliber shells.
                    1. rytik32
                      26 May 2020 09: 50 New
                      0
                      Quote: Comrade
                      Novikov often gave out fiction or other people's “hunting stories” as historical facts, so there is no way to take him seriously

                      Any sources, and not only Novikov, should be subjected to critical analysis, at least minimal. I shoveled a lot when creating this article. And what I just did not read. Several people wrote that Oslyabya was the first to open fire. But we look at what ships they were on and we understand that they might not have seen the Suvorov. And they saw the trim on the stern of the "Oslyaby". Again we look at which ship - cruisers or transports, i.e. could see Oslyabyu after 180 degrees.
                      But Shcherbachev was on the “Eagle” in the aft tower and could perfectly see the “Oslyabya”.
                      Quote: Comrade
                      For half an hour, so many medium-caliber shells couldn’t get into Oslyabya.

                      I want to clarify, do you think that there were more large-caliber shells? Or is the overall score too high? For 152 mm, I had the idea that% was overestimated when I looked at the ratio of hits in the “Eagle” in caliber. But the “Eagle” is a too muddy story, there is no objective data, the most complete data of the Japanese does not reflect hit in the armor without consequences.
                      By the way, I calculated how many shells were supposed to go to Oslyabyu after 14-40 at the same rates as 30 before this time. Little. 1 305 mm, 2 203 mm and 4 152 mm.
                      1. Comrade
                        Comrade 27 May 2020 00: 17 New
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I want to clarify, do you think that there were more large-caliber shells? Or is the overall score too high?

                        I will sow a grain of doubt.
                        1) According to Russian time, the battle on August 1 began at 05:05 (there are other information, for example, R. M. Melnikov writes 05:10) by firing from the Japanese side, ours began to respond at 05:18. At 09:50, "Idzumo" made the last shot.
                        Japanese armored cruisers fought for four hours and forty-five minutes, during which time “Russia” and “Stormbreaker” received +35 shells (R. M. Melnikov). Presumably, only four armored cruisers achieved, taking into account hits in the “Rurik”, +100 hits.
                        According to the schedule of Sidorenko, Japanese armored cruisers fired:
                        "Kassuga" - thirteen minutes
                        "Nisshin" - twenty five minutes
                        "Idzumo" - twenty minutes
                        "Adzuma" - forty-two minutes
                        "Tokiwa" - twenty three minutes
                        "Yakumo" - eighteen minutes
                        "Iwate" - seven minutes
                        Thus, seven cruisers in total fired for 148 minutes. Conventionally, it is as if each of the seven cruisers fired on the Oslyab during twenty one minutes.
                        According to Gribovsky, presumably during this time they achieved the maximum magpie hits. I am writing “maximum”, since it cannot be ruled out that there were six-inch shells from the battleships in the Oslyabya.

                        2) We look at the Kamimura squadron.
                        Four armored cruisers per two hundred eighty five minutes of battle are achieved, presumably, +100 hits.
                        Reduce the time of firing by half, all the same, a striking contrast is obtained with the alleged Gribovsky effectiveness of firing at Oslyab.
                        Four cruisers on August 1, 1904 fired 142 minutes (285/2), the number of hits 100-110.
                        According to Gribovsky, on May 14, 1905, seven cruisers achieved about forty hits in 21 minutes. Well, even if 35-37 (we’ll write three or five on armadillos), anyway, against the background of the battle in the Korean Channel, this comes out too much.
                        Where could such accuracy come from? My opinion, which, of course, I do not impose on anyone, was that there was no place for such accuracy of shooting, the number of hits of 6 '' - 8 '' shells in Oslyabyu Gribovsky was overstated.
                      2. rytik32
                        27 May 2020 01: 33 New
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Where could such accuracy come from? My opinion, which, of course, I do not impose on anyone, was no place for such accuracy, the number of hits of 6 '' - 8 '' shells in Oslyabyu Gribovsky was overstated.

                        Let's throw some factors.
                        1. Organization of fire. In Tsushima:
                        "One officer was on the upper Mars of the foremast to help spotters, he transmitted data to the fire control officer with the help of a speaker and flags.
                        Fire control was concentrated entirely in the hands of the managing officer, the slightest amendments to the distance and lead were not allowed either to officers - pluton commanders, nor to gun calculations. "
                        Under Ulsan, there were situations when one ship shot even three! Those. clearly a different fire control scheme.
                        2. Tired gunners.
                        “I heard that by the end of the battle on August 14, our firing accuracy decreased; as the officer participating in the battle said, the main reason for this to one degree or another was the fatigue of the gunners’ eyes” - quotes as in paragraph 1. from a lecture by K. Abo.
                        3. Armadillos fired from 152 mm more precisely cruisers (at least in the exercises), and "Sikishima" more often than others.

                        The question is, whatever one may say, I can’t get less than 30 confirmed hits in half an hour of battle. Even at Andrei’s remark that the hits could be after 2:20, I reread the testimonies of the witnesses. 20-25 hits definitely before 2:20, 10 is doubtful, and not a single one is guaranteed after 2:20 (I see the logic that the witnesses no longer paid attention to the hits, but thought about salvation). If you distribute these 10 then the Sidorenko table will get 8 to 2.

                        And according to Gribovsky. I met only the final figure of 40 shells. Does he have a clarification that this is only from cruisers? Which of his books?
                      3. Comrade
                        Comrade 27 May 2020 04: 53 New
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Under Ulsan, there were situations when one ship shot even three! Those. clearly a different fire control scheme.

                        With your permission, a couple of questions.
                        How does the number of targets affect the accuracy of the three gunners of the three guns firing at three targets?
                        Were these isolated cases, or a system?

                        Quote: rytik32
                        2. Tired gunners.

                        She made herself known at the end of the battle, so the Japanese began to shoot less often, and only for sure.
                        The rate of fire slowed, but this did not affect the accuracy of the fire.


                        Quote: rytik32
                        Armadillos fired from 152 mm more precisely cruisers

                        What is the individual accuracy of the shooting of Japanese armadillos and armored cruisers, we will never know.
                        The results shown in the exercises are infinitely far from firing accuracy in combat conditions.
                        On April 25, 1905, the Fuji fired the main caliber from the guns of the worst caliber, and three weeks later it inflicted fatal injuries on the battleship Oslyabya and the last shot successfully hit Borodino, after which the latter, without failing, rolled over to starboard side and sank.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        and Sikishima is more often than anyone else.

                        Unlike others, he could not shoot at all.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The question is, whatever one may say, I can’t get less than 30 confirmed hits in half an hour of battle.

                        Sorry, not "confirmed", but declared crew members of the ship.

                        In the previous comment, we examined the "version of Gribovsky" against the background of accuracy of shooting for a certain period of time of the cruisers Kamimura.
                        Now another example.
                        For the whole battle near Port Arthur, the ships of the Russian squadron got eight 12 "; five 8 "shells; nine 6 "-8" shells, eight 6 "; six 3" and one 57 mm.
                        As we recall, there are 35-40 minutes (according to Japanese sources, 50 minutes) at a distance from 46 to 26 cab. the entire United Fleet worked (6 armadillos, five armored cruisers, four "dogs").
                        We have officially recognized by the Russian side twenty two hit by shells 6 '' - 8 '' against allegedly magpie on the "Oslyab".
                        The time is comparable, the gunners are fresh and full of energy :-)
                      4. rytik32
                        27 May 2020 22: 39 New
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        How does the number of targets affect the accuracy of the three gunners of the three guns firing at three targets?

                        If no one else shoots - no way. And if for the same purpose another ten guns work, then difficulties arise with the recognition of hits.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Unlike others, he couldn’t shoot at all

                        The increased consumption of shells can be explained by an earlier transition to a quick fire just because it was shot.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Sorry, not "confirmed", but declared by the crew

                        I note that this is not just statements, it is the evidence of the commission of inquiry.

                        Quote: Comrade
                        In the previous comment, we examined the "version of Gribovsky" against the background of accuracy of shooting for a certain period of time of the cruisers Kamimura.
                        Now another example

                        Next time, I ask you to consider the battle on the Chemulpo raid and the Asama indicators and give comments on why the accuracy is so different from battle to battle. And, accordingly, does it make sense to focus on accuracy under Ulsan or near Port Arthur to assess accuracy under Tsushima. I closed this question for myself a long time ago and from the accuracy indicators in the Yellow Sea (as the largest battle) I took only the accuracy ratio between 305 mm (10%) and 203-152 mm (1,8%).
                      5. Comrade
                        Comrade 27 May 2020 23: 59 New
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        if a dozen guns work for the same purpose, then they appear without proof of difficulty with recognition of hits.

                        I suppose these are isolated cases. Or is it not so, and for almost all five hours did the Japanese cruisers prevent each other from firing?

                        Quote: rytik32
                        The increased consumption of shells can be explained by an earlier transition to a quick fire just because it was shot

                        If it had been shot, the consumption of shells of the main caliber would not be so small against the background of the consumption of 12 '' shells by the rest of the battleships.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        these are not just statements, they are testimony from the commission of inquiry.

                        Does history know cases when people sincerely believed in something that was not really there?
                        Now, if Oslyabya survived and ended up in a Russian or neutral port, it would be possible to take such information seriously, as the description of the damage to Tsesarevich, for example, is not in doubt.
                        The Japanese sunk into the Second World War English cruiser, many crew members were convinced that they were torpedoed, but the commission investigating the circumstances of the case came to the conclusion that this was not so.
                        Later surveys of the ship's skeleton confirmed the conclusion of the commission.
                        Without drawing any parallels, I repeat, forty hits in half an hour is too much, therefore without evidence this figure is not credible.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        I ask you to consider the battle on the Chemulpo raid and the Asama indicators

                        The overall accuracy of the Japanese, firing 419 rounds of 8 "-3" caliber on Russian ships, was 2,62%. For guns 8 "/ 45, this figure is 11,11%, for 6" / 40 - 4,39%. As you know, after lifting the "Varyag" on August 8, 1905, the Japanese, examining the cruiser, found traces of 11 hits - 3 8 "and 8 6".

                        Quote: rytik32
                        comment on why accuracy is so different from battle to battle.

                        Shooting accuracy is affected a bunch of factors, therefore it is impossible to mechanically extrapolate accuracy from one battle on other battle, trying to determine what the accuracy of shooting was in that other battle.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        of the accuracy indicators in the Yellow Sea (as the largest battle) took only the accuracy ratio between 305 mm (10%) and 203-152 mm (1,8%).

                        When you determined the percentage of hits of medium-caliber shells, did you take into account the consumption of such shells (and accuracy) for ships of the following formations:
                        3rd combat detachment. Armored cruiser "Yakumo", the cruiser "Kasagi", "Takasago" and "Chitose".
                        5th combat detachment. The cruiser "Hashidate", "Matsushima", the battleship "Chin Yen".
                        6th combat detachment. Armored cruiser "Asama", cruiser "Akashi", "Suma", "Akitsushima" and "Itsukushima".
                      6. rytik32
                        28 May 2020 00: 51 New
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        I suppose these are isolated cases. Or is it not so, and for almost all five hours did the Japanese cruisers prevent each other from firing?

                        You did not understand my promise. It was that with the method of organizing fire used at Tsushima, the situation where one ship fires in three could not be in principle. From this, I concluded about different ways of organizing fire.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        If it had been shot, the consumption of shells of the main caliber would not be so small against the background of the consumption of 12 '' shells by the rest of the battleships

                        We do not have objective data on why the consumption was lower. There can be many reasons from "cherished shells for 3 days of fighting" to "afraid to overheat the trunks."
                        Now, if "Oslyabya" survived

                        Even in discussions of this topic, when calculating accuracy in the Battle of Jutland, they took into account hits in a sunken ship))) Why is Oslyabya worse than Lyuttsov? Just that does not fit into your version?
                        Quote: Comrade
                        forty hits in half an hour - too many

                        I wrote about thirty)))
                        Quote: Comrade
                        therefore, without evidence, this figure is not credible

                        Including according to these testimonies, the court passed a verdict, but you do not consider them evidence - this is your right! I will not insist.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        therefore, it is impossible to mechanically extrapolate accuracy from one battle to another battle

                        Now our positions are drawing closer!
                        Quote: Comrade
                        When did you determine the percentage of hits of medium-caliber shells

                        I myself did not count, I took the calculations of several authors, including Andrey from Chelyabinsk. By the way, the calculations are slightly different, but not very significant. And I understand how approximate my calculations are. And from the fact that the ships you brought in were calculated or not counted, well, the calculation for one shell to and fro would change. In general, with an error of a dozen shells, this is such a trifle!
                      7. Comrade
                        Comrade 28 May 2020 02: 58 New
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        my promise. It was that with the method of organizing fire used at Tsushima, the situation where one ship fires in three could not be in principle.

                        What could have prevented the commander of artillery fire from the Asama cruiser, for example, ordering two front casemate 6 "guns to fire at one target from a combat mars, a single casemate 6" gun to fire at a second target, two rear casemate 6 "guns to fire at third goal?

                        Quote: rytik32
                        We do not have objective data on why the consumption was lower. There can be many reasons from "cherished shells for 3 days of fighting" to "afraid to overheat the trunks."

                        a) In the battle near Cape Shantung, without saving, they fired almost twice as many as 12 '' shells, and then suddenly they started saving money? Against the background of the order of the fact that the fate of the empire depends on the battle?
                        b) In the Tsushima battle, overheating of the trunks at first was unlikely to be feared, as we recall, there were casings with running sea water that cooled the trunks of the main caliber guns after each shot.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Why is Oslyabya worse than Luttsov? Just that does not fit into your version?

                        I don’t have a version, it’s just not credible that many hits over such a period of time.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Including according to these testimony, the court passed a verdict, but you do not consider them evidence - this is your right!

                        The court acquitted the officers of the “Eagle”, where the Swede stated that the main caliber shells with a gulkin nose remained, and many dozens of 12 '' shells hit the battleship.
                        A hundred years passed, Japanese documents surfaced, and it turned out that at the trial both sides were being deceived or mistaken (emphasize the necessary). We leave the motive beyond discussion.
                        So the court in this case is not credible: he did not have the opportunity to verify the testimony, so they took it on faith.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        from whether the ships you brought in were calculated or not, well, the calculation for one shell to and fro would change.

                        Take an 8 '' shell, for example.
                        The Japanese released them over six hundred, we are aware of three hit in the battleships and about one in the "Diana". But if it turns out that there was at least one hit of an 8 '' shell in the Askold, then the number of 8 shells hit would increase from four to five. i.e., twenty-five percent.
                        Understand how important is accurate counting? Until it is done, data on the battle in the Yellow Sea can be used only with reservations. And in such a matter as using the accuracy of shooting 8 '' guns for extrapolation, this information is not suitable at all, since, as shown above, one additional projectile is enough to dramatically change the percentage of hits for a given caliber.
                        Thus, we have to admit that we do not yet have reliable statistics.
                        Except for the battle of Port Arthur, of course. There are no shells of an unknown caliber, all hits were examined in a calm environment.
                        I have a sketch of how you can assess the possible number of hits in Oslyabya, but this is quite time-consuming, and the result will still be only speculative.
                      8. rytik32
                        28 May 2020 21: 46 New
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        What could have prevented the commander of artillery fire from the Asama cruiser, for example, ordering two front casemate 6 "guns to fire at one target from a combat mars, a single casemate 6" gun to fire at a second target, two rear casemate 6 "guns to fire at third goal?

                        According to Japanese instructions, sighting at distances of more than 4000 m must be carried out in one gulp, and this is the EMNIP, at least 3 guns. Trite guns are not enough for 3 goals)))
                        Yes, and managing fire for three purposes is more difficult: it is necessary to monitor all, amend the data, transmit the data, you can’t tell the wrong distance ... Here you already have to triple the staff of rangefinders, artillery officers and observers!
                        Quote: Comrade
                        and then suddenly they started saving

                        Yes, Ulsan’s experience.
                        Quote: Comrade
                        In the Tsushima battle, overheating of the trunks at first was hardly feared

                        Well, maybe what kind of malfunctions were ...
                        Quote: Comrade
                        The Swede stated that main caliber shells with a gulkin nose remained

                        This Shamshev said, apparently Rudnev gave him an example)))
                        Quote: Comrade
                        and many dozens of 12 '' shells hit the battleship.

                        This is Kostenko
                        Quote: Comrade
                        just one additional shell is enough to dramatically change the percentage of hits for a given caliber

                        In LM there were many hits of roofing felts 6 roofing felts 8 inches, so I counted in 2 stages. First I took 1.8% for 6 + 8 inches, and then I already divided% by 6 and 8, but in order to keep 1.8% in total.
                        Your opinion is very interesting to me. If 100 shells hit the Oslyabyu in Tsushima, how would they be distributed by caliber? Just give an assessment, no explanation or evidence needed.
                      9. Comrade
                        Comrade 29 May 2020 02: 57 New
                        0
                        It will not be difficult for you to indicate the source, where it is said that the armored cruisers Kamimura on August 1, 1904 fired simultaneously for three purposes?
                        I came across information that the “Idzumo” shot at three cruisers, but since it was not said there that it was happening at the same time, Togo armadillos came to my mind. In the Tsushima battle, they also fired on several targets, but this does not mean that they did it at the same time.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        According to Japanese instructions, sighting at distances of more than 4000 m must be carried out in one gulp, and this is the EMNIP, at least 3 guns.

                        Perhaps this is how it was in theory, but in practice, in the battle on August 1, the Japanese began shooting at with the bow guns of the main caliber. These are two guns maximum.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Yes, Ulsan’s experience.

                        If you mean the alleged "shortage" of shells at Kamimura, then
                        a) a message about this was received only from "Idzumo".
                        b) Four armored cruisers fired 958 shells of the main caliber, and their standard ammunition totaled 1 760 shells. Consequently, 54,43% of the shells were fired.
                        I’m not sure that the presence of forty-five percent of the main caliber ammunition in the cellars is a serious reason for leaving the battle.
                        c) the battleship "Shikishima" did not participate in that battle, therefore, he had no experience when he faced a deficit of shells in battle.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        This is Shamshev said. This is Kostenko

                        This is so, thanks for clarifying.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        In LM there were many hits of roofing felts 6 roofing felts 8 inches

                        Judging by the nature of the damage, it was mainly 6 '' shells.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        If 100 shells hit the Oslyabyu in Tsushima, how would they be distributed by caliber? Just give a rating

                        I'm afraid she will inevitably be emotional. Such an assessment, in my opinion, should be preceded by a survey, which will require a lot of time.
                      10. rytik32
                        29 May 2020 22: 49 New
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        You will not be troubled to indicate the source, where it is said that the armored cruisers Kamimura on August 1, 1904 fired simultaneously on three targets?

                        Patients: “At 06.23 the battle resumed, and almost immediately the Rurik got a fatal hit that damaged the steering, from that moment the cruiser lost control. In addition, he began to gradually lag behind the head cruisers. Shooting on both sides was chaotic and uncontrollable, no matter what historians try to write. Even in official Japanese works it is recognized that the Izumo - the flagship! - shot at all three Russian cruisers at the same time. "
                        Quote: Comrade
                        and in practice, in the battle on August 1, the Japanese began shooting at with the bow guns of the main caliber. These are two guns maximum

                        This is further evidence that the Japanese used innovations in organizing fire in Tsushima. Of course, Melnikov went too far, but still ...
                        Quote: Comrade
                        the battleship "Shikishima" did not participate in that battle, therefore, he had no experience

                        Do you seriously deny the exchange of experience among the Japanese ???
                        About the factor of shortage of ammunition, then lectures were given
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Such an assessment, in my opinion, should be preceded by a survey that will require a lot of time

                        But you said that 40 shells in half an hour is a lot? So, still there is some kind of your assessment!
                        And further. I apologize in advance for bringing the logic to the point of absurdity.
                        So. The information of our sailors contains errors, and even intentional lies. The Japanese also can not be trusted. They "Oslyabya" on the right side turned over. And confused in the testimony of whom "Fuji" opened fire. The fact that Oslyabya drowned turns out to be based on unverified and unreliable information. So we can’t say that Oslyabya drowned, right?
                      11. Comrade
                        Comrade 30 May 2020 00: 27 New
                        0
                        Patients: Even in official Japanese works, Izumo is recognized as the flagship! - shot at all three Russian cruisers at the same time. "

                        This author is not far from Pikul :-)
                        Someone on Tsushima once quipped: "They don’t take offense at the Sick."
                        We open the third volume, "Descriptions of military operations at sea in the city of Meiji 37-38" and on page 60 we see that the phrase describing the shooting of "Idzumo" does not contain the word simultaneously.


                        Quote: rytik32
                        Melnikov certainly went too far

                        By no means.
                        On the same page we read:
                        Head cruiser Izumo first opened fire on the "Rurik" of 8 '' guns, and then of 6 '".

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Do you seriously deny the exchange of experience with the Japanese?

                        I note the neglect in the Tsushima battle of this experience by three other battleships, including the flagship.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        The Japanese also can not be trusted. They "Oslyabya" on the right side turned over. And confused in the testimony of whom "Fuji" opened fire.

                        You compiled the answer to me, taking as a basis the comments of two of your opponents. One of them is your humble servant :-)
                        Your objections to a colleague about the Japanese, in my subjective opinion, are quite convincing, and I share them.
                      12. rytik32
                        30 May 2020 22: 55 New
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        I note the neglect in the Tsushima battle of this experience by three other battleships, including the flagship.

                        To claim ignoring this experience is possible only on the condition of the rate of fire at the Yellow Sea, but alas ...
                      13. Comrade
                        Comrade 31 May 2020 01: 03 New
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Claiming ignoring this experience is possible only on the condition of the rate of fire at the Yellow Sea, but alas

                        The hint is clear, it sounds logical.
                        But against the background of a lack of a serious comparative analysis of the duration of firing by Japanese armadillos in two battles, a formal comparison of four hundred with something 12 '' shells with six hundred 12 '' shells is incorrect.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 24 May 2020 20: 14 New
    +1
    Greetings, dear Valentine!
    I ask you to comment on the schedule of Sidorenko (which is in the article). According to him, it turns out that Sikishima shot at Oslyab as much as 40 minutes. This raises questions - didn’t he shoot at Oslyab with the main caliber, or didn’t he hit, or was the schedule wrong?
    1. Comrade
      Comrade 24 May 2020 22: 59 New
      +2
      My respect, dear Andrew!

      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      I ask you to comment on the schedule of Sidorenko (which is in the article). According to him, it turns out that Sikishima shot at Oslyab as much as 40 minutes. This raises questions - didn’t he shoot at Oslyab with the main caliber, or didn’t he hit, or was the schedule wrong?

      One gets the impression that the Shikishima had problems with sighting, as evidenced by the moderate, compared to even the Fuji with its obsolete artillery, the consumption of main projectile ammunition against the background of a disproportionately high consumption of medium caliber shells.
      Total 74 "suitcases" and 1 395 6 '' shells. As we recall, the "Fuji" is 106 и 532 respectively.
      The method of shooting the Japanese is described by one of the English attaches who personally observed this in practice. First, with the help of rangefinders, the Japanese made primary measurements of distances to targets, and then they clarified it with shots from medium-caliber guns. And the method of determining the distance using medium artillery among the Japanese, according to the report, was the main one.
  • unknown
    unknown 24 May 2020 08: 03 New
    +1
    How everything is running.
    Thank goodness, grades are starting to change.
    Very slow, but there is already movement.
    The Japanese had no advantage in the main ships.
    Rather the opposite.
    On the side of the Japanese: one armadillo with Krupp armor, two armadillos with Harvey armor, one obsolete armadillo, even inferior to the Petropavlovsk type.
    And eight, the so-called "armored cruisers."
    Each of which, not only could not fight one-on-one with a modern battleship, but also get away from it.
    The Japanese did not have much speed advantage.
    Mikasa is overloaded 900 tons in construction. He entered the battle with a total overload of three thousand tons.
    What real speed could he develop?
    But the main thing is what speed Fuji could develop. By the beginning of the REV he could not go more than 15 knots. And in an overloaded state? Or is someone sure that only the flagship was overloaded?
    Obviously, it’s real (whatever the Japanese write in their “official stories”) that the course of the Japanese first detachment could not exceed 14 knots.
    Oddly enough, but the course of the Kammimura detachment could not exceed this value.
    During the years of the RPA, the "Azuma", the slowest "armored cruiser", could not maintain a speed of more than 15 knots for a long time. And overloaded? Or "armored cruisers" did not have operational overload?

    Could the Russians go at a speed of 14 knots?
    No conspiracy theories are needed.
    Of course they could.
    Construction overload of battleships of the Borodino type, judging by the Orel, is 678 tons.
    Part of the construction overload could be removed. It has thermal protection for swimming in the tropics and watercraft. It was possible to get rid of part of the operational overload by transferring it to non-combat ships of the squadron. Fouling of the underwater was minimal. And that could be fixed.

    Russian problems are the concentration of fire of several enemy ships on one ship.
    The reason is the Japanese advantage in speed. The advantage that the Japanese initially received from Rozhdestvensky. The advantage is not due to some technical advantage in speed, but an advantage in tactics.

    The "shell version" without a speed advantage looks very one-sided. It was impossible to realize it without an advantage in speed. And the version itself is very funny. The Japanese during the years of the REV could not produce, and reload shells of this caliber. Citizen Shimoze is a mythical figure, like his "shimoza".
    The Japanese, most likely, used a batch of English shells equipped with liddit in this battle.
    The British, even before the REV, were faced with the fact that the design of their heavy guns was unsuccessful: gun barrel ruptures occurred, for example, during the shooting of a Mediterranean squadron. Bursting from shells equipped with black gunpowder. Of course, in this battle the British risked: the Japanese could be left without any heavy guns, the battle lasted. The British made the right conclusions from this battle: the shells continued to equip with black powder, and later switched to the concept of "low speed - heavy projectile". The guns made by the new, "German technology" received only
    "Washington" battleships such as "King George V".
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 24 May 2020 08: 38 New
    +2
    The experience of a small number of WWII battles suggests that it is much easier to hit a standing target. And even from a stop, getting into a moving ship is difficult. The experience of executions of the French by the British and Americans, if that.
    Therefore, I think that the author’s statistical calculations on the probability of hits can be easily multiplied by 2. The distance was quite real for a confident defeat with large guns.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 24 May 2020 18: 30 New
    0
    we will be helped by an analysis of the correlation of the fire impact of the Russian and Japanese fleets in the setting of the Tsushima battle on the example of the ships on which the most intense fire was concentrated. This is Mikasa among the Japanese and Oslyabya among the Russians. Yes Yes! I was not mistaken, it was Oslyabya, not Prince Suvorov, and I will prove it.

    In order to do this, it is necessary to prove that the number of hits for a comparable period of time 12 "shells in" Oslyabyu " surpassed the number of 12 "shells that hit the" Prince Suvorov ".
    Judging by the absence of objections, according to the Oslyaba, with us, consensus, the battleship received just three "suitcases".
    According to the logic of your article, the “Prince of Suvorov” was supposed to get another less 12 "shells, once the main target of the Japanese was" Oslyabya ".
    However, there is good reason to believe that the Prince of Suvorov got into +8 12 "shells, which is a lot more than" Oslyabya "received.
    The Japanese ships, I repeat, carried the fire from target to target, and if in some period of time more ships were fired at the Oslyab than at Prince Suvorov, this does not give us any reason to conclude that the Oslyabya for the first Forty minutes of the Tsushima battle, more than 12 "shells were fired than by" Prince Suvorov. "
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 26 May 2020 00: 26 New
    0
    Hard case. I can’t understand what all the same interferes with adults, it seems, before indulging in a heated discussion of alternative history, at first I will still get acquainted with the official description of the very last Oslyaby battle. But it is!

    The author of the article was not too lazy to add Novikov-Priboy and Semenov to his list of literature, but there was no place for the main source materials. But even a couple of paragraphs from official documents is enough to surprise the author’s flight of imagination and many commentators.

    Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji (1904-1905) / comp. Pestilence. Gene. headquarters in Tokyo; trans. with yap. A. Voskresensky; ed. under the editorship of Pestilence. Gene. headquarters. - SPb. : A type. Maritime Ministry, 1909-1910. - 4 t.



    1. rytik32
      27 May 2020 10: 42 New
      +2
      I will answer.
      I believe the report of the Fuji commander more. He is the source. His testimony is beating with actual damage.
      And in the "description of hostilities ..." and "Oslyabya" on right the sideboard lay down, and according to the testimonies of all of ours, and even according to common sense, to the left. So the link to one source of truth in the last resort is a so-so option.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 28 May 2020 00: 36 New
        0
        Quote: rytik32
        I believe the report of the Fuji commander more. He is the source. His testimony is beating with actual damage.

        But believe in vain. Moreover, you probably read it in an English translation from Japanese. I would like to recall that the transfer of proper names is not the strongest side of hieroglyphs. Captain Fuji - Matsumoto and Captain Asahi - Nomoto could use perfect different hieroglyphs to convey the name of the battleship Suvorov, but this does not mean that they shot at different ships. You will re-read, pay attention to the distance carefully indicated by the commanders. For example, before the "Oslyabi", Matsumoto is suddenly closer than Nomoto to Suvorov, although Asahi was the fourth and not Fuji.

        In general, this strange glitch with names came from the British, it is impossible to take it seriously, such a shooting, in principle, does not fit into the well-known picture of the battle and simply into the Japanese charters of that time.
        1. rytik32
          28 May 2020 00: 55 New
          0
          Quote: Saxahorse
          You will re-read, pay attention to the distance carefully indicated by the commanders. For example, before the "Oslyabi", Matsumoto is suddenly closer than Nomoto to Suvorov, although Asahi was the fourth and not Fuji.

          The distance was determined by the rangefinders, and then their accuracy was not very high. In addition, there may be errors when recording or reprinting data.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 28 May 2020 22: 47 New
            +1
            Quote: rytik32
            The distance was determined by rangefinders, and then their accuracy was not very high

            Even on Russian ships there were two rangefinders :) In addition, the number is checked by sighting. Well, to make a mistake when translating a hieroglyph is an order of magnitude easier than retyping Arabic numbers.

            I have given you an excerpt from the official report of the Naval General Staff of Japan, in addition verified by the Russian Naval Headquarters. There is simply nowhere to go officially :)

            The Japanese could not notice on which board Oslyabya rolled over; it turned 180 degrees. But here is the key point of the battle, the opening of fire, they certainly checked and asked if something was unclear. Pay attention to how carefully they indicated the time and distance for each ship at this moment.

            But the Campbell version literally popped out of nowhere, there is no evidence of such a fire pattern. And I repeat, in addition to distance errors, this version roughly contradicts the entire maneuvering scheme. In addition, the firing of each unit is strictly regulated and is carried out according to the flagship signals. I do not remember the case that the Japanese just as defiantly neglected the instructions of their commander as in the Campbell version.

            In general, this is a dummy. The British simply did not care about the details of this battle, the British simply did not understand or properly argue their articles.
            1. rytik32
              29 May 2020 22: 35 New
              0
              Quote: Saxahorse
              I don’t remember the case that the Japanese just as defiantly neglected the instructions of their commander as in the Campbell version

              But in Tsushima, was Togo's order to “hit on the head”?
            2. rytik32
              29 May 2020 22: 56 New
              0
              Quote: Saxahorse
              Even on Russian ships there were two rangefinders

              “Our rangefinders Barra and Stroda deteriorated very quickly,” wrote the artilleryman of the battleship “Emperor Nicholas I”, midshipman G. Ungern-Sternberg.
              Quote: Saxahorse
              In addition, the number is checked by sighting

              Now tell us how to calculate the range from the sighting data?
              Quote: Saxahorse
              There’s simply nowhere to go official

              If you knew how many lies in official history!
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 30 May 2020 22: 40 New
                0
                Quote: rytik32
                If you knew how many lies in official history!

                Here I completely agree with you! Politics covers historical facts like a bull to a sheep! On the other hand .. Over the years, and even more so decades, and even more so to the 115th anniversary, even politics has withered out many times and is more like a poorly fed goat, instead of a fierce bull :))

                "Our rangefinders Barra and Stroda went bad very quickly,"
                This is not surprising .. Rozhdestvensky did not lift a finger for a real check of the equipment settings. Even the results of Nebogatov’s firing during the campaign didn’t at least move their armadillos to check the tinctures of the range finders. Well, if stupid then this is not treated by anything ..: (((

                In general, the only one who attended to long-range shooting exercises is, oddly enough, Nebogatov. He is the only one who shot on exercises at a distance of 30 or more cable during his campaign. And he was the first to discover big problems with the settings of rangefinders. And even managed to eliminate them! Already in the third firing he managed to achieve, if not hits, then at least cover training goals. It is not surprising that old people such as BBO and Nikolay 1 unexpectedly flashed real hits at distances of 40-50 kbl. in the Tsushima battle.

                "But in Tsushima, was Togo's order to" hit on the head "?"
                Yes!!!! It was of course! The order to shoot at the flagships was given even before the battle, and already in the battle was specified by flag signals of the commanders of the first and second detachment. Moreover, more than specifically, indicating the distance and rear sight to the enemy ..
                1. rytik32
                  30 May 2020 23: 04 New
                  0
                  In general, I share your opinion as of Rozhdestvensky, as the main reason for the defeat in Tsushima. The list of mistakes made by him is simply huge. And it seems to me that even if Nebogatov was at the head of the squadron, such a rout would not have happened. I consider his actions during the battle quite literate.
                  1. Saxahorse
                    Saxahorse 31 May 2020 22: 19 New
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    And it seems to me that even if Nebogatov was at the head of the squadron, such a rout would not have happened.

                    Here I agree with you. Any of the younger flagships would have worked better. Apparently because it’s worse than the commander of the ZPR even deliberately did not come up with :(

                    However, Nebogatov also has serious questions. He completely failed the ending of the battle at Tsushima. Already having an order to transfer command, Nebogatov was unable to organize a reception by the squadron control. It was this that led to the instant collapse of the squadron immediately after the end of the battle and the appearance of Japanese destroyers, and an unorganized flight of ships in different directions.
  • Victor Leningradets
    Victor Leningradets 27 May 2020 14: 11 New
    +1
    Somehow, the neglect of the 6 "and 8" community of high-explosive shells of the Japanese is not clear. Well, yes, they could have disabled 12 "towers of Russian battleships, but most of the holes in the unarmored side and superstructures, as well as the main loss in personnel and medium / small caliber guns, were given by them. By the way, the glorious" Imp. Alexander III, and the “Eagle” inherited mainly from them. Fully received from the detachment of Kamimura and Oslyabya. And the hole "into which the carriage could pass" simply put a premature point in the fate of the ship.
  • Trapperxnumx
    Trapperxnumx 27 May 2020 18: 24 New
    +1
    Quote: Comrade
    they were all fired from the battleship Fuji,

    Some kind of evil genius and heavenly punishment for our fleet, not an armadillo ...
  • rytik32
    15 June 2020 15: 14 New
    0
    Quote: Comrade
    It was there that in the mine hold there were barrage mines and unloaded shells of barrage mines, which, according to eyewitnesses, fell out through this hole.

    Testimony of Mine Officer Michman G. Lohman:
    While the patch was being turned on and the steering wheel was being transferred, the destroyer brought Oslyabya to the place of death. They began to rescue the team sailing near the destroyer.
    They pulled 8 people out of the water.
    The flag (K) was raised on the destroyer, but no one approached us, and only managed to turn the steering wheel, when the Japanese cruisers opened fire on us with small artillery. The commander immediately took full swing and, leaving me at the helm, he himself went to watch the ball mines floating near the destroyer, when they decided that they had surfaced from Oslyabya; then I accidentally managed to find out that the mines were thrown from the Korea transport without caps so as not to endanger themselves from their explosion in the transport.